Biological_Naturalism_in_Extended_Dual-A.pdf

8/17/2019 Biological_Naturalism_in_Extended_Dual-A.pdf

1/23

1

5/31/2015 8:29 AM

Copyright © 2015 (except quotes and responses from other authors, i.e., those texts which are not written bythe author of this article) by Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research Institute. Author’spermission is needed for re-producing and/or quoting any portion except the text quoted from other authorsFor referring, the following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2015). Biological Naturalism inExtended Dual-Aspect Monism and Conscious Robots. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision andConsciousness Research [Available: ], 7 (3). [Last update: Sunday, May 31, 2015, 8:29 AM].

Title page

Title of manuscript: Biological Naturalism in Extended Dual-Aspect Monismand Conscious Robots

Author: Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal

Work Affiliations and address:Vision Research Institute

25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA.

Email Address: [email protected]

Financial Disclosure/Funding Information: The work was, to some extent, supportedby VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research Institute research Fund. The

funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, orpreparation of the manuscript.

Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Acknowledgments The work was supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research

Institute research Fund. Author would like to thank two anonymous colleagues (some ofthe phrases/sentences are adapted/paraphrased/quoted from their reviews in Sections1, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3), John R. Searle for the email discussion on BiologicaNaturalism and traditional views, Arnold Trehub for the email discussion on his Retinoidframework, Alfredo Pereira Jr., Max Velmans, and Pankhuri Singhal for critica

comments, discussion, and suggestions. Author is also affiliated with DristAnusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India;

Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, PendraBilaspur, C.G. 495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East o

Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata, Gorakhpur, U.P. 273001 India. URLhttp://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home. Email: [email protected].

Author Contributions: Wrote the paper: RLPV.

Postal address of submitting author (single author manuscript):Vision Research Institute25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA.


2/23

2

Biological Naturalism in Extended Dual-Aspect Monism and Conscious Robots

Abstract

Previously, an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework forconsciousness was proposed: It (a) has the least number of problems, (b) addressed the

‘hard’ problem of consciousness (how to explain subjective experiences), and (c) can betested scientifically. Here, the term ‘consciousness’ is defined as the mental aspect of a stateof brain-system or that of a state of brain-process from the first person perspective

consciousness has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function . The terms‘mental’ and ‘physical’ are used in the sense of the eDAM framework (not dualism). The

eDAM framework has five components: dual-aspect monism, dual-mode, varying degrees ofmanifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts, necessaryconditions of consciousness, and the segregation and integration of dual-aspectinformation. In Searle’s Biological Naturalism (BN), conscious states are real andirreducible , caused by lower level brain processes , realized as higher-level or system

features, and function causally . Here, the eDAM framework attempts to: (a) interpret BN

and address the objections raised in BN by traditional views (dualism and materialism), (binvestigate if conscious robots can be supported, and (c) investigate if the eDAM isparsimonious and more efficient compared to other frameworks.

Keywords : Easy and hard problems of consciousness; functional and experiential aspectsof consciousness; dual-aspect monism; Biological Naturalism; materialism; idealism

interactive substance dualism; segregation and integration (or binding) of informationemergence; supervenience; functional integration; access and phenomenal consciousnessnecessary conditions of consciousness.

1. Introduction

This article consists of three main sections: (1) the first elaborates the two concepts o

matter and defines the term ‘consciousness’ before using it and elaborates the article’s

preferred view in the mind-brain debate: the ‘eDAM’ (extended dual aspect monism

framework. (2) The second section (i) interprets Searle’s Biological Naturalism (BN) in terms

of the eDAM framework where both are consistent with each other to some extent because

both are non-traditional views, and addresses the objections raised in BN by traditiona

views (dualism and materialism); (ii) examines the possibility of a conscious robot (Strong

AI), and theorizes that it is possible in the eDAM framework; and (iii) argues that the eDAM

view should be chosen as preferred view because of (a) the parsimony due to the Occam’s

razor principle and the model selection criterion derived from the Akaike informationstatistics and (b) its explanatory and predictive powers. (3) The third section critically

investigates if the eDAM framework is more efficient and better than other frameworks

such as BN, materialism (including materialistic emergence), idealism, interactive

substance dualism, triple-aspect monism, and reflexive monism, and retinoid system.


3/23

3

1.1. Concepts of matter and definition of consciousness

Concepts of matter : There are two concepts of matter: (i) first, the Yājñavalkya-Bādarāyaņa-Aristotle’s concept of matter, where matter has rūpa/form and has the potentiality for experiences (Pereira Jr., 2013; Radhakrishnan, 1960; Swami Krishnananda1983); it is used in our frameworks (Pereira Jr., 2013; Pereira Jr., Vimal, & Pregnolato2015; Vimal, 2013). (ii) Second, the Kaāda-Democritus’ concept of matter (who identifiesmatter with atoms/particles), which implies that matter is non-experiential (Vimal, 2015a)

it is used in science (such as physics, chemistry, and biology). The second concept misleadsmaterialistic biologists who make grave mistake of following non-experiential materialismthat has serious unsolvable problems and hence cannot address the hard problem ofconsciousness. Biologists who follow Yājñavalkya-Bādarāyaņa-Aristotle’s concept of mattershould not have such problems.

Definition of consciousness : There are about forty meanings attributed to the term‘consciousness’, which were identified and categorized according to whether they wereprincipally about function or about experience (Vimal, 2009b). An immediate advantage othis categorization is that it makes clear what materialism can do and what it cannot doMaterialism may explain functions but cannot explain experiences. In other words, thiscategorization sets the clear-cut limit for materialism. Furthermore, the optimal definition

(that has the least number of problems) of consciousness, using Yājñavalkya-Bādarāyaņa-Aristotle’s concept of matter, is: consciousness (a) is the mental aspect of a state of the brainmind system or that of a state of a brain-process in the first person perspective (1pp), and (b)has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function (Vimal, 2010b). Thisdefinition is used in the five-component-eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 20132015a, 2015b), which is concisely summarized below.

1.2. An extended version of Dual-Aspect Monism (eDAM) framework

The extended dual-aspect monism framework (eDAM) is a monist framework and isdifferent from interactive substance dualism and quantum interactive dualism. Thisframework is an alternative to a materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick &

Koch, 2003). The materialistic framework does not address the hard problem because theexplanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983) still remains. As per Crick and Koch, the hardproblem of consciousness is the most difficult problem. It is “fruitless to approach thisproblem head-on”; instead, it will be useful first to find “the neural correlate(s) oconsciousness (NCC)” and then try to explain it in causal terms. This will hopefully tell ushow to address the hard problem (quotes are from (Crick & Koch, 2003)). This strategymight have lead Koch towards a version of dual-aspect monism in (Koch, 2012), but itcertainly led me to the eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) thattries to solve the hard problem as elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).

The eDAM framework is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and physical lawsand the principle of ‘dependent co-origination’ 1. The eDAM attempts to address the ‘hard

problem of consciousness (how to explain subjective experiences) as elaborated in (Vimal2015a). In addition, this framework can be tested scientifically. For example, if the doctrineof inseparability between the 1pp-mental (for living systems) and physical aspects of aconscious brain-mind state from the third person perspective (3pp) is somehow rejectedthen the eDAM framework needs major modification; this is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).

The eDAM framework has five components that are summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) andvery concisely given below in the interest of space:

(I) Dual-Aspect Monism : This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2008b). Briefly, thequalitative/mental and the physical aspects of a state of any entity (elementary particle to


4/23

4

neural-network to whole universe) are inseparable in dual-aspect monism; this can becalled the doctrine of inseparability . The qualitative/mental aspect of an entity-statecomprises of: (a) the qualitative aspect of the entity-state which consists of superposed potential basis-states related to forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in spaceand time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and non-living systems. And (b) themental aspect of the entity-state which consists of superposed potential basis-states(Section 1.2 of (Vimal, 2015a)) related to the potential primary irreducible subjectiveexperiences (SEs) representing the pre-existence of the potentiality of experiences for living-

system and/or conscious artifacts. The degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect andthat of the 3pp-physical aspect dependently co-arise 1; this entails the inseparability

between both aspects. The concept of superposition is borrowed from physics (especially quantum physics

and is elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a) and Section 2.3 of (Vimal, 2015a). As per (Vimal2015a), “the basis-states related to potential primary irreducible subjective experiences(SEs) are superposed in the mental aspect of a state of neural-network. The superposed

basis-states collapse/reduce to a specific basis-state related to a specific primary SE (suchas redness) for its realization (actualization) through the matching and selection processes(selected by the self, not by any homunculus) in the related neural-network ‘complex’ with

integrated information (Φ) (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) higher

than its critical threshold value for consciousness.” The integrated information (Φ) iselaborated later in (V).

(II) Dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms : This is discussed in (Vimal2010a). Briefly, the two modes are stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-modeand cognitive-feedback-signals-related-mode. They interact for conjugate matching andthen the selection of a specific subjective experience occurs and experienced by the self(Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), which is further elaborated later in Section 2.1.

For experiencing a specific SE, there are three major interacting signals: (i) stimulusdependent feed forward (FF) signals, (ii) stimuli-related-memory-dependent cognitive

feedback (FB) signals, and (iii) self-related signal that is a part of reentrant FB signals. Theself (a) is the SE of subject (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), (b) consists of proto-self, core-self, andautobiographical-self (Damasio, 2010), and (c) is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of ‘self-related neural network (such as cortical midline structures: (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004)and its activities’.

The matching/interaction is between FF and FB signals; then the self-related signals

interact with the resultant signal representing the matching between stimulus-related FFsignal and cognitive FB signals; thus, there are interactions between the three major

signals; this interactive process can be called as ‘the specific SE is selected and experiencedby the self’.

(III) Variation of the degree of manifestation of aspects : This is detailed in (Vimal2013) and summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) as follows: “The ‘concept of the varying degrees othe manifestation (appearance/strength) of aspects’ means that the degree đ of theappearance and/or strength of aspects varies depending on the levels of entities. At eachlevel, the manifestation of aspects is through dependent co-origination (Nāgārjuna &Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a)1, i.e., through co-evolution, adaptation, natural selectionco-development and sensorimotor tuning. For example, the degree of manifestation ofmental aspect in an inert non-conscious entity is zero and high in an awake-consciousentity.


5/23

5

The third component is varying degrees of manifestation (appearance/strength) of physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect depending on the levels of entities andcontexts, where contexts include entity-state, environment, background, surround, and so on .

In inert (nonliving) entities at classical level, such as a molecule, the physical aspect oits state is from the objective third person perspective (3pp) and the degree of itsmanifestation is high. […]

The mental aspect of a state of a living-system is from the subjective 1pp and thephysical aspect is from the objective 3pp. This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such

as forms and patterns, can be perceived or implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mentaaspect of a state of a non-living system is ‘latent’ to us from 3pp.

This does not mean that nonliving systems have consciousness like us that is hiddenrather, the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving entity carries potential proto-

experiences in superposed form as a Nature’s mechanism for the pre-existence of potentiaSEs. We perceive the form, pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time,and/or pattern of vibration related to an inert entity, which indicates the existence of itsqualitative aspect. Therefore, it is better to use the term ‘qualitative aspect’ in place o‘mental aspect’ for non-living systems to address some biologists’ skepticism; for the samereason, we use ‘1pp-mental aspect’ for conscious states and ‘mental aspect’ for non-conscious states.”

(IV) Necessary conditions of consciousness : This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015b)Briefly, the necessary conditions of access (reportable) consciousness are the formation o

neural-networks, wakefulness, reentrant interactions among neural populations, fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness

integrated information in ‘complex’ of neural-network such as thalamocortical complexeswith critical spatiotemporal ‘grain-size’, working memory, stimulus contrast at or abovethreshold level, and neural-network proto-experiences that are potential subjectiveexperiences. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for non-reportable phenomenal consciousness. The criterion for the selection of necessary conditions of

consciousness is that if any of these conditions is missing, we will not have consciousness.

(V) Segregation, differentiation, and integration of information : This is discussedin (Vimal, 2015a). Briefly, there are two steps: (i) the segregation of information for theanalysis of specific stimulus attribute and then (ii) the integration of information for the

synthesis of all attributes (related to dimension such as redness, sub-mode such as colorand mode such as vision), which results unified consciousness. In other words, the firststage of processing is the segregation of information (such as the information related tophysical and conceptual attributes), which are analyzed and processed for preciseness andspecificity in different specialized neurons of related brain areas. Then, the second stage o

processing is the integration of information (or binding of attributes) (related to differen

functions, concepts, experiences and so on) in various neural-network-complexes, whichresults unified consciousness. The term ‘differentiation’ signifies that there are a largenumber of possible functions and potential experiences; this leads to higher effectiveinformation (Tononi, 2004).

The integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009 Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) is based on the materialistic identity theory (consciousness isintegrated information) or to some extent panpsychism (Tononi & Koch, 2014). Howeverboth materialism and panpsychism have serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). ThereforeIIT is interpreted in terms of more efficient metaphysics, such as the eDAM framework in


6/23

6

(Vimal, 2015a), which has the least number of problems; here, information is a dual-aspecentity.

In the eDAM framework, consciousness is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of related

neural network that has high amount of integrated mental-information ΦmentalConsciousness has two sub-aspects: (a) the experiential aspect such as SEs includingfeelings, emotion- and thought-related experiences and (b) the functional aspect such asrelated functions. The 3pp-physical aspect of this state is the correlated neural-network(such as thalamocortical main complex) and its activity as its neural substrate that has

high amount of integrated physical-information Φphysical, which is close to the term

‘integrated information’ Φ used in (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) and (Balduzzi & Tononi

2009). Since 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects are inseparable , ‘mental’ and ‘physical

information related to the same brain-mind state are also inseparable .

1.3. Specific aims

There are four specific aims of this article: First, in Section 2.1, the article interpretsSearle’s Biological Naturalism (BN) in terms of the eDAM framework, and address theobjections raised in BN by traditional views (dualism and materialism). Second, in Section2.2, it investigates if conscious robots can be supported. Third, in Section 2.3, it

investigates if the eDAM is parsimonious. Fourth, in Sections 2.3 and 3, it investigates ithe eDAM framework is more efficient compared to other frameworks, such as BN

materialism (including materialistic emergence), idealism, interactive substance dualismtriple-aspect monism, reflexive monism, and retinoid framework.

2. Models and Results

2.1. The Biological Naturalism in the eDAM framework

Searle renamed the mind-body problem of traditional views (dualism and materialismas Biological Naturalism (BN), where consciousness has four empirical essential features

(Searle, 2007): qualitative feel (what-it-feels-like ), subjective ontology, single unifiedconscious field, and intentionality (see the Table).

In BN, conscious states are real and irreducible , caused by lower level brain processes

realized as higher-level or system features, and function causally . The BN is certainly a newway of thinking and rejects traditional views, and seems somewhat consistent with the non-traditional eDAM framework (Section 1.2).

However, BN (Searle, 2007) still confuses researchers because sometimes it appears tolean towards materialism, sometimes interactive substance dualism, or sometimes dual-

aspect monism. An example related to materialism is: “brain processes causeconsciousness” (Searle, 2007), which seems to imply that physical entity brain-processes

cause mental entity consciousness. An example related to interactive substance dualism is

“Conscious states ... cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else ” (Searle, 2007), whichseems to imply that consciousness is a mental entity and is different and independent from

the physical entity brain and its processes. An example related to dual-aspect monism is“conscious states are realized simultaneously with the neuron firings” (Searle, 2007), where

the term ‘simultaneously’ has effects similar to the inseparability of mental and physicalaspects.

However, materialism and substance dualism have serious problems as elaborated in(Vimal, 2010b, 2013).


7/23

7

Therefore, it is justified to interpret BN in terms of the least problematic eDAMframework to unpack some of the concepts of the BN that have objections from traditionaviews and address those objections; both are accomplished as follows:

[I] The ‘brain processes’ of the BN can be interpreted as the matching and selection processesin the eDAM framework : As per Searle, “Conscious states ... cannot be eliminated or reducedto something else. All conscious states are caused by lower level brain processes. … brainprocesses cause consciousness” (Searle, 2007). This hypothesis needs unpacking in the

eDAM framework as follows:(a) Irreducible primary experiences (mental entities) are not created by material brain or

its processes (physical/material entities).(b) Consciousness related brain processes (or neural networks) are (a) correlated with

experiences as NCC (see Table), or (b) the neural basis of consciousness.(c) There are many brain processes, such as lower-level neural (brain) processing related

to stimulus-dependent feed forward (FF) signals, higher-level neural processing related tofeedback (FB) signals, and neural processing related to the matching/interaction betweenFF and FB signals and the selection of specific subjective experience (SE).

(d) FF and FB signals and their interactions entail dual-aspect conscious states of brainmind system . The term ‘cause’ in BN’s “brain processes cause consciousness” is misleadinginstead, the eDAM framework uses the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect andthat of the 3pp-physical aspect dependently co-arise 1 entailing the inseparability of aspects.

(e) Primary irreducible experiences, however, potentially pre-exist in Nature and thebasis-states related to potential primary irreducible experiences are superposed in themental aspect of an entity-state.

(f) A specific subjective experience is realized through the brain processes such as thematching and selection processes as briefly elaborated in (Section 1.2) and detailed in(Vimal, 2010a), which entails the irreducibility of experiences.

Please insert Table somewhere around here; Table is located after References and before

Endnotes

[II] Experiences influence brain processes through inseparability of aspects : The hypothesisthat conscious states function causally (Searle, 2007), i.e., experiences influence brainprocesses can be unpacked by using the doctrine of inseparability of the eDAM frameworkwithout making category mistake2 as follows. First, the mental information (such as inintention) in the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of an entity) is immediately, faithfully, andautomatically translated into the physical information in the 3pp-physical aspect of theentity (such as the related neural network and its activities because both aspects areinseparable 1) and information is conserved. This implies that “conscious states are realizedsimultaneously with the neuron firings” (Searle, 2007). Then, the physical signal related to

this entity influences/causes the correlated brain process (physical signal) without makingcategory mistake.

[III] Unpacking BN’s ‘consciousness is irreducible ontologically, but reducible causally’ : As perSearle, “In the case of consciousness the causal reduction does not lead to an ontologicalreduction” (Searle, 2007). The brain processes, as unpacked above in the interpretation [Iof the BN, are the matching and selection mechanisms, which entails that consciousness isirreducible ontologically, but the brain processes and related experiences entail dual-aspec


8/23

8

conscious states through the doctrine of inseparability and dependent co-origination1 usingFF signal, FB signal, and/or their interactions (matching process).

[IV] Simultaneity between consciousness and its NCC : As per Searle, “conscious states arerealized simultaneously with the neuron firings” (Searle, 2007). This is consistent with theeDAM because inseparability implies simultaneity between the mental and the physicaaspects of a conscious state as in the interpretation [II] of the BN.

[V] Dualism and materialism can be rejected but the dual-aspect monism is maintained : Asper Searle, “One way to see Biological Naturalism is as an attempt to preserve what is truein each [dualism and materialism] while discarding what is false. In order to do that wehave to overthrow a set of powerful philosophical presuppositions” (Searle, 2007). The BNhas selected the true features of dualism and that of materialism but ends up withcriticisms from both metaphysics. However, if the BN is interpreted in terms of the eDAMframework (as in interpretations [I]-[IV]), then we do not have to overthrow powerfuphilosophical presuppositions entrenched in the five components of eDAM framework(Section 1.2).

[VI] In general, the mental aspect of a state of a brain-mind system includes informationrelated to consciousness (functional and experiential aspects), conscious and non-conscious thoughts, and other conscious and non-conscious cognition (such as attentionand memory). Therefore, all entities can be categorized in two groups: conscious and non-

conscious entities. In this article, the terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ are used in the sense ofthe non-traditional (or semi-traditional) eDAM framework; these terms are not used in the

sense of Cartesian substance dualism.

As per LaRock, the BN is based on weak form of emergence: consciousness emerges only ithere are sufficiently organized neurons present to allow for suitable causal relations(LaRock, 2013). This “fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject

unity” (LaRock, 2013). Both strong and weak emergence are mysterious and needsunpacking; to the some extent, this is accomplished in (Vimal, 2013).Searle proposes that brain processes (physical entity: traditional notion) cause

consciousness (mental entity) as if physical entity causes mental entity (Searle, 2007); thisis confusing because it seems to make category mistake2 in the traditional notion of thephysical and the mental (Feigl, 1967). However, there is no category mistake in BiologicaNaturalism because it is assumed that brain processes are capable of creating irreducibleprimary subjective experiences as a brute fact (that is the way it is!). This is because, as perSearle, “brain processes cause consciousness” (Searle, 2007). Searle also proposes, “Alconscious states are caused by lower level brain processes ” (Searle, 2007).

Thus, there seems to be apparent confusion: Do brain processes cause conscious states

or consciousness? Answer is both as per Searle, but how? In the eDAM framework, thisconfusion can be addressed as follows: the lower level brain processes entail dual-aspectconscious states, i.e., the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of 3pp-physicaaspects of conscious brain-states dependently co-arise1. In other words, each consciousstate has inseparable 3pp-physical and 1pp-mental aspects, which implies that if 3pp-physical aspect is objectively known then 1pp-mental aspect is automatically, rigorouslyand immediately subjectively known through subjective experience (SE) because of thedoctrine of inseparability and vice-versa. In both aspects, it is the same information related


9/23

9

to the same reality and we are just describing it in two different perspectives (see also(Trehub, 2013)).

Furthermore, brain processes such as the matching and selection mechanisms canselect a specific SE (experiential aspect of consciousness) through the matching of feedforward with feedback signals and experienced by the self (see below). It should be notedthat physical entities (such as the firing of a neuron) interact with other physical entities(such as the firing of other neurons), but mental entities (such as subjective experiencepainfulness) do not interact with (or cause) physical entities (such as firing of pain related

neurons). Thus, the category mistake2 is not made in the eDAM framework.One could ask: is the eDAM framework property dualism? Answer is NO. As per property

dualism, the world consists of just one kind of substance (physical kind) that has physicaproperties and mental properties, i.e., mental properties inhere in physical substances such

as brains; and consciousness is ontologically (and causally) irreducible. Thus, propertydualism is based on materialism. The eDAM framework is not the property dualism becauseit is based on dual-aspect monism (not materialism), where a state of an entity hasinseparable 3pp-physical and 1pp-mental aspects (not of the entity but of its state becausean entity can have multiple states). They are just from different perspectives, namely, the

physical aspect is from 3pp, and the mental aspect is from 1pp. It is the same informationbut different ways of ‘viewing’ either from 3pp or 1pp. Physical aspect does not causemental aspect and vice versa ; rather, they are inseparable , they have the same informationin different perspectives, and the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of 3pp-physical aspects of conscious brain-states dependently co-arise1 in the eDAM frameworkIn other words, any change in one aspect/perspective is automatically, immediately, andfaithfully translated into the language of other aspect/perspective because information is

conserved. In the BN, since consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes(although it is ontologically irreducible), it does not appear to be property dualism (Searle2002). Perhaps, emergent materialism, non-reductive physicalism/functionalismanomalous monism, and epiphenomenalism fall under property dualism, which needunpacking in terms of the eDAM framework to address the hard problem.

In addition, the eDAM framework is neither proto-panpsychism or nor panpsychism3

and hence does not inherit their problems.Furthermore, Searle (Searle, 2014) (a) extends the BN elaborated in (Searle, 2007), and

(b) rejects substance dualism, property dualism/epiphenomenalism (because mentaproperties such as thirst, hunger, or an intention to raise arm have causal effects on

physical properties such as drinking, eating or raising arm), materialist reductionismbehaviorism, and computationalism. (c) Searle proposes three stages to enhanceconsciousness research (Searle, 2014): (i) find NCC, (ii) test if NCC is a causal correlation(silencing the NCC must stop experiences and resuming the NCC restarts consciousness)and (iii) build a theory that explains why these phenomena have these effects. The eDAMframework, as a theory, does a good job in addressing the mind-brain debate; for example

silencing the NCC also silences the related experiences and resuming the NCC alsoresumes those experiences because of the inseparability of 1pp-mwntal and 3pp-physicaaspects. The BN implicitly seems to imply that the Nature has potentiality for experienceswhich is consistent with the eDAM framework.

2.2. Conscious Artifacts (Strong AI)

Can we build conscious artifacts/robots/strong artificial intelligence (AI)? This is a

provocative but an essential and an interesting question because conscious artifacts can


10/23

10

obviously bring a new revolution in the advancement of science and technology. Its answerseems to be first based on metaphysics, biological laws, and physical laws, and second onthe availability of appropriate technology.

Searle's Biological Naturalism supports conscious artifacts because “brain processescause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is abiological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious” (Searle2007).(p.328). Tononi’s IIT (Tononi, 2008) also implies that it is possible “to construct

highly conscious artifacts by endowing them with a complex of high Φ (Koch & Tononi

2008)”.As per IIT (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012), integrated information

is consciousness, which is an identity theory based on materialism that has seriousproblem. Since Kaāda-Democritus’ definition of matter used in science is non-experientia

and does not even have potential for experiences (consciousness) (the fundamentaassumption of materialism) as discussed in (Vimal, 2015a), generating consciousness from

such non-conscious matter is impossible; otherwise, there will be gross violation of its ownfundamental assumption.

If we assume that matter has potential for consciousness (as Yājñavalkya-Bādarāyaņa-Aristotle’s definition of matter implies) then it is no more materialism, it will be then dual-aspect monism metaphysics. Implicitly, Koch and Tononi (Koch, 2012; Koch & Tononi

2008; Tononi, 2008) seem to imply dual-aspect monism, but Tononi calls it the ‘centraidentity’ that is “an experience is a maximally integrated conceptual (information) structure ”

(Tononi, 2012).(p.306). As discussed above, Tononi’s IIT seems to be based on materialismbut now Tononi and his colleagues seem to confess that their IIT, to some extent, is basedon panpsychism (Tononi & Koch, 2014). However, both materialism and panpsychism haveserious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). Therefore their proposal has some confusion andserious problems, which are addressed clearly in (Vimal, 2015a) by interpreting IIT in termsof the eDAM framework.

Since, in materialism, non-experiential matter (that does not even have potential forexperiences) cannot generate consciousness, eliminativism holds that consciousness

(subjective experience) does not exist (Dennett, 1978), i.e., our and robotic consciousnessare illusion. However, how can we eliminate our daily obvious and robust subjective

experiences (that are the entities we are sure of!)? This implies that the materialism is falseIf the functional integration framework based on materialism is proposed, it is unclear howthe qualitative feature of the experiential aspect of consciousness (what-it-feels-like : (Searle2007)) can be derived from the integration of function, and hence related explanatory gapproblem remains.

However, if the functional integration framework is interpreted in terms of dual-aspectmonism based frameworks, such as the eDAM framework where the mental aspect includesfunctional and experiential sub-aspects, one could argue that conscious artifacts arepossible.

In other words, the eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), whichincludes the necessary conditions of consciousness (Vimal, 2015b) and integratedinformation (Vimal, 2015a), supports conscious robots (without violating biological lawsthat are one of the necessary conditions of consciousness). Such conscious robots can haverobotic subjective experiences (perhaps different from human subjective experiences). Thisis because each entity including silicon system has inseparable qualitative/mental andphysical aspects; and the qualitative/mental aspect of each entity has potential for

subjective experiences, i.e., experiences potentially pre-exist in the qualitative/mentaaspect of a state of each entity as superposed-basis-states in latent form. The degree đ of


11/23

11

manifestation (appearance/strength) of aspects varies depending on the levels of entitiesand contexts (Vimal, 2013), and the degrees đ of manifestation of mental and that ophysical aspects dependently co-arise1. For example, both aspects are fully and equallymanifested in active awake conscious human beings. In non-living matter, the mentaaspect of a state of an inert entity is latent (i.e., only its qualitative/form aspect can beperceived in 3pp or implicitly inferred) but its physical aspect is fully manifested.

As per many frameworks of the mind-brain debate (such as materialism, panpsychismfunctionalism, eDAM and so on), strong AI is a conceptual possibility. One of the colleagues

stated that the possibility of conscious artifacts might be correct; however, one needs toshow that the eDAM framework provides an important advancement on the current state of

the debate on the possibility of conscious robots. To this end, this article argues that theeDAM framework provides the important advancement on this debate via its fourth and

fifth components (Sections 1.2.(IV) and 1.2.(V)), namely, the necessary conditions oconsciousness (Vimal, 2015b) and the segregation, differentiation, and integration oinformation (Vimal, 2015a). In other words, artifacts/robots (strong AI) must be designedand implemented in available technology in such a way (a) that the necessary conditions ofconsciousness (Section 1.2.(IV)) are satisfied and (b) that their integrated physica

information (Φphysical) is above critical threshold for having robotic consciousness.

2.3. Framework selection: parsimony because of (a) the Occam’s razor principle and(b) the model selection criterion (MSC) from Akaike information statistics

The functions and related experiences are embodied (their basis-states are superposedin respective brain-mind states) and embedded in related structures. In the eDAM

framework, an event creates a dual-aspect brain-mind state that has two inseparableaspects. (i) First is a qualitative/mental aspect, where the 1pp-mental component of thisaspect that has inseparable experiential and functional sub-aspects of consciousness andthe qualitative component of this aspect has forms and patterns. (ii) The second is its 3pp-physical aspect, which is composed of correlated structures and their activities (NCF(neural correlate(s) of function) and NCC). The inseparability between aspects must always

be maintained; they cannot be segregated or separated. The rationale is as follows.When evolution, natural selection, and adaptation based ecosystem ecology changes astructure, a new function arises. If it is useful, then it is embodied and embedded inneural-network (NN)-structure. If a certain function is not any more useful to the organism,related structure is modified or selected out. This modification or selecting out can occurwhen organism is inactive for example; but it takes long time (years and generations insome species). In this manner, ecosystem ecology and adaptation can add new structure,function, and experience, delete unused structure, function, and experience, or modifystructure, function, and experience. However, in all cases, the inseparability betweenstructure, function, and experience is maintained whenever it is needed, i.e., they areconsidered as just one variable for Occam’s razor: if one of them is selected out, others are

selected out as well. Since function and experience are in 1pp-mental aspect, they aregrouped together as sub-aspects of consciousness. Since structure is 3pp-physical, it isanother inseparable aspect. Thus, they all are inseparable , i.e., they are tightly linkedtogether, and move together as if they are just one single entity-state and just one singlevariable for Occam’s razor to avoid slicing of aspects. If we try to segregate or separate theseaspects, Occam’s razor will slice off the gap because of the separation (or weak link) due tothe segregation; and then the segregation or the separation will be selected out and will bebrought back to inseparability . The underlying principle behind inseparability is that thedegree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspect and that of the physical aspect


12/23

12

dependently co-arise1, co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tuned for sensorimotor tuningappropriately depending on the levels of entities and contexts. Ecosystem ecology andadaptation do not need segregation between aspects during conscious experience andfunction. This is because ecosystem ecology and evolutionary changes are very slow process(can take years and/or generations) compared to the duration of consciousness for aspecific event (that takes seconds to a few minutes at the most: we usually cannot maintainthe same brain-mind state after a few seconds). The updates in structure, function, andexperience can be done without segregation during inactive-state. Therefore, the Occam’s

razor objective credibility (essential in scientific research) for the eDAM framework is 100%of the materialism.

In the triple-aspect monism (TAM), the gap because of the separation of aspects or weaklinks due to the segregation are between 1 and 2 (i.e., 1-2), 1 and 3 (i.e., 1-3), and 2 and 3

(i.e., 2-3), where 1 is aspect-1, 2 is aspect-2, and 3 is aspect-3 in three-aspect frameworks This is because the first aspect of the TAM framework can occur without the other two (i.e.1-2 and 1-3) and the second can occur without third (i.e., 2-3), but the second cannotoccur without the first (i.e., 2-1), and the third cannot occur without the first (i.e., 3-1) andthe second (i.e., 2-3). This gives 3 degrees of freedom for the slicing of Occam’s razor’s

slicing. Therefore, the Occam’s razor objective credibility of TAM is about 33% of the eDAMframework or materialism.

In other words, ecosystem ecology, adaptation, and Occam’s razor will select out three-aspect frameworks because some of the aspects are segregable and will use the eDAMframework instead to solve the serious problem of association among structure, function,and experience. This is because otherwise there are very large number of possibleassociations of a large number of micro-, meso-, and macro-structures, functions, andexperiences in innumerable species. This is a huge combinatorial association problemwhich ecosystem ecology, adaptation, and Occam’s razor need to solve. This is one ofrationale for using the eDAM framework instead of triple-aspect or three-world typeframeworks.

Furthermore, we need methods to find the degree of scientific credibility, viability, or

reliability of our frameworks. There may be many methods such as the model selectioncriterion (MSC) from the Akaike information statistics (see Section 4.A, Appendix B.2 o

(Vimal, 1998)). Occam’s razor is another method. Parmenides’ single metaphysics (1 freeparameter) and materialism (1 free parameter) have highest objective creditability (100%) asper Occam’s razor. This is one of the reasons why science uses materialism. However, boththese metaphysics have serious problems such as explanatory gap problem. Occam’s razorhas no objection on the eDAM framework because there is one single free parameter as

both aspects are inseparable and the eDAM does not have other problems as othermetaphysics have. However, Occam’s razor has serious objection on triple aspectframeworks that have separable/segregable aspects. How do we evaluate our models if wedo not use these methods? Just philosophical arguments for their pragmatic usefulness are

not enough; scientists/skeptics may not accept them. Furthermore, since the ReflexiveMonism (RM) (Velmans, 2008) is a version of dual-aspect monism framework thatpresumably has inseparable aspects (personal communication with Velmans), the number

of parameter is 1 as in the eDAM framework; the RM’s scope is limited to conscious beingswhereas the eDAM’s scope is unlimited. Therefore, we elaborate the above two methods forthe framework-selection as follows:

The MSC (model selection criterion) is derived from the Akaike information statistics(Vimal, 1998); higher MSC indicates better model. The MSC is defined as:


13/23

13

MSC = ln (A/B) - (2Np/Nd) (1)

where ln is natural logarithm; A is the sum of the weighted squared deviation of the datafrom the weighted mean of the data; and B is the sum of the weighted squared deviation ofthe data from the model. Np is the number of parameters and Nd is the number ofexperimental data points. Since currently we do not have experimental data points andquantitative mechanisms of model related to various frameworks for model-prediction, letus assume that all frameworks yield the same model predictions implying the same ln (A/B)

The number of free parameters (Np) for various frameworks is as follows. (a) Np is 1 formaterialism, idealism, eDAM, and RM. (b) Np is 2 for dualism (independent physical andmental entities) because the segregation is between 1 and 2, 2 and 1. (c) Np is 3 for TAM(physical, non-conscious mental, and conscious mental aspects) (Pereira Jr., 2013) becausethe segregation is between 1 and 2, 1 and 3, or 2 and 3. (d) Np is 6 for Freud’s framework(physical brain, unconscious, and conscious aspects) because the segregation ispresumably between 1 and 2, 2 and 1, 1 and 3, 3 and 1, 2 and 3, or 3 and 2. (e) Np is 6 forPopper’s three worlds framework because the segregation is assumed similar to that forFreud’s model. The comparisons between eDAM, dualism, and triple aspect frameworks

from Eq. (1) are given below:

MSCeDAM – MSCDualism = [2(Np=2)/Nd] TAM – [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM = (4-2)/Nd = 2/Nd > 0(eDAM vs. Dualism) (2)

MSCeDAM – MSC TAM = [2(Np=3)/Nd] TAM – [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM = (6-2)/Nd = 4/Nd > 0(eDAM vs. TAM) (3)

MSCeDAM – MSCFreud = [2(Np=6)/Nd]Freud - [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM = (12-2)/Nd = 10/Nd > 0 (eDAM vs. Freud) (4)

MSCeDAM – MSCPopper = [2(Np=6)/Nd]Popper - [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM

= (12-2)/Nd = 10/Nd > 0 (eDAM vs. Popper) (5)

This implies that the eDAM framework is better than dualism that is better than TAMwhich is better than Freud’s framework that is equal to Popper’s framework as per MSCderived from the Akaike information criterion. This is the same conclusion as from Occam’srazor. To sum up, the comparative degree of scientific credibility, viability, or reliability oframeworks (assuming Nd same for all frameworks) are as follows:

Occam’s_razor(materialism, idealism, eDAM, RM, Dualism, TAM, Freud, Popper):: (1, 1, 1, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) based on (1/Np) (6)

MSC_AIC(materialism, idealism, eDAM, RM, Dualism, TAM, Freud, Popper):: (1, 1, 1, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) based on (1/Np) using Eqs. (2)-(5) (7)

One could argue for under-determination of theory by data, i.e., empirical data test only apart of theory because of the limitations of data collections. However, this fact should notaffect the above comparative conclusion if we assume that all frameworks can explain thesame collected data.

In other words, as one of the colleagues stated, this section argues that the eDAM is the

preferred framework because of the parsimony due to the Occam’s razor principle and the


14/23

14

model selection criterion derived from the Akaike information statistics. In addition, as perthis colleague, this section correctly recognizes that “such considerations are only relevantonce it has been determined that competing views are equally virtuous in other respects(their explanatory power, predictive power and so on), and so they make it a workingassumption that eDAM and its competitors (materialism, dualism and so on) meet thiscriterion.”

Therefore, other factors (such as “greater explanatory etc. power”, the serious problemsof frameworks, limitation in scope) must also be considered for selecting the preferred

framework in “the contemporary debate concerning the ontology of mind and body”[Quotes are adapted from this colleague’s review.]

Thus, materialism, interactive substance dualism, and idealism have serious problemsas elaborated in (Vimal, 2010b, 2013); views related to dualism, TAM, Freud, and Popper

are less parsimonious; BN is confusing and controversial; and RM is limited to consciousbeings. On the other hand, the eDAM (a) is parsimonious, (b) has unlimited scope, (c) hasequal or greater explanatory and predictive powers (somewhat elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a)compared to competitors, (d) is the least problematic framework, and (e) can address thehard problem of consciousness. Therefore, the eDAM should be considered as the preferred

view.

3. Discussion

We would like to investigate if the eDAM framework is more efficient compared to otherframeworks, such as BN, materialism, materialistic emergence, idealism, interactivesubstance dualism, triple-aspect monism, reflexive monism, and retinoid framework, which

are very briefly discussed as follows in the interest of space:Biological Naturalism : As elaborated in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, BN is confusing and

controversial and has been attacked by both traditional views namely materialism andinteractive substance dualism. However, if BN is interpreted in terms of eDAM, then therelated problems can be addressed.

Materialism : Here, non-experiential matter is the fundamental reality and experientiaaspect of consciousness emerges from matter such as brain or identical with brain-states

The major problem is the explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983): how can experiencesarise from non-experiential matter? The problems of materialism are elaborated in (Vimal2010b, 2013).

As per materialistic emergence framework (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010LaRock, 2013), the experiential aspect of consciousness is an emergent phenomenon , closer

to neuroscience, which is “the result of dynamic interactions between widely distributedneuronal groups” in thalamocortical neural-networks (Edelman, 2003). One could also

argue that consciousness is simply neural activity or integrated information (identity theoryframework), so mysterious emergent phenomenon is not needed. However, both these

materialistic frameworks have the problem of explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): how can asubjective experience (a) emerge from a non-experiential matter such as a brain and itsactivities, processing, and integrated information in it or (b) identical with its state?

Furthermore, in materialistic emergentism (Fingelkurts et al., 2010; LaRock, 2013), thehypothesis is that SEs somehow emerge in neural-networks (Vimal, 2008a); but, preciselyhow SEs emerge is not clear. We have tried to unpack ‘emergence’ in the eDAM frameworkin (Vimal, 2013), which hypothesizes that a specific SE does not really emerge from non-experiential matter such as brain. Rather, it is selected from the potential SEs that

potentially pre-exist in Nature and embedded in a specific neural-network (as memory


15/23

15

traces formed during neural Darwinism ) by the self during the interaction between feed-forward and feedback signals in the neural-network by the matching process (Vimal2010a) and experienced by the self (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007) as concisely elaborated inSection 2.1. This is extended in terms of information integration (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009 Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) in a ‘complex’ of neural-network, where the measure or degree o

integration (Φ) is higher than critical threshold for consciousness as further elaborated in(Vimal, 2015a).

Idealism : It is just opposite to materialism, i.e., non-material consciousness is the

fundamental reality, and the appearance of matter-in-itself emerges from consciousness(i.e., from the structure of sets of conscious subjective experiences and potentiaexperiences). However, there is a serious problem explanatory gap problem of idealismwhich is just opposite to that of materialism: how can matter-in-itself (i.e., Kant’s ‘ ding ansich’ or noumenon; not its appearances, i.e., not Kant’s phenomenon: (Kant, 1787/1996)emerge from the non-material consciousness? The problems of idealism are elaborated in(Vimal, 2010b, 2013).

Interactive Substance Dualism (or simply dualism): Here, mind (consciousness is a

mental entity) and matter can independently exist but can interact in conscious entities This has many problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013) such as the association problemconsciousness (such as redness) can take significant amount of time to associate to specificneurons (such as redness-related neurons) in searching their locations over billions oneurons whereas it takes just few msec to experience when we open our eyes. Moreover, a

mental entity (such as consciousness) cannot interact with matter because otherwisecategory mistake2 is made?

Triple aspect monism (TAM): It has three aspects: physical aspect (aspect-1), non-conscious mental aspect (aspect-2), and conscious mental aspect (aspect-3): “At the lowerlevel [aspect-1], the system can be described as an ordinary physical-chemical-biologicaone, ruled by causal relations that ultimately reduce to the four fundamental physicaforces. At the middle level [aspect-2], the system can be described as an information-

processing system obeying the rules of information theory. At the higher level [aspect-3]

the system can be phenomenologically described in terms of conscious experiences orpresentations, which can be symbolically represented” (Pereira Jr., 2013).(p.321-2). Triple

aspect monism is less parsimonious than the eDAM framework as elaborated in Section2.3.

Reflexive monism : It is a version of dual-aspect monism, where “experiences areanywhere, they are roughly where they seem to be … representations in the mind/brainhave two [inseparable] (mental and physical) aspects, whose apparent form is dependent onthe perspective from which they are viewed” (Velmans, 2008). It is limited to consciousbeings, whereas the eDAM framework does not have such limitation.

Retinoid framework : It is based on three principles: (i) In (Trehub, 2013)’s dual-aspecmonism,1pp-private descriptions and 3pp-public descriptions are “separate accounts of a

common underlying reality”. This seems equivalent to the private 1pp-mental aspect andthe inseparable public 3pp-physical aspect of the same state of the mind-brain system inthe eDAM framework. (ii) As per (Trehub, 2013), “The bridging principle … For any instanceof conscious content, there is corresponding analog in the biophysical state of brain.” As per Trehub (email communication on 12-and-13-May-2015), 1pp conscious content and its

corresponding 3pp biophysical state of brain are inseparable during the execution of relatedfunction and experience. Therefore, this bridging principle is consistent with the eDAM’sinseparability of 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect of a state of brain-mindsystem in the eDAM framework. In addition, both the eDAM and the retinoid frameworks


16/23

16

hypothesize that (a) primary irreducible experiences potentially pre-exist in Nature becausewe have no firm grounds to rule out anything as a ‘potential’ property of nature, and (b)both aspects co-evolve leading to inseparability between them. (iii) As per (Trehub, 2013)“Consciousness is a transparent brain representation of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective .” Here, “the brain representation is a 3pp physical aspect, an aspect of thebrain that can, in principle, be experienced in the public domain by N independenobservers (1pp). This is the scientific aspect. But the brain representation of the scientificobject of study in the public domain is transparent within the personal brain of each

scientist. […] retinoid mechanisms are limited to living systems” (email communication with Trehub on 12-May-2015). In the eDAM framework, the experiential aspect of consciousnessis the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of the brain-mind system or that of a state of a brain-process, and the related brain-representation (a neural-network and its activities) is theinseparable 3pp-physical aspect. The retinoid framework seems to be limited to livingsystems and perhaps conscious artifacts.

Furthermore, one could argue that materialism is more parsimonious than dualism asper Occam’s razor because it has just one parameter (matter is the only fundamentalreality), whereas dualism has two parameters (mind and matter). Some materialists (suchas (Papineau, 2006b)) can argue that the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) is simply anartifact of an intuitive conviction that dualism is true, i.e., “dualism has us all in itsintuitive grip” (Papineau, 2006a). To justify the eDAM framework, one has to reject allmaterialism based frameworks, such as: materialistic emergence, non-reductive

physicalism/functionalism, supervenience, identity theory that includes materialisticidentity-theory based IIT, phenomenal concept strategy (Carruthers & Veillet, 2007; Levin

2006; Papineau, 2006b), Rosen’s modeling relation in complex system (Rosen, 1998)reductive materialism, eliminativism, and so on. In addition, one has to reject idealism andinteractive substance dualism (or simply dualism).

In our view, materialism, idealism, and the dual-aspect monism (different frominteractive substance dualism) metaphysics are monistic frameworks; therefore, they are

more parsimonious compared to interactive substance dualism from Occam’s razor’s pointof view. Moreover, dualism itself has serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013), which cancertainly free us from its strong intuitive grip.

The major objection to materialism is its fundamental assumption: matter is thefundamental reality and it is inherently and fundamentally non-experiential and does no

even have potential for generating experiences. Then we try to create experiences out ofsuch non-experiential matter. This is the gross violation of its own fundamenta

assumption. The explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983) is: how can subjective experiencesbe created from non-experiential matter that does not even have potential for experiences? This is just a side effect of this gross violation. An analogy may help: if we assume tha

seeds of orange cannot create apple and then trying to create apple out of orange seeds will

obviously be impossible task. The same goes for idealism, which is just opposite tomaterialism and has serious problem to explaining how to create matter-in-itself (not itsappearance) out of consciousness as elaborate above.

If we assume that matter has potential for having subjective experiences (SEs) then it isno more materialism, it would then be dual-aspect monism with matter (such as brain andits activities) as the physical aspect and a potential experience (such as a SE) as the

inseparable mental aspect of a state of an entity (such as the brain-mind system).If we look at closely, one can argue that some frameworks that assume materialism but

accept the existence of experiences have an implicit trace of dual-aspect monism (brain’s


17/23

17

neural-networks and neural activities as the 3pp-physical aspect and experiences as the1pp-mental aspect of brain-mind states). For example, in emergentism, we assume thatexperiences somehow emerge from brain. In supervenience, we assume that experiencessupervene on the physical or functional integration. In identity theory, we assume that thestate related to an experience is identical with the state related to the corresponding brainprocesses. In phenomenal concepts strategy (Carruthers & Veillet, 2007; Levin, 2006Papineau, 2006b) (Type-B materialism), subjective experiences are recognitional conceptsthat apply to physical properties, and we pick out demonstratively physical properties in

our subjective experiences, which must potentially pre-exist. This means that Type-Bmaterialists accept the existence of subjective experiences. In all these frameworks, theexistence of experiences is acceptable, which seems brain’s neural networks and activitiescan be considered as the 3pp-physical aspect and experiences as 1pp-mental aspect ofbrain-mind states.

Let us take another example, as per Libet et al., “The onset of cerebral activity clearlypreceded by at least several hundred milliseconds [minimum 150 ms; average 350 ms] thereported time of conscious intention to act” (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Onecould argue that it is possible to initiate subjective intention (subjective experience o‘wanting’ or intending to act) in 1pp as a cause for an objective action (endogenous motoract) in 3pp. This appears as if ‘mind causes brain-activity’ (close to idealism or interactivesubstance dualism). However, it makes category mistake2 because mind and matter are twodifferent categories in the traditional notion of the physical and the mental entities (Feigl1967) and hence one cannot cause other. Therefore, materialism, idealism, and interactivesubstance dualism must be rejected. Instead of these metaphysics, we need to consider theeDAM framework, where both (mental and physical) are inseparable aspects of the same

brain-mind state1.Furthermore, as per Libet et al., “cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary

act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjectiveawareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been initiated cerebrally” (Libet et al., 1983) This seems to imply that unconscious process is from 3pp because it is latent to 1pp

consciousness to a certain degree (0


18/23

18

and hence their claims are controversial (King, 2014; Libet, 2006; Pockett, 2006; Schlegeet al., 2013; Schurger et al., 2012; Trevena & Miller, 2010). The eDAM framework canaddress this controversy; for example, the readiness potential may be the 3pp-physicalaspect of the mind-brain-state, and its 1pp-mental aspect indicates that the subject ismerely paying attention (King, 2014; Trevena & Miller, 2010).

The eDAM framework is consistent, to a certain extent, with other dual-aspect viewssuch as (a) reflexive monism (Velmans, 2008), (b) triple-aspect monism (physical, nonconscious mental, and conscious mental aspects) (Pereira Jr., 2013) and (c) retinoid

framework (Trehub, 2013), but each have its own problems as elaborated above and inSection 2.3.

To sum up, the eDAM framework is better than materialism, idealism, interactivesubstance dualism, and other versions of dual-aspect monism.

4. Conclusions

(1) Consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of brain-system or that of astate of brain-process from the first person perspective; consciousness has two sub-aspectsconscious experience and conscious function .

(2) A materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003) does notsolve the hard problem, but makes the problem clearer.

(3) An alternative to materialism is an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAMframework for conscious experience. The eDAM framework has five components: (i) dual-aspect monism, (ii) dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms, (iii) the variation othe degree of manifestation of aspects, (iv) the necessary conditions of consciousness, and(v) the segregation, differentiation, and integration of information.

(4) The eDAM framework is parsimonious; it has the least number of problemscompared to all other frameworks; it is consistent with psychophysical, biological, andphysical laws; it attempts to address the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness (how to explainsubjective experiences) and it can be scientifically tested as elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).

(5) The eDAM framework can interpret and unpack Biological Naturalism’s claims (suchas brain processes cause irreducible experiences, and consciousness can influence brainprocesses) using (a) the matching and selection mechanisms, (b) the doctrine oinseparability of 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects, and (c) the principle of co-dependent origination1. The eDAM can address the objections raised in BiologicalNaturalism by traditional views (dualism and materialism) without making categorymistake2.

(6) The eDAM framework supports conscious robots and is parsimonious.

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

References

Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2009). Qualia: the geometry of integrated information. PLoS Comput Biol, 5 (8)

e1000462.Bruzzo, A. A., & Vimal, R. L. P. (2007). Self: An adaptive pressure arising from self-organization, chaotic

dynamics, and neural Darwinism. J Integr Neurosci, 6 (4), 541-566.Carruthers, P., & Veillet, B. (2007). The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Journal of Consciousness Studies

14 (9-10), 212-236.


19/23

19

Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003). A framework for consciousness. Nat Neurosci., 6 (2), 119-126.Dennett, D. C. (1978). The Intentional Stance . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Edelman, G. M. (2003). Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. P Natl Acad Sci USA, 100 (9)

5520-5524.Feigl, H. (1967). The `Mental' and the `Physical', The Essay and a Postscript . Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press. See also, The `mental' and the `physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience, 2, 370-497.

Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., & Neves, C. F. H. (2010). Emergentist monism, biological realismoperations and brain-mind problem. Phys Life Rev, 7 (2), 264-268.

Kant, I. (1787/1996). Critique of Pure Reason (Werner Pluhar, Trans. 2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett (OriginalKritik der reinen Verkunst. Königsberg, 1787).King, C. C. (2014). Space, Time and Consciousness Cosmology. Cosmology

, 18 , 100-109.Koch, C. (2012). Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist . Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT) Press.Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2008). Can machines be conscious? Spectrum IEEE Trans Image Process, 45 , 55-59.

Lachaux, J. P., Pezard, L., Garnero, L., Pelte, C., Renault, B., Varela, F. J., & Martinerie, J. (1997). Spatialextension of brain activity fools the single-channel reconstruction of EEG dynamics. Hum Brain Mapp5 (1), 26-47.

LaRock, E. (2013). From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism. Philosophia Christi, 15 (1), 97-118.

Levin, J. (2006). What is a Phenomenal Concept? In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and

Phenomenal Knowledge. New essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (pp. 87-110). Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pac Philos Quart, 64 , 354–361.Libet, B. (2006). The timing of brain events: reply to the "Special Section" in this journal of September 2004

edited by Susan Pockett. Conscious Cogn, 15 (3), 540-547.Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to

onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary actBrain, 106 (Pt 3) , 623-642.

Meisenzahl, E. M., Koutsouleris, N., Bottlender, R., Scheuerecker, J., Jager, M., Teipel, S. J., Holzinger, S.,Frodl, T., Preuss, U., Schmitt, G., Burgermeister, B., Reiser, M., Born, C., & Moller, H. J. (2008)Structural brain alterations at different stages of schizophrenia: a voxel-based morphometric study.Schizophr Res, 104 (1-3), 44-60.

Nāgārjuna, & Garfield, J. L. (1995). The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (J. L. Garfield, Trans.). New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press(Translation and commentary by J. L. Garfield).Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004). Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends Cogn Sci, 8 (3), 102-107.

Papineau, D. (2006a). Kripke’s Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists (unpublished); http://www.davidpapineau.co.uk/articles-online.html .

Papineau, D. (2006b). Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), PhenomenaConcepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (pp. 111-144)Oxford University Press.

Pereira Jr., A. (2013). Triple-Aspect Monism: A Conceptual Framework for the Science of HumanConsciousness. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: CurrenPerspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp. 299-337). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Pereira Jr., A., Vimal, R. L. P., & Pregnolato, M. (2015). Can Qualitative Biophysics Solve the Hard Problem?

In R. R. Poznanski, J. A. Tuszynski & T. Feinberg, E. (Eds.), Biophysics of Consciousness: AFoundational Approach . Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd (in preparation).Pockett, S. (2006). The great subjective back-referral debate: do neural responses increase during a train of

stimuli? Conscious Cogn, 15 (3), 551-559.Radhakrishnan, S. (1960). Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life . London: Ruskin House, George

Allen & Unwin Ltd..Rosen, R. (1998). Essays on Life Itself . New York: Columbia University Press.Schlegel, A., Alexander, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Tse, P. U., & Wheatley, T. (2013). Barking up

the wrong free: readiness potentials reflect processes independent of conscious will. Exp Brain Res229 (3), 329-335.


20/23

20

Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D., & Dehaene, S. (2012). An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior toself-initiated movement. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A .

Searle, J. R. (2002). Why I Am Not a Property Dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (12), 57-64.Searle, J. R. (2007). Biological naturalism. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to

Consciousness (pp. 325-334). Oxford: Blackwell.Searle, J. R. (2014). Introduction: Addressing the hard problem. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 13 (2), vii-

xi.Swami Krishnananda. (1983). The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad . Rishikesh, Himalayas, India: The Divine Life

Society .

Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neurosci, 5 (1), 42. Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto. Biol Bull, 215 (3), 216-

242. Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account. Arch Ital Biol, 150 (4)

293-329. Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2014). Consciousness: Here, There but Not Everywhere

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7089v1.

Trehub, A. (2013). A foundation for the scientific study of consciousness. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann(Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp219-232). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Trevena, J., & Miller, J. (2010). Brain preparation before a voluntary action: evidence against unconsciousmovement initiation. Conscious Cogn, 19 (1), 447-456.

Velmans, M. (2008). Reflexive Monism. J Consciousness Stud, 15 (2), 5-50.

Vimal, R. L. P. (1998). Spatial-frequency tuning of sustained nonoriented units of the Red-Green channel. JOpt Soc Am A Opt Image Sci Vis , 15 (1), 1-15.Vimal, R. L. P. (2008a). Attention and Emotion. The Annual Review of Biomedical Sciences (ARBS), 10 , 84-104.Vimal, R. L. P. (2008b). Proto-experiences and Subjective Experiences: Classical and Quantum Concepts. J

Integr Neurosci, 7 (1), 49-73.Vimal, R. L. P. (2009a). Dependent Co-origination and Inherent Existence: Dual-Aspect Framework. Vision

Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Availablehttp://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2009-Vimal-Coorigination-LVCR-2-7.pdf], 2 (7), 1-32.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2009b). Meanings attributed to the term 'consciousness': an overview. J Consciousness Stud16 (5), 9-27.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2010a). Matching and selection of a specific subjective experience: conjugate matching andsubjective experience. J Integr Neurosci, 9 (2), 193-251.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2010b). On the Quest of Defining Consciousness. Mind Matter, 8 (1), 93-121.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2013). Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity ofMind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp. 149-181). CambridgeUK: Cambridge University Press.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015a). A dual-aspect framework for consciousness: segregation and integration oinformation. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research, 7 (2), 1-25. [Available]

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015b). Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: necessary conditions of consciousnessVision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research, 7 (1), 1-28. [Available]


21/23

21

Table: The features of the 3pp-physical aspect of an entity-state, the 1pp-mental aspect ofa conscious brain-mind state, and the mental aspect of a non-conscious brain-mindstate are compared. An entity-state means a state of any entity including consciousand non-conscious brain-mind system and inert system. We use the term‘qualitative/mental aspect’, where the qualitative aspect is for all systems, and themental aspect is for living systems. The content of Table is adapted with somemodification from (Searle, 2007) and its chart with respect to the eDAM framework aselaborated in Section 2.1: The features 1-8 of 3pp-physical aspect is the same as that

of ‘Physical’ in the (Searle, 2007)’s chart. The features 1-4 of 1pp-mental aspect oconscious brain-mind state is the same as that of ‘Mental’ in the Searle’s chart, and

its features 5-6 is the same as that of ‘Physical’ in the Searle’s chart. The rest ofeatures of columns 2 and 3 are from (Searle, 2007), but modified for the eDAM

framework. The features of the mental aspect of non-conscious entity-state inColumn 4 are speculative and based on the eDAM framework. The features of Tableare not based on traditional views (dualism and materialism); rather, they are basedon the eDAM framework.


22/23

22

Features 3pp-physical aspect of entity-state

1pp-mental aspect of conscious brain-mind state

Mental aspect of non-consciousentity-state

1 Objective Subjective, the degree of manifestation đ

of 1pp-mental aspect is 1 (Vimal, 2013). Subjective, but the degree ofmanifestation đ of mental aspect varieswith the levels of entity-states; 0≤đ


23/23

Endnotes

1 Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent originationand that is also why he rejects causality; the entities that lack inherent existencedependently co-arise (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a).

In the eDAM framework, since the degree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspectof a state of a brain-mind system and that of the inseparable physical aspect of the same

state of the same brain-mind system vary with the levels of entities and contexts, it lacksinherent existence. Although both aspects inherently exist in each state of each entity at allevels.

In other words, the degree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspect and that of thephysical aspect dependently co-arise, co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tuned for sensorimotor

system appropriately depending on the levels of entities and contexts, which entail theinseparability of both aspects. In this sense, the symmetry between physical and mentalaspects of a state of brain-mind system in the eDAM framework is maintained, where the3pp-physical aspect does not cause the 1pp-mental aspect in living systems or vice-versa .

2 Since mind and matter are two different categories in the traditional notion of the physical

and the mental entities (Feigl, 1967), and hence one cannot cause (or interact with) otherotherwise category mistake is made.

3 The criticism against this statement (the eDAM framework is neither proto-panpsychismor nor panpsychism) is that the doctrine of inseparability of dual-aspect monism seems tobe a statement of the dual-aspect panpsychism. This confusion is addressed (in detail) in

Section 3.4 of (Vimal, 2010a). Briefly, in dual-aspect monism, there are three competinghypotheses (Vimal, 2010c), where each of them follows the doctrine of inseparability :

(i) Superposition based hypothesis (H1), where the basis-states related to potentiaprimary irreducible experiences (subjective experiences (SEs) and/or proto-experiences(PEs)) are superposed in the mental aspect of each entity-state; when a specific stimulus is

presented to the neural-network, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching andselection process and experienced by the ‘self’ as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a). This

superposition based hypothesis (H1) is used the eDAM framework, which is neither proto-panpsychism or nor dual-aspect panpsychism and does not have the problems ofpanpsychism, proto-panpsychism, and other metaphysics.

(ii) Superposition-then-integration based hypothesis (H2), where only PEs aresuperposed, which are integrated (co-developed) mysteriously by neural-Darwinism leadingto specific SEs.

And (iii) Integration based hypothesis (H3), where each entity has its own PE, whichkeeps on transforming appropriately as physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspecsomehow (mysteriously) co-evolves, co-develops, and co-tunes for sensorimotor from

elementary particles to neural-networks to whole universe using the concept of dependentco-origination (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a). This is the dual-aspectpanpsychism and has many problems as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010b).

Date post:	06-Jul-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	blagoje
View:	214 times
Download:	0 times

Biological_Naturalism_in_Extended_Dual-A.pdf

Documents