Ammunition surplus: once the threat to enemies, today the threat to possessorUnplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) - case studies

Prepared by Blaz Mihelic

7-9 July 2014, Geneva, Swiss

Agenda• UEMS risk index (statistical data)• UEMS the cost and consequences• Ammunition depot as a source of illegal ammunition• UEMS case studies

– Turkey – Afyonkarahisar– Cyprus – Naval base– Congo – Brazzaville

• UEMS basic risk assessment

• Recommendations

UEMS - statistical data in the period 1979 to 2013, Ref: Handbook Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) Excess Stockpiles

as Liabilities rather than Assets; Edited by Eric G. Berman and Pilar Reina; Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2014,

First published in June 2014

Statistical data of UEMS

Table Number of UEMS by year and casualties, 2002 - 2011 Years Total Fatalities Injured

2002 20 1182 5787 2003 29 181 322 2004 20 1195 1683 2005 21 108 417 2006 21 54 174 2007 25 169 716 2008 25 55 340 2009 30 67 366 2010 31 148 277 2011 40 383 1944

Grand Total 262 3542 12026 Source: Small Arms Survey Prepared by: Pilar REINA, 10 November 2012.

UEMS probability estimated by historical modelPEvent = (26.2/(1930 x 0.4) = 0.0339 = 3.39 x 10-2 (3.39%)

Number of Exploded Sites is larger than number of UEMS (examples are Novobohdanivka in Ukraine and Pugachevo in Russia

UEMS Risk Index Probability & Severity

UEMS the cost and consequences

• Lost in humans and injured• Damage to civilian infrastructure • Humanitarian crises, humans displaces• Clean-up operation cost: surface, subsurface, water coved area• The overall cost of the incident • Lost in ammunition and military infrastructure• UEMS contaminated sites are:

– Potential source of explosives and ammunition – attractive for terrorist and illegal trading

– UXOs attractive for locals as a source for income by collecting metal scrap (brass, copper., steel etc.) many locals including kids were killed or injured years after event

– Handling & disposal of UXOs found in UEMS affected areas is more hazard and costly in comparison with disposal of stockpiled ammunition

– UEMS affected areas are rarely secured (fenced and guarded)

Ammunition depot as a source of illegal ammunition Explosion rocks Libyan airbase

• Another Libyan ammunition depot blew-up Monday (December 9th 2013).

• Some 50 criminals were behind the explosion at the tank ammunition storage site at the Brak al-Shatie airbase, 650 kilometers south of Tripoli, a Sebha security source said.

• Thieves hoping to steal copper from destroyed ammunition reportedly poured gasoline on the arms depot in the morning. Overheating in the afternoon caused rockets and shells to ignite

• Four base guards were injured, two of them seriously. They were transferred to Tripoli for treatment.

• The attack is the second of its type targeting the same bunker in less than two weeks.

• Thirty people died in a blast at the airbase on November 28th. The explosion occurred when a group attempted to steal copper from the site. Victims of the explosion included African migrants.

Turkey: explosion at military depot in Afyonkarahisar

• The explosion occurred at 21:15 local time on 5 September 2012 in Afyonkarahisar, Turkey. According to the Turkey Armed Forces 25 servicemen died, four other soldiers and three civilians were injured by the accident

• Accident happened in uncertain circumstances. One of the potential reasons for the accident is poor ammunition management system.

• Comments of Turkey gen: The stock check should not have been conducted at night and that the number of soldiers involved in the procedure at Afyonkarahisar seemed to be too high.

Turkey: ammunition storagebunkers are orientated towards and close to public

road and civilian infrastructure

Afyonkarahisar Ammunition stock in the nearby bunker after explosion

Ammunition Mismanagement at military depot in Afyonkarahisar : reference previous slides

• Ammunition stock is too high,• Unstable stock / stock is under angle,• Stock is placed wall to wall (no isle),• Ammunition boxes are laying on the floor,• Boxes are touching ceiling,• Ammunition boxes are not palletized,• Stock is close to the entry door,• Ammunition boxes are not connected,• Ammunition stock list is missing, • UN marking system on boxes is missing,• Doors are probably not blast resistant - certified.• QD distances between PES and ES at storage site are questionable, • Doors on bunkers are oriented to exposed sites: civilian buildings,

roads or bunkers

Cypriot authorities confiscated containers in February 2009 from a ship sailing off and stored near the Vasilikos power plant the largest

electricity and drinking water production facility

AE filled 98 containers sitting next to the Power Station No QD requirements meet or risk assessment done

Superiors were ignored warnings by local commander

Cyprus: UEMS the price13 killed62 InjuredBlackout in half of the countryCost: EUR 2 billionDefence and Foreign Ministers Resigned

Congo-Brazzaville• On 4 March 2012, a series of blasts occurred at an army

arms dump in Brazzaville, the capital of the Republic of the Congo. At least 250 people were killed by the explosions. Additional bodies were said to be "unfindable.“ Among the dead were six Chinese workers from a Beijing Construction Engineering Group work site close to the armory. Interior Minister Raymond Mboulou said that nearby hospitals were overflowing with injuries, with many wounded lying in hallways due to lack of space. Total injures exceeded 2,300. More than 13,800 people were left homeless. One survivor described the event as feeling like "the apocalypse; others described it as "like a tsunami or earthquake.

Congo-Brazzaville before explosion

Congo-Brazzaville before explosion; ammunition depot located in the city

Congo-Brazzaville ammunition depot after explosion

Congo-Brazzaville after explosion

Congo-Brazzaville national disaster because of absent of PSSM

Congo-Brazzaville example of basic risk assessment process takes just to open site, move with cursor to the location and enter amount of explosives, result is

for illustrative purpose only http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/map/

• Explosives & ammunition 10.000 kg class 1.1 (as example)

• VBD Vulnerable Building Distance (Purple line)

• IBD Inhibited Building Distance (Yellow line)

• PTRD Public Traffic Route Distance

AA&E Management Source of technical informations

• United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals

• United Nations Safer Guard Program & International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)

• OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition • Regional Ammunition Stockpile Reduction (RASR)• European Network of National Safety Authorities on Ammunition

(ENNSA)• CNAD AMMUNITION SAFETY GROUP (AC/326) / NATO Munitions Safety

Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

The most active organizations in PSSM

AA&E Management levels• National level:

– Stakeholders and policies– National Safety Authorities on Ammunition (to approve

risk assessment for each PES)– Laboratories and testing centers

• MOD:– Organization structure– Developed directives and regulations– Qualified personnel (trained & certified)– Personnel-command responsibility– Risk assessment and personnel responsibility (all levels) – QA/QC (all levels)

• AA&E duties (Logistic and EOD):– ESO, ATO, AT, Ammunition Handler, etc

Thank you for your attention