Bowstar diagram Gas - PIMS International · 2016. 4. 20. · Bowstar that has been developed by...

Risk Control @ Lower Cost

Asset catagory: Land pipelines

Unwanted event: Pinhole

Copyright PIMS International B.V.

Felland Noord 3

9753 TB HAREN

Bowstar diagram Sasol GasO‐000/PIMS INTERNATIONAL‐SASOL GAS/07

© 2014 by PIMS International B.V., Haren, Nederland. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, modified or adapted, without the prior written consent of PIMS International B.V., unless explicit permission has been given by PIMS International B.V. PIMS International B.V. accepts no liability for any loss or damage or expense of any kind, caused by the use of the information and data in this document.

Documentno: O‐000/PIMS INTERNATIONAL‐SASOL GAS/07

Bowtie: Unwanted event – Pinhole

Origin data Sasol – modified / fictitious

© 2014 by PIMS International B.V Page 3 of 40

Acknowledgement This article presents a full bowtie diagram resulting from a risk assessment that has been carried out by PIMS International by making use of the Bowstar methodology. It is published to assist pipeline operators in the optimization of their risk management practice. Application of this methodology will be a big step forward in risk control and will enable the asset manager to control both safety and operational risk at maximum transparency for all stakeholders. Once implemented Bowstar will be used to monitor any unexpected change in operational risk level, give early warnings, enables Life Cycle Cost optimization and supports all related investment decisions. The bowtie diagram that is presented in this document is based on the risk assessment that has been carried out in Sasol Gas pipeline operations (SA). Part of the data is fictitious and has been added by the author to clarify some special features of the Bowstar methodology. Rob Bos gratefully wants to thank Sasol Gas and in particular Neo Modise, Divisional Manager Pipeline Integrity, for his kindness to use their bowtie diagram data to clarify the methodology of Bowstar that has been developed by PIMS International B.V. Rob Bos Neo Modise Director PIMS International B.V.

Divisional Manager: Pipeline Integrity Sasol Gas

Felland Noord 3 9753 TB Haren Netherlands Rob.Bos@pims‐international.com Tel: +31 6 24 20 24 52

146 Houtbaai Street,Culverwell Park, Elandshaven Germiston South Africa [email protected]





Content 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 7 2 Bowtie methodology ............................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Basic model ............................................................................................................................. 8 2.2 Bowstar bowtie model ............................................................................................................ 9 2.3 Escalation factors .................................................................................................................. 11

3 Bowtie Analyse: Pinhole ........................................................................................................ 15 3.1 Main diagram ........................................................................................................................ 15 3.2 Threat 1 of 9: External corrosion ........................................................................................... 16 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 16 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 16 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 17 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 18 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 18 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 19 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 20 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 21

3.3 Threat 2 of 9: 1std Party interference ................................................................................... 21 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 21 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 21 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 21 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 21 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 21 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 22 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 22 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 22

3.4 Threat 3 of 9: 2nd Party interference (contractors etc) ........................................................ 22 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 22 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 22 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 22 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 22 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 22 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 23 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 23 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 23

3.5 Threat 4 of 9: 3rd Party interference (digging etc)................................................................ 23 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 23 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 23 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 24 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 24 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 24 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 25 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 26 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 26

3.6 Threat 5 of 9: Operational error(high P) ............................................................................... 27 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 27 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 27





Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 27 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 28 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 28 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 28 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 28 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 29

3.7 Threat 6 of 9: Internal corrosion ........................................................................................... 29 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 29 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 29 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 29 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 29 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 30 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 30 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 30 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 30

3.8 Threat 7 of 9: Internal erosion .............................................................................................. 30 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 30 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 31 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 31 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 31 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 31 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 31 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 31 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 31

3.9 Threat 8 of 9: Natural disaster .............................................................................................. 32 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 32 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 32 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 33 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 33 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 33 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 34 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 34 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 34

3.10 Threat 9 of 9: Vandalism, terrorism ...................................................................................... 34 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 34 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 35 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 35 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 35 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 35 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 36 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 36 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 36

3.11 Consequence 1 of 2: Gas emission ........................................................................................ 36 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 36 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 37 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 37 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 37 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 38 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 38





3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 38 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 38

3.12 Consequence 2 of 2: Fire ....................................................................................................... 39 Life cycle barriers ........................................................................................................................... 39 Design barriers .............................................................................................................................. 39 Construction barriers .................................................................................................................... 39 Commissioning barriers ................................................................................................................. 39 Operations barriers ....................................................................................................................... 40 Maintenance barriers .................................................................................................................... 40 3rd Party interference prevention barriers ................................................................................... 40 Mothballing / removal barriers ..................................................................................................... 40





1 Introduction The goal of using the Bowtie method of PIMS International B.V. is to create an overview that includes the risks and organization of policy, the effectiveness of mitigating measures, possible improvements, and the costs involved. The results particularly contribute to asset management in the following ways:

1. They help to ensure the integrity and safety of the assets in place, as well as improving the continuation of operations while focusing on economic optimization.

2. They are utilized to provide input for high‐level investment decisions. 3. They can be used in tender procedures to improve transparency of risk management practice

and to support project execution as they help to monitor the firmness of assumptions made and to mitigate unforeseen issues in time

The Bowtie method is semi‐quantitative, meaning that the data used in the model is based on both expert opinion and casuistry.





2 Bowtie methodology The Bowtie methodology is applied by implementing the steps mentioned below. Please note that these steps are not always executed in this specific order. Moreover, some of these steps can be executed concurrently. 1. Preparation:

‐ Determining the scope, selecting the members of the expert team, location, and data to be used in the Bowtie workshops.

‐ Defining the objectives in the risk matrix e.g. failure frequency, corporate values and the corresponding severity of the consequences.

During the workshop:

2. Inventory: ‐ Determining the unwanted event in each area relevant to the expert team (during the

workshop) ‐ Create an inventory of the threats that could lead to the unwanted event in each area. ‐ Create an inventory of the consequences that could result from the unwanted event in each

area.

3. Specification: ‐ Identification of the escalation factors of the seven phases of the life cycle. ‐ Identification of the measures (existing and new) in order to mitigate the escalation factors. ‐ Quantification of the mitigating measures (existing and new) by effectiveness and cost (for a

period of five years). ‐ Ranking of the risk matrix.

After workshop:

4. Analysis: ‐ Data analysis ‐ Calculations ‐ Validation of outcome (during a second workshop) ‐ Investigating trends in failure behaviour (frequency of unwanted events), using for instance

maintenance logs from SAP.

5. Reporting and results: ‐ Reporting of the Bowtie results as well as the performance indicators.

2.1 Basic model The general Bowtie model has the following components:

‐ Unwanted event: The unwanted event refers to a hazard that needs to be controlled. In the industry this is sometimes also referred to as the ‘top event’. It is situated in the centre of the bowtie model.





‐ Threats:There are a number of threats that could cause the unwanted event to occur. They are visualised in the model on the left side and shows a direct relationship between the causes of the unwanted event and the unwanted event itself.

‐ Consequences: The consequences are displayed at the right side of the model. The consequences refer to the possible results in case the unwanted event does indeed occur. This involves a direct relationship between the unwanted event and the consequences of the unwanted event.

The following picture illustrates the basic setup of the bowtie diagram:

2.2 Bowstar bowtie model An attribute is added to the threats that represents the relative contribution of each threat to the unwanted event. The sum of these threat contributions is always 100%. Every threat and consequence has seven barriers (standard). These barriers are being shaped by the seven life phases of the infrastructure. The purpose of these life cycle barriers is to enable differentiation between life cycle specific threats and corresponding mitigations and, as a result, measure the effectiveness and economics of each individual mitigating measure in preventing the unwanted event to happen and/or minimizing the consequence of the unwanted event. With the life cycle barriers included, the basic Bowtie model of PIMS International has the following shape:





Please note that although the number of threats and consequences may vary, the number of life cycle barriers always remains constant. An attribute is added to each life cycle barriers that represents the relative effectiveness of the barrier in the prevention of the unwanted event. The sum of these life cycle barriers is always 100% for each threat / consequence.

The allocation of the value for effectiveness is conducted by casuistry. Whenever casuistry is not available, each member of the expert team is requested to give an estimate of the effectiveness of each life cycle barrier. The final value of each life cycle barrier is calculated as the average of estimates. A discussion between the members of the expert team will be brought up if the differences in individual scoring is too high.





2.3 Escalation factors The next step in the development of the Bowtie is to define the so‐called escalation factors. These are sub‐threats which could erode the degree of effectiveness of the life cycle barriers. For instance: insufficient depth of cover (DOC) could lead to serious damage of the pipeline caused by the threat: Third party interference. Hence, in this case, ‘Depth of cover insufficient’ is an escalation factor. This example is illustrated in the following pictures:

Escalation factor incl. percentage contribution to life cycle (total = 100%)

Threat that can result in unwanted event incl. percentage

contribution (total = 100%)

Life cycle barrier incl. percentage of total life cyclebarriers (total barrier value all life cyclus = 100%)

Mitigating measures(2)Green : is implementedBlue : can be improvedRed : newYellow : no mitigation available

Actual life cycle barriereffectiveness (calculated by

software)

Mitigating measures (1)Cost of mitigation mesures (e.g. M€/5 year)Effectiveness of mitigating measure





Remark: the blue framed boxes elucidate the specific features of the full developed diagram, incl. the results of the calculations of the Bowstar software. The following picture gives the basic diagram including the calculated summed life cycle barriers for each threat / consequence:

Ranking risk matrix:1. Financial consequences2. Employee Safety and Health3. Community Safety and Health4. Environment

Actual summed barrier valueof all life cycle

Maximum summed barrier valueof all life cycles that can be achieved by the

implementation of all improvements

Hazard

Unwantedevent

Consequence

Threat that can result in unwanted event incl. percentage contribution (total = 100%)

Current contributionthreat to unwanted event

Contribution threat tounwanted event after

implementationimprovements





More information on e.g. risk reduction (visualized in the risk matrix) and life cycle performance, are calculated as well by the Bowstar software. Examples are given in the following pictures:

Option for risk reduction by the implementation of new / improved mitigations are visualized by the arrows.





The threat contribution (green), the effectiveness of life cycle barriers (red) and the options for improvement (blue) are visualized by the bars.

The reduction of failure frequency resulting from the mitigating measures is visualized by the blue line.





3 Bowtie Analyse: Pinhole

3.1 Main diagram





3.2 Threat 1 of 9: External corrosion

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers





Construction barriers





Commissioning barriers

Operations barriers

No barriers

[T1] ‐ External corrosion

50%

[T1.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 15%

22%

[T1.2] ‐ Construction

Actual: 8%

14%

[T1.3] ‐ Commissioning

Actual: 14%

20%

[T1.3.1] ‐ Insufficient attention for CPefficiency

big pipelines

15,5%

[T1.3.1.1] ‐ Check on proper functioning CP‐system

1,6 MEur

80%

[T1.3.2] ‐ Insufficient attention for CPefficiency

small pipelines

15,5%

[T1.3.2.1] ‐ Check on proper functioning CP‐system

0,1 MEur

80%

[T1.3.3] ‐ As built drawing poor quality, spread all over

the place

23%

[T1.3.3.1] ‐ CP drawings need to be stored on a

central place

0,1 MEur

90%

[T1.3.3.2] ‐ Check by commissioning team

0,38 MEur

40%

[T1.3.4] ‐ Maintenance concept not correct

implemented

15%

[T1.3.4.1] ‐ Check by commissioning team

0,38 MEur

40%

[T1.3.5] ‐ Coating not in good condition

31%

[T1.3.5.1] ‐ DCVG / PCM standard practice

3 MEur

90%

[T1.4] ‐ Operations

Actual: 0%

0%

[T1.5] ‐ Maintenance

Actual: 18%

21%

[T1.6] ‐ 3rd Party interference prevention

Actual: 17%

22%

[T1.7] ‐ Mothballing / removal

Actual: 1%

1%





Maintenance barriers





3rd Party interference prevention barriers





Mothballing / removal barriers

3.3 Threat 2 of 9: 1std Party interference

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers

No barriers



No barriers

Operations barriers

No barriers








No barriers

3.4 Threat 3 of 9: 2nd Party interference (contractors etc)

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers

No barriers


No barriers


No barriers

Operations barriers

No barriers







No barriers


No barriers

3.5 Threat 4 of 9: 3rd Party interference (digging etc)

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers

[T4] ‐ 3rd Party interference (digging etc)

20%

[T4.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 16%

18%

[T4.1.1] ‐ Mechanical strength transmission

pipelines not appropriate

12,5%

[T4.1.1.1] ‐ Application code ASME B318 and BS

0,5 MEur

90%

[T4.1.1.2] ‐ Quantitative Risk Assessment transmission

pipelines has been executed / area classification has been

applied

0 MEur

60%

[T4.1.2] ‐ Mechanical strength distribution

pipelines not appropriate

12,5%


0,5 MEur

90%

[T4.1.2.2] ‐ Quantitative Risk Assessment distribution

pipelines has been executed / area classification has been

applied

0 MEur

60%

[T4.1.3] ‐ Insufficient protective measures against

3rd party interference

75%

[T4.1.3.1] ‐ Route selection

0 MEur

10%

[T4.1.3.2] ‐ Buried pipeline to protect against 3rd party

activities

0 MEur

70%

[T4.1.3.3] ‐ Marker signs to indicate pipeline position

0 MEur

10%

[T4.1.3.4] ‐ Protective slabs (concrete, PE etc) remark Barrier only applicable at places where slabs are

installed

1 MEur

9%

[T4.1.3.5] ‐ Add sensors to pipeline (cable etc) to detect vibrations that

indicate 3rd party activities

10 MEur

90%

[T4.1.3.6] ‐ Warning tape 300 mm above top of pipe

0 MEur

30%







Operations barriers

No barriers


20%

[T4.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 16%

18%


Actual: 12%

19%

[T4.2.1] ‐ Material bad quality

30%

[T4.2.1.1] ‐ Inspection by Inspection Authority TUV, Moody International etc)

0 MEur

95%

[T4.2.2] ‐ Welding bad quality

20%

[T4.2.2.1] ‐ NDT‐inspection welds are present (radiography)

0 MEur

99%

[T4.2.2.2] ‐ Inspection by Inspection Authority TUV, Moody International etc)

0 MEur

95%

[T4.2.3] ‐ Depth of Cover insufficient, not meeting

design

20%

[T4.2.3.1] ‐ DOC has been measured, deviation from design are marked with

red/blue

0,1 MEur

80%

[T4.2.3.2] ‐ DOC is checked with laser on excavating

machine

0,1 MEur

90%

[T4.2.4] ‐ Damage of pipeline during construction

30%

[T4.2.4.1] ‐ Inspection onsite by 1st party to

secure proper performance of the 2nd party, only until

pipeline is exposed

3 MEur

70%


Actual: 11%

11%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 12%

24%


Actual: 25%

28%


20%

[T4.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 16%

18%


Actual: 12%

19%


Actual: 11%

11%

[T4.3.1] ‐ Poor quality documentation

99%

[T4.3.1.1] ‐ Check of documentation at handover

Accurate monitoring pipeline position impossible

0 MEur

80%

[T4.3.1.2] ‐ Measurement pipeline defect status and position with intelligent pig,

determine frequency, currently 1/7 year

20 MEur

85%

[T4.3.2] ‐ Development subcritical defects resulting

from hydrotest

1%

[T4.3.2.1] ‐ Maximize hydrotest duration to 15 minutes to prevent the

development of subcritical defects

0,1 MEur

60%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 12%

24%


Actual: 25%

28%


Actual: 0%

0%












No barriers





3.6 Threat 5 of 9: Operational error(high P)

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers


[T5] ‐ Operational error(high P)

4%

[T5.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 22%

24%

[T5.1.1] ‐ Design not capable to withstand higher

pressurer

50%


0,5 MEur

90%

[T5.1.2] ‐ Pipeline has not the right classification

50%


0,5 MEur

90%


Actual: 2%

4%


Actual: 18%

18%


Actual: 25%

30%


Actual: 22%

24%


Actual: 0%

0%






Operations barriers



No barriers


4%

[T5.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 22%

24%


Actual: 2%

4%


Actual: 18%

18%

[T5.3.1] ‐ Test pressure control system hasnt been

executed

45%

[T5.3.1.1] ‐ Hydrotest procedure should prevent

hydrotest not to be executed

0 MEur

99%

[T5.3.2] ‐ Hydrotest pessure too low

0,1%

[T5.3.2.1] ‐ Hydrotest procedure should prevent hydrotest to be executed at wrong pressure (too low)

0 MEur

99%

[T5.3.3] ‐ Emergency Shut Down hasnt been tested

54,9%

[T5.3.3.1] ‐ HIPPS system check Commissioning procedure guarantees

proper execution ESD test

0,1 MEur

99%


Actual: 25%

30%


Actual: 22%

24%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

0%


4%

[T5.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 22%

24%


Actual: 2%

4%


Actual: 18%

18%


Actual: 25%

30%


Actual: 22%

24%

[T5.5.1] ‐ Insufficient maintenance testing

pressure control system

40%

[T5.5.1.1] ‐ Proper execution of Maintenance concept should prevent overdue maintenance in pressure control system (leak

test etc)

0 MEur

90%

[T5.5.1.2] ‐ Surveillance of Safety Department and PTV Inspection program should guarantee the execution of the maintenance program

0,1 MEur

60%

[T5.5.1.3] ‐ Disassembling and renovation safety

valves 1/3 year

1,25 MEur

95%

[T5.5.2] ‐ Changes in system configuration are not

implemented in maintenance concept

60%

[T5.5.2.1] ‐ MOC procedure should guarantee correct implementation of changes

0,1 MEur

85%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

0%






No barriers

3.7 Threat 6 of 9: Internal corrosion

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers







Operations barriers



No barriers


No barriers

3.8 Threat 7 of 9: Internal erosion

Life cycle barriers

[T6] ‐ Internal corrosion

4%

[T6.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 15%

15%


Actual: 8%

10%


Actual: 10%

10%


Actual: 36%

40%

[T6.4.1] ‐ Unpredictable internal corrosion

mechanisms

60%



20 MEur

85%

[T6.4.2] ‐ Accumulation of liquids in pipeline

40%

[T6.4.2.1] ‐ Application of pig to remove accumulated

water from pipeline

5,67 MEur

90%

[T6.4.2.2] ‐ Gas heaters to prevent condensation of

water

0 MEur

85%


Actual: 21%

25%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

0%





Design barriers


No barriers


No barriers

Operations barriers


No barriers


No barriers


No barriers

[T7] ‐ Internal erosion

3%

[T7.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 77%

95%

[T7.1.1] ‐ Dust contaminated gas results in

erosion

80%

[T7.1.1.1] ‐ Filters are applied to prevent erosion resulting from dust in gas

0 MEur

80%

[T7.1.2] ‐ Break through of condensate

20%

[T7.1.2.1] ‐ Fluid catchers are installed to prevent condensate coming in

pipeline

0 MEur

85%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

5%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 0%

0%





3.9 Threat 8 of 9: Natural disaster

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers







Operations barriers

[T8] ‐ Natural disaster

3%

[T8.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 27%

31%


Actual: 20%

28%


Actual: 5%

5%

[T8.3.1] ‐ Document and performance control not

properly executed

40%

[T8.3.1.1] ‐ Measuring earthing standard practice during commissioning

0,1 MEur

95%

[T8.3.1.2] ‐ Control of certificates standard

practice during commissioning

0,38 MEur

95%

[T8.3.1.3] ‐ Check as built information standard

practice during commissioning (can be improved up to 95%)

0,5 MEur

95%

[T8.3.2] ‐ Changes are not correctly implemented

60%

[T8.3.2.1] ‐ MOC procedure should guarantee correct implementation of changes

0,1 MEur

85%


Actual: 5%

6%


Actual: 25%

27%


Actual: 2%

3%








No barriers

3.10 Threat 9 of 9: Vandalism, terrorism

Life cycle barriers

[T8] ‐ Natural disaster

3%

[T8.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 27%

31%


Actual: 20%

28%


Actual: 5%

5%


Actual: 5%

6%


Actual: 25%

27%

[T8.5.1] ‐ Checking proper function devicesearthing etc not properly executed

50%

[T8.5.1.1] ‐ Checking functioning preventive devices against natural

disaster standard practice

0,1 MEur

90%

[T8.5.2] ‐ Consequence of natural disaster not notified

50%



20 MEur

85%

[T8.5.2.2] ‐ Helicopter inspection incl fixing

(interval 1 time per 2‐4 week)

3 MEur

70%

[T8.5.2.3] ‐ Car / foot patrol incl fixing (1/month)

7,7 MEur

60%

[T8.5.2.4] ‐ PIMS in Space

1,5 MEur

95%


Actual: 2%

3%


Actual: 0%

0%





Design barriers



No barriers

Operations barriers

[T9] ‐ Vandalism, terrorism

6%

[T9.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 26%

30%

[T9.1.1] ‐ Rectifiers not vandalism proof

80%

[T9.1.1.1] ‐ Housing of rectifiers in SA is vandalism proof (concrete housing)

0,25 MEur

60%

[T9.1.1.2] ‐ Housing of rectifiers in Mozambique

concrete armoured housing

0,5 MEur

90%

[T9.1.2] ‐ Pressure reduce station not protected against vandalism

10%

[T9.1.2.1] ‐ Installation detection device on places

that are suspected to unauthorized activities

0 MEur

90%

[T9.1.3] ‐ Easy access to underground pipeline

makes them sensitive to vandalism terrorism

10%

[T9.1.3.1] ‐ Increase of DOC to minimize easy access to underground pipeline (MSP

and GNP pipelines)

5 MEur

99%


Actual: 1%

1%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 20%

24%


Actual: 26%

27%


6%

[T9.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 26%

30%


Actual: 1%

1%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 20%

24%

[T9.4.1] ‐ Vandal entering rectifier station not notified

60%



0 MEur

90%

[T9.4.2] ‐ Pressure reduce station not protected against vandalism

40%

[T9.4.2.1] ‐ Armoured response to prevent vandals entering the

location

0,5 MEur

70%


Actual: 26%

27%


Actual: 9%

18%


Actual: 0%

0%








No barriers

3.11 Consequence 1 of 2: Gas emission

Life cycle barriers


6%

[T9.1] ‐ Design

Actual: 26%

30%


Actual: 1%

1%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 20%

24%


Actual: 26%

27%

[T9.5.1] ‐ Unauthorized excavation and hot tap

30%



0 MEur

90%


7,7 MEur

60%

[T9.5.2] ‐ Vandalism not notified

70%



20 MEur

85%

[T9.5.2.2] ‐ Helicopter inspection incl fixing

(interval 1 time per 2‐4 week)

3 MEur

70%


7,7 MEur

60%

[T9.5.2.4] ‐ PIMS in Space

1,5 MEur

95%


Actual: 9%

18%


Actual: 0%

0%





Design barriers



No barriers

G1 G0 G2 G1

[C1] ‐ Gas emission[C1.1] ‐ Mothballing / removal

Actual: 0%

0%

[C1.2] ‐ 3rd Party interference prevention

Actual: 20%

27%

[C1.3] ‐ Maintenance

Actual: 10%

27%

[C1.4] ‐ Operations

Actual: 32%

34%

[C1.5] ‐ Commissioning

Actual: 0%

0%

[C1.6] ‐ Construction

Actual: 5%

6%

[C1.7] ‐ Design

Actual: 1%

6%

[C1.7.1] ‐ Loss of containment not detected

3%

[C1.7.1.1] ‐ Odorization of gas should increase the

chance of detection of loss of containment

0,3 MEur

35%

[C1.7.2] ‐ Ignition sources too close to the pipeline, eg highway on 10 m distance

from pipeline

40%

[C1.7.2.1] ‐ Application of zoning distance meeting

code requirements

0 MEur

5%

[C1.7.3] ‐ Ignition sources like power lines, railway,

tram etc cant be prevented

40%

[C1.7.3.1] ‐ No measure against ignition gas leak by power lines, railway etc

0 MEur

0%

[C1.7.4] ‐ Ignition by static electricity

1%

[C1.7.4.1] ‐ No measure against ignition gas leak by

static electricity (pd2 criterion)

0 MEur

0%

[C1.7.5] ‐ No vent stack

16%

[C1.7.5.1] ‐ Construction of vent stack with sufficient

capacity

0 MEur

99%





Operations barriers




No barriers

G1 G0 G2 G1


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 20%

27%


Actual: 10%

27%


Actual: 32%

34%

[C1.4.1] ‐ No Emergency Plan

80%

[C1.4.1.1] ‐ Emergency Plan is in place

0,1 MEur

90%

[C1.4.1.2] ‐ Emergency drill on regular time basis

0,8 MEur

90%

[C1.4.1.3] ‐ Safety distance document for fire brigade

0,1 MEur

25%

[C1.4.1.4] ‐ Control room calls the Emergency Control

when a gas leak occurs

0,1 MEur

90%

[C1.4.2] ‐ Leak not detected and if it is, geographic position unknown

5%

[C1.4.2.1] ‐ The tool Pipeline Manager can

pinpoint on the geographic position of the leak

0,1 MEur

90%

[C1.4.3] ‐ Excessive release of gas due to high pressure

15%

[C1.4.3.1] ‐ Reduction pressure in pipeline to minimize volume of gas

release

0,1 MEur

60%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 5%

6%

G1 G0 G2 G1


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 20%

27%


Actual: 10%

27%


50%

[C1.3.1.1] ‐ Loss of containment is detected

during pipeline survey (foot patrol observation crop damage discoloration)

0,1 MEur

5%

[C1.3.1.2] ‐ Loss of containment is detected during pipeline survey by helicopter (observation

crop damage discoloration)

0,1 MEur

1%

[C1.3.2] ‐ Crack propagation results in excessive release

of gas

50%

[C1.3.2.1] ‐ Application of crack arrestors to prevent

crack propagation

1,44 MEur

70%


Actual: 32%

34%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 5%

6%

[C1.7] ‐ Design

Actual: 1%

6%





3.12 Consequence 2 of 2: Fire

Life cycle barriers

Design barriers



No barriers

A1 A0 A2 A1

[C2] ‐ Fire[C2.1] ‐ Mothballing / removal

Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 12%

16%


Actual: 7%

19%


Actual: 21%

22%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 13%

16%

[C2.7] ‐ Design

Actual: 5%

27%


3%

[C2.7.1.1] ‐ Odorization of gas should increase the

chance of detection of loss of containment

0,3 MEur

35%

[C2.7.2] ‐ Ignition sources too close to the pipeline, eg highway on 10 m distance

from pipeline

40%

[C2.7.2.1] ‐ Application of zoning distance meeting

code requirements

0 MEur

5%

[C2.7.3] ‐ Ignition sources like power lines, railway,

tram etc cant be prevented

40%

[C2.7.3.1] ‐ No measure against ignition gas leak by power lines, railway etc

0 MEur

0%

[C2.7.4] ‐ Ignition by static electricity

1%

[C2.7.4.1] ‐ No measure against ignition gas leak by

static electricity (pd2 criterion)

0 MEur

0%

[C2.7.5] ‐ No vent stack

16%

[C2.7.5.1] ‐ Construction of vent stack with sufficient

capacity

0 MEur

99%





Operations barriers




No barriers

A1 A0 A2 A1


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 12%

16%


Actual: 7%

19%


Actual: 21%

22%

[C2.4.1] ‐ No Emergency Plan

80%

[C2.4.1.1] ‐ Emergency Plan is in place

0,1 MEur

90%

[C2.4.1.2] ‐ Emergency drill on regular time basis

0,8 MEur

90%

[C2.4.1.3] ‐ Control room calls the Emergency Control

when a gas leak occurs

0,1 MEur

90%

[C2.4.1.4] ‐ Safety distance document for fire brigade

0,1 MEur

25%

[C2.4.2] ‐ Leak not detected and if it is, geographic position unknown

5%

[C2.4.2.1] ‐ The tool Pipeline Manager can

pinpoint on the geographic position of the leak

0,1 MEur

90%

[C2.4.3] ‐ Excessive release of gas due to high pressure

15%

[C2.4.3.1] ‐ Reduction pressure in pipeline to minimize volume of gas

release

0,1 MEur

60%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 13%

16%

A1 A0 A2 A1


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 12%

16%


Actual: 7%

19%


50%

[C2.3.1.1] ‐ Loss of containment is detected

during pipeline survey (foot patrol observation crop damage discoloration)

0,1 MEur

5%

[C2.3.1.2] ‐ Loss of containment is detected during pipeline survey by helicopter (observation

crop damage discoloration)

0,1 MEur

1%

[C2.3.2] ‐ Crack propagation results in excessive release

of gas

50%

[C2.3.2.1] ‐ Application of crack arrestors to prevent

crack propagation

1,44 MEur

70%


Actual: 21%

22%


Actual: 0%

0%


Actual: 13%

16%

[C2.7] ‐ Design

Actual: 5%

27%

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