Literal vs. nonliteral language - novelty matters Rachel Giora, Tel Aviv University http://www.tau.ac.il/~giorar Introduction Nonliteral language has a long lasting reputation for being highly unique - ‘‘the mark of genius’’ and ‘‘above the commonplace and mean”. In contrast, literal language - “the use of proper words” – is taken to render language “perspicuous’’ (Aristotle, 350 BCE). More recent research, however, has witnessed the pervasiveness of nonliteral language in mundane uses (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989, to cite but a few). Still, the poetics of everyday language (e.g., the nonliteralness of the “legs” and the “back” of a chair) is often lost on comprehenders on account of its lack of novelty. At the same time, however, our passion for novelty (Berlyne, 1950; Freud, 1922; McDougall, 1923; Sheldrake, 1981/2012) forgoes the possibility that literal language may be also poetic. Consider, for instance, how highly conventionalized nonliteral expressions 1 such as big shoes to fill or curl up and die may become innovative by resorting to their alternative literal interpretation, as in “Those are some very big shoes to fill (size 83, in fact)" 2 or curl up and dye. 3 Consider also the literal use of “know” in KNOW Pinkwashing 4 , which is used in an innovative way, without resorting to figurativeness. While highlighting both the literal request to become acquainted with pinkwashing and the literal need to reject it, this use deautomatizes or rather defamiliarizes the familiar literal 1 An expression becomes conventionalized, or frozen, or fixed through frequent use and habit, to the extent that it is now listed in our mental lexicon with one or more given meanings. 2 http://designarchives.aiga.org/#/entries/%2Bcollections%3A%2250%20Books %2F50%20Covers%20of%202010%22/_/detail/relevance/asc/3/7/21564/the-man- behind-the-nose/1 I thank Jenny Birger for this example. 3 http://www.curlupndye.com/ 4 http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/news/news/4366- inequality-forum-2012-pinkwashing-a-palestinian-queer-community.html 1
Transcript
Literal vs. nonliteral language - novelty mattersRachel Giora, Tel Aviv University
http://www.tau.ac.il/~giorar
Introduction
Nonliteral language has a long lasting reputation for being highly unique - ‘‘the mark of genius’’ and ‘‘above the commonplace and mean”. In contrast, literal language - “the use of proper words” – is taken to render language “perspicuous’’ (Aristotle, 350 BCE). More recent research, however, has witnessed the pervasiveness of nonliteral language in mundane uses (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989, to cite but a few). Still, the poetics of everyday language (e.g., the nonliteralness of the “legs” and the “back” of a chair) is often lost on comprehenders on account of its lack of novelty. At the same time, however, our passion for novelty (Berlyne, 1950; Freud, 1922; McDougall, 1923; Sheldrake, 1981/2012) forgoes the possibility that literal language may be also poetic.
Consider, for instance, how highly conventionalized nonliteral expressions1 such as big shoes to fill or curl up and die may become innovative by resorting to their alternative literal interpretation, as in “Those are some very big shoes to fill (size 83, in fact)"2 or curl up and dye.3 Consider also the literal use of “know” in KNOW Pinkwashing 4, which is used in an innovative way, without resorting to figurativeness. While highlighting both the literal request to become acquainted with pinkwashing and the literal need to reject it, this use deautomatizes or rather defamiliarizes the familiar literal meaning of “know” by fragmenting it, thus bringing to the fore an additional sense of the word (which now includes rejection).5 Note further the innovativeness of the literal “know” in the street art of KNOW HOPE6, which deautomatizes the sense of “no”, while breaking up a familiar literal collocation7 (No hope), enriching it with optimism.
Consider further how (visual) background information in Lahav Halevy’s (2002) art8 deautomatizes the all too familiar name Sharon Stone (see Figure 1). Deconstructing a fixed expression by introducing an alternative referent for Sharon and a literal meaning of Stone results in a novel literal interpretation.
1 An expression becomes conventionalized, or frozen, or fixed through frequent use and habit, to the extent that it is now listed in our mental lexicon with one or more given meanings.2http://designarchives.aiga.org/#/entries/%2Bcollections%3A%2250%20Books%2F50%20Covers%20of %202010%22/_/detail/relevance/asc/3/7/21564/the-man-behind-the-nose/1 I thank Jenny Birger for this example.3 http://www.curlupndye.com/4 http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/news/news/4366-inequality-forum-2012-pinkwashing-a-palestinian-queer-community.html5 Deautomatization is invited once a conventional use is questioned, thus activating a less familiar meaning or interpretation. On deautomatization, see e.g., Russian formalist Shklovsky, 1917/1965 and Prague linguist Mukarovský, 1932/1964, 1978).6 http://www.flickr.com:80/photos/idanska/247228762/7 A collocation refers to a set of words that frequently co-occur so as to become a conventional fixed expression.8 http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/sharon-stone
Can conventional metaphors be also revamped? Consider how, in what Livak (2008) caught on camera, including the facial expression of the Palestinian, the all too well-known smiley is deautomatized, rendered into an innovative cryly (Figure 2):
Can innovativeness be both literal and metaphorical? In (Figure 3), using photomontage techniques, Heartfield (1934) spelt out his anti-Nazi views by deautomatizing a conventional Nazi symbol - the Swastika - turning its arms into the executioner‘s blood-dripping axes. Although the novelty is “literal” in that there is no visual “semantic anomaly” (known to typify metaphors), it nonetheless calls for a metaphorical interpretation.
Similarly, in Figure (4), Heartfield (1932) realizes a metaphor (“swallows gold”). As a result, the novel literal reading involves a visual “semantic anomaly” which can only be interpreted metaphorically (expressing the artist’s opposition to Hitler’s gain-based regime):
Can the realistic also be viewed as nonliteral? In addition to Figure 2, consider how in Livak (2012; see Figure 5) real-life background information - the protest slogans “Free Palestine” engraved on the road blocks the Israeli soldiers are leaning against - ridicule the perceptual figure - the soldiers - by setting up a stark contrast between the two, allowing a novel sarcastic reading of the percept as a whole:
These instances suggest that it is innovativeness rather than nonliteralness that might make a difference. It is via novelty then that both literal and nonliteral communication could be ‘‘the mark of genius’’.
Novelty matters: The case of comprehension
Behavioral level
According to Aristotle (350 BCE), metaphors (among other “unusual” uses) are difficult to understand: A text or style is “a riddle, if it [mostly] consists of metaphors”. This view has been adopted by a number of processing models, not least by the standard pragmatic model (e.g., Grice, 1975 and Searle, 1979). It has, however, been vastly questioned by various scholars trying to show that, given various factors, especially specific contextual information or semantic space, metaphor will be no more difficult to make sense of than literal counterparts (Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg, 2001; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Keysar 1989; Kintsch & Bowles, 2002, among others; for a review, see Giora 2003).
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Contextual considerations momentarily set aside (but see Optimal novelty in context – the case of sarcasm, below), experimental evidence accumulated in various laboratories shows that it is not degree of nonliteralness that makes a difference but degree of novelty; it is the latter that affects processing difficulties (Giora, 1997, 2003; see also Gibbs, 1980), degree of pleasurability (Brône & Coulson, 2010; Giora, Fein, Kronrod, Elnatan, Shuval, & Zur, 2004), and the neural substrates involved (Giora, 2009; Giora, & Stringaris, 2010).
“Degree of nonliteralness” pertains here to the continuum ranging between literal and nonliteral (idiomatic, metaphoric, ironic/sarcastic, hyperbolic etc.) language. “Degree of novelty” pertains here to degree of salience.
According to the graded salience hypothesis (Giora 1997, 1999, 2003), a meaning is salient if it is coded in the mental lexicon and enjoys prominence due to exposure (e.g., familiarity, frequency, conventionality) or cognitive factors (e.g., prototypicality), regardless of degree of nonliteralness (e.g., the nonliteral curl up and die, the literal body and soul, the literal and metaphoric sharp, the sarcastic big deal, read my lips, the literal plant meaning of tree). A meaning is less-salient if it is coded but scores low on these variables, regardless of degree of nonliteralness (e.g., the literal, riverside meaning of bank; the nonliteral diagram meaning of tree). A meaning or an interpretation that is not coded is nonsalient; it is novel or derived, regardless of degree of nonliteralness (e.g., the literal body and sole; the nonliteral Weapons of mass construction).
An interpretation based on the salient meanings of the utterance components, termed salience-based interpretation, is not coded either. Based on constituents’ salient meanings, it too is indifferent to degree of nonliteralness. Consider the literal interpretation of What a lovely day for a picnic, intended sarcastically when said during a wet and wild weather. This literal interpretation is based on the salient, here literal, meanings of the individual constituents (e.g., lovely) that make up the utterance (see Giora, Fein, Laadan, Wolfson, Zeituny, Kidron, Kaufman, & Shaham, 2007). Such is also the metaphoric interpretation of This one's really sharp, when said of a student and intended sarcastically, which is based on the salient, here nonliteral, meanings of the individual constituents (e.g., sharp) that make up the utterance (see Colston and Gibbs, 2002). Such is also the sarcastic interpretation of the nonliteral Weapons of mass construction,9 which is based on the more familiar nonliteral (Weapons of mass distraction) and literal (Weapons of mass destruction) collocations (Giora et al., 2004).
With regard to processing, salient and less salient meanings are activated unconditionally. However, access is ordered: more salient meanings are activated first. Salience-based interpretations, albeit noncoded, are easier to process (this one is really sharp said of a bright student) compared to nonsalient interpretations not based on the salient meanings of their components (this one is really sharp said of a knife that doesn’t cut at all, see Colston & Gibbs, 2002).
Would any degree of novelty make a difference either processing-wise or aesthetics-wise? According to Giora et al. (2004), it is “optimal innovativeness” rather than other degrees of innovation that is singled out in these respects. To be optimally innovative a stimulus should introduce a nonsalient, novel interpretation (A peace of paper) while invoking a salient meaning of a familiar stimulus (A piece of paper). Such innovations are aesthetically favored over both a “familiar” alternative (A piece of paper),
a “pure” innovation (a pill of pepper), or a “variant” version (A single piece of paper). Optimal innovations may be literal (curl up and dye), invoking a conventional collocation (here idiomatic - curl up and die), metaphoric (pinkwashing), invoking a conventional expression (here metaphoric - whitewashing), or sarcastic, (Einstein? I don’t think so!), echoing a familiar expression or thought (here metaphorically attributing to one Einstein’s ingenuity) while projecting a dissociative, ridiculing stance (Du Bois 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995).
Optimal innovations, however, take longer to process than their familiar counterparts, because they involve activating additional (salient) meanings on top of the intended novel one. However, they are most pleasurable, regardless of whether they are literal or nonliteral, verbal or nonverbal (see also Hekkert, Snelders & van Wieringen, 2003; but see Bohrn, Altmann, Lubrich, Menninghaus & Jacobs, 2012, who show that while pleasure ratings did not single out proverbial optimal innovations compared to other alternatives, their neural substrates did, indicating activation of the affect-related medial prefrontal and medial temporal regions). Next in pleasurability are familiar expressions; least pleasing are variant versions and (even less so) pure innovations (see Giora et al., 2004).10
And if degree of novelty matters, would any number of evoked salient meanings matter? According to the account of verbal wittiness as consisting in double grounding (Brône & Coulson, 2010), pleasure derived from optimal innovations increases when optimally innovative utterances are “double grounded”. What does double grounding mean? Consider, for instance, the reference to Bridgestone - a company that manufactures car tires - in U.S. slowdown punctures Bridgestone’s profits. Here the novel metaphor “puncture” is double grounded in that its activated salient literal meaning is relevant to what is said in more than one way. On the one hand, it is related to the profits in question. On the other hand, it is relevant to the nature of the company, thereby triggering a number of contextual effects (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). In contrast, given that Cold Stone is an ice-cream company, the same metaphor (“puncture”) in U.S. slowdown punctures Cold Stone’s profits is single grounded, its salient literal meaning being relevant in only one way.
Pleasure derived from double grounded optimal innovations, however, comes with a cost. Double grounded metaphors are more taxing, taking longer to process than single grounded ones.
Studies focusing on nonliteral language only also demonstrate the importance of novelty. For instance, when testing idiomatic language, findings reveal that high-salience and low-salience idioms involve different processing routes. Whereas shorter response times and small N400 amplitude were observed for the last word of highly salient idioms, indicating no processing difficulties, the last word of idioms low on salience prompted an increased N400 amplitude and longer response times, disclosing processing difficulties (Laurent, Denhières, Passerieux, Iakimovac, & Hardy-Baylé 2006). Similarly, studies focusing on metaphor comprehension also indicate different processing routes for novel compared to familiar metaphors. Whereas nonsalient, novel metaphors were interpreted
10 On gradual increase of aesthetic appreciation vis a vis gradual increase in degrees of deviation/innovativeness, see van Peer, Hakemulder, & Zyngier (2007) who also show that for a deviation to be noticeable it must be of a certain magnitude; for different findings showing that the highly novel and the highly familiar are rated as equally least likable, see, e.g., Berlyne (1971), Wundt (1874), among others.
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via comparison processes, this trend was shifted to categorization when these items underwent conventionalization (Bowdle and Gentner 2005).
Differences between novel and familiar metaphors were also demonstrated for typically developing children. While whether the metaphoric stimuli were visual or verbal did not make a difference, whether they were familiar or novel did (Mashal & Kasirer, 2012). And when younger and older individuals were concerned, results showed that age-related changes were associated with the appreciation of the novelty of the metaphors. Novelty but not familiarity affected the appreciation of the plausibility of metaphors (Mashal, Gavrieli, & Kavé, 2011).
Individual differences?
Longer reading times for optimal innovations, whether literal (TverianHorse11 invoking Trojan horse) or metaphoric (Dying Star, invoking A born Star - a popular Israeli TV show), compared to conventional collocations, whether literal (wooden table) or metaphoric (flower bed), have been also attested to for different groups (Giora, Gazal, Goldstein, Fein, & Stringaris 2012). In Giora et al. (2012), individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and typically developing individuals were asked to read such optimal innovations and conventional collocations for comprehension. Materials were presented inside and outside context. And although the experimental group took longer to read the targets overall, both groups exhibited similar patterns of behavior. Both groups took longer to read novel items compared to familiar ones, regardless of degree of nonliteralness, thus demonstrating that it is novelty rather than degree of nonliteralness that is effort-consuming.
In Gold and Faust (2012) too, individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and typically developing individuals took longer to process novel metaphors compared to conventional ones. In Colich et al. (2012), who looked into sarcasm interpretation, both the experimental group with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and the control group exhibited similar patterns of behavior. Although response times to targets were significantly faster among participants with ASD compared to control participants, both groups took longer to process optimally innovative sarcastic utterances than (salience-based) literal ones. When comparing processing of salient vs. nonsalient stimuli, different groups may exhibit similar patterns of behavior, suggesting that it is degree of novelty rather than nonliteralness that matters (as will also be shown in the next section).
Biological level
Research into the neural substrates of nonliteral language (whether with or without contextual support) also suggests that the relevant distinction which accounts for hemispheric division of labor has to do with degree of salience/novelty rather than with degree of nonliteralness (Giora, 2003, 2007). For instance, lesion studies (e.g., Giora et al. 2000; Kaplan et al. 1990; Winner & Gardner, 1977), studies of individuals with Alzheimer's disease (Amanzio, Geminiani, Leotta, & Cappa, 2008), as well as studies involving healthy adults (Eviatar & Just 2006; Kacinik & Chiarello, 2007) demonstrate that processing nonsalient (novel) nonliteral (sarcastic, metaphoric) interpretations relies
11 Tveria—Hebrew for Tiberias—is an Israeli city.
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more heavily on the right hemisphere (RH) than on the left hemisphere (LH). In contrast, processing conventional meanings (both literal and nonliteral) engages the LH to a greater extent than the RH (Lee and Dapretto, 2006). This has been replicated by using a variety of technologies. Thus, results obtained from fMRI, DVF, rTMS, and ERP studies demonstrate increased activation of RH areas during processing of optimally novel interpretations of figurative language (Arzouan, Goldstein, & Faust 2007; Bottini et al., 1994; Cardillo, Watson, Schmidt, Kranjec, & Chatterjee, 2012; Faust & Mashal 2007; Mashal & Faust 2008; Mashal, Faust & Hendler. 2005; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, Jung-Beeman, 2007, 2009; Pobric, Mashal, Faust, & Lavidor, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005) as well as optimally novel interpretations of literal language – e.g., the compositional interpretations of idioms (Mashal et al., 2009). And while RH advantage was demonstrated in processing nonsalient interpretations of metaphors during first exposure, repeated exposure benefited the LH (Mashal & Faust, 2009) as would be predicted by the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003) and the career of metaphor model (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). A more recent finding involving conventionalization of novel metaphors, however, indicates a bilaterally-mediated process rather than a hemispheric shift across brain areas (Cardillo et al., 2012; for a different view showing that both novelty and figurativeness engage the RH, see Coulson & van Petten, 2007; Diaz, Barrett, & Hogstrom, 2011).
How optimal innovations shape their environment: The case of production
Optimal innovations deautomatize salient meanings, whether literal or nonliteral. Their environment may therefore “resonate” with these salient meanings (Giora, 2011a). According to Du Bois (2012), “resonance” pertains to “the activation of affinities across utterances”. As shown by Giora (2007), resonance involves echoing utterances’ salient meanings and salience-based interpretations by both prior and subsequent context. This should be true even if these meanings and interpretations are contextually inappropriate (e.g., the literal meanings or interpretations of metaphors).
As illustration, consider the following example (1) in which fire and its associates are used both conventionally (here metaphorically, related to shooting; in italics for convenience) and innovatively (here metaphorically, related to killing via food and water shortage; in bold for convenience):
(1) Let's be clear about this: Israel's fire at Gaza has not ceased. There is no Israeli ceasefire in Gaza. There is no Israeli ceasefire even when Israel's soldiers aren't shooting a single bullet in Gaza …There are food shortages in Gaza. Israel is denying Gaza food…Food shortages kill. Denying food is fire.
There's a shortage of potable water in Gaza. ... Water shortages kill. Denying water is fire.
Both Gaza and the West Bank will go on igniting under fire, till they kindle Sderot [an Israeli city] again too. The bullet-less fire that Israel is shooting at the
dispossessed of Gaza is fire that it is also shooting, by proxy, at the dispossessed of Sderot. (Mazali, 2006)
If we focus on the optimally innovative fire-metaphors (in bold) - “Food shortages
kill. Denying food is fire... Water shortages kill. Denying water is fire” - it is obvious that they resonate with their conventional uses in both their early and late contexts. In early context, fire is used conventionally to indicate using arms (against the Gazans): “Israel's fire at Gaza has not ceased. There is no Israeli ceasefire in Gaza”. In late context, that which follows these novel uses, an additional novel metaphor emerges, constructed on the basis of this and yet another salient metaphoric meaning, referring to anger as heat (see Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987): “Both Gaza and the West Bank will go on igniting under fire”. Here “igniting under fire” is a double or even triple grounded metaphor; it has first to do with the (salient, metaphoric) rage against oppression which, in turn, resonates with its salient literal meaning (“kindle”) and then with its salient metaphoric meaning (“bullet-less”).
Deautomatizing salient meanings via echoing them may render innovative a conventional use. Consider the following example (2) in which prior literal information “smeared with mud” deautomatizes the conventional metaphor “dirty” which follows that headline (and possibly renders metaphoric the literal interpretation of a “face smeared with mud” as well):
(2) Imagine this face smeared with mud
Until today, Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, managed to avoid dirty political confrontations (Mualem, 2007).
In (3) below (a translation of the Hebrew version), which is basically sarcastic, the metaphorical optimal innovation “on the wings of danger” (which in Hebrew literally reads carried [to power] on the wings of danger) activates the salient Hebrew idiom carried on the wings of fame/glory). This metaphorical innovation is related to the next conventional metaphor clip his wings (which in Hebrew literally reads “collapse/force down his wings”, meaning “discourage”) via the salient literal meaning of the metaphoric “wings”. While in the optimally innovative metaphor the “wings” are not those of whoever is carried on them, in the (Hebrew) metaphor which follows - “clip his wings” - they are. In fact, both metaphors rely on different affordabilities of “wings”, and don’t share a metaphorical sense. Still, juxtaposing these two metaphors deautomatizes them by foregrounding the salient literal meaning of “wings” which they share, allowing both to be double grounded, if not poetic:
(3) The rule of fear….So what is possible? There is no response. Because what would those who make threats do without their threats? They may very well be able to deal with Israel's real problems, like its moral self-image, its refusal to make peace and its socioeconomic difficulties. But this is not why Netanyahu was elected. He came to power on the wings of danger. Just don't try to clip his wings lest, God forbid, this stirs hope (Levy, March 2009).
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Can an act be an optimal innovation, whether literal or nonliteral?
Can one aim at getting across an optimal innovative message, whether literal or nonliteral, by tempering with the reality? To be able to answer this question, let’s focus on a few examples. Consider, first, the following example (Figure 6), titled “Metzer-Meisser land exchange”.12 This act enacts a literal interpretation of “land exchange” focusing on an alternative literal meaning of “land”, which, in Hebrew, also means “soil”, and on an alternative literal meaning of “exchange”. The more familiar use of the collocation, which is deautomatized in Figure (6), becomes highly frequent any time “peace” talks or discussions of a prospective agreement between Palestinians and Israelis are on the agenda. In such “peace” talks, “land exchange” is used euphemistically to refer to population exchange, or, put more bluntly, to ethnic cleansing. By enacting an optimally innovative literal interpretation of the collocation, the artist, Micha Ullman (1972), registers his objection to its conventional meaning, projecting thereby a sarcastic viewpoint which ridicules the idea:
12 Metzer, an Israeli Kibbutz, and neighboring Arab villages, including Messer and Kafin, promoted coexistence and cooperation. Many of the kibbutz members protested the construction of the “security” fence, which robbed the Palestinians of their lands and olive groves, especially those of Kafin’s. Eventually, the latter were bulldozed to make way for the fence and the road that ran alongside it.
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Figure 6: Metzer-Meisser land exchange
Consider, further, the example in Figure (7). While protesting the Israeli war on Gaza (December 27, 2008 - January 18, 2009), Anarchists Against the Wall - a direct action group of Israeli activists - made use of metaphorical acts in order to allow Israelis an experiential insight into the plight of the Palestinian citizens of Gaza. In Figure (7) they personify dead children of Gaza, compiled on the road.13 This act takes place at the entrance to Sde Dov Air Force base (in Tel Aviv), thereby also blocking entry to the base. This action thus sends both a literal and a metaphorical message.14
In Figure (8) the Anarchists set up a “military” roadblock in Tel Aviv, so that Israeli citizens experience, even if momentarily, what it is like to be under the Israeli occupation and control, which is what Palestinians experience on a daily if not on a moment-by-moment basis.
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Figure 8: The Anarchists’ military roadblock in Tel Aviv
Acts too, then, can be optimally innovative, both literally and nonliterally.
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Optimal novelty in context – the case of sarcasm
Sarcasm (or sarcastic irony), if not conventionalized, is usually rendered optimally innovative by means of context. It’s in context that it also meets the conditions for optimal innovation (Giora et al., 2004). Indeed, the interpretation of non-lexicalized sarcasm is constructed on the fly - derived on the basis of sarcastically biasing information. Sarcastic remarks, when understood, entertain both the novel/nonsalient sarcastic interpretation as well as the salient meaning of the sarcastic key word(s) and the salience-based interpretation of the utterance as a whole (see Giora, 1997, 2003; Giora & Fein, 1999). Is sarcasm, then, pleasing? Is it more pleasing than an alternative, more familiar or salience-based interpretation as would follow from the optimal innovation view (Giora et al., 2004)? Specifically, is interpreting a sarcastic remark embedded in a strongly supportive context more taxing than interpreting its similarly supported salience-based interpretation, as would be predicted by the optimal innovation view (Giora et al., 2004) and by the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 1999, 2003)?
Is sarcasm pleasing?
Sarcasm and pleasure have not been as directly assessed as were metaphors and pleasure (for novel metaphors being more pleasing than their salience-based, often literal interpretation, see Giora et al., 2004; Giora, Fein, Kotler, & Shuval, in press; Shuval & Giora, 2009). However, given that sarcasm is intended and considered as humorous (Dress, Kreuz, Link, & Caucci, 2008; Lampert & Ervin-Tripp, 2006; Leggitt & Gibbs, 2000), there is probably some way in which it is pleasing, especially if one is not the target of the sarcastic remark.
Indeed, van Mulken, Burgers, & van der Plas (2010) found that appreciation of sarcasm depended on whether the sarcastic intent was recognized, its message acceptable, and its target excluded the present company’s group members. More recent results (Drucker, Giora, & Fein, 2013) somewhat support this view. They show that women, scoring low on a sexism scale, enjoyed sarcasm most when it was directed by women against men; they enjoyed it least when it was directed by women against women. In contrast, men, scoring as low on a sexism scale, did not enjoy sarcasm directed against women as much as they did when it was directed against men, specifically by other men. It seems that for a powerful group, competing with ingroup members is more enjoyable than competing with less powerful outgroup members (Drucker et al., 2013). Indeed, as shown by Bowes & Katz (2011), (self-reported) aggressors perceived their sarcastic comments as more humorous and less aggressive than the victims. Taking the perspective of the aggressor, then, allows one to dismiss sarcastic comments as teasing. This ties in well with previous findings showing that aggressive people are less sensitive to the negativity displayed in their sarcasm (Blasko & Kazmerski, 2006; Werner & Nixon, 2005).
Sarcasm, then, is pleasing, as would be predicted by the optimal innovation view, but on condition that one takes the perspective of the aggressor rather than the victim’s.
Does (non-lexicalized) sarcasm come with a cost, as would be predicted by the optimal innovation view? An enduring question debated in the field of nonliteral language is whether strong contextual support may affect a smooth processing of nonsalient sarcasm so that it is no more difficult to comprehend than its salience-based (often literal) interpretation when embedded in a strongly supportive context. Before trying to deal with this question, one should first clarify the notion of strong contextual support. What context, then, would count as strong enough to make a sarcastic remark easy to understand?
According to contextualists, a context that might facilitate sarcasm interpretation initially is such that induces an expectation for a sarcastic remark. Upon one view, anticipating a sarcastic remark may be prompted by setting up a contrast between a protagonist’s expectation and the reality that frustrates it (Gibbs, 1986, 2002). It may also be induced by a context involving multiple constraints which may cue the addressee as to the speaker’s sarcastic intent. For instance, in addition to failed expectation, context may include information about speaker’s occupation, or involve proliferated uses of negations, negative emotions, or a victim (Campbell & Katz, 2012; Pexman, Ferretti & Katz, 2000). Note, however, that although, as shown by Campbell & Katz (2012), such hints prevail in the contexts of sarcasm produced by their participants, the authors conclude that they do not make up a set of necessary conditions, nor is any of them, on its own, a necessary condition.
Indeed, as shown by Giora, Fein, Kaufman, Eisenberg, and Erez (2009), a context featuring a frustrated expectation on its own (4) did neither favor a sarcastic over a nonsarcastic remark compared to a context featuring a realized expectation (5); nor did it facilitate sarcasm comprehension compared to a context featuring a realized expectation. In fact, in both contexts, sarcasm took longer to read than in a context featuring no expectation (6).
(4) Frustrated expectation
Context:Sagee went on a ski vacation abroad. He really likes vacations that include sport activities. A relaxed vacation in a quiet ski-resort place looked like the right thing for him. Before leaving, he made sure he had all the equipment and even took training classes on a ski simulator. But already at the beginning of the second day he lost balance, fell, and broke his shoulder. He spent the rest of the time in a local hospital ward feeling bored and missing home. When he got back home, his shoulder still in cast, he said to his fellow workers:
Sarcastic target sentence:“Ski vacation is recommended for your health”Final sentence:Everyone smiled.Comprehension question:Do you think Sagee will go for a ski vacation again?
(5) Realized expectation
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Context:Sagee went on a ski vacation abroad. He doesn't even like skiing. It looks dangerous to him and staying in such a cold place doesn't feel like a vacation at all. But his girlfriend wanted to go and asked him to join her. Already at the beginning of the second day he lost balance, fell, and broke his shoulder. He spent the rest of the time in a local hospital ward feeling bored and missing home. When he got back home, his shoulder still in cast, he said to his fellow workers:
Sarcastic target sentence:“Ski vacation is recommended for your health”Final sentence:Everyone smiled.Comprehension question:Do you think Sagee will go for a ski vacation again?
(6) No-expectation
Context:Sagee went on a ski vacation abroad. He has never practiced ski so it was his first time. He wasn't sure whether he would be able to learn to ski and whether he will handle the weather. The minute he got there he understood it was a great thing for him. He learned how to ski in no time and enjoyed it a lot. Besides, the weather was nice and the atmosphere relaxed. When he got back home, he said to his fellow workers:
Literal target sentence:“Ski vacation is recommended for your health”Final sentence:Everyone smiled.Comprehension question:Do you think Sagee will go for a ski vacation again?
But even when contexts do, in fact, induce an expectation for a sarcastic utterance, findings fail to demonstrate initial facilitation of sarcastic interpretation. Instead, most of the findings in the field show that initial processing of sarcastic remarks involves activating their contextually inappropriate, salience-based interpretation first.
For instance, Giora et al. (2007) showed that when contexts induced an expectation for a sarcastic utterance, such expectation did not facilitate sarcastic interpretation initially. In fact, it was always the contextually inappropriate, salience-based interpretation that was facilitated first. This has been shown when contexts were dialogues featuring a sarcastic speaker (shown to prompt an expectation for another such turn on that speaker’s behalf). This has also been replicated in studies in which participants read only items that ended in a sarcastic comment (the +Expectation condition) as opposed to the studies in which only half of the items ended in a sarcastic remarks and half in a nonsarcastic remark (the -Expectation condition).
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In the dialogues experiment, target utterances biased toward the sarcastic interpretation took longer to read than those biased toward the nonsarcastic ones; in the +/- Expectation experiments, response times to sarcastically related probes were always longer than those to salience-based related probes, which were always activated initially, regardless of interstimulus interval (ISI) (750-1000 ms) or strength of expectation.
In a series of follow-up studies, in which contextual strength was reinforced by multiplying sarcastic cues, these results remained nonetheless constant. In, Fein, Yeari & Giora (2013; for an initial report, see also Giora, 2011b), dialogues similar to those used in Giora, Fein, Laadan et al. were furnished with explicit markers. Thus, in the sarcastically biased dialogues (7), whenever the sarcastic speaker contributed a sarcastic utterance, an explicit sarcastic marker (e.g., mockingly) was inserted; in the salience-based biased dialogues (8), speakers’ turns were furnished with an explicit nonsarcastic marker (e.g., sadly), attesting to their sincerity. (Target utterances in bold, for convenience):
(7) Sagi: Yesterday I started working as a security guard at Ayalon shopping mall.Yafit: Irit indeed told me she had seen you there.Sagi (desperate): It turned out it’s quite a tough job, being on your feet all day.Yafit: I hope that at least the pay is worth the effort.Sagi: At the moment I get 18 shekels per hour.Yafit (mocking): Great salary you’re getting.Sagi: I know that’s not enough but they promised a raise soon.Yafit: And how much will you actually get after the raise?Sagi: In two weeks from now I’ll get 20 shekels per hour.Yafit (still mocking): Wow, a highly significant raise.
(8) Sagi: Yesterday I started working as security guard at Ayalon shopping mall.Yafit: Irit indeed told me she had seen you there.Sagi (desperate): It turned out it’s quite a tough job, being on your feet all day.Yafit: I hope that at least the pay is worth the effort.Sagi: At the moment I get 18 shekels per hour.Yafit (sadly): A very low salary.Sagi: I know that’s not enough, but they promised a raise soon.Yafit: And how much will you actually get after the raise?Sagi: In two weeks from now I’ll get 30 shekels per hour.Yafit (happily): Wow, a highly significant raise.
Results show that reading times of target utterances (measure in the first three experiments) were always longer following sarcastically biased dialogues than following salience-based biased dialogues (although only marginally so in the third experiment). In addition, sarcastically related probes took longer to respond to compared to salience-based related probes. (This was true at 750 ISI and marginally so at 2000 ms ISI but not at 1500 ms ISI).
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Fein et al. (2013) further tested the contextualist approach by strengthening the contexts in the +Expectation condition (originally in Giora, Fein, Laadan et al., 2007), but not in the -Expectation condition, by letting participants know that sarcasm interpretation was tested. Participants were also allowed a great variety of delays for the lexical decision task (750, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500 and 3000 ms ISIs). Results, however, showed that strengthening the contextual bias (manipulated in Giora, Fein, Laadan et al, 2007) in favor of a sarcastic interpretation by introducing an additional constraint did not affect the patterns of results obtained earlier. Despite employing multiple constraints, sarcasm was not facilitated. Compared to the sarcastic interpretation, however, incompatible salience-based interpretations were made available initially in both conditions (although at the longest delay of 3000 ms they began to decay).
Similarly, in Pexman, Ferretti and Katz (2000), contexts were strongly biased in favor of a sarcastic interpretation. They involved a contrast between what is said by a target utterance and the contextual information preceding it. In addition, they further featured a speaker of high-irony occupation (e.g., comedians, factory workers; see e.g., Katz, Blasko, & Kazmerski, 2004; Katz, & Pexman, 1997), thus raising an expectation for a sarcastic remark. Regardless, such strong contexts failed to facilitate sarcastic interpretations compared to contexts inviting a metaphoric or a neutral reading of the target. Instead, they exhibited increased reading times of targets relative to the neutral and no occupation contexts.
Findings in Colston and Gibbs (2002) also showed that nonsalient (sarcastic) interpretations took longer to process than interpretations based on the salient (metaphoric) meanings of the utterance constituents. Utterances (This one's really sharp), whose key word (sharp) has both salient literal and metaphorical meanings, took longer to read when embedded in sarcastically (9b) than in metaphorically biasing contexts (9a):
(9) a. You are a teacher at an elementary school.You are discussing a new student with your assistant teacher. The student did extremely well on her entrance examinations. You say to your assistant,"This one's really sharp."
b. You are a teacher at an elementary school.You are gathering teaching supplies with your assistant teacher. Some of the scissors you have are in really bad shape. You find one pair that won't cut anything. You say to your assistant,"This one's really sharp."
In addition, double grounded optimally innovative sarcasm (as when "This one's really sharp” is said of a student who did extremely poorly on her entrance examinations) took longer to process compared to single grounded optimally innovative sarcasm (as in 9b).
Such results demonstrate the cost of processing optimal innovations which, as predicted, is not alleviated by contextual support. Interpreting optimal innovations is taxing because, on top of an intended
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nonsalient interpretation, they invoke salient meanings and salience-based interpretations, even if inappropriate. Strong contextual support does not enable bypassing these meanings and interpretations, thus allowing an aesthetic effect.
Sarcasm and contextual resonance - corpus-based studies
If sarcasm involves activating its salient meaning and salience-based interpretation, its environment may resonate with these meanings and interpretations. Indeed, corpus-based studies of spoken interactions and written discourse provide support for the prevalence of salience-based albeit incompatible interpretations in the environment of sarcastic remarks. For instance, in Giora and Gur (2003), 75% of the (Hebrew) sarcastic remarks, exchanged among friends, were responded to by reference to their salience-based but incompatible interpretations. In Kotthoff (2003), in dinner-table conversations among friends, responding to the salience-based but incompatible interpretations of the (German) sarcastic remarks was the norm; responding to the nonsalient compatible interpretation occurred significantly less frequently. However, the reverse was true of interlocutors who were adversaries participating in TV talk-shows.
Looking at (Hebrew) newspaper editorials and op-ed articles, written by well-known sarcastic journalists during 2008-9, revealed a similar trend. On the basis of a corpus which included 70347 words and 1597 sarcastic utterances (15466 words), Giora, Raphaely, Fein, and Livnat (2012) showed that salience-based interpretations featured dominantly in the environment of sarcastic remarks. Although in many cases (43%) the environment of sarcastic utterances did not reflect any of their meanings or interpretations, in many other cases (57%) it did. First, in very few cases (3%), the environment of sarcastic utterances addressed both their sarcastic and salience-based interpretations; in other cases (10%), these sarcastic utterances induced extended sarcasm. However, in a great number of cases (36%), the environment (in italics, for convenience) of the sarcastic utterances (in bold, for convenience) resonated with their salience-based interpretations exclusively (10a-b); a significantly smaller number of cases (8%) were echoed via their sarcastic interpretations exclusively (11a-b):
(10) Environment manifesting salience-based resonance(a) All this really could have been peachy if not for the fact that blindness is dangerous
and the not-so-good ending is known in advance (Levy, July, 2009).15
(b) Most of the tycoons that have borrowed, in recent years, tens of billions of NIS, in bonds, from the public, find it hard to adjust to the harsh conditions in the First Class of commercial airlines (Rolnik, 2008).16
(11) Environment manifesting sarcastic resonance (a) A modest studio of less than 140 square meters with two enormous rooms outfitted
like the most luxurious hotel (Kashua, 2008).
15 On negative understatements being sarcastic, see Giora et al. (2005).16 In the original Hebrew version hard and harsh were described by using the same (polysemous) root (translated by Elad Livnat).
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(b) The man [Olmert] who made a number of courageous statements about peace late in his tenure has orchestrated no fewer than two wars. Talking peace and making war, the "moderate" and "enlightened" prime minister [Olmert] has been revealed as one of our greatest fomenters of war (Levy, January 2009).
Such results support the view that (sarcastic) optimal innovations activate their salient meanings and salience-based interpretations which are retained even in the mind of their producers, allowing them to resonate with their own contextually inappropriate interpretations on account of their relative accessibility.
Conclusions
A vast array of findings supports the view that it is degree of novelty rather than degree of nonliteralness that matters. Specifically, optimally innovative stimuli (Weapons of mass construction), which, in addition to their novelty, also invoke some familiarity (Weapons of mass destruction), affect both pleasure and mode of processing. Whereas such stimuli have been shown to take longer to process compared to familiar ones, they have been further shown to be more pleasing compared to other alternatives. Double grounding - when more than one familiar stimulus is prompted - increases the pleasure (Brône & Coulson, 2010).
Degree of nonliteralness, however, does not matter. Both literal and nonliteral optimal innovations are more costly and enjoyable compared to familiar stimuli, whether literal or nonliteral (Giora et al., 2004; van Mulken et al., 2010; Shuval & Giora, 2009). The fact that it is degree of novelty rather than degree of nonliteralness that makes a difference has been shown to be true of different kinds of populations, whether typically or atypically developing. We all invest more in making sense of novel utterances and benefit from it (Amanzio et al., 2008; Giora, Gazal et al., 2012; Mashal et al., 2011; Mashal & Kasirer, 2012).
With regard to enjoying optimal innovativeness such as sarcasm, some social factors also play a role. For instance, sarcasm is most enjoyable when taking the speaker’s rather than the victim’s perspective (van Mulken et al., 2010; Drucker et al., 2013). Where unequal relations are added to the equation, this means that the disempowered (e.g., women), taking their own group’s point of view, enjoy such innovations best when the speaker is an ingroup member and the victim - an outgroup member; they, however, enjoy it least when the speaker and the victim are ingroup members (Drucker et al., 2013).
Context, however, does not play a role in that it does not facilitate processing of optimal innovation initially. It does not allow bypassing salient meanings or salience-based interpretations, even when it is strongly biased in favor of the optimally innovative target. Even when bias is made apparent as when a relevant occupation is mentioned (e.g., comedian; see Pexman et al., 2000) or a speaker’s intent is made explicit (by e.g., prefacing what is said by cues such as mockingly or by training comprehenders to expect sarcasm, or by letting them know in advance that what is at stake is sarcasm comprehension see Fein et al., 2013; Giora et al., 2007), processing effort does not decrease compared to control conditions. Optimal innovations are always more difficult
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to process than equivalent but more familiar stimuli involving salient meanings or salience-based interpretations.
Neural substrates also support the view that it is degree of innovativeness rather than degree of nonliteralness that matters. Unlike familiar stimuli, which tend to engage left hemisphere regions (Kana, Murdaugh, Wolfe, & Kumar, 2012), optimal innovations tend to engage right hemisphere areas, regardless of degree of nonliteralness (e.g., Amanzio et al., 2008; Arzouan et al., 2007; Bottini et al., 1994; Cardillo et al., 2012; Eviatar & Just 2006; Faust & Mashal 2007; Giora et al. 2000; Kacinik & Chiarello, 2007; Kaplan et al. 1990; Mashal & Faust 2008; Mashal et al., 2005; Mashal et al., 2007, 2009; Pobric et al., 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Winner & Gardner, 1977, among others). Optimal innovations, then, capture processors’ attention and make them invest in making sense of them, while, in return, they reward them with pleasure. No wonder they are used so pervasively in propaganda and counterpropaganda of all kinds, including commercials, newspapers headlines, or books’ titles. Future research should examine whether beauty we invest so much in “is truth and truth – beauty” (Keats, 1820) both in language and thought as well as in social and political behavior.
Acknowledgements
The research reported here was supported by THE ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (grant No. 436/12) and the Vice President for Research and Development at Tel Aviv University Encouragement Fund. Thanks also go to Lahav Halevy’s (2002) for his permission to use Sharon Stone, to Keren Manor/Activestills for the permission to cite Figures (7-8), to Micha Ullman for the permission to use Metzer-Meisser land exchange. I am also obliged to Vered Heruti and Noa Shuval for introducing me to some of the works of art used here.
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