Bourdieu and Language

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Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language

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Pierre Bourdieu and the

Practices of Language

William F.Hanks

Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley,California 94720-3710; email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2005. 34:67-83

First published online as a

Review inAdvance on

May 23, 2005

The Annual Review of

Anthropology is online at

anthro.annualreviews.org

doi: 10.1146/

annurev.anthro.3 3.070203.143907

Copyright 2005 by

Annual Reviews. All rightsreserved

0084-6570/05/1021

0067$20.00

Key Words

habitus, field, symbolic power, discourse, linguistics

Abstract

This paper synthesizes research onlinguistic practice and critically

examines the legacy of Pierre Bourdieu from the perspective of lin

guistic anthropology.Bourdieu wrote

widely about languageand lin

guistics, but hismost far reaching engagement with the topic is inhis

use of linguistic reasoningto elaborate broader sociological concepts

including habitus, field, standardization, legitimacy, censorship, and

symbolic power. The paper examines and relates habitus and field in

detail, tracing the former to the work of Erwin Panofsky and the lat

ter to structuralist discourse semantics. The principles of relative au

tonomy, boundedness, homology, and embedding apply to fields and

their linkageto habitus. Authority, censorship, and euphemism

are

traced to the field, and symbolic power is related tomisrecognition.

And last, this chapter relates recent work inlinguistic anthropology

topractice and indicates lines for future research.

67



Contents

READING BOURDIEU. 68

HABITUS . 69

FIELD. 72

LANGUAGE

STANDARDIZATIONNDCHANGE . 75

LANGUAGE,LEGITIMATEAND

AUTHORITATIVE. 76

CENSORSHIPAND

EUPHEMISM. 76

SYMBOLIC POWER. 77

CONCLUSION. 78

READING BOURDIEU

The first challenge for alinguistic

anthro

pologist reading Bourdieu is Bourdieu's own

language.It is terse in papers like "The

Berber House" (1973), dense and reflexive

in the Outline (1977) and The Field of Cul

tural Production (1993), and willfully obscure

inReproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977).

He argues against theoretical programs and

their terminologies but advances his own pro

gram and terminology. His vocabulary de

rives from fields as diverse as economics, art

history, literature, linguistics, philosophyof

language, statistics, and social theory (partic

ularly structuralist and Marxist), along with

the layers of specific literature bearing on

North Africa, French society, and history.

Yet he rejects critical presuppositions that at

tach to the languagein its own field (e.g.,

competition, monopoly, supply, demand, cap

ital) (1985, p. 19). Throughout the writ

ings he useslinguistic-semiotic terms, such

as arbitrariness, generativity, invariance, and

structure, but he dismisses much of the lin

guistics and semiotics from which theyare

drawn. He was also embedded in several de

bates over such basic topicsas reason, inten

tionality, and political thoughtand was him

self politically engaged. His linguistic wagerwas that he could absorb selected terms and

concepts from other fields, while excluding

much of the intellectual baggage they usually

carry. The result is that readers unaware or un

sympathetic to his wager will find Bourdieu's

prose paradoxical, inconsistent, or opaque. It

also opens him towithering

criticism such as

Hasan

(1999),

who attacks his claims about

language.

To understand Bourdieu's language,we

must situate it in the conceptualuniverse of

practice theory, including the empirical anal

yses through which the theory was developedand to which it is adapted (Goodman 2003).

The attemptwas to

join theoryand analysis

in empirically grounded "scientific" sociology

(Bourdieu 1985, p. 11;Bourdieu &Wacquant

1992, pp. 224-47) on the basis of "the re

lational mode of thinking" (Bourdieu 1977).This iswell illustrated in the ethnographic

treatment of honor, kinship, agricultural prac

tice, domestic space, the body, the calendar

(Bourdieu 1977), the use of statistics (1977,

1979), survey data on audiences and sales

(1993, pp. 85, 88, 98), and historical back

groundto

generalizationsabout literature and

art innineteenth-century France (1993, part

II).The language of practice is focused not on

finished objects, but on processes of construc

tion, networks of interarticulation, and vari

eties ofreflexivity.

This is true whether the

object is symbolic structure (Bourdieu 1973),

political action (1991b), Flaubert (Bourdieu

1993), the French academy (1988), or the

judgment of taste (1979). There is little pointin proposing fixed definitions of his basic

terms because they get their sense from the

relational work they do inanalysis.

A student oflanguage

can read Bourdieu

in at least two ways. The first way is to focus

on what Bourdieu says about language and

linguistics,on

topics such asperformativity

and description, censorship, and "legitimate

language" (1991b). Similarly,we could con

front him on his readingsof Saussure, Chom

sky, Austin, Benveniste, Labov, and other

language theorists (Hasan 1999). The result

would be to focus on what Bourdieu claimed

aboutlanguage

and linguistics, usuallyin the

68 Hanks



course of a polemic. Important though it

is, the problem with this way of reading is

that it reveals more about Bourdieu than

about language.A more

productive approach

iswhat can be called asecond-degree reading:

Bracket what Bourdieu claims aboutlanguage

directly,and focus instead on what he

saysabout other aspects of social life.The fact is

that his treatment of a range of social phenom

ena apart fromlanguage

bears the trace of lin

guistic reasoning, sometimes filtered throughstructuralism and sometimes not. His intellec

tual debt to linguistics and semiotics as away

of thinking is greatest perhaps when it goes

unexplored,for instance in the

symbolicanal

ysis of the Berber house (1973), the development of the field concept (1985, 1991a, 1993),

the principle of autonomy applying to fields,the arbitrariness of classification, and the gen

erative capacity of habitus and the competence

of those who have it. Moreover, when talk

ing about language, Bourdieu seldom if ever

approaches the level of empirical specificityneeded to assess his claims, whereas on other

topics he does. To borrow his own terms, the

first degree of reading defines language as the

objector

opus operatum about which claims are

made, whereas the second degree of reading

treatslinguistic reasoning

as amodus operandi,

partly independent of what he is talking about.

Although both areimportant,

we are con

cerned here about the latter.

HABITUS

One of the widely cited concepts developed

by Bourdieu was his idea of the habitus. At

base, habitus concernsreproduction insofar

as what it

explains

are the

regularities

imma

nent inpractice.

Itexplains regularity by ref

erence to the social embeddingof the actor,

the fact that actors are socially formed with

relatively stable orientations and ways of act

ing. The stability of the habitus is not ex

pressed in rules, which Bourdieu rejects, but

in habits, dispositionsto act in certain ways,

and schemes of perception that order individ

ual perspectives along socially defined lines.

Through the habitus, society is impressed on

the individual, not only inmental habits, but

even more incorporeal

ones.Citing Mauss

(1973, p. 117), social embedding is realized in

ways of moving, gesturing, gazing, and orient

ing in lived space (Csordas 1994,Enfield 2005,

C. Goodwin2000,

Hanks1990, Haviland

2000, Kendon 1997). For language, the habi

tus bears on the social definition of the

speaker, mentally and physically,on rou

tine ways ofspeaking,

ongesture and em

bodied communicative actions, and on the

perspectives inculcated through ordinary ref

erential practice in a given language (Ochs

1996).

We can distinguish three lines of thought

joined in the concept of habitus. The first

is the Aristotelian idea of the hexis, whichBourdieu treats as the individual dispositionthat joins desire (intention) with judgment

(evaluation). This ideawill become themodus

operandiof practical action, the guiding frame

of reference that aligns intention with judgments of good and bad, appropriate and in

appropriate. Speakershave hexis insofar as

theyenact

through speech expressive inten

tions and the metalinguistic evaluations that

guideboth themselves and their understand

ing of others. The second strand in habitus

is the phenomenological ideas of habitual

ity and "corporeal schema" (Bourdieu 1985,

p. 14;Merleau-Ponty 1962).The critical shift

here isfrom disposition to embodiment. The

corporeal schema ofMerleau-Ponty (1962) is

neither arepresentation of the body,

nor a

sheerly physical understanding of it.Rather, it

is the prise de conscience, the momentary grasp

that the actor has of being a body. This in

cludes, grasped jointly,both the actual

posturaldisposition of the body and the backgroundhorizon of other postural arrangements that

arepossible but not actual. At this

point,

Bourdieu, like thephenomenologists,

is con

cerned with the familiarity and immediacy of

corporeal experience, both ofwhich are inher

ited by the habitus. For language, the ques

tion is how speakers grasp their ownengage

ment in communicative practice, both verbal

www.annualreviews.org Pierre Bourdieu and thePractices ofLanguage 69



andgestural.

On this point there is overlap be

tween habitus andlanguage ideology

as stud

ied in linguistic anthropology. The third line

of habitus is more concrete and detailed. It

is the approach developed by the art histo

rian ErwinPanofsky.

Ingeneral, Panofsky

adapted the scholastic concept of habitus

to cultural productionin medieval France.

Closer to mentalism than tophenomenology,

Panofsky defined habitus in terms of "habits of

mind" that laybehind Gothic architecture and

scholastic philosophy, arguing in effect that

cultural production is profoundly shaped bythe ways of the thinking of its time. Let us

look moreclosely

at his thesis to better un

derstand the habitus of linguistic practice.

Panofsky (1976 [1951]) developed a con

cept of habitus that is the immediatemen

tal counterpart of Bourdieu's use of the

term. Bourdieu translated Panofsky's book

into French in 1967, and wrote apostface

to

the French edition, in which he comments

on the importance of the art historian's no

tion of habitus (Bourdieu 1974 [1967]).To my

knowledge, this is the first usage of the term

in Bourdieu's published writing. Panofsky's

starting point is the observation that there

arestrong parallels between Gothic architec

ture and scholastic philosophy, which devel

oped within a 100 mile radius of Paris, over

about a century and a half (Panofsky 1976,

pp. 4-5). Followinga concise overview of

trends in the two fields between 1130 and

1270, the "concentrated phaseof this aston

ishingly synchronous development," Panof

skystates his central thesis: that this is more

than mereparallelism it is

agenuine

cause and effect influence, but

in contrast to an individual influence, this

cause-and-effect relation comes about by

diffusion rather than by direct impact. It

comes about by the spreading of what may

be called, for want of a better term, amen

tal habit reducing this overworked clich

to its precise Scholastic sense as a'principle

that regulates the act,' principium importans

ordinem ad actum. Such mental habits are at

work in all and every civilization. (Panofsky

1976, pp. 20-21).

Panofsky is careful to distinguish the no

tional content of cultural products from what

he calls the modus operandi of their produc

tion, the

procedures through

which

they

are

produced. It is the modus operandi,not the

opus operatum, the procedurenot the work,

that bears the mental habit (Panofsky 1976,

p. 27). Thus, the principle of transparency

governed architectural design,as clarification

governed scholastic thought. Cathedrals were

designed with an eye tototality, symmetry,

andreplication

of homologous parts,as

argu

ments were based on distinctiveness, deduc

tive cogency, the mutualinferability among

parts, and explicitness (Panofsky 1976, pp. 4358). Using the twin Scholastic principles of

manifestado and concordatia, he argues for the

existence of a "visual logic" that would have

structured the Scholastic view of architecture,

unifying, for instance, material stability with

textual authority, and subtending the mental

habits of clarification, contradiction, and res

olution (Panofsky 1976, pp. 68-68).Bourdieu was

sufficientlymoved

bythis

work to undertake its translation and to de

scribe it as "sans nul doute un des plus beaux

dfis qui ait jamais t lanc au positivisme"

("without any doubt one of the most beau

tiful challenges ever leveled at positivism").As he did repeatedly in subsequent writings,

he seizes on the importanceo modus operandi

asopposed

to the notional content of cultural

works, quoting Panofsky who described these

as "fundamental principles that support the

choice and presentationof motifs as well as

the production and interpretationof images,

stories and allegories" (Bourdieu 1974 [1967],

pp. 137-39).1 Amongthe several basic lessons

*In this review, Bourdieu's postface is cited as Bourdieu

1974. All translations from French byW.E Hanks, un

less otherwise noted. Bourdieu read widely in Panofeky's

works, citing this quoted passage from "Iconography and

Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance

Art."

joHanks



Bourdieu draws from Panofsky is the need to

reject the dichotomy between individual cre

ativityas embodied in

singular works and col

lective values as embodied in the habitus that

guides the creation of those works (Bourdieu

1974, p. 142). He goeson to contrast "struc

tural

methods,"

which

catalog homologies

be

tweensymbols

and systems, with Panofsky's

search for the underlying, mostlyunconscious

principles that give rise to those homologies.

The latter, inculcated in schools and embod

ied in the habitus, aregenerative schemes that

cut across different spheres of cultural pro

duction, generating both works and thoughts

(Bourdieu 1974, p. 152). Bourdieu suggestsa

comparisonto

Chomsky's generative gram

mar then later refers to the Saussurian idea of

parole ("speech") to suggest the existence of

generative schemes whose effects can be per

ceived onlyin the works (parole, performance)

in which they are realized (Bourdieu 1974,

p. 160).2 He writes,

... the habitus of the creator as a system of

schemes constantly orients choices which,

while not deliberate are nonetheless system

atic, which without being ordered and or

ganized expressly in relation to an ultimate

end, are nonetheless bearers of a sort of fi

nality which reveals itself only post festum:

that self-constitution of a system of works

united byan ensemble of significant rela

tions is accomplished in and through the as

sociation of contingency and sense which is

made, unmade and remade ceaselesslyac

cordingto principles that are all the more

constant that theymore

completely escape

consciousness_(Bourdieu 1974, pp. 161

62).

If we substitute "speaker" for "creator" we

have here acogent summary of his approach

TABLE 1 Two definitions of habitus

From Panofsky To Bourdieu

Mental habits Embodied habituality

Evaluative perspective Eye, gaze

D esire/intention Inclination, posture

Cultural production Labor of the body

Mental schema Embodied schemaExecution Mobility

Achieved via training Achieved via reproduction

Exercised in expert practice Exercised in ordinary practice

Relative synchrony ("spirit of age") Diachrony, emergence

Design of ritual space Occupancy of domestic space

Links philosophyto architecture Links actor to fields

Belief, ideology Misrecognition, doxa

Regulates action Regulates practice

to utterance production. The final issue Bour

dieu addresses in this "Postface" is innovation.

Must we, he asks, revert to irreducible individ

ual creativityto

explainthe work of those, like

Abb Suger, who break from the esthetic tra

ditions of their time? In effect, he responds in

the negative, asserting the necessity of habi

tus as the social, generative, unifying principle

that makes intelligible the singularity of the

individual creator (Bourdieu 1974, pp. 165

66).3

Panofsky'snotion of habitus is focused on

designand does not extend to the embodied

experience of being within the built spaces of

Gothic cathedrals. By 1972, Bourdieu had ex

plicitly rejected mentalism and proposed that

the body,not the mind, was the "site" of habi

tus (1977). This shift has numerous entail

ments, summarized inTable 1.

The left column inTable 1 summarizes

Panofsky's approachin terms of its elements,

althoughnot in the precise

terms that he

used. The mental habits that caused the ho

mologiesbetween philosophy and architec

ture have become embodied habits, engaging

2This is the first time, to my knowledge, that Bourdieu

compares the habitus with agenerative grammar, amislead

ing and ultimately failed comparison that was nonetheless

salient to him in 1967, when the "Postface" was written

(Hanks 1993).

3Students of linguistic anthropology will be reminded here

of Sapir's "Speech as a Personality Trait," where he spellsout the necessity of social basis without which individ

ual style is unintelligible (Sapir 1985). See also Eckert &

Rickford (2001).




both mind and body. The evaluative perspec

tive, once embodied, emergesas active per

ception, and the intentional states of desire

and purpose become the inclination of body

posture. On these points, whichtogether

de

fine hexis, Bourdieu comes torely

more on

Merleau-Ponty (1945) than on Panofsky. The

cultural production of thephilosopher and ar

chitect becomes the labor of the body. The

mental sch mas become embodied schemes

of perception andunderstanding.

The active

process of production works through the bodyin motion and gesture. The inculcation of

themental habits through specialized trainingbecomes the discipline of the body throughthe repeated regularities of ordinary practice.

Whereas Panofsky sought to define the "spirit

of the age" as a relatively synchronous system

of ideas, Bourdieu foregrounds the temporal

open-endednessof habitus. Where the for

mer examined thedesign of monumental rit

ual spaces, the latter was concerned with the

actual occupancy ofordinary spaces, particu

larly the household. Panofsky derived the reg

ularities of philosophy and architecture from

his version of habitus, and Bourdieu derived

theregularities

ofordinary embodied practice

from his redefined habitus. Finally, although

Panofsky does not speak of belief or ideol

ogy, the habitus he discerns is an intellectual

formation complete with principles, premises,

and self-justifying judgments. These elements

emerge in practice sociologyas

misrecogni

tion and doxa, that is, the false belief that so

ciety operateson reason and merit and the

unquestioning adherence to its order.

From alanguage perspective, habitus cor

respondsto the social formation of speak

ers, including the disposition to use languagein certain ways, to evaluate it

accordingto

socially instilled values, toembody expres

sion in gesture, posture, and speech produc

tion (Arno 2003, Bucholtz 1999, Farnell 2000,

Ochs 1996, Ruthrof 2000, Streeck 2003). It

wasdeveloped

toexplain reproduction with

out rules. It follows that in apractice approach

tolanguage, regularities

of "usage"are not

explained by rules, codes, or conventions but

by embodied dispositions and sch mas, which

are not "followed" or"obeyed" but are actu

alized in speech. Obviously, such anapproach

must have a way oftreating

context because

the habitus neither arises in a vacuum, nor is

it actualized in a vacuum. This leads to Bour

dieu's idea of the "field," to which we now

turn. Habitus, he says, emerges specificallyin

the interaction between individuals and the

field, and it has noindependent existence apart

from the field (Bourdieu 1993, p. 349).

FIELD

As defined in practice theory, a field is a form

of social organization with two main aspects:

{a) aconfiguration

of social roles, agent po

sitions, and the structures they fit into and

(b) the historical process inwhich those positions are

actually taken up, occupied byactors

(individual or collective). For instance, if "de

manding instructor" or "motivated student"

arepositions in the academic field, they

are

taken up in the course of such situated activ

ities as seminar discussion, grading,and eval

uation. Ready examples of fields are primary

education, the academy, the field of artistic

production, discipline-based fields such as an

thropology or linguistics, and the field of or

ganized religion. The idea is that each of these

can be treated as a space of positions and po

sition takings. Like the duality of perceptionschemes and practices of perceiving

in the

habitus, the duality of position and position

takingmake any field adynamic form of orga

nization, not a fixed structure.Within a field,

positions are defined by opposition, such as

teacher ^ student, author ^ literary agent ^

reviewer, or judge ^ jury# defendant in a

legal proceeding. This sense of opposition is a

case of relational thinking, derived primarilyfrom structuralism. Among his sources, Bour

dieu cites Trier (Bourdieu 1993, p. 314), Tynianov and the Russian formalists (Bourdieu

1985, p. 17),Cassirer, andJakobson (Bourdieu

1977).Thus the linguistic analogs of the con

ceptare

readily apparent: semantic field, any

paradigmatic array of opposed terms, any

72Hanks



"system" of literary genres. Moreover, like a

language for the Prague School linguists, a

"field" is durable but not fixed; it exists in a

"dynamic synchrony."

If the positions in afield are related to one

anotherby opposition, the agents who take up

positions

are related

by struggle

and

competition. [Compare Eckert &McConnell-Ginet

(1992) on "communities of practice."] From

the viewpoint of action, any field is a space of

"strategic possibilities" inwhich actors have

potentialmoves and courses of action, an idea

Bourdieu (1993, p. 314) credits to Foucault.

This shift from structure and dynamic syn

chrony to action and history is intended to

movebeyond classic structuralism (Brubaker

1993; Calhoun 1993; de Certeau 1984, 1988;

Comaroff & Comaroff 1991). It also impliesanother

key element, namely that values cir

culate in any field and are the basis of compe

tition among agents. This circulation of value

includes such thingsas

prestige, recognition,

and authority, but also material wealth and

capital. Relative to a field, any agent has a tra

jectory or career consisting of the positions it

has occupied, how theywere taken up, how

theywere vacated, etc. Hence from a

prac

tice perspective, speaking and discourse pro

duction are ways oftaking up positions

in so

cial fields, andspeakers have trajectories

over

the course of which they pursue various values

(Bourdieu 1993, pp. 345^46; compare Spitulnik 1996, Urban 2001). In so doing, they are

formed by the field.

This is the point atwhich habitus and field

articulate: Social positions give rise to embod

ied dispositions. To sustain engagement in a

field is to be shaped, at least potentially, bythe

positionsone

occupies. The speaker who

produces discourse in afield like the academycomes to be shaped by the positions (s)he takes

up and the forms of discourse they call forth.

Already molded to the field, the habitus shapesthe individual in away similar toElias 's(2000)

"civilizing process"or Pascal's formation of

the believer through the practice of prayer and

the pomp of spectacle (Pascal 1976, pp. 116,

118,127,139-143; Bourdieu 1997).The field

thus becomes not an external feature of con

text but a formative input that shapes the in

dividual through the habitus.

To describe a social phenomenonas a

"field" is therefore to focus on certain of its

features: the space of positions, the histori

cal

processes

of their

occupancy,

the values

at stake, the careertrajectories of agents, and

the habitus shaped by engagement. Comparedwith a term like "context," field is both more

specific and moreconsequential. The factors

already cited give rise to additional features

found in any field, including three specified

by Bourdieu (1985, pp. 20-21): {a)a language

game in which certain ends arepursued with

certain discursive resourcesaccording

to es

tablished guidelines, (b) a set of beliefs and

assumptions that undergird the game, and (c)the specific stakes at play (what is to be lost

or gained, how, and by whom). These factors

could be illustrated with the language games

of argument, publication, and discussion in

the academy, all based on the beliefs that ra

tional analysis and effective rhetoric are skills

that mark "good work," and productivity is

measured by discourse productionin recog

nized genres (Kroskrity 2000, Schieffelin et al.

1998,Woolard & Schieffelin 1994).These be

liefs further feed into the definition of the

habitus and are activated in the choices, hopes,

and expectations of agents in the field. There

fore, strugglesover

particular stakes reinforce

theground

rules of the game as well as the

dispositions of its players (Bourdieu 1991b,

p. 57).This circularity is a type of reflexivitycentral to

practice theory. Irrespective of the

intentions, aims, orunderstandings of any of

the players, practice in the field reproducesthe demands of the field in the embodied dis

positions of the players.One final feature contrasts the concept of

field from that of context asusually under

stood in language studies. Any field is rela

tively bounded, notby walls or natural barri

ers but by constraints on who canengage in

which positions. This bounding is illustrated

in institutional settings by certifications,

specialized training, competitive selection,




class-based exclusions or inclusions, and eco

nomic orsymbolic

resources. The idea is not

that any field has a discrete, accepted border

around it, but that access isalways differen

tial and selective. Thus the degree granting

training of scientists, the exclusivity of elite

schools and companies, the religious training

and disciplines of organized religions, and the

limits on access to the media inpolitics

are

all boundary mechanisms that help define the

fields in which they operate. Whereas "dis

course context" asusually understood is the

surround of an utterance or form, the field

with its boundaries assumes no discursive act

at its center. It existsprior

to and apart from

any particularutterance or

engagement and is

in this senseobjective.

There aremany

fields inany society,

and

this raises the question of how they relate to

one another. One important relation is sim

ilarity of organization, which Bourdieu calls

homology. There arehomologies between the

literary and artistic fields, inwhich evaluation

and consumption of genres is differential in

parallel ways. Similarly,access to

capital and

leisure is differential in the economic field.

The outsider artist is to the field of artis

tic productionas the poor are to the field

of economy because both stand in a rela

tion of marginal exclusion (Bourdieu 1993).

Bourdieu's interest in homologies is alreadyatwork in the habitus and probably derived

from his reading of Panofsky, reinforced bythe premium he placed on relational thinking.

For our purposes, it points toward comparison

among different fields in terms of their posi

tions, position takings, distributions of value

and resources, habitus, and so forth. Astudy

focused on language would compare fields in

terms of their discursive resources, the kinds

of effectsthey

have when putto use, the sorts

of strategies producers (speakers) pursue and

the ends theyachieve.

Beyond their "topological" similarities,

fields may be concretely articulated in what

we can call embedding relations. For instance,

the field of literary production is embedded in

the field of power, which is, in turn, embed

ded in the field of class relations (Bourdieu

1993, pp. 38, 319). Here there ismore than

homology at stake because the embedded field

is, to adegree, organized by

the embedding

one(s). A field based on, contained within,

or constrained by another field is, to that

degree, nonautonomous, whereas one whose

organizing elements arespecific

to itself is

autonomous. For example,an academic de

partment in apublic university

in contem

porary U.S.A. can be looked at as a field

embedded within the broader fields of the dis

cipline, the institution, higher education, and

the sources of research funding.To the extent

that the departmental field isorganized by the

mandates of these other fields it is nonau

tonomous, whereas it is autonomous insofar

as it has its ownfunctioning principles. (See

also Bachnik & Quinn 1994.)

One kind of field central to linguistic prac

tice is the deictic field, namely the socially de

fined context of utterance in which language

is used for various purposes, including ref

erence and description, the performance of

speech acts, and ordinary verbal interaction

(Hanks 2005). The positions in the deictic

field includeminimally the participant frames

of Spr, Adr, Object, and their numerous multi

party analogs (Goffman 1981,Goodwin 1981,

Hymes 1972); the spatial and temporal set

ting; and the indexical parameters in which

participants have access to each other and the

situation around them. In the course of speak

ing, interactants take up and vacatepositions,

and theyact within them and upon them. Em

bedded within the deictic field are settings,defined by interactive relevance, and situa

tions, defined by themutual perceptibility of

the parties. Given that linguistic practice takes

place invirtually every sphere of social life, the

deictic field is in turn embedded in one or an

other social fields: The interactant in verbal

practice speaksas a

proponent of aposition

inpolitical debate, as a boss or worker, as a

preacher,as

legal counsel, astherapist

or pa

tient, as a kinsman in the domestic field. The

deictic field is relatively autonomous insofar as

it isdefined by language, but nonautonomous

74 Hanks



in those features imposed by the embed

ding social fields. In this perspective, verbal

functions such as reference, description, il

locutionary forces, and indirection are recast

as ways of taking up positions in the field.

The boundary processes in play in all fields

constrain participants' differential access to

positions, and individuals have meaningful

trajectories of position taking over time (at

whatever level we measure). Values that cir

culate through the deictic field are varied,

according to the embedding field. Perhapsmost

important, sustained engagement in spe

cific deictic fields helps shape the interactants'

habitus, their dispositions to construe settingsin socially formed ways.

LANGUAGESTANDARDIZATION ANDCHANGE

Much of traditional linguistics treats languageas the product of an irreducible inner logic,sometimes called a code. The grammar of a

language likeEnglish orMaya states the cor

responding code in terms of categories (Sen

tence, Noun Phrase, Verb Phrase, etc.) and

the processes that derive and operateon them.

In traditional grammar, it is standard to as

sume that this code is perfectly shared by the

speakers of the language, this sharedness be

inga common sense

requisite for mutual un

derstanding. In amovecongenial

to sociolin

guists and anthropologists, Bourdieu notes

that the apparent unity of any languageis the

product of a historical process of unification

or standardization, andlanguages vary across

the society inwhich they are spoken. Accord

ing to Bourdieu, standardization is produced

by suppressing nonstandard variants, a point

on which sociolinguists have provided more

subtle accounts (Eckert & Rickford 2001,

Silverstein 1998). Whereas agrammarian

uses

the term code analytically, for Bourdieu it

echoes the legal code in which conduct is

regulated and "rules are to be followed"

(Haviland 2003, Mertz 1994). Behind the

unity of most standard languages lie power

relations, unifying administrations, economy

and state formation, or governance (Herzfeld

1996). Dictionaries, grammars, and their au

thors are part of the same process, as is the

inculcation of standard in the educational sys

tem. Access to the standard through education

providesaccess to the positions of power in

which it is used. The entire process is a kind

of symbolic domination inwhich nonstandard

varieties aresuppressed, and those who speak

them are excluded or inculcated. Thus indi

viduals acquire the disposition to acquiesce to

the standard as amatter of their own interest

because itgives

access to power. Thereby, they

uphold the system of domination, just as com

petitors in a field uphold the game in which

they compete. Discoursestrategies aimed at

securingends involve attunement to the de

mands of the field, and thereby underwrite

the field with itshierarchies. The result is that

social hierarchy, based on access to power, is

transposed into stylistic hierarchy, on the ba

sis of the association of different verbal styles,

registers, or varieties with different positions

(Agha 1994; Bourdieu 1991b, p. 55;Errington

1988; Heller 1992; Kataoka & Ide 2003;

Rumsey 2002; compare Ochs 1992, Eckert

1998, Cameron 1998 on gender).

Just as a practice approach splits "the lan

guage"into social varieties, it also distin

guishes among discourse genres (Eckert 2000,

Eckert & Rickford 2001, Hanks 1987, Feld &

Schieffelin 1998,M. Goodwin 1990). Gen

res are historically specific, relatively stable

types of discourse practice correspondingto

different positions in social fields. French

literary genres, for instance, are hierarchi

cally ordered, each onedefining a position,

and to write in agenre is to take up a

position (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 312, 326; see

also Bauman 2001, Briggs & Bauman 1992,

Hanks 1987). From this perspective, indi

vidual discourse works instantiate genresor

genre blends drawn from aspace of discur

sive possibilities (Bourdieu 1985, p. 21). The

definition of the literary in terms of formal

properties, such as the poetic function of Tynianov and Jakobson, is inseparable from the

www.annualreviews.org Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices ofLanguage 75



broader field of cultural production. By de

limiting the literary, it in effect affirms the

autonomy of the literary field itself, which

onceagain illustrates the principle that ac

tion tends to reinforce the field in which it

occurs, regardless of the intentions of the

actors.4

LANGUAGE, LEGITIMATE AND

AUTHORITATIVE

The processes at work in standardization and

hierarchies ofstyles and genres also give

rise to what Bourdieu calls legitimation and

authorization. Both of these turn on how

languageis

socially evaluated.Legitimacy is

accorded to selected ways ofspeaking

or writ

ing in that they are recognized by other pro

ducers, by the dominant classes and bymass

audiences (Bourdieu 1993, p. 331; Garnham

1993). Inculcated in education (Collins 1993,

Lave &Wenger 1991,Mertz 1996,Wortham

& Rymes 2003) and the family (Ochs 1988,

Ochs & Schieffelin 1995), the dominant lan

guage is legitimated in that it receives recog

nition and is the measureby which other vari

eties are evaluated (in at least some situations).

Differences in social and economic position

tend to be reproduced inunequal knowledgeof

legitimate language,which in turn rein

forces constraints on access to power. At this

point, Bourdieu cites Labov's work onEnglish

variation inNew York (Labov 1966), suggest

ing that members of aspeech community

can

share allegianceto the same standard, despite

differences in the (nonstandard) varieties theythemselves speak. Thus, even

thoughnon

standard varieties are an unavoidable effect

of social differences, it is the standard that is

accorded recognitionas

legitimate.The dis

crepancy between whatspeakers

do and what

they consider legitimate is a force of language

change in the form of distinctive deviations

from the standard.

Legitimacyis

closely related to autho

rization in Bourdieu'sapproach (Bourdieu

1991b). The key difference is that authorityis invested not in language varieties, but in

the agents who use them(compare Ahearn

2001). This is also the main difference be

tween Bourdieu (1991b) and Austin (1962),as Bourdieu himself presents it.For themost

part, Austin'sspeech

acts are recast aspractices

in the field, and Bourdieu derives from the

field itself the illocutionary effects that Austin

attached toperformative speech, lb be effec

tive, any speechact must be

recognizedas ef

fective, it must be legitimate for those upon

whom it has an effect. Whereas this constraint

could be treatedas an

Alpha felicity condition by Austin, it is the core phenomenon for

Bourdieu. Moreover, thespeaker gets the au

thorizing effect from the field, not from the

languagenor from his or her own best inten

tions. To produce authorized languageis then

to draw on the social field for authority and,

in sodoing,

to reinforce it.

CENSORSHIP AND EUPHEMISM

The flip side of authoritative and legitimate

language is censorship and euphemism, lb

speaka

language is not to command a code,

but to act in a world that oneaccepts tac

itly.Standardization and

legitimationsanc

tion certain ways ofspeaking, rewarding

some

while silencing others. The effect is to intim

idate and censorspeech without any discrete

acts of intimidation or censoring. Any field

automaticallycensors the discourse that cir

culatesthrough

it. It calls for what Bourdieu

(1991b, pp. 137-62) describes as euphemism,

namely themuting of critique and individual

expression accordingto what is rewarded or

sanctioned in the field. Through euphemism,the sanctions of the field become part of lin

guistic practice itself, not external conditions

but internal elements. A game joining form

with field, euphemism requires competence

to play effectively. Like censorship, it helps

4It is questionable whether the poetic function actually re

inforces the autonomy of the literary field, given that this

function is at work inmuch of ordinary language use, a

point emphasized by Jakobson (1960) and carried forth in

the ethnography of speaking.

j6 Hanks



shape the habitus of speaking agents, both

their ownexpressive dispositions and their

evaluations of others' expression. To euphem

ize one's speech, consciouslyor not, is to self

regulate: The individual is fitted ever more

closely to his or her position in the field. This

isone of themechanisms bywhich the habitus

is formed at the point where actors engage in

fields.

SYMBOLIC POWER

Censorship, authorization, and the reinforce

ment of dominantlanguages

are all trace

able to the pervasive effects of power (com

pare Gal & Irvine 1997, Lindstrom 1992).

Insofar as the power issymbolic, Bourdieu

(1991b, p. 164) describesit as

"thatinvisi

ble power which can be exercised only with

the complicity of those who do not want to

know that theyare

subjectto it, or even that

they themselves exercise it." This complicity

lies at the heart of practice and is explained

notby any conscious concealment but by the

structural relations between semiotic systems

(including language), the habitus (includingthe perspectives it embodies), and the field.

Bourdieu arrives at this analysis stepwise.

First, structuralism (from Saussure to L viStrauss) demonstrated that symbolic systems

areinternally structured, have their own his

torical dynamics, and are logically prior to

the acts in which theyare instantiated. Sec

ond, citing Kant, Cassirer, Sapir, Whorf, and

Americanist anthropology, he observes that

these systems construct the worlds inhabited

by those socialized into them. As developedunder the guise

oflinguistic relativity,

rou

tinelanguage

useprovides ready-made

terms

in which actors apprehend and represent re

ality, including language itself (Gumperz &

Levinson 1996, Hill & Manheim 1992,

Lucy 1992, Silverstein 2000). Hence through

speaking a language one is embedded in a

universe of categorization, selective distinc

tions, and evaluations.Symbolic systems are

structuringas well as structured. Inspired by

Durkheim andMauss, Bourdieu joins the two

Steps in a circular relation that foreshadows

the complicity cited above: It is because sym

bolic systems are structured that theycan

order experiencein the ways they do, and

because they order experience theyare rein

forced by practice. The third step is to link

the first two steps to class divisions on the ba

sis of relations to labor and production, and

therefore to apolitical economy (Irvine 1998).

Bourdieu took the political economy to be a

sociological precondition and source of any

symbolic system, thereby rejectingthe arbi

trariness assumed by structuralism. By bring

ingto bear their own

categorieson relations

of power from which they are ultimately de

rived, symbolic systems reinforce domination.

Much as stylistic hierarchies aremotivated bysocial

hierarchies, symbolic systemsarise from

and reinforce power differences. By engag

ing in linguistic practice, and quite apartfrom

their intentions or aims, actors arecomplicit

with the pervasive power relations in which

their language is embedded. Competence in

the standard emergesas a form of

symbolic

capital, often rationalized as the intrinsic value

of "refined" or "proper" speaking, but ulti

mately derived not from language but from

power relations.

Why does Bourdieu claim that this elaborate

circularityis invisible to the

peoplein

volved in it? The chain of reasoning goes

like this. Systems of distinction, including lan

guage, present themselves to nativespeakers

as natural. This is aby-product of the circu

larity between distinctions made in alanguage

on the one hand, and divisions in the social

field to which they are applied on the other.

The two arepartially independent but mutu

ally reinforcing. Furthermore, in the course

of ordinary practice, speakers tacitly assume

systems of distinction and division from mo

ment tomoment (Cicourel 1993). Speech is

produced and understood against this social

horizon, whose very tacitness shelters it from

scrutiny. Assumed, habituated, and schema

tized in the habitus, systems of difference ap

pear self-evident. Theyare too

thoroughly

incorporated and too obvious to be easily




noticed inordinary practice. When they

are

noticed, theyare

usuallyrationalized in terms

of arbitrary convention (why does "table"

stand for table?), the functional requirementsof communication (why does language have

the properties it does?), or local communica

tive motives (why did he say that?). Further

more, aslinguistic anthropologists have es

tablished, commentary on language is itself

formulated inlanguage. Consequently, the

ontological complicity between linguistic and

social categories makes each of them appear

natural.

This naturalness is illusory though because

itmisrecognizes the role of power in the mak

ing of semiotic distinctions. Indeed, one of

the signal concepts developed by Bourdieu

is this circle of masking and misrecognition(Bourdieu 1990). Linguistic anthropologists

have long known that nativespeakers

are

largelyunaware of the systematic workings

of their language, but misrecognition ismore

fundamental than awareness. It is the social

effect whereby power divisions and the im

posed rules of the game are underwritten by

practice, however strategic, and by the ratio

nalizing ideas people have aboutlanguage

and

practice.Thus common sense doxa regarding

correctness, elegance, clarity, or effectiveness

inspeech hides what ismore

accuratelyseen

as the market value of speech styles relative to

the dominant language. In the literary field,

for instance, the belief in individual creativ

ity is amisrecognition based on the illusio that

what isvalued is intrinsic creativity In amore

accurate account, as Bourdieu sees it, what is

valued iswhat fits the demands of the field, and

the effective producer is the one best attuned

to the field. Bourdieu & Passeron (1977)make

this pointin relation to education when they

argue that success in school dependsnot on in

dividual ability, as usually claimed, but on the

selection effect whereby successful students

come from the social milieux that the educa

tion system isdesigned to legitimate. They de

scribe this misrecognitionas

"genesisamne

sia" (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, pp. 5, 9). In

discussing the historicity of reason, Bourdieu

generalizes the point, arguing that what le

gitimatesreason is not reason, but rather re

ceived convention, ultimately linked to power

and pageantry (Bourdieu 1997, Ch. 3).

It is a small step from power misrecog

nized tosymbolic violence. The speaker

cen

sored orobliged

toeuphemize in order to earn

credit, show loyalty,or maintain confidence is

the object of symbolic violence because his

or her speech is curtailed, whether by self or

other. Obviously,to be classified, evaluated,

stereotyped,or

portrayedas such and such is

to be the object of symbolic violence. Just as

misrecognitionis a structural relation more

general than any instance of misrecognizing,

symbolic violence is a structural relation. The

violence inquestion depends neither on vi

olent actsnor on

the intentions that mayanimate them. Masking relations of force,

symbolic violence dominates by defining as

legitimate limitations that derive from and re

inforce differences of power.

CONCLUSION

Many of the linguistic anthropologists cited

here have addressed one or another element in

Bourdieu's approachto

language,sometimes

to great effect [Irvine (2001) on style and dis

tinction; Ochs (1996) on socialization; Haeri

(1997), Hill (1987), andWoolard (1985) on

language markets; Cicourel (2001) on medi

calknowledge].

For the most part, broad dis

cussions of the approach have been critical of

Bourdieu's claims about language,sometimes

for good reason (Hasan 1999). He is usually

vague where a linguist needs specificity and of

ten specific where linguists do not tread. But

ifwe look beyond such claims, there is a deepconsonance between much of practice the

ory and the intellectual framing of linguistic

anthropology (Goddard 2002, Hanks 1996).

This is evident in the occasional citations

tolinguistic sources, but more

pervasivelyin

the way Bourdieu reasons about such criti

cal conceptsas habitus and field. From these

two concepts and their interactions emanate

arange of

phenomenaof great interest to

j8

Hanks



students of language, including standardiza

tion, domination, authorization, legitimation,

and their opposites. To this we add censorship,

euphemism, and symbolic violence, whose re

lations to discourse productionare direct.

This list isunfinished, as isBourdieu's legacyfor language, but it indicates some of the sites

atwhich work has been done andmore could

be done. The meanings of these terms are ob

viously specific to Bourdieu's approach, and it

isdifficult tomap precisely from his paradigminto the approaches typical of linguistic an

thropology (Duranti 2003). Phenomena that

appear unified under one view aresplit apart

under the other. Language ideology, style,

and interaction correspondto

multiple ef

fects of the relation between habitus and field.

For thelinguistic anthropologist, by contrast,

Bourdieu's habitus splits apart into many dif

ferent factors that run the gamut from gram

mar tospeech, gesture, language ideology,

and

space. The contemporary focus on indexical

ity derives mostly from Peirce's semiotics and

its development in the ethnography of speak

ing. By contrast, Peirce and indexicalityare

virtually absent from practice sociology, justas

Panofsky and Merleau-Pontyare all but miss

ing in linguistic anthropology. These absences

aregenerative

sites for future research into

linguistic practice, understood as both objectand modus

operandi, form and occupancy, ours

and others'.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research on which this article isbased has benefitted from contributions from anumber of

students and colleagues. I am grateful for extended discussions with Berkeley graduate students

in the seminars on colonial history, practice theory and linguistic anthropology between 2000

and 2004 and from discussions with Liu Xin, in our co-taught seminar. Special thanks to

Rob Hamrick and Alysoun Quinby who have assisted me in all phases of this article from

bibliographic research to final editing. Thanks finally toJennifer Johnson-Hanks, extraordinaryinterlocutor.

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