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Lewis R. Binford U .nlversitv of New Mexico Alb, u qu erq ue 459

In Pursuit of the Future

Background

In the late d I

d

1950S an ear y 1960s a numbet of us advocated some fun-

amental chang . h h"'es III t e way arc aeologists Viewed the archaeological

record and p ti I I . h "" ar ICU ar y III t e conventIOnS then current for assigningmeaning to archaeological facts. Subsequently, there have been majorchanges in the ways archaeologists approach the archaeological record

and, III turn, in the ways in which we seek 10 justify the meanings weassign to archaeological observations. What I wish 10 discuss is nor what

we have done-that is a matter of record and should perhaps more ap-

propriately be discussed by others. Instead, I want 10 discuss what needs

to be done.Science is a field that is dedicated to addressing our ignorance and,

as such, should have built-in tactics designed 10 guide us 10 the recogni-non of ignorance in need of investigation. For the generation of those

who were my teachers, recognized ignorance consisted largely of rhe sites

we had not dug or the places and time periods we had not investigated.

Ignorance was recognized as primarily arising from a lack of observa-

tions or discoveries. I tried to cballenge this view of ignorance by point-ing out that ignorance must also be recognized in the character of theknowledge and belief base that we use when interpreting our observa-

tions. This challenge arose directly from the implications that the findings

of general anthropology bave for archaeology. It was difficult 10 Ignorethe teachings of anthropology, especially rhe demonstration that culture,

the received knowledge and beliefs that we use 10 Vlewmg the world: (r). diff d"" I ItS ao d (2) IScharactenz

ed

IS 1 erent among iverse SOCIOCU tura sys em ,

b

di " h hi . I . t ry of a given cultural sys-y ifferenr stages dutlng t e !SlOlIca traJec 0

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460 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 461

tern. It had to be acknowledged that scientists are not exempt from cul-ture; they, like all other humans, are participants in culture. This meansthat for science to be truly successful it not only has to acknowledgeignorance about the external world but also to view its task as recogniz-ing ignorance of a particular type, ignorance relative to the culture, thereceived "knowledge" and beliefs, of the scientists themselves, This is avery different view of science than that which characterized the earlierphases in the development of scientific methods, Under early, strict em-piricists' views it was thought that the dedicated scientist could clear hismind of cultural bias and see reality "objectively." Anyone familiar withanthropology cannot accept such a position. We cannot operate as hu-mans outside Our cultural milieu.

The task of science is not only to sharpen and hone our culturallyconditioned ideas about the external world but, in addition, to investi-gate the limitations of our received knowledge and beliefs about the ex-ternal world. In short, the task of science is not the objective approxi-

mation of "truth" but just the opposite: the investigation of ourculturally guided ignorance about reality. If we accept this goal, and theview that culture is learned, then it is clear that the enhancement of knowledge could modify our culture. If as anthropologically informedscientists we are successful in approaching our goal, then our refinementof knowledge (and thus of culture itself) will enrich our ability for deal-ing with reality.

How well does our received knowledge allow us to deal with theworld of experience? How accurate is our alleged knowledge of theworld? If one adopts other perspectives or contrastive means of obser-vation, how different does the world of experience appear? These are thequestions and tactics I used in my early papers to question the utility of the traditional archaeological paradigm, I tried to demonstrate that usingthe normative culture concept as an exclusive explanation for archaeo-logically observed differences and similarities was inadequate and mis-leading. I tried to demonstrate that processes and forces other than themental templates of the ancients conditioned the archaeological recordas seen by archaeologists. Once this is recognized, it becomes clear thatthe archaeological record contains information of relevance to the inter-esting problem of understanding cultural differences themselves. Thiswas an attempt to enrich our archaeological knowledge. At the sametime it was a critical evaluation of the inadequacy of traditional archae-ological concept of culture to guide us to an understanding of the past

and, more importantly, of cultural processes themselves.

Two Responses to the New Archaeologv

, , , he exclusive explanation for theThe shift from believing In culture as t h d irs contain inforrna-

., that t e e poslarchaeological record to recogruzmg h ture of culture itself

' 'II ligh s as to t every nation that will potentia yen I ten u I f 'n nocence, For man y,id CI k ( 3) as our ass a I dis descr ibed by Davi a r e 197 ith hIss of innocencean

ne W,t rn e rothe state of innocence was a secure 0 . , ty What do we do?, I ' sea of uncerram . "security t hey found them se ves in a, , In this SItuatIOn

' hat i ducrive strategy, ,How do we proceed? W at IS a pro f ther fields of invesn-ists b k guidance rom a hman y arch aeo logists egan to see " uences. O n the at er

hi h h d ennchmg conseq iseuid dgarion, in many cases, t IS as a I umber of misgur e, hi chaeo ogy a n 'IIhand there has grown up WIt rn ar among those who WI

' " ing converts 'darguments that many claim are gaml t that I feelare in nee, I ' these argumen s hreplace the current generation. tIS, I the could well lead arc ae-

of review. If they are not treated SetlOUSy, Iuctive era, I will refer to

, . h b k ard and nonpro I uctural-ology mro still anot er a c w " d (2) contextua -SIrt ctlOlllSman two ap-these arguments as (1) recons ru , t between these, f dlsagreemen hei opo-ism. There are many pomts a , tellectually unique, t ell Pfrh '

'themasm ote"preaches, and while I treat f ' I to acknowledge manyff d d b my at urenents will surely be a en e y ,

di iveness I I cy of archaICdetai led c laims to i snncuv . b I 'n te llecma ega I'" a e an di a IStSI consider reconstructIOnISm t ach with which tra 'lion h f

' ' " ItIS an appro "th the groW! 0science or stnct empmcism. d cates the posmon at b 'Id'ng an

' f ble It a vo d on UI Iwould be quue com orta ,' , I sive lydepen ent up , k b brick .d ndmg ISexc u I' bnc Yknowledge and un ersta I d bout external rea Ill' 'Ill' limit-

f k owe ge a . 's traglcaaccurate structure on, mp [etely wro ng, It I h o t hink ' thIS IS not co he ones w

While in a StrIct sense I dge that we are r ( did the' , ay acknow e II assumes asing. Its practll loners m, yet i t operationa Y d 1 ssumesthatId f xpenence, I war! . t a

abou t t he war a e h 'des in the externa 'I f mation pro-, ' ) h t trut reS! ch 10gICa orarchaic sClennsts tanding of ar aeo ,,, bserver- wete understa th " bJ'ectlve a ,

by gaining an accura h Id be clear to e a b' tively Thus, Crtt-cesses-processes that s ~u haeological record a Jec f a~empring tocan, by force of will, see t, e a~cequently takes the form

habiases of "this

h' int of vIew r , tales, t e f theicism from t IS po . and cautlonary "e~ nature 0strallo n , the tru th'

point out, by reman h eolog ist from seemg 'us statemenr on 15world" that keep the arc a

B,ford 19 83 for a prevlO

I rd (see m , thatarchaeologica reco , 'ntellect ual , m, d to be anll-' J owthIssue). rructionism ten s f borh canceptua gr

In addition, recons, the importance a, p preclateadvocates fall to a

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464 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 465

tossed out the "testing of ideas" aspects and focused on the externalworld as the direct source of knowledge. They saw knowledge as flowingto us from "discoveries" in the world of experience (Gould 1985). Ourideas were tacitly seen as potential "distortions" of rhe true reality, areality that could be known directly through insightful, observational

"purification" and accurate measurement. This purification has been ex-tended to include skepticism regarding the "borrowing" of ideas fromother fields (Schiffer 1981:91-904), a failure to see value in conceptand theory development (Schiffer 1981:95), and, recently, the open ad-vocacy of a return to empiricism (Gould 1985).

The tactical research focus on behavior by new archaeologists,which occurred in the Context of idea evaluation, has been strangely mis-interpreted as a denial of the importance of culture itself. Some have evenadvocated the scrapping of the culture concept in favor of a focus onbehavior (see Flannery 198:> for a reaction to this trend). For them, thegoal of archaeology should be the accurate reconstruction of past dy-

namics in the proximate or behavioral sense, which will eventually leadto an "ethnographic" picture of the past. The final goal is seen as uncov-ering, in the empiricist's sense, laws of human behavior. The challengeoffered by new archaeologists and the tactics appropriate to that chal-lenge were proposed as an evaluarion of the intellectual tools of archae-ology and paradigmatic growth. Reconstructionists, however, were ledto redirect the goals of archaeological inference (i.e., describing past be-haviors particularistically rather than past cultures organizationally) andadopted a reactionary idea of science.

At the same time that reconstructionism was building in the litera-ture, another important and very different reaction to the new archaeol-ogy was taking place. This response was guided not from an attempt toreturn to outdated methods of science, but from what was thought to bea "new" view that challenged the very utility of science itself. I refer tothis reaction as contextual-structuralism.

The recognition that we cannot achieve "objectivity" in the mannerconceived by archaic scientists became a popular point for endless reiter-ation. The recognition of the importance of culture, standing as a filterbetween us and "reality," was emphasized. During the era of the growthof the new archaeology the writings of Thomas Kuhn (197 0) were readwidely by the new generation of archaeologists. Kuhn makes importantpoints regarding objectivity that are directed toward philosophers of science. When read from a nonscientific perspective, however, these

arguments appear to cripple the approach to learning that many readers

naively believe to be the scientific method: the archaic view of science.The result has been exactly the opposite of the response by the re-constructionists. Where the reconstructionists have adopted a "reaction-ary" view of science by returning to a strict empiricism, the contextual-structuralists have largely rejected all science. Wbete some reconstruc-tionists essentially reject the concept of culture, the contextual-structuralists embrace it not only as the explanation for the archaeolog-ical record (Hodder 198:>a)but the explanation fat the behavior of scien-tists (Landau 1981: Perper and Schrier 1977). They espouse the viewthatscience is incapable of producing knowledge, instead, it is thought to becapable only of projecting subjective, culture-bound views onto the ex-ternal world. From this perspective the new archaeologists are labeledout-of-date archaic scientist/empiricists or "ditty" positivists, while atthe same time the demand is made for a return to the traditional "cul-tural" approach for the interpretation of archaeological remains. This

, ' k " I d's that we can evaluate theposture leads to crippling s epncrsrn. t eme

. d hit' ally understand culture;utility of our own Ideas an t at we can ana y ICin short, it denies that science can help us to learn.

We might be able to see the I'ast more clearly : : : : lt O ~ ~ c ~ ~between our misinterpretatl?nbs I and w t~[Leon/ and Palkovichrealistically, there IS no surra e met a1985:43 0 ].

, irion h ve only nihilistican-What can we do? Advocates of this poSltfIOnafi methodology in

d the " nny" 0 SClentl cswers. We should aban on e tyrarmr n society since "our) , . frelevance In our ow ,

favor of "important ISsuesa "(M e and Keene 1983:4-f ' I context oorresearch i s a resul t a our SOCia h learn f rom our inter-

'need t at we canII). For those of us who are convi b ill chauvinistic suggestions.,. ' th se appear to e 51 y, . 'acnon W Ithexpenence, e I " and reconstCllCtlonJsm ,ar-

, ' h t tual-structura ISmIn contending Wit con ex d bl b' d"'lll"ou em.chaeology is clearly in an mte ecrua

A Theoretical Response to the Issues

f th mixed with misguidedggets a rru I dAs in many contlicts there are nu h t I cannot use knowledge a

" ite true t a h ethought. For instance, It IS qui think with ideas I do not ave.not have. It is equally true that I cann:~ent that we are limited by re-Thus the contextual-strucrura!tst arg I tools available in our time IS

, d b the conceptusceived knowledge an y

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466 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford i In Pursuit of the Future 467

demonstrably correct. Demonstrating that the ideas with which we work are consistent with the culrure of which we are a part is trivial. Do wereally expect scientists to be "outside" their culture? That, of course, isimpossible. Pointing such things our, however, does not mean that weare intellectually determined. Just because scientists are culture-bearing

animals does not mean that they are intellectually shackled by cultureand doomed to the ignorance and subjectivity of their time. Similarly,demonstrating a consistency between what we think at anyone time andthe broader cultural matrix in which we participate does not provide anevaluation of the utility and accuracy of those ideas, regardless of theirongin.

The reconstructionist position contains equally limiting ideas. Themost restricting, in my opinion, is the strict empiricist approach to learn-ing. The reconstructionist tendency is to view empirical generalizationsas the primary goal of research; to attempt the inductive elevation of such descriptive statements to "lawlike" status; and in turn to believe

that this empirically grounded description of the world will somehowallow us to gain an understanding of the world (Raab and Goodyear19 84; Salmon 1982; Schiffer 1976:4; Smith 1982). The positive aspectsof this "empirically grounded" posture are that a focus on descriptioncan lead to more accurate recording, to the recognition of complexity(such as many of the so-called distortions that may stand between thestatic record and the dynamics of the past), and to a greater appreciationfor the character of the empirical domain that we study: the archaeolog-ical record. Accurate description and justified inference are crucial toscience, but as Hugh Mellor (1982:60) has pointed out:

III

II

III

III

1

l

one accepts this damning criticism of empiricism, then the consequencewill be that empiricists in fact only describe the world "subjectively,"andthe growth of knowledge will be tragically curtailed.

The defenders of empiricism could note with justification that "dis-coveries" are possible, that we can encounter experiences for which we

have no prior cognitive devices for accommodation, and that we canthereby expose the limitations of our ideas. Although this is certainlycorrect, the presence of anomalies does not ensure their recogrunon. Asmost cultural anthropologists would be quick to point out, we have theremarkable capacity to accommodate the world of experience to whatwe already believe about that world. I would argue that dis~overiesarenot simply the intrusion of the external world on our cogrnnve frame-work. Instead, they come about largely from a skeptical posture on thepart of the scientists, who search for the inadequaCIes 10 their reeel,vedwisdom and thereby prompt their most valuable asset (th~1[irnagma-tions) to develop and invent new and more appropriate cogrunvedevices

and theories, Such things come from us, not from experIence. ,The empiricist approach seeks to ground empirically o~r experr-

ences in conventionally made and synthesized observatIOns.!liIS en5~re~that we will never see challenges to our conventions, A Strict empmcaapproach tends to reinforce the false view that our contemporary cogm-

d d at the same time suppressestive tools and knowledge are a equate an, ' there I'S, ' ' The Important pOlO

our most valuable asset, our ImagInatIOns. , nces An ap-di f h we use our expene .

to have a clear understan mg 0 ow d d description in con-proach that seeks empirical generalIzatIons ernan s oach to learning is

h h hand the correct apprventional te rms. On tea t e r nanu, the l imitat ions of ourf ience to expose

dependent upon the use a expen , " I 'Sclearly limited.I ' t tegy empIrICIsm

conventions, As a earrnng s raregy, lit

a roaches may appearto

Although the contextual or structura s, pp an be argued in ways, 'If of these posItIons c ,

challenge SCiencei tse , many h f science, For mstance,ib the growt a our

that could well contn ute to hi k thoughtSthat we. , tha t we cannot t Instrong dedication to the posItIOn, 'I ble to US is crucial. Ae-

k id e that IS unavar a ddo not have or use nowe g If' nee as I have pres ente, . I'd the goa SO sere , Iceptance of this posItIon va I ares f cogni tiveand theore tIca

, I ist st c o urown I' 'them namely, the skeptIca rrus ru, the exposure of their mura-

, , ' , dedIcatIon to dtools and hence the sCIentIsts , fawn culrure-boun perspec-

d trauon 0 our .' " hatrions, The continuous emo ns, f " f wi ll" and "objec tIVIty tf I if the old claIm a ree I in humantives clearly a si es, d traditional attempts to exp a

plagued both archaIC SCIencean

Explanation is not a kind of inference. Just because the phenomenonto be explained would be more safely predictable if it were moreprobable doesn't mean it would therefore also be better explained.

When the strict empiricist approach to understanding is followedthere is a disdain for the use of imagination and for inventive thought,and a cry for grounded empirical relevance for every idea introduced(Gould 1985:641). Bur the search for understanding-explanation-isan intellectual activity and not strictly a synthesis of observations. Thus,the empiricist approach ensures that understanding will not be forthcom-ing, only that we will have a more accurate description of the world asit appears when we are guided by our particular cognitive framework. If

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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -468 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford / In Pursuit of the Future 469behavior. The limitations of the contextual-structuralist position appearwhen there is a failure to acknowledge that the enhancement of scientif-ically guided learning strategies can result in the growth of knowledge.

The anti-science posture derives not from recognizing the role of culture in our daily lives but from the acceptance of a "generative" model

of culture change, which is characteristic of the contextual-structuralistposition. A generative view assumes that an inner core serves as the or-ganizing feature for surficial behavior or action. This organizing featureis manifest by the actions of participant/actors who are programmed tothis core of belief, meaning, or symbolic structure (for a clear exampleof this view, see Glassie 1975 and Deetz 1982).

As Ernest Gellner (1982:II6) has insightfully argued, however,

understanding of these processes, not from some imaginative character-ization of a stable and internally closed symbolic systemcapable only of "acceptable" rearrangement of its finite components. The structuralistposition is inappropriate to sociocultural systems, and more importantly,it is wrong.

The falsity of this posture is demonstrable by the factthat a paradoxis inherent in its arguments. For instance, we acknowledge, ascontextual-structuralists have that we cannot use ideas we do not haveor reason with information we do not possess. The paradox arises whenthis proposition is linked with the false generativeidea of sociocultural

. . d b W h hi d ,'t I'S commonlysuggesteddynamics descnbe a ove. en t ISIS one,b king to understand the par-that we cannot know the past except y see I

f h h h Id hy ancient peoples. Weticular symbolic codes or systems 0 t oug t e. .. h bl k h Id this aid us 1 1those ancienr peoples,mIg t reasona y as, ow wou I

. h did t have nor accumu atelike us could neither think Ideas t ey I no I f ' . th sked? For examp e, romknowledge relevant to quesnons ey never a bl k

. h I gist J might reasona Y as ,my retrospective viewpoint as an arc aeo 0 P I I' h i ,If I couldMiddl Upper a eo it Ie.what caused the transition from I e to .' . ith a popula-

, ime f th aphic mrervrew WImagically go back in t ime or an e nog r 'I fi d hat (r) they wouldtion of late Neanderthals, I would most certahmy n ttl'on and (2) they

I,' duri g sue arransr ,not know that they were ivmg unng su- sses both conditionif that major procewould have little 1 any awareness 'of thei r culture his-

. e the t rajector ytheir l ives and at the same nrne mov nima.inable to them.

. .' f f life unknown or u "..... . .tory In the direction 0 a way 0 ., of the partiCIpants m

gh b h fs or oplmonsHow c an the thou ts, e Ie,. blern t hat arises f rom a. id . solvmg a pro .

ancient cultural systems ar me m 'hat the ancients could nei-. erspecnve t , Ntotally different perspecnve-r-s P I d they did not have. 0

. b t with know e ge blther experience nor reason a ou. I " solutions to pro emsId VIderea isncNeander thal would or cou pro f myvastlydi fferentper-

. , ' the context 0 hPosed by me problems ar rs ing in . . t Asa modernarc ae-, d oral V1ewpom. . th tspective knowledge base, an temp, know somethmgof e pasologist ihave the wonderful opportumty to , 'pants in any intellecrually

. lly invisible to partlCJ . fast par-on a temporal scale vrrtua " 1 f the perspeCtlve 0 P

,. I I tern Slmtlar y, rom . aginabIe tounspecialized cu tura sys . f h . future in ways unrmthing a t err f lilYthat was

ticipants I can know some . . . hts into an order 0 rea , rh Ithem. I can quite literally gam msig Irural systems. Demanding diat

, ' . anClent cu I ff 82for a s-unknown to partiCIpants In , B' ford and Sab 0 r9

.. , ectlve (see1n m uch sense asadopt a particIpant s persp I r ty makes about as

.' ) theonyrea'cussion of thIS Issue as

IIlIIII1

[

(

I!

I

the point about the symbol tokens used by systems such as languageis that they are cheap .... Sounds, marks on the paper, symboltcgestures, all cost virtually nothing .... Because this is so, but onlybecause this is so ... we can expect symbolic systems to play out

their full inner potential.

Unfortunately, as Gellner (1982:II6) also points out, adherents to this"generative" view fail to appreciate a fundamental point, namely, that

there are extensive aspects of human life, alas including those thatseem essential to survival, whose actual sequence of events is deter-mined not merely by the free play of some underlying core mecha-nism (if it indeed exists at all), bur by the blind constraints andshortages and competitions and pressures of the real extraneous en-vironment.

Generative approaches fail to explain cultural systems because of their stubborn denial that we are dealing with thermodynamic systems,not simply with cost-free symbolic codes. Cultural systems are organi-zations with essential dynamics that are dependent upon the flow of en-ergy through them. Energy is captured by such systems in nature, not byhuman participants thinking or codifying costless symbolic dreamsabour this very concrete materialist process. In turn, the trajectory of aculturally organized thermodynamic system is not determined by whatthe bearers think about the process. Instead, it is determined by the be-havioral and organizational ways in which the system articulates withenergy sources and with internal and external competitors. Understand-ing patterning in the history of past cultural systems derives from an

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470 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 471

demanding that we not look through microscopes, since the "true" re-ality is that which is available only to the naked eye! Archaeology is notserved by acceptance of a false ontological assumption.

We cannot understand the past through the eyes of the ancients.Similarly, we cannot know the past or the present by simply accepting

one form of subjective view as correct on the basis of asserted privilegedinsight (e.g., binary oppositions). We must seek to know the past accu-rately through, and not in spite of, the use of our perspective. It followsthat we must accept responsibility for the character of the intellectualtools we use, and we must continuously seek to improve and modifythem in terms of the knowledge available to us and the opportunities forlearning open to us. At the same time we accept this responsibility, wemust realize that both our knowledge base and the conceptual tools withwhich we approach the archaeological record may be limited and/or in-appropriate. As suggested earlier, our job is quite literally the evaluationof our own cultural tools-the tools that we use in seeking to describeand understand the external world, which for us is simply the archaeo-logical record.

Most contemporary archaeologists, except the strict empiricists, ac-knowledge that we cannot know reality in terms of itself, but onlythrough the cognitive and explanatory devices that we use. We furtheracknowledge that these devices may be wrong and are part of a broadertradition of received "knowledge" within which we participate (in otherwords, our own culture). Many may reasonably ask, how can we knowthe past? Frequently, the answer is that we cannot. We should, therefore,abandon our self-deceiving exercises and address ourselves to a criticalunderstanding of our own culture-bound ideas from the perspective of internal criticism, since the external world is thought to be denied us by

virtue of Our subjectivity (see Hodder I984).This position has been well stated by Mary Hesse. She concludes

that we must adopt a position denying "that there is a fundamental dis-tinction between theoretical and observation predicates and statements"(Hesse I974:33). The nature of the external world is denied to us byvirtue of the assumed fact that our cognitive system molds experience sothat the external world is not permitted to intrude on its internal integ-rity. At first blush this sounds reasonable; it even appears consistent withmany of the points I have advocated here. In addition, on one level it isgood advice. Certainly, the more aware we are of the context of ourideas, the less likely we would be to accept such received ideas as "true"

(Leone I982). In denying a scientific method for evaluating ideas, how-

ever, the position moves so as to transform archaeology into moral phi-losophy.

We can accept the fact that we can neither reason with knowledgewe do not have nor think with cognitive devices unknown to us, and wecan also acknowledge the fact that we commonly accommodate the

world of experience to our own belief system of the moment. We cansupport the view that an awareness of how our ideas of the momentcame into being could constructively sharpen our skepticism. We cansubscribe to the position that we should be both moral and ethical mour

d b ib t t he view that our choices of search for knowle ge, We may su sen eo, .Id b ' , h ds for knowledge withinresearch problems shou e sensmve to t e nee

, f h ' , however demands that weour own society. None 0 t ese positrons, ', . d ' dify the limiting effects thatdeny our ability to learn an 10 turn to rna , ,

our culture places on our understanding of external reality,

A Practical Response to the Issues

, Wh scientistshope to accomplish isScience i s a s trategy for [earning. at I ar id so tha t they

, ' in the externa wto perfect ways of seeking expenences , I d Put another way,

" lleged know e ge.will implicate inadequacies 10 our a ,. f hei Ilegedknowledgeby

, , d [iability o twasciennsts study the accuracy an re , ,' ' the body of ideasicned ose "maano ns 10seeking experiences designe to exp, Th seekto put rheir ideas

and beliefs with which they begin their quest. ey creationist might be, . k th m more secure, as ain Jeopardy, not to rna e e h di very of "truth" or to

, d di ted to t e rscoprone to do. Science IS not e lea . . . hr.", b d of ideas IS r ig .

the demonstration that a given 0 Y I h f the new archaeology.Ir, d h centra t rus t 0These ideas constitute t e k transform ignorance

h edure that see s toadvocated a ttent ion to t e proc . b ddress ed are whether we. t1ssuesto ea flldinto knowledge. The Importan wz do not learn by a seY e-

if how we learn. we f' ancecan learn and, I we can, rge ourselvesa ignor. h ki g that we can pu , d not

ceiving ourselves Into t 10 10 for instruction. SimIlarly,we aand "obJ'ectively" approach nature ibl F' IJ v we do nor learn by

. sposs1 e. inauj, . Jlearn by denying that learn10g I , if tion for adopting a parttcu arediting an alleged past to serve as jusn chaIpresent. Welearn by expJor-

" I I posture 10 t e 'h ds thatvalue-laden polmca or mora , ing with sciennfic mer a ,, b expetlmennn Id of expen-

ing learning s tra tegIes, Y " d re lat ive to the wo r

I ideas 10 )eopar ycontinuously P ace our, al record that was

ence, d there is an archaeoJogIcThere was a past, an

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474 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 475

appreciated in two ways. First, the beliefs and perceptions of the pastparticipants could not have been germane to a reality of which they couldnot have been aware, the macrotemporal scale of systems change and thefactors that were conditioning it. Second, the observations by ethnogra-phers and historical figures, while perhaps documenting something of the

internal dynamics of cultural systems, cannot be expected to be necessar-ily germane to an understanding of a much slower and larger-scale pro-cess of change and modification. Thus, the reality with which we deal isone that living, breathing persons have in fact never directly experienced.lt is true that their cumulative participation provides the energy baseupon which the macroforces of change operate; yet they never experi-enced such impersonal forces. The archaeologist, seated in the present, isoutside history in the participant sense. We have a chance to understandhumankind in a way that no participant, or no social scientist addressingthe quick-time events of direct social experience, could ever imagine. Tofail to recognize this potential, to fail to grasp a new understanding of humankind from this different perspective-the perspective of the ma-croforces that condition and modify lifeways in contexts unappreciatedby the participants within complex thermodynamic systems-is quite lit-erally to "abandon our birthright."

It is true that archaeology is anthropology in that it seeks to under-stand humankind. Yet it is simply wrong to attempt to force our uniquedata and our ability to appreciate dynamics on a macroscale, in the or-

/ganizational sense of the term, into the limiting experiences and frame-works developed for treating the quick-time events of the human parti-cipants in history. We are not ethnographers of the past, we are notsociologists, we are not historians in the humanistic sense of the term;

.. we are scientists dedicated to an understanding of the archaeological rec-

ord. Its patterning and character strongly suggests that the common so-cial science perspectives on humankind are inappropriate to our archae-ological view of humanity. Although we may, in Pompeii-like situations,sometimes reconstruct quick-time events and situations, it is equally truethat we have the opportunity to view these human-scale events simulta-neously in terms of other observational properties indicative of the or-ganizational contexts in which they were conducted. In this opportunitywe can learn something of the properties of the systems within whichpast persons participated but did not necessarily cognize.

For a long time archaeologists have had an inferiority complex rel-ative to ethnologists and cultural anthropologists. We were convinced

that the participant perspective and its personalized scale of experience

was the only reality. The archaeological record was viewed as a poor,distorted reflection of this assumed unitary reality. Surely we need todevelop links between the varying scales of perception suggested above;bur more importantly we must realize that we have the opportunity tostudy scales of reality that are experientially denied to the ethnographer.

The appropriate action for us is not to lament the "limitations" of thearchaeological record bur to appreciate the limitations of the ethno- vgraphic experience and the records and ideas that arise in the ethnogra-pher's brief touch with a circumscribed reality. The archaeological recorddocuments a broader and potentially more fascinating reality.

Conclusion

My message in pursuit of the future has been made up of several com-ponents. First, I have argued that cultural systems are not closed Ideolog-ical structures. They are thermodynamic systems open to mfluence a.ndeven determinancy from the broader thermodynamic forces with whichthey must articulate. Second, I have suggested that since there IS an ex-

., I db' wed as a closed systemternal world our scientific cu ture nee not e vie , ', 'f hange Weas SCIentistSthat is subject only to internal generative types 0 cnanxe- "

b I' r received and subjectivehave the opportunity to learn y p acmg ou , Id b ki eriences JD the externaviews of the world in jeopar y, Y see mg exp id F' Ily I

h I, ' r ions of our leas. rna world that are designed to expose t e mnra I , h 1-, ' '1 domain rhat arc aeo 0

have suggested tha t the par ticular expenentla d d 'of 'I d d merits a scale an omam

gists study, the archaeologica recor, ocu d b dJ continues to op- ..,, , hast and un ou te y

process that was operative rn t e P, d k wledgethis pro-f 1,' d I fe span an noerate today, but because 0 our urute "

, II ' t d by partiCIpants.cess ISgenera y not apprecia e h I I ' t ask 01 seeking tof d ith the c a engmgArchaeologists are a ce WIt h ne of UShave everki d f henomena t at no

understand at least two rn sop , ortant the long-term, If and more Imp ,experienced directly: the past itse . I' d documents. Archaeolo-

h h haeologlCa recor ind dmacroprocesses t at t e arc d ding 01 humankm an, t gain an un erstan J

gists have the opportuntty 0 , d b ost social,c,enllstS.. ' I appreCIate Y m , h-its transformations not prevIOuSy .' archaeologIStssee t em

host practICIog II think it is fair to say t at m J f "di t archaeology" and re eg ate, " at the leve 0 rr ' depen-

selves as s tr ic t empmclSts b d for inference to an IDthe fundamental debates regarding met rhar is considered to be largelydent domain of theoretical dISCUSSIOnThis responsestem, fromthe fact

, d day act IVIlles .irrelevant to their ay-to-

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476 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 47 7

that at least one of the messages central to the "new archaeology" hasnot been received: namely, the view that our ideas directly condition howwe meaningfully organize and assimilate experience at the very point of observation. On the other hand, unquestioning acceptance of this sameproposition has led to the belief that we cannot learn from experience;

hence, nihilism and skepticism permeate many "theoretical discussions."In turn, the "dirt archaeologists," correctly convinced that they can learnfrom experience, relegate such discussions to the stratosphere of specu-lative, irrelevant side issues. Many return to the sterile posture of partic-ularism, as exemplified by traditional culture-historical approaches, eventhough this posture has long since been demonstrated to be inadequate.Our success in the future depends upon our thoughtful attention to thisimpasse.

I suggest that there are solutions. I also believe that our future de-pends not only upon our successful response to the "dirt archaeologist's"view of the problem but upon a shift in the character of archaeologicaleducation as well. If the young persons entering our field are not edu-cated to the character of the very real intellectual issues that archaeolo-gists must solve, and if education continues to be in the hands of "dirtarchaeologists" who largely do not understand the nature of our intellec-tual problems, archaeology will stagnate in the dead end of strict empir-icism and particularism. On the other hand, if theoretical discussion re-mains in the hands of those who are skeptical about our abilities to learn,"dirt archaeologists" are correct in rejecting theory as being irrelevant.

In my opinion, many of our problems stem from adopting the ar-guments of ethnologists as if they somehow had a more "direct" under-standing of reality. Similarly, the skeptical attitude of many "dirt archae-ologists" regarding theory is probably rooted in a realistic appreciation

of what the archaeological record is. It is not the same reality that eth-nologists study. We need to devote our energies to the development of

..I archaeological science, which means the building of theory appropriateto our world of experience as guided by scientifically rooted learningstrategies.

In the future we must' pursue increased sophistication in scientificlearning strategies, increased dedication to understanding the archaeo-logical record, and importantly, the development of knowledge regardingthe operation of processes that transcend the quick-time events and ex-periences of participants in systems. Pursuit of these goals will realize forus a potential understanding of humankind that is uniquely offered toarchaeologists.

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