1 Electronic Biometric Verification of Voters in Pakistan: a Silver Bullet? March 2015 Summary Election “rigging” in Pakistan Reacting to allegations of widespread voter impersonation (or “election rigging”, as commonly referred to in Pakistan) the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) attempted to conduct audits in several constituencies to determine the extent of multiple voting and voter impersonation. This should have been possible by comparing the fingerprints in the voters’ rolls with the fingerprints captured by polling officials. The audit results were inconclusive - while there was some evidence of multiple voting, the matter remained largely unresolved. The main obstacle for an effective audit was the poor quality of voter verification carried out by polling officials and the poor quality of ink for fingerprints. Pakistani biometric system The inconclusive results of the audits led political parties to call on the ECP to introduce biometric verification systems. Pakistan already has one of the more advanced electoral rolls with biometric features. To qualify as a voter, Pakistanis must obtain a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) which contains a photograph and fingerprint. This enables NADRA and the ECP to prevent the duplication of records, to conduct stricter authentication of eligible voters, and allows polling officials to check photo IDs to verify voters. Electronic technology in biometrics verification So when calling for the introduction of biometric verification, in the Pakistani context, this refers to an ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION (EBV) system, which uses electronic devices to capture voter fingerprints at the polling station and effectively moves the authority for verification of the voter from polling officials to a computer. The theory behind the use of the EBV is to prevent malpractice of polling officials by limiting their authority with the use of electronic technology. Benefits and challenges To properly assess the benefits and costs of electronic biometric voter verification, the assessment must take into consideration the context of the existing electoral infrastructure in Pakistan and inherent challenges specific to the country. Considering the context of Pakistan’s specific electoral procedures, the potential benefit of the upgrade of the existing systems is fairly narrow, though it would limit the ability of polling officials to facilitate multiple voting and voter impersonation. Briefing Paper No. 02 of 2015 IP3 is funded by the European Union
Transcript
1
Electronic Biometric Verification of Voters in Pakistan: a Silver Bullet?
March 2015
Summary
Election “rigging” in Pakistan Reacting to allegations of widespread voter impersonation (or “election rigging”, as commonly referred to
in Pakistan) the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the National Database and Registration
Authority (NADRA) attempted to conduct audits in several constituencies to determine the extent of
multiple voting and voter impersonation. This should have been possible by comparing the fingerprints in
the voters’ rolls with the fingerprints captured by polling officials. The audit results were inconclusive -
while there was some evidence of multiple voting, the matter remained largely unresolved. The main
obstacle for an effective audit was the poor quality of voter verification carried out by polling officials and
the poor quality of ink for fingerprints.
Pakistani biometric system The inconclusive results of the audits led political parties to call on the ECP to introduce biometric
verification systems. Pakistan already has one of the more advanced electoral rolls with biometric features.
To qualify as a voter, Pakistanis must obtain a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) which contains a
photograph and fingerprint. This enables NADRA and the ECP to prevent the duplication of records, to
conduct stricter authentication of eligible voters, and allows polling officials to check photo IDs to verify
voters.
Electronic technology in biometrics verification So when calling for the introduction of biometric verification, in the Pakistani context, this refers to an
ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION (EBV) system, which uses electronic devices to capture voter
fingerprints at the polling station and effectively moves the authority for verification of the voter from
polling officials to a computer. The theory behind the use of the EBV is to prevent malpractice of polling
officials by limiting their authority with the use of electronic technology.
Benefits and challenges To properly assess the benefits and costs of electronic biometric voter verification, the assessment must
take into consideration the context of the existing electoral infrastructure in Pakistan and inherent
challenges specific to the country. Considering the context of Pakistan’s specific electoral procedures, the
potential benefit of the upgrade of the existing systems is fairly narrow, though it would limit the ability of
polling officials to facilitate multiple voting and voter impersonation.
Briefing Paper No. 02 of 2015
IP3 is funded by the European Union
2
On the other hand, the challenges of introducing such a system are immense, starting with the unrealistic
expectations brought about by such technology. A further challenge is in the costs; the ECP may be
tempted to provide some preliminary estimates of the cost, but the final figures will prove elusive, as the
experience from other countries shows. Finally, before the ECP even starts introducing the new technology,
legislators will have to create a legal framework that will protect key principles of transparent elections. In
addition, the size of Pakistan and the state of its infrastructure present further challenges to the possible
deployment of newly procured electronic devices.
Standards and experience The concrete standards for electoral biometric technology have yet to be developed. The international
election community has made some advances in developing standards for the use of electronic voting and
counting technologies, but the source of biometric standards is largely found either in technical standards
or privacy and personal data standards. Transparency remains a paramount issue, so the key features of
electronic systems must allow for sufficient transparency. As this paper presents, the use of electronic
biometric verification is still a very limited feature of elections and only few countries have introduced
electronic devices in the verification of voters. Implementation has been challenging and the results are
mixed.
How should Pakistan proceed? Political pressure in Pakistan over the EBV reached the stage where the ECP felt compelled to publicly
announce introduction of the EBV for the next elections. This political pressure, however, is not based on a
full understanding of the benefits and challenges that arise from the introduction of the EBV. There has
been no public debate on whether the expectations from the EVB might be too grand. Before the ECP
develops specifications and initiates procurement, Pakistani stakeholders should agree on a systematic
approach to the issue. As proposed in this paper, these steps should include:
Analysis whether to invest into EBV which will remove (or reduce) authority of polling officials to
verify voters and give this authority to the electronic device OR to invest into enforcement of the
existing polling procedures;
Clear conclusions about what will not be resolved with the EBV;
Agreement on who should lead the process of introduction of the EVB and definition of roles;
Clear working plan on the phases for introduction of the EBV. These phases should include:
o Assessment and clear description of the need
o Equipment demonstration
o Development of technical specifications
o Assessment of the cost
o Reform of the legal framework
o Pilot testing
o Work plan for gradual implementation
3
Introduction: Biometrics in Elections
What is biometrics? Biometrics is a short term for technology for measuring and analysing human features, such as skin ridges
on fingers, eye features, voice characteristics, facial patterns, and any other human feature. These features
can be recorded and analysed with electronic technology: fingerprint scan, iris scan, voice sound record, or
a photograph of the face. Fingerprint and photography of the face (photo ID) remain the most commonly
used biometric tools.
How is it used in elections? In practice, photo ID and fingerprints are the only biometric
tool used in elections, as a feature of the electoral rolls. Their
use is slightly different.
Photo ID
The principal use of the photo ID is verification of voters at
the polling station. It is simple to implement and there is no
need for use of electronic technology at the polling station.
Fingerprint
Use of fingerprints has some advantage over the photo ID.
Fingerprints can be utilised:
to find duplicate records in electoral rolls
to verify authenticity of the support for the candidate1
to verify voters at the polling station
in the conduct of the post-election audit to confirm voters participation
While use of fingerprints has some advantages, optimal utilisation of its functionalities requires a robust
electronic technology infrastructure. Capturing of fingerprints requires scanners. Powerful servers are
required for analysis of large number of fingerprints with Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS). Proper verification of voters requires electronic devices available at each polling station, as visual
analysis of fingerprints is not a reliable method.
Electronic Biometric System used in Ghana 2012
Photo by Electoral Commission of Ghana
Voter registration kit Voter verification device
1 Some legislations condition eligibility for candidates by requiring them to collect certain number of authenticated
signatures.
IDENTIFICATION? AUTHENTICATION?
VERIFICATION?
Strictly speaking, identification and
authentication are a bit different.
Identification is “finding” the voter in
the rolls. Authentication is confirmation
of the voter’s identity. In practice, these
functions may be conducted
simultaneously, hence the commonly
used term VERIFICATION.
4
Use of biometric in Pakistani elections Pakistan is already using photo ID and fingerprints in the
electoral process. The 2010 amendments to the legal
framework effectively linked civil registry with electoral rolls
by requiring voters to obtain a Computerized National
Identity Card (CNIC). The CNIC records contain an electronic
photograph and fingerprint and these are exported into the
electoral rolls.
This enables the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) and Election Commission of
Pakistan (ECP) to prevent the duplication of records, to conduct stricter authentication of eligible voters,
and allows polling officials to check photo IDs to verify voters. However, the system does not allow for
proper verification of voters with fingerprints, as Pakistan does not use electronic fingerprint scanners at
polling stations. Manual capture and analysis of the fingerprints by polling officials proved ineffective and
the poor quality of fingerprints prevented effective post-election audits. When this became apparent,
political parties, and to certain extent, the ECP, started advocating for the introduction of electronic
technology for biometric verification of voters – Electronic Biometric Verification (EBV).
Electronic Technology in Biometric Verification: Key Considerations
Purpose Electronic technologies for verification of voters automate some processes but also add complexity and
cost to an election. Introducing electronic technology is not a simple add-on to the existing process – it is a
systematic change of the electoral operation. For that reason, the introduction of electronic technology
must be thoroughly questioned and the first step must be a clear definition of the purpose. This is
especially relevant in the field of electronic biometric verification as there is no conclusive judgment yet
whether the benefits are greater than the challenges.
Potential benefits Benefits of electronic biometric voter verification must be assessed in the context of existing electoral
infrastructure. This means that the assessment needs to take into consideration information what kind of
information is already contained in electoral rolls, what kind of data and ID systems are used in the country,
and whether voters possess voting or other type of ID card. Many of these tools can be developed without
adding electronic biometric verification to the electoral process. However, if designed and implemented
properly, adding the EBV could:
limit polling officials and voters in their ability to facilitate voter impersonation
automate the verification process for the support and nomination of candidates
Challenges
Eliminating fraud with modernisation
In an effort to modernise electoral operations, election authorities place unrealistic expectations in
technology. It is often a mistake to expect that technology will resolve a range of corrupt practices, and
technology advocates often overstate the possible benefits. Elimination of the “human factor” in election
operations does not eliminate the possibility of corrupt practices; rather, it merely changes the nature and
the methodology of corrupt practices.
Estimate of the cost
It is virtually impossible to generalise the cost of introducing electronic biometric systems in order to make
quick benefit and costs analyses. Each system will depend on multiple factors such as:
Biometric Verification vs. Electronic
Biometric Verification
Voter verification with photo ID is simple
and does not require electronic
technologies. However, effective use of
fingerprints requires scanner and AFIS.
5
existing electoral infrastructure – the type of voters database, availability of civil and voter ID
systems, voter registration procedures, etc.
logistical environment and national communication and power infrastructure
organisational structure and human resources of the electoral authority
polling procedures
Comparing the price of devices procured in another country is largely irrelevant. The cost analysis must
take into consideration factors beyond the cost of fingerprint scanning devices. These are the costs of pilot
projects, trainings, modifications of the existing IT system, the supporting infrastructure, etc. As an
example, the initially estimated cost of biometric registration in the Democratic Republic of Congo was
US$285 million, while the final cost was over US$546 million. The equipment itself was less than US$45
million.2
Processing power
To operate biometric databases to detect duplicates, the IT system must have the capacity to process and
compare each fingerprint with all fingerprints in the database. For example, if there are 90 million voters in
the database, the system will have to check each print against each finger in the database and make
89,999,999 comparisons. In case multiple fingers are being checked, this number exponentially increases.
These processes can only be effectively conducted by powerful computer servers.
Training
Introduction of new technology in election processes requires extensive training for those who will use the
systems. Electoral authorities must understand that potential vendors will likely present how devices
perform in a controlled environment. This creates the perception that devices are easy to operate.
However, the real situation will not be as smooth and problems will occur. Training needs to include these
situations.
Backup options
In virtually every country where biometric verification was introduced, things have not gone according to
plan. Devices or polling officials have failed. Especially in cases where biometric verification is used for the
first time, paper electoral rolls should serve as a backup to avoid breakdown of voting processes. The
authorities also need to prepare alternative procedures for disabled voters and those whose biometric
features are impaired, such as damaged finger ridges.
Infrastructure
The infrastructure that supports the use of biometric technology for voter verification is completely
different than that used for the paper based process. Delivery, installation, maintenance, and operating
electronic devices require electrical power, backup batteries, and replacement devices.
Transparency
Implementation of any electronic technology restricts opportunities for observation. Digital electronic
records cannot be observed as paper records and audit options are limited. Data transfers become even
more sensitive aspects of the electoral process which require tamper detecting measures.
International Standards for Electoral Biometric Technology
Universal electoral standards Universal electoral standards define the key standards for democratic elections and some of the main
principles are applicable in any type of elections. These standards are articulated in international
2 EISA, Voter Registration in Africa (2010) and Budget General Du Processus Electoral de la Transition, CEI
6
conventions, declarations, and political commitments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of racial Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and
the UN Convention Against Corruption.
However, while the international election community has made advances in developing standards for use
in electronic voting and counting, specific biometric standards for electoral purposes have yet to be
developed.
Universal biometric standards Since biometric tools have been used for a long time by law enforcement and for civil registry purposes, the
first biometric standards were focused on developing technical specifications for fields of forensics and
fingerprint databases. With the development of information technology and electronic digital tools, the IT
community played a significant role. The first biometric standards were published by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology in 1986 (ANSI/NBS-ICST 1-1986). Since then, many national and
several international organisations have formed committees and are continually working on biometric
standards. Some of the most important committees are formed by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC),3 which have been
developing biometric standards since 1988 and have so far published numerous biometric standards.
Examples of these standards are:
biometric vocabulary
testing methodology
finger, signature and iris image data formats
physical characteristics and test methods for ID-cards
jurisdictional and societal considerations for commercial applications
security specifications
user interfaces
machine readable travel documents
Cryptography and security mechanisms
Other standards In the absence of specific electoral biometric standards, useful sources for relevant standards are found in
conventions and guidelines that define privacy and transparency. Some of the most interesting ones are:
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
1980
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union Directive 95/46/EC on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data
Aside from conventions, the National Democratic Institute provides useful guidance for transparency
issues4: “At every point where electronic technologies are to be employed in election processes the
following question must be asked by policy makers, election administrators, political contestants,
3 JTC 1/SC 37, JTC 1/SC 17 and JTC 1/SC 27
4 Monitoring Electronic Technologies in Electoral process, NDI 2007
7
nonpartisan election monitors, the media and the public: “Will it be possible to provide sufficient
transparency in the application of this technology to allow problems to be identified and allow effective
remedies to be provided?”
Proposed electoral biometric standards In the absence of specific standards for the use of electronic biometric technology in elections, standards
for the use of electronic voting are a useful source for development of recommendations. The Council of
Europe developed recommendations to Member States on legal, operational, and technical standards for e-
voting5. Some of the recommendations on e-voting could be translated into principles for a biometric
system for the verification of voters:
Principles
Universal Suffrage
Unless universally accessible, the system shall only be an additional and optional means of
verification
The user interface should be understandable and easily usable
The systems should be designed, as far as is practicable, to maximise the opportunities for persons
with disabilities
Equal Suffrage
The system should prevent voters from having multiple records
The system should prevent multiple voter verifications
Free Suffrage
If biometric and paper-based verification is conducted, there should be a procedure for reliable
aggregation of the data
The system shall indicate clearly to the voter if the verification was successful or not
Secret Suffrage
The system shall be so designed so it is impossible to link verification to the vote
Procedural Safeguards
Transparency
The authorities shall take steps to ensure that voters understand the system
Information on the functioning of the system shall be made publicly available
Any observers, to the extent permitted by law, shall be able to observe the system
Verifiability and accountability
The components of the system shall be disclosed, at least to the competent electoral authorities, as
required for verification and certification purposes
Before any system is introduced, and at appropriate intervals thereafter, and in particular after any
changes are made to the system, an independent body, appointed by the electoral authorities, shall
verify that the e-voting system is working correctly and that all the necessary security measures
have been taken
Use of biometric voters list or verification systems shall not prevent partial or complete re-run of
elections
5 Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on legal, operational and technical
standards for e-voting (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 September 2004 at the 898th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
8
Reliability and Security
All possible steps shall be taken to avoid the possibility of an unauthorised intervention affecting
the system
The system shall contain measures to preserve the availability of its services during processes and
to mitigate malfunction and breakdowns
Before any election takes place, the competent electoral authority shall satisfy itself that the e-
voting system is genuine and operates correctly
Only persons appointed by the electoral authority shall have access to the central infrastructure,
the servers, and the voters’ data. There shall be clear rules established for such appointments.
Critical technical activities shall be carried out by teams of at least two people. The composition of
the teams shall be regularly changed. As far as possible, such activities shall be carried out outside
election periods.
If stored or communicated outside controlled environments, the data shall be encrypted
Operational Requirements
The voter shall be able to check the information that is held about him/her on the register and
request corrections.
In cases where there is an overlap between the period for voter registration and the voting period,
provision for appropriate voter authentication shall be made
The system shall be auditable and the conclusions drawn from the audit process shall be applied in
future elections and referendums
Technical Requirements
Users shall be involved in the design of the systems, particularly to identify constraints and test
ease of use at each main stage of the development process
Consideration shall be given, when developing new systems, to their compatibility with existing
ones, including those using technologies designed to help people with disabilities
Open standards shall be used to ensure that the various technical components or services of an
biometric system, possibly derived from a variety of sources, inter-operate
It is recommended to use Election Markup Language (EML) to guarantee interoperability
The competent electoral authorities shall publish an official list of the software used. A procedure
shall be established for regularly installing updated versions and corrections of the relevant
protection software. It shall be possible to check the state of protection of the equipment at any
time.
Those responsible for operating the equipment shall draw up a contingency procedure. Any backup
system shall conform to the same standards and requirements as the original system.
Systems shall generate reliable and sufficiently detailed observation data so that election
observation can be carried out. The time at which an event generated observation data shall be
reliably determinable. The authenticity, availability and integrity of the data shall be maintained.
The e-voting system shall maintain reliable synchronised time sources. The accuracy of the time
source shall be sufficient to maintain timestamps for audit trails and observations data, as well as
for maintaining time limits for registration, nomination, voting, or counting.
The authenticity, availability and integrity of the voters' registers and lists of candidates shall be
maintained. The source of the data shall be authenticated. Provisions on data protection shall be
respected.
The integrity of data communicated from the pre-voting stage (e.g. voters' registers and lists of
candidates) shall be maintained. Data-origin authentication shall be carried out.
After the end of the elections, access to the biometric system should be limited and allowed only
for auditing purposes.
9
The audit system shall be designed and implemented as part of the system. Audit facilities shall be
present on different levels of the system: logical, technical, and application.
Authorities shall introduce certification processes that allow for any ICT (Information and
Communication Technology) component to be tested and certified as being in conformity with the
technical requirements.
Experience with Electronic Biometric Verification There are only very few countries using electronic devices biometric voter verification. These include
Venezuela, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil, and Mongolia.
Venezuela: lack of trust Along with electronic voting machines, Venezuela introduced a
biometric verification system for the 2005 elections as an
additional, but not mandatory, check in verification of voters.
Even eight years after the system was first introduced, in
about 11% of cases, voters’ fingerprints could not be matched
with fingerprints in the electoral rolls. This meant that polling
officials had to allow voters to vote with their photo ID, as long
as the system did not indicate that the voter had previously voted.
The system appeared to prevent multiple voting, but not with the
precision which was originally planned.6 If election authorities had
not allowed voting by voters whose records were not found using biometric verification, many voters
would have been disfranchised. However, this back up option is a double edge sword. On the one hand, it
allows polling officials to correct weaknesses of the system; on the other hand, it undermines the trust of
stakeholders in the real purpose of the system. But the accuracy and the paper option is not the only
problem –trust is further undermined by inappropriate design of the machine. Since there was a visible link
between the voter identification device and the voting device, a quarter of Venezuelan voters did not
believe that their vote was secret.7
Kenya: paper list saves the day Political parties in Kenya insisted on introduction of the EBV system, citing
voter impersonation and multiple voting as the main source of electoral
fraud. Eight candidates in the presidential election had written to the
electoral authorities prior to election day, demanding that no paper
electoral rolls be sent to polling stations. Since the electoral rolls in Kenya
did not include fingerprints, Kenyan election authorities launched an
extensive biometric voter registration process. Unfortunately, the
introduction of the EBV commenced to near to election day and the late
start effected procurement procedures8 and delayed hardware receipt,
configuration, and training of polling officials. On election-day, polling
officials had to revert to the paper-based electoral rolls provided as a
contingency because, by the end of the day, in more than half of the polling stations equipped with the so
called “Electronic Voter Identification Device” (EVID) the devices failed to function properly.9
6 Carter Center, 2012
7 Poll conducted in 2012 by Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
8 Documented by report of the Auditor General
9 ELOG report
Venezuelan voting device with voter verification unit
Kenyan verification device
10
Brazil: gradual implementation Along with Venezuela, Brazil was one of the first countries
to introduce electronic biometric verification. The
experience in Brazil differs greatly from that of Kenya.
Instead of a comprehensive change and massive
procurement, Brazilian authorities initiated the change in
2008 gradually, and started with several pilot tests. After
testing in three pilot cities, the Brazilian electoral authorities
expanded the system to 1.1 million voters (out of 142
million registered voters) in 60 municipalities. In the second
stage, completed in April 2012, over 7 million voters in 235
new municipalities were included in the scheme. Currently,
over 11 million voters are included in the scheme. Brazil’s target date for 100% rollout of the biometric
verification is 2018, ten years after it was first tested.
Recommendations to Pakistani Electoral Stakeholders It is important to underline that electoral rolls in Pakistan already include biometric data - photo ID and
fingerprints. This data is obtained through the civil registration process and is transferred into the electoral
rolls, which enables electoral authorities to limit duplicate records and allows polling officials to verify
voters by checking photo IDs. However, fingerprints have failed to serve as an additional safeguard at the
polling stations for several reasons:
visual comparison of the fingerprints in the rolls with voters’ fingerprint at the polling station is not
an effective system
polling officials did not apply the ink and the print properly which resulted in poor quality
fingerprints
even with proper verification of the voter, the blame for multiple voting is on polling officials who
allowed voter impersonation and multiple voting10
Proper voter verification at polling stations is possible with the existing photo ID, but the weak point is how
polling officials conduct this verification. This was confirmed by audits conducted by the ECP and NADRA.
The main dilemma for Pakistani stakeholders can be formulated as:
What will not be resolved with the electronic biometric verification? Pakistan already has one of the more advanced electoral rolls with biometric features, linked to the unique
personal ID and civil registry record. This system already addresses issues of duplicate voters and the
inclusion of ineligible persons in the electoral rolls. Additionally, the system provides a solid framework for
the effective zoning of the polling stations and the delimitation of boundaries. Many stakeholders,
including DRI, propose further integration of civil records and electoral rolls through legislative
amendments and formalisation of administrative regulations.
10
Dawn repot: http://www.dawn.com/news/1048088
To invest in electronic verification systems which will prevent polling officials from malpractice -
neglecting the voter verification process and allowing multiple voting
OR
To invest in the enforcement of existing polling procedures by polling officials?
Brazilian verification device
11
Wholesale introduction of electronic technology cannot mitigate malpractices of polling officials. It is
evident from experience that paper electoral rolls must be deployed as a necessary backup option.
Paradoxically, this could provide even more opportunities for malpractice as polling officials could allow
multiple voting by “verifying” voters through both systems. Furthermore, a poorly designed biometric
system could allow polling officials to override or ignore the verification altogether and allow multiple
voting, just as with the paper system.11 Ghana’s 2012 elections shows how the EVB devices did not prevent
the malpractices of polling officials.
Technology cannot be a replacement for the ECP’s enforcement of polling procedures. Even without using
electronic devices at the polling station, NADRA could confirm instances of multiple voting, but with little
consequences. The ECP and other state authorities have yet to prosecute polling officials or voters involved
in voter malpractice.
Election observers12 were critical about the capacity of polling officials, who were largely untrained.
Introduction of technology will not mitigate this problem – on the contrary, introduction of electronic
technology will demand even more skills. Training requirements will place additional burdens on polling
officials without precedent in Pakistani elections.
Who should lead the process? Introduction of electronic biometric verification is not just a technical upgrade of the process. It is a
substantial reform of the process that has legal and operational consequences. Legal interventions are
beyond the scope of the ECP. It is a multi-stakeholder issue, comparable to the introduction of CNIC into
the electoral process. The responsibility of building a legal framework lays with the parliament. However,
the ECP could take the lead on technical issues and provide administrative and technological options for
consideration.
What is the first step? Focussing on a detailed definition of the problem that needs to be solved with technology is a crucial step
in the process. Characterising the problem as “vote rigging” does not provide sufficient detail; the definition
of the problem must be as narrow as possible. Only after defining the problem would it be possible to
properly define the function of the technology.
Failure to give due diligence to this step could produce a system which performs essentially the same
functions as the existing system, albeit at a much higher cost and with a new set of operational challenges.
Proposed phases for introduction of EBV
Assessing the need
The ECP and the Parliament could establish a working committee to define the problem that EBV should
resolve and focus on the concrete sequences in the polling procedures. Vendors should not be involved in
proposing solutions before assessing the need. The committee’s conclusions should be published and
presented at a public hearing.
Demonstrations
After defining the task of the EBV, the committee could invite vendors to demonstrate the capabilities of
such systems. These non-binding demonstrations would assist the committee in making informed decisions
about whether the technology could address their defined needs.
11
Investigation of breakdown of EVB machines in Ghana’s 2012 elections showed that machines were about 50 percent less likely to experience breakdown if they were in polling stations with observers. Also, the more competitive race in the constituency was strongly associated with machine breakdown. EVBs actually facilitated election fraud, including over-voting and ballot stuffing (Electoral Fraud and Biometric Identification Machine Failure in a Competitive Democracy, Golden, Cramon, Ofosu 2014 http://egap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/golden-kramon-ofosu.pdf) 12
This briefing paper has been produced by Democracy Reporting International for IP3.
Improving Parliamentary Performance in Pakistan (IP3) Islamabad, Pakistan T / +92 (0) 51 831 8209 F / +92 (0) 51 2821315 [email protected]
www.ip3.org.pk
IP3 is funded by European Union
Disclaimer: This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of IP3 and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
