Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Bi-level providers - consumers competitionmodel
CUI Yaheng, BEAUDE Olivier, LE DU Marc,ZORGATI Riadh
EDF R&D OSIRIS department
Smart Energy and Stochastic Optimization thematicweek - June 2, 2016
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Outline
1 Decentralizing in electricity systems
2 Bi-level competition model
3 Simulation
4 Conclusion and perspectives
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Outline
1 Decentralizing in electricity systems
2 Bi-level competition modelConsumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumer with RE and storage
Providers modelYearly dynamics
3 SimulationPreliminar simulation setting: only 2 providersSimulations: convergence of the dynamics?Simulations: analysis of the obtained equilibrium
4 Conclusion and perspectives
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Decentralizing in electricity systems: big picture
Legislator
regulatory rules, constraints
Global / local network manager
responsible for the global / local supply - demand balance
Wholesale producertraditional / virtual power plants
Minimize his global costown supply - demand eq. + risk
Productionplanning
Adjustmentrequest
Other producerslocal, intermittent
Minimize his global costlocal supply - demand eq. + risk
Productionplanning
ElectricitymarketS
Buy
Sell
Buy
Sell
Providers / traders
Buy Sell
Nonflexible consumers
traditional fixed
electrical appliances
Calculate his Bill
Flexible consumersfixed applis + flexible ones
(water-heaters, electric veh.)
Minimize his bill
Flexible cons. withlocal productionfixed applis + flexible ones+ local (intermittent) prod.
Min. his billMax. his self-cons. / prod.
Sell
1st subproblem Providers / traders
Buy Sell
Nonflexible consumers
traditional fixed
electrical appliances
Calculate his Bill
Flexible consumersfixed applis + flexible ones
(water-heaters, electric veh.)
Minimize his bill
Flexible cons. withlocal productionfixed applis + flexible ones+ local (intermittent) prod.
Min. his billMax. his self-cons. / prod.
Sell
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Decentralizing in electricity systems: a few main
ingredients
Decentralize = a few reasons / needs
emergence of local actors → new (local) decision-takers
⇒ coordinate local VS global with prices, incentivesNatural framework for bilevel models + mechanismdesign [4, 9]
huge and complex problems
⇒ (stochastic) decomposition = ”fictively” decentralize
local data / information (privacy concerns...)
⇒ Design of (strategic) information exchange scheme[2, 5]
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Outline
1 Decentralizing in electricity systems
2 Bi-level competition modelConsumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumer with RE and storage
Providers modelYearly dynamics
3 SimulationPreliminar simulation setting: only 2 providersSimulations: convergence of the dynamics?Simulations: analysis of the obtained equilibrium
4 Conclusion and perspectives
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Bi-level competition model
Bi-level competition game (Stackelberg multiple-leaders /multiple-followers game):
Leaders (upper level): electricity providers f ∈ F
Followers (lower level): electricity consumers c ∈ C
Provider1 Provider2 · · · ProviderF
Non-flexible
consumers
Flexible
consumers
Flexible
consumers withRE and storage
Electricityprice
Providerchoice
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Consumer electricity bill and provider profit
Yearly price for provider f is a sequence of size D ∗ T withindices j ∈ J day and t ∈ T time-slot.
Price [6]:
pfj(t) = gfjt(∑
c∈C
ℓcj(t))
Consumer bill:
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈T
pfj(t)× ℓcj(t)
Provider profit:
∑
c∈Cf
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈T
pfj(t)× ℓcj(t)
with Cf set of consumers choosing f as provider.
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Nonflexible consumer
Nonflexible consumption profile: ℓ0c = (ℓ0cj (t))j∈J ,t∈T
Pb = provider choice
minf ∈F
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈T
pf j(t)× ℓ0cj (t)
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Flexible consumer
Fixed consumption profile: ℓ0c = (ℓ0cj (t))j∈J ,t∈T
+ Flexible consumption profile: ℓ1c = (ℓ1cj (t))j∈J ,t∈T
Pb = flexible consumption scheduling + provider choice
minf ∈F
∑
j∈J
minℓ1cj∈R
T+
∑
t∈T
pf j(t)× (ℓ0cj(t) + ℓ1cj(t))
s.t.
{ℓ1cj (t) ≤ ℓmax, ∀j ∈ J ,∀t ∈ T ,∑
t∈T ℓ0cj (t) + ℓ1cj(t) = Lcj , ∀j ∈ J
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Flexible consumer with renewable energy (RE)
and storage
Fixed consumption ℓ0c + flexible consumption ℓ
1c
RE generation profile w
storage charging /discharging profile s
→ storage energy level ecj(t) = ecj (t − 1) + scj (t)
Pb = consumption/storage scheduling + provider choice
minf ∈F
∑
j∈J
minℓ1cj∈RT+,
s∈RJ×T
∑
t∈T
pf j(t)× [ℓ0cj(t) + ℓ1cj (t)− wcj(t) + scj(t)]+
s.t.
ℓ1cj(t) ≤ ℓmax, ∀j ∈ J ,∀t ∈ T ,∑
t∈T ℓ0cj (t) + ℓ1cj(t) = Lcj , ∀j ∈ J ,
0 ≤ ecj (t) ≤ Ec , ∀j ∈ J ,∀t ∈ T ,
where [x ]+ = max(x , 0).
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Providers model
For provider f ∈ F
Πf (pf ,p−f ) =∑
c∈Cf (pf ,p−f )
∑
j∈J
∑
t∈T
pfj(t)× ℓcj(t)
where p−f the prices proposed by alternative providers
p−f = (p1, · · · ,pf−1,pf+1, · · · ,pF )
Pb = profit maximization
maxpf ∈P f
Πf (pf ,p−f )
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Consumer’s/provider’s decisions update: a yearly
dynamics
Consumer’s choices 6= perfect rationality → Discretechoice models [8]
1. Class choiceProportions in different classes for the year to come
γyi =
e−αconsCyi
∑i∈{0,1,2} e
−αconsCyi
with y index of year, i index of the classes (0 non-flexible, 1flexible, 2 flexible with RE and storage), Ci cost, αcons pricesensibility for consumers.
2. Provider’s choiceSame model with αprov
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Consumer’s/provider’s decisions update: a yearly
dynamics
Provider f ’s price-update → best-response strategy [3]
pf ,y ∈ arg maxpf ∈P f
Πf (pf ,p−f ,y−1)
with y year index,
−f = (1, · · · , f − 1, f + 1, · · · ,F ) alternative providers.
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Outline
1 Decentralizing in electricity systems
2 Bi-level competition modelConsumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumer with RE and storage
Providers modelYearly dynamics
3 SimulationPreliminar simulation setting: only 2 providersSimulations: convergence of the dynamics?Simulations: analysis of the obtained equilibrium
4 Conclusion and perspectives
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Simulation setting: only 2 providers
Two providers: F = {1, 2}
Two classes of consumers: non-flexible, flexible
Consumers daily energy need → ”Recoflux” ERDF data:nonflexible consumption = base consumptionflexible consumption = water-heating
No yearly evolution of energy needs
Daily exogenous on/off peak fare:
pf = (t fon, tfoff , p
fon, p
foff )
0am 5am 10am 3pm 8pm
Time
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Price
(€/kWh)
ton toff
pon
poff
On/off time fare
Off peak fare choices On peak fare choices
Other parameters: αprov, αcons, ℓmax max. flexible load,
γy=0flex
initial proportion of flexible consumers
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Pseudo-code for the yearly dynamics simulation
Initial year pf ,y=0 randomly chosen
Calculate initial consumers consumption+ provider choice
while∑
f ∈F ‖pf ,y − pf ,y−1‖ >= ǫ and y ≤ Y do
Next year y = y + 1
for f ∈ F do
for pf ∈ Pf do
Simulate consumers consumption+ provider choice
Calculate Πf (pf , p−f ,y−1)
end for
Choose pf ,y maximizing Πf (·, p−f ,y−1)end for
end while
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Simulations: convergence of the dynamics
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Bill (p.u.)
Dynamic bills for flexible consumer
Provider 1
Provider 2
αprov=αcons=1
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0
20
40
60
80
100
Proportion (%)
Dynamic proportions for flexible consumer
Total
Provider 1
Provider 2
αprov=αcons=0.05
Figure: γy=0flex
= 100% and ℓmax = 3kW
0am 5am 10am 3pm 8pm
Time
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Price
(€/kWh)
maximal on/off allowed prices minimum off-peak duration
On/off time fare
Initial fare provider 1 Initial fare provider 2 Final fare
⇒ same final fare for both providers with minimumoff-peak duration and maximum prices levels
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Convergence: impact of discrete choice models
αcons ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}αprov ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 4}
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0α_cons
0
1
2
3
4
5
α_prov
Convergence of the dynamics
Convergence
Divergence
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Bill (p.u.)
Convergent dynamics
Provider 1
Provider 2
αprov=αcons=0.05
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Year
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Bill (p.u.)
Divergent dynamics
Provider 1
Provider 2
αprov=αcons=0.05
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Consumer’s bill / provider’s profit at equilibrium
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Bill (p.u.)
Bill dynamics
Nonflexible
Flexible
αprov=αcons=0.05
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Profit (p.u.)
Profits dynamics
Provider 1
Provider 2
αprov=αcons=0.05
⇒ nonflexible consumer’s bill > flexible consumer’s bill
⇒ providers’ profit nearly doubled (strongly depends on themin./max. prices allowed to the providers)
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Estimated impact on the electricity network
metrics
0am 5am 10am 15pm 20pm
Time
0
1
2
3
4
Consu
mption (kW
)
Daily consumptionInitial
Finalαprov=αcons=0.05
PARy=1 : 1.34PARy=5 : 2.03
⇒ Peak-to-Average-Ratio PAR = max(ℓ)mean(ℓ) almost doubled!
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Consumers interest for flexibilityFlexible x%: consumer with x% of flexibility (SAME TOTALENERGY NEED)
ex Flexible 0% = nonflexible / Flexible 100% = flexible
1 2 3 4 5
Year
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Bill (p.u.)
Dynamic cost with different level of flexiblity (%)
γ 0flex = 0%
γ 0flex = 25%
γ 0flex = 50%
γ 0flex = 75%
γ 0flex = 100% αprov=αcons=0.05
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Sensibility to initial consumer pool
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Bill (p.u.)
γ 0flex = 10%
γ 0flex = 20%
γ 0flex = 30%
γ 0flex = 40%
γ 0flex = 50%
γ 0flex = 60%
γ 0flex = 70%
γ 0flex = 80%
γ 0flex = 90%
γ 0flex = 100%
αprov=αcons=0.05
⇒ no effect of initial pool on the obtained (final)equilibrium
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Outline
1 Decentralizing in electricity systems
2 Bi-level competition modelConsumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumer with RE and storage
Providers modelYearly dynamics
3 SimulationPreliminar simulation setting: only 2 providersSimulations: convergence of the dynamics?Simulations: analysis of the obtained equilibrium
4 Conclusion and perspectives
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
Conclusion and perspectives
generic bilevel model to analyze providers - consumerscompetition
intuitive preliminary simulation results on a simplesetting→ to be enriched with sourcing part (end of good timesfor providers...)
theoretical study of a simplified Stackelberg modelwith
only F = 2 providersonly nonflexible and flexible consumersendogenous polynomial prices (link with existing resultsin routing games [7, 1]).
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
References I
Eitan Altman, Tamer Basar, Tania Jimenez, and NahumShimkin.Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs.Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 47(1):92–96,2002.
Vincent P Crawford and Joel Sobel.Strategic information transmission.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,pages 1431–1451, 1982.
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole.Game Theory.MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
References II
L. Gkatzikis, I. Koutsopoulos, and T. Salonidis.The role of aggregators in smart grid demand responsemarkets.IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,31(7):1247–1257, July 2013.
B Larrousse, O Beaude, and S Lasaulce.Crawford-sobel meet Lloyd-Max on the grid.In Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),2014 IEEE International Conference on, pages6127–6131, 2014.
A. H. Mohsenian-Rad, V. W. S. Wong, J. Jatskevich,R. Schober, and A. Leon-Garcia.Autonomous demand-side management based ongame-theoretic energy consumption scheduling for thefuture smart grid.
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
References III
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 1(3):320–331, Dec2010.
Ariel Orda, Raphael Rom, and Nahum Shimkin.Competitive routing in multiuser communicationnetworks.IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (ToN),1(5):510–521, 1993.
Kenneth Train.Qualitative choice analysis: Theory, econometrics, andan application to automobile demand, volume 10.MIT press, 1986.
Bi-level providers -consumers
competition model
CUI Yaheng,BEAUDE Olivier,LE DU Marc,
ZORGATI Riadh
Decentralizing inelectricity systems
Bi-levelcompetition model
Consumer model
Nonflexible consumer
Flexible consumer
Flexible consumerwith RE and storage
Providers model
Yearly dynamics
Simulation
Preliminar simulationsetting: only 2providers
Simulations:convergence of thedynamics?
Simulations: analysisof the obtainedequilibrium
Conclusion andperspectives
References IV
W. Tushar, J. A. Zhang, D. B. Smith, H. V. Poor, andS. Thibaux.Prioritizing consumers in smart grid: A game theoreticapproach.IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 5(3):1429–1438, May2014.