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A Griffon helicopter from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron carrying the 3 RCR Quick Reaction Force during an exercise near Velika Kladusa,Bosnia, June 2001.

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very personal experience, and no one person has a monopolyon the phenomenon of leadership; therefore, this article isoffered in the spirit and in the hope that the sharing of my expe-rience, and the planning and approach to leadership that Iapplied, may prove worthwhile to those fortunate to have asimilar command opportunity.

hat type of leadership is appropriate for anational commander on operations? This arti-cle examines the question from the perspectiveof one who has recently returned from opera-tions as a national commander.Over 33,000Canadians ave served n the Balkans n thepastdecadeand, sadly,somehavepaid the ultimate sacrifice.Many others have been njured physically and mentally bytheir experience. In some respectsCanadaand its militaryhavebecomeBosnia-weary, speciallywhenconsideredn thecontext of 11 September 001 and Operation Apollo" inAfghanistan such is the paceof our operations hata recent-ly returned Operation Palladium" rotation can becomecon-

temporary history so soon. Although our Operation"Palladium" commitmento SFOR n Bosniahasmoved o theedge of the radar screen, t remains a key componentofCanada's ole in NATO, the military being an extensionofdiplomacy.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEADERSHIP TOCOMMAND AND LE"ADERSHIP THEORYG ~ven he limita~ion of leng1?' ~e perspective of th~sarticleis one of applied leadership m a command appomtment.It is helpful to understand how the theoretical and analyticaldifferences between command and leadership relate to thepractical application of leadership as part of command, and tobriefly discuss leadership heory. '!

Retired Lieutenant-General .R. Crabbe has distilled,from many definitions, he natureof military command. Hedescribes ommand n the following terms:What follows is a commander's perspective,one honouredto serve with 1656 Canadian servicemen and women -Army,Navy and Air Force, Regular Force and Reserve -along withthe Canadian civilian members of the Contractor SupportProgramme (CSP) and the Canadian Forces Personnel SupportAgency (CFPSA) who executed Rotation 8 of Operation"Palladium" between April and October 2001. Command is a

To directanddo so with authority.To think and make sound udgmentsand decisions,often without all the facts.Colonel Chris Corrigan s the Director ofStrategicStudiesat the CanadianForces College.

29utumn 2002 .Canadian Military Journal

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others.4 It is a complex phenomenon that involves cognability and behavioural traits. Leadership has been examin the context of what it is -"a process whereby an ndividinfluences a group of individuals to achieve a common gohow it differs from power -"the capacity or potential to inence," further defined as "position power... the power a pederives from a particular office or rank in a formal organizasystem" or "personal power... the power a leader derives ffollowers," how it differs from coercion -"the use of forcaffect change... manipulating penalties and rewards... thrand punishment," and how it differs from management "thactivities of planning, organizing, staffing and controllinconcerned with creating order and stability."5 Executive leership combines inspirational leadership and its obligatiothe profession with strategic decision-making and its obltion to the organization or institution.6 Leadership has been described in the context of the relationship betweenversus process-based leadership. Trait-based leadershifounded on such traits as personality, appearanceand expential skill-sets, thereby suggesting that this style narrowwhat some call 'born leaders'. Process-'based eadershfounded on the interaction between the leader and followin the context of the environment, and suggests that leaship can be learned.7 Leadership has been further definethe theories of laissez-faire, transactional, and the most rent and dominant. theory, that of transformational leaship.8 "Evidence has accumulated that transform&tionalleership can move followers to exceed expected performanIt is seen as a particularly powerful source of effective leership in Army, Navy, and Force settings,"9

In war, o be responsible or taking lives and savinglives.In peaceand war, o establishmoral standards,nd odirect and enforce how military members elate toeachotherand o society.To think, decide,act, establishstandards, nd exertinfluence.To be able to bring military forces to bear on theenemyon behalf of the state.!Furthermore, he elaborates that commanders must befighters, leaders, tacticians, thinkers and disciplinarians, aswell as examples of fine moral character possessing he indis-pensable values of honesty, oyalty and ntegrity. Leadership sinherent in command.2 In a military construct, command andthe leadership skill-set can be described as a sub-setof what istermed 'best military judgment' -the intuitive ability to makedecisions based on years of training, experience and profes-sional and personal self-development, ncluding recognition ofpastp&ttems and circumstances that determined past decisionsand we~e.gained hroughout one's career.3 had the privilegedand rai~,~opportunity o apply leadership with the authority of

command. Many others, including staff officers, do not havethis opportunity.Leadership has been studied extensively through the useof concepts and models. It has been analysed in terms of a setof principles or characteristics of behaviour -the work ofsociologists, psychologists and practitioners -that have been

The plethora of leaderconcepts and theories could gone cause to believe that the ptical application of leadershcomplicated. Certain concepttheories of leadership are enviment specific, while stylesleadership are trait specific. Texamination explores the apption of leadership in an optional context. It could be that certain styles of leadeare appropriate when applieddifferent strata or groups personnel in hierarchTransactional leadership is baon the needs of the leader rathan that of the followers or tdevelopment. It involves extsic motivators, is directive pr~scriptive, and is approprwhen applied to followers atSoldiersof the 3rd Battalion,The Royal CanadianRegiment articipatingn a platoon ive-fire exercise ~?we~ evels .of an organiz~twhile servingwith SFOR n Bosnia-Herzegovina. TransformatIonal leadershIpan expansion of transactioleadership. Transformational leaders motivate others tomore than they originally intended and often more than thought possible. They set more challenging expectationstypically achieve higher performances."10 Transformatioleadership s based upon a process whereby an individ

engages others to create a connection. It involves intrinmotivators, individual consideration, and intellectual charisma stimulation. It is descriptive and more approp

applied to virtually every discipline. Some 65 classificationsystems have been derived over the past 55 years in the processof examining the definition and dynamics of leadership. Theseclassifications include concepts of leadership being part of agroup dynamic or process whereby the leader, as an agent ofchange, personifies the will of the group. Another classifica-tion views leadership as being based or centered on the per-sonality traits of the leader and his or her ability to influence

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Uz0-t4~WD0when applied to managers,supervisors and leaders. I BernardBass elaborates four components of transformational leader-ship:

likely to relate ntellectually o the officersand charismaticallyto the other anks.GETTING INTO THE RIGHT FRAME OFMIND -THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGEA s Chief of Staff Land Force Central Area (LFCA), theforce-generating Area for Rotation Two of Operation"Palladium," and later while visiting Kosovo as the AreaCommander for the LFCA-generated contingent to Operation"Kinetic One," I was not a stranger to the Balkan situation.That said, one can never fully prepare one's self intellectuallyfor the Balkans.14 "Anyone who claims o be an expert on theBalkans clearly has never ived there, and once they have, theywill realize that they will never understand he Balkans."IS

Leadership is charismatic, such that the followerseeks o identify with the leaders and emulate them.Leadership inspires the follower with challenge andpersuasion, providing meaning and understanding.Leadership is intellectually stimulating, expandingthe follower's use of his or her abilities.Finally, leadership is individually considerate, pro-viding the follower with support, mentoring andcoaching. 12The Charismatic Leadership Component s characterizedby a leader who is unhesitant o take risks, has high moral andethical standards, and consistently does the 'right thing'.Leaders who are optimistic and enthusiastic, who communicatea shared vision and expectations, and who inspire team spiritcharacterize the.. nspirational Motivation Component. Theseleaders also d~m-onstrate the Intellectual StimulationComponent sino~ they are able to articulate theirvision, are receptive to change and supportive of newideas and approaches, and can delegate tasks whileinstilling trust in their subordinates. The fourth com-ponent is Individualized Consideration, whereby atransformational leader genuinely demonstratesinterest in each member of the organization, and in sodoing validates the importance and self-worth ofeach member. This leadership technique requiresgood listening skills and is typified by 'managementby walking around'.13 In practical terms, these fourcomponents are not in any order of priority or ofequal weighting, but vary according to one's person-ality. One can be an effective transformational leaderwithout being overly charismatic. Arguably, GeneralGeorge Patton was more 'charismatic' and 'inspira-tional' than his boss, he less 'charismatic' yet 'intel- I

lectual' General Omar Bradley. I

In advance of this command opportunity, I revisited my'kit bag' of command experiences and personal leadership'first principles'. The dearth of historical study and analysis ofthe ten years of Canadian experience in the Balkans made thismore difficult. Yes, unit and contingent/task force war diaries

A 3 RCR patrol in Bosnia, summer 2001

It can be said that the transactional leadershipstyle applied at lower levels shifts more to transfor-mationalleadership as one occupies higher positionsof authority, rank and responsibility. For those in theearly stage of their military career, such as juniornon-commissioned officers and junior officers, whodo not yet share or who have not yet internalized thesame order or values of the institution and are stillundergoing initial military socialization -learningthe 'do's and don'ts' -issues can appear 'black andwhite'. As a result, transactional leadership s moreappropriate. For those with greater length of serviceand increased authority, responsibility and rank, suchas senior non-commissioned officers and field offi-cers who have internalized the shared order and val- .ues of the institution, issues become ess 'black and white' andincreasingly 'grey'. In this particular case, transformationalleadership is more appropriate. Put another way, the transac-tional leadership appropriate at the platoon, company, unit'tactical' level gives way to transformational leadership whendealing with senior officers at the formation level or seniorstaff and DND civilians at the 'operational' and 'strategic'level. The four components of transformational leadership canbe applied to varying degrees to all strata of an hierarchicalorganization. In a military application, a commander is more

and the latest editions of unit histories 'are replete with the'Keeganesque, Face of Battle' 16anecdotal feel for what tookplace at the tactical level, but what of the higher Canadiannational-strategic and UN/NATO military-strategic environ-ment and decision-making hat provides the context forCanada's commitment to the Balkans?

With respect o what ype of leaderand commander newants o be, General ret'd) Fred Franksprovides he follow-ing answer:3utumn 2002 .Canadian Military Journal

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Commanders have different command styles. If youspend any significant amount of time around Armypeople, you're going to encounter no little commen-tary about these differences. There is no right "'fay tocommand, no template out of which commanders arestamped. Some commanders -to point out the morevisible differences -are loud, physically dominantextroverts; others are quieter, more soft-spoken, moregiven to indirection. Such opposites can be equallyeffective as commanders.17

mulated my guidance and intent to commanding offearly, and repeatedly ommunicatedt. I visited my sdinate chain of commandduring pre-deployment raiComing from LFCA and being a former Chief of StafCommander, knew many of them well. On 16 Feb2001, in the cavernous ield house in Petawawa,CoMark Skidmore, Commanderof 2 CanadianMecharigade Group, in a short and dignified ceremony,ducedme to the 1300soldiers hat he was o loan me fomonths. This very early leadershipappearance as myopportunity to communicate with what was to be a portion of my future team.20hat is one's commandpersona or leadership gameface'? None of this is mysterious;all who have experiencedthis pre-command ynamicwill be able o relate. Commandssuchan intenselypersonal xperience. For me it was a con-scious revisiting of prior command experiences, hile alsoreflecting upon the many role models,good and bad, that Ihave experienced. This experiential or pattern recognition

THE PREPARATION CHALLENGEF or Rotation 8, the units were identified almost a yeadvance, with teams forming and building cohesionmonths prior to deployment. I had to apply a 'light toucthe troops were not yet umy command, would come under my communtil deployed, and remathe training responsibilithe force generating LFCA. I, with my headters staff principals, coned the strategic, reconsance in October 2000,the units conducted theitical reconnaissance November. Upon my rfrom the strategic reconsance, I shared, in a mamore transactional transformational, my ovations and guidance witthe leadership in the bgroup, down to comlevel, prior to their tacreconnaissance. Each tion has its own styleapproach. I conditionedfuture command team to duct their own estimate

f 'A ' S d Th R I C d ' D . h . d , . 11 " B .not simply conduct a reliefT oopers rom qua ron, e oya ana Ian ragoons sig ling a ra ar a a survel ante Sl e, osnla, .h

June 2001. place wI h t e outgO ng, teams. I impressed them that this was a good intellectual exercise and thatowed it to themselves and their soldiers.

allows one to better detennine the best leadership course ofaction. Negative role models are of value as they teach you tol-erance, as well as how not to be. ISTraining for the battle group commenced n Oc2000, for the National Support Element or Direct Su

CombatService SupportBat~alionearlier in mid-Septe2000, and for the National Command Element, my Force Headquarter~, 5 January2001. One can easilthat 'training creep' can lead to a six-month deploybeing preceded by six months of training. As 'traicreep' has a severe mpact on quality of life, all in the cof commandmust keepa grip on their subordinateso enthat overtraining does not take place. It is importantraining be done o meet he most ikely scenario, atherthe worst-case cenario.

As a leader, you must be true to yourself and 'comfortablein your own skin'. However, there is one luxury a command-er is not permitted...that of being shy or aloof. John Masterswrites in The Road Past Mandalay, "Command doth makeactors of us all."19 All members of a military team have anexpectation of being well led. To be a good leader, a personmust relate to soldiers (some would say, love soldiers'), lovesoldiering, demonstrate passion for the mission and, throughwords and deeds, clearly demonstrate that one cares for one'ssoldiers and their well-being.

Leadership s about communicating, defining reality,providing hope and inspiration, and communicating whoyou are and what your expectationsare. For my part, I for- The practiceof fonning ad hoc organizationsrom viduals rather han assigning asks o formedcohesive n32 Canadian Military Journal. Autumn 20

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Although the Task Force Headquarters was fonnedfrom personnel assigned from across the Canadianthe long-lead time and preliminary training resulted inrequisite team cohesion. This situation, combined with abenign mission, reduced the operationalwith ad hoc organizations. Future task forceonned at short notice for more robust missions,afforded the same pre-deployment cohesion-fonn-It is ill-advised for strategic reconnaissancepar-headquarters staffs to meet for the first time in Trentonprior to deployment, or, even worse, on the tarmac onin the theatre.

impressedupon me that to be a transformationaleaderonemustbe willing to be transformed s well.COMMANDING ANDTHE APPLICATION EADING

There s another aspect hat is worthy of mention. Forofficers fortunate enough o get an operationalappointment, his is the one time that theyhave the resources o conduct such ntense and high-training. As a result, somehave a propensity o pushing to as high a level as possible. This is fine forofficer~ serving only a two- to three-year our ofduty and ttlis being their first or secondopera-tour. However, t is not a morale enhancer or the sol-a unit that have always served at unit duty and arer third, fourth or fifth tour. A transformationalrealizes hat not all in his command ossess he sameof experience or motivation, and that he must controlmoderate he environmentappropriately. In this respect,creep' needs o be disciplined to ensure he rightpre-deployment raining and the mission's

The front end of the build-up training is in war fighting upteam level live-fire manoeuvre in a battlecontext. After this necessary war-fighting trainingthe important mission-specific training that gets every-right frame of mind for peace support operations.training is very well supported by the Peace SupportCentre in ~ngston, and includes law of armed con-rules of engagement, media training, first aid, foreignmine awareness and combat stress condi-All of this training is concluded with a brigade-con-field training exercise that serves o confirm the opera-is followed by operational dec-each commander up to the next higher levelcommand. Embarkation leave then takes place,by deployment.

D uring the mission, I made a point of being away fromthe headquarters three to four days every week to visitthe Canadians n the five campsand in eachof the multina-tional divisional (MND) headquarters in Banja Luka(MND(South-West)),Mostar (MND(South-East))and Tuzla(MND(North)), as well as at Headquarters SFOR inSarajevo. I also called on our ambassadorsn Zagreb andSarajevo. I had at my disposala Griffon helicopter, whichreduceda one-wayground rip from the northern o southernend of the areaof responsibility rom ten hours o three. Mystaff had my utmost rust, and they did not needme presentall the time. Before each rip I would be briefed on he ssuesand,evenmore importantly,on whom was o meet. I madea point of knowing the name of every officer and seniorNCO, and recognizing he contribution that he or she wasmaking. I impressedupon my chain of command hat thesevisits were not intrusive or commandperformances, ut inthe spirit of genuine nterest of who they were, what theywere doing, and how I as Task Force Commandercouldmake their lives better. On each visit I would spenda nightwith the troops o better get a feel for the atmosphere. tookwith me my human ntelligence eam o quietly measure hesituation; my RSM,of course, o get the

Ieal unfettered nfor-mation from the resi-dent senior NCOs,my staff officer to geta feel for the views ofthe junior officers,and my MasterCorporal driver whounobtrusively captured he mood of the NCOs. For eachvisit I also mpressedupon he cas that whoeverwas avail-able to host me was sufficient, no matter what the rank. Italmostgoes without saying that all leadersmust know theirtroops,but a transformationalleadel; n addition to knowinghis troops well, must make a connection with them anddemonstratehat he genuinely aresand has their best nter-estsat heart.

I assumed ommand rom my long-time friend ColonelGrant in Velika Kladusa on 3 April 2001, and handedColonel Denis Brazeauon 3 October2002. At theof commandboards ofand upon redeployment re the missionreports, briefs and debriefs to the CDS andmy End Tour Brief to the Joint (J) Staff,post-Daily Executive Meetingon 14 November2002.

Answerable to the DCDS for each of the 1656 positions, Ihad to substantiate he real mission need and value of the con-tribution, especially at each of the divisional and SFOR head-quarters. NATO has an insatiable appetite for Canadian staffofficers because of our 'can do' attitude, and NATO will con-tinue to ask for more. This is very important, because or everyperson out on a tour, at home four to five others and their fam-ilies are affected.On two occasions, in addition to my routine weekly vis-its to each camp, I insisted that all personnel, civilian and mil-itary, be available for a Commander's Hour. These occurredat the end of the first month in the theatre and at the tour'shalfway mark -the time when complacency and boredomoccur and, as a result, accidents become more likely. A month

into the tour was right, as all had settled into their jobs andtheir environment, and the chain of command had had ampletime to impose their influence. I spoke to everyone about my

Worthy of note is the pre-deployment office calls allhave with each of the CDS, DCDS andenvironmental Chief -in my case, he ChiefEach stressed heir full support and uncon-confidence in the Task Force's ability to meet the mis-did much for my morale, and confirmed to me that evenneed morale boosts from time to time. It also

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role, their role, my expectations of them and what they couldexpect from me. It was especially important to foster a unityof team effort out of a disparate group of Canadians -mili-tary from formed units, individual augmentees, both RegularForce and Reserve, civilians from the CSP and the CFPSA-all having varying degrees of expectations and expe'rience.Since they were subjectto the same standardsof discipline and quali-ty of life, they all had tobe treated equally. Thediffering standards,military cultures andnorms of other contin-gents was a challenge,as was maintainingCanadian standards nthe large multinationalcamps, such as for the fifty Canadians at SFOR Headquartersin Sarajevo and the eighty at MND(SW) Headquarters inBanj'll I;,.uka. I therefore spoke to all personnel, military andcivilial;l alike. I spoke to such ssues as negligent discharges,

fraternization, drugs and alcohol, security of weapons andammunition, speeding and vehicle safety, applying the'buddy system' especially on R & R, and TUmourmanage-ment. I appealed to them not to 'let themselves down', and inso doing, let down their section, platoon, company, unit, theTask Force, and Canada. Guilt can be a compelling tool!True transformational leadership is contagious -when youdemonstrate a genuine caring for them, they will place ahigher value on themselves and care for each othel: At theend of each session demanded questions. The mental gym-nastics were great fun and the highlight of each visit.

operations as primacy,mission accomplishment as cnumberone. Following closely was furthering the evoand support o the missionof the CSP and the CFPSaddition o getting o know as manypeople n uniform asible, I enjoyed nteracting with the highly committededicatedCanadian ivilians belonging o 28 CFPSAanCSP. Both of these nitiatives were commencedn Rota-CFPSA to improve the morale and welfare supporTask Force,and CSP o have Canadian ivilian supposonnel rom ATCO-Frontec ssumehe basicstatic camport functions rom those n uniform. CSPallowed allin uniform o focus on he missionoutside he camps, nprovided some relief to the-' o-called endangered ptrades, such as cooks, firemen and constructionengwho, due to their small numbers,high demandand resrepeated eployments, avebeenwithering recently. It csaid with confidence hat Rotation8 advancedhese woectsconsiderably.

An unspoken objective of mine, but one that I discnearer o tour end, was my wish to bring everyone homeOf course, long before we arrived in Bosnia, I spoke issues of training and operational safety. Death is alwaelement of what we do. I did not want to create unduly aaverse environment for the chain of command, but merhighlight the exercjse of common senseso as not to put ain harm's way needlessly. Few things done in Bo~nia are the life of a Canadian. .The limitation of length precludes an examination odealings with the other national commanders -the brigacommanding the British and Netherlands contingentscolonel commanding the Czech Republic contingent, suNATO commanders and the national chain of commHowever, a few words on my approach to commanding

cers are warranted.Key to the processof communicatings the means, nd

used every meanspossible. Arguably, the most importantoperationsorder annex n any domestic operationor peacesupport operation s the Communicationsor Public Affairs(PAFF) annex. In peace supportoperations t equals, f notexceeds,he mportance f the Fire Support nnex. Therefore,I paid close attention o my media plan, and in concertwithmy very capablePAFFOplanned our media raining and thescope of media visits from Canada. After the closure ofEritrea in June,we were the object of the media's affectionand had two very successful nd well-coveredmedia visits.We used every visit as a means o communicate,whether hevisitors were Honorary Colonels, VIPs, Assistant DeputyMinisters or our own Minister. Visitors did not geta free ride:we gave hema messageo take home. So mportantwas hiscommunication that I would personally brief visitors onarrival, then et them oose nto the AOR with the units. Priorto departure would personallyout-brief them o ensure hattheywere aking home he correct nformationand acts ratherthan perceptionor romours -romours that could have thepotential to causeus to 'chase our tails' later responding oMinisterial Inquiries. Transfonnationalleadersmanifest hepersona or the conscienceof the group and share with thegroupwhat he outsideworld is thinking about hem. As such,I promotedamongsthe visitors he expectationhat he roopswould appreciatevery much an expression f the value oftheir six monthsof dedication o the missionand he sacrificesmadeby their families.

A transformational leader cultivates opportunitiegrowth and developmentor his troops and ensuresgthrough mentoring or tutoring. With respect o my immate subordinates, was very conscious hat nonehad exenceas a commandingofficer on an operation,even hmany had been sub-unit commandersat the companytoon or troop level; and most had been on operatiothose positions previously in the Balkans. Consequeach had to be mentored appropriately. For a six-mtour, one must get to know one's commanding offquickly and determine which of them thrive under mior descriptive cC1mmand,nd which of them are moreductive with prescriptive or directive command. I balaoversightwith their freedomof action. As a strong bethat a healthy commandclimate needs o be pushed dfrom above, and that soldiering should be fun, I wathem o enjoy their operationalcommandas much as pble. That said, ITdid conduct morale checks on themalthough one is never lonely in command,one is aloncommand. Their only respite is in the presenceof commanders, way from their charges. No cracking owhip was needed with my command team; they required a bit of reining-in. I had to monitor and prthem from themselvesby ordering them to slow downset a gentler pace. An abundanceof keennessbeapparentabout he midway point of the tour before anthem had had their family reunion trip home. Upon rWell in advance f deployment determinedwhat want-ed to achieve n the six monthsof commandon operations.As

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and out of appreciation for their hard work my staff and Ilooked upon ourselves as extensions of the J Staff. Also, it wasimportant for all of us to understand the differing staff battlerhythms betweenNDHQ and Bosnia, and the six-hour time dif-ference. In Bosnia we worked around the clock, seven days aweek, and we had one job -the relentless pursuit of the mis-sion. The J Staff had to march to the morning briefing timingsof the Daily Intelligence and Operations Briefing, as well asthe Daily Executive Meeting. They had other missions to man-age and operations to mount, so we were not the only missionon their 'radar screen'. The dispatch of the Task Force Harvestsquadron group to Macedonia for the month of SeptemberandOperation "Apollo" are but two examples. ..

with mission successand the tour end in sight, wereof themselves and their subordinates. Ithis was not a big issue. It is mentionedbecause,fun and a healthycommandclimate which need o comethe top down, so does command rhythm or tempo.need to set an example of self-. Responsibilityand six monthsofbut operationsbreedsa culture of work that is verycould not have asked or a finer command eamsoldiers and gentlemenall.

Having discussed he command relationship with sub-a brief examination of the relationship betweenters nd the staffs at various evels s appropri-Staff procedures nd principles are very simple; it is thethat is challenging. A transformational leaderhe relationship of trust to engenderingamongan environment of self-realization that causeso perform and exceed heiras welL ~b care

cohesion. Issuesmustthe big issues savedhe commander.

An essential element of the superior-subordinate relation-ship is establishing 'command rhythm' -that common under-standing between both with respect o when, how and how fre-quently they interact. From a leadership theory perspective, it

is about finding a comfortable balance or point on the contin-uum that has directive, prescriptive, transactional leadershipat one end of the continuum and descriptive transformationalleadership at the opposite end of the continuum, Never havingworked with the Chief of Staff J3 befor~, and having said thata six-month tour does not afford the luxury of time to get toknow each other, he and I still established a good relationshipvery early in the tour,

Gone are the days of the mil-Imessage system when thereate time for considera-te responses.so many means of

instantly, espe-e-mail where peopleiate response, Iabout disci-the flow of informationfrom NDHQ. Early on,pervasive 'tech net' started tothe 'command net', and we

by well-meaning butG b I ' t h 2d R ' R I C d. A ' f' ..I h ld k .uns e onglng 0 ten eglment, oya ana Ian Horse rtiliery Iring on a range near Glamoc, Bosn!a-

y t ey wou s Ip our Herzegovina, May 2001.and go directly tothus the headquarters staff could not provide 'topfor the units. This was never a bottom-up issue norssue with the J Staff. For example, one NDHQ civilianwould include, as a default setting, the DCDS noas an info addresseeon e-mails. This was a classicf elevating staffing to the inappropriate level. Wethen have to keep the DCDS informed on this mun-issue with which he did not need to beThe point here is that issues must be staffed at thelevel and elevated sparingly. The same appliesuse of your 'silver bullet'. This was never an issue

We sought to mentor, protecr and provide leadership tothe subordinate staffs. We also worked to honbur the princi-ples of battle procedure, always appreciating two-down andgiving simple and clear direction one-down. Of course, onlythey can udge the degree to which we were successful. Ourdealings with all levels of international staffs were conductedknowing that we, as the national headquarters, representedCanada: we were friendly, apprQachableand diplomatic. Weunderstood the cultural differences between the contributingnations, and the mindsets and differing standards of theirarnled forces.

The J Staff, without exception, were outstanding. Theycontinuity between each Rotation, as all haveat least two or three Operation "Palladium" rotationsn given by the CDS and DCDS. This is a depth ofthat one could not possibly grasp in the short six-attached to the DCDS branch for operations,

35

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THE STRATEGIC TASK FORCE fellow Task Force Commander. I contacted him every for the duration of his mission." C onflict is waged on three levels -the strategic, opera-tional and tactical. Each level is defined .according tothe nature and purpose of the military operations being con-ducted and the outcomes they are intended to achieve. They

are not dependenton thesize of the forcesengaged or the level ofcommand involved.Although the levels ofconflict form a hierar-chy, there are no sharpboundaries, and theyoften overlap."22 Theunits of the task forcewithin the CanadianAOR, and divisionalmissions within the divisional AOR such as the OffensiveSuPI?ortGroup, operated at the tactical level. Outside the divi-sionlM bukwithin the SFOR AOR, it could be argued that our"units'f:1;qnductedasks at the operational or theatre level. Thedispatch of the Task Force Harvest squadron group toMacedonia for the month of September was an example of atactical level sub-unit crossing the operational level to act andhave an influence at the national-strategic level and, in sodoing, garner Canada international recognition.23 Reinforcingthis was the level at which I interfaced with the national chainof command, answerable to the CDS: I was interfacing at themilitary-strategic level.

CONCLUSIONH aving previously described my command experiendiscussed he various theories and concepts of leada retrospective analysis reveals that in most cases I transformational leadership -not only because t waspriate to the mission, but also because t best suited my

Canada continues in its long tradition of peace operations in the Balkans -through Operation "PalladThis worthy commitment has influenced past and Canadian servicemen and women, and will likely inffuture members of the Arnied Forces. As the geopoliticmilitary situation changes, so too must the mission evmeet the requirement. Rotation 8 carried on this trwhile primarily acting at the tactical and operational However, it also had the unique opportunity to impactstrategic level. In the preceding, I have attempted to demy style of leadership as applied on an operation in relaleadership heory and, given the right level of prresourced raining and the participation of talented, comprofessional people, describe the ease n which operatiobe conducted suct;.essfully.

Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina continues to make tary difference to the maintenance of a safe and securronment in order to permit nation building. The CaArmed Forces continues to make a difference in Bosnidifference of which all Canadians can be justifiably prouarlier I mentioned the morale boost I received from theconfidence expressed to me by the CDS, DCDS, and CLS.Remembering this, I made a point of contacting our Task Forc~Commander in Macedonia and offering him my support as a

22. Canada:' Anny -B-GL-300-000/FP-OOODepartment f National Defence,1998), p. 7823. Krulak, GeneralCharles. The fonner Comof the U.S. Marine Corps has described he prefuture reality of warfare in his concept of tStrategicCorporal: Leadershipn the Three Blowhere In onemoment n lime, our servicemembe feeding and clothing displaced efugees prohumanitarian ssistance. n the next moment, be holding two warring tribes apart conductingkeeping perations. Finally, they will be fightinly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the samwi\hin threecity blocks. It will bewhat we call thBlock War." In this article he posits hat the sufuture humanitarian assistance, eacekeepingtional warfighting missionswill depend on the dmadeby Stna11nit leaders,and by actions akelowest level. Most importantly, these missirequire them to confidently make well-reasonsionsunder extremestress decisions that will lsubject o the..harsh crutiny of both the mediacourt of public opinion. In many cases, he inMarine will be the most conspicuous symAmerican foreign policy and will potentially innot only the immediate actical situation,but thetional and strategic evels aswell. His actions, hwill directly impact he outcomeof the argeropand he will become... the StrategicCorporal."Corps Gazette, ol. 83, No.1, January1999,pp.

1. Crabbe,LGen R.R, "The Natureof Command,"TheHuman n Command,McCann,Carol and Pigeau,Ross,eds" (New York: KIuwer AcademiciPlenumPublishers,2000),p. 11.2, Ibid,pp.11-12.3. The authorhasdiscussedhis concept n a numberofoccasionswith its proponent,General ret'd) Fred Franks,US Army, former CommanderRADOC andCommandervn (US) Corps n Operation DesertStorm,"4. Northouse, Peter G, "Introduction," LeadershipTheory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: SagePublications,1997),p. 25. Ibid, pp.1-12.6. Okros, Captain(N)A., NSSC 4 Lecture -ExecutiveLeadership,April 4, 2002.7. Northouse, bid, pp. 4-5.8. Ibid, pp. 130-147.9. Bass, Bernard M" Transformational Leadership:Industry, Military, and Educational Impact (Mahwah,NewJersey:ErlbaumAssociates, ublishers,1998), . 2.10. Ibid, p. 4.11. Ibid, pp. 130-140.12. Ibid, p. 5.13. Ibid, pp. 5-6.14. Among the many books available, read FitzroyMaclean, EasternApproaches London: JonathanCape,1947), Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York:Random House Inc" 1999), and Michael Ignatieff'sBlood andBelonging Journeys nto theNewNationalism(Toronto: Penguin Books, 1993) and The WarriorsHonour; Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience New

York: Metropolitan Books, 1997).15. Ambassador amHanson,Canadian mbassadoroBosnia-Herzegovina, April 2001. Throughoutmy touras commander, was fortunate o be 'coached'by bothAmbassadorHanson and our Ambassador o Croatia,AmbassadorDennisSnider.16. Keegan John, The Face of Battle (New York:Viking, 1976). In this popular primer and classic, heauthorwrites rom the soldier'sperspective t the acticallevel of the sights,soundsand smell of thebattlefield.17. Clancy,Tom, with General ret'd) Fred Franks, ntothe Stonn: A Study in Command (New York: G.1'.Putnam'sSons,1997),p. 47.18. Most of the principlesof leadership learned uringmy first regimental our. It was put succinctly o me bymy first troop WarrantOfficer: "All we need rom you sthat you don't embarrass s, that you know the echnicalaspectsof your job, that you be fair, firm, consistent,friendly, and, n the inal analysis,show hat youcareand,haveour best nterests t heart." WO HerbBoehmer,1stTroop,A Squadron, th CanadianHussars.19. Wintle, Justin (ed), The Dictionary of WarQuotations (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989),p.128.20. Make sure hat the public address ystemworks inorder or all to hear your bon mots'!21. The Daily ExecutiveMeeting ncludesall groupprin-cipals: the Deputy Minister, the CDS, the Chief of theMaritime Staff CMS), he Chief of the Land Staff CLS)and he Chief of the Air Staff CAS), or !heir representa-tives,normally heir AssistantsACMS, ACLS,ACAS.

36 Canadian Military Journal. Autumn 2