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October 1979Copy 1 of 2

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CIA History

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(pages 1-167)

OFFICIAL HISTORY'OF THE

BAY OF PIGS OPERATIONVOLUME II

PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCTOF FOREIGN POLICY

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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

APPROVED FORRELEASEL DATE:.. . 25-Jul-2011PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

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OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THEBAY OF PIGS OPERATIONVolurre. I I Par t i c ipa t ion in the

Conduct of Foreign Pol icy

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FOREWORD

Nearly 20 years have e lapsed s ince th e Agencywas au thor ized by Pres iden t Eisenhower to undertakea program o f cove r t ac t ion to over throw Fide l Cast ro ,b ut d esp ite voluminous wri t ings subsequent to theac t iv i t y in te nd in g to show the d isas t rous na tu re o fCIA 's g uid an ce o f the ope ra t ion , no a t t en t i on eve rhas focused on the Agency's p a rt ic ip a to r y r ole inth e formulat ion of United S ta t e s fo re ign pol i cy v i s -a -v i s Guatemala and Nicaragua dur ing the course o fth e opera t ion . One purpose o f t h i s volume in theOff i c i a l Histo ry o f the Bay o f Pigs se r i e s i s toexamine in de t a i l the ex t en t o f those r e l a t i on sh ip sas they impacted on - - o r in f a c t became - - th epo l i c i e s o f the United Sta tes government t owa rd thosetwo coun t r i e s .

In Guatemala, the Agency d e al t d ir ec tly withth e Pres iden t Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes o r h is persona lr ep resen ta t ive Roberto Alejos ; and th e r e l a t i on sh ip swere f a r more complex - - and covered a longer t imespan - - than was the case with Nicaragua.

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nego t i a t ions i n i t i a t ed by th e Agency with th e Govern-ment o f Guatemala heavi ly involved both the Departmentso f S ta t e and Defen se; an d, dur ing the Eisenhower ad -min i s t r a t i on , the S pecia l Group.

The Nicaraguan s to ry pr inc ipa l ly concerned th eAgency's e f fo r t s to obta in an a i r base and po r t f a c i l i t y fo r launching the an t i -Cas t ro s t r i k e fo rce aga ins tCuba; and th e involvement was d i r ec t ly with the Pres i den t o f N ic ara gu a, Luis Somoza Debayle, and h is bro the r ,Anastas io Somoza Debayle, the Commander of Nicaragua ' sArmed Forces . The US embassy in Nicaragua and i t sr ep resen ta t ives were kep t informed and, in gene ra l ,supported the Agency as the b al l c ar r ie r with theGovernment o f Nicaragua. The s to ry was r e l a t i ve lys t ra igh t fo rward with th e Agency being given th e greenl i gh t to n eg ot ia te in many areas a f f ec t i ng US r e l a t ions with t h a t count ry .

A t h i rd Cent ra l American country , Panama, wasinvolved marg ina l ly in the Agency's an t i -Cas t ro e f fo r t .Forts Randolph and Sherman in th e Canal Zone were th es i t e s i n i t i a l l y s ele cte d fo r PM and communicationst r a in ing fo r the cadres which w ere to h elp o rg an iz ethe d i s s iden t elements ins ide Cuba; and France a i r f i e l d '

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in the Zone a lso was used by Agency a i r c r a f t duringth e course o f the pro jec t . CIA's n eg o tia tio n s f oruse o f these Panama s t t e s , the re fo re , were with theUS Departments o f Defen se and Army, r a t he r than withthe government o f Panama.

As the an t i -Cas t ro program o f the US was imple-mented, a sometimes embarrassing re l a t ionsh ip withth e United Kingdom developed because o f the frequencywith which a i r c r a f t o f the an t i -Cas t ro Brigade madeemergency l and ings on th e a i r s t r i p a t Grand CaymenIs land and, in one i n s t ance , a t Kings to n, J amaic a.Agency p er so nn e l a ss ig n ed to th e a nti- C as tr o p ro je c twere no t d i rec t ly involved in th e n eg o tia tio n s withthe sen io r UK r ep resen ta t ives fo r re lea se o f e i the rthe a i r c r a f t o r t h e i r crews. Acting upon i n s t ruc t ionsreceived from the DCI l eve l , CIA,sl ____________________Iwas pr inc ipa l ly re sp on sib le fo r re solving such pro blem s; an d, consequen t ly , s ~ c h nego-t i a t i ons a re not sub jec t to d is cu ss io n in t h i s volume.*

* The topic i s discussed in Volume I o f t h i s h i s to ry ,A ir Operat ions .

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As w i t h the p r e c e d i n g v o lu me o f t h i s s e r i e s ,th e au thor w i s h e s to a c k n o w l e d g e the con t r ibu t ionso f the o the r members o f the CI A History Sta f f , Mrs.S h a r o n Bond a n d M r s . Eula l i e Hammond, to th e c o m p l e -t ion o f t h i s s e g m e n t o f the Bay o f P i g s h i s t o ry .From subs t an t ive research to typing a n d proofreading,t h e y d id w h a t e v e r n e e d e d d o i n g reg ard le ss o f t h e i rjob descr ip t ions . F o r a n y e r ro r s o f f a c t o r ques t ionso f i n t e rp re t a t i on , t h e y a re b l a m e l e s s - - th e a u t h o ra s s u m e s f u l l re spons ib i l i ty .


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Foreword

VOLUME I I

Contents

iiP a r t I Guatemala

A. Background11

B.

C.

E s t a b l i s h i n g Con ta cts w i thYdigoras and Alejos . . .Cover, S e c u r i t y and L a t i nP r i d e . . . . . .

3

12D. Quid Pro Quos 24E. November Revol t P o l i c y Makersvs P r a g m a t i s t s . . 28F. Minor Skirmishes : I n t e r - andIntra-Agency . 52G. The S p e c i a l Forces T r a i n e r s --Pragmatism and P a t i e n c e 57H. The Changing P o l i t i c a l Climate 73I. Third Coun tr y I nvol vement 80J . GOG - JMATE and t h e KennedyA d m i n i s t r a t i o n 84

P a r t I I Nicaragua 100A. Background 100B. I n i t i a t i o n o f Discuss ions withP r e s i d e n t Somoza . . . . . . . 101

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C. Rip Rober tson 's Excursion in toDiplomacy . . . . . 108D. Qualms a t High Levels 122E. Back to Robertson - - Act iv i s twith Fores ight . . . . . . 127F. Who Would Do What fo r Whom? . . 133G. Down to the Wire with Somoza . 138

Par t I I I

Par t IPar t I I

Conclusions

Source ReferencesGuatemalaNicaragua

Appendixes

. 147

. . 149 . . 161

1 . Guatemalan Revolt , November 1960:Miscel laneous Cables . . . . . . 1682. Memorandums re Specia l Force Tra iners 230

A. Four Memorandums o f Agreement . 231B. Memorandum fo r Chief , WH/4 fromA/DDP/A, 28 Dec 60 , 235. . . . .C. Memorandum fo r Chie f , WH/4 fromA/DDP/A, 30 Dec 60 . . . . . . 241D. Memorandum fo r Deputy A ssis ta nt toth e SecDef fo r Spl Ops, 30 Dec 60 . 245

3. Por t ion o f Oral History Interview withAmbassador John J . Muccio, 13 Apr 71 . . 246

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The c l e a r e s t case to me o f th e CIAa f fec t ing d i r e c t ly nego t i a t ions withanother Chief of Sta te was Ydigoras .I th ink t h a t was f rank ly unavoidableand inescapab le , because we had almostcons tan t problems o f a kind o f operat i ona l na tu re . Here we were t r a in inga fo rce t h a t [Col .] Jack Hawkins oncecha rac te r i zed to me as the most powerfulmi l i t a ry fo rce from Mexico to Colombiain h is [Ydigoras ' s ] country . He himsel ffaced a l o t o f domest ic opposi t ion - -a t one t ime they t r i ed to overthrow him,as you remember. He wanted to g e t t h i s[Cuban] group ou t o f the re as soon asposs ib le , and I am sure t ha t you haveseen a l o t o f th e t r a f f i c and memorandao f di scuss ion ; bu t it seems to me r e a l l yto charac te r ize e spec i a l l y the pe rio d inNovember-December (1960) when Torn Mannwanted to g e t th e Brigade th e he l l ou to f Gua temala a nd Ydigoras would havewelcomed it. There was no place fo rthem to go. I still remember t h a t weeven t a lked about fe r ry ing them to t h a tt ra in ing s i t e I l in

I which was a measure o f th e des -pera t ion - - o r despera te des i re - - toge t them ou t o f the re [Guatemala]. Wet a lked again about t ry ing to f ind a remotes i t e in the con t inen ta l US., bu t Tom Mannwith th e Sta te Department would have noneo f t ha t . In t h a t per iod when so r t ofcQnstant opera t iona l problems with Ydigoraswere a l l wrapped up in the l a rge r ques t iono f where th i s t ra in ing ac t iv i t y could becar r ied on and how it could be made l e s sobt rus ive - - I th ink it was j u s t i n ev i t ab le t h a t Agency r ep resen ta t ives foundthemselves dea l ing d i r ec t l y with Ydigoras .

Richard M. Bis se l lto Jack B. Pfe i f f e r17 October 1975

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THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Volume I I Pa r t i c i pa t i on in the Conducto f Foreign Pol icy

Pa r t IGuatemalaA. Background

Direc t p a rt ic ip a ti on in th e a f f a i r s o f Guatemalawas no t new in Agency his tory ' . In 1954 CIA had pro-vided suppor t and had motivated Guatemalan forces whichousted then Pres iden t Cas t i l l o Armas, a pro-communist ,in favor o f th e presidency o f Jacobo Arbenz Guzmann.

On 26 Ju ly 1957 Arbenz was assass inated and th epo l i t i c a l s i t ua t ion in Guatemala evolved in to a t h ree -way dog f i gh t among th e fo rces o f the l e f t , the r i gh t ,and th e cen t e r . _______ 1

===========================================:::;- 1_________________________ Iand wereopposed to both the l e f t i s t s and to the par ty o fYdigoras Fuentes - - th e r i g h t i s t candidate who a l sohad th e suppor t o f the Army. When it became c l ea r

Ithat Ydigoras wasthe most popula r f igure in Guatemala

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. arrangingfo r a behlnd the s ce ne s c on re re nc e betweenYdigoras and the_ MDN [Cruz S a la z ar 's p a rty ].A "deal" was arranged whereby th e assemblywould e l e c t Ydigoras and th e MDN would ge tt h ree sea t s in th e cab ine t , fo rg ivenessfo r the s in s committed under th e Cas t i l loregime, and a f inanc ia l "pay-off" to Cruzand othe r MDN l e ade rs . On 12 February 1958th e Assembly e lec ted Ydigoras as Pres iden t . 1 /In the i n t e rva l from th e e l ec t i on o f Ydigoras

un t i l th e announcement o f Eisenhower 's an t i -Cas t roprogram, both th e government o f Guatemala and, throughth e Agency, the United Sta tes Government began tofocus c lo se r a tt en ti on on Fide l Cas t ro ' s revolut ionwhich led to the overthrow o f the Bat i s t a governmenta t th e beginning o f 1959. Although th e Department o fS ta te h es ita te d to c l a s s i fy C astro as a communist ,t he re was little doubt among Clandest ine Serv icespersonnel about th e d i rec t ion in which Cas t ro wastending; and by the ear ly pa r t o f 1960, it was c l ea rt h a t th e Government o f Guatemala (GOG) was w il l ing totake some r i s k s in opposi t ion to Fide l Cas t ro . Notonly d id Guatemala sever o f f i c i a l r e l a t i on s with Cuba,but be fore the end of February 1960, Pres iden t Ydigoras.of fe red th e use o f h is t e r r i t o ry to suppor t propagandaac t i v i t i e s d ir ec te d a ga in st Cas t ro ; and he a lso made

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a s pe cif ic o ff er through the CIA " to groups favorablyregarded by us [of] t r a in ing f a c i l i t i e s in the Petena rea o f Guatemala." 2/*

B. Establ i sh ing Contacts with Ydigoras and AlejosIt was more than two months fo l lowing Pres iden t

Eisenhower 's announcement o f an an t i -Cas t ro programbefore Chief JMATE, Jacob D. Es t e r l i n e , and

I Robert K. Davis , met with r ep re se n ta ti ve s o f~ - th e GOGi but in the i n t e rva l between the announcementand Es te r l i ne ' s f i r s t meet ing , Davis had al ready e s t a b ~l i shed con tac t with Roberto Alejos - - th e p r inc ipa lrep resen ta t ive o f Pre s iden t Ydigoras Fuentes in a l l

* It i s i n t e r e s i ng to observe t ha t t h i s spec i f i cre fe rence to the use of th e Peten area in Guatemalawas reworded fo r use by th e DCI in a memorandum toth e members o f th e Specia l Group to read " th i s t r a i n ing and holding [of an t i -Cas t ro Cubans] would beconducted in a secure remote area o f a f r iendlyLat in American coun t ry . " 3 / The Specia l Group 5412was a group composed of the As si st an t S e cr et ar ie sof Sta te and Defense, th e DCI, th e Pres iden t ' sNat ional Secur i ty A d v i s e ~ and a CIA Sec re t a r i a t .I t s p r inc ipa l purpose was to r ev iew p ropo sed paramil i t a ry and c landes t ine opera t ions and to provideguidance on such proposals fo r th e Pres iden t . Pres i den t ~ i s e n h o w e r made ex tens ive use o f t h i s group,but Pres iden t Kennedy l a rge ly abandoned it un t i ll a t e in th e per iod o f the Bay o f Pigs ope ra t ion .


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TOP F R E T

subsequent ma tte rs i nv olv in g th e CIA.* Este r l ine in -c iden t a l l y , had been the sen io r of f i c e r in th e Head-quar te r s end of the opera t ion which had forced ther es igna t ion and ous t e r o f Pres iden t Arbenz in 1954.During the f i r s t meetings with Alejos and Ydigorasin Guatemala City on 30 and 31 May 1960, plans werei n i t i a t ed fo r th e use of a por t ion o f Ale jo s ' s cof feep lan ta t ion - - Finca Helve t i a - - as a communicationst ra in ing s i t e ; and di scuss ions were held concerningadd i t iona l s i t e s fo r the t ra in ing o f p aram ili ta rycand ida te s .

At th e same t ime , it was made c l ea r to Ydigorast h a t th e Agency sponsored Cuban ex i l e organ iza t ion ,the Fren te Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), wouldnominal ly be re sp on sib le f or whatever t ra in ing ac t iv -i t i e s o f Cubans, took place in Guatemala. The nameso f Antonio Varona and Jus to Car r i l l o were given toP re s iden t Ydigoras and Rober t Alejos as two o f the

* Eisenhower 's an t i -Cas t ro program was dated 17 March1960. CIA's an t i -Cas t ro e f f o r t was lo ca te d w ith in th eWestern Hemisphere Divis ion , Branch 4 (WH/4). In i t i a l l yWH/4 was given th e cryp t JMARC; but when t h i s was compromised, the cryp t was changed to JMATE. Throughoutt h i s h i s t o ry , excep t when d i r e c t quotat ions a re given ,th e term JMATE i s used.


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key f igu res in the FRO. According to Es t e r l i ne ' sr epo r t o f th e meeting " i t was never sa id in so manywords t h a t CIA, in e f f e c t , i s support ing these people ,it was im p lic it in Pres iden t Ydigoras ' s a t t i t ude t h a the wel l understood t h a t suppor t i s being given tothese people through i nd i rec t means."* In playingh is own game o f p laus ib le den iab i l i t y , Ydigoras p o i n t ~ dou t t h a t the l e s s he knew o f th e ope ra t ion , th e be t t e rwould be h is den ia l s to th e Organiza t ion of AmericanSta tes (OAS) o r o ther s who were concerned th a t a nt i -Cast ro ac t i v i t i e s were being mounted within h is coun t ry ' sborders . It was a l so during t h i s f i r s t sess ion betweenChief , WH/4 and the Guatemalans t h a t plans were madeto in t roduce Este r l ine to th e Guatemalan ambassador

* Arthur Schles inger pu t th e s i t ua t i on qu i t e accu-r a t e ly in th e fo l lowing comment: \The Fren te was appropr ia te ly named:

it was a f ron t and nothing more. Whilei t s members t a lked among themselves , CIAwas engaged in a r e c ru i t i ng dr ive amongCuban refugees in Flor ida and Centra lAmerica. It had a l so persuaded Pres iden tYdigoras o f Guatemala to permi t the es tab l i shment o f a s ec r e t t ra in ing camp and a i rbase in the Guatemalan mountains."3a/

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in Washington, Carlos Alejos , th e b ro th er o f RobertoAlejos . y *

Portents o f th ings to come fol lowed shor t lya f t e r Es te r l i ne ' s f i r s t meeting with Roberto Ale jo s .On 8 June 1960, Alejos , as he had indica ted in h isi n i t i a l meeting with Davis and Este r l ine , was in theUnited Sta tes where he met with Este r l ine . Among .thesub jec t s discussed , in add i t ion to the u t i l i za t i on o fGuatemalan t e r r i t o ry fo r the t ra in ing o f a nti -C a str oCubans, Alejos sa id t h a t he would be taking a looka t th e a i r s t r i p a t Retalhuleu to see if it was capableo f handl ing C-54 a i r c r a f t . Construct ion and renova-t ion o f t h i s a i r s t r i p would l a t e r give r i s e to bothsome in t ra -agency squabbles and also some s t r a i n inth e re l a t ionsh ips between th e Agency and Ale jos .

At t h i s t ime, too , Alejos was very much concernedabou t th e United Sta tes ambassador to th e OAS, JohnDryer, who, according to Ale jos , was press ing the GOG

* Carlo s A le jo s apparen t ly was appoin ted US ambassador a sho r t t ime p r i o r to Es t e r l i ne ' s meeting withY d i g o ~ a s and Roberto Ale jos . A cab le to the Departmentfrom Guatemala City on 18 May 1960 noted t h a t CarlosAlejos "Ambassador-designate to the US" would ar r ivein New Orleans on 25 May 60. 4a/

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to respond to a Cuban charge t ha t Guat6mla was beingused as a s tag ing base fo r a planned invas ion of Cubaand t ha t an OAS inspect ion was in order . Ale jos ' sresponse was t h a t if Cuba would agree to a s imi la rinspect ion , Guatemala could be f re ely v is te d by theOAS team. In what would be a cont inuing i r r i t a n tthrough the course o f P ro jec t JMATE, Roberto Alejosalso expressed h is d i sp l easu re with th e f a i l u r e s ofthe governments o f H on du ras and EI Salvador to breakre l a t ions with Fide l Cas t ro ' s Cuba. 5 /

Whether Es te r li n e a c tu a ll y met with AmbassadorC ar lo s A le jo s a t t h i s t ime i s not known, bu t it appearsposs ib le t ha t such a meeting may have taken p lace .*In any event a cable sen t from Guatemala City to theGuatemalan Embassy in Washington, D. C. fo r RobertoAlejos dated 7 June 1960, addressed i t s e l f in pa r tto Raul Roa 's (Cuba 's Foreign Minis ter) re qu es t fo r

* One of Roberto Ale jo s ' s cards w ith th e fol lowingnote ( t r ans la ted from Spanish) was found in Chief ,WH/4 records:Caro l io :The bearer i s a good f r i end , I prayt ha t you wi l l a s s i s t him and make use o fh is contact s in th e US.


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the OAS i n v e s ti g a t i o n o f Guatemala, and it a l s o con-t a i n s t h e fol lowing t a n t a l i z i n g message:

Impossible t o g i v e proof o f what i shappening i n Cuba[ . ] Members o f t h eP r e m i e r ' s p e r s o n a l guard have been s h o t[according to ] some sources o f informat i o n . j*By mid-June 1960 p l a n s were w e l l i n hand f o r

e s t a b l i s h i n g t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n Guatemala. RobertoA l e j o s , who had gone from Washington t o Miami, hadbeen i n tr o d u c e d t o Casimiro (Chick) Barquin o f DPDt h e Agency's a i r arm - - who was about t o t a k e o f f f o rGuatemala t o survey t h e a i r f i e l d s a t San Jose and R e t a l -h u l e u , t o check t h e a i r s t r i p a t P e t e n , and t o s e e whato t h e r a i r s t r i p s might be a v a i l a b l e . Rober t Davis ,

1 was i n Miami t o perform t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n s .--------As proved t o be t h e c a s e i n Nicragua, ---'=====,------ 1_____ IGUatemala planned t o i s o . l a t e I Ia c t i v i t i e sfrom t h e PM and communications t r a i n i n g programs which

* In S panish t h e message r e a d as f o l l o w s :PRUEBAS LO QUE PASA EN CUBA IMPOSIBLE DARLASFUSILARIAN MIEMBROS GUARDIA PERSONAL PREMIERUNA DE LAS TANTAS FUENTES INFORMATION STOP.Apparent ly i n the t r a n s m i s s i o n o r i n t h e c a b l e s esome words and p u n c t u a t i o n were l o s t , ' o m i t t e d , o rgoofed up.


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were about to be es tab l i shed . But unl ike the Nicaraguans i t ua t i on where ~ w a s be t t e r able to do t h i s , suchi so l a t i on was more t heo re t i c a l than prac t i ca l . 7 /

Davis d id t e l l Roberto Ale jos t h a t mat te rs pe r -t a in ing to th e t ra in ing s i t e s fo r the ant i -Cas t roCubans would hencefor th be discussed with Juan PaulaArgeo. Paula was a member o f the FRD and it had beenagreed between the head o f th e WH/4 po l i t i c a l sec t ion ,Gerald (Gerry) Drol le r , and the FRD t ha t Paula wouldwork ou t de t a i l s o f r eim bu rsin g A le jo s d urin g thecourse o f t h i s i n i t i a l survey t r ip .* The funds wereos tens ib ly coming from th e FRD through Paula . In thecourse o f a rr iv in g a t dec is ions on the f inancing andth e funding o f th e t r a in ing , it was pointed ou t t h a tDrol le r should urge th e FRD l eadership to inc reasei t s own fund ra i s ing program. 8 /

While on the one hand the Agency was concernedwith masking th e funding fo r the FRD from the Cubans,it was a t the same t ime concerned with disguis ing

* DrQller was known to th e Cubans as Frank Bender - a cover i den t i t y t h a t wasn ' t blown un t i l the publ icat io n o f Arthur Sch les inger ' s A Thousand Days in 1964.Juan Paula was, in fac t , Manuel F. Goudie.


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Ale jos ' s pos i t ion from the Cubans - - h is ro l e wouldbe as a pr iva te Guatemalan c i t i z en , cooperat ing wi ththe FRD element fo r i dea log ica l reasons . 9 / In ad-d i t ion to the Agency's i n t e r e s t in p ro tec t ing thecover s t o r i e s , Ydigoras himsel f was very much con-cerned t h a t the t r a in ing program no t be revea led toth e publ i c . In one ins tance when he heard t h a t aGuatemalan Congressman was t ry ing to promote suppor tfo r a group o f pro-Ba t i s t a Cuban r e c ru i t s to over-throw Cas t ro , he made it qu i t e c l ea r t h a t such aprogram would f ind no suppor t a t the p re s iden t i a ll eve l . Ydigoras even went so fa r as to sugges t t h a tperhaps he should expe l a few pro-Ba t i s t a and a fewpro-Cas t ro Cubans from Guatemala fo r propagandapurposes in order to p ro tec t the Agency's on-goingope ra t i ons . 10/*

By mid-July 1960, const ruc t ion work had begunon th e communicat ions t r a in ing base and th e sea rchwas underway fo r a su i tab le a i r s t r i p . By ear ly August ,despi te some r e se rva t i ons o f th e DPD e lement in charge

* Source re fe rence numbers 11 and 12 no t used.

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August

T O P ~ E T

o f the a i r opera t ions , it had been decided, pa r t i cu -l a r l y s ince it had been favored by the Pres iden t o fGuatemala, t h a t the Retalhuleu a i r s t r i p , a gradedsod-s t r ip o f approximately 4 ,300 ' in leng th , ly ingin th e NW co rne r o f Guatemala, roughly 40 km fromthe Pac i f i c coas t and 50 km from th e Mexican border ,would be expanded to 5,000'xlOO' with a crushed s toneand aspha l t su rface . S ui tab le hanger type s t r uc tu r e sand o the r necessary a i r f i e l d f a c i l i t i e s would be in -s t a l l ed a t t h a t s i t e fo r the a i r t r a in ing base . 13 /

Although the de ta i l s are given in ano ther h is to ry ,a word should be sa id here abou t th e highly commendableperformance o f one o f the Agency's eng ineers from t h Office o f Logi s t i c s , I r who on 31960 was ass igned to th e R e ta lh ule u p ro j ec t as th er e s iden t eng ineer arld who on 13 September saw Pres identYdigoras o f f i c i a l l y i n a ~ g u r a t e the opening o th e a i r -s t r i p with th e landing of some DC-3 's , a C-46, and acouple o f Aero Commanders. By 30 September a l l con-s t ruc t ion was completed including th e ex tens ion o f th ea i r s t r i p to 5,000 ' and the base was ready fo r th e inau -gura t ion o f t r a in in g ac t i v i t i e s . 14/*

* Despi te some severe c r i t i c i sm from th e A/DDP/A, C.Tracy Barnes , about cos t over runs , i n e f f i c i e n t( f a ; ~ : ; ~ ~ : n u e d on following page)


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C. Cover, Secur i ty and Lat in Pr ideA high degree o f coopera t ion between th e P re sid en t

o f Guatemala and the Agency was c lea r ly ev iden t in theplans to provide a cover s to ry fo r the i nc rease o f a i rac t i v i t y a t Reta lhuleu . At the d ed ic at io n o f the base(JMADD), Ydigoras poin ted ou t t h a t the a i r f i e l d was be-in g r en ov ate d to provide pro tec t ion to r the northwestborder o f G ua te ma la a nd to provide a t r a in ing base fo rnew B-26's w hich were being acquired under th e Mili ta ryAssis tance agreement with the United St a t e s . The i n fan t rybase (JMTRAV) was to be p ro vid ed c ov er by GOG t roops - -r epo r ted ly the pa lace guard fo r Pres iden t Ydigoras - -who had begun t r a in ing in the a rea in o rder to d isgu iseAgency ac t i v i t i e s with the Cuban ex i l e s .

In ques t o f suppor t fo r h is an t i -Cas t ro e f f o r t ,Ydigoras was no t r e luc t an t to devise cover s to r i e s ofh is own. In the ea r ly pa r t o f August, fo r example,Ydigoras to ld Car l Jenkins , then COB JMTRAV, t h a t he,Ydigoras , had " invented" a Cuban warship t h a t was sup-posed to be lurking o f f o f the ea s t coas t t h rea t en ing

management by I I, and s im i l a r o the r charges drawn ex-c l u s i v e ~ y from h inds igh t , r a the r than on- s i t e inves t iga -t i on , Mr. I I d id a magnif icent job when faced withheavy obs tac l e s , not the l e a s t o f which was approximate ly100" o f r a in f a l l in the Retalhuleu area during the per iodwhen th e a i r s t r i p was being extended. The Chie f of WH/4Support sa id in f ac t , " the r e s i den t eng inee r i s to be commended fo r the exce l l en t performance o f a d i f f i c u l t t a sk . " 15 /

TOP- : ' ; ~ E T


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invas ion . He then leaked th e word t h a t he was ac -cep t ing o f f e r s o f Cuban ex i le s in Guatemala to as-s i s t h is country in i t s defense aga ins t a Cas t roa t t ack . All o f these ac t i v i t i e s were being ca r r i edon d i r e c t ly between th e Pres iden t o f Guatemala andth e Agency's rep re sen ta t ive s in th e f i e ld . TheDepartment o f S ta te , if informed o f the GOG suppor tfo r JMATE, chose to appear ignoran t o f any invo lve-ment o f th e us Government.

Beginning in ea r ly August o f 1960, GuatemalaAir Force B-26 's and P-S l ' s f lew to a l l pa r t s o fthe count ry to provide add i t iona l suppor t fo r thecover s to ry ; and as Ydigoras had i nd ica t ed in theea r l i e r pa r t o f the month, j o i n t Army/Air maneuversbegan in the San Jose , Retalhuelu , and Champer icoareas to give fu r the r suppor t to the s to ry t h a t theinc rease in tr a in in g a c t i v i t y was r e l a t ed to improv-ing th e s t a t u s o f th e GOG's own mi l i t a ry . To insurethe secur i ty o f the a rea where th e Agency ac t i v i t i e swere ce nte red , th e newspapers and the publ ic wereadvised t h a t th ey sh ou ld not t respass in th e t r a in ingareas because l ive ammunition was going to be


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employed in the exe r c i s e s . 16/*The Pres iden t o f Guatemala was i n t e r e s t ed in

doing more than simply providing a cover s to ry fo rthe Agency ac t i v i t i e s . Throughout th e p er io d p r i o rto th e invasion and even through th e course o fth e in va sio n he o r h is ch i e f spokesman, RobertoAlejos , made it qu i t e c l e a r on numerous occas ionst h a t they would be wi l l ing , indeed were anx ious , tosee Guatemalan Army and A ir Force personnel ac t ive lypa r t i c i pa t e ln th e o pe ra tio ns a ga in st C a st ro 's Cuba.As ear ly as September 1960 when the f i r s t resupplyove r f l i gh t was being planned , Alejos and the DefenseMinis te r o f Gua tema la wer e in s er io u s d is cu ss io nwith Car l Jenk in s , the COB o f th e ground t ra in ingbase , JMTRAV, about th e poss ib i l i t y o f using someGuatemalan personnel as e i t he r PDO's o r ass ign inga coun te rpa r t Guatemalan Air Force crew to th e C-54

* It i s poss ib l e t h a t t h i s t ra in ing was made pos s i -b l e , in pa r t a t l e a s t , by th e 5,000 pounds o f smal larms and perhaps as much as 100,000 pounds o f machineguns , amm un itio n, a nd rocke t s t h a t CIA provided tothe GOG a t t h i s t ime. 17 /

- 14

T O ~ E C R E T


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t h a t would be used in th e ove r f l i gh t . 18/* The pros -pec t o f u t i l i z i ng Guatemalan,personnel in add i t ionto the Cubans appeared a t t r a c t i v e to Agency personne lin the f i e l d , but it crea ted negat ive responses fromHeadquar ters .

Sounding in one ins tance Very much l i ke a replyor ig ina ted from the Department o f Sta t e , the Headquar te r s response to a c==Jreques t t h a t a Guatemalancadre be i n f i l t r a t ed with th e Cuban teams read : "Neg-a t ive Poss ib i l i t y adverse po l i t i c a l repercuss ionstoo g rea t to j u s t i fy t h i s ac t ion . " 19/ The enthus iasmin Guatemala a l so went beyond those immediately incharge o f th e government . In O ctober 1960 pendinga Guatemalan congress iona l i nves t iga t ion of ac t i v i t i e s

* An odd f ea tu re about the cab le from 1 __to Headquarters with Ydigoras ' s r eques t was the fo l -lowing query: "Do you have Cuban crew se lec ted? Wouldthey come from a i r group a l ready in Guatemala?" Thiswould appear to be the long way around to ge t ananswer to th e ques t ion and may r e f l e c t the i nc ip i en tant ipa thy between the WH/4 cont ingent a t JMTRAV andthe DPD elements a t th e a i r base a t Retalhuleu whichwould l a t e r l ead to harsh words and b i t t e r rec r imina-t i ons t h a t would only be solved - - and then in pa r t - -by th DDP, Richard M. Bis se l l . As near ly as can bedetermined, Car l Jenk ins was the f i r s t COB a t JMTRAV,se rving from ea r l y September un t i l 9-10 December 1960. 18a /

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,

a t Reta lh ule u, th e p r i nc ipa l po l i t i c a l opponent o fYdigoras F uente, Jose Cruz Salazar , who was scheduledto t e s t i f y before the Congress about the a i r base ,was br ie fed by Alejos and Ydigoras concerning t he i rsuppor t fo r Pro jec t JMATE. Upon complet ion o f t h i sb r i e f i ng , Guatemala cab led Headquar ters t h a t Cruz

en thus i a s t i c a l l y endorses e f fo r t and wi l la s s i s t p ro vid e c ov er fo r pro jec t beforeCongress . Also fee l s it adv i sab le to havepicked Guat in pro j e c t . In tu rn , he sa idin two days he can ea s i l y ra i se an ex t rahundred who would be wil l ing to f i gh taga in s t Castro and communism. 20/By way o f showing some apprec ia t ion to the GOG

fo r its suppo rt , the Agency provided numerous namet r aces a t the request o f Alejos or Ydigoras - - namet r aces which turned up Cast ro agents in Guatemala o ri nd ica t ed l eg i t imate Cuban de fec to rs who wished toen t e r Guatemala. 21/ CIA ass i s t ed in having repor teds igh t ings o f submar ines o f unknown or ig in o f f th ewest coas t o f Guatemala checked ou t - - submarines sus -pee ted o f carry ing arms o r br ing ing pro-Cast ro guer r i l l a s to Guatemala. In one ins tance I--------suggested t h a t Headquarters f ab r ica te a photo o f aSovie t submarine supposedly o f f the Guatemalan coas t .c==Jsa id t h e ~ h o t o could "be placed in th e Guatemalan

- 16 RET


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pres s , and suggested "may be good way gree t ing Khrushchevon a r r i v a l UN." 22/*

It was also during the ea r ly period o f i n i t i a t i ono f ac t i v i t i e s in Guatemala t h a t th e Agency accommodat-ed th e req ues t o f Pres iden t Ydigoras fo r about 20,000rounds o f 20mm an t i - a i r c r a f t ammunition valued a t about$30,000. The ammunition was to be used fo r t ra in ihgo f AA gun crews, both as pa r t o f th e cover and d iver -s ion from JMADD/JMTRAV ac t i v i t i e s and also as an ac tua lpa r t o f th e Guatemalan defense program a ga in st in cu r-s ions o f Cuban a i r c r a f t over th e i r e as t .coast . 23 /

Rela t ions with the GOG and i t s r ep resen ta t iveswere no t a l l sweetness and l i gh t . A couple o f annoy-ing problems which came up in the ear ly f a l l o f 1960concerned a i r ope ra t ions , and th e key f igure , as inmost of th e disputes between the Agency and the GOG,was Roberto Alejos . In one ins tance he was exceedinglyupse t by the change in an incom ing , a i r c ra f t schedule ,and Guatemala cab led Headquar ters to i n s i s t - - aga in ,

* CND ac tua l l y had P2V's sweeping the Pac i f i c coas tof Guatemala during the period 14-18 October 1960 inan a t t empt to loc a te a repor ted Sovie t submarine - with no luck .

- 17

TOP fRET


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apparen t ly - - t ha t l a s t minute changes in f l i gh t sched-ules were unacceptable to Alejos and t h a t if he couldnot be given 24 hour not i ce o f planned f l i gh t s , thenschedules should be revised in order to accommodateAle jos ' s demand. 24/ Some pre l iminary di scuss ionsbetween th e Agency's r ep resen ta t ives in Gua tema la andthe Thompson Cornwall Company ( the cons t ruc t ion companyrespons ib le fo r the improvements o f th e R eta lh ule ua i r f i e l d ) over th e ques t ion of providing cover fo rthe Agency's PBY came to naught when Ale jo s p oin te dou t th e numerous d i f f i cu l t i e s which wou ld a t tend thea t t empts to cover the a i r c r a f t commerc ia l ly . Alejosnoted t h a t it would be much s impler to br ing the PBYin black, o r char te red in h is name, r a t he r than toa t t empt to use it under commercial cover. 25 /

The problem of a i r c ~ a f t maintenance posed amore se r ious quest ion in terms o f both co ver and d ip lomat ic re l a t ions with Guatemala. In th e ea r ly summero f 1960 nego t i a t ions had been undertaken with a CostaRican a i r c r a f t maintenance-organizat ion known as SALA.The Development Pro jec t s Divis ion , (DPD) which wasin charge o f a i r o pe ra tio ns f or JMATE had i n i t i a t edthe contac ts with SALA through I-------------

- 18 -


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TOprRETL- ~ a I Icorpora t ion which was Agencycon t ro l l ed . For cover purposes it was owned by twomembers o f the FRD. Agency employees in key pos i t ionsin the company could moni tor i t s ac t i v i t i e s and conductnecessary bus iness . The B-26 and C-46 a i r c r a f t fo ruse in the JMATE pro jec t were nominally to be soldto the FRD byl I which, in tu rn , wouldsuppor t the cover t ha t the a i r c r a f t a t JMADD belongedto the Guatemalan Government. I Iwouldnego t i a t e with SALA fo r maintenance o f the "Guatemalan"a i r c r a f t . All o f t h i s , o f course, to involve fe r ry ingo f B-26's from CONUS in to Guatemala black, removingand replac ing o f GOG in s ign ia on a i r c r a t as theymight move from Guatemala to Costa Rica where SALAhad i t s pr inc ipa l maintenance base , and genera l lyconduct ing opera t ions in such a manner as to ~ r o v i d eviable cover . 25a/

By mid-September however, no agreement had ye tbeen reached. A few days p r i o r to the t ime t ha t theDPD r ep resen ta t ives planned to c lose the f i n a l agree-ment ~ i t h SALA, a dispute arose between DPD and WH/4/PM.The ques t ion ~ o n c e r n e d an apparent DPD a t t empt to goit alone in the nego t i a t ions with SALA. The upshot

TOP


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TOP;&CRET

was t h a t a SALA rep re sen ta t ive ar r ived in GuatemalaCity accompanied by th e Costa Rican ambassador. Thetwo Costa Ricans had then v i s i t ed var ious Guatemalano f f i c i a l s seeking information about a damaged C-46which DPD an t ic ipa ted t ha t SALA would be ca l l ed onto r epa i r . DPD planned to have the SALA rep re sen ta -t i ve , who had never been c leared by the Agency, v i s i tthe JMADD s i t e . This v i s i t was den ied , and, in add i -t i on , Joseph Langan, Chief , WH/4 Secur i ty , in h ismemorandum on the inc iden t s t a t ed :

In view o f the f a c t t h a t r e l a t i on sbetween Guatemala and Costa Rica areapparen t ly in a ra the r s t r a ined s t a t ea t t h i s t ime, these inqu i r ies have re su l ted in p lac in g the JMADD ac t i v i t i e sin an embarrassing s i t u a t i on r e l a t i veto th e Guatemalan government and in ourdea l ings with various o f f i c i a l s o f sa idgovernment ... Had the Guatemalan government been aware o f the need fo r a i r c r a f tmechanics , t h i s need might poss ib ly havebeen f i l l e d from with in Guatemala ando bv ia te d the necess i ty fo r b r ing ing theSALA Corporat ion in to th e JMADD ac t i v i t yand, as a by-product , considerably re - \duced the expense o f such ac t i v i t i e s . 26/

The maintenance con t rac t between th e Agency and SALAwas never pu t in to fo rce because it go t in to thesevery sens i t ive po l i t i c a l a reas . 26a/


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Because he played such a s i g n i f ic a n t r o l e i nt h e Agency's r e l a t i o n s h i p with h i s g o v e ~ n m e n t , as p e c i a l word should be s a i d here about Roberto Alejoswho was Y d i g o r a s ' s a l t e r ego i n p r a c t i c a l l y a l l m a t t e r sconcerning t h e Agency's Guatemala program. A l e j o s wasinformed on even t h e most minute d e t a i l s - - o r if hewas n o t informed, he l e t it be known t h a t he was d i s -s a t i s f i e d , d i s p l e a s e d , and d i s a g r e e a b l e . Where ont h e one hand he was almost s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o rcover ing t h e death o f the f i r s t Cuban t r a i n e e , CarlosRafae l Santanya, whose dog t a g number would be usedt o i d e n t i f y the e x i l e s as t h e 2506 B r i g a d ~ on o t h e ro c c a s i o n s Alejos could behave as though he, r a t h e rthan t h e Agency, were i n charge o f t h e t r a i n i n g o p e r -a t i o n i n Guatemala. with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c c i d e n t a ld e a t h o f t h e Brigade t r a i n e e , a c a b l e from Guatemalat o Headqua rt er s no ted t h a t a f t e r t h e r ecovery o f t h ebody, t h e autopsy, and t ~ b u r i a l , t h a t :

Alejos moved q u i c k l y t o cover i n c i d e n twith l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , from Governor downt o a d j o i n i n g f i n c a manager. Thank God theya l l belong Government P a r t y and he can con-t r o l them. Believe t o t a l c o s t s ops g i f t sno more than $1,0 00. 27/In t h e e a r l y p a r t o f October 1960, A l e j o s was

one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l s i n a p o t e n t i a l l y explosive


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i nc iden t which could have had se r ious repercuss ions ,including poss ib le loss o f Gua tema lan and US l ivesand th e c lo sin g ou t o f the t r a in ing bases in Guatemala.The unfor tunate s i tua t ion seems to have occurred , inpa r t a t l e a s t , because o f the i n ab i l i t y of Agencypersonnel to communicate in Spanish with t h e i r Guate-malan hos t s . Col. Antonio Batres had reques ted per mission to en t e r the JMADD s i gna l cen te r in o rde r tot r an smi t a message. Batres was not o nly C hief o fGuatemalan Air Force opera t ions , he was a lso thepersona l p i l o t o f Pres iden t Ydigoras . The Agencyof f i c e r in charge o f th e communications cen te r haddelayed Col. Batres a moment in order to secure sens i t ive mate r i a l s in the a rea . According to th e r epor tto Headquar ters , Batres thought t ha t he was beingd en ie d a cc es s to the commo f a c i l i t i e s which he apparen t ly had u t i l i z ed previously; and he departed thescen&, only to r e tu rn again with Roberto Alejos , ha l fa dozen Gua tema lan so ld ie rs , and th e commander o f th eGuatemalan secur i ty guard a t JMADD. Alejos a l so wasto ld t h a t he would have to wai t fo r a few minutes whilethe area was made secure - - a t which pc i n t Alejos ,accompanied by the commander o f the Guatemalan guard


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u n i t and B a t r e s , forced h i s way i n t o t h e s i g n a lc e n t e r and informed t h e Agency o f f i c e r t h a t he wasunder a r r e s t .

P r i o r t o , and i n a n ti c i p a t i o n o f , A l e j o s ' sr e t u r n and th e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a forced e n t r y , t h eJMADD s e c u r i t y o f f i c e r had informed t h e communicationso f f i c e r t h a t such an e v e n t would p ro ba bly o cc ur andt h a t no r e s i s t a n c e t o Alejos should be made. F o r t u n a t e l y i n t h e ensuing d i s c u s s i o n s between Alejos andthe Agency's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , t h e s i t u a t i o n was s o r t e do u t - - d e s p i t e A l e j o s ' angry s t a t e m e n t s t h a t it wash i s i n te n t i o n t o c l o s e down t h e communications a c t i v i t y i n o r d e r t o b r i n g t h e number o f n e g a t i v e a s p e c t so f t h e o pe r a t i o n t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f " t h e b i g boys i nWashington." 28/

There were , however, no r e p e r c u s s i o n s nor s e c u r i t y breaks r e s u l t i n g from t h i s i n c u r s i o n by t h e Guate-malans i n t o t h e commo c e n t e r . The communicationso f f i c e r whom Alejos had d e c l a r e d t o be "under a r r e s t "was never t e c h n i c a l l y a r r e s t e d and, by way o f apology,Alejo? i n v i t e d t h e o f f i c e r t o h i s home a s a d i n n e rg u e s t .


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TOP/RETD. guid Pro Quos

Ale jos ' s disp lays o f temper may have had a l e s sthan sub t l e inf luence on subsequent negot ia t ions withthe Agency's rep re sen ta t ive s in Guatemala. Short lya f t e r th e foregoing inc iden t , Chief , WH/4 (Jake Es te r -l i ne ) reques ted au thor i ty to ob l iga t e $150,000 fo rcompensation to p ro pe rty owners in the a rea o f theReta lhu leu a i r base fo r damages r esu l t ing from reno-vat ion o f th e a i r f i e l d . Seventeen k ilomete rs o f road-way were reportedly "damaged cons iderab ly" when used asan access road to Roberto Ale jos ' s f inca , and r epa i ron th e seventeen ki lometers was s e t a t $100,000 - -plus an add i t iona l $50,000 to pay fo r rock taken fromthe r i ve r on property owned by one Senor Ralda on 5acres o f h is proper ty . 29 / Following Headquar tersau thor i za t ion o f the payments to Alejos and Ralda,

[went to Headquar ters with a cab le on~ - - - - - - ~4 Nov 1960 reading:

1 . Payment o f the $50,000 has to bemade to Ralda immediately upon prepara t ion and de live ry o f th e lo ca l leg aldocuments, as t h i s Al ej os u nde rs ta nd in g ,and he had made the commitment to Ralda.2. Opera t iona l ac t i v i t i e s and l i a i sonwith high Gua t governmen t o f f i c i a l s wouldhave been s er io u sl y a ff e ct ed , and th e


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success o f the p ro j ec t mater ia l ly jeopardized if payment i s delayed. 3. Copieso f leg a l documents wi l l be forwarded Head-quar te r s with the r e ce ip t . 30/Despi te th e fa c t th a t the $100,000 was supposed

to make the f inca roadway and the 17 ki lometers pass-able during the ra iny season , an engineer ing r epor ti nd ica t ed t h a t the s teep grade was washing out theba l l a s t and the road would need to be paved. T h o m p s o n ~Cornwal l , th e engineer ing ou t f i t which had re s to redRetalhuleu , had given an es t imate of $185,000 to dothe job . A le jos had t r i ed to ra i se the di f fe rencebetween the $100,000 Headquarters had approved and thet o t a l con t rac t p r i c e , but had been unable to do so .A cab le o f 25 Nov 60 from Guatemala indica ted t h a t_________Imight be ab le to make a dea l with Alejos fo rl e ss than th e f u l l c on tr ac t p ric e and requested t ha the be author ized to of f e r a maximum o f $130,000. Themessage to Headquarters ended w ith the s ta nd ar d p le at h a t th e n eg o tia tio n be author ized as the mat te r wasextremely de l i ca te and ~ o u l d cause embarrassment toth e p ro j ec t . An outgoing cable from the Direc tor on26 Nov 60 au thor ized c==J to negot ia te up to $130,000if t h a t proved to be necessary ; and the re leas ing


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o f f i c e r fo r the cable was the DDP, Richard M. Bis-s e l l . 31/

In addi t ion to these sums approved fo r paymentto Alejos , o th e r l eg it ima te expenses the Agency in -curred were fo r the use o f Ydigoras ' s a i r c r a f t andfo r repaving and maintenance o f the La Suiza a i r s t r i pon Ale jos ' s property - - a t o t a l o f $32,000. 32/Ale jos ' s var ious cla ims appear to have been l e g i t i -mate expenses incurred under th e terms o f the open-ended o r a l contract-which had been in e f f e c t s incethe i n i t i a t i on o f th e p ro j ec t in Guatemala. Despi teth e f a i l u re o f Alejos to s ign documents fo r us ing ana l i a s i den t i ty John Black - - o r h is f a i l u r e toexecute a wr it te n c o nt ra c t, 1 1 wrote t ha t :

JMATE does f ee l moral ly and l ega l lyo bl ig ate d to reimburse Alejos fo r anyexpenses he incurs in h is e f fo r t s fo rthe Pro j e c t if he subm its a claim fo rre imbursement . It i s on t h i s bas i st h a t th e r e la t ionsh ip with Alejos nows t ands . To sum up the r e la t ionsh ip between the Agency and Alejos , there hasbeen no discuss ion o f paYment o f sa la ryo r o th e r monetary bene f i t s . Alejosexpects to be reimbursed fo r any expenses incurred in behal f o f the Agency,. and th e Agency, to maintain i t s s e l fre spec t and r e la t ionsh ip with theSubjec t , i s committed to pay fo r suchexpenses . 33/


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Oral agreements notwi ths tand ing , the re i s ev i -dence t h a t Alejos t r i ed to take advantage o f th e sit-ua t ion on a number o f o cc as io ns . As ea r ly as August1960, fo r example, Ale jos ' s bro the r - in - l aw , an eng ineer ,was proposed fo r a con t rac t o f $1,000 per month fo rwork re l a t ed to the development o f the JMTRAV t r a in ings i t e ; and in January 1961, o r shor t ly p r i o r to January;Alejos had proposed t h a t Agency t r anspor t a i r c r a f tf ly ing between Gua temala and Flor ida be used to ca rry,shrimp to the United Sta tes . The numerous d i f f i cu l t i e sa t tendan t upon such an opera t ion were s u f f i c i e n t tocoo l t h i s p ro po sa l, b ut fa r more pressure was exer tedby A le jo s d urin g the per iod shor t ly before th e invasionin an a t tempt to g e t the Agency to help him s e l l h iscoffee crop - - presumably because h is pa r t i c i pa t i onin p ro j ec t ac t i v i t i e s had forced him to miss numerous,oppor tun i t i e s to obta in the bes t pr i ce fo r h is cof fee .The Agency found an expor t agen t in th e US fo r Alejos ,bu t th e cof fee sa les were to be w ith in the Guatemalanquota . 34/*

* How such r e la t ionsh ips would be regarded in l i g h to f th e inves t iga t ive mora lity o f th e mid-1970 ' s , i sa moot po in t . At a t ime t h a t the Bay o f Pigs wasbeing planned , the ac t i v i t i e s which now might seem

(footnote cont inued on fol lowing page)- 27 -


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E. November Revolt - - Pol icy Makers vs Pragmat i s t sFor a l l p r ac t i c a l purposes , the voice o f the US

Government in Guatemala during the months when theground and a i r t r a in ing bases - - JMTRAV and JMADD,r espec t ive ly - - were being es tab l i shed was t h a t o fth e Cent ra l In t e l l i gence Agency. Agency t r a in ingprograms were developed with the f u l l and completecoopera t ion o f th e Pres ident o f Guatemala, h is p r in -c i pa l spokesman, Roberto Alejos , and o ther high GOGo f f i c i a l s . Such i n t e r e s t as the Department o f Stateevidenced in the a f f a i r s o f Gua tema la were concernedp r in c ip a l l y with embarrassments t h a t might r e su l tfrom Cuban charges in the OAS o r in the UN re l a t ingto US suppor t fo r Cuban ex i l es t r a in ing in th e Guate-malan a r ea . By mid October o f 1960 t h i s po in t wascaus ing some c on st er na ti on to Ass i s t an t Secre ta ry o fSta t e , Thomas Mann . 35/ From th i s tim e fo rw ard un t i lh is re pl ac em en t a s Ass i s t an t Secre ta ry o f Sta t e fo rAmerican Republican Affa i r s , Mann was the Agency's

pre j ud i c i a l were unquest ionably necessary in view o fthe f a c t t h a t CIA was forced to use the Guatemalant r a in ing s i t e s . The Agency's prefe rence fo r the useo f CONUS f ac i l i t i e s fo r th e t ra in ing had been cont inuous ly denied .


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p r inc ipa l p ro t agon i s t in the Department o f S t a t e .Despi te t h i s , however, he was a man who, in r e t r o -spec t a t any r a t e , was held in the highes t regardby both Richard Bis s e l l , the DDP, and Jake Es te r l i n e ,Chief , WH/4.*

While Tom Mann would cont inue to be embroi ledin the Agency 's r e l a t i on s with Guatemala, th e United

* In an Oral H istory Inte rv iew w ith th e author in thef a l l o f 1975, Es te r l ine had the fo l lowing comments tomake about Mr. Mann:I f you discussed a pro jec t in gene ra lterms and he d idn ' t l ike it, he would t e l lyou, bu t i f you could br ing him aroundto th e p oin t where he sa id , "wel l , go a head and do it, bu t be damn sure t ha t youdo it a l l ou t , " t h a t would be th e end o f

it. I th ink he was one o f these who f e l tt h a t th e pre s t ige o f the United Sta tes wasge t t ing very t h in in the hemisphere - - inthe sense o f re l a t ing it to our gunboatd ip lomacy d ay s ... when we could o f s o r to f rape the lock and the re would be noproblem with it. I th ink t h a t he f e l tt h a t the odds o f being able to p ut ev eryth ing in to it were very s l i ~ i but , aga in ,when he f ina l ly r ea l i zed what th e a l t e rna t i v e s were, he f ina l ly sa id , "Well , if t h i si s it, then let's do t h a t p l an , and let'sgo th e whole way on it." I had many go-arounds with Tom on something un t i l I. f i n a l l y go t him to agree, o r he sa i d ," I am not going to ag ree ." In t h i s casehe f i n a l l y agreed. No, it would be veryhard to f au l t Tom on the t h i n g . 2 !

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Sta tes ambassador to Gua tema la , J ohn J . Muccio, whopre fe r red a back sea t with regard to a l l ac t i v i t i e sconcerning th e Cuban Brigade , was a lso going to beforced in to an ac t ive ro le in a t l e a s t one even t whereth e Agency played th e key ro le - - the preserva t iono f th e Ydigoras pres idency in November 1960. Asear ly as Ju ly o f 1960, Ydigoras expressed to 0

Ih is f ea r t h a t th e Part ido Gener al T raba jo------and the Part ido Unidad Revolucionario could poss ib lyover throw his admin i s t ra t ion . With t h i s in mind,Ydigoras had discussed with I land Car lJenkins th e pos s ib i l i t y o f forming a mul t i -na t iona lforce composed pr inc ipa l ly o f ant i -communists froma l l par t s o f the world, inc lud ing Guatemala andothe r Lat in American coun t r ies . As pa r t o f t h i sp rogr am , Rober to Alejos had suggested to ~ a n dJenkins t h a t Guatemalan volun teers be t r a ined as apa r t o f the JMATE opera t ion . While th e f i e ld wasf av or ab ly d is po sed to undertake t h i s s o r t o f t r a i n -ing fo r the Guatemalans, no progress was made withHeadquarters on th e p lan . 37/*

* In f ac t , Ydigorasand h is Cabinet had decreed - and the Congress had approved - - a 30 day s t a t e of( footnote cont inued on fo l lowing page)


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TOp l RET

By mid October 1960, th e in te rn al s itu a t io n inGuatemala h ad worsened, and Ydigoras was press inghard on Wash ington fo r loans and gran t s - in -a id toa s s i s t him in main ta in ing con t ro l . The GOG faced af inanc ia l c r i s i s - - s a l a r i e s had been cu t , peoplewere unemployed, and the Lef t i s t s were making st rongin roads in th e po l i t i c a l l i f e o f the country . Agenera l s t r i ke had been ca l l ed , and t h i s posed aposs ib le t h r ea t to the overthrow o f th e Ydigorasgovernment. "Reports o f varying r e l i ab i l i t y" sug-gested t h a t Castro might be supplying funds to andt r a in ing cadres o f an t i -Ydigoras groups in Guatemalain an a t tempt both to ous t Ydigora s a nd , consequent ly ,pu t an end to Guatemalan suppo rt fo r the Cuban t r a i n -ing program. The s i t ua t ion had become so se r ioust h a t by the end o f Octo ber an d the ear ly pa r t ofNovember JMADD had completed prepara t ions fo r a quickevacuat ion o f a l l th e a i r c r a f t and a l l s ta t ion personnel

se ige on 19 July 1960. Carl J en kin s, ass igned toWH/4/PM, was providing opera t iona l guidance to c==Jpr io r . t o assuming h is job as COB TRAV. In September1960, Ernes t W. Sparks was named Chief , JMATE ac t i v i t i e sin Gua temala a nd thus became th e adv ise r to I II Ion ops plans . 37a/

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to France Fie ld in Panama. Ydigoras himsel f was facings tr on g c on gr es sio na l oppos i t ion from those who refusedto be l ieve t ha t he had not permi t ted the use of Guate-malan t e r r i t o ry fo r th e t ra in ing o f the an t i -Cas t roCuban group.

How d es pera te th e s i t ua t ion appeared to the GOGwas noted in a cable from Headquar ters to Guatemala:

JMARC p r inc ipa l Department o f Sta tecon tac t to ld [Gerard] Drol le r t ha t Alejos[presumably Ambassador Alejos] had informedPres ident Eisenhower o f Guat plan s tageCuban invasion Guat . According t h i s plan ,it i s in tended fo r number o f Cubans landGuat beach and d ig fo r arms caches os tens ib ly placed t he re by Cast ro agen t s . "Invading Cubans" would be apprehended byGuats and brought to trial. Tr i a l proceedings would be extremely f a i r andsen tences ext remely l i gh t . Ydigorasdes i res con t r a s t Guat app l ica t ion j u s t i c ewith t ha t o f Cas t ro . In tended t ha t theen t i r e opera t ion be bloodless and withou tshoot ing. 38/It was not c l ea r whether the " invaders" were to

be volun teers from among th e t roops in t ra in ing a tJMTRAV, bu t before any such opera t ion could takeplace , a r e a l c r i s i s broke in Guatemala.

On 13 November 1960 an emergency cab le fromJMADD was received in Headquarters ' a t 0931 (Washingtont ime) , s ta t ing t h a t Roberto Alejos had ar r ived a t the


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MADD base to t e l l the Agency r ep resen ta t ives t h a tvarious c i t i e s , inc lud ing Guatemala City , were having"minor ski rmishes with communist e lements . " At t h i st im e, A lejos made a reques t t h a t MADD "be preparedto pa r t i c ipa t e in show o f s t reng th in form o f f ly -overs" and it was th e p lan o f the Acting Chief o fJMADD to comply with Ale jo s ' s reques t pending Head-quar te r s ap pro va l. 39 / The American Embassy 's i n i t i a lmessage was rece ived in the Department a t 1234 hours(Washington t ime) , and sa id "some kind o f upr i s ing"in Guatemala City had been abor t ed . 39a/

Within a few hours o f th e f i r s t announcement ofth e r evo l t , the re began a rash o f emergency cablet r a f f i c among Guatemala Ci ty , JMADD, and Headquarterst h a t cont inued fo r the nex t three to four days . Almostimmedia te ly , fo r examp],e, key Agency personne l inGua tema la were h i t with reques t s fo r support andas s i s tance from the Ydigor as gover nmen t. One o f thef i r s t reques ts came from th e Min i s t e r o f Defense ,Rubin Gonzales Sigui who, f e a r fu l t h a t the r evo l t wasbeing. d i rec ted and sponsored by Cuban e lements , askedt ha t th e US provide s urv e il l an c e fo r enemy sh ips whichmight be opra t ing between Cuba and Puerto Barr ios

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one o f the p r inc ipa l cen ters of the r evo l t . In re -sponse to t h i s reques t , which a lso was supported byth e US ambassador in Guatemala Ci ty , the Navy au thor -i zed two P2V a i r c r a f t to survey th e area as f a r southas Panama and, in add i t ion , assigned a d es tro yer topa t ro l the Gulf o f Honduras area .* 39b/ The charget h a t the r evo l t was Cas t ro backed would be repea tedthroughout the pe riod o f th e revo lu t ion , bu t no ev i -dence was ever found to ind ica te t h a t it was anythingo the r than an i n t e rna l upr is ing o f d i ss iden t Guatemalans,pr inc ipa l ly elements o f the Army. In f a c t , beforeth e revo lu t ionary episode came to a conclus ion , thePo l i t i c a l and Psycho log ica l warfare un i t o f WH/4 wasto sugges t t ha t if l eg i t ima te evidence was not foundto impl ica te Cast ro , t h a t such evidence be manufacturedto show t h a t th e bas is fo r th e r ev o lu tio n w ~ in fac tfrom Fide l Castro and h is c ote rie .

During the course o f the f i r s t day ' s ac t ion ,th e Cuban fo rces in t ra in ing a t JMTRAV were a le r t edto prepare fo r any cont ingency. The Guatemalan t roopswhich-had been used as pa r t o f the cover and secur i ty

* Unsourced comments in th e fo l lowing paragraphs arebased on cab les reproduced in Appendix 1, GuatemalanRevol t , 13 November 1960: Misc el la n eou s Cab le s.- 34 -TofRET


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forces in th e TRAV and ~ ~ D D areas were c a l le d tose rv ice by Ydigoras, and the Agency's C-46 a i r c r a f tou t o f JMADD p ar t ic ip ate d in t r anspor t ing these t roopsto Guatemala Ci ty . There was considerable concernabou t the f a c t t h a t t h i s l e f t only one C-46 a t theRetalhuleu a i r f i e l d , and t h i s would be i n su f f i c i en tshould an emergency evacuat ion o f th e Cuban Brigadeand Agency personne l be requi red . Headquartersd i r ec t ed , however, t h a t a i r t r anspor t suppor t continueto be given to the Ydigo ra s government . An add i t iona lproblem presented a lmost immediately to JMATE was aGOG req ues t fo r la rge amounts of ordnance to rep laceexpendi tures from the f i r s t day ' s s t ra f ing and rocke ta t t a ck s by Guatemalan Air Force B-26 ' son var ious

. po in t s which had f a l l en to the re be l f orc es . TheGuatemalan government reques ted , . among o ther ordnance,components fo r manufacturing napalm bombs; bu t t h i sreques t was r e jec ted fo r te ch nic al r ea sons .

Requests from th e f i e ld went to Headquartersfo r the standby of add i t iona l B-26's t ha t might beneeded by MADD and fo r C-54 f l i gh t s to b ring in smal larms and ammuni ti on . The Chief o f Air opera t ions a tJMADD, Major Bi l ly B. Campb ell, h ad been to Headquar te rs


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fo r meet ings with DPD and was v i s i t i ng I I,Eglin Air Force Base en route back to ~ l l i D D a t theoutbreak o f the r evo l t .* At one po in t it was plannedt h a t Campbell a nd another B-26 p i l o t would make anemergency f l i gh t to MADD with the bomb bays o f the8-26 ' s loaded with ammunition and arms. By mid a f t e r noon on 13 November, I I, L t. Col . FrankEgan, who would soon (9/10 December 1960) t ake chargeo f the TRAV base , and L t. Col. Quent in V. Ear l , whoin th e absence o f Bi l ly Campbell was proceeding tothe MADD base as commanding of f i c e r , went forward toHeadquarters with a GOG req uest to use JMATE's B-26'sand US p i l o t s if they would volunteer to f i gh t fo rthe Ydigoras government.** MADD a ls o in dic ate d t h a t

, ! - - - - - - - - r - - - - - - - - -r - -L - ~ \ ** In an Oral History i n t e ~ v i e w with th e au thor on15 June 76, Lt. Col . Bi l ly B. Campbell (USAF, Ret . )of fe red a somewhat d i f f e r en t vers ion o f th e GOGapproach to JMADD. Campbell s ta te d th at :

Alejos had been a t the base j u s t p r i o rto my ge t t ing back down and had Guat. t roops and had th rea tened to take overth e base - - JMADD - - and take over thea i r c r a f t and use h is own p i lo t s to que l lth e invas ion which was coming up throughPuer to Barr ios and Hondu ra s. 39c/( footnote cont inued on fo l lowing page)


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Ydigoras would l i ke to use the JMTRAV Cubans - - th emajor i ty o f whom had volunteered to f igh t fo r Guate-mala - - to help pu t down the revo l t . As the f i r s tday wore on, the s i tua t ion o f the Guatemalan govern-ment became inc reas ingly d i f f i cu l t . Ydigoras ordereda 30-day s t a t e o f siege and ca l led an emergency se s s iono f Congress . The rebe l fo rces were gaining more ground,l i t e r a l l y and f igura t ive ly .

Apparent ly fa i l ing to rece ive an answer fromHeadqua rt er s c once rn ing the use o f US p i l o t s and Cubant roops , I I cabled Headquarters shor t ly before 0300 hours (Washington time) on 14 November 1960with a reques t from Ernie Sparks and Col . Egan fo rpermiss ion to commit 218 Cuban volun teers from JMTRAVas a i rborne i n f an t r y fo r an a s sau l t landing a t thePuer to Barr ios a i r base a t dawn.. In add i t ion , theya lso reques ted permiss ion to u t i l i z e MADD B-26 's

\p i lo ted by US personnel - - vo lu n te e rs a ga in - - to

Although the cab le t r a f f i c f a i l s to mentiont h i s i ncurs ion by Alejos , it i s ve r i f i ed by an eyewitness who was pre sen t in the communications rooma t Reta lhu leu when Ale jo s fo rc ed himself in to thesecure a r ea . This witness r eca l l ed Headquarter ' si n s t ruc t ions to co op era te w ith A le jo s and a lso th eau thor iza t ion fo r Se ig r i s t and Beale to f ly s t r i ke saga ins t th e rebe l s in Puer to Bar r i o s . 39d/

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suppo r t the a t t a ck . The reason fo r the use o f USB-26 p i l o t s was given as fol lows:

Due f a c t Guat p i lo t s have had no prac t i ce th i s type op and Cuban p i lo t s haveno t ye t pa r t i c ipa t ed in combined a i r /ground exe rc i se s plus need fo r prec iset iming and coord ina t ion a i r s t r i ke witha i r a s sau l t l and ing , r eques t author i tyuse us vo lun t ee r p i lo t s to insure successt h i s op .

Request au thor i ty use one AEDEPOTvolun teer with each as s au l t t r a n spo r ta i r c r a f t to provide bes t l eadersh ipava i l ab l e . 40/*The Headquar ters re ac tio n to t h i s r eques t i s

bes t exp la ined in th e words o f the then Deputy Direc-to r o f Plans , Richard M. Bis s e l l who sa id :

I remember with some viv idness t h a t Iwas ca l l ed up by the Watch Off i ce r a tabout 2:30 in th e morning and a cab le hadcome in , I th ink from Egan, and Ydigorashad asked to borrow some o f th e Brigadeto pu t down an upr i s ing in Puer to Barr ios .Egan wanted an answer within an hour o rsomething o f t h a t kind . I -d id , a t t h a thour in th e morning, ge t in touch withTom Mann; bu t I could ge t no dec i s ion ou to f Tom Mann. He sa id he cou ldn ' t poss ib lya c t on a m atte r o f t h a t kind un t i l he could

* AEDEPOTS were de fec to rs from the USSR who had beent r a ined i n i t i a l l y by the Agenc: fo r v ario us ty pe s o fI lopera t ions I Because t he i rpr lmary mlSS10n was phaslng ou , some 26 o f themvolun teered and were used as t r a in ing o f f i c e r s a tJMTRAV. See a l so , pp. 66-67 of t h i s volume.

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see the Secre ta ry in the morning. Sohere again , you have Ydigoras levying ar eques t on an Agency rep re sen ta t ivel o ca l l y , under circumstances and with at ime schedule t h a t , as it turned out ,made ef fec t ive re fe rence to the Sta teDepartment j u s t imposs ib le . The Sta teDepartment was not equipped to decidesomething l i ke t h a t with in an hour . . . .r know t ha t r s en t a cab le to Egan saying"Yes" on my re spons ib i l i ty ; and my reasonsfo r doing t h a t - very de f i n i t e l y a t thet ime - - were t h a t r d i dn ' t th ink t h a t dec i s ion ought to be l e f t to Egan. 41/There seems to have been some c on fu sio n as to

what ac tua l ly happened fo l lowing the reques t whichMr. Bis s e l l approved. The i n i t i a l cab le repor t ingth e ac t ion s t a t ed s imply t ha t :

Upon Ydigoras ' s i n s t r ~ ~ t i o n s throughAlejos , a i r c r a f t and t roops launched onschedule . However, when planes a t PuertoBa rr io s, o rd er countermanded as it d i s covered majori ty rebe l s had e va cu ate d b as edur ing nigh t . All a i r c r a f t and TRAVt roops re turned JMADD. 42/On 17 November however, in an a f t e r ac t ion r epo r t itwas s t a t ed :

MADD B-26 's commenced a i r s t r i ke aga ins tPuer to Barr ios a i r base a t 0607 hours l o ca l ,s t r a f i ng area with rocke t s and .50 ca l .As f i r s t C-46 s t a r t ed to l and , B-26 's s t r a fedin f ron t landing C-46. C-46 made successfu l- landing encounter ing sporad ic smal l armsf i r e . Cuban t r a inee s aboard a i r c r a f t re turned f i r e through por t s dur ing l and ing .R eca ll o rd er given before C-46 completedlan din g. T herefore, p i l o t d id 180 degree

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turn and took o f f immediately and a l lC-46 ' s and B-26's re turned d i r e c t ly toMADD. LUIThe most accurate s to ry o f the a i r opera t ion

mounted by the Agency, however, comes from the pr inc i -pa l eye witness to the ac tua l opera t ion aga ins t PuertoBarr ios , C. W. (Connie) Se i g r i s t , who had i n i t i a l l yfe r r i ed one o f the B-26 ' s to Guatemala from the Agency'sopera t ions in th e Far Eas t , Se ig r i s t has wri t t en :

I b elie ve th e Guatemalan Army Colonelwho was in charge o f our base inform ed u so f the r evo l t . This was l a t e in th e a f t e r noon [of 13 November 60] . I offered myse rv ices , if needed, in suppor t o f Pres iden tYdigoras . So d id some o f th e Cubans. Wef e l t what we were working fo r would a l l godown the tubes if th e r evo l t was successfu land we were exposed. Late a t n igh t , ouro f fe r was accepted . The Guatemalan Air Forcere fused to par t i c i pa t e .

I flew a B-26 with a Cuban p i lo t -observernamed Crespo (he was l o s t l a t e r f ly ing aB-26 a t the Bay o f Pig s ) . I s t ra fed and, .rocketed the a ir f i e ld a t Puer to Barr ios tosof ten the f i e ld fo r the C-46 ' s t h a t werecarry ing the Cuban t roops who were torepluse a r evo l t . The Guatemalan Air ForceColonel , Antonio Bat re s , asked me l a t e r tof ly cover fo r Guatemala army t roops whowere flown in to some a i r f i e l d s in th emountains to coun te ra t t ack a pa r t o f ther evo l t . Although I flew cover , no c lose. suppor t act ion was requ i red o f me. I flewa lone . Also, l a t e r Col. Batres asked meto pa t ro l the en t i r e sou thwes t por t ionalong th e coas t o f Guatemala and to f i r e

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in to any grouping o f people o r v eh ic les .I pa t ro l l ed most o f the day , s topping tor e fue l once, but no ac t ion was requiredas the re wasn ' t a sou l o r veh ic le in s igh t .I flew a lone . 44/*Among othe r de ta i l s provided by Se i g r i s t was th e fac tt h a t two B-26 's were involved in th e Puerto Barr iosac t ion , the second being flown by W. H. Beale , whoa l so had flown a B-26 in from the Far East . Seig r i s t "flew a t o t a l o f four s o r t i e s , inc lud ing one to PuertoBar r i o s , one in the mountains, and two along the coas t .Except fo r the opera t ion in th e mountains when he re -fue led a t Guatemala C ity N atio na l Airpor t , Se ig r i s tconfined h is f l i gh t s to Reta lhu leu . With re fe renceto th e ac tua l s t r i k e , Se ig r i s t noted as fo llow s:

Our t a r ge t s were r e s t r i c t ed by Col.Batres in th e Puerto Barr ios so r t i e .

* There i s suppor t fo r Se i g r i s t ' s comments re th eGuatemalan Air Force in th e cab le t r a f f i c . Cables toWashington from both I I and th e Ambassador i nd i ca ted t h a t the A ir Force of f i c e r s were unhappy aboutboth using the Cubans and shoo t ing t h e i r fel low Guatemalans . In a meeting o f th e S pe cia l Group, Livings tonMerchant o f Sta te regarded t h i s mat te r "with extremegrav i ty , commenting t h a t it might wel l l ead Pres iden tYdigoras to withdraw permiss ion fo r us to cont inue inGuatemala." 45/ Inasmuch as Ydigoras had al ready dec ided . tha t h is co ntro l o f th e government depended onsuppor t from JMADD (and JMTRAV) Merchant 's fea rsseem unwarranted.


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TOP fRET

Some o f the a i r f i e l d bu i ld ings were supposed to be holding hostages , bu t the f i e ldproper with i t s s up ply sh ed s and such werepulver ized . We s t ra fed d i tches , bushes ,o r anything where someone could f ind cover~ l o s e enough to the runway to harass theC-46's t h a t were to land w ith th e Cubant roops . We never were informed o f KIA o rwounded counts . We did hear t ha t a coupleo f Americans on the g round wat ched Bi l l andI a t a s af e d is ta nc e and repor ted t h a t wedid a tremendous job - - whatever t h a t mightmean.

Three C-46 's were involved. [They were]flown by Cubans. One C-46 l anded . As itwas ro l l i ng to a s top , the Cuban t roopss ta rte d f ir in g ou t the doors and escapeha tches . The p i l o t thought he had landedin a t r ap and cont inued to t ake o ff wi th ou t eve r having come to a s top . They re fused ( a l l three C-46 's) to land a f t e r t h a tand re turned to Retalhuleu wi th a l l o thert roops still aboard.

I would g uess aro un d 100 t roops wereinvolved. I can only es t imate a t what Isaw. As to Agency t r a ine r s - - he re , aga in ,t ime has s l ipped my memory - - bu t I be l ievet he i r American Commander was on one o f theC -46 's , bu t not the C-46 t ha t l anded . Hewas still the s a ~ e Commander fo r th e Bayo f P ig s .*

* This i s a re fe rence to L t. Col . Frank Egan, the PMt r a i ne r . Egan 's vers ion o f the i nc iden t i s somewhatd i f f e r en t than Se ig r i s t s . In h is tes t imony to theTaylor Committee Egan sa id :

Pres iden t Ydigoras reques ted t h a t wemake an a i rborne l anding, which we d id .I was in command o f th e ou t f i t . Washington gave us permiss ion to do t h i s , bu t Iopera ted under th e Mission Chief in GuatemaId. ( footnote cont inued on fo l lowing page)


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I persona l ly flew a t o t a l o f around 15hours on th e four so r t i e s . This covereda two day per iod . My l a s t so r t i e in thel a t e af ternoon on the coas t o f the secondday [15 Nov 60] ended a t MADD. I was in formed t ha t the r evo l t was over . I heardt ha t Col . Batres had flown to Puer to Barr iosand was negot ia t ing with the ones in chargeo f the r evo l t . I was not pr iv i l eged tof ind out the re su l t s o f th e r evo l t , bu t itwas over . I be l ieve the Guatemalan A irForce cance l led our f l i gh t s when theyinformed us o f Col . B atres ' a ctio ns ... Idid accep t my orders a t the t ime and didsupport Col . Batres ' command, but my bosseswer e Amer ic an s; and I would have respondedto t he i r orde rs . None were given a f t e rt he i r f i r s t permiss ion fo r me to fo l lowCol . Batres . !i/Jacob D. Este r l ine , Chief o f J ~ A R C p ro j ec t had

some subsequent conversat ion with the Americans whowere mentioned in Se i g r i s t ' s repor t . In discuss ionswhere he had sugges ted t h a t the B-26's ope ra t ing

Inasmuch as Egan did not give any spec i f i c s about deplaning h is t roops , both he and -Se ig r i s t could bet echn ica l ly co r rec t .The Deputy C h i ~ f o f DPD claimed t h a t 216 Cubant roops "were committed to Puerto Barr ios a ir s tr i p a t0600 hours on 14 November. I f it i s poss ib le , theset roops wi l l have to be evacuated if the s i t ua t ionworsens ." Once again , however, the language i s vagueenough to be t r u e , s in ce th e re fe re nce d evacuation o fthe Cuban t roops does no t spec i fy t h a t they were tobe evacuated from Puerto Barr ios . There i s no argument, o f course , t h a t they "were committed to Puer toBarr ios a i r s t r i p , " but only in what amounted to atouch-and-go landing. 45a/


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aga ins t Puer to Barr ios had been flown by Guatemalanp i l o t s , Jake

was chal lenged seve ra l t imes by peoplefrom the United Fru i t Company who werethe re a t Puerto Barr ios a t the t ime, andthey sa id "look, we have been l iv ing a round Guatemala fo r years and we havenever seen Guatemalan p i l o t s f ly o r shoo twith the prec i s ion t h a t these fe l lowssho t . They d i dn ' t k i l l anybody." (Anybody t h a t they weren ' t supposed to k i l l ,I guess i s the way to pu t i t . ) Therewasn ' t a s t ray bu l l e t anywhere, theys tr ic t ly h i t mil i t a ry t a rge t s . Butt he re was a case o f a green l i gh t fromSta t e Department, and then they sa idthey d i dn ' t mean it. It was academic,because it was done. 47/*

* Es t e r l i n e ' s add i t iona l comments are i nd ica t ive o fthe confusion t ha t one faces in t ry ing to s o r t ou tde t a i l s o f th e Bay of P ig s , 16 years a f t e r th e ev en t .In con t r a s t to Bisse l l ' s prev ious ly noted remarkswith re fe re nc e to the cable reques t ing permissionto a c t in response to Ydigoras ' s r eques t , Jake no tedt h a t :

We got t h i s urgen t ca l l r eq ue stin g th euse o f our t roops . We got it, and we lookeda t it and d i dn ' t know what to do with it.We ca l l ed Sta te Department and sa id , "Wesuppose t h i s i s c r i t i c a l . The whole th ingi s going to po t ." I suppose t ha t it wasRubottom o r somebody a t t h a t l eve l overt h e re , t h a t we ca l l ed . They sa id "Well , Iguess you had be t t e r give him what he wants . "-So we gave him what he wanted, and t h a twas about the t ime t h a t it was in motion;and we got a ca l l back from Sta te Depar t -ment saying they 'd checked, and they d i dn ' tmean it, but it was in motion a t t h a t po in t . 48/


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When the c r i t i c a l r eques t fo r ass i s t ance camein from Egan, the opera t ion - - per Mr. Bis s e l l ' s de-c i s ion - - was approved in an outgoing cable fromWashington sho r t ly a f t e r 0500 hours on th e morningof 14 November and it was s t a t ed s pe ci f ic al ly t ha tonly CAT p i lo t s could be used - - if they volunteered . 49/*Although th e outgoing au thor i za t ion ind ica ted " w concerned t h a t Cuban t roops being committed ln ad-vance o f Guat t ro op s, a lso fee l pa r t of the s t r i k efo rce must be Guatemalan to o f f s e t st igma o f a t t ackby f o re ig n me rc en a ri es ," t he re i s no ind ica t ion t h a tGuatemalan t roops were aboard the C-46 's headed fo rPuerto Barr ios ; and as Se ig r i s t poin ted ou t , he flewth e Puerto Barr ios s t r ike with a Cuban in th e r i gh ts ea t and p re sumab ly Bea le also used a Cuban as h isco -p i l o t . 50 /

In add i t i on to the t r anspor t o f Guatemalan andCuban t r oops by C-46 's and the B-26 so r t i e s , o the reven ts a l so occupied those Agency personnel a t JMADDand JMTRAV. One o f the mos t immedia te was the GOG's

* This was to el iminate the p o ss ib i l i ty th a t any ofthe Agency's USAF ass ignees a t Jr4ADD might be involvedin a shoot down o r acc iden t .


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need fo r a dd it io na l smal l arms and ammunition. Duringthe course o f 14 November, the re was a heavy exchangeo f cable correspondence on t h i s sub jec t , with the u l-t im ate p la n being t h a t C-124 's would pick up mate r i e lfrom 1 1 atl_D land would de l ive rth e req uired submachine guns , ammunition fo r th e sub-machine guns, and l a rge quan t i t i e s o f .30 and .50ca l i b e r ammunition to E glin A ir Force Base where itwould be picked up by two C-54's and flown down toRetalhuleu a i r base . 50a/ The C-54 f l i gh t s wereauthor ized to use USAF or I con t rac t a i r crews(OSTIARIES) o r any combinat ion o f these crews for thede l ive r i e s . Fl i gh t plans and landing approaches toRetalhuleu were given in g rea t de t a i l in th e cab let r a f f i c to insure t h a t the mater ie l - - and personnel- - ar r ived sa fe l y . Discuss ions .concerning emergencyevacuat ion p lans fo r the TRAV and MADD bases werei n i t i a t ed with DOD r ep resen ta t ives , and an emergencys igna l plan was a l so prepared.* 50b/

* Emergency plans were fo r a i r evacuat ion o f Pro jec tpersonnel from Retalhuleu to France F ie ld in the PanamaCanal Zone. Contingency planning in case o f l o s s o fthe a ir s tr ip a t Retalhuleu ca l l ed fo r su rface t r anspor t .from TRAV and MADD to Champerico on the west coas t andt r ans f e r to smal l boat s a t t h a t po in t fo r evacuat ion( footnote continued on fo l lowing page)


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with t h i s f lu r ry o f ac t iv i ty it i s i n t e r e s t i ngto note t ha t it was more than 24 hours before Head-quar te r s got around to giv ing i t s concurrence toth e ass ignment o f L t. Col . Ear l as Chief of Base a tJMADD and L t. Col . Egan as Acting Chief o f Base a tJMTRAV. The Chief o f the JMADD a i r opera t ions , Bi l lyCampbell, who was up a t Eglin Air Force Base whenthe r evo l t broke ou t was off -again-on-again in termso f h is re tu rn to Reta lhuleu . Before the c lose o f14 November, Campbel l ' s orders had been changed backto the or i g i na l date and t ime o f depar ture (15 Novem-ber) and the plan to have him f ly ammunition down toMADD in a B-26 had been scrubbed. Befo re commit ti ngany DPD a i r c r a f t Headquar te rs ca re fu l ly inqui red ifany "Guat a i r asse t s defec ted o r been taken over byrebels which [sic] can knock down JNCLEAR a i r c r a f t .Are t he i r [sic] any Guat areas to be avoided ." 51 /

About mid-day on 14 November 1960, Headquartersinformed Guatemala City t h a t t he re had been a t e lecon

by vesse l s o f the USN. Coinc identa l with poss ib leevacuat ion were discuss ions o f a l t e rna t i ve t r a in ings i t e s fo r the Cubans, inc luding bases in the Z. I . ,or t r ans f e r to l I t ra in ing f a c i l i -ty . SOc/


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between Ambassador Mucc io and S ec re ta ry o f Sta t eChr i s t i an Her te r concerning use o f the Cubans tohe lp que l l the r evo l t . On t h i s po in t AmbassadorMuccio wou ld cable l a t e r :

In j u s t i f i c a t i on Ydigoras at tempteduse l a s t week must r epo r t t h a t understandpr io r "Washington au tho r i za t ion" given touse t r a i nee s . I knew nothing t h e i r useun t i l ha l f hour p r i o r Secre t a ry ' s ca l l .... I sen t message through]urging Ydigoras conf ine t h e ~ m ~ t ~ O ~ " m ~ l ' I ' l ~ t ~ a ~ r ~ y ~bases and not o pera te o ut in to c iv i l i ana r ea s . ?_ ~ / *

By mid-af te rnoon, a j o i n t Sta te /CIA message, or ig ina tedby C. Tracy Barnes , ADDP/A, was sen t to l---------s t r es s ing t h a t if t he re were any Cuban t r a inees a t ornear Puer to Barr ios they should be reca l l ed to Reta lhuleu .This cable a l so suggested the p o ss ib il i ty th a t a l l theCuban t r a inees might be removed f rom Guatemala ( th i swould be an on-going ~ u b j e c t of . specu la t ion un t i l thec lose ou t o f the r evo l t ) . 53/

Even as the j o i n t message was g oin g fo rw ard ,Headquar ters was aware o f th e f ac t t h a t the Cuban

* The admission by Muccio t h a t he was unaware o f thef ac t t h a t members o f the Brigade -- to say nothing ofth e B-26 so r t i e s by Se ig r i s t and Beale - - were beinga i r l i f t ed to Puer to Barr ios speaks poor ly fo r theAmbassador 's awar eness o f th e s i tua t ion and ind ica test h a t the Agency was p lay ing it c lo se to the ves t v i s a -v i s Muccio.

T O


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t roops had not been deplaned a t Puerto Barr ios ; bu tthe Department o f S ta te wanted to pu t in to the o f f i c i a lrecord t h a t they were in o pp os it io n to using Cubant roops to support Ydigoras and t h a t Guatemala shouldreq uest th e US to a s s i s t in prevent ing the importa t iono f fore ign arms o r forces - - Cuban, t ha t i s - - in toGuatemala. Following its req ues t to the US, th e De-par tment wanted th e GOG to a sk fo rm ally fo r OAS ac t ionunder the Rio Treaty.

The j o i n t State/Agency message also asked t h a tthe f i e ld supply any informat ion t h a t could be d i s -covered o f Cuban involvement in th e Guatemalan revo l tand then it went on to walk the l i ne between th e poss i -b i l i t y o f Ydigoras ' s su rv iva l and Ydigoras ' s over throw.Les t th e record be unc lear , 1 lwasd i rec ted as fo l lows:

To a vo id amb iguity the fo l lowing ac t ionsare now author ized:A. Continued use o f C-46 ' s fo r t roopmovement and fo r o the r necessaryt r anspor t . Assume p i l o t s are

e i the r CAT o r Cubans.B. Provide GOG with ammo and otherma te r i e l if, and only if, sen io rresponsib le GOG o f f i c e r spec i f ica l lyreques t s such mate r i e l ; D in consu l t a t ion with Ambassador agrees t h a t


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need exis t s and t r ans f e r otherwiseproper .C. Provide GOG with B-26 a i r c r a f t if,and only i f , c r i t i c a l need ex i s t s ,use l i ke ly give subs t an t i a l advant age , and GOG can prov ide p i l o t s .

I n c on ne cti on with any dec i s ion suppor tYdigoras weigh poss ib i l i t y whether no tremote t ha t r ebe l s may no t be l e f t wing noranti-U S, as ac tive suppo rt [fo r Ydigoras]under such c ir cumsta nc es c ou ld be undes i r ab l e . 53a/*Before the af ternoon (14 November) was over , a

cab le from Headquarters went to a l l Lat in Americans ta ti on s a le rt in g everyone to the poss ib i l i t y o fCuban in te rven t ion in any o f th e L at in American coun-t r i e s . I t warned:

As e ve nts u nfo ld , keep in mind, wewant p ic tu re Castro " in te rven t ion" asr e su l t c landes t ine subvers ion , money

* As a l ready repor ted , "ambigui ty" was not avoided - Connie Se ig r i s t has noted t h a t he flew some 15 hoursin the course ,o f two days, 14-15 November. Accordingto t h i s message - - which was rece ived a t approximately1400 hours Guatemalan t ime on 14 November - - Se ig r i s tt echn ica l ly should have b een g ro un ded. As Se ig r i s trepor t ed , however, he was tak in g o rd ers from Col .Batres because no one had to ld him otherwise . Se ig r i s tcontinued to follow th e i n i t i a l orde rs t ha t he had beengiven- to suppor t Col . Bat res ' s r eques t s , and he stoppedf ly ing miss ions when G u a t e m a l ~ n o f f i c e r s to ld him th er evo l t had ended.


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payments, arms t r a f f i c , i l l e g a l CubanEmbassy pa r t i c i pa t i on , e t c . and no t g ivef a l se impress ion Cuban revolu t ion "ca tching on" in p op ula ri ty o the r WH coun t r i e s .Also use any pe r t i nen t news peg as occasion mention cont inued shipments and t r a i n ing in use Sovie t b loc arms inc ludinga r t i l l e r y by Cast ro mi l i t i a . 54 /By 16 November 1960, th e r evo l t fo r a l l prac t i c a l

purposes had come to an end. At t h a t t ime there werepockets o f r e s i s t ance repor ted in the area betweenPuerto Barr ios and Gualan, bu t no evidence had beenfo und which would suppor t charges o f Cuban involvement .Before the conclus ion o f th e f igh t ing , however, Pre s i -dent Ydigoras d id reques t - - and rece ived - - two o fth e JMADD B-26 's because th e Guatemalan Air ForceB-26 's had been sho t up to th e po in t where they werein no condi t ion to f ly add it io na l combat miss ions . Asa r e s u l t o f the unset t led s i t ua t i on in Guatemala, r e -cru i tment of PM ground t r a inees fo r JMTRAV was suspendedun t i l fu r the r no t i ce , the B -26 's were reca l l ed to th eJMADD a i r base , and, fo r th e moment, a l l Air NationalGuard (ANG) and mil i t a ry ass ignees to ~ f f i D D were con-f ined to the b ase .* During the course o f the r evo l t

* It was repor ted to Headquar te rs t h a t on th e mOLningo f 15 Nov 60, four armorers from MADD. had been br i e f l ydeta ined by an "o f f i ce r group" a t the Guatemala Citya i r f i e l d . The de ta inees probably were USAF mil i t a ryass ignees .

- TOP)FCRET


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in Guatemala, Headquar ters informed th e base in Flor i dato "discourage" Tony Varona from sending any FRDvolunteers in to th e C en tra l American a rea ; and Head-qua r t e r s a l so r e jec ted a r eques t from th e GOG to haveAgency l i e de tec to r exper t s pa r t i c i p a t e in i n t e r roga t -ing the captu red r eb el p ris on er s. As an a l t e rna t i v e ,D was to ld to provide guidance to the GOG to h i rea commercial f irm to pa r t i c i p a t e in th e in te r roga t iono f th e pr i sone rs .*

F. Minor Skirmishes: In t e r - and In tr

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