59
SYLLABUS CIVIL PROCEDURESECOND YEAR WMSU COLLEGE OF LAWBY: ATTY.
FLORIZA P. SALES
I. INTRODUCTION JURISDICTION OF MTC. MCTC, MTCC, MeTC and RTC in
Civil Cases:Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994AN ACT EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction
in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction. "(1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where
the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) (now, P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such
demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
(now, P400,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,
where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or (P300,000.00) in probate matters in Metro
Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) (P400,000);
"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations;
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and "(8) In all other cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00)."
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows: "Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:"(1)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof." Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is
hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant
of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where
such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included
in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;"(2) Exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises
the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession; and "(3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots."Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to
read as follows: "Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and
Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration
cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective
claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases
shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts."
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
A. Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation:
1) G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999, Russel vs. Vestil
EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T.
REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO
TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM
TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES versus THE HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A.
VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO
BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN.KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order
dated January 12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A.
Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56,
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, as well as his Order dated February 13, 1995 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against
private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in
substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of
land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of
56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was previously
owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the
death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal
heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the
lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public
document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION
OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6,
1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the
property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are
also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document
was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the
only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever
had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the
document be declared null and void and an order be issued to
partition the land among all the heirs. 1
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss 2 the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject
land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) 3 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of Liloan,
Compostela. 5Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss 6 saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(1) of
B.P. 129, as amended. 7
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss. 8 A Motion for Reconsideration of
said order was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging
that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one
for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to
annul a document or declare it null and void, 9 hence, one
incapable of pecuniary estimation falling within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the
motion for reconsideration. On February 13, 1995, the respondent
judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
10
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or
not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before
the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action
is one for re-partition and since the assessed value of the
property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case
falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless
one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had the occasion to rule
that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those
for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; 14 also actions questioning the validity of
a mortgage, 15 annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to
recover the price paid 16 and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance. 17
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are
cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of
the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila,
or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional
Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However,
the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to
declare null and void the document in which private respondents
declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves
to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs
and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for
the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document
above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein. 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order
denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, is SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City is ORDERED to
proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. MAN-2275. No
costs.
2) G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011, Ungria, et al vs. CA, et
al.
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS,
represented by LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R.
PELOMIDA as their Attorney-in-fact versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY,
BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS,
FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and
ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO,PERALTA, J.:Assailed in this petition for
review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution2 dated September 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 60764.On August 26, 1999, respondents Rosario
Dideles Vda. de Castor (Rosario), Nepthalie Castor Itucas, Ferolyn
Castor Facurib (Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor, Lea Castor Dollolosa
and Rosalie Castor Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint3 for ownership, possession
and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two
documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's
conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land
against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria, defendants Avelino Gumban,
Dolores Cagaitan, Zacasio Poutan, PO1 Jonas Montales, Ignacio
Olarte and alias Dory. Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of
the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of the respondents are
their legitimate children. The documents they sought to annul are
(1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including
Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by
Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and
(2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960
executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.Petitioner Ceferina
filed a Motion to Dismiss4 (Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam) on the
following grounds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by
virtue of the valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action
is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription; (3) the action
is barred by laches; and (4) plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action, or filed the case prematurely for failure to resort to
prior barangay conciliation proceedings.Petitioner also filed an
Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss5 raising the following additional
grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the
court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs
to pay the filing fee in full. Respondents filed their Opposition
thereto.On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 denying the
motion to dismiss, to wit:After the motion to dismiss and its
addendum have been received, it is now ripe for resolution. One of
the grounds alleged in the complaint is for the recovery of
conjugal share on Lot No. 1615, of Pls-209 D with damages.It is
alleged that the late Fernando Castor and Rosario Dideles Vda. de
Castor were married on September 15, 1952, and the application to
the land was dated January 17, 1952 and the patent was issued by
the President on November 19, 1954.The said land was sold to the
defendant on October 3, 1960 (Annex C) and an Affidavit of
Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 which was made a part
thereof as Annex "D." Considering the marriage of September 15,
1992, the said land became conjugal as of the date of the marriage
and, therefore, thereof belongs to the wife, Rosario Dideles Vda.
de Castor.Thus, considering the above, the motion to dismiss is
DENIED.7Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8
which the RTC denied in an Order9 dated February 4, 2000.Petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion10 asking the RTC to resolve the issues of
(1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged
from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2)
reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4,
2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to
the complaint.Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a
Motion to Allow11 them to continue prosecuting this case as
indigent litigants.On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus
Motion in an Order12 that read in this wise:On the omnibus motion
regarding filing fees, the plaintiffs asserted in its motion that
they are charging defendant actual and compensatory damages such as
are proved during the hearing of this case. So also are attorneys
fees and moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this
case.Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession
(sic) to determine how much is to be charged.At any rate, if after
hearing the Clerk of Court determine that the filing fees is still
insufficient, considering the total amount of the claim, the Clerk
of Court should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same x x
x.As to the second issue, the same has already been decided in its
order dated February 4, 2000.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
omnibus motion is DENIED.The defendant shall file their answer
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order.13From this
Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue
prosecuting the case as indigent litigants.On March 30, 2000, the
RTC issued a Clarificatory Order14 reading as follows:As has been
said, the plaintiff asserted in its motion that they are charging
defendants actual and compensatory damages as has been proved
during the hearing of this case. So also are attorney's fees and
moral damages all to be proved during the hearing of this
case.Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession
(sic) to determine how much is to be charged.At any rate, after
hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still
insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment
that may be entered.As to the motion seeking from the Honorable
Court allowance to allow plaintiff to continue prosecuting this
case as indigent litigants, suffice it to say that the same is
already provided for in this order.WHEREFORE, the defendants shall
file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order.15In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.Petitioner filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the
Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by
the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents
filed their Comment thereto.In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the
CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that SC Circular No. 7
would not apply where the amount of damages or value of the
property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied only in
cases where the amount claimed or the value of the personal
property was determinative of the court's jurisdiction citing the
case of Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte.16 The CA found that
respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing
of the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the
case despite the failure to state the amount of damages claimed in
the body of the complaint or in the prayer thereof. The CA found
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
It noted that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000,
which stated that "if after hearing the Clerk of Court determines
that the filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be
considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered" was in
accordance with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion.17 The CA proceeded to state that a judicious examination
of the complaint pointed to a determination of the respective
rights and interests of the parties over the property based on the
issues presented therein which could only be determined in a
full-blown trial on the merits of the case.Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution
dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the
defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise
unavailing. It found that the subject property is covered by a
Torrens title (OCT No. V-19556); thus, it is axiomatic that
adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of
ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a
Torrens title; that unless there are intervening rights of third
persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision directing
the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of
laches will not apply as against the registered owner.Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following assignment of errors:THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE
RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
IS BARRED BY LACHES AND EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.18We
find the petition without merit.Preliminarily, although not raised
as an issue in this petition, we find it necessary to discuss the
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the
purpose BP Blg. 129.19 Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129,
provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction on the following actions:Section 1. Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as
follows:Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;(2) In all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; x x xSection 3 of RA No. 7691 expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts,
thus:Section 3. Section 33 of the same law (BP Blg. 129) is hereby
amended to read as follows:Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x
x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.Respondents filed their
Complaint with the RTC; hence, we would first determine whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on
the above-quoted provisions.The Complaint filed by respondents in
the RTC was for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative
causes of action either to declare two documents as patent
nullities and/or for recovery of conjugal share on the subject land
with damages or redemption of the subject land. In their Complaint,
respondents claimed that Rosario and Fernando are the registered
owners of the subject land with an assessed value of P12,780.00;
that the couple left the cultivation and enjoyment of the usufruct
of the subject land to Fernando's mother and her second family to
augment their means of livelihood; that respondent Rosario and
Fernando thought that when the latter's mother died in 1980, the
subject land was in the enjoyment of the second family of his
mother, but later learned that the subject land was leased by
petitioner Ceferina; that sometime in August 1999, respondents
learned of the existence of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960,
where Fernando had allegedly transferred his rights and interests
on the subject land in favor of Eugenio, petitioner Ceferina's
father, as well as an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November
23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner Ceferina; that
Fernando's signature in the Deed of Transfer was not his but a
forgery; and the Affidavit of Relinquishment was also void as it
was a direct result of a simulated Deed of Transfer.Respondents
prayed that they be declared as absolute and lawful owners of the
subject land and to order petitioner and the other defendants to
vacate the premises and restore respondents to its possession and
enjoyment therefore. On their second cause of action, they prayed
that the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest Including
Improvements Thereon be declared as a forgery, purely simulated and
without any consideration; hence, inexistent, void ab initio and/or
a patent nullity, as well as the Affidavit of Relinquishment which
was the direct result of the Deed of Transfer. Respondents also
prayed in the alternative that if the Deed be finally upheld as
valid, to order petitioner to reconvey to respondent Rosario the
undivided one-half portion of the subject land as conjugal owner
thereof and to account and reimburse her of its usufruct; and/or to
allow them to redeem the subject land.It would appear that the
first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession
and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real
action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject
land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since
it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00,
the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided
under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as
amended.Notably, however, respondents in the same Complaint filed
alternative causes of action assailing the validity of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by Fernando in favor of
petitioner's father. Respondents also sought for the reconveyance
to respondent Rosario of the undivided one-half portion of the
subject land as conjugal owner thereof in case the Deed of Transfer
of Rights and Interest will be upheld as valid; and/or for
redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of joinder
of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of
possession of, or any interest in the real property under
contention, but includes an action to annul contracts and
reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus,
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.20In Singson v. Isabela
Sawmill,21 we held that:In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).22Thus, respondents correctly
filed their Complaint with the RTC.It is a settled rule in this
jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and
filing fees.23 It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action.24Section 7(b)(1) of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial
Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or
a complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the
stated value of the property in litigation, is:x x x x(b) For
filing:1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated ........ P400.002. x x xIn a real action, the assessed
value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.25Since we find that the case involved the
annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the
docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but
should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the
entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would
reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court,
together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court.
Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the
RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.
Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the
case is terminated. 26Notably, petitioners claim that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction in this case is premised on her contention
that respondents violated SC Circular No. 7 issued on March 24,
1998 requiring that all complaints must specify the amount of
damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in
the prayer to be accepted and admitted for filing. Petitioner
argues that respondents alleged in paragraph 13 of their Complaint
that:(T)he reasonable rental for the use of the [subject] land is
P2,000.00 per hectare, every crop time, once every four months, or
P6,000.00 a year per hectare; that defendants in proportion and
length of time of their respective occupancy is and/or are jointly
and severally liable to plaintiffs of the produce thereby in the
following proportions, viz: (a) for defendant Ceferina de Ungria
for a period of time claimed by her as such; (b) for defendants
Dolores Cagautan, a certain alias "Dory," and PO1 Jonas Montales,
of an undetermined area, the latter having entered the area
sometime in 1998 and defendant alias "Dory," only just few months
ago; that defendant Ignacio Olarte and Zacasio Puutan of occupying
about one-half hectare each.27and in their prayer asked:x x x
Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, in proportion to
the length and area of their respective occupancy, to pay
reasonable rentals to the plaintiffs in the proportion and amount
assessed in paragraph 13 of the First Cause of Action.x x x x(a)
Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs
actual and compensatory damages such as are proved during the
hearing of this case;(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees and moral damages, all
to be proved during the hearing of this case.28Thus, the RTC should
have dismissed the case, since respondents did not specify the
amount of damages in their prayer.We are not persuaded.SC Circular
No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29 where we held that a pleading
which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being
asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee.However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,30 we laid
down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to
wit:1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.Subsequently, in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,31 we
said:Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for
payment of damages "in amounts justified by the evidence" does not
call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC
Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all
complaints must specify the amount of damages sought not only in
the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be
accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively
modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for
damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the
awards finally granted by the trial court.x x x judgment awards
which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven
during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his
duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fees.32A reading of the allegations in the complaint
would show that the amount of the rental due can only be determined
after a final judgment, since there is a need to show supporting
evidence when the petitioner and the other defendants started to
possess the subject land. Thus, we find no reversible error
committed by the CA when it ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in issuing its Order dated March
30, 2000, where the RTC stated that "since there was no hearing
yet, respondents are not in a position to determine how much is to
be charged and that after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines
that the filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be
considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered." x x
xWHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.3) G.R. No. 176858,
September 15, 2010, Padilla vs. Magdua.HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA,
represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA versus DOMINADOR MAGDUA.CARPIO,
J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Orders dated 8 September 20062 and 13 February 20073
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in
Civil Case No. 2001-10-161. The FactsJuanita Padilla (Juanita), the
mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque,
Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners,
as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned.
Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia
(Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a
letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them,
petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared
the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was
then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property4 (Affidavit) in favor of
Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The
records do not show that the land was registered under the Torrens
system. On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the
RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership,
possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare
void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia
and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua
(Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of
Ricardo.Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through
misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the
consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that
prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land.
However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left
for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third
parties. Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita
in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978
Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be
leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited
from her parents. Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan,
Leyte.In an Order dated 20 February 2006,5 the RTC dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed
value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the amount
cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC
reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the case.
Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the
case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the
right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when
one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the
exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC
added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer
of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no
action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by
Ricardos daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion
of the order states:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of
the Court is reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the
Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
The dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason
of lack of jurisdiction but by reason of prescription.SO
ORDERED.7Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which
the RTC denied in an Order dated 13 February 2007 since petitioners
raised no new issue.Hence, this petition.The Issue x x xWith regard
to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC
did not err in taking cognizance of the case. Under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),14 amending Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following
actions:Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction."(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;"(2) In all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or,
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x xOn
the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which involve title to
or possession of real property, or any interest, outside Metro
Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). The provision states:Section 3. Section 33 of
the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:"Sec. 33.
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x"(3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots."In the present case, the records show that the assessed value
of the land was P590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as
of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone,
being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but
also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of contracts
are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.151avvphi1Petitioners are correct. In
Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16 we held that:In determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the
due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita
in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of
the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal
heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of
sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the
principal action sought here is something other than the recovery
of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.17 In sum, we
find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by
the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription,
insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of ownership
to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits
to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the
land.4) G.R. No. 104796 March 6, 1998, De Leon vs. Court of
AppealsSPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON versus
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and
DANILO ELAYDAMENDOZA, J.:The question for decision is whether in
assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action
for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the
real property, subject matter of the contract, should be used as
basis, or whether the action should be considered as one which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged
should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, 7(b)(1)
of the Rules of Court. The trial court held the fees should be
based on the value of the property, but the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the flat rate should be charged. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.The facts are as follows:On
August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against petitioners,
praying for the following reliefs:1. Ordering the nullification or
rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary
Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code
and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said
contract.2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for
being absolutely simulated; and3. Ordering defendants (petitioners)
to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's fees in the
amount of P100,000.00.Other reliefs and remedies as are just and
equitable in the premises are also prayed for. 1Upon the filing of
the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to
pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken
down as follows:P450.00 Docket fee for the Judicial Development
Fund underOfficial Receipt No. 1877773150.00 Docket fee for the
General Fund under Official ReceiptNo. 683421510.00 for the Legal
Research Fund under Official Receipt No.6834450. 2On September 26,
1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by reason of private respondents' nonpayment of the correct
amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to
the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for
attorney's fees, private respondents should have paid docket fees
in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged value of the two
(2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought
to be annulled. 3On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed
opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright
dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the
alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees,
considering that the amount paid by them was that assessed by the
clerk of court. 4 On October 9, 1991, petitioners filed a reply to
which private respondents filed, on October 17, 1991, a
rejoinder.On October 21, 1991, the trial court 5 denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss but required private respondents to
pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the
parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was
denied by the trial court. They therefore, brought the matter to
the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1992, rendered a
decision 6 annulling the orders of the trial court. The appellate
court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract
is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the
docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property,
subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied
in a resolution dated March 25, 1992 of the appellate court. Hence,
the petition for review on certiorari.Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court provides:Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. (a) For
filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave
of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a
complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the
stated value of the property in litigation, is:1. Not more than
P20,000.00 P120.002. More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00
150.003. P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00 200.004.
P60,000.00 or more but less than P80,000.00 250.005. P80,000.00 or
more but less than P100,000.00 400.006. P100,000.00 or more but
less than P150,000.00 600.007. For each P1,000.00 in excess of
P150,000.00 5.00(b) For filing:1. Actions where the value of the
subject mattercannot be estimated P400.002. Special civil actions
except judicial foreclosure ofmortgage which shall be governed by
paragraph (a)above 400.003. All other actions not involving
property 400.00In a real action, the assessed value of the
property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees. (emphasis added)Petitioners argue that an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a
real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be
paid by private respondent should be based either on the assessed
value of the property, subject matter of the action, or its
estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last
paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of the
Court dated September 12, 1990. Since private respondents alleged
that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been
sold for P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be
considered the estimated value of the land for the purpose of
determining the docket fees.On the other hand, private respondents
counter that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of
sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so,
the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141,
7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they cite the cases of
Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. and Bautista v. Lim. In Lapitan this
Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:A review of the
jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that
the second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were
the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws
of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of
the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).Actions for specific
performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs.
Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's
Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And
no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties,
why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently
treated, a "rescission" being counterpart, so to speak, of
"specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly
have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify
one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action
for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters
which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same
manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of
fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation
expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like
those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967
(legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the
determination of the validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua
v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment);
Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of
mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the
relations of the parties, the right to support created by the
relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al. v.
Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of
documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same
nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for
rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is,
therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action
for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such
action as one capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must
be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated
for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed
by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by
the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging
multiplicity of suits.Conformably with this discussion of actions
"where the value of the case cannot be estimated," the Court in
Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is
one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its
filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the
former Rule 141, 141, 5(10). Said this Court:We hold that Judge
Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as
basically one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation (1 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 55; Lapitan vs. Scandia, Inc., L-24668,
July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 781-483).Consequently, the fee for
docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now
respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal
research fund fee, if she has not paid it, as required in Section 4
of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law Center).Thus,
although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is
the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is
controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly applied these cases to
the present one. As it said:We would like to add the observations
that since the action of petitioners [private respondents] against
private respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or
rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the
action should not be confused and equated with the "value of the
property" subject of the transaction; that by the very nature of
the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint,
sans any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the
transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages, the assessment
and collection of the legal fees should not be intertwined with the
merits of the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to
sustain private respondents' [petitioners'] position on what the
respondent court may decide after all, then the assessment should
be deferred and finally assessed only after the court had finally
decided the case, which cannot be done because the rules require
that filing fees should be based on what is alleged and prayed for
in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the
complaint.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.5) G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007, Heirs of Valeriano
Concha, Sr., et al vs. Sps. Gregorio Lumocso and Bienvenida Guya,
et al.HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA
CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P.
CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA,
ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA versus SPOUSES
GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA.
DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the decision3 and resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions5 and order6 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case
Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to
dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr.,
claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No.
5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No.
5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A
(Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso
(Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case
No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent
holders and registered owners of the subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7 and his
children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto,
Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha,
filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with
Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya."
They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556
issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The
case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed
as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners
prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate
of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab
initio;
2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property
of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as
the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;
3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties
(sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this
Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force
and effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21
forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages;
P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses;
and to pay the cost of the proceedings;
5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the
area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total
volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they]
being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved,
and owned by the plaintiffs;
6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and
remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in
the premises.8
On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance
with Damages were filed by petitioners,9 this time against
"Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot
No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for
a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two
complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City
and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In
Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527)
4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of
Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA
141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No.
1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)
hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located
at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk
of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the
defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees
illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the
cost of the proceedings.10
In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870
and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located
as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of
the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n]
as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)
hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor
of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision
in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and
OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western
portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this
Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force
and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest
trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the
cost of the proceedings.11
The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21,
1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea
Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated
in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha
"painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land,
including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land"
located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess
4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare
portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely,
peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since
1931;" d) that they continued possession and occupation of the
4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23,
1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses
"have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to
the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from
1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January
1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by
force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises,
illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil
Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for
Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that
even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had
already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that
respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No.
6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject
lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer
in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents
"surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots
despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i)
that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over
the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an
opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that
respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued
"on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and
k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an
innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the
complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance;
(c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and
estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to
Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots
are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve
actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary
estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by
R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action:
for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled
by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be
considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents.15 The respondents filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17
In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that the
nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by
their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or
cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more
than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of
the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject
properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has
jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that
the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."
Petitioners cited: a) Raymundo v. CA24 which set the criteria for
determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation; b) Swan v. CA25 where it was held that an action for
annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos
v. CA26 where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of
title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the
RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27
where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the
property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is
located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that
the assessed values of the subject properties are within the
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have
included in their prayers "any interest included therein"
consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by
respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as
shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value
of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the
RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection based on
this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29 To determine whether
a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is
important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the
relief sought.30
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve
actions for reconveyance.31 An action for reconveyance respects the
decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer
of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those
who claim to have a better right.32 There is no special ground for
an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party
has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the
registered owner33 and that the property has not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.34
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases
typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the
common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to
constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz: (a) That
plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea
Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the
area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares
untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest
from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this
property by occupation or possession;35(b) That spouses Valeriano
S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees
standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the
defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12,
1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case
Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation,
[and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut,
collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil
Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and
six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private
land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain,
plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec.
48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land
Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew
when they] surreptitiously filed38 [their respective patent
applications and were issued their respective] free patents and
original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to
the petitioners];39
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding
original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40 and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser.41These cases may also be considered as actions to remove
cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the
cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners'
alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment
of their alleged title.42
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to
remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which
court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less
than P20,000.00, to wit:Civil CaseNo. Lot No.Assessed Value
51886195P1,030.00
54336196-A4,500.00
54346196-B4,340.00
7529-A1,880.00.43
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant
cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or to quiet
title46 over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the RTCs
(formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction
"[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred
upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)."
Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on
jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129
or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The
distinction between the two classes became crucial with the
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994 which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to
include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law,
original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which
involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the
first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced
to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in
the speedier administration of justice."49
The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage and ICE
Plant Corporation v. CA,51 relied upon by the petitioners, are
inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for
mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of
title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of
pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the
pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of
P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the
criterion for determining whether an action is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of
whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and
Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees
was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount
was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can
Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort
to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was
venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages,
accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on
October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving
the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects
title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the
property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage
is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No.
94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."Worse, the cases of Swan
v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited by the petitioners, contradict
their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under
Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were
filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court
held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had
original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos,
the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of
title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and
possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus,
while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court
classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of
title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the
subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the
subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the
respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing.
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear
that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the
trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term
"any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in
determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed
value of the realty involved that should be computed.54 In this
case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject
properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than
P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs
not to the RTC but to the MTC.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City,
Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and
5434.
SO ORDERED.6) G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002, Copioso vs.
Copioso, et al.LOLITA B. COPIOSO versus LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL,
ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF
APPEALS.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090 which dismissed petitioner's
petition for certiorari as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and
Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint2 for reconveyance
of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda
Doria, and the estate of deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as
vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira
Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased
brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property
having inherited the same from their parents, and that through
fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his
name and that of spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria who subsequently
sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed for the
reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-owners
thereof. When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion
for bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject
property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses
Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than
P20,000.00.
The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000
denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject matter
of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly
within its jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the
motions to dismiss and at the same time maintaining her position
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the assessed
value of the property was below P20,000.00.
The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance. Motion
for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the appellate
court, hence this petition.
Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par.
(3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691 which
provides -
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot
be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of
"title, possession and interests" of each of the stakeholders over
the subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and
relief prayed for in the complaint coupled with the assessed value
of the disputed property place the action within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19,
par. (1), of the same law which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: In all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation: x x x
Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance
is a case of joinder of causes of action which include the
annulment of sale and other instruments of false conveyance
incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence
of the RTC.The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases
is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation
to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with
civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand,
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to
cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P.
129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving
sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real
property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of
the claim or the assessed value of the real property involved, such
that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real
property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount,
jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession
and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested
property the assessed value of which falls within the
jurisdictional range of
