Better Administrating the Challenging
Groups in the National Pension in Korea
Jan 2010
Seong Sook Kim NPRI NPSHyungpyo Moon KDI
Ⅰ Current State of the National PensionⅡ Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the National PensionⅢ Causes of Low Compliance to the Scheme Ⅳ Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging GroupsⅤ Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Current State of the National Pension
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Expansion of Coveragebull 1986 legislationbull 11988 enforcement of the scheme
- workplaces with 10 workers or morebull 11992 expanded to the workplaces with 5
workers or morebull 71995 expanded to rural areas bull 4 1999 expanded to urban areas
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Reformsbull 1998 First Reform- Pensionable age 60 rArr 65 (2013~2033)- Earnings replacement rate 70rArr60(from 1999)- Introduction of periodic financial review
bull 2007 Second Reform- Earnings replacement rate 60rArr40(2008~2028)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ Current State of the National PensionⅡ Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the National PensionⅢ Causes of Low Compliance to the Scheme Ⅳ Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging GroupsⅤ Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Current State of the National Pension
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Expansion of Coveragebull 1986 legislationbull 11988 enforcement of the scheme
- workplaces with 10 workers or morebull 11992 expanded to the workplaces with 5
workers or morebull 71995 expanded to rural areas bull 4 1999 expanded to urban areas
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Reformsbull 1998 First Reform- Pensionable age 60 rArr 65 (2013~2033)- Earnings replacement rate 70rArr60(from 1999)- Introduction of periodic financial review
bull 2007 Second Reform- Earnings replacement rate 60rArr40(2008~2028)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Current State of the National Pension
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Expansion of Coveragebull 1986 legislationbull 11988 enforcement of the scheme
- workplaces with 10 workers or morebull 11992 expanded to the workplaces with 5
workers or morebull 71995 expanded to rural areas bull 4 1999 expanded to urban areas
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Reformsbull 1998 First Reform- Pensionable age 60 rArr 65 (2013~2033)- Earnings replacement rate 70rArr60(from 1999)- Introduction of periodic financial review
bull 2007 Second Reform- Earnings replacement rate 60rArr40(2008~2028)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Expansion of Coveragebull 1986 legislationbull 11988 enforcement of the scheme
- workplaces with 10 workers or morebull 11992 expanded to the workplaces with 5
workers or morebull 71995 expanded to rural areas bull 4 1999 expanded to urban areas
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Reformsbull 1998 First Reform- Pensionable age 60 rArr 65 (2013~2033)- Earnings replacement rate 70rArr60(from 1999)- Introduction of periodic financial review
bull 2007 Second Reform- Earnings replacement rate 60rArr40(2008~2028)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ-1 Brief History of the National Pension
Reformsbull 1998 First Reform- Pensionable age 60 rArr 65 (2013~2033)- Earnings replacement rate 70rArr60(from 1999)- Introduction of periodic financial review
bull 2007 Second Reform- Earnings replacement rate 60rArr40(2008~2028)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
Size of the Insured as of the end of year(Unit 1000 workplaces 1000 persons)
Year Total Workplaces Regional Insured Voluntary Voluntary + continuous
WP Insured Total Rural Urban
rsquo88 4433 586 4431 - - - 14 03
rsquo92 5021 1204 4977 - - - 322 115
rsquo95 7497 1525 5542 1890 1890 - 487 158
rsquo99 16262 1861 5238 10822 2083 8739 329 1686
rsquo08 18335 9216 9493 8781 1941 6841 276 329
909 18614(1000)
9729 9894(532)
8647(464)
1914 6734 335(02)
389(02)
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by sex (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Sex Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Male 612 639 589 257 305
Female 388 361 411 743 695
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by age (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Age Total Workplace Regions Voluntary Voluntary ampContinuous
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Under 30 199 233 162 06 -
30-39 294 332 252 59 -
40-49 293 281 309 235 -
50-59 211 154 277 700 -
60amp over 02 - 00 - 1000
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Under 5 5-9 10-49 50-99 100-499
Workplace 631 205 140 13 09
Insured 139 130 258 88 164
500-999 1000-2999 3000-4999 5000-9999 10000 amp over
Workplace 01 00 00 00 00
Insured 53 64 26 26 52
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 2 Applied Population by the N P
The Insured in regions with exemption from contributions (Sep 2009)
(Unit )
Total insured
Total insured in regions
Urban Rural
1000 1000 1000 1000
The insured with earnings declaration -
420(1000)
400(742)
490(258)
The insured with contribution exemption
270 580(100)
600(806)
510(194)
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅰ- 3 Size of Pensioners and Benefit Level The Insured by size of workplaces (Sep 2009)
(Unit 1000 persons )
65 or more in total
Basic Old age Pension
NP+Public Occupational No benefit
5210(1000)
3563(684)
1377(NP1195 PoP 182)(264)
953(183)
Only BOAP 553 NP+BOAP 131Only NP or POPs (133))
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Administrative Challenging Population
Groups in the NP
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅱ-1 Groups Excluded from the Application Types of the groups excluded from the
application (Sep 2009)(Unit 1000 persons )
Types persons
Students amp military personnel aged 18 to 27 3344 251
Insured of public occupational pension 1450 109
Pensioners of the public occupational pension 110 08
Beneficiaries of the Basic Livelihood 755 57
Pensioners of the National Pension 79 06
Spouses with no earnings 5534 416
Others 2048 154
Total 13320 1000
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅱ-2 Groups Exempted from Paying Causes of exemption from paying
contributions (Sep 2009)(Unit )
Total Unemployed Suspension from office
Cease of business
Hospitalization over 3 months
1000 759 19 87 02
National disaster
Economic difficulties
In jail Missing Schooling etc
00 68 02 07 56
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅱ-3 Groups not Paying contributions Rates of contributions collections
(11 Sep lsquo09~10 Oct lsquo09)(Unit billion won )
Total Workplaces The insured in regions Voluntary(+Continuously)
Total Urban Rural
1877 1671 201 156 45 5
881 938 584 588 569 1000
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅱ-4 The Insured with Low Earnings Average earnings of the insured by types
(Unit thousand won)
Average earnings in total
Workplaces The insured in regions
Average Urban Rural
Dec rsquo95 943 1053 577 - 577
Apr rsquo99 1096 1440 785 841 629
Dec rsquo08 1751 2012 1089 1119 1003
Sep lsquo09 1763 2016 1073 1101 994
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Causes of Low Compliance to the
Scheme
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅲ -1 Feeble Labor Market amp Economic Difficulties
Size and rate of affiliation to the NP among the insured as employees
(Unit 1000 persons )
Types 2004 2005 2006 2007
Temporary casualinformal
1540(316) 1630(329) 2100(255) 2170(231)
Temporary casualformal
1870(411) 1930(454) 13080(324) 3030(301)
Regularinformal 1520(969) 1420(979) 1500(977) 1720(985)
Regularformal 5940(981) 6260(993) 6530(985) 6800(994)
Total 10860(787) 11230(802) 13220(714) 13720(719)
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅲ -2 Defective Infrastructure for Good Administration
Vulnerable to catch the earnings activities and earnings of the insured in regions appropriately- Gradual improvement but yet enough
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅲ -3 Mistrust on the National Pension
Misunderstanding of the National Pension- Difficulty of understanding the complicated social insurance pension
Short history of the National Pension- Pensioners are much better than the insuredin the level of trust
- Gradual increase of trust in the N P
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Measures for Better Administrating the
Challenging Groups
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅳ - 1 To Promote Contribution Careers
Activating the delayed payment of contributions and the return of lump sum refund
Subsidizing contributions to the low income earners
Expansion of credits Activating voluntary affiliation Reduction of minimum qualifying years
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅳ - 2 Improvement of Administrative Capacity
Promoting the transition of the insured status to the insured in workplaces
Improvement of infrastructure to seize earnings appropriately
Consolidation of collection organizations
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅳ - 3 Improving the Trusts in the Scheme
To promote the insuredrsquos understanding tothe NP- Giving better and more customer-oriented services
Gradual increase of the insuredrsquos interests in the NP as the NP matures
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Empirical Examination
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 1 Policy Options for Coverage Expansion Option1 Introduction of non-contributory universal
basic pension- Due to rapid population aging the BP expenditure alone will take
up 72~96 of GDP in 2050 (avg rep rate 15~20)- When financed by VAT the tax rate (currently 10) should go up
to 21~29 by 2050
Option2 Providing compliance incentives thru contribution subsidy
- How effective is the contribution subsidy in enhancing coverage ofthe challenging groups
- Who should be the targeted groups
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 2 Current Contribution Subsidy for FarmersFishermen
Beneficiaries persons who are engaged in agricultureforestry livestock or fishery businesses(farmers and fishermen)
Subsidizing period 1995 ~ 2014
Financing tax-financed (Special Accounts for Agricultureand Fishery Structure Adjustment)
Subsidy amount
- if monthly income le SIA 45 of income (12 of contribution)
- if monthly income gt SIA 45 of SIA (fixed amount)
SIA(Standard Income Amount) 3-year average income of the total insured
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 3 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study KIHASA 2007- number of obs 1723(individually insured 18~59)
Model Probit Regression
Classification Regular Non-regular Self-employed Others Total
Workplace based
Insured
Paid 1977 (995) 180 (862) 75 (828) 14 (144) 2245 (943)
Unpaid 10 (05) 29 (139) 16 (172) 81 (860) 136 (57)
Sub Total 1987 (834) 209 (88) 91 (38) 95 (40) 2382 (100)
Individually Insured
Paid 120 (526) 108 (324) 461 (673) 134 (284) 824 (479)
Unpaid 108 (474) 227 (676) 224 (327) 340 (716) 899 (522)
Sub Total 228 (133) 335 (195) 685 (398) 474 (275) 1723 (100)
exempted 80 (739) 166 (730) 109 (489) 298 (878) 653 (727)
default on premiums 28 (261) 61 (270) 115 (511) 42 (122) 246 (273)
Others include unpaid family workers unemployed economically inactive populationData Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (1) Compliance rates of the subsidized farmers and fishermen are
highest throughout all income levels Non-compliance is pronounced among wage workers who are
mostly low-paid and temporarydaily workers
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Income Levels
563622
710 737 724662
616
725
9191000 1000
755
406
800
386
534
399
205
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-10000 10000~20000 20000~30000 30000~40000 40000+ Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 4 Differences in Compliance Rates (2)
Compliance rates are increasing with the higher age cohorts
Data Korean Welfare Panel Study 2007
ltFiguregt Compliance Rates among the Individually Insured by Age Cohorts
415
635 645
763
662
00
607
767 770 755
166
320
428
662
406
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18~30 31~40 41~50 51~59 Total
Self-employ ed Farmers amp Fishermen Wage Workers
()
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 5 Effectiveness of Contribution Subsidy
The marginal effect of contribution subsidy to farmers and fishermen is statistically significant and robust
Among sub-groups the effect of contribution subsidy is significantly high when compared to wage workers
- Compared to other self-employed contribution subsidies areestimated to increase the compliance rates of farmers and fishermen by close to 10 percentage point
- Provision of similar subsidies to individually-insured wage workers may increase the compliance rates substantially
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
ltTablegt Regression Results (Probit)
Dependent VariablesIndividually Insured Self-employed
employer Wage Workers
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6
Gender00175 00075 00059 -00004 00120 -00217
(0039) (0039) (0052) (0052) (0053) (0055)
Education00119 00142 00076 00101 00026 00060
(0006) (0007) (0008) (0008) (0009) (0009)
Age00162 00190 00204 00222 00042 00103
(0018) (0018) (0026) (0026) (0023) (0024)
Age200000 -00000 -00001 -00001 00002 00001
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
ln d_income1)01762 01825 00805 00858 02747 02923
(0032) (0033) (0032) (0033) (0048) (0049)
d_agri01953 00939 03076
(0053) (0053) (0061)
of obs 1240 1240 690 690 706 706
Log pseudolikelihood -7797 -7744 -4199 -1486 -4256 -4141
Robust standard errors in parentheses plt001 plt005 plt011) adjusted for family size using n
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(1)
There is a strong possibility that the provision of contribution subsidy can substantially increase the compliance rates of atypical workers with low wages
Contribution subsidy can be considered as a pre-emptive social investment as it will alleviatepoverty among the elderly in the future
It is much less costly compared to the introduction of non-contributory demogrant-type basic pension
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Ⅴ- 6 Policy Implications(2)
How to design subsidy scheme
- provide incentives both to workers to participate in the NPP
- and to employers to convert the individually insured workersinto workplace-based insured
example 3(G)-3(E)-3(W) for very low-paid workers2(G)-35(E)-35(W) for low-paid workers
- need to consider the equity issue between workers and self-employed
Thank You
Thank You