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Thought and Utopia in the Writings of Adorno, Horkheimer, and BenjaminAuthor(s): ADRIANA S. BENZAQUÉNSource: Utopian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1998), pp. 149-161Published by: Penn State University Press

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Thought andUtopia in theWritingsofAdorno, Horkheimer, andBenjamin*

ADRIANA S. BENZAQUEN

"The philosophers have only interpreted theworld, in various ways; the

point, however, is to change it."Marx's succinct, elusive eleventh thesis on

Feuerbach has not ceased tohauntWestern culture ever since itspronouncement: the rejection of themere activity of interpretation, nd thepositing of

a new task, change, effected a crucial displacement in our understanding of

what itmeans to think, know, and act in theworld. What is this task of

changing theworld? The significance of this question is enormous. Marx's

thesis has been the focus of debates on the relation between theoryand practice. Marxists engaged in revolutionary activity often read it as an indict

ment of philosophy, understood as "thinkingwhich is isolated frompractice"

(Marx 144), with the consequence thatMarxist theory,granted a subordi

nate position in relation topractice, lacked independence and lost thecapac

ity for self-reflexivity.Yet what was the role of philosophy afterMarx's

thesis?Adorno refers to thisproblem in theopening ofNegative Dialectics:

"Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because themoment to

realize itwas missed. The summary judgment that ithad merely interpretedtheworld, that resignation in the face of reality had crippled it in itself,becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change theworld miscar

ried" (3). Adorno's words might be construed as a reversal ofMarx's thesis.

Do theycancel the task of changing theworld in favor of a restored philosophy ofmere interpretation?usan Buck-Morss claims that, lthough "Adorno

accepted aMarxist social analysis and used Marxist categories in criticizingthegeistige products of bourgeois society. .., thewhole of his theoretical

effortwas to continue to interprettheworld, whereas thepoint had been to

change it" (42). Was Adorno's theoretical effort then a regression to the

philosophical stance critiqued and rejected byMarx? In thispaper, I suggestthatAdorno's thoughtnever abandoned the space opened up byMarx's the

sis.Adorno's rejection of the subordination of thought topractice respondedto theneed to reconceptualize thought in lighto/both thenew taskproposed

byMarx and the historical failure of the one-sided

acceptance, by manyMarxist revolutionaries, of practice alone. In what follows, I reflect on the

relation between the Frankfurt School's insistence on critical thought and

Marx's injunction tochange theworld. The alternative to the simple opposition of thinking and practice (and concomitant rejection of thinking), yetalso to the conflation of the two (thinking as practice, or praxis), is to think







150 UTOPIAN STUDIES

thought as a practice: one among many, with specific characteristics and a

role toplay toward the task of changing theworld. But how can critical thoughtthink,and contribute to,change? How can thoughtenvision aworld beyondthe actual?the free society, thedifferentfuture,Utopia? And what are, fortheFrankfurtSchool, the limitations and the risks of Utopian thinking?

On UtopiaThe materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is only in the

absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Such absence con

curs with the theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into sec

ular form by not permitting Utopia tobe positively pictured; this is the substance

of itsnegativity. At itsmost materialistic, materialism comes to agree with the

ology. Adorno 07)

Horkheimer andAdorno's critical theoryof society is founded on thevisionof a betterworld, and, simultaneously, the refusal to describe this Utopianvision inpositive, substantive terms.Their refusal towrite Utopia has beenrelated to the Jewish ban on images.Martin Jay insists on "the subterraneaninfluence of a religious theme on thematerialism of the Frankfurt School"

(56) and Buck-Morss notes Horkheimer and Adorno's adherence to "the

JewishBilderverbot by refusing to delineate the nature of postrevolutionarysociety" (24). Jaywrites that, just as, for the Jews, "call[ing] God by his

rightname" would be premature since "themessianic age has not yet arrived,"theFrankfurt School's "unwillingness to outline a Utopian vision" issuesfrom the "conviction that true reconciliation could never be achieved byphilosophy alone" (262). The relation between Adorno and Horkheimer'ssilence and theJewish banmay have been, as Jay indicates, "actually causalormerely a post facto rationalization" (56); however, the establishment ofthis relation does not necessarily explain the refusal towrite Utopia,which,as Jay,Buck-Morss, and Seyla Benhabib point out, goes back toMarx him

self.1Whatare

the significance and implications of the ban on images andthe refusal to describe Utopia? Is it legitimate to say thatAdorno, Horkheimer andMarx adhered to a Jewishmystical prohibition (because of theirJewish origin? out of religious sympathies?), ormust we actually look for

something else thatwould explain theircommon "refusal to say"? In what

way does (Jewish) theology agree with historical materialism?"Reconciliation is thehighest notion of Judaism, and expectation is its

whole meaning," write Horkheimer and Adorno inDialectic ofEnlightenment (199). They also name theirown Utopian vision "reconciliation" (seeJay262). Adorno claims that there is something inherent in the idea of reconciliation thatprecludes its discursive formulation:

"Irreconcilably,the

idea of reconcilement bars its affirmation in a concept" (160). Likewise, afuturethat is expected tobe different(utopian, reconciled) cannot be describedwith categories taken from thepresent.No present categories would be ade

quate to describe the radically differentfuture, // t is tobe radically different.Horkheimer writes:







xhoughtandUtopia 151

Whoever cares for a human arrangement of theworld can look to no court of

appeal, to no existing or future power. The question of what "one" should do

with power once one has it, the same question which was so meaningful for the

bureaucrats of themass party, loses itsmeaning in a struggle against them. The

question presupposes the continued existence of thatwhich should disappear:the power to dispose of the labor of others. If society in the future really func

tions through a free agreement rather than through direct or indirect force, the

result of such an agreement cannot be theoretically anticipated. ("Authoritarian State" 113, my emphasis)

Like Judaism, critical theoryaims at reconciliation; unlike Judaism, it does

not believe that there are any guarantees thatUtopia will inexorably comeabout. Thus, expectation cannotmean the same thing forJews and for criti

cal philosophers (or historical materialists, or revolutionaries). Expectation,not as passive waiting but as theactive contribution of thought tochange, is

understood byAdorno and Horkheimer as negative thinking.Negative think

ing criticizes the existent as thatwhich can and should change, and in so

doing itmarks the space of an absence. That absence, however, is not tobe

filled with images or given a positive content; it is to remain as absence, as

possibility. Negative thinking stays on this side of the change it seeks. It

knows that it isnot yet the radically different,and will not deceive itselfnor

others inpretending that it is.Thus, Horkheimer states, "Marxist science constitutes thecritique of bourgeois economy and not theexpounding of a social

ist one" ("Authoritarian State" 108). Only by refusing towrite positivelymay thought guarantee, not truth itself, but thepossibility of truth: "The

metamorphoses of criticism into affirmation do not leave the theoretical

content untouched, for its truthevaporates" (Horkheimer andAdorno xii).Marx's thesis posits aworld thatcan be changed. The task of a thought

that follows this thesismust first of all be to identifyand resist the idea of

immutability hich saturatesdiscourses and practices of reproduction.Adorno

and Horkheimer reject the "static view of history" because it "precludes

hopeof a

progressive emancipationof the

subjectfrom eternal childhood in

both community and nature" (Horkheimer, Eclipse ofReason 133). InDia

lectic of Enlightenment, they examine how both enlightenment and mythfunction according to theprinciple of repetition. Repetition ensures that the

futurewill be just like thepresent?which is fundamentally just like thepast:

The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as repetition, that

theEnlightenmentpholds gainstmythical magination,s theprinciple f

myth itself. The arid wisdom that holds there is nothing new under the sun,

because all the pieces in themeaningless game have been played, and all the

great thoughts have already been thought, and because all possible discoveries

can be construed in advance and all men are decided on adaptation as the

means of self-preservation?that dry sagacity merely reproduces the fantasticwisdom that it supposedly rejects: the sanction of fate that in retribution relent

lessly remakes what has already been. (12)

The "untruth" of enlightenment consists in "the fact that for enlightenmenttheprocess is always decided from the start" (24). A philosophy thatunder







152 UTOPIAN TUDIES

takes to determine "the limits of possible experience" closes off the pos

sibility of the unprecedented. Enlightenment approaches theworld as "a

gigantic analytic judgment" (27)?an approach which does not really differ

frommyth's blind belief in fate?thus denying change, revolution or Utopia.The culture industryalso participates in the reproduction of things-as-theyare: it "confirm[s] the immutabilityof circumstances" by drawing "on the

life cycle, on thewell-founded amazement thatmothers, in spite of every

thing,still go on bearing children and that thewheels still do not grind to a

halt" (148-49). Reproduction and immutability, ideologically represented as

theway

of theworld,

do notsimply "happen," necessarily, inevitably,

but

are the result of ongoing human effort.What causes Adorno and Horkheim

er' s amazement is not that radical change is possible, but that it has not yet

happened. What requires explanation is the success, so far,of reproduction.In spite of thecomplicity of enlightenment andmyth in reproducing the

idea of immutability, the reality of suffering testifies to thepossibility and

necessity of change. Adorno claims inNegative Dialectics: "The physicalmoment tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that thingsshould be different" (203).2 The forms under which suffering occurs are

given different names: exploitation, unfreedom, domination, horror, irra

tionality, etc, In all its forms, it is an objective mark of that-which-should

not-be, a reminder that the task is, still, tochange theworld. The negation of

suffering is thematerialist Utopia: the vision of a "truly human," free, self

determining society in thisworld, which, as a recent event in thought,has

replaced religious notions of an afterlife, theKantian kingdom of ends and

theHegelian Absolute Knowledge (as idealist Utopias). Horkheimer and

Adorno firmlybelieve in thepossibility of amaterialist Utopia: "The present

potentialities of social achievement surpass theexpectations of all thephilos

ophers and statesmenwho have ever outlined inUtopian programs the idea

of a trulyhuman society" (Horkheimer,Eclipse ofReason v). The advent of

the trulyhuman societywould constitute an unprecedented event, a qualita

tive change forwhich there are no historical examples: "in regard to theessential kind of change atwhich the critical theory aims, there can be no

corresponding concrete perception of it until it actually comes about. If the

proof of thepudding is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future"

(Horkheimer, Critical Theory 220-21). The futureUtopian society, thecom

munity of free human beings, is possible (that is, thinkable), on the one

hand, because itsmaterial prerequisites already exist in the technologicalachievements of this society, and, on the other, because of the "secret Uto

pian dimension" contained in theenlightenment concept of reason.

Dialectic of Enlightenment reveals the entanglement of enlightenmentand

myth,of reason and domination. However, both

enlightenmentand rea

son are "discordant" (109): they"contain" (in both the senses of include and

prevent) thepossibility of Utopia or trueuniversality. Discussing Kant's phi

losophy,Horkheimer andAdorno assert that

Kant's concepts are ambiguous. As the transcendental, supra-individual self,

reason comprises the idea of a free, human social life in which men organize







Thought andUtopia 153

themselves as theuniversal subject and overcome the conflict between pure and

empirical reason in the conscious solidarity of thewhole. This represents the

idea of a true universality: Utopia. At the same time, however, reason consti

tutes the court of judgment of calculation, which adjusts theworld for the ends

of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than the preparation of

the object frommere sensory material inorder tomake it thematerial of subju

gation. (83-84)

The formation and expansion of capitalism repressed theUtopian possibilityin reason; it turned reason intounreason, survival into self-destruction, and

Utopia intomyth. Enlightenmentbecame

deception becauseit

betrayed itsown promise, the promise which nevertheless survives in the materialist

vision of the free, classless society. Paradoxically, the secret Utopian possi

bility is "liberated" only in the rare instances of a discourse thatmakes the

horror visible and allows for something else to be revealed. There are two

such moments inDialectic ofEnlightenment, one in each of the excursus.

The firstone refers to a brief scene inThe Odyssey:

The cold distancing of narration, which still represents horror as if itwere a

conversational topic, also allows the horror as such to appear for the first time

that in song is solemnly represented as fate. Reticence in narrative, however, is

the sudden break, the transformation of what is reported into something longpast, by means of which the semblance of freedom glimmers that since then

civilization has notwholly succeeded inputting out. (78-79)

The passage in The Odyssey (and Horkheimer and Adorno's reading of it)functions in twoways: firstly, it reveals the objective reality of horror and

sufferingas something that is not decreed by fate (thereforeunchangeable)but produced by human beings; secondly, by refusing to disguise horror as

(already existing) freedom, by presenting itnegatively and grasping itas it

is, it allows for real freedom (as thatwhich does not yet exist) to become

thinkable as an absence. The negative, ruthless denunciation of suffering

opens up the space for an end to suffering.The second moment refers toSade and Nietzsche, the advocates of a transvalued cruelty: "The fact that

Sade and Nietzsche insist on the ratio more decisively even than logical

positivism, implicitly liberates from itshiding-place theUtopia contained in

theKantian notion of reason as in every great philosophy: theUtopia of a

humanitywhich, itselfno longer distorted, has no furtherneed to distort"

(188-89). For Adorno and Horkheimer, Sade's and Nietzsche's representationof inhumanity,of the logic of domination inherent in theenlightenment

concept of reason, ismore "humane" and "compassionate" thanother, self

professed enlightenedworks which are complicitous with domination by not

givingita name and a face.

Makinghorror and

sufferingvisible is

perhapstheonly way of preventing resignation and resisting theiracceptance as the

normal state of things, the immutable order of theworld.

Horkheimer and Adorno argue that reason can only begin to repairitself and fulfill its Utopian promise in theworld if it undertakes its own

self-critique.The self-critiqueof reason demands theacknowledgment of its







154 UTOPIAN STUDIES

active, productive character, and the abandonment of notions of fate, immuta

bility and necessity used as alibis for the reproduction of suffering:

Reason can realize its reasonableness only through reflecting on the disease of

theworld as produced and reproduced byman; in such self-critique, reason will

at the same time remain faithful to itself, by preserving and applying for no

ulterior motive the principle of truth thatwe owe to reason alone.... The pos

sibility of a self-critique of reason presupposes, first, that the antagonism of

reason and nature is in an acute and catastrophic phase, and, second, that at this

stage of complete alienation the idea of truth is still accessible. (Horkheimer,

Eclipse ofReason

177).

Adorno andHorkheimer refuse topredictwhether the self-critique of reason

and the end of domination will orwill not happen in thenear future. In their

writings, the present is understood as containing simultaneously two

opposed tendencies, thepossibility both of an intensification of barbarism,and of the establishment of a trulyhuman society: "Misery as the antithesis

of power and powerlessness grows immeasurably, togetherwith the capac

ityto remove allmisery permanently" (Horkheimer andAdorno 38). Philos

ophy poses the question of "why mankind, instead of entering into a trulyhuman condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism" (xi). However,

the status of each possibility and the likelihood of itsbecoming actuality arenot commensurable. The tendency toward an increase in domination (the"advance toward an administered world" or "development toward total inte

gration" [x]) is actually thecontinuance of things-as-they-are.The problemfor thought is how to break the chain of repetition and reproduction. The

task of changing theworld?the realization of Utopia?necessitates the dis

entanglement fromnecessity (as thatwhich ties the future to thepresent), byway of thedisentanglement of two ideas contained in theconcept of neces

sity:material necessity (human beings' material needs in order to survive)and logical necessity (an inevitable course of development):

The difference between concept and reality?not the concept itself?is the

foundation for the possibility of revolutionary praxis. A necessary relationshipexists in class society between the changes in the mode of production and the

course of an ideology; this relationship can be deduced conceptually. But the

necessity ofpast events determines thewill toward freedom which ispresent in

class society as little as does the inevitability of future events. For every con

clusion stemming from the belief that history will follow a progressing line

(regardless of whether one considers this line to be straight, spiral, or zig-zag),there is a counter-argument which is no less valid. (Horkheimer, "Authoritarian

State" 109, my emphasis)

The state of barbarism is reproduced by means of the view that sees the"flight from necessity" (or historical progress) as a (necessary) "guaranteeof the freedom to come" (see Horkheimer and Adorno 39-41). A thoughtthat follows the imperative of changing theworld must dispel the confusionof material and logical necessity, and realize thatprogress is on the side of

reproduction, development on the side of immutability.The transformative








movement of this thought is to think (logical, developmental) necessity as

contingency, thusopening up spaces of possibility:

Philosophical theory cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing tendencyor the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future. However, by doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role

of absolutes?e.g. the idea of the individual as itdominated the bourgeois era

?and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy can func

tion as a corrective of history, so to speak. (Horkheimer, Eclipse ofReason 186)

On History and Revolution

Critical theory is the activity of theorizing in thepresent in order to allowfora better future. In so doing, itmust reflecton theproblem of temporality.If theUtopian future is tobe realized, thoughtmust confront thequestion of

history, as the relation between past, present and future,and as our relationtopast and future.What is it that ties thepresent to thepast, and the futureto thepresent? This question motivates Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the

Philosophy of History," written shortly before his death in 1940 and published posthumously. Throughout the "Theses," Benjamin contrasts two

views of history: historicism (which unites such apparently opposed factions

as Fascism, Social Democracy and vulgar Marxism) and historical materialism. Historicism ("our accustomed thinking"), forwhich history equalsprogress, participates in the reproduction of domination and in the rise of

Fascism. Historical materialism, on the other hand, is the attempt to arriveat "a conception of history thatavoids any complicity with the thinking to

which these politicians [who betrayed the cause against Fascism] continue

to adhere" (258). The task of the historical materialist is "to brush history

against thegrain" (257), to outline the right conception of history adequateto the task of changing theworld.

Like thenarrator inThe Odyssey, like Sade andNietzsche, Benjamin's

historical materialist makes the horrorvisible: "The tradition f theoppressedteaches us that the 'state of emergency' inwhich we live is not the exception but the rule.We must attain to a conception of history that is inkeeping

with this insight.Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bringabout a real stateof emergency" (257). In his allegory of the"Angelus Novus,"

Benjamin portrays history as "one single catastrophe which keeps piling

wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of [the angel of history's]feet,"while a storm ("progress") irresistibly propels it into the (unseen)future (257-58). The experience of sufferingmakes even cultural treasures

appear as "documents of barbarism" (256), inextricable from theoppressionthatwas

requiredin their

production. Benjaminrelates the two

conceptionsof history to two conceptions of time. The historicist notion of progress

depends on a perception of time as empty and homogeneous: "The conceptof the historical progress ofmankind cannot be sundered from the conceptof its progression through a homogeneous, empty time.A critique of the

concept of such a progression must be thebasis of any criticism of progress







156 UTOPIAN STUDIES

itself (261). Historical materialism rejects thehistoricist view of history as

"a chain of events," a sequence of causally connected moments. Progress as

"progression through homogeneous, empty time" is revealed as necessity:thatwhich cannot deviate from a pre-determined course. Belief inprogress,

Benjamin warns, obstructs the realization of a different temporality, andinhibits action and change: "Nothing has corrupted the German workingclass somuch as the notion that itwas moving with the current" (258). Thehistorical materialist pursues time as the opening to the "Messianic," as

"time filledwith thepresence of the now" (261). Here we see once again thelinkbetween historical materialism and Jewish

theology, allegorically depictedby Benjamin in his first thesis (253). Messianic time is any cessation or

interruptionof progressive history. Itsmodel is the present, which "com

prises the entire history ofmankind inan enormous abridgment" (263).The writing of history is forBenjamin an urgent task,performed "at a

moment of danger" (255). History-writing is the attempt topreserve thepastand the struggle for the redemptionof theoppressed past.Historicism and his

torical materialism differ in theway theyunderstand and relate to thepast.Historicism purports togive the"eternal" image of thepast; historicalmaterialism supplies "a unique experience with thepast" (262, my emphasis). The

method of historicism is additive, cumulative: "itmusters amass of data tofill

the homogeneous, empty time" (262). Historical materialism, on the other

hand, is "based on a constructive principle" (262). It does not objectivelyreporton or disclose a past thatwas always already there,but constitutes an

interventionaffectingour relation to thepast, and thusour understanding ofthepresent.Materialist historiography isnot interested infilling up the time ofthepast, each and every one of itsmoments; it scrutinizes thepast and stopsinwhat Benjamin calls a "monad": "a configuration pregnantwith tensions"

(262). In themonad, the historical materialist "recognizes the sign of aMessianic cessation of happening, or, put differently,a revolutionary chance inthefight for theoppressed past" (262). In this statement,Benjamin equates

the"Messianic cessation of happening" with revolution. Indeed, the rejectionof history as progress demands a transformation f the idea of revolution.

In "The Authoritarian State," Horkheimer follows Benjamin in rejecting theprogressive view of history:

just as thought by itself cannot project the future, neither can itdetermine the

point in time. According to Hegel, the stages of theWeltgeist follow one

another with logical necessity and none can be omitted. In this respect Marx

remained true to him. History is represented as an indivisible development. The

new cannot begin before its time. However, the fatalism of both philosophersrefers to the past only. Their metaphysical error, namely, that history obeys a

defined law, is cancelled by their historical error, namely, that such a law was

fulfilled at its appointed time. The present and the past are not subject to thesame law. (105)

Horkheimer reinterpretsHegel and Marx, and formulates (against what

Benjamin calls "vulgar Marxism") an understanding of revolution as that

which can happen at any instant:








Itmight be said of past historical enterprises that the time was not ripe for

them. Present talk of inadequate conditions is a cover for the tolerance of oppression. For the revolutionary, conditions have always been ripe.What in retro

spect appears as a preliminary stage or a premature situation was once for a

revolutionary a last chance for change. A revolutionary is with the desperate

people forwhom everything is on the line, not with those who have time. ...

Critical theory... rejects the kind of knowledge that one can bank on. It con

fronts historywith thatpossibility which is always concretely visible within it.

...[T]he consequence that flows from historical materialism today as formerly

fromRousseau or theBible, that is, the insight that "now or in a hundred years"thehorrorwill come to an end,was

always appropriate. ("AuthoritarianState"

106)

Revolution is not continuous with thepast; itdoes not follow already exist

ing trendsor historical laws. Revolution is not necessary, nor is itprogress.Horkheimer's language here echoes Benjamin's: revolution,which "bringsabout what will not happen without resistance and constantly renewed

efforts to strengthen freedom: the end of exploitation," is not "a further

acceleration of progress, but a qualitative leap out of the dimension of

progress" (107). Socialism is not the inevitable outcome of capitalism but

something else, new, different.The task of revolution is one forwhich the

time is always right,a possibility that is always visible inhistory.Revolution forBenjamin (and Horkheimer) is not an acceleration of

time,but its "arrest," or a "leap" out of (homogeneous, empty) time.Both

history-writing and revolution have the same structure,purpose and effect:

making the continuum of history explode. The historical materialist focuseson amoment in thepast "in order toblast a specific era out of thehomogeneous course of history" (Benjamin 263). The writing of history is a "wrest

ing away" from traditionwhich restores thepossibility of hope. A dialectical

leap in the open air of history,which halts thewheels of progress?this is"how Marx understood the revolution" (261). As thatwhich signals (theadvent of) the radically other, theMessianic is the revolutionary. In Ben

jamin's understanding, materialism and theology necessarily overlap?which is not to say that thismakes the overlap easier to comprehend or

accept by everybody else, including Adorno and Horkheimer, who were

both drawn toward and troubledby Benjamin's allegorical vision. Benjaminwrites that the Jewish prohibition from investigating the future "does not

imply.. . that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty

time," the time of progress as the repetition of the same; on the contrary,

"every second of timewas the straitgate throughwhich theMessiah mightenter" (264). Expectation here means opening up a space for the unex

pected. A thought that looks to the futuredisables thewriting and acting of

historyin the

present.Notions of

progress, development, gradual change,evolution, function to reproduce things as theyare; the task of changing the

world requires thinking in terms of breaks, rupture, revolution. Thoughtabout the future, better society oscillates between two poles: a rational,describable Utopia (the evolutionary pole), and amystical, radically "other"

Utopia (the revolutionary pole). The paradox inUtopian thinking is that the







158 UTOPIAN STUDIES

more the Utopian future becomes describable, themore it (inescapably)resembles the present. The only way for thought to contribute to the task

of bringing about the radically new is to think itspossibility; to formulate

itwould be self-defeating. Utopia is then thought of as a blank space, a

moment of fulfillment and redemptionwithout a God guaranteeing its real

ization. Utopian thinking borders on mysticism, a worldly mysticism, a

mysticism without aGod.

On Thought and Transformation

The call for unity of theory and practice has irresistibly degraded theory to a

servant's role, reversing the very traits it should have brought to thatunity....The liquidation of theory by dogmatization and thought taboos contributed to

the bad practice; the recovery of theory's independence lies in the interest of

practice itself... .Today, with theory paralyzed and disparaged by the all-gov

erning bustle, itsmere existence, however impotent, bears witness against the

bustle. This iswhy theory is legitimate and why it is hated; without it, there

would be no changing thepractice thatconstantly calls for change. (Adomo 143)

Critical theory's various "refusals to say" have provoked the charge that it

suffersfrom lack of clarity and itsvision from lack of normativity.A writ

ten style that is concerned with aesthetic presentation, that relies upon the

brevity of the aphorism, the thesis and the essay rather thanmore exten

sively argued forms, is often disqualified as unclear, elitist,or, at best, elusive

(see Benhabib 163). However, this charge risksmisconstruing the theory'sown purpose and self-understanding. Comparing Adorno's theorizingwith

Erich Fromm's, Buck-Morss asserts: "For [Fromm] thegoal of knowledgewas tohave something?a new and lasting theory?at the end. But Adorno,whose concern was a new social reality, saw in the desire topossess even a

theory the risk of reproducing the commodity structurewithin consciousness" (186). The two kinds of theory-writing "clear" and "elusive") derive

from and respond to two views of the activity of thinking.To a thoughtwhose task is to change theworld, "having a theory,"even were it theright

theory, is no end. Thought itself aims at being transformative. It appeals to

the "thinking individual"; itproduces the thinking individual, inviting and

demanding participation, elaboration, interpretation.Lack of clarity is not a

characteristic of the theory but of the (social/historical) object. Thoughtmust approach theobject in all itscomplexity and reflect thatcomplexity in

itspresentation, if it aims at changing theobject.The charge thatcritical theory lacks a clear normative dimension also

risksmisunderstanding itsvery nature. Seyla Benhabib notices that "[i]t is

endemic to themode ofinquiry

known as'critique' that,despite

itsemphaticnormative dimension, it considers itself to have transcended the normative

naivete of evaluative theories prescribing an ideal ethics and an ideal politics" (8). The "absence of normativity" is for her a source of puzzlementand frustration.However, Benhabib mistakes for a "lack" what is indeed a

deliberate refusal. The imperative to change theworld issues from theexpe








rience of suffering,horror and revolt.The thought thatadheres to itnever

theless reserves for itself theright to refuse to say why suffering should not

be.3Adorno insists: "Dialectics need not fear the charge of being obsessed

with the fixed idea of objective conflict in a thing already pacified; no singlething is at peace in theunpacified whole. The aporetical concepts of philos

ophy aremarks ofwhat is objectively, not just cogitatively, unresolved" (153).In a letterof 1843, Marx contends thatcritical philosophy's lack of norma

tivityand a positive vision of the future is actually an advantage: "each [ofthe reformers] is compelled to confess to himself thathe has no clear con

ceptionof what the futureshould be.

That, however,is

justthe

advantageof

thenew trend: thatwe do not attempt dogmatically toprefigure the future,butwant to find thenew world only through criticism of the old" (13). The

task of thought is to contribute to the achievement of self-consciousness in

struggle: "the work of our time to clarify to itself (critical philosophy) the

meaning of its own struggle and itsown desires ... is work for theworld

and for us." Thought clarifies itself to itself, and in so doing "itwill tran

spire that theworld has long been dreaming of something that itcan acquireifonly itbecomes conscious of it."Recognizing that the task is "to carryout

the thoughtsof thepast,"Marx adds that "mankind begins no newwork, but

consciously accomplishes its old work." And he concludes: "[I]f thedesign

ing of the futureand theproclamation of ready-made solutions for all timeis not our affair, thenwe realize all themore clearlywhat we have to accom

plish in the present?I am speaking of a ruthless criticism of everything

existing, ruthless in two senses: The criticismmust not be afraid of its own

conclusions, nor of conflictwith thepowers thatbe" (13).Critical theoryasserts that the activity of thoughtand the independence

of theoryare crucial inmaintaining thepossibility of change. It rejects the

subordination of theory to practice, or,what amounts to the same thing,calls for the unity of theory and practice.4 For Adorno and Horkheimer,

thoughtas thoughthas a role toplay toward the task of changing theworld.

A decisive component of theirdiagnosis of thepresent is "theweakness ofthemodern theoretical faculty" (Dialectic of Enlightenment xiii). In these

conditions, critical thoughtbecomes evenmore necessary; inAdorno's words,"true revolutionary practice depends on the intransigence of theory in theface of the insensibilitywith which society allows thought to ossify" (41).

What exactly is the role of thoughtvis-?-vis change?a thought thatremains

independent from practice and is not predictive nor prescriptive? As we

have seen, forHorkheimer, Adorno and Benjamin the different, Utopianfuture is a possibility forwhich there are no examples or guarantees that it

will ever be actualized. How can a thought that rejects notions of progress,

development

or historical lawspreserve hope?

Horkheimer and Adorno's

hope restsnot on belief in an inexorable future but on theuncompromisingcritique of thepresent: "Hope for better circumstances?if it is not amere

illusion?is not so much based on the assurance that these circumstanceswould be guaranteed, durable, and final, but on the lack of respect for allthat is so firmly rooted in the general suffering" (225). A thoughtwhich is







160 UTOPIAN STUDIES

itselfgrounded in uncertainty can offer no certainty that the futurewill be

better; theonly thing itcan do isguarantee that thedifferentfuture,a futurenot necessarily tied to thepresent of domination, remains a possibility. Crit

ical thought,which defends the possibility of Utopia yet has learned from

themistakes of past utopianism, understands change not as themove towarda pre-determined Utopian future,but in termsof escape out of present intol

erable circumstances. What it needs toguarantee is that themove out of the

present ispossible. Critical thought is thus thinkingagainst the limits to the

possibility of the future.

NOTES

*I gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided the by Social Sciences and Humani

ties Research Council of Canada.

1. See Jay 262, Buck-Morss 24 and Benhabib 41. On the relation between the "Jewish

messianic element" and the Utopian hopes of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin, see also

Liidke 110-11.

2. "Regarding the concrete Utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of thewrong state of

things. The right state of thingswould be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction" (11).

3. Benhabib seems uneasy about Marx's refusal to assume a prescriptive role as well. OnMarx's vision of the future society and "true universality," shewrites: "What one needs, what

gives one pleasure, and the capacities one chooses to develop would all change. But change

according towhat criterion and in light of what norms? Remaining true toHegel's method of

immanent critique, Marx does not say, and maintains that the historical process will generateits own critical standards. The task of the critic is not to provide reality with Utopian blue

prints for the education of mankind" (113).4. Horkheimer notes that "the modern propensity to translate every idea into action, or into

active abstinence from action, is one of the symptoms of the present cultural crisis: action for

action's sake is inno way superior to thought for thought's sake, and is perhaps even inferior

to it" (Eclipse ofReason vi).

REFERENCES

Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. Tr. E.B. Ashton. NY: Seabury, 1973.

Benhabib, Seyla. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of theFoundations of Critical Theory.NY: Columbia UP, 1986.

Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Tr. Harry Zohn. NY: Schocken, 1968.

Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin ofNegative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Ben

jamin, and theFrankfurt Institute. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1977.

Horkheimer, Max. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Tr. Matthew J. O'Connell and others.

NY: Herder and Herder, 1972._. Eclipse ofReason. NY: Seabury, 1974.

_. "The Authoritarian State." In The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. Ed. Andrew

Arato and Eike Gebhardt. NY: Urizen, 1978, 95-117.

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Tr. John Cumming.NY: Continuum, 1991.








Jay,Martin. The Dialectical Imagination: A History of theFrankfurt School and the Institute

of Social Research 1923-1950. Boston: Little, 1973.

L?dke, Martin. "The Utopian Motif Is Suspended: Conversation with Leo Lowenthal." New

German Critique 38 (Spring/Summer 1986): 105-11.

Marx, Karl. "For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing" and "Theses on Feuerbach."

In The Marx/Engels Reader. 2nd ed. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. NY: Norton, 1978, 12-15

and 143-45.

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