Book From Anticipation to Action Godet

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Future-oriented studies


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Other titles in this sries

New technologies and developmentBiotechnologies in perspectiveCulture des les et dveloppement/Islands' culture and development

Biotechnologies in developing countries: prsent and future. Vol. l:Rgional and national survey


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Michel Godet

From anticipationto action

A handbook ofstratgie prospective

Prface by Joseph F. Coates

U N E S C O P u b l i s h i n g


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Originally published as De l'anticipation l'action:manuel de prospective et de stratgie Dunod, Paris, 1991Translated from the Frcnch by Clare Degenhardt

Rcvised by Valrie ShepherdThe author is rcsponsibie for the choice and theprsentation of the facts contained in this book and forthe opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarilythose of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

The dsignations employed and the prsentation of thematerial throughout this publication do not imply theexpression of any opinion whatsoever on the part ofUNESCO concerning the lgal status of any country,territory, city or area or of is authorities, or concerning

the dlimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Published in 1994 by the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization7 place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, FranceComposed by ric FrogPrinted by Presses Universitaires de France^ Vendme

ISBN 92-3-102832-4

UNESCO 1994Printed in France


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Prface

In an ge of anxiety and a period of transition., ail institutions craveinsight into the future. The globalizing of the world's conomies iscreating new complexities for business planning and aggravatinguncertainties about the business environment. The imminence of themiliennium is, for many, a social milestone, a point at which the futureof nations will be seen to be bright and optimistic or in dcline. In every

sector, stocktaking, anticipation and plans are the order of the day as weapproach that transition.

This attention to the future is surely favourable to the humanenterprise. But the anticipation of the future is strile unless it isaccompanied by systematic, well-grounded, comprehensive actionableplans. Since the sminal work of the Marquis de Condorcet at the tirne ofthe French Rvolution, the Western worid has learned that it can identifylong-term trends and that it can anticipate many of the consquences ofnew developments. Further, it is clear that our actions influence thefuture. But more important is the rcognition that we can consciously actto influence the future in directions in which we wish it to evolve.

Surely no one but a fool would ciaim that we can see the future withcrystalline clarity or that we can take actions which will dtermine thefuture. AH we need is to agre on this modest claim: that we can see thefuture to a degree that is useful for planning and that we can takeactions which will make dsirable outcomes more likely and undesirableoutcomes less likely.

Central to the current look to the future is the concept of alternatives- that in view of ail the complexity ahead of us, it makes little sens tosay 'this will happen' or 'that won't happen1. Taking complexity into


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Prface

account, we need to recognize a range of alternative futures as the basisfor planning and systematic action.

Professor Godet's vvork is an outstanding example of the intgrationof anticipation and planning for action. But his strengths as an analystand as a planner go well beyond that. Too much of the study of thefuture - even today in this globalizing world - is parochial andprovincial. Few British or American futurists, planners and forecasterspay much or any attention to work done outside their nationalboundaries and even less attention to work done outside their nativetongue. One of the accomplishments of Professor Godet is to vvorkacross cultures and across languages to give his work a value which isenhanced by his catholicity of perspective and broad embrace of

materials.By being cross-national in its orientation, Professor Godet's work is

an unusuat, if not unique, contribution to the management and futuresliterature. It draws on a wide range of exprience and illustrations andoffers a broader dmonstration of techniques practised by corporationsand other organizations than is generally found in other sources.Godet's work is an attractive intgration of theory, the historicalvolution of management and planning techniques and the practicaltools of the trade, ail amply iliustrated. Again, unlike other vvriters in thefield, Professor Godet offers a felicitous combination of technique and

substance.Beside UNESCO's traditional readership of national and rgional

planners, the primary audience for Professor Godet's book is businessand other organizational planners. The secondary, and nearly asimportant, audience is professors teaching courses in business schoolsin relation to planning and the future. Along those lines, it might benoted that many American business schools hve their curricula underre-examination and are moving to intgrale futures thinking into theMaster of Business Administration programme. Professor Godet'swork shouid make a spcial, positive contribution to that new move.

The book shouid also find a substantial audience among individualswithout planning responsibilities, vvho, out of curiosity or concern, seeka better understanding of the choices before us and the tools forexploring those choices,

JOSEPH F. COATES

Coates &Jarratt, Inc.Washington, D.C.


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Contents

1, FOR ANOTI-IER FUTURE 1

1 Dreams crait rcalky 1]. 1 The dangers of being reactive and the benefits of being pre-acive

and pro-active 1

1.2 Using intuition and reason for planning and action 2

1.3 From anticipation to action by means of appropriation 3

1.4 Contingency and change: ! ,001 keys to excellence 4

1.5 Towards a revival of planning 5

2Scliools of prospective: modcls which endure in spiic offashion6

2.1 The post-industrial school, bctwcen optimism and pessimism 6

2.2 The neo-Makhusian school ofthought 7

2.3 Long waves and crises as bearers ofhope 8

2.4 Bifurcations, determinism and creativity of chaos 10

2.5 Mutineers and mutants as die bearers of change 13

3Schools of strategy: coniradictory fashions, complemcnlary modcls15

3.1 The heuristic schooi: from cornmon sens to the simplistic 16

3.2 The rationalise school: from success to misuse, pending a revival 19

3.3 Stop bacl American soaps and Japanese curios 20

4 Spreading the cultures of prospective and strategy 25

5 One logic in len chapicrs 26


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FROM DETERMINISM TO DETERMINATION, FROM

FORHCASTING TO 'STRATEGIC PROSPECTIVE' 29

1 Action-oriemed anti-fatalislic thinking 29

2 A critique offorecasting 32

2.1 Dfinitions 32

2.2 Inaccurate data and (instable models 34

2.3 Excessive quantification and extrapolation 34

2.4 The future explained in terms of the past 36

3 Usefulness and scope of prospective 38

3.1 Usefulness and credibility of prospective analysis 38

3.2 What ingrdients go into making an accurate forecast? 39

3.3 What makes a good expert? 393.4 The absence of neutrality of information and forecasts 40

4 Pluralism and complcmentarity 41

4.1 Problems and methods 41

4.2 Planning needs forecasts with scnarios 44

4.3 Proposais for solving the crisis in forecasting 45

4.4 Key concepts for a methodology 47

5 Practical advice for future thinking 47

5.1 Ask the right questions and mistrust convcntional wisdom 47

5.2 Think in the long term and imagine first what wilt not change 495.3 Use simple, adaptable methods to stimuiate thought and

facilitate communication 50

5.4 Start with prospective workshops 51

5.5 Practical guideiines for prospective groups 53

THE SCNARIOS METHOD 57

1 Origins and dfinitions 57

2 Types of scnarios and stratgies 60

3 Objectives of the scnarios method 633.1 Construction of the base 643.2 Building scnarios 67

4 Illustrations 74

4.1 Scnarios as tools of strategy and/or management 74

4.2 Successful utilisation of scnarios - the case of Elf 77

5 Anticipation and scnarios: myihs and rcalities 79


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4. IDENTIFYING THE KEY VARIABLES:

ST RUC TUR AL ANALYS I S 831 Origins and objectives of'structural analysis 83

2 Listing ail the variables 84

3 Location qf relationships wilhin the structural analysis matrix 85

4Search for the key variables wilh the MICMAC method 90

4.1 Direct and indirect classification (MICMAC) 914.2 The MICMAC principle: raising the power of the matrix 934.3 Comparison betwcen direct, indirect and potential classifications 964.4 The influence-dependence chart 99

5 Value ami limitations of structural analysis 101

5. UNDERSTANDNG THE ACTORS' STRATEGIES:

T H E M A C T O R 0 METHOD 105

1 Constructing the actars' strategy table 108

2 Idenlifying the stratgie issues and associatcd objectives 111

3 Positioning each actor in relation to the stratgie objectives (signed

position matrix) 113

4 Ranking the objectives for each actor (valued position matrix) andassessing the range of possible convergences and divergences115

5 Evaluaiing the balance of power and formulating stratgie recom-

mendations (valued matrix of position wilh power coefficients)119

6 Key questions for the future 126

6. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY:

EXPERT CONS ENS US METH ODS 129

1 Scanning possible futures: morphological analysis 130

1.1 The field of possible futures^ a morphological space 1301.2 Problems and limitations 132

1.3 The useful morphological subspace 132

2 An inventory of expert-consensus methods 134

2.1 The Delphi method 134

2.2 Voting machines: Regnier's Abacus and the Consensor 137

2.3 Cross-impact methods 139

3 The SMIC method 142

3.1 The principle and the aim of SMIC 1433.2 Relationships between hypothses and scnarios: the search for

cohrence 144


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3.3 Results: hierarchy of scnarios and sensitivity analysis 146

3.4 Applicability and limitations 1484 Case-studies 1504.1 Air transport scnarios 1514.2 Nuclear energy scnarios to the year 2000 1584.3 Excerpts from the SMIC questionnaire 163

7. IDENTIFYIMG AND EVALUATINGSTRA TEGIC OPTIO NS 17 11The dcision process: identify, valuais, choose and implantent171

2 Relcvance irecs: frovi objectives to action 174

2.1 The qualitative hierarchy: aims, objectives, means and action 1742.2 Flow chart notation and action valuation 1762.3 Usefulness and limitations 178

3 Classical metliodsfor options evaluating 178

4 Mukicriteria methods 1824.1 Aid to decision-making 1834.2 Listing possible actions 1844.3 Analysis of the consquences of actions 1854.4 Defining criteria and evaluating actions in terms of thse criteria 185

4.5 Dfinition ofpoticies and ranking actions 1864.6 Multicriteria dcisions in stratgie management 1874.7 Sophisticated tools, limited applications 188

5 The melhod of comparative reverse ranking 1895.1 The reverse ranking rules 1905.2 The ranking of actions 190

6 The Electre II method 1936.1 'Super-ranking'relationships 1936.2 The ranking of actions 1956.3 Conclusion 197

7 The Mithipol melhod 1977.1 A simple operational tool 1977.2 Case-study: launching a new product 198

8. IN TE GR AT IN G SCENARIOS AND STRATEGV 20 71 Back to square one in stratgie management 2081.1 Tvvo age-old concepts 208! .2 Two exemplary models: the Church and the armed forces 2091.3 Two pioneers: Henri Fayol and Frederick Winslow Taylor 211

1.4 A prophet in the dsert of management: Mary Parker Fotlett 213


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2 The mergence and developmeni of stratgie management from 1920 to

the prsent217

3 The invitable encounter 220

3.1 The rise of prospective thinking 2203.2 Questioning planning 221

4An inicgraied approach: stratgie prospective224

9. PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONSMAKE THE DIFFERENCE 22 91 Quality of leaders and witmitig teams 229

2 'Yes' to the plan and shared vision, 'no'10 ils pitfalls 2323 Mctamorphosis ojstructures and behaviour234

3.1 Adaptable or anticipatory structures? 2353.2 Simple, lean structures 237

3.3 Stratgie centralisation and operational dcentralisation 238

3.4 Stratgie consquences of environmental changes 2393.5 From an end to habits to a mental rvolution 24t

10. T H E D A WN O F T H E T W E N T Y - F I R S T C E N T U R Y 247

1Multiple nnceriainiies linked to the absence oj a regulator2482 A quasi-certainty: Europtimisw 2512.1 From Ruropessimism to Europtimism 251

2.2 Europe 1993: the dream and the reality 252

3 Elcven likely trends 254

3.1 Dmographie imbalances and South-North andBast-North migratory flows 254

3.2 Threats to the physical environment and the ngative iegacy

of past growth 255

3.3 A lawless and turbulent international environment 2583.4 Slow, irregular, unequa! and interdependent growth 259

3.5 New energy price rises: bnficiai if they are graduai 2593.6 The flood of new technologies: a new comptitive order 2603.7 Deregulation associated with new international

and rgional rgulation 260

3.8 Economie comptition on a global scalewith states playing a key rle 261

3.9 Dcline in industrial jobs and rise of service industries 262

3.10 Crisis of the Welfare State 264

3.11 New forms of exclusion 265


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4 Three major uncertainiies 2664. i Will the rate of diffusion of new technologies

be as rapid as forecast? 2664.2 Metamorphosis of work and cmployment 2674.3 Evolution of lifesryles and social organization

in developcd countries 268

5 The lie of the land in the year 2000, in brie} 2695.1 Probable trends 2705.2 Major uncenainties 2735.3 Possibie discontinuities (examples) 274

REF ERE NCE S AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 275


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1. For another future

1. Dreams create reality

This book is, above ail, a manual of prospective and strategy; its mainaim is to provide simple, operational tools for the conspirator of thefuture, which potentially means ail of us. What does this mean? Howcan we reconcile intuition and reason? How can we move from

anticipation to action? What are the keys to excellence? What shouldwe make of the successive fashions and models which dominateprospective and stratgie thinking? Thse are the main thmes whichwe shal! address in this introductory chapter, before outlining thebook's format.

1 .1 . T H E DA NG ERS OF BEING REA CTI VE AND TH EB E N E F I T S O F B E E N G P R E - A C T I V E A N D P R O - A C T I V E

Unfortunately, anticipation is not widespread among managers. Whenail is going well they can manage without it, and when things are goingbadly it is too late to see any further than the end of one's nose: one hasto react, and quickly.

However, reaction alone leads nowhere (remember Seneca'scomment: 'There is no favourable wind for the man who knows notwhere he is going1). In other words, if there is no future direction theprsent is empty of meaning. This emptiness is frightening; in theabsence of a plan, too many managers thus find a constantly renewedoutlet in the intoxication of action. Too many managers pedal like crazy

1


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from one stage to another, according to an itinerary imposed by the whimof circumstance. Absorbed in their efforts, with their no ses at the

handlebars, they no longer hve the time to think. Eventually, in full swingand on the verge of exhaustion, they iose their balance. Let us reiterate:action in the short-term reality has no meaning unless it takes place in thelong-term context of a plan, because 'the future is theraison d'treof theprsent'.

Prospective is above ail an attitude of mind (anticipation and will)and a way of behaving (with imagination and hope) mobilized in orderto ensure quality and control of our prsent and future existence.Prospective reins ta tes dsire as the productive force of the future. If ithas no future direction the prsent is empty of meaning. Thus, dreams

do not oppose reality, they create it, and a pian animated by dsire is thedriving force for action.

1.2. USING INTUITION AND REASON FOR

PLANNING AND ACTION

Whilst reflection must not paralyse action, pilotage with vision whilekeeping a look-out cannot replace strategy. It is because of past lack ofanticipation that the prsent is full of questions, which yesterday were

insignificant but which today are urgent and which hve to be settlednow, to the dtriment of what is important for the future.So it is time we stopped opposing pilotage with vision (intuition) and

stratgie pilotage (reason). Both are necessary; it ail dpends oncircumstances. A person cannot be reduced to a rational mind (the leftbrain); he is also driven by the emotional faculties (the right brain).Rational and heuristic schools of stratgie thought are only apparentlyin opposition; in fact they are complementary. If one or the other isdenied, a person's behaviour becomes crippled, because he now hasonly a debilitated thought faculty.

A sound initial reflection, imbued with relevance and cohrence,reinforces the efficacy of action and raction in the face of events. In therire of action the time for reflection is limited to a few moments ofintuition and refex thought. Intuition is the lightning flash which springsfrom the right brain through the synthesis of information and analysisstored in the left brain; hence the importance of initial reflection and ofaccumulating such reflection. The same applies to rflexes - they arebetter after intensive training.

Being reactive should not be confused with being flexible. The first isimprovised as an organization's appropriate response to external hazards.


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Drcams creaie reaiily

The second is kept up as an intrinsic capacity of the organization to reactand adapt to the environment without losing its direction. In other words,internai flexibility is the condition for external reactivity. The first drivesfrom physical condition, the second from rflexes.

1.3. FROM ANTICIPATION TO ACTION

BY ME AN S OF A PP RO PR IA TI ON

Intellectual and emotional appropriation is a compulsory stage ifanticipation is to crystallize into effective action. Thus we discover thethree components of the Greek triangle: prospective thought givescontent to mobilization, maintains motivation (motives for action) andnourishes stratgie will.

We can define thse three components as 'Logos' (thought,rationality, discourse), 'Epithumia' (dsire in ail its noble and not sonoble aspects) and 'Erga' (action and realization). The marriage ofpassion and reason, of heart and mind, is the key to success in actionand to individual growth (the body).

Let us give the same message in colour: the blue of cold reasonassociated with the yellow of warm feeling produces the green ofbrilliant action. In the Greek triangle we find old debates which are stillcurrent. Thus men of thought complatn about not having a grasp onaction, and men of action complain that they lack the time forrefiection.

One day we realized that the best ideas were those that peoplediscovered by themselves. The phenomenon is well known: a good ideawill move up the company hierarchy more easily if the boss believes itcornes from him; one should adopt this same reasoning with people onewishes to convince.

Any thinking which is not appropriated by those concerned and

which relates to change will hve difficulty crystallizing into effectivestratgie action. On the other hand, there must be a 'content' to beappropriated. Individual and collective motivation and mobilization arestronger and last longer when there is willingness to be drawn upon fora future project. The Greek triangle has its head at the base, in order toshow that reason is not enough to ensure balanced action, and thatpassion is a necessary stage (Fig.l).


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Far anotherfuture

AnticipationProspective

thought

AppropriationCollective

mobilization

F I G . 1. The Greek triangle: prospective gives contentand direction to collective mobilization. M. Godet.

1.4. CONTINGENCY AND CHANGE:1,001 KEYS TO EXCELLENCE

According to the principle of contingency,1 there are no universal keyfactors of excellence which are valid in ail circumstances. For example,zro stock and just-in-time hve been profitable aims for some

companieSj but also very expensive or even ruinous for others.Management theorists should recall that statistics teach us not to

confuse corrlation with causality. It would appear that the authors ofInSearch of Excellence(Peters and Waterman, 1982) forgot this distinction.In their X-ray of successful United States companies in i 980, they notedthat thse companies had various points in cornmon which theyimmediately termed 'secrets of excellence'. Colinearity is not causality,however; they should hve examined whether poor performancecompanies also demonstrated thse same characteristics. In fact, themajority of companies cited in In Search of Excellence experienced

difficults during the 1980s. Should we conclude from this that thesecrets of excellence were actually the secrets of failure?

Certainly not - it is simply a matter of recognizing the principle ofcontingency and admitting that there are combinations of human,organizational, technical and financial factors which are effective in aparticular given context but which wiil not be so in other contexts. Thsecombinations are multiple and change over tirne.

1. Contingency: that which couid not be, or which couid be orherwise; in other words,the opposite of necessity.


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Dreams crcate reality

The only key factor of success whose permanence we can vouch foris preciseiy this principle of change, 'the source of diversity'. BiaisePascal noted that 'boredom is born out of uniformity'. Variety is anindispensable stimulant for motivation - without it effectiveness is weakjwith it anything is possible. Remember the experiments of Elton Mayoin the 1930s: by increasing and then decreasing tlie light intensity in thefactories of Western Electric he increased output each time.

A far-seeing manager is one who regularly introduces factors tobreak habits. In order to remain motivated a person needs to bepermanently diverted and stimulated by challenges. Such challenges aremore mobilizing if they are new, and more relevant if they form part ofa cohrent trajectory. This is how we should understand apparentlydisjointed attempts to mobilize tlie intelligence of organizations:leadership by objectives, participative management; quality circes,company plans, etc. Ali thse attempts are marked by success andfailure. In addition, reactivity and management in real time - which, aswe hve seen, it would be dangerous to make a religion of- can provenecessary and even miraculous in certain prcise circumstances.

A universal key to excellence does not exist - it must be permanentiyremodeiled according to environmenta developments, counteractingthe habits which fix organizations in the deep sleep of rigidity. What

brought success yesterday could perhaps be the cause of failuretomorrow. In order to adapt to a changing word, we need to knovv howto change structures, behaviour and habits.

1. 5. TOWARDS A RE VI VAL O !" PLANNING

Any exclusive practice quickly becomes abusive, so managers must becareful to avoid becoming addicts of reactiviry and real-time manage-ment. In plain language, we say yes to reactivity, but on the condition

that it does not become an end in itself. Tactics, fhat is, contingentdecision-making, should not take tlie place of strategy. From this pointof View, the expression 'stratgie reactivity' is a source of misunder-standing, as normaily reactivity should be placed at tlie service ofstrategy. The same applies to so-cal!ed 'stratgie management', a beauti-ful pleonasm, since by dfinition the aim of management is to put tlieorganization at the service of strategy.

Jean Cocteau put it so well: 'Fashion is what goes out of fashion.'Soon reactivity will hve had its hour and we shall rediscover, perhapswith new words, the virtues of stratgie planning - a skilful mix of

voluntarism and flexibiiity. For this comeback to happen, tlie concept of


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the plan wili first hve to be definitively liberated from the bureaucratiecorsets in which it has wrongly been laced.

2. Schools of prospective: models whichendure in spite of fashion

It is not by chance that prospective is less sensitive to the effects offashion than strategy. As a matter of fact the horizon of prospective isusualiy long-term (defined as the horizon at which many things couldhve changed), whereas the horizon of strategy is generally shorter:fashion in clothing changes every year; fashion in housing does not.

Although fashion is too ephemeral for prospective, it has never-theless experienced diffrent schools of thought over rcent dcades.Eric Philipart (1986) has written an excellent synthess on this subject.Inspired by him we distinguish hre four schools: post-indu striai, neo-Malthusian, long waves, and bifurcations and chaos.

2 . 1 . T H E P O S T - I N D U S T R I A L S C H O O L ,

BHTWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMSM

This school of thought, born in the 1960s, a rime of rapid growth, issymbolized by the work of Daniel Bell (1976), The Corning of Post-industriai Society: A Veniure in Social Forecasting.The book's subtitle is notneutral; it conveys the idea that change, particularly technologicalchange, can be accelerated and controlled by forecasting and planning.The methods exist-Erich Jantsch (1967) made a survey of them atOECD. This school of thought, on the whole liighly optimistic, had beenchampioned several years earlier by a book by Herman Kahn andAnthony Wiener (1968) on the year 2000 (i.e. the quivalent of 2025today). Kahn remained extremely optimistic until his death. His last book(Simon and Kahn, 1984) was The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global2000(i.e. a response to a report to the United States prsident publishedin 1980, which was very pessimistic about future ecosystems).

Alvin Toffier is probably part of this schooi of thought. A talentedjournalist, he received tremendous mdia exposure withFuture Shack(1971), which was subsequently enhanced with his later books, parti-cularlyThe Third Wave(1981). Thekey to success is simple: extrapolatetechnological change and announce the best sometimes, and often the


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Sciwols of prospective: models ivhich endure in spite offashion

worst. As a good journalist, he knows that 'bad news is good news1. SoinFuture Shockhe wrote:

We are at the dawn of an international rvolution which will overthrowpariaments and houses of congrcss in the coming dcade. But this raising ofshields against the ravages of the ill-managed application of technoiogy couldcrystallize into a pathological form, like a futurephobic Fascism under whosergime men of science would replace Jews in the concentration camps.

We shall make no further comment!None of this was very serious, but it did hve the merit of making

people think. Forecasting and planning's infatuation with controlling thefuture came to an end with the oil shocks and the conomie crisis.However, several years later, at the end of the 1970s, the champions ofthe third industrial rvolution, which it was believed would ensue thanksto new information technologies, biotechnologies and new materials,rekindled the fiame of the post-industrial society. Daniel Bell kept silent,and technological determinism was reborn out of his ashes. It was avehicle for unfounded clichs about the society of tomorrow, such as thequalifications required for future professions. Tomorrow's jobs would bein the services, linked to the major trends of modem societies (ageing,leisure, security), which meant, in particular, care in the home, housemaintenance, gardening - ail jobs where comptition and demand forquality would impose high standards of professionalism, which shouldnot, however, be confused with high qualifications.

2 . 2 . T H E N E O - M A L T H U S I A N S C H O O L O F T H O U G H T

This school of tliought was characterized by the Club of Rome, foundedin 1968 by industrialists, acadmies and high-level civil servants. In a

way this school of thought is also the heir of the 1960s wave of ratio-nalism. It rested on the technique of System dynamics, developed atMIT by jay Forrester. The first report of the Club of Rome by Meadowset al. (1972),The Limits w Growth,had an explosive impact. Exponentialgrowth could no longer continue, resources would run out and the woridwould collapse under dmographie pressure. The report did not reallypose the right questions, but it did hve the merit of provoking a greatdebate, although it was quickly eclipsed by the conomie crisis.

OECD's 'Interfuturs' report (Interfuturs, 1979), produced underJacques Lesourne in 1978, showed that there were not really any physica

limits to growthj but more particularly problems of rgulation on the


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global scale in an interdependent vvorld where, according to DanielBell's famous phrase: 'Governments hve become too small for the bigproblems, and too big for the small problems.'

Ecology was part of thse big problems, and the Giobal 2000 reportin 1980 began with the following terrible prdiction: 'If current trendscontinue, the world in the year 2000 will be more polluted, morecongested . . .'. In an interview in 1982 Gerald Barney, the author of thereport, revealed to us that this first phrase had been censored - that is,remodelled; the original version was: 'If current policies continue . . .*,which is not at ail the same thing. The diagnosis was much less fatalisticbut also more accusatory of those who govern us. So the Interfutursauthor s were right - it was rgulation which was lacking.

Since the end of the 1970s there hve been two other schools ofthought: long wave theory and bifurcation theory.

2.3 . LONG WAVES AND CRISES AS BEARERS OF HOPE

The theory of long waves re-established Kondratiev's analyses, whichexplained successive waves of growth and recession by waves of in-novation. Each phase of the growth-recession cycle would last for abouttwenty-ftve years. Thus, after the high growth of 1950-74, there wouldbe a trail across the dsert undl the 1990s. Then would begin the era ofa fifth Kondratiev cycle, supported by the technological rvolutionwhich had been latent since the 1970s. This theory of technological longwaves spawned the neo-Schumpeterian gurus, wel! represented by theworks of Christopher Freeman (1974) and Scherer (1986), or in Francethe so-called rgulation school. Thse works generally emphasizedsocio-organizational obstacles, that is, the rigidities opposing transfor-mation of production structures and curbing the structural changeswhich the new technologies would necessitate.

Part of my own earlier work to a certain extent descended from thisline - but not totally, for I emphasized above ail the actors (in crisis)facing Systems (undergoing change). From this perspective, crisis isperceived both as the consquence of rigidities and as the main lever toovercome tliem, changing as it does our habits, structures, and beha-viour. Crises are bearers of hope and capitalism is a perptuai hurricaneof crative destruction (to quote Schumpeter). The titles of my booksover the years -Demain les crises(Tomorrow Crises) (1980);Crises AreOpportunities(1985) and (with Jacques Lesourne)La fin des habitudes(The End of Habits) (1985) - provide a good rsum of my inter-prtation of crises and change.


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Schools ojprospective: models vhich endure in spite ojfashion

But there is a fondamental diffrence between this work and that ofthe supporters of long waves and some of their gurus. I hve alwayschallenged technologica! determinism, which in our modem societieshas taken over from the religious determinism of the past (witii thetechnological fairy replacing God).

There is no fatalism. There are, on one hand, forces of change and,on the other, forces of inertia. Often thse are in opposition and wespeak of rsistance to change or (economically, socially) non-viablechange, depending on which is in favour. Structures and behaviour arecharacterized by strong inertia, which curbs adaptation and volutionand then becomes rigidity if change (whether desired or not) has not

been prepared for well in advance.If long waves exist, they are socio-organizational rather thantechnological, i.e. they are linked to the non-linear rhythms of societiesand people. Unlike people, society shows no regularity between cycles ofsleep and intense activity. Random external and internai circumstancescan precipitate volution in an unexpected direction and, for example,give power to certain actors who, armed solely with their will and theirplans, manage to overturn the course of events and cause bifurcations.

The collapse of the communist rgimes in the countries of EasternEurope provides a good example of bifurcation - it was unforeseen and

nothing enabled us to forecasl it, even though the forces which ied to thesplitting up of the empire had been spotted a long time ago (I refer tothe work by Hlne Carrre d'Encausse (1979),L'empire clate).

It was assumed that thse forces were oniy at work over the very longterm and scnarios of violent disturbances and repression wereimagined, but never scnarios of almost calm volution, with a forcedmarch towards pluralist democracy and the market economy. A shorttime ago it was supposed that German runification woutd inevitably beaccompanied by the neutralization of Germany and the Finlandizationof Western Europe . . . Today's reality has overtaken yesterday's fiction.

It is Eastern Europe that is westernizing and the former GermanDmocratie Republic which is joining NATO. We rejoice at ail this.However, the new equilibrium is unstable and could lead to otherdangerous bifurcations, particularly in Russia and the new republics,where internai difficulties are weakening the reformist forces. We shouldnot forget the lesson of history: external war often served as an outlet forinternai contradictions.

The prospecrivist will bear in mind that one shouid remain modestin the face of the future - that nothing is ever hopeless or established,and that probably part of what is still fiction today will be reality

tomorrow. Which part, where and how? We shall not reply recklessly,


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but say simply that one must remain ready to face any eventuality, vvhichmeans, for example, not letting down one's guard on the subject ofEurope an defence.

2 . 4 . B I F U R C A T I O N S , D E T E R M I N I S M

A N D C R E A T I V I T Y O F C H A O S

At the time vvhen thse upheavals are occurring (still contingencies), thebifurcation and chaos thories from the hard sciences (mathematicSjphysics, biology) are encroaching into the social sciences.

It ait began at the end of the Iast century with the work of themathematician Poincar (1889-1908). He showed that certain Systemsof parametric quations had no stable solution, but an infinit number ofunstable solutions, which could go from one extrme to another as afonction of the parameters and of time. This is Poincar's 'mathematicalindeterminism'. Thus, there exist sets of quations which are sensitive tothe initial conditions vvhose solutions diverge in a chaotic manner. It isalso to Poincar that we owe the notion of the 'diagram of bifurcations'.

We note in passing that there is a double uncertainty hre:uncertainty over the measurement of the initial conditions anduncertainty over the consquences of this lack of prcision for thecalculation of the solutions. In such Systems, determinism would behidden, would hve ail the appearance of chance, and woutd in any caseremain indterminable (if only because of the lack of prcision of dieoriginal measurement). Much later thse ideas were taken up again byLorenz (1963) in simulating weather-forecasting models. He showedthat a slight initial fluctuation could reverberate in an exponential andchaotic way over time. This idea was made famous by the image of the'butterfly effect', according to which the simple beating of a butterfly'svving in one part of the world could in an extrme case cause a storm inanother part some weeks or months later. Thus we once again hve die

idea of a 'deterministic chaos'.In the 1970s Uya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1979) used the

thories and experiments of thermodynamics and physical chemistry togo further and develop the concepts of 'order through fluctuation' and'crative chaos' (Prigogine, 1990). They showed mat, 'far from theinitial conditions of equilibrium', there appeared bifurcations leading toother equilibria. Near dise critical points, slight internai or externatfluctuations in the system can be dcisive in determining whethermovement is towards one branch of volution or another. Transposedto social Systems, thse slight fluctuations could be, for example, chance

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Schools of prospective: models which endure in spite offashion

disturbances or individua! actions. At thse critical points 'fluctuations

are dangerous', whereas otherwise they could remain insignificant.This reading of social Systems based on analysis of the volution ofphysical Systems is interesting for prospective in that it reconcilesdeterminism on the one hand (the System has a history which conditionsits future possible trajectories, and leads- to one diagram of bifurcationsrather than another), and freedom on the other (in the bifurcation zoneinsignificant actions, caused by chance or by free will, can set off majorupheavals). Outside thse critical points, fluctuations are not events. Inthse new interprtations of volution, chance, necessity and free will,alternately and together, play a determining rle.

Other scientists from biology, such as Henri Atlan (1979),participated in this movement, implicitly taking up once again Darwin'sprinciple of natural slection, adaptation and diversity (1859). Certainchance mutations (fluctuations) vvithin living Systems constitute events.Events can also resuit from fluctuations in the environrnent and causenew adaptations 'complexity through noise' that is, a superior variantof the organism/superior mode of diversity in die System. Chance is thedriving force of volution, and noise becomes information. In short, thisis 'chance as organizer'.

Is it possible to adapt thse descriptive thories of the volution of

physical or biological Systems to explain die transformation of socialSystems? With die current state of knowledge we hve to answer in thengative, which is just as well. It is not that we are veiling our faces inhorror and retreating into some kind of obscurantisrn (rejecting scienceand its advances). It is simply that the rea! world is much too complexfor us to hope mat one day we will be able to find an quation to explainits hidden determinism. Even if we could,theinhrent uncertainty overany measurement, especially socia! measurements, would mean diat, atleast in our minds, the range of possible futures would remain wideopen; rightly or wrongly, this is our mental image of the famous

'diagram of bifurcations'.So we hve to act as if chaotic determinism did not exist and takeaction in order to move in die direction of those evolutionary brancheswhich seem dsirable to us. We prefer Pascale's bet and die mydi ofSisyphus tirelessly pushing his rock to the fatality of determinism. Theexpression 'chaotic determinism' seems doubly unacceptable to us,since it renders human will powerless in die face of the dual games ofnecessity and chance.

Bifurcation and chaos theory above ail demonstrate, ex posi, thatchange in structure corresponds to one solution of a System of differentiai

quations - for a given value of die environmental parameters. However,

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ex antethe question remains., vvhat will be the value of thse environmentalparameters and their eventual volution? This problem has to beovercome in order to dtermine whether the future which will materializeout of the range of possible futures is a rupture, a disaster, or not.

This is precisely die aim of prospective - to dtermine what could bethe values of the environmental parameters, taking account of forces atvvork and actors' plans, i.e. what are the possible, reaiizable and dsirablescnarios regardless of any offence thse might cause.

Bifurcation and chaos theory relaunched 'La querelle dudterminisme' (the quarrei about determinism), to quote the title of acollective work published in 1990 (Asterdamski et ai.). The resoluterejection of determinism in the social sciences should not, however, leadto a restraint on research in fondamental science. Ren Thom, theauthor of catastrophe theory,- seems to be isolated in this quarrei. Yetheis right to say that: 'Determinism in science is not a given, it is aconquest, The enthusiasts of chance are apostles of dsertion' (see hisarticle entitled 'Halte au hasard, silence au bruit' (Let Us Hait Chanceand Silence Noise) (Thom, 1990.)

Many European readers did not corne across this debate, which isnow so fashionable, until the highly publicized success of the book onchaos theory by American journalist James Gleick (1987). Thebestselling management authors sensed that it was a gold mine, and in

1987 Tom Peters publishedThriving on Chaos.In 1986 Eric Philipart wrote: 'In the USA, the utilization of thse

concepts seems still to be timited to the adoption of new metaphors(without attempting to demonstrate the validity of this procdure) as aneasy way of giving discussions otherwise lacking in great originality theappearance of novelty.'

In Europe chaos theory is favoured by the mdia. It is true that thevocabuiary iends itself to journalistic emphasis and whets the appetitewith words which make us dream, such as 'strange attractors', 'fractals','bifurcation cascades', 'the butterfly effect', etc or which inspire fear,

such as 'noise', 'disorder', 'catastrophe', 'chaos'.

2, The terni 'catastrophe theory' has become popular, but it is often misundcrstood,bcciuisc of the vcry strong impact on the imagination of the word 'catastrophe'. ForThom, a catastrophe is the disappearance of onc cquilibrium and the establishmentof a conscutive one with a continued modification of potential. Simple cxamplcs areprovided by the paasing from a liquid statc o a solid or gascons state, or themetamorphosis of the chrysalis into a bunerfly (it is the same but it is complctclydiffrent). On this subject we share he views of the mathematician Ivar Eckciand(1984): 'Catastrophe theory has no vocation to be normative or even to predict . . . itdocs not announce anything, not even catastrophes . . . the success of this theory restspartly on an initiai misunderstanding caused by the magie of words.'

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Sc/mols of prospective: niodels whiclt endure in spile offashioti

It is alvvays good to enrich one's vocabulary, especially when thseconcepts cho well-established mathematical conventions or physical

mechanisms. The scientists who write on thse subjects generally respectthe potential and the limiis of thse concepts. They oniy venture to trans-pose them into the social domain as questions, and vvith extrme caution.

They will nevertheless be reproached for not always giving the samemeaning to the same words - giving rise to misunderstandings whichcause epic quarrels between specialists about chance, determinism, etc.Unfortunately, in the field of social sciences the 'fluctuation' in themovement of ideas brought about by bifurcation and chaos theory liasonly added to the disorder and confusion in 'houses' where thehousekeeping of ideas leaves much to be desired.

We are stitl a long vvay from the 'science of complexity' hailed bysome experts (cf. Amara, 1984). Meanwhile it is primarily complicationthat we are confronting. In fact, complexit' has become a great cookingpot into which we haphazardly tlirow ail the concepts we find on thetable of advanced ideas (epistemology, information theory, thermo-dynamics, dissipative structures, bifurcations and of course chaos, notto mention self-organization). To give the resulting soup a rputation ofgood cuisine we invoke the names of ail the saints (scholars,intellectuals) who protect thse concepts. But we forget that they are notail from the same church. Thus, the so-called 'science of complexity' israther like a new religion which claimed to be superior because itborrowed from Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. It is an idea than weshould ponder over no longer than we would over Espranto.

Representational models do not escape the vagaries of fashion, andfashion always relies on models. This is as true for prospective as it is forstrategy and management - except that prospective has a greaterpropensity for models, and strategy has a greater sensitivity to fashion.

2 . 5 . M U T I N E E RS A N D M U T A N T S A ST H E B E A R E R S O F C H A N G E

Where should we place prospective in relation to thse schools ofthought? It has to be said that prospective constitutes an unclassifiablemosaic which borrows the most illuminating aspects of various readings,

From religions determinism prospective retains the fact mat thequestion of why (the clockmaker) is not raised by the answers to thequestion of how (the ciock). Science is advancing but the idea of Goddoes not recde; it continues to assert itself as a defence against the

absurd.

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The theory of volution has brought to prospective tlie principles ofnatural slection and adaptation, which hve lost none of their

modernity, for both individuals and for organizations facing inter-national comptition, as Hubert Landierhas shown clearly (1987). Themechanisms exist; it is up to us to make use of tliem for our own beneftt,to adapt to and to transform our environment.

Actors are not disarmed in the face of Systems: they can act either todrive or to restrain volution. The inertias of structures, behaviour andhabits are such that often it is necessary to destroy former organizationsin order to create new ones.

From chaotic determinism prospective wili retain bifurcations andthe possibility that certain mutineers or mutants may be bearers of

change: 'Not any individual, idea or behaviour, but the "dangerous"ones, that are ab!e to use for their own benefit those non-linear relationswhich would ensure tlie stability of the former average state' (Prgogineand Stengers, 1979).

How are we to recognize bifurcation points? 'Which events, whichinnovations will remain without consquence, which otliers are capableof affecting the whole System and determining irreversibly tlie choice ofvolution; where are the zones of choice, and the zones of stability?'Thse are the questions which make up the daiiy menu of prospective.When we identify tlie range of possible futures are we not also

recognizing the diagram of bifurcations? Are not the parameters ofbifurcations also the key variables of prospective analysis?

Since determinism is indterminable, we must act as if nothing hadbeen set in motion, as if only tlie rbellion of free witl could overturn tlietyranny of chance and necessity.

For sorae years we hve noticed that scientific work has beenconverging on tlie concept of self-organization. What are we to make ofthis new fashion of self-organization? Is its success due to the iact thatit is both suggestive and fuzzy? It is as much an cho of Fourierism orworkers' struggles as it is of cybernetics (Von Foerster) or Prigogine's

'order through fluctuation'. Now it is penetrating conomie science(cf. Lesourne, 1990). In its new acceptance it forms part of the gataxyof concepts mentioned above.

What is it ail about? For Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1982), 'The self-organizing process seems to be a resuit of interaction between an auto-nomous structure and chance events which are extraneous to it. Becauseit thus allows adaptation to the new and to production again self-organization achieves, at least localiy, a reversai of time's arrow.'

This 'reversai of time's arrow' is no more than what prospectivemeans by 'The future is theraison d'treof the prsent'. In other words,

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we can say that dsire as the productive force of die future is also diemain driving force of self-organization.

3. Schools of strategy: contradictory fashions>complementary models

Fashion has a short memory, Many ideas on organizationalmanagement and strategy are worthy of die famous comment recalledby Georges Yves Kervern (1986): 'Good ideas and new ideas,unfortunately, are not die same thing.' In fact, in stratgie circles newthings are often not interesting and interesting things are often notnew, as we can see if we look back to the sources of military stratgiediinking (Clausewitz, General Beaufre), and to the founders ofmanagerial thinking at the beginning of this century (Fayol, Taylor,Mary Parker Follett).

On this subject, Michel Crozier remarks that, despite its inadequacy,'fashion offers new ways of responding to die new problems' whichregularly appear and as a resuit of which former problems go out offashion. Of course, thse new problems are pardy generated by dieexcesses of previous fashions. Thus, fashion is renewed and destroyedby the successive waves of rigour and imagination which by turns areelevated as dogma.

It has to be said that this succession is onty apparent to specialists,and diat consumers dress themselves from one source and anodier instrategy's ready-to-wear boutiques, depending on their history, thetrresources and die information available to them. Some su'Sl choose goal-oriented planning or strategically segmented profit centres (linking dieproduct with die market), others go for company plans togemer with

quality circles. In order to be like die Japanese, some even go so far as toturn the company into a place of regimentation and psychologicalconditioning. Heads of companies believe diemselves to be messiahsand hammer out their 'ten commandments'.

The reality is simply a mixture of ail this, confused radier dianintelligent, where we juxtapose the pices of die puzzle but do not reallymanage to put them together. The right and left brain form a wholewhich cannot be dissociated. Warm values (endiusiasm, charisma,dsire, plans, wiil) and cold values (reason, analysis, calculation,forecasting) are not in opposition but complment and mutually

reinforce each other.

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This fact resurfaces throughout the literature on management. Wecan quote the excellent Riboud (1987) report Modernisation, mode

d'emploi(Modernization: Directions for Use):

Today there are compares performing wcli in ail branches of industry, even themost vulnrable. It is firsty a question of peopie with indisputable profcssionalcredibility and proven charisma. Today, motivation of peopie is thesine qua noncondition for effectiveness and profitability. . . . Peopie are motived if theirdeep-seatcd aspirations are respected. To do this, managers must listers to themand, through negotiated agreements, arrange with them proposed objectivesand positive sanctions. They should neglect neither the aspiration to be nor theaspiration to hve,

This complementarity does not prevent division, or ratlier a dialogueof the deaf, between, on one hand, supporters of a rationalist approach(conomie analysis, operational research, segmentation, portfolio ana-lysiSj planning) and, on the other, supporters of an approach fittinglycalled heuristic by Marie-Jos Avenier (1985), because one of its fun-damental principles is to act and then to learn from action. We shallstick to thse terms, which are very close to those suggested by odnerauthors, such as Thomas Durand (1985) and Alain Charles Martinet(1983).

3 . 1 . T H E H E U R I S T I C S C H O O L : F R O M

C O M M ON SENS! ; T O T H E SI M P L IS T I C

The heuristic approach excited Worldwide interest with the success ofthe book by Peters and Waterman (1982),In Search ojExcellence,and inFrance with the first book by Herv Serieyx (1982), Mobiliserl'intelligence de l'entreprise(Mobilizing Corporate Intelligence), and hissecond book., vvritten with Georges Archier (1984),L'entreprise du 3metype(The Company of the Third Kind). Thse books insist, rghtly, on

the importance of the human factor - which managers must know howto motivate, mobilize, make responsible - the indispensability oflistening to the customer, and the necessity of (perceived) quality ofproducts and services.

For supporters of the heuristic approach, thought should not beallowed to paralyse action. They claim that the clever methods of therationalist approach hve often led to failure. They prefer to proceed bytrial and error, by an incrmental approach, developing what works andabandoning what doesn't. So far so good, but care should be taken notto throw the baby out with the bathwater.

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The defkiencies of stratgie pilotage musr not lead to pilotage bysight. There must be a meaning to the mobilization of people; it is not

an end in itself, flexibility and pi!oting by sight lead nowhere. Moreover,rationalists were quickly able to poke fun at their detractors. In fact, inautumn 1984 a celebrated Business Week article tempered initialenthusiasm for the secrets of excellence: a significant proportion of thecompanies presented by Peters and Waterman in 1982 as successfulexamples of collective mobilization were in difficulty. Hre was proofthat the gymnastics of collective mobilization are not sufficient to ensureflexibility and performance in ail circumstances: in addition,anticipation of change and planning of strategy and innovation arenecessary.

A sound initial reflection, imbued witli relevance and cohrence,reinforces the efficacy of action and reaction in the face of events. In thelire of action the time for reflection is limited to a fevv moments ofintuition and reflex thought. Intuition is the lightning flash which springsfrom the right brain through synthesis of information and analysis storedin the left brain; hence the importance of initial reflection and ofaccumulating such reflection. The same applies to rflexes - they arebetter after intensive training.

Accused of gross simplification, some champions of the heuristicapproach reply that their message is still too complex. Carried away bytheir 'passion for excellence', they turn it into a religion and their bookbecomes a catechism where company heads are transformed intomythical heroes playing the rle of apostles. They thus forget thatenthusiastic mobilization around charismatic leaders is not an end initself, and that flexibility cannot replace strategy. The Gospel accordingto Saint Mac had the fate it deserved at the pen of Georges Yves Kervern(1986) (seebox).

The Gospel grew by 610 pages in one fell swoop with Tom Peters'book, Thriving on Chaos (1987). The author does not beat about the

bush. This book, he writes,throws into question ail the concepts of management. Today, flexibility and apassion for change must replace our inclination for mass production, destinedfor mass markets and based on the possibiiity (iong past) of making relativclyreliable forecasts. . . . tomorrow's champions will move ahead of chaos.

This is total deiirium - ail the more paradoxical as the success of thiskind of book is precisely the resuit of the effectiveness of a System ofmass production and distribution (sales in garage and airport kiosks). Inthe form of pilotage by sight the heuristic approach is quite insuffkient

and may lead to worse just as easily as better.

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The Gospel according to Saint Mac, by G. Y. Kervern

{Annales des Mines, Grer et Comprendre,March 1986)'Good jdeas and new ideas, unfortunately, are not the same thing'. This cruelphrase, which certain professors amuse themselves by writing on theirstudents' work, would not be out of place describng the writings of theApostlcs of Excellence, the celebrated Thomas J. Peters and Robert W.Waterman, both educated at the school of McKinsey and adtnired advocatesof what could be called 'The Gospel according to Saint Mac', which has soldin its millions. The Gospel runs to 806 pages of which 306 pages for the OldTestament {In Search of Excellence, 1982) and 446 pages for the NewTestament(A Passion for Excellence,1985).

Among those ideas which are good but not new, we find ourselvesconfronted with 'what every chief executive should know': be a good boss,take care of your clients, look after your staff, be vigilant about quality,simplify as much as possible, do what you know how to do, decentralize, anduse small motivated groups for innovation.

Thse are the much-vaunted wonders of excellence which everybody istalking about today as if this were a histori discovery in the annals ofmanagement. We can cenainly rejoice that thse basic truths hve beenesteemed so highiy. We may dplore the fact that they are sometimes ignoredby certain chief executives. We can be glad that our US competitors hve a

tendency to ignore them. Wc may tremble at the idea that the japanese areputting them scrupuiousty into practice. But do we need to pay S 12,000 foreach confrence devoted to the articulation of thse holy princtples?

Among those ideas which are new but not good, at least two are currentiyenjoying a greatsuccs d'estime,in California at any rate:

mistrust of human reason; mistrust of respect for rules.

Thse two ideas hve culminated in rhe paradigm of the 'skunk'. For the authorsofA Passion for Excellencea skunk today refers to individuais who pursue ahighiy crative activity on the margins of a company'.s formai Systems.

There are two rules in the skunk catechism: act first, ask questions Iater; 'cheating' is OK, and more efficient.

The skunk thus has short ideas. His drug is action, his slogan KISS (FCeep ItSimple and Stupid). The word 'scupid' is very important since it accuratelysums up the mistrust of the rational model which forms a basis for that'coming rvolution', Let's pray that this KISS, apologist for the rough andready and the stupid, does not turn out to be the KISS of Death for Scienceand Management.


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3 . 2 . T H E R A T I O N A L I S T S C H O O L : F R O M S U C C E S S

T O M IS U S E , P E N D IN G A R E V IV A L

As Marie-Jos Avenier has quite correctly written (1985): 'If there is adearth of literature on the operating modes of pilotage, we are, on theotlier hand, witnessing a vritable burgeoning of practica! tools.' Thseplanning tools are well-known: life cycle, the exprience effect, stratgiesegmentation, portfolio analysis, muiticriteria choice, etc. The panoplyhas recently been enriched by comptitive analysis, value chains andcomptence trees, and it's not finished yet, since scnarios fromelsewhere (prospective) are now disembarking on PSanet Strategy.

Thse rational methods found great success in the 1960s and 1980s.

They had the great merit of imposing a common language and relevantmodes of reasoning which allowed gnrations of managers to be trainedin strategy. Since then the concepts of segmentation, of milch cows andof stars hve been part of ail managers' vocabularies.

The champions of the rational methods often went too far5however.They were tempted to prsent one scnario or another as the universalkey to stratgie analysis.

Reality rebels against panaceas and always contradicts theory withsolid counterexampes.

Thus, for example, according to the exprience effect cited by theBoston Consulting Group, companies having the strongest market shareshould be the most comptitive. How then can we explain the betterperformance of smaller companies with a weak market share? Theanswer is probably to be found in the area of innovation and in thediversification which it permits. Is not the accumulation of expriencewith a given technology and mode of production a source of rigidity, abrake on volution?

The effects of volume, quality and innovation ail, to a greater orlesser extent, play a rle in profitability, as the authors of the PIMSmethod (databank on the performance of companies which can be usedfor simulation) hve shown (cf. Buigues, 1985, and Thitard, 1984).

Each tool of the rationalist approach is partly true but also partlyfalse. The degree to which it will be one or the otlier dpends on manyother factors, internai and external to the company, which cause thelatter to be understood as an lment of a System, of a network, or evenof a network of actors and System. In tliis context, Georges YvesKervern and Jean Pierre Ponssard hve noted (1990): 'The search forrationality therefore becomes the search for a language adapted to animperfect state of knowledge which it is nevertheless in one's interest to

share in order to structure collective action.' In otlier words, the rational19


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approach must pollinate the heuristic approach to give action theintelligence, analysis and thought which it lacks. In this way we find the

complementarity between thse two currents, mentioned above, whichit is useless to oppose. Stratgie pilotage needs the compass, ins-truments and maps of the rationalist school of thought.

3.3 . S T O P B A D AM ER I CA N S O A P S

A N D J A P A N E S E C U R I O S

The rationalist and heuristic schools hve a tendency to follow fashionand to forget the exprience of the past. Thus the SWOT approach of

looking at external strengths, weaknesses (human, technical, financial),external opportunities and threats, which vve owe largely to thepioneering work of Igor Ansoff (1965), has appeared out-of-date tosome people. It's ail very weil to speak of value chains, comptitiveenvironmental chains, stratgie positioning, or the mobilization ofpeople; to start vvith, one should really know one's products, one's mar-kets, one's costs and one's human, technical and financial resources. Thestratgie diagnosis's prescription dpends above ail on the conclusionsof this classic check-up. This is how celebrated books speak of businessstrategy, without saying a word about financial or human aspects.

Speaking frankly, after many and careful readings, I am convincedthat most bestsellers in the field of management are the quivalent ofAmerican TV sriais. Thse 'products', usually 'made in the USA',repeat the obvious, which is applicable to everybody, and from gneraiconclusions draw simplistic examples which are easy to understandwithout any great effort. They are sold in airports like magazines. Letushope that thse intellectual sandwiches don't spoil die appeu'te of thosejust starting out. For the rest, they are not dangerous, since they containvirtually nothing worth remembering.

Most commonly in thse vvorks, usuaily several hundred pages long,

an avalanche of uninteresting maxims of the type 'the boss puts his deskin the middle of the typing pool' (Tom Peters and Nancy Austin)substitutes for dmonstration. But, you will say, this dfinitive commentis particularly applicable to the heuristic school. Alas, not really!

In factj certain stars of the rational school, like Michael Porter, onlypartly escape criticism. It is not the content which is wanting, it is thespirit of synthesis - and the reader finds him- or herself drowning in aDde of analytical dtails. Thus, for example, in the interplay of actors inthe comptitive environment (Porter, 1980), ittakes some time to realizethat the author is repeating the same thing over and over again by

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considering, each time, each one of the actors in relation to ail the others.Reasoning is diluted by the encyclopdie volume of the writing. Theprudent and efficient reader contents him- or herself with the summaries.At the same time, in-depth criticism is becoming rare. One needs to goright to the end and keep a clear head to notice, for instance, that the firmis scarcely ever approached from the angle of its financial reality andhuman identity!

Mischievous longues are proposing a remedy for the tedium ofAmerican soaps on management: wait for the next pisode (book),which will hve the same defects but the advantage of starting with ashort rsum of the previous pisode. The latest vogue to date consistsof marrying management with chaos (theory) (Peters, 1987). We hvealready discussed what we think of this unconsummated marriage.

As with a firework display, we must end this introduction with thefinale announced right at the beginning. This involves one of the mostfamous japanese curios, a 'crue lie' which made directors tremble, shookpoliticians and filled the front page of magazines: everyone gulped itdown and it continues to circulate Worldwide.

Let's tell this incredible taie. Everything started with those terriblecomments attributed to the prsident of Matsushita: 'We are going towin and the industrialized Western countries will lose. You can no longer

do much about it because you carry the seeds of your defeat withinyourseives. Your organizations are Taylorist, but worse stiil, so are yourheads . . . whereas we are post-Taylorists . . ."

Widely quoted since the middle of the 1980s, thse commentsprovided a saluary electric shock to the brain: Japan's advance could beexplained by its management model, which must first be understood inorder then to draw inspiration from it. However, it has been known since1987 that this rext is a 'true lie' - its author, Serieyx, revealed it in hisprface to a book by Isabelle Orgogozo (1987) and confirmed it in 1989in a new book entitled!^e zro mpris(Zro Scorned).

3. This xt w;ss citet! by G. Arehier and M. Serieyx inL'entreprise du 3bma type,with thesubtitlc 'A Japanese Prsidents Speech'; then, wkhout quite knowing how, rumourattribuiec it to he prsident of Matsushita. For the sake oi'complecness, the rest ofthe test is given herc. The ideas and style of Herv Serieyx arc casily discernible. 'Youarc totally persuade! tluit you makc your businesscs function wcll by distinguishingbosses on one skie, executives on the other, hinkers on one side, those who sit righton the other. For you, management is the art of making the bosses' icteas passconvenientiy into the hands of ihe workers. We are post-Taylorists, we know thatbusiness luis become so complicated, so difficult and the survival of a firm soproblematic in an increasingly dangerous, unexpected and comptitive environment,that a firm must mobilize he intelligence of everyone every day to hve a chance ofmaking it. For us, management is precisely the art of mobilizing and stacking up ail

this total intelligence in the service of the company project.'

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Thus the Japanese system of management would hve become a realfashion based on a false mode]. It would be a kind of rumour, but it is

well known that, in order to circulate, rumours need to cho realities. Weknow that Japanese courtesy is falsely modest and often hidessuppressed arrogance. The text was plausible. What a shame! For oncea Japanese seemed to be telling us a few home truths.

The story would hve stopped hre if I hadn't been invited by theManagement Centre of Europe in June 1990 to speak to 300 managersfrom around the world who had corne to Paris for the sole purpose oflistening to eminent people such as Henry Kissinger makepronouncements on the prizes to be won and lost today. Among thespeakers, I had the opportunity to listen to R. T. Pascale (Pascale and

Athos, 1984), Harvard professor, recognized as one of the bestspecialists on Japan and its management model. Surprise was followedby inward shock - in the middle of his speech, he let loose, in English,the infamous quotauon attributed to the prsident of Matsushita. Whatwas I to think? What was to be done - but sound the alarm and checkwhat was going on? By questioning Pascale's assistant, I discovered thathe had only been using the quotation for two or three years, while hislast interview with the prsident of Matsushita had taken place in 1982.Persevering, I pushed curiosity so far as to (discreetly) challengeR. T. Pascale himself. Visibly embarrassed - to his crdit - he told me

that in fact 'he had one day read this ten-line text! (the English versionis identical to the French). He added, in connection with something else,that he 'had met the prsident of Matsushita in 1982 and that the latter,who was very old, spoke English almost inaudibly'. However, what he'believed he understood from die prsident corresponded exactly towhat he had later read as one of his pronouncements'. Perhaps Joan ofArc bas rivais across the Atlantic!

To clinch die matter I neverthefess reported ail diis to Serieyx, wholaughed hearuly and swore to me that we were definitely dealing widi a'true lie' (and not 'a false true-lie'), and that he had not translated some

obscure United States journalist. Serieyx specified that the quotauonhad been in circulation and published since 1978, following a trip toJapan, in a business review.

Will this dniai succeed in snuffing out the rumour? Rumour isalready playing for time by putting the dniai in doubt, Who knowsHerv Serieyx in die United States? Not, in any case, Professor Pascale'sassistant, who happens to be French-born: 'Never heard of hinV was hercomment. Americans are ignorant of work not written in English, i.e. thegreater part of the world's writing . . .

This true-fatse text is only one of a number of Japanese

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Schooh of strategy: contradictoryJashio7tstcotnpleiiiematy tiiodels

pronouncements used as rfrences or bogies.*1 We are dealing with areal management fashion based on a false model. What share doesreality hve in the images we receive of Japanese management?

In order to explain the formidable competitiveness of Japanese firms,we should first cite the will to work to escape the privations of the 1950s,the memory of which is still fresh in people's minds. Japan has no otherresources than peopie and their labour. 'Just-iri-time' productionmethods were developed there because of the acute lack of space and thecostof maintaining physical stocks caused by the very high price of land(four-fifths of japan comprises uninhabited wooded mountains). Thisis why Japanese factories are so compact, which requires great efforts inorganizing production but ultimately improves productivity. This modelshould not be engraved on tablets of stone; Koreans are often morecomptitive than the Japanese, with huge factories where zro stock isnot the rule.

Concepts of productivity and quality hve been imported from theUnited States, where, in the 1950s, productivity was the highest in theworld. Since no one is a prophet in his own land, it was at Japan that theAmericans W. E. Deming and J. M. Juran, considered the fathers of theconcept of quality, aimed their applied ideas (see Weiss, 1988). At first,it was a question of small groups responsible for improving processes

and products at the most gnerai levels. But the idea of 'total quality

1

,literally die quality 'of everything together', soon became indispensableand was treated as a collective goal for which responsibility was shared,rendering the very notion of quality control useless (when speaking ofthe same thing, American authors tend to use the word 'excellence'). Ifquality has had such success in Japan, it is also for preventative reasons:Japanese products are exported Worldwide without die need to developcostly networks of after-sales service.

Other pillars of the Japanese management System hve beenadvanced to explain the success of its companies: first and foremost,

employment for life, which in reality oniy involves a fifth of wage-earnersbut testifies above ail to the attachment and quasi-feudal loyaity ofemployes to their company.

The Japanese does not exist as an individual but as a member of agroup, a clan. This is the context in which we shouid relocate anotherpiliar of the Japanese management System: consensus. Group pressureis essential to explain the apparent social harmony which reigns inJapanese society and companies. Certain sayings like 'hammering down

4. I hve writtcn a book on this subject, with Picrrc-Noel Giraud (19S7)J cntitkd

Radioscopie du Japon.

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the nail which sticks out' iiluminate the conditions under which thefamous consensus is achieved. In addition to the officiai control of

hierarchy - 'being beaten on the head' - there is the unofficial butomniprsent controt of colleagues: 'being pulled by tlie feet'.

How could people not stay in line under such conditions? In eachcase it is a question of doing as the others do: not leaving the officebefore one's colleagues, not behaving differently. Thus the famedconsensus is less the resuit of negouation than the fruit of a collectiveself-censuring where each renounces his or her own ideas for fear ofcompromising the harmony of the group, which, in any case, would notforgive the m for it.

Nor is it at ail surprising that trade unions avoid unreasonable socialconflicts and that the 'good' union leaders are rewarded with promotion.Indeed, this occurs to such an extent that, in order to become a manager,it is useful to hve had union responsibilities at one time or another.

Another clich of the Japanese mode!: the performance of manu-factiiring industry thanks to a longer working day than elsewhere. Theofficiai statistics are more theoretical than real, for the constraints ofproduction and group life are such that, 'spontaneously', manyemployes stay late in the evening and corne back on Saturdays - oreven Sundays - to achieve their targets. Group pressure is such that itis better to do as one's colleagues do and give up a significant pro-

portion of one's leave.Motivation and mobilization are thus at the heart of the System. At

Honda, for example, the prize goes to whoever makes tlie mostproposais for improving productivity. This motivation dtermines thesignificant bonuses (worth severai months' salaries) which are paidtwice a year.

Thus, contrary to common wisdom, the Japanese miracle rsidesneither in management advances nor technology, but rather in theorganization of production, in the most concrte sens of the term. Itis a question of doing well what one has to do with order, method,tidiness and, of course, the ail-important wcll-motivated staff. None ofthis is outside our grasp; the Japanese eiectronic industries set up inthe United Kingdom are already performing better than those in Japanitself. However, the United States example demonstrates mat simplytransferring a model (or rather its image) to another reality does notautomaticatly work: production by the tightened/stretched flovv just-in-time method has shown itself to be more costy than useful innumerous companies. For its part, Germany testifies to anotherreality: the Germans are as efficient as the Japanese, yet work iess thantlie French,

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Spreadi>ig the cultures of prospective and strategy

Ultimately, the principal virtue of the true-false Japanesemanagement modet is to hve unleashed a vritable mentai rvolution in

our companies (quality circles, company projects, self-training, the cuitof business). Future historians will perhaps recognize Japanese methods,as vvell as the salutary rle they hve played in the West.

4. Spreading the cultures of prospectiveand strategy

At the end of this introductory chapter, we are resolutely optiniistic.Indeed, debate and dispute over prospective and strategy are fertile andfashions help models to progress and ideas to advance.

We may end by confirming the vidence. If the recipes presented byAmerican business schools and management bestsellers were as usefulas claimed, American businesses would be performing better andUnited States industry less sick. Companies are not the only onesaffected by the plotting of a desired future. Authorities, local com-munities and associations hve already got the forward-planning itch.The democratization of prospective is only just beginning.

It is safe to bet tliat prospective and stratgie cultures will spread widelythrough organizations. This dmocratie diffusion cannot fail to raise theievel of debate. American soaps and Japanese curios will be abandoned forbooks by classic authors and reflection on the strong and durableperformance models which are burgeoning around us in Germany, France,Italy and Spain. Thse models are based on long-term, planetary visionsand ambitions, efficient management of the (technical, financial, human)means of production to achieve objectives, and highly intelligent ulilizationof tlie human lever, and ail done with respect for identity and in harmonywith culture. In a word, the movement being sketched out is indeed that 'ofa European school of stratgie management.'f As Fernand Braudel said(1980): 'What units Europe is its diversity.' The common characteristicof this European school is precisely the variety of organizations andbehaviours which are proving effective. Thus the principle of contingencyis tlie essential basis of this school, which has aiways existed, but which isonly just beginning to recognize itself.

5. This was the title chosen by AF T and AFPLANE for their internationalcolloquium held on 1-2 February 1990. Proceedings are availablc frorn AFCET, 16

Boulevard Percire, Paris 75017, France.

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Far anotlier future

5.One logic in ten chapters

The field covered by his manual is above al! that of prospective.Developments in company strategy aim primarily to propose a synthesisof widely scattered material. By relying on this synthesis, it wili bepossible to illuminate the complementarities anci synergism between thetvvo approaches. In this sens, this work retains the logicof Scnarios andStratgie Management(Godet, 19S7).

The first two chapters deal with the fundamenta! principles ofanticipation. As the future is not written anywhere and lias still to bebuilt, prospective thinking lias nothing to do with the determinism offururotogy or forecasting. The critique of quantification and extra-

polation of trends is necessary to improve the complementarity betweenapproaches: planning needs forecasts with scnarios.

The following chapters iist the methods of the prospective tool-box,illustrated by case-studies. In this way we prsent the necessarymathematicaf procdures for identifying the key variables of the future^analysing the interplay of actors, reducing uncertainty and finallybuilding scnarios and defining stratgie options.

The third chapter is devoted to the scnarios method, whose logicalsquence (dlimitation of the System, rtrospective analysis, actors'strategy and constructing scnarios) has become established after

dozens of prospective studies.However, this entirely literary logic is an insufficient weapon for

tackling the analysis, comprhension and cxplanation of increasingiycomplet Systems. Hence the need to call on the more formaiized toolsof Systems analysis defined by Barel (1971) in the following manner:'Systems analysis, in most cases, consists in bringing out the fact thatthe goal examined nuist be re-placed in a wider context than ilsoriginal System. The term "analysis" serves to underline theusefulness of breaking down complex problems into their constituentparts.'

n the chapters which foilow, we shal! prsent some of thseformalized tools to which one can rurn at one stage or another of thescnarios method.

Structural analysis and the MICMAC method, particularly usefulfor dlimitation of the system and for determining the essentialvariables, are presented in Chapter 4.

Analysis of the past and of future projects is a valuable support forunderstanding the interplay of actors whose analysis by theMACTOR method is the basis of Chapter 5.

Morphological analysis, useful for scanning the field of possibilits

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One logic in lot chapters

and identifying the key dimensions of the scnarios, is presented at thebeginning of Chapter 6.

Expert mthodologies (DeSphi and cross-impact) allow us to assessdie likelihood of diffrent hypothses acting on the variables and keydimensions for the future. Chapter 6 is speciaily devoted to one ofthse: SMIC methodology.

By presenting thse diffrent tools and mediodoiogical supports, we willat die same time better understand how to utiiize die scnarios method.Let's be clear, however, diat, although the squence is logical, it is notessential to follow it from A to Z: everything dpends on die degree ofknowledge one has of the System studied and the goals being pursued.The scnarios mediod is a modular approach and can, where necessary,

be limited to the study of particular modules, for example: Structural analysis of, and search for3key variables. Analysis ofactors' strategy. Surveying experts on key hypothses for the future.

One of the biggest constralnts of the scnarios method is time. In gneraitwelve to eighteen months are needed to carry out die logical procdurein its entirety; half of tliis time wiil be spent on construction of die base.If only three to six months are availabte, it is prfrable to concentrateone's thoughts on the module which seems most important.

The complte scnarios method has only been applied in just underhalf die cases quoted in Chapter 3. In order to iilustrate die modularcharacter of the tools of prospective, they are presented via diffrentcase-studies. Ail the saine, for reasons of confdentiality it has not beenpossible to prsent a complte and detailed example in ail stages.

The outlook is clear, the scnario System will continue to play arfrence rle but will seldom be^arried through from A to Z. That canonly be the business of specialists undertaking long and exacting work.

The prevailing winds are blowing in the direction of a democratizationof prospective. Prospective is itself moving to embrace the appropriationof methods and is imposing openness and simplicity. This is a strong trendwhich ought to reinforce still furdier die enthusiasm for prospectiveworkshops and to favour the modular use of tools - as needed, and asappropriate to pariicular probSems, circumstances and tempraments.

It is dien appropriate to identify and evaluate possible stratgieoptions. Chapter 7 prsents the problematic of the decision-making andvaluation process and develops the principal methods of multicriteriachoice available, notably the Multipol method, a pardcularly simple andeasy-to-use tool.

Chapter S concerns itself with marrying prospective and strategy(by showing how the meeting and integraon of thse two approaches

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For another future

was invitable). This chapter also provides the opportunity to return tothe sources of strategy and management. On the way, we discover that

thse concepts are as old as the hills and that modem authors hveinvented nothing - the essentials had already been said and written along time ago by forerunners such as Henri Fayol, Frederick WinslowTaylor and Mary Parker Follet. One lesson may be drawn froni thisrtrospective: there are a thousand and one keys to excellence.

Chapter 9 attempts a synthesis. It demonstrates that people are at dueheart of the diffrence between organizations that win and those diatlose. It also describes the metamorphosis of structures and behavioursthat is indispensable if old habits are to be broken and a true mentalrvolution is to be iaunched.

The final chapter, entided 'The Dawn of the Twenty-First Century',proposes a review of the main trends and uncertainties whichorganizations will hve to face in the future.

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2. From determinism

to dtermination, fromforecasting to 'stratgie prospective'

'The future cannoi beforecast, it is prepared'Maurice Blondel, philosopher

Prospective is neither forecasting nor futurology, but a mode ofthinking for action and against fatalism. Prospective recognizes that thefuture is the 'raison d'tre of the prsent', that it is multiple anduncertain, and that prospective is a way for everyone to take controi oftheir own futures. This chapter looks at the rle of such qualitative

prospective analysis in the context of business planning and fore-casting. Scnario-building merges as more vital than ever forforecasting and stratgie management.

1. Action-orienteci anti-fatalistic thinking

Those who claim to foretel! or forecast the future are inevitably liars, forthe future is not written anywhere - it is stil! to be constructed. This is

fortunate., for without this uncertainty, human activity would lose itsdegree of freedom and its meaning - the hope of a desired future. If thefuture were totally foreseeable and certain, the prsent would be corneunliveable. Certainty is death.

Thus, the first aim of prospective thoughtis to illuminate the choicesof the prsent by the light of possible futures. Good forecasts are notnecessarily those vvhich are realized, but those which lead to action toavoid the dangers and arrive at the desired objective.

The frquent erro

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