Kernos Revue internationale et pluridisciplinaire de religion grecque antique 8 | 1995 Varia Body and Soul in Plato's Anthropology Conrado Eggers Lan Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/kernos/592 DOI: 10.4000/kernos.592 ISSN: 2034-7871 Publisher Centre international d'étude de la religion grecque antique Printed version Date of publication: 1 January 1995 Number of pages: 107-112 ISSN: 0776-3824 Electronic reference Conrado Eggers Lan, “Body and Soul in Plato's Anthropology”, Kernos [Online], 8 | 1995, Online since 11 April 2011, connection on 21 September 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/kernos/592 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/kernos.592 Kernos
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KernosRevue internationale et pluridisciplinaire de religiongrecque antique 8 | 1995Varia
Body and Soul in Plato's AnthropologyConrado Eggers Lan
PerhapsPlato is the first philosopherwho settlesthe dualismbody-soulinthe history of Greekthought1. Of course,at leastsinceHerodotus(Le. ca 450B.e.) we hearabout the soul's immortality after the body'swasting away (II,123). And the Potidaea'sinscription("aither receivedsouls;earth,bodies",if thereconstlUctionof the endof the line is right) showsthat, by the year432 B.e.,at leastsornepeoplethoughtthat the fate of the ｜ ｪ ｦ ｕ ｘ ｾ could be other than theone of the (jOOl.W., both of thesebeing therebytwo different "components"ofthe man alive. But you canneverknow, in thesecases,what is exactlymeantby ｜ ｪ ｦ ｕ ｘ ｾ and (jOOlHX. The text of Potidaea'sinscription is similar to the one ofEuripides (about ten years later): "1tVBÛI.l<X <went> to aither, 1:0 (joolla to earth"(Suppl., 533-534). And 1tVBûlla meanshere, as ｜ ｪ ｦ ｕ ｘ ｾ often does, "breath" or"breathof live". It is to be remindedthat still Diogenesof Apollonia claims that"the ｜ ｪ ｦ ｕ ｘ ｾ of aIl living beings" is "air" (fr. 5), "warmer than the air outside inwhich we are, but much colder than that near the sun"; and a little after(accordingto the long Simplicius' quotation)qualifies this "eternalair" as (joolla(fr. 7)2.
Now we readin Plato'sGorgias(524b2): "Deathis not anythingbut, in myopinion, the loosening (Olo:Â,UO'lÇ) of two things one from another,soul andbody". elearerstill -becausethe idea is now developed-we find in Phaedo(64c4-8): "And do we think of it (sc. death) as anything but the departureＨ ｡ Ｑ ｴ ｡ ￂ Ｌ ￂ ｡ ｹ ｾ Ｉ of soul from body, and of being dead as the separatedbeing(xroplç ... YByovÉvat) of the body by itself, having beenparted Ｈ ｡ Ｑ ｴ ｡ ￂ Ｌ ￂ Ｌ ｡ ｹ ｾ ｶ Ｉ
This paperwas presentedfor the first time to a meetingorganisedby the Fundaci6nOrtegay Gasseton "The subjectof Man", in BuenosAires, september1993. Here 1 makeonly a couple ofadditions: two foot-notes(2 and 7) where1 take in accounttwo worthwile objectionscordially madeto me in that occasionby Miles Burnyeat.
1 1take as provedby B. SNELL (D/e EntdeckungdesGe/stes,Hamburg,19553, chap.1esp. p. 21-42) that before the 5th cent. B.e. the Greekshad not a conceptionof "body" and "soul" suchas theone they had from that moment.Nonetheless,1 don't agreewith him on that the evolution of thesenotions consistsin the discoveryof such a dualism (cf. my essayEl conceptode alma en Home1'O,Facultadde Filosofia y Letras, 19873 [1967J,p. 25). 1 rather think that this dualismaroseonceupon atime, in philosophicalanalysis;and that it fulfilled a very useful function during centuries.1 onlywonderif it remainsuseful to-day, and, aboveail, if it correspondsstrictly to humanreality, evenatearlier Greek times.
2 As anothersampleof Presocraticuse of ｣ ｲ Ｆ ｾ ｡ Ｌ M. Burnyeat(see supra, n. ') remindedmeMelissus'fr. 9: "Now, if it is, it must be one; and beingone, it musthaveno ｣ ｲ Ｆ ｾ ｡ Ｂ Ｎ But 1don't know,once more, what ｣ ｲ Ｆ ｾ ｡ means here, especiallywhen it is not opposedto ｜ｪｉｕｘｾＬ not even as thePotidaea'scase.
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From the soul, and the separatedbeing (XOOptç '.. dvut) of the soul itself, havingbeenparted(à1tUÀ,À,UYEîcruv) From the body?". Hackforth (Plato'sPhaedo,p, 44n. 1) daims that sucha "definition of death" doubtlessrepresentsthe normalcontemporaryview (my italics), but he brings a testimonyaboutChrysippusand otherlater texts as examples3.
In fact, by no meansdo we know that such a view was "contemporary"toPlato, though we can imagine that sorne similar thought lay behind thePotidaea'sandEuripides'sentences.However,it aIl dependson the meaningofboth notions,bodyandsoul, or of both Greekwords, crroJlU and Ｇ ｬ Ｇ ｕ ｘ ｾ Ｎ (BecausefinaIly we cango badcevento Homer,who alreadytalks aboutcrroJlU and Ｇ ｬ Ｇ ｕ ｘ ｾ
at death-andonly at death, ＧｬＧｕｘｾ being the last breathor departedspirit andcrroJlU the remainingcorpse.)
Of course,it is very diffieult to draw a sharpline betweenthe time whenthe bodilessnatureof soul is assertedfirst, andthe previoustime; but in fact wehaveno certainevidencethereofbeforePlato'sPhaedo.To be sure,Plato doesnot say explicity in Phaedothat soul is incorporeal:he usesonce the wordàcrroJlu'toç (85e5: the first use of this word, insofar as 1 know) referring to theattunementof the lyre, while the lyre itself is a body; but it is a comparisonmadeby Simmiaswith Socrates'precedentargumentaboutthe different natureof body and soul (78b-80d).And 1 do not know earlier texts pointing to anykind of differencein naturebetweenthem.
Now, what short of dualismis this whieh is posedby Plato?Is it a cosmieoneor an anthropologieaione,or both?
We know, indeed,that Platoposesa cosmiedualism(for the first time, aisoin this case): Being ('to àd OV, Phd., 79d2, Ti., 27d6j 'to 1tUV'tE",roÇ av, Rp.,477a2; o'ÙcrtU, Rp" 534a2-3, Sph.) 248a7, all, Phlb.} 54a5 ff., etc.) andBecoming(often without this specifiename,refering only to "visible things"jbut 'to ytYVOJlEVOV àe{ in Ti., 27d6-7,and aboveal! yéVEcnÇ in Rp" 534a3-4,Sph"248a7,alO, a12, Phlb.) 54a5ff" etc.),
However, we can see, on the one hand, that this ontologieai dualism,whieh is so sharplydrawn in Phaedo,becomesa sourceof severaldiffieultiesfor Plato (cf. Parmenides,I30b-134e),who tries to build a bridge betweenthetwo kinds, suchas the onewhieh the notion of World-Soui offers in Philebus,TimaeusandLaws,
On the otherhand, in the passagePhd,} 79a- 80a referredto above,Platodoesnot put the anthropologieaidualismbody-souiin a way so dearandsharpas he doesin the caseof the cosmieone: soul is akin "to what is divine anddeathless",while body is akin "to what is humanandmortaI" (BObI, b3-4).
3 HACKFORTH quotes,besidesthis testimony(SVF, II, 790, after NemesiusEmesenus),anotherallegedly belonging to Epicureansapud Lucrecio (III, 838-839), and a passage(471b) of theperipathetictreatiseDe resplratlonereferring to Democritus(D,-K. 68 A 106), which doesnot seemappropriateto the point. In a wiser way, DODDS (Plato's Gorgias, p. 379) quotesonly Haekforth'sreferencesto Stoics and Epicureans,and says: "the definition <of death> was acceptedboth byStoics... and by Epieureans"(my italies),
BODY AND SOUL IN PLATO'S ANTHROPOLOGY 109
To be sure, the division betweenthe invisible-divine-deathlessand thevisible-human-mortalis sharpandclear: Platohasbegunthe passagepostulatingthat "there are two kinds of thing (or "existents",as Bluck translatesovta), thevisible andthe invisible" (79a6-7),anddevelopingtheir differences:onekind is,besidesvisible, neverconstant,not intelligible, human,etc., while the invisiblekind is alwaysconstant,intelligible, divine, etc.
Now, Plato says, "we ourselves(Le. men) are partly body, partIy soul"C79bl-2, Hackforth'stranslation).At this point we would say that soul belongsto the invisible kind of thing, sinceit is just invisible, andthat body, in the sameway, belongsto the visible kind. Plato, however,does not assertthat, but thatsoul is more akin (cruyyevÉcrtepov)andmoresimilar Ｈ ｯ ｾ ｯ ｴ Ｖ ｴ ･ ｰ ｯ ｶ Ｉ to the invisiblethanbody is, and body is moreakin andmoresimilar to the visible thansoul isC79b4-80b5).
But what do the qualifications"akin" and"similar" meanin such a context?In fact, it is noteworthythat ｣ ｲ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｡ Ｌ in Phaedo,is neverreferredto otherbodiesthan the human one, even when Plato criticizes the Presocratic'sviews onnature,96a ff. (the soleexceptionwould be Simmias'assertionon the lyre andcords as bodies,but it is clear that it is only a comparison,later rejectedbySocrates).It happenssimilarly at the other middle dialogues,although thedualismbody andsoul is sometimesreferredto other living beings,especiallyto godsor stars,explicitly at Phaedrus(245eff.; cf. Rep.)VII, 530b3).
It is firstly at Sophist,where Plato -perhapsunder the influence of the"earth-borns"describedat 246a ff., who reduceeverythingto bodies-talksabout bodies other than thoseof living beings: just "lifeless bodies", a'Vuxa｣ ｲ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｡ (227a3,b7, 265c3). In the Politicuswe find the term "body" in a senseclose to the aristotelianüÎvll (Skemptranslatesit "stuff"; seehis foot-note at258e2and 288d2), in the scopeof craftsmanship.
Now in Politicus (269d6) it is also referred to the bodily nature of theuniverse,for the first time4. And this view is developedat Philebus, Timaeusand LawsX. In Phil.} 30a6we hearthat "the body of the universeis ensouled"(tO to'Îl navtoç ｣ ｲ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｡ ￋ ｾ Ｇ ｖ ｵ ｸ ｯ ｶ av huyxave), and this body is said to beconstitutedby fire, water, air and earth(29alO), Le. the so-calledelements.Andthis World-Soulrules, like the humansoul, throughits intellect, andin its caseitrules the universe(and it is said "regal", like in Phaedrus,and in the samewayit is calledagain"Zeus", 30dl).
And in Timaeusthis constitutionof the universeout of fire, water, air andearthis carriedon to its ultimate elements,which are triangles.TherebyPlato
4 lndeed W. THEILER (Zur Geschlchte der te/e%glschenNaturbetrachtung bis au!Aristote/es,Zürich-Leipzig, 1925, p. 14 ff.) goesback to Diogenesof Apollonia, throughXenophon'sMemorabl/la, l, 4, 17, for the conceptionof a world-body and of a world-soul, paralleling withPh/b., 28-30. But it is by no meanssure that Xenophon'spassagehas been previous to Plato'sPhllebus.Moreover, the fr. 5 and 7 of Diogenesshow, as we haveseen,no clear dualism betweenbody and sou!. To he sure,Theiler'smain point is the teleologicalview, andwe can agreewith himthat it is alreadypresentin Diogenes.
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posesa mathematicalconstructionof matter -somethingwhich has beenmuchdiscussed,whetherit is a genialanticipationof modernphysicaltheories,or merelya fantasy.Concerningour presentresearch,we mustsaythat it is thefirst time that fire, water, air and earth are said to be "bodies" (53c4), and,insofar as they constitutethe world's body, it is spokenof as what to-daywecall "universe'smatter" andnamingit "body". It is noteworthy,besides,that it isalso the first time -at least insofar as we know- that we can see the word"body" applied to the regularsolids: "Ail body (or "every kind of body", orperhaps"ail the structureof the body", 'to 'tO\> crroJla'toçeHioç) hasdepth" (53c5-6). It is an uncommonuseof the word, sinceEuclideshimselfmentions"solids"and "solid figures" (XIII def. 1, 9, 10)5. Perhapsthis new platonicuse is due tothe effort to abstract,as muchaspossible,the notion of "body" Cthus the worddooç), in orderto go into the ultimate "elements"of the world-body.
But we mustnotice that this ensouledbodywhich the world consistsof is"a perceptible(or "sensible", aicr811't6ç)god" (92c7), that is, a being who isintermediatebetweenthe invisible realm and the visible one (or, in the termsof 35al-6, betweenthe "indivisible being" and the "divisible being"i.
This mixed compositionof the world thus becomesa corroborationof theparticularway of man'sbeing, whosesoul had beensaid "more akin" to theIdeas, while his body was "more similar" to the other visible things whichsurroundus.
Now, sincePlato definesdeathin Phaedo,as "the departureof soul frombody" and caracterizes"the pursuit of philosophy" as "training for dying andbeing dead" (64a5-6),we would expectthat Plato depictedbody only as anobstaclefor man. However, it is not so: without his body, Plato says,Socrateswould not be able to do what he thinks is best(99a5-7).Even it is only fromthe bodily perceptionthatwe canknow the things themselves(75a5-7).
In fact, P!ato cannatconceivehumansou! (nor any sou!) without body.Neithercanthe gods'soulsdispensewith body (Phdr., 246d1, Ti., 40 ff., Laws,X, 889b5-7?Not eventhe highestsoul, the World-Soul, cano
E. SACHS (Die fanf p/atonlschenK6rper, Berlin, 1917, p. 2) takes as granted that the"philolaus" fragment 12 belongsto an ancient tradition; but 1 think that to-day its inauthenticity ispl'Oved (cf. W. BURKERT, W'elsheltund W'lssenschaft,NOrnberg,1962, p. 255 and n. 206 [= Lore andScience,CambridgeMass., 1972, p. 276 and n. 183). Xenokrates,fr. 53 Heinze, talks about "fivefigures and bodies", and PS.-Plato'sHplnomls, 981b3 about "solid bodies" (cf. 1. TARÂN,Academlca,Philadelphia,1975, p. 39, n. 176, and p. 263). Perhapsin the Academythe term "body"was used by sorne mathematiciansin the platonic sense,and thencewe can read in Aristotle itsdefinition as "that which has three dimensions" (Toplca, 142b24; see many other examplesinBONITZ, ad crroJ.llX). Anyway, ail the testimoniesabout the geometricaluse of "body" are pasteriorta Plata.
6 Cf. H. CHERNISS,Arlstot/e'sCrltlclsm ofP/ato andtheAcademy,New York, 19622, p. 407-411
andp. 606 ff.
7 Regardingthe Phaedl'lls' passage,M. Burnyeat(see note ') objectedto me that there Plataexposesa papularview which he doesnat share.1agreethat it is a popularconception,but 1 thinkthat the Tlmaeus'and Laws' passageswhich 1 quoteshowthat Plato sharesit. And besides,the view
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To be sure,Plato talks more thanonceabouthumansoul without its body:e.g. Gorgias, 523c-e,where souls, after death,go on to be judged "naked","stripped" of their body; Phd., 76c-e,where it is said that our soulsknew theIdeas before birth, when they lived in Hades,deprivedof bodies; and otherpassagesfrom Plato'seschatologicalmyths.
But aIl this kind of tales belongsto myths (even the quoted passageofPhaedo,as l tried to showelsewhere8). It is not evenconsistentwith what issaid in other mythical passages,like that of the final myth of Phaedo,whereonly those few men "who have purified themselvesenough throughphilosophylive without bodyaIl time to come" (l14c2-4).
Above aIl, if we take literally Phaedo'stalking about the knowledgeofIdeasin Hades(talking which is depictedas a IlUeoÀoyeîv, 61e2and 70b6), we.should find a flagrant contradictionwith Plato's interpretationof his ownallegory of cave, where we can read that the releasedprisoner is thephilosopherwho attains the knowledgeof the Ideas,but that, when he haslooked upon them enough(ilmvroç, 519d2), we must return to society: wemustnot allow him to spendaIl his life in contemplation,"believing that, whitestill living', he is "settledin the Islandsof the Blest" (519c5-6).
But evenin Phaedowe are told that the true philosopher,"when takingreasonas his guide and beingalwaysin the contemplationof what is true anddivine andnot conjectural,andnourishingitself on that; deemsthat it is in thisway how he must live as long as he is alive, and that after deathhe arrives atwhat is akin to himself' C84a7-b2).In this passagePlatospeaksclearly-like inRep.,V-VII- regardingthe full (or nearlyfull) knowledgeof Ideasduring life,not after death,
In Sophist, 249a4-10Plato assertsthat intellect (voûç) involves life, andthat in its turn life implies soul and soul motion, We find the sameimplicationintellect-soulin Phlb" 30c9,wherewe can read, insteadof the sequencesoul-motion, the previousbondsoul-body(30a3,6, b2). Similarly, but more strongly,in Timaeus,30b3-5: "since it is impossiblefor the intellect to be presentinanythingapartfrom soul", the Demiurge"framedintellect within soul and soulwithin body",
Indeed, it is not said explicitly that it is impossiblefor the soul to existapart from the body; but l think, pacethe neoplatonisticinterpretations,thatthe implication soul-bodyis so clear as the one intellect-soul,at least in latedialogues;and, asmatterof fact, we find it alsoin middle dialogues.
Let us returnnow to the dualismbody-soulin Phaedo.The line which Platodrawstherebetweenthe "two kinds of thing" is definite, but, aswe haveseen,the onedrawn betweenbodyandsoul is not so sharp.Why? BecausePlatoputsforward in Phaedoa "two-dimensional"anthropology,if l am allowed to usea
that Plato does not conceivesoul without body seemsto be required by the soul's definition atPhdr., 245c-e.1 owe to GabrielaCaronefor this last helpful observation.
8 El mita de la muerfe de Sôcmfes en el Fed6n, in Méfhexls, 2 (1989), p. 19-28.
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HerbertMarcuse'sterm. The two kinds of thing meantwo possible(opposite)goalsof humanbehaviour,suchas they are, for the divine Craftsmanof Tim.,27d-29b,two possible(opposite)patternsof making.
And mancanchoosebetweenthe two aims,becausehe sharesin both, heis somebody(as philosopher,at least)who dwells in someintermediaterealm(Le. in the world-god). Body meansfirst the obstacleClhl1to8wv) which arisesfrom humannatureand that the philosophermustovercome,and in this senseit is like the cavefrom which the prisonersmust releasethemselves.But bodymeansbesidesthe conditionwithout which the philosophercannotreachanydegreeof truth, the meansthroughwhich the knowledgeof Ideas becomespossible.Thencebody is for man, at the sametime, sourceboth of slaveryandfreedom.
