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Narrative in African Philosophy

Richard H. Bell

Philosophy / Volume 64 / Issue 249 / July 1989, pp 363 - 379DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100044715, Published online: 30 January 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819100044715

How to cite this article:

Richard H. Bell (1989). Narrative in African Philosophy. Philosophy, 64, pp363-379 doi:10.1017/S0031819100044715

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Narrative in frican Philosophy

RICHARD H. BELL

African culture will take concrete shape around the struggle of its

people, not around songs, poems, or folklore (Franze Fanon)

Philosophy . . . cannot develop fully unless it 'writes its memoirs' or

'keeps a diary' (Paulin Hountondji)

Introduction

P. O. Bodunrin, in his 1981 essay, asks: 'Is there an African Philos-

ophy, and if there is, what is it?'

1

This question has occupied centre

stage am ong younger African intellectuals for abou t a decade now . T h e

most articulate among these intellectuals, who are themselves philoso-

phers, are Bodunrin (Nigeria), Kwasi Wiredu (Ghana), H. Odera

Oruka (Kenya), Marcien Towa and Eboussi Boulaga (Cameroon), and

Paulin Hountondji (Benin). These philosophers among others are in

dialogue with one another and currently are seen to be the principal

architects of a new orientation in African thought.

2

In a wo rd, they answer tha t African philosophy should be 'critical,

scientific philosophy'. Now this would be singularly wnremarkable if

we did not explore tw o po in ts: (1) the African contex t in wh ich th is

notion arises, and (2) what specifically is meant by 'critical' and 'scien-

tific' by these thinkers. I will look at these two points in very brief

outline, the n I will tu rn to a way of think ing ab out A frican philoso phy

which is not taken up in the current debate (or, at best, only on the

periphery of the debate) and which, when combined with the 'critical'

aspect, would , I believe, constitu te a philosoph ical outlook which could

be said to be identifiably African. T h is latter point I will call philos-

ophy'snarrative aspect.

1

P. O. Bodunrin, 'The Question of African Philosophy', Philosophy 56

(1981), 161.

2

An earlier and briefer version of this essay was presented to 'The Philos-

ophyClub' at the University of DaresSalaam, Tanzania, in March1985.1am

grateful to Professor Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba of the history faculty in Dar

es Salaam for providing the occasion for these remarks and for the useful

discussion which followed them. He also read and criticized a draft of this

paper. The notion of the African Palaver as a piece of narrative philosophy is

an idea he first suggested to m e.

Phibsophy,

64 1989 363


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Richard H. Bell

As a critical en terp rise , philosophy is an active process of q uestioning

and self-criticism. It engages in this activity to identify the biases of

one's tho ug ht and to transc end or logically alter those thoug hts for ones

which more accurately reflect our natural and human world. This

process never ends because it is continually faced with new realities

embedded in our world. Each new reality we encounter calls for new

criticism. Included in the critical aspect of philosophy is conceptual

clarification, whereby the meaning and the use of concepts in our

language are the focus of critical investigation.

As a narrative ente rprise, philosophy takes account of the contexts in

which human dialogue and human life take place. It is this aspect of

philosophy which is expressive of varied ways in which human life is

articulatedthe values, ideologies and truths of individuals and com-

m un ities. It is the narra tive aspect of philosophy wh ich ties it to a

cu lture and gives it its existential text ur e. It is also the n arrative aspect

of philosophy which preserves it from abstraction.

Although the critical aspect of philosophical reflection is being

addressed by contemporary African philosophers, very little has been

said by African ph ilosophers abo ut the narra tive aspect of philosophy

as

I have characterized it. The debate on the critical aspects is a highly

self-conscious one among 'professional' philosophers in Africa. It has

been pursued in part in order to shed the unwanted burdens produced

by a generation of so-called ethno-philosophical reflection. Let me

outline the context for 'critical, scientific philosophy' and its recent

reform ulation in African tho ug ht before looking at wh at I believe to be

its narrative complement.

The Context for Critical, Scientific Ph ilosophy in Africa

1. Ethno-philosophy

This concept refers to the 'apologetic' attempts among Europeans in

Africa in the first half of this cen tury to articulate w hat they understood

to be an identifiable outlook among Africans that was in some sense

philosophical. It was an extension of the nineteenth-century Hegelian

philosoph ical no tion th at th ere was a 'un ity of be ing ' tha t gave orde r and

coherence to the natural and human order that could be expressed in

some universal way in a single underlyin g princip le. T h e famous book

of the Belgian priest Placide Tempels,

Bantu Philosophy

(1945) is one

model for what is called 'ethno-philosophy'. Tempels posited the

notion of a 'vital force' as foundational to the world view of all Bantu-

speaking peoples of eastern and central Africa. What has come to be

called the 'animistic' world view is traceable, in part, to Tempels and

this ethno-philosophical view.

3

3

A

book of importance

is Alexis

Kagame,La

Philosophie bantou rwandaise

364


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A second strain of ethno -ph iloso phy ispluralistic , rather than uni-

versalistic.

Th e p luralistic analysis has as one aim to show that cu ltures

differ and each has its own coherence and distinctive truth-functional

way in which it conceives of and expresses its world. Thus the Dogon

and Yoruba, the S am buru and D inka, the Ku ria and Bambara have

differing cosmological, ethical, and social systems that are to be equally

valued with the world views of non-African societies.

4

Both the pluralistic and universalistic ethno-philosophy have been at

the heart of Fre nc h and British anthropologica l litera ture for the past

fifty years, and have generated a host of philosophical problems

centring around the concept of relativism: moral, cultural and cogni-

tive relativism. Both forms of ethno-philosophy are aimed at a non-

African audience and largely use African societies as a laboratory for

cross-cultural studies. One critic of such ethno-philosophies has said

that they have dealt with African societies 'as a voiceless face under

private observation, an object to be defined and not the subject of a

possible discourse', i.e. not the subject of a two-way conversation.

3

In neither form of ethno-philosophy was there a large amount of

actual African philosop hical literatu re ge nera ted, tho ugh a great deal of

interest about African culture was generated. It has, however,

positively identified and, to a significant extent, transcribed into a

written literature the rich oral folk traditions of stories, songs and

mythologies of African peo ple. It has gone a long way toward convert-

ing an African self-understan ding from an oral to a w ritten m od e. T h e

importance of this latter point will be discussed later.

2.

Negritude

The theory of negritude, most fully formulated and espoused by

Leopold Senghor, underlines the uniqueness of racial and cultural

4

Two paradigmatic ethnographic studies which underlay the pluralistic

view are E. E. Evans-Pritchard's work among the Azande and the Nuer, and

Marcel Griaule's F rench team working on the Dogon of Mali and Upper Volta

nowBurkina Faso).Aseminal article that has led to much discussion on these

issues is Peter Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive Society', collected in

Rationality,Brian Wilson (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970). See also M.

Hollis and S. Lukes (eds),

Rationality and

Relativism (Oxford: Basil Black-

well, 1982).

5

Houndontji, op. cit., note 3, 34.

de

I etre (Brussels, 1956). For an interesting discussion of the role that this

book along with Tempels' book played in the development of African philos-

ophy see

Paulin Hountondji,

AfricanPhilosophy:

Myth and

Reality

(London:

Hutcheson University Library for Africa, 1983), 3444. Alsoseethe introduc-

tion to Hountondji's book by Irele, 15-20.

365


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Richard H. Bell

consciousness of the African and thus contributes to the idea of a

singular cultural identity.

6

Senghor's version, however, complicates

the matter by arguing for a collective African consciousness, thus

neutralizing the significance of the plurality of African cultures. It

contrasts collective racial and cultural traits of Africans with specific

traits of other collective cultu res, e.g. Eu rope ans or Ch inese. In aword,

Senghor identified the collective trait of Africans as: 'Emotive sen-

sitivity'. 'Em otio n', he said, 'is comp letely N egro as reason is Gree k . . .

Yes, in one way, the Negro is richer in gifts than in works.'

7

Although negritude became a significant force for African indepen-

dence mov em en ts and w as lifted up as a virtue pow erfully expressed in

nationalistic poets like Aime Cesaire, it was also a most unhappy

platform upo n w hich to stand once indep end ence was achieved. It had

a most unfortunate by-product, argues Wole Soyinka, leading to 'an

abysmal angst of low achievement'. 'Negritude', Soyinka said, 'revealed

to the m [Africans] the very seductive no tion that they had to search for

their Africanness. Until then, they were never even aware that it was

missing.' Most devastating about the theory, said Soyinka, is that

Negritude trapped itself in what was primarily a defensive role,

even though its accents were strident, its syntax hyperbolic and its

strategy aggressive. It accepted one of the most commonplace

blasphemies of racism, that the black man has nothing between

his ears, . . .

8

3.African Humanism and Socialism

Owing, in part, to the background of the theory of negritude, African

humanism is identified with movements of national independence and

with the development of a collective African identity. Its broader base,

however, includes the ideological works of Franz Fanon, a particular

style of socialism or communalism, and the inspiration of such found-

ing national leaders as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, Kuanda, and

Kenyatta. The social and political writings of Nkrumah and Nyerere

are of partic ula r im po rtan ce in formula ting the basis for African social-

6

Senghor's works on negritude includeLiberteI .Negritudee thumanisme

(Paris: Sueil, 1964). AccordingtoPaulin Hountondji, op . cit., 215, as earlyas

1939, Aime Cesaire, in

his

poemCahierd n retouraupays natal,had used

the

term 'negritude' with similar value implications.

7

Senghor, as translated by Wole Soyinka and found in Soyinka,

Myth,

Literature andthe AfricanWorld (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 129.

8

Soyinka, ibid. Soyinka's entire critique of 'negritude' is brilliantly analyt-

ical. See his pp. 125-136.

366


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ism.

9

Both African hum anism and socialism have underscore d the value

of

a

common African heritage and the inhe ren t struggle left to a peop le

who were exploited by colonial powers and continue to be exploited by

the conflicting ideologies of Western capitalism and revolutionary

Marxism. African political philosophy reflects the tension between the

Western and M arxist intellectua l train ing of its national leade rs and the

dependence of their nation-states on external economic forces. In this

tension loyalties are divided between independent self-development

and external political and economic pressures. It has become

increasingly apparent, Irele believes, that the political and economic

realities at pre sen t exert 'a far grea ter press ure u po n African m ind s th an

the question of identity . . .'.

10

Because of this latter point many argue

that the only relevant philosophy for Africa today is a politicized

'liberation' philosophyone of resolute revolutionary self-assertion

and self-reliance.

11

Although the literature of African humanism and socialismideo-

logical essays, political party credos, major addresses aimed at the

international communityprovides a rich source for philosophical

reflection and criticism, not all Africans see its effect upon an African

philosophy as wholly positive. Hountondji and Towa, for example, see

this literature as an ally of ethno-philosophy and neo-colonialism

(Hountondji, op . cit., p . 171). As literature , however, it does provide

an opp ortun ity for philosop hers to critique it and to transcen d its

limitations in an ongoing search for truth, but as part of African

philosophical literature it is only an occasion for dialogue and should

not be taken as a truth in its own right, they would argue. African

humanism and socialism has, nevertheless, produced a rich and inter-

9

Especially Nkrumah, Consciencism (London: Heinemann, 1964), and

Nyerere, Ujaama, Essays in Socialism (Oxford University Press, 1968).

Among important philosophical and social concepts are 'consciencism', 'nega-

tive and positive action' (Nkrumah) and 'villagization', 'familyhood', and

'education for self-reliance' (Nyerere).

10

Irele in Hountondji, op . cit.,23.Julius Nyerere expressed this tension in

his recent address to the Royal Commonwealth Society, 20 March 1985, in

London. Text found in Daily News, Tanzania, 23 March 1985.

11

This was clearly apparent to me during a recent visit to Tanzania (March

1985).

Both university students and educated young people working

in areas of

economic and social development echoed this theme that their reality was one

of

'struggle' from both external economic and political pressures and with their

own will to prevail against great odds. T heir philosophy was, simply, that of

'liberation'. This was not, however, the considered view of many of the

'professional' academicsphilosophers and social scientists I met in Dar es

Salaam and earlier in Nairobi (at the Institute of African Studies, winter

1980).

367


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Richard H. Bell

esting body of lite ratu re tha t has its philosophical as well as social and

political value.

Critical Philosophy

There are two currents in 'critical' philosophy in the African context,

the universalistic and the dialectical. The universalistic current is most

strongly advocated by Bodunrin, Wiredu, and Odera Oruka,

12

while

the dialectical current is favoured by Hountondji, Eboussi Boulaga and

the more ideological Marxists like Towa and Amilcar Cabral.

13

The starting point for the more universalistic approach is the rejec-

tion of ethno -ph ilosophy and a stand taken with philosophy as practised

by the main lines of the Western philosophical tradition inherited from

the ancient Greek philosophical context. Philosophy for Bodunrin is

'criticism'. As with the Greek context where Socrates and Plato were

opposed to popular beliefs and opinions, so too must African philos-

ophy be opposed to traditional cultural beliefs and the popular folk

behaviour. 'Criticism', says Bodunrin, is 'rational, impartial, and

articulate appraisal whether positive or negative.'

14

For these thinkers,

the point is to lift the philosophical enterprise by self-criticism to the

universal level of discussion, then to turn to the specific existential

conditions and priorities of the African social and political context.

15

This universal view does not go nearly far enough according to

Pau lin H ou nto nd ji, and at the same tim e it goes too far. It goes too far

in

risking African philosophical identity to the Western bias, and it does

12

Cf. Bodunrin, op. cit., Kwasi Wiredu,Philosophy

and

an African Culture

(Cambridge University Press, 1980), and Odera Oruka, 'Mythologies in

African Philosophy',East

African

Journal IX, No. 10 (October 1972), and

'Four Trends in African Philosophy' inPhilosophy

in

the Present Situation of

Africa, (Diemer Alwin ed.) (Weisbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner Erlagh

Gm BH, 1981). Many of the essays in Richard A. Wright's collection,African

Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd edn (Lanham, MD: University Press of

America, 1984), reflect this universalistic outlook.

13

Cf. Hountondji, op. cit., Eboussi Boulaga,

La

Crise

du Muntu

(Paris:

Presence Africaine, 1977), Marcien Towa,Essai

sur

la Problematique

Philos-

ophique

dans

VAfrique

Actuelle.

Point de Vue no. 8, 2nd edn (Yaounde:

Editions Cle, 1979); and the excellent critique of the dialectical outlook found

E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, 'Philosophy in Africa: Challenges of the African

Philosopher', Mawazo 5, No. 2 (December 1983), originally in French, 'La

philosophie en Afrique ou les defis de l'africaine philosophic', published in

Canad ian Journal of African Studies 13, N os. 1-2 (1979).

14

Bodunrin, op. cit. , 173.

15

This view is developed most effectively by Wiredu, op. cit.

368


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not go far enough in limiting the discussion to the specifics of the

African context

itself.

Like the others, Hountondji wants a fresh

starta break from ethno-philosophy and other ' intellectual impedi-

ments and prejudices'. But he also wants to carve out a more specific

channel for African philosophy. So although both of these currents

share some com m on goals, the dialectical cur ren t of critical ph ilosophy

is more closely bou nd to the political struggles and intellectual history

of contem porary A frica. H oun tond ji establishes what could be identi-

fied as four criteria for philosophy in the African context. A review of

Hountondji's thesis will serve to critique the critical-dialectical view

and will carry us to the next move in our argument. His four criteria

are:

1.

That Philosophy be Written

Philosophy, he says, is 'critical reflection par excellence and cannot

develop fully unless it '"writes its memoirs" or "keeps a diary'".

16

Philosophy is a 'set of texts written by Africans and described as

philosophical by their authors themselves'.

17

Th is rules out what Odera

Oruka has called 'philosophic sagacity' or the oral reflections of Afric-

ans reputed for their wisdom and insight. Such sagacity, Ho unton dji

says,

is mythological discourse rather than philosophic discourse.

18

This is a much disputed point in the discussion among African

thinkers and H ou nto nd ji's view leaves only a slight crack in the door for

oral tradition when he says that moral tales, legends, proverbs, etc.,

16

Hountondji, op . cit., 105.

"Ibid., 33.

18

Ibid.,

81.

Hountondji's argument here is very interesting and I will quote

a lengthy passage. The pros and cons of this point, I believe, could be the

subject of

a

separate essay. He

writes:

'Oral tradition favours the consolidation

of knowledge into dogmatic, intangible systems, whereas archival transmis-

sion promotes better the possibility of a critique of knowledge between indi-

viduals and from one generation to another. Oral tradition is dominated by the

fear of forgetting,

of

lapses of memory,

since mem ory is here left to its own

resources, bereft of external or material support. This forces people to hoard

their memories jealously, to recall them constantly, to repeat them continu-

ally, accumulating and heaping them up in a global wisdom, simultaneously

present, always ready to be applied, perpetually available. In these conditions

the mind is too preoccupied with

preserving

knowledge to find freedom to

criticizeit. W ritten tra dition , on the contrary, provid ing a material s upp ort,

liberates the m em ory , an d pe rm its it to forget its acqu isitions, provisionally to

reject or question th em , be cause it knows that it can at any mo me nt recap ture

them if need be. By guaranteeing a permanent record, archives make actual

memory superfluous and give full rein to the boldness of the mind' (Houn-

tondji, 1983, 103f.).

369


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Richard H. Bell

may prove philosophical only wh en they are transc ribed . O nly then , as

texts, a re they sub jects for critical reflection.

19

T h is does allow some of

the transcriptio ns provided by ethn ogra phe rs and literary scholars of

African culture to become the subject matter of philosophical reflec-

tion, but the oral tradition as such cannot qualify as philosophy.

2.

That the Literature or Discourse be Scientific

Related to the first criterion, Hountondji makes a distinction between

what he calls 'artistic literature' and 'scientific literature'.

20

Philosophy

belongs to the latter. The 'sagacity' of an expressed mythology, or

poetry, or the visual arts (the iconic traditions of a culture) as 'artistic

literature' is contrasted with a way of thinking more akin to more

natural or theoretical sciences, i.e. 'mathematics, physics, chemistry,

biology, linguistics'.

21

Furthermore, scientific discourse is historical,

says Hountondji; it has an 'intrinsic historicity of a pluralistic dis-

course', while 'the discourse of a man like Ogotemmeli . . . opts out of

history in general and, more particularly, from that groping endless

history, that unquiet, forever incomplete quest we call philosophy'.

22

For there to be an African philosophy, Hountondji believes there

must first be an African science. 'It is not philosophy but science that

Africa needs first.' This, says Hountondji, will get us away from

'metaphysical p rob lem s', ' the mean ing of life', and pro blem s of 'human

destiny' and 'the existence of God'.

2 3

Only when we rid ourselves of

such problems could a scientific philosophy be developed.

3. That the Discourse be Exclusively of African Geographical and

Ethnic Origin

Not only does Hountondji rule out all oral discourse and 'artistic

litera ture ', but m ost of the ethno -philoso phica l literature can only be an

occasion for African philosophy since the vast majority of it is written

by Eu rope ans and N or th A m erican s. African philosophy is restricted to

'scientific' texts by Africanstexts 'signed by Camerounians Eboussi-

Boulaga, Towa and N'johMouelle, by the Ghanaian Wiredu, by the

19

Ib id., 105f.

20

Ib id ., 82f.

21

Ibid. , 83.

22

Ibid., 83f. Hountondji's distinction between 'artistic' and 'scientific' liter-

ature is highly problematic as a way of dividing philosophy from other

literary/cultural forms of expression, as we shall see shortly.

23

Ibid. ,

98ff.,

also see p. 168. If such problems cannot be included as

philosophy, then we have made a radical shift in the meaning of the term

'philosophy' altogether.

37


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Kenyan Odera . . . 'Along with Hountondji himself, these thinkers, he

says,'announ ce and delineate a new theoretical stru cture in the history

of our philosophy'.

24

He does acknowledge that some past literature

could qualify as philosophical discourse, e.g. some works of the eigh-

teenth century G hanaian Anton-W ilhelm Amo and W . E. Abraha ms as

well as such political leaders as Nkrumah.

25

4.

That the Internal Texture of Philosophy be Purely Dialectical

This is the m ost far reaching an d the most pro mising of his criteria, and

the one from which I will develop a further thesis.

All learning, Hountondji says, appears as 'an event in language, or

more precisely, as the product of discussion'.

26

African philosophy

must develop in the context of a 'constant free discussion about all

problems concern ing its discipline'.

27

Paradoxically by such an 'internal

discussion' among Africans, Hountondji believes that African philos-

ophy will develop beyond narrow ethnic bou nda ries and become

universal.

Philosophy as this dialectical event in language must secure for itself

'freedom of expression as a necessary condition for all science, for all

theoretical development and, in the last resort, for all real political and

economic progress . . A

28

After securing liberty for criticism, philos-

ophy may then begin its more concrete task of developing its own

theoretical cou rse ; it may take on its own h istory in the African contex t.

In the course of developing his dialectical view of philosophy, Houn-

tondji makes this Socratic po in t: th a t '. . . tru th is the very act of looking

for truth, of enunciating propositions and trying to justify and found

them'.

29

Socrates, Hountondji concludes,

was able to enter the theoretical history of Greece because his

disciple or fellow citizens took the time and tro ub le to write dow n h is

thou ghts, to discuss, som etimes to criticize and often to distort the m .

Similarly, we Africans can probably today recover philosophical

fragments from our oral literature, but we must bear in mind that so

far as authentic philosophy goes, everything begins at the precise

mo ment of transcrip tion, w hen th e mem ory can rid itself of cum ber-

some knowledge now entrusted to papyrus and so free itself for the

24

Ibid., 105.

25

See Hountondji's selected bibliography of the kinds of literature by

Africans that qualify as 'philosophy', ibid., 185-186.

26

Ibid., 67.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid., 69.

29

Ibid., 73 .

371


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Richard H. Bell

critical activity which is the beginning of philosophy, in the only

acceptable sense of the word.

30

At this point I will tu rn to the development of the narrative aspect of

African philoso phy . T he re are seeds in Ho unton dji which point in this

direction, b ut also formidable con straints which, in the end, w ould lead

Hounton dji to reject th e idea of a narra tive side to philosophy as it will

be developed here.

Narrat ive Phi losophy

1.

The Oral Philosophical Tradition

W hen H ounto nd ji said tha t 'tru th is the very act of looking for tru th , of

enunciating propositions and trying to justify and found them,' he

concisely stated a Socratic vision of philosophy. What he failed to

accept, however, and what his first criterion disallows, is that Socrates

himself

is

a philosoph er an oral and sagacious philoso pher Th oug h

we certainly m ust accept the no tion that, witho ut P lato, Socrates would

be at best a faint m em ory , we can also constru ct from the early Platonic

dialogues a picture of Soc rates' philosophy which has some autonomy

from Plato's philosophy. Even though we are indebted to Plato's tran-

scriptions, the Socratic philosophy is philosophy inanoral mode and is

not strictly de pe nd en t up on Plato's criticisms. Initially, Plato sought to

render Socrates' thought in its oral mode by reconstructing it in

dialogue forma distinctive tribute to Socrates' particular form of oral

reflection. In the Socratic dialogues, Socrates' philosophy has its own

internal narrative life. Socrates,

as oral philosopher,

makes his way into

subsequent philosophical history independent of Plato as his critic and

he gives shape to a distinctive philosoph ical sty le. Socrates was not only

engaged in do ing philoso phy with his fellow citizens in the streets of

Athens, but the very form of

elenchus

caught in his dialogues and the

literary form of dialogue itself shaped the thought of scores of philoso-

phers wh o followed him in a distinctly Socratic m od e. Even tho ugh we

have a written litera ture from these followers, they were engaged in the

active search for truth and trying to justify and ground the concepts of

justice, virtue, piety, beauty, knowledge, and truth, in a manner remi-

niscent of the

oracular

lifelong ques t of Socra tes in theagoraof Athens.

30

Ibid ., 106. I owe a debt to Ernest W amba-dia-Wamba who suggested to

me that Hountondji's position could embrace a more thoroughly Socratic

view. I would disagree that this is implicit in Hountondji's bookAfrican

Philosophy,but Wamba-dia-Wamba madeanumber of interesting suggestions

of his own as to how

we

might see the oral village tradition to be an example

of

Socratic philosophical reflection. This latter point will be developed in the

next section.

37


12/18


What is specifically philosophical in the situations that gave rise to

Socratic discourse? The situations that forced dialogue for Socrates

were what I would call narrative situations common to ordinary life.

Euthyphro sou ght to justify h is court action against his father's alleged

crime; Gorgias strained to provide some substantive foundation for his

rhetorical exercises; Protagoras and Callicles wrested power for them-

selves on the grounds that self-interest took precedence over concern

for one's society; Polus, when confronted with the prospects of suffer-

ing, would choose evil over good to prese rve his pleasu res. T he se views

and others were challenged by Socrate s. H e wan ted to get to the roo t of

why we might choose evil rather than good, or self-interest over the

interest of the whole of the community, and to see if justice is truly

served by such cho ices. T h e o rdinary struggles of hum an life are played

out in these narrative situations popu lar views are expressed, disputes

are put forward, and h um an c onc erns are voiced. A narrative situation,

if it is to be of some philosophical interest, will generate discussion

leading towards alternative views, resolutions to the disputes, or just

solutions to expressed human concerns. Each new situation which

forces dialogue in a critical fashion is the narra tive 'stu ff of ph ilosophy .

2.

The African Palaver

If

we

search for w hat kin ds of narra tive situations force critical dialogue

in the African con text w e need not look far. T h e very natu re of village

life yields many such critical dialogues. A property dispute is brought

before the elders and debatedwhy? So justice can be served. When

concern for illness or a community crisis arises, we might ask why a

diviner or healer is called or a council convened? To determine the

cause of the illness or the rea son for the crisisnot merely to commiser-

ate or 'spirit' them away. The village model in Africa is a model of free

discourse for the purpose of making good judgments and for doing

justice for individuals and the community. These narrative situations

force dialogue and give rise to human reflection, and they are far from

uncritical. Each dialogical situation has earmarks of the Socratic enter-

prise ;

each is formative of the values characteristic of that community;

each reflects the existential texture of human life; each dialectically

serves to move a community from injustice to justice, from wrong to

right, from broke nness to wholeness, from ignorance to tru th . As each

community devaluates' its life in terms of new external factors, it can

critically evolve its traditions to meet modernity.

It is no secret tha t any written form , including the w ritten dialogue,

fails to capture a spirited, critical discussion among human beings.

There is something linear about any written form that has difficulty

capturing the layered and nuanced features of speech. Here the model

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Richard H. Bell

of a community Palaver in many tradition al African villages is instruc-

tive. Erne st W am ba-dia-W am ba, has observed that ' the Palaver is an

appropriate community method and practice to resolve contradictions

among the people and to strengthen organic mutual links of solidarity

among all the m em bers of the com mu nity' .

31

T h e Palaver is a means of

'free'

or ' liberated' speaking by community members, but it is not

uncritical or unreflective . If, for example, the equ ilibrium of a com-

munity is threatened, its causes may be identified and dealt with by

calling a Palaver. This becomes a forum for self-questioning of and by

all the community members and it is rule governed 'in a manner

sanctioned by the ancestors'.

32

Furthermore, there are usually leaders,

the Nzonzi, wh o are known specialists or who emerge on the spot, as

'masters of the clarification of speech'. They function as competent

handlers of

dialectics; they are therefore dialecticians. . . . They are very able

detectors of the divisive 'bad word'and stimulators of the palaver;

they he lp assure that it does not deg enerate into violent antagonism.

They know how to make severe criticisms without offending or

silencing the one criticized. . . .

33

Wamba-dia-Wamba goes on to note that a good Nzonzi

must know how

to listen

attentively and tirelessly;

to pick up

the

essence of each word spoken; to observe every look, every gesture,

every silence ;

to grasp

the ir respective significance . . . and to elabor-

ate . . . arg um en ts to coun ter . . . unju st positions and/or to re-affirm

or reinforce correct positions.

34

In a word,

Nzonzi

are like Socratic m idwives, gu iding the palaver to

just and wise conclusions.

35

The palaver clearly reflects

a

philosophical

situation

it reflects a real critical effort on the par t of its participants to

resolve its common dilemmas.

36

In the palaver can be found a rich

source for philosophical reflection in the African context that Houn-

tondji both und erpla ys and at times scorns even thoug h he lays claim to

31

E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, 'Experience of Democracy in Africa: Reflections

on Practices of Communalist Palaver as a Social Method of Resolving Contra-

dictions among the People'.

A

paper discussed in

a

Seminar

in

the Department

of Theory and History of State Law, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es

Salaam, 17 May 1985, p . 5. Unpublished.

32

Ib id ., 24f.

33

Ibid., 30.

34

Ibid. , 31 , my em phasis.

35

Ib id ., 32f.

36

Wamba-dia-Wamba has some very telling comparisons between Socrates

and the palavering community in his concluding pages, ibid., 45-49.

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a form of philosophical reflection of a Socratic na tu re . Th ese are m ore

than just 'philosophica l fragmen ts from our oral tradit ion '. Th ey are the

self-expressed forms of life of Africans.

It is from such narrative situations in human life that the narrative

aspects of philosophy arise. If, as Hountondji says, philosophy 'writes

its mem oirs' and 'keeps a diary', then such a me mo ir or diary m ust

include the sharpest 'rum ina tion s' about hu m an life. A mem oir or diary

is a narrative, and a philosop hical m em oir or diary does not chan ge its

narrative character, rather, it reflectively streamlines the life story to a

more self-critical and prag m atic form . T her e are differences betw een

the narratives of a palavering community, the narratives of literature

(epic, fiction, drama) and what Hountondji calls 'critical' philosophy,

but their differences are not simp ly those b etween art andscience. T h e

multiple narrative aspects of philosophy often reflect the manner in

which both art and science are woven into the fabric of life. This is

clearly and dramatically illustrated through a wide range of ritual

actions in the African context. Although it is certainly true, as Fanon

said about twenty years ago, that 'African culture will take concrete

shape around the struggle of its people', that struggle is also expressed

by and lived thro ug h the 'son gs, po em s and folklore' of its peo ple.

These are part and parcel of the memoir that philosophy must write;

they are part of the conversation, both oral and written, that Africans

must keep going in a creative fashion.

3.

Art and Literature as Self-expression

When I speak of the narrative aspect of philosophy, I do not mean the

mere narration or telling of one's storythe story line or plotrather,

narrative here means those accounts that emerge from the experiences

in a culture that m ark im po rtant m om ents in the life of its people : the

experiences in human life that force dialogue, that force discussion and

reflection, that place human beings in a social matrix of struggle and

solidarity and thus position them to move forward with a clearer sense

of individual and co m m unity identity and responsibility.

Another form of philosophical narrative is embedded in African art.

The critical essays of Wole Soyinka deftly explore this form of narra-

tive.

37

Soyinka in his search for the true 'self-apprehension' of African

culture does not minimize its struggle for liberation nor shrink from

modernity, yet he stresses the narrative contexts found in contempor-

37

Soyinka's essays in

Myth, Literature and the African World

op. cit., are

philosophical in the best sense of being critical, but they also point beyond

criticism to wh at he calls 'quinte sse ntia l' to an African self-un derstandin g or an

authentic African self-ap preh ensio n.

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Richard H. Bell

ary African art (ritual drama, literature, poetry, music and sculpture).

He realizes that the modern human struggles which so deeply wound

and co nstrain th e cu rrent African reality can be dealt with only if there

is a creative m ean s for exp ressing the anger, the suffering and th e hope

that is the African experience. Both the liberation struggle and the

self-

expression of the deepest values of its people are found in what Soyinka

calls the culture's ' iconic tradition'.

An iconic tradition is more than a collection of artifacts, stories,

symbols and formalized ritual; it is a primary and reflective mode of

articulation of human life and, as such, can be philosophical in nature.

Contemporary African fiction, ritual drama, music, and visual arts are

not a spon taneou s eruptio n of raw em otion. T he y are highly structured

and reflective. They are, in Soyinka's words, 'material evidence of the

integration and cohesiveness of a culture

in situ ...

they are celebrative

instruments of an integrative world'.

38

Part of the narrative con-

sciousness of a culture is its aesthetic consciousness, and the aesthetic

consciousness of a culture is expressed through its iconic traditions.

An aesthetic consciousness is itself a reflective consciousnessone

step removed from the immediacy of sensible experience. An aesthetic

consciousness or de rs sensible expe rience in a fashion tha t is expressive

of human hope and wholeness. When for example, a work of art is

produced from the aesthetic consciousness and displays only the frac-

tured nature of human life, it is making a judgment on the culture

which is itself fractured, pointing to the incompleteness of human life.

Such an expression in a work of art presupposes a sense of what

wholeness is and of what the beautiful could be. Soyinka rem arked that

'the true icons of a people are themselves the repository of a worldly

wise human history.'

39

What is expressed in the art of a culture, in its

iconic tradition, is not accidental, nor is it simply the spontaneous

expression of em otion s and feelings; it is, rath er, the conscious creation

of considered and often wise reflections of a people on its age, and as

such deserves to be taken seriously as par t of the n arrative portra it of the

people's most important concern. This is as much the very stuff of

philosophy as are the so-called 'critical' reflections which are made

upon it.

Soyinka gives focus to another goal of an authentic African philos-

ophy. He says that an African philosophy, in its narrative aspect,

should 'trans late t he inh erent or stated viable values of a social situation

into a conte m porary or future outlook'.

40

The 'inherent or stated viable

38

T heideaof an'Iconic tradition' within African culture was developedby

Soyinkain alecture 'Icon sforSelf Retrieval:T heAfrican Experience', given

at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 14November1985.

39

Soyinka, Oberlin lecture,1985.

40

Soyinka, op. cit., 98.

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values' are those embedded in one's narrative situation, and the con-

tinuous translation of these values is, for Soyinka, a revolutionary

activity. T h is tran slation is what he calls the 'rev alua tion ' of tradition al

values.

Revaluation require s the lifting u p of the deepe r traditional values of

a

community and recasting the m to meet today's realities. He provides

us with this example from his readin g of an episode in C amara Laye's

novel, The Radiance of the King (1956). When Camara Laye revealed

to the white explorer, Clarence (the anti-hero of the novel) that 'dru m -

ming is a complex art . . . 'he was not simply turning the clock back to

some quaint traditional value for its own sake. Rather, he was, as

Soyinka says, 'eliciting' and 'initiating a process of revaluation which

was itself revo lutio nary in the anti-colon ial situatio n'.

41

There is no

reason why the same principle cannot be equally true in the 'post-

colonial situa tion '. Soy inka's concep t of revaluation of the

viable

values

of a traditional life is developed in a man ne r th at avoids the d ang ers of

nostalgia for the return to 'roots' and the various pitfalls of the theory of

negritude. Heeding Fanon's warning, it must be continuously asked:

How can one 'enter into the African system of values' without being

either too nostalgic or too a dulatory? Soyinka has clearly show n u s how

African fiction and ritual drama can provide a clear entry into deeper

values which enable us to see possibilities for the revaluation of values

in the contemporary contexts of our lives.

Another example from Soyinka comes from his analysis of Ousmane

Sembene's no vel,

God s Bits of Wood

(1970). Sembene moves beyond

mere story telling to record 'hu m an stren gth s and w eaknesses, heroism

and com munal solidarity . . , '.

42

H e forces up on his reade rs a vision of

'a new society in the process of coming to birth'.

4 3

He does this by

having Bakayako, a labour organizer on a colonial owned railway line,

help his people find themselves by becoming aware of 'the missing

practices of his people',

44

and restoring those practices which were

viable to the new situation.

In this revaluation, Bakayako represents an authentic African

self-

expression and has quite the reverse effect of the ethno-philosophical

descriptions of traditional values. Soyinka writes:

Bakayako is portrayed as understanding and controlling the future

(or at least the path towards it); he supersedes all existing moral

authority and forges, through his inflexible will, the unique com-

41

Ibid., 125f.

42

Ibid., 117.

43

Ibid., 118.

44

Ibid., 119, my emphasis.

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Richard H. Bell

m unity of the Railway L ine into a force tha t rob s the oth er de ity, the

Colonial Super-reality, of its power.

45

Ethno-philosophical descriptions of traditional value, if not thoroughly

revaluated in the hands of an African self-expression, can easily become

the hand-maid of 'the other deity'. In fiction and drama, as in the oral

narratives of traditional co m m un ities, can be found the 'm em oirs' and

'diaries' that Hountondji calls for as a prerequisite for philosophy.

Soyinka, like the o ther African w riters we have discussed sees the

necessity of liberating oneself from the values of othersnamely, 'the

destructive alien intrusion' of Euro-culture.

46

W hen this is done , how-

ever, som e new v alues must be ready to fill the v oid. It is here that the

'missing' practices of the people come into play and, when revalued,

constitute a new outlook 'whose reference points are taken from within

the culture itself .

47

This Soyinka calls a 'positive apprehension' of an

African cu ltu re and he tries to identify some of the values he sees as

viable for revaluation.

Concluding Remarks

Co ntrary to H oun tond ji 's view that philosophical texts m ust be the

w ritten critical reflections of th ink ers engaged in a certain kind of

historical struggle, w e must broa den the concept of a

text

to include the

kind of narrative situations we have been discussingsituations within

both the oral and iconic traditio ns. In doing this we lose nothing andwe

reclaim a nu m be r of crucial thin gs for African ph ilosop hy. W e reclaim

par t of the richness of an oral heritage th at con tinue s to play a role in the

historical struggle that is the post-Colonial experience in Africa; we i

reclaim the value of the substantial and important literary and artistic

co ntrib utio n tha t Africans are making to the ir own cultu re and which ;

has significantly shaped our Western understanding of the African

reality. Finally, with this more inclusive view, we reaffirm the con- ]

tinu ity betwee n the non-litera te and literate com munities which still :

co-exist in the African contextboth of which have a critical-reflective \

role in the self-expression of African p eo ple . T here is no 'great divide' j

between critical and literate contexts and narrative and non-literate I

contexts in African culture.

48

j

45

Ibid.,

117.

46

Ibid.,

105.

47

Ibid.,

viii.

48

Cf. Jack Goody, The

Domestication

of the

Savage Mind

(Cambridge

University

Press, 1977); see

especially chapters

two and three, and

Robin

Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', collectedin

378


18/18


There is also no 'great divide' between 'scientific' and 'artistic' as

Hountondji would have us believe when it comes to meaning in

philosophical reflection. Both are viable forms for critical self-expres-

sion, and both share in the sha ping of the African reality. Philoso phy 's

aim is to reflect and criticize the reality particular to human life and

thought, and such reflection and criticism would be empty if it did not

embrace the narrative aspects of human life and culture. A 'positive

apprehension' of African values must account for both critical and

narrative dimensions of African life. These are complementary and

crucial to philosophy in the African context. To ferret out such 'viable

values' and to discuss how each m igh t be 'reva lued ' is a task to be left to

the

'discourse' and th e lived strugg les am ong Africans and for Africans.

The College of Wooster

Wilson,Rationality,

op . cit. note 4. A m uch greater 'divide ' would be apparen t

in a culture where literacy was the norm and th en where seg men ts of th e

culture lose their literacy and thus lose the capacity to function freely within

the culture. In the latter case there is no oral-traditional background for a

person's self-expressionthere is only cultural disenfranchisement. This is a

growing phenomenon in the United States where increasing illiteracy is

contributing to a heightened class division.

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