Brandner v. Pease, Alaska (2015)

7/25/2019 Brandner v. Pease, Alaska (2015)

1/21

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER .

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

MICHAELD.BRANDNER,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERTJ.PEASE,M.D.,

PROVIDENCEALASKA

ANESTHESIAGROUP,and

PROVIDENCEALASKAMEDICAL

CENTER,

Appellees.

)

) SupremeCourtNo.S-15633

SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-11-10914CI

OPINION

No.7066November25,2015

)

)

)

)

)

))

)

)

)

)

)

AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,Third

JudicialDistrict,Anchorage,PatrickJ.McKay,Judge.

Appearances: Charles W. Coe, Law Office of Charles W.

Coe, Anchorage,forAppellant. Roger F. Holmes,Biss &

Holmes,Anchorage,forAppelleesRobertJ.Pease,M.D.and

ProvidenceAlaskaAnesthesiaGroup. RobertJ.Dicksonand

Christopher J. Slottee, Atkinson, Conway & Gagnon,

Anchorage,forAppelleeProvidenceAlaskaMedicalCenter.

Before: Fabe,Winfree,andBolger,Justices. [Stowers,Chief

Justice,andMaassen,Justice,notparticipating.]

BOLGER,Justice.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/21

I. INTRODUCTION

A cardiac patient who underwent open heart surgery sued the

anesthesiologist and medical providers involved in the surgery. The superior court

dismissed the patients claims onsummary judgment, concludingthat the patient had

offered no admissible evidence that the defendants breached the standard of care or

caused the patient any injury. On appeal the patient relies on his expert witnesss

testimony thatcertainsurgicalprocedures were suboptimaland thatpatients generally

tendtohavebetteroutcomeswhenotherproceduresarefollowed. Butweagreewiththe

courtsconclusionthatthistestimonywasinsufficienttoraiseanyissueofmaterialfact

regardingwhetherthedefendantshadviolatedthestandardofcareinawaythatcaused

injury to thepatient. Wealsoaffirmthe courts orders involvingattorneys feesand

costs.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

A. HeartSurgery

Dr.MichaelBrandnersufferedaheartattackinSeptember2009andwas

admitted to Providence Alaska Medical Center (the Medical Center) for emergency

bypass surgery. Dr. Kenton Stephens was the cardiac surgeon who performed the

operation;Dr.RobertJ.Peaseadministeredanesthesia. Dr.Brandner isalsoamedical

doctor,licensedtopracticeplasticandreconstructivesurgery.

The surgery lasted six hours. At the outset Dr. Pease intubated

Dr. Brandneronhis second attempt and used the drugpropofol to induce anesthesia.

Shortly thereafter Dr. Brandners blood pressureprecipitously dropped, but according

to Dr. Stephens, Dr. Brandner did not suffer complete cardiac arrest. Dr. StephensperformedCPRwhileadditionaldrugswereadministeredtocounteractthedropinblood

pres sure. Dr. Brandners blood pressure ultimately stabilized, and the operation

continued.

-2- 7066


3/21

Dr. Pease then placed a transesophageal echo (TEE) probe in

Dr. Brandners esophagus to take ultrasonographic pictures of his heart and obtain

diagnos tic informationaboutitscondition. TheTEEprobesoonfailed,andDr.Pease

then notified Dr. Stephens of this failure. According to Dr. Stephenss deposition

testimony,herespondedbysaying,Okay,well,Impressingonwiththeoperation, do

whatyoucan. TheTEEprobewasnotreplaced.

Dr.Stephens performed asix-vesselbypass. Dr.Brandnersurvivedthe

operationandwasdischarged12days later. Inhisnotesfromafollow-upappointment

about a week after discharge, Dr. Stephens indicated that [Dr. Brandner] has been

progressingquite well. Dr.Stephensalso indicatedthatDr.Brandnercouldreturnto

full activity within six weeks of surgery and authorized him to return to his plastic

surgerypractice. InMarch2011Dr. Stephenswrotea letteronDr. Brandners behalf

indicating that [h]is recovery has been quite exemplary and that he had steadily

returnedtopractice.

B. Proceedings

In September 2011 Dr. Brandner filed a complaint against Dr. Pease,

Providence Anchorage Anesthesia Group (the Anesthesia Group), and the Medical

Center.1 Dr. Brandner alleged that [t]he administrationofanesthesia performed by

Dr.RobertJ.Peasewasbelowthestandardofcare,...wasnegligentlyandrecklessly

performed[,] and cause[ed] [Dr. Brandner] to sustainpermanentinjuries. Healso

allegedthattheAnesthesiaGroupand theMedicalCenter were vicariously liable for

Dr. Peases actions. Dr. Brandner alleged that he suffered severe and permanent

1 Dr. Peaseand theAnesthesiaGroupare jointly representedbythesame

firm;theMedicalCenterhasseparaterepresentationandhasfiledindependentbriefing.

Butbecausethesethreepartiesinterests,arguments,andevidencearegenerallyaligned,

weusuallyrefertothemtogetherastheprovidersthroughout.

-3- 7066


4/21

injuries,lossofpastandfuturewages,.. .[and]lossofenjoymentoflife[,]andthathe

incurred past and future medical expenses[.] In response to interrogatories,

Dr. Brandner specifically alleged [i]njury to and loss of myocardiumwithseverely

compromised cardiac functionand reserve;[i]njury tobrainwithnoticeable loss of

shorttermmemoryfunctionasdemonstratedontesting;and[s]everede-conditioning,

loss of calcium, with associated muscoloskeletal problems, displaced sternal

incision/wound with prolonged healing and continued pain, as well as hemorrhoids

requiringsurgeryandwithongoingproblems.

In February 2012 the providers jointly moved for summary judgment,

arguingthat the lawsuitmust be dismissed withprejudice unless [Dr. Brandner] can

produce an affidavit from a qualified expert claiming Dr. Pease failed to meet the

standardofcare,[and]thisfailurecausedorcontributedtohisinjuries. Themotionwas

supported by the affidavit of a board-certified anesthesiologist specializing in

cardiovascularanesthesiawhoattestedthat[t]hemedicalcareprovidedbyDr.Peaseto

[Dr.Brandner]wasappropriateinallrespectsandmetthe[s]tandardof[c]are.

InJuly 2012 Dr. Brandner submitted the affidavit of Dr. StevenYun,a

board-certified anesthesiologist, in connection with his opposition to the providers

motionforsummaryjudgment. Dr.Yunattestedthatthetreatment,care[,]andservices

providedby...Dr.RobertPease[]weresuboptimalandcontributedto[Dr.Brandners]

prolonged and delayed recovery. Specifically, Dr. Yun stated that in all medical

probability, (1)[p]ropofolwasnottheoptimalchoiceofinductionagentandits use

led directly to . . . [Dr. ] Brandners cardiac arrest,2 (2) the difficulty insecuring

[Dr.] Brandners airway . . . directly contributed to [his] cardiac arrest, and (3) the

Asnotedabove,Dr.Stephensdenied thatDr.Brandnersufferedcomplete

cardiacarrest.

-4- 7066

2


5/21

amountofdamageto[Dr.Brandners]heart,[the]timetohookuptheby-passmachine,

[and] theextentofsurgeryperformedwouldhave beenreduced by the use ofaTEE

[probe] throughout his surgery. Following the submission of this affidavit, the

providerswithdrewtheirsummaryjudgmentmotions.

InSeptember 2013 Dr. Brandnerwas indicted infederal court onseven

countsofwirefraud.3 The grand jurychargedhimwithattemptingtoconcealmillions

ofdollarsinassetsfromhiswifeduringdivorceproceedings.

In January 2014 the parties deposed Dr. Yun. During the deposition

Dr.Yunadmittedthatalthoughhewasapracticinganesthesiologist,hehadnotpracticed

cardiovascular anesthesiaorusedaTEEprobesinceabout2001. Healsostatedthathe

wasnotqualifiedunderthecurrentstandardofcaretopracticecardiovascularanesthesia

becausehelackedcertificationintheuseofTEEprobes.

WithregardtoDr.Brandnerssurgery,Dr.Yunreiteratedhisopinionthat

theuse of propofol and the failure tointubate Dr. Brandneronthe firstattemptwere

suboptimal,butherefusedtosaythateitherfellbelowthestandardofcare. Dr.Yun

didstatethatthefailuretoreplacetheTEEprobefellbelowthestandardofcareandthat

cardiacpatientsgenerallytendtohavebetteroutcomeswhenaTEEprobeisusedduring

surgery. Butherepeatedlydeclinedtodrawanyconclusionsaboutwhetherthelackof

aTEEprobecausedharmtoDr.Brandner specifically,explaining,Ithinkthatgoesa

little beyondmyarea ofexpertise. Dr. Yunalsoconfirmed thathis affidavit , which

statedthatDr.BrandnersoutcomewouldhavebeenimprovedbytheuseofaTEEprobe

throughoutsurgery,wasbasedonhisgeneralizedunderstandingof the utilityofTEE

probesnothisspecificunderstandingofDr.Brandnerssituation.

3 See 18U.S.C.1343(2012).

-5- 7066


6/21

In February 2014 the providers jointly moved to exclude Dr. Yuns

testimony,arguingthatDr.Yunwasnotaqualifiedexpertinthefieldofcardiovascular

anesthesia. Whilethismotionwasstillpending,andless thanamonthbefore trial was

set to begin, Dr. Brandner requested a continuance. Citing the ongoing criminal

proceedingsagainsthim,Dr.Brandnerarguedthathe[wouldnotbeableto] testify[]or

explainhis circumstancesand thatexercisinghis right toremainsilent is prejudicial

eveninacivilcasebecause[i]fheis acquittedand/or thechargesaredismissed,his

currentcriminalchargesbecomeirrelevantand...[in]admissibleunderEvid[ence]Rule

404(b). HealsoacknowledgedtheprovidersmotiontoexcludeDr.Yunandstatedthat

[i]f[Dr.Yun]isstruckfrombeingawitness,thetrialcannotproceed.

The providers opposed Dr. Brandners request for a continuance. The

MedicalCenterarguedthatpostponingthetrialwasunnecessarybecauseDr.Brandners

substantial rights would notbe violated:4 The [criminalproceedings] . . . do not

prevent [Dr. Brandner] fromputtingon his evidence concerninghis . . . surgery, the

resultsfromthesurgery,hisexpertsopinions(totheextentthat[the] trialcourt allows

thattestimony),and his test imonyondamages theessentialelementsofhis case.

TheMedicalCenter also arguedthatDr. Brandners requestwasdilatory becausehis

indictmenthadbeenissuedfivemonthsbeforeandhecouldhavemovedtocontinuetrial

atanytimeduringtheinterveningmonths. TheAnesthesiaGroupnotedthatithadhired

an additional physician at great expense . . . to cover the two weeks Dr. Pease is

expectedtobeintrialandthattwoout-of-stateexpertwitnesseshadalreadyrearranged

theirschedulesandpurchasedticketstoattendtrialinAnchorage.

4 See Wagner v. Wagner,299P.3d170,175 (Alaska2013)(Arefusalto

grantacontinuance constitutesanabuseofdiscretionwhenapartyhasbeendeprived

ofa substantial rightor seriouslyprejudiced. (quotingSiggelkow v. Siggelkow,643

P.2d985,987(Alaska1982))).

-6- 7066


7/21

Although the superior court called Dr. Brandners motion to continue

dilatory, inexplicable, and inconvenien[t] [to] opposing litigants, opposing

attorneys, and the [c]ourt, the court reluctantly granted his request. But the court

ordered Dr. Brandner to pay the actual out-of-pocket costs the Anesthesia Group

incurredasaresultofpostponingtrial. Thecourtlaterreconsideredthiscostsawardon

Dr.Brandnersmotionandconfirmeditsdecisiontoawardcosts.Butthecourtreduced

the award after learning that the Anesthesia Groups billings included costs that were

avoidable since Dr. Pease was sti ll available to work, including travel, hotels, car

rentals, per diem, overtime, and other costs associated with the substitute

anesthesiologist. In addition the court granted the providers motion to exclude

Dr. Yuns testimony after finding that Dr. Yun was not a practicing, board-certified

cardiovascular anesthesiologist. Dr. Brandner then asked the court to reconsider its

exclusion of Dr. Yuns testimony, contending that there is no such thing as board

certification in cardiovascular anesthesia and use of the TEE probe is allowed by

anesthesiologistswithoutanycertification.

In March the providers again moved for summary judgment, supporting

their motions with four affidavits. Two of these affidavits were fromboard-certified

anesthesiologistswhoassertedthatDr.Peasesactionsmetthestandardofcare. Intheir

motions theprovidersarguedthat,becausethecourthadexcludedDr.Yunstestimony,

Dr. Brandnerhadno expert to testify about the appropriate standard ofcare. In the

alternative they argued that Dr. Yuns deposition testimony, even if admitted in its

entirety, did not raise any genuine issues of material fact, because there was no

admissibleevidencethatanyof[Dr.Peases]actions[includingthefailuretoreplacethefaultyTEEprobe]causedinjurytoDr.Brandner.

The superior court granted the providers summary judgment motions.

Althoughacknowledging that its previous order excludingDr. Yun was based onthe

-7- 7066


8/21

erroneous premise that Alaska recognizes board certification for the subfield of

cardiovascularanesthesia,the court nonetheless excluded Dr. Yuns testimony. The

court also ruled that even if Dr. Yunwere qualifiedas anexpertwitness, summary

judgmentwould still be warranted because Dr. Yun did not causal ly connect any of

Dr.PeasesallegedlynegligentactstoanyofDr.Brandnersclaimedinjuries.

TheprovidersmovedforAlaskaCivil Rule 82attorneysfeesandcosts.

The superior court granted their requests but reduced the awards slightly from the

requestedamount.

Dr.Brandnerappeals.

III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

We reviewrulingsonmotions forsummary judgment de novo, reading

therecordinthelightmostfavorabletothenon-movingpartyandmakingallreasonable

inferencesinitsfavor. 5 Wewillaffirmagrantofsummaryjudgmentwhenthereare

no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a

matteroflaw.6 Wemayaffirmthesuperiorcourt on anybasis supportedby the

record,evenifthat basiswas not considered by thecourtbeloworadvancedbyany

party.7 We review a trial courts fact-based determinations regarding whether

5 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.,322P.3d

114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quotingWitt v. State, Dept of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030,1033

(Alaska2003)).

6 Maness v. Daily,307P.3d894,900(Alaska2013)(quotingRussell ex rel.

J.N. v. Virg-In,258P.3d795,801-02(Alaska2011)).

7 Smith v. Stafford,189P.3d1065,1070(Alaska2008)(quotingGilbert M.

v. State,139P.3d581,586(Alaska2006)).

-8- 7066


9/21

attorneys fees are reasonable for an abuse of discretion.8 However, [w]e review

de novo whether the superior court correctly applied the law in awarding attorneys

fees.9

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Granting The Providers

SummaryJudgmentMotions.

In a suit alleging negligence or willful misconduct by a health care

provider, AS 09.55.540(a) requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence:

(1)thedegreeofknowledge or skillpossessedorthe

degreeofcareordinarilyexercised underthecircumstances,atthetimeoftheactcomplainedof,byhealthcareproviders

inthefieldorspecialtyinwhichthedefendantis prac ticing;

(2) that the defendant either lacked this degree of

knowledgeorskill or failed toexercise thisdegree ofcare;

and

(3)thatasaproximateresultofthislackofknowledge

or skill or the failure to exercise this degree of care the

plaintiffsuffered injuriesthatwouldnototherwisehavebeen

incurred.

Inmedicalmalpracticeactions...thejuryordinarilymayfindabreachofprofessional

dutyonlyonthebasisofexperttestimony. 10

8 Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Assn, 175 P.3d 1234, 1236 (Alaska

2008)(citingMarron v. Stromstad,123P.3d992,998(Alaska2005)).

9

Dearlove v. Campbell,301P.3d1230,1233(Alaska2013)(citingGlamannv. Kirk,29P.3d255,259(Alaska2001)).

10 Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Grp., PC,3P.3d916,919(Alaska2000)

(omissioninoriginal)(quotingKendall v. State, Div. of Corr.,692P.2d953,955(Alaska

(continued...)

-9- 7066


10/21

The superior court granted summary judgment infavorof the providers

undertwo independentrationales. First, the court concludedthatDr. Brandners only

expert,Dr. Yun,wasnotqualifiedto testifyas anexpert incardiovascular anesthesia.

Second,thecourtconcludedthat,evenifDr.Yunwerequalifiedtotestifyasanexpert

in cardiovascular anesthesia, his testimony did not make a clear causal connection

betweentheallegedmalpracticeand Dr. Brandners injuries under[any] of thestated

theoriesofliability.

Dr.Brandnercontestsbothoftheseconclusions. Withrespecttothecourts

second conclusion, Dr. Brandnerargues that if Dr. Yunhadbeenfound qualified to

testify as anexpert incardiovascular anesthesia, then there would have beengenuine

issuesofmaterial fact regardingall three allegedinstancesofmalpractice: theuseof

propofol, the two intubation attempts, and the failure to use a working TEE probe

throughoutthesurgery.

1. Dr.Brandnerproducednoexperttestimonydemonstratingthat

the standard of care had been breached with regard to his

propofolandintubationmalpracticeclaims.

Dr.Brandnercontendsthat[t]hereisagenuinedisputeoffactastowhether

theuseofthe drugpropofolandthe secondintubationattemptweresuboptimal;taken

togetherthese[support]Dr.Yunsconclusionthat[Dr.]Peasesactionsfellbelow the

standard of care. (Emphasis added.) But Dr. Brandnermischaracterizes Dr. Yuns

testimony. InhisaffidavitDr.YunstatedonlythatDr.Peases failuretouse aworking

TEE probe duringsurgery fell below the standard of care;he did not make the same

claimaboutDr.BrandnerspropofolandintubationtheoriesoraboutDr.Peasesactions

generally. AndinhisdepositiontestimonyDr.Yunexplicitlystatedthathe[couldnot]

(...continued)

1984)).

-10- 7066

10


11/21

makethe argumentthat[theuseofpropofol]wasbelowthestandardofcareandthat

takingmorethanoneattempttointubateapatientwassuboptimaland...notideal,but

notnecessarilybelowthestandardofcare. UnderAS09.55.540(a)theproviderscould

nothavebeenheldliable for eitheroftheseallegedactsofmalpracticeonthebasisof

Dr.Yunstestimony.

2. Dr. Brandner produced no evidence to supporthis claim that

thefailuretouseaworkingTEEprobethroughoutthesurgery

causedhisspecificinjuries.

Dr.YundidtestifythatDr.Peasesfailuretouse aworkingTEEprobe

andtheMedicalCentersallegedfailuretohaveaworkingbackupprobeonhandfell

belowthestandardofcare. But thesuperior court concluded thatDr.Yunfailed to

causally connecttheTEEshutdownandthe physiciansdecisiontoproceedwithouta

sparewithanyinjurysufferedby[Dr.]Brandner. Weagree.

Dr.BrandnerarguesthatDr.Yun,inhisdeposition,describe[d]theeffects

[that]the[defendants]negligencecausedto[Dr.]Brandner. Dr.Brandnercitesseveral

instancesinDr.YunsdepositiontestimonywhereDr.YunsuggestedthatDr.Brandner

probably wouldhavehadabetter outcome ifaTEEprobe hadbeenused. But when

thesestatementsarereadinthecontextofDr.Yunsfulltestimony,itbecomesclearthat

Dr.Yunwasopiningonlythatpatients in general tendtohavebetteroutcomeswhena

TEEprobe is used not thatthe failure touse aworkingTEEprobethroughoutthe

surgeryharmedDr.Brandnerspecifically. Dr.Yuntestifiedelsewhereinthedeposition:

Icantmakeanyspecificconclusions. Icanonlysay,ingeneral,thatpatientswhohave

aTEEprobeusedintheircardiacsurgerytendtodobetterthanthosewhodonot. And

whenaskedwhetherit was outsidethescopeof[his] trainingandexpertisetobeable

to testify about the impact the surgery hadon [Dr.] Brandner inhis particularcase,

Dr.Yunsimplyreplied,Yes.

-11- 7066


12/21

Asamatterofstatisticalprobability, evidencethatpatientsgenerallydo

betterwithagiventreatmentdoesnotnecessarilyprovidecausalsupport thataspecific

patientwilldobetter. TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuitrecently

examinedthe logical pitfallinherent in attemptingtoprovecausationwithregard toa

specific patient basedonstudies demonstratingcorrelation amongpatients in general.

Anexpertwitness testifiedthat the chances ofa patients recovery increasedbyover

50%whengivenadrug,andconcludedthattherefore,theplaintiffmorelikelythannot

wouldhaverecoveredhadhereceivedthedrug.Butasthatcourtexplained,

thisreasoningisstructurallyunsound. . . . Whenapersons

chancesofa betteroutcomeare 50%greaterwithtreatment

(relative tothechancesofthose whowere nottreated),thatisnotthesameasapersonhavingagreaterthan50%chance

ofexperiencingthebetteroutcomewithtreatment. The latter

meets the required standard for causation; the former does

not.[11]

In thepresentcase,Dr.Yunstated thatpatientswhohaveaTEEprobe

usedintheircardiacsurgerytendtodobetterthanthosewhodonotinotherwords,

the chances of a better outcome increase when a TEEprobe is used. But Dr. Yun

providednospecificfiguresaboutwhatpercentageofpatientsdobetter,inwhichways,

andbyhowmuch. Withoutthisinformation,Dr.Yunsstatementsaboutgeneralpatient

outcomesprovidesnosupportforDr.Brandnersspecificclaimthathisrecoverywould

havebeenbetterhadaworkingTEEprobebeenusedthroughouthissurgery.

HeretheAnesthesiaGrouppresentedan expertwhostatedthatthefailure

touseaworkingTEEprobehadnoeffectonthesurgery, andDr.Yundeclinedtooffer

testimonyto thecontrary. Theuncontestedevidencethatthe lack of a workingTEE

Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.,670F.3d21,33 (1stCir. 2012)(emphasis

added).

-12- 7066

11


13/21

probe had no impact on Dr. Brandners specific surgery overrides any marginal

relevanceofDr.Yunstestimonyaboutpatientoutcomesingeneral.

ForthesereasonsthesuperiorcourtwascorrecttoconcludethatDr.Yuns

testimony provided no evidence that the failure touse a workingTEE probe was the

likely cause of Dr. Brandners alleged injuries. Dr. Brandner pointed to no other

evidenceofcausationinhisoppositiontosummaryjudgment, nordoes heciteanysuch

evidence on appeal. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in the

providersfavor.12

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying

Dr. Brandners Request For Additional Time To Depose The

ProvidersExperts.

Priortothesuperiorcourtssummaryjudgmentruling,Dr.Brandnermoved

to depose Dr. T. AndrewBowdle,ThomasVasquez,andDr. Pease,whoseaffidavits

supported the providers summary judgment motions. The providers opposed the

motion,pointingout thatDr. Brandnerhad ample time to depose all three witnesses

beforethediscoverydeadline. ThesuperiorcourtdeniedDr.Brandnersmotionasmoot

because[his]onlyexpertcannottestifythat . . . thelackofaTEE[probe] causedany

injury to [Dr.] Brandner. Dr. Brandner contends that this order was an abuse of

discretion.

Thesuperiorcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretion. Dr.Brandnerhadproduced

noevidenceofcausation,while,incontrast,the providers submitted fouraffidavits to

supporttheirsummaryjudgmentmotion. Dr.Brandneraskedtodepose threeofthefour

witnesses,but hedidnotattempttodeposeorstrike the testimonyofDr.Beerle,who

statedthat[t]hemedicalcareprovidedbyDr.Peaseto[Dr.Brandner]wasappropriate

Becauseweaffirmthesuperiorcourtonthisbasis,wedonotreachtheissue

ofDr.Yunsqualificationsasanexpertwitness.

-13- 7066

12


14/21

inallrespectsandmetthe[s]tandardof[c]are,andthataworkingTEEwouldnothave

changed the surgeons plans to bypass the vessels chosen. Accordingly,even if the

superiorcourthadstrucktheaffidavitsofDr.Bowdle,Vasquez,andDr.Peaseintheir

entirety, the providers would have remained entitled to judgment as a matter of law

becauseDr.BrandnerproducednoevidenceofcausationtocounterDr.Beerlesexpert

testimony.

C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering

Dr.BrandnerToReimburseCostsTheAnesthesiaGroupIncurredAs

AResultOfHisMotionToContinue.

Dr.Brandnermovedforacontinuancelessthanonemonthbeforetrialwas

settobegin,largely based oncriminalcharges thatwere filedfivemonthsprior. The

superior court reluctantly granted the continuance, but specifically found that

[Dr. ] Brandner. . . violatedthepre-trialorderdeadlinesbyfailingto timely file this

motiontocontinueandsuchviolation...directlycaused...costs[totheproviders].

ThecourtorderedDr.Brandner to paythecoststhattheAnesthesiaGroupincurredas

aresultofthecontinuancewithin30days. TheAnesthesiaGroupsubmittedanaffidavit

stating that its total costs from the continuance were $27,559.38 $22,559.38 for a

temporary anesthesiologistwhowashired tocoverforDr. Pease duringtheoriginally

scheduled trial period and whose contract could not be cancelled,and $5,000 for the

cancellationfeeforoneofitsexpertwitnesses. ThecourtinitiallyorderedDr.Brandner

topaytheAnesthesiaGrouptheentiresum,thoughthecourtsubsequentlyreducedthe

costawardto$24,878becausetheAnesthesiaGroupsbillingsrevealedthattheoriginal

sumincludedtravel,hotels,carrentals,perdiem,overtime[,]andotheravoidablecosts

forthetemporaryanesthesiologistthat[t]he[c]ourtdidnotintendtoaward. Despite

this reduction,Dr. Brandner contends that the superior court abused its discretion by

awardingthesecosts.

-14- 7066


15/21

Dr. Brandner argues that it was unfair for him to pay for a temporary

anesthesiologist who was [n]ever needed. He points out that the temporary

anesthesiologistwashiredtoallowDr.Peasetoattendtrial,andheclaimsrevenueor

wagelossduetoapartyattendingatrialisnotrecoverableunderanyrule,andtherewas

nothing to showthat a [temporary anesthesiologist] wasneeded toreplaceDr. Pease,

whowasavailable[towork]whenthetrialwascontinued. Dr.Brandnerfurtherargues

thatthecostawardopensthedoorsforpartiestoclaimlossof incometoattendtrialas

acomponentofdamagesorasacomponentoflitigationcosts. Hearguesthatthecourt

penalizedhimforexercisinghis FifthAmendmentrights. Andhecontends that the

requirement that he pay the Anesthesia Group for their costs within 30 days was

inconsistent with the civil rules and amount[ed] to a[n] [unreasonable] sanction.

Theseargumentsareunpersuasive.

AlaskaCivilRule40(e)(2)grantsthesuperiorcourtsignificantdiscretion

inrequiringapartymovingforacontinuancetopaythecostsresultingfromthedelay

oftrial.13 Rule40(e)(2)provides:

Unless otherwisepermit tedby thecourt,applicationfor the

continuanceofthetrial...shallbemadetothecourtatleastfivedaysbeforethedatesetfortrial... . Ifsuchcaseisnot

trieduponthedayset,the court in its discretion may impose

such terms as it sees fit, and in addition may require the

payment of jury fees and other costs by the party at whose

request the continuance has been made. (Emphasisadded.)

Recently,inCooper v. Thompson,weaffirmedacostsawardfortravel,lodging,and. ..

attorneys hours oftrialpreparationthatwouldhavetobeduplicatedasa resultofa

13 Cooper v. Thompson,353P.3d782,796(Alaska2015).

-15- 7066


16/21

partysrequesttocontinuetrial.14 Thepurposeofawardingsuchcostsisnottopunish

thepartyrequestingacontinuance buttorequire[that]partytopayforthesefinancial

costswhenitwasresponsiblefortheneedtocontinuethetrialsoclosetothedateitwas

scheduledtobegin.15

ItisuncontestedthattheAnesthesiaGroupcommittedtopayingthesecosts

under the assumption that the trial would commence on the scheduled date. The

postponement of tha t trial, which Dr. Brandner requested and the Anesthesia Group

opposed, made the costs unnecessary but did not absolve the Anesthesia Groups

contractualdutytopaythem. AndtheAnesthesiaGroupcouldhaveavoidedcommitting

tothesecostsinthefirstplaceifDr.Brandnerhadmovedforacontinuanceearlier.

For thisreasonDr. Brandneris incorrectthat theaward opens thedoors

forparties to claim loss of incometo attendtrial asacomponentofdamagesorasa

componentoflitigationcosts. Affirmingthecosts awardhere merely recognizes that

when a partys delay in filing a motion to continue causes another party to incur

nonrefundablecoststhatcouldhavebeenavoidedhadthemotionbeenfiledearlier,the

superior court hasdiscretiontoassignthose costs to themovingparty. Itinno way

affects the general rule that such costs are normally each partys respective

responsibility.16

14 353P.3dat796. AswiththeAnesthesiaGroupscostsinthepresentcase,

thetravelandlodgingcostsinCooper werenotcostsanopposingpartywouldnormally

berequiredtobearunderRule79. See AlaskaR.Civ.P.79(f)(listingcoststhatmaybe

awardedtoaprevailingparty).

15 Id.

16 Cf. AlaskaR.Civ.P.79(f)(listofcoststhatmaybeawardedtoprevailing

partydoes notincludecosts associatedwithgrantofcontinuance,suchas fees incurred

forcancellationofexpertwitnesses).

-16- 7066


17/21

Dr. Brandner is also incorrect that the imposition of these costs was

intendedtopenalize[] himforexercisinghis Fifth Amendmentrights. The superior

courts order explicitly stated: The delay in filing the motion not the fact that

[Dr.]Brandnerhaddecidedtoexercisehis[Fifth]Amendmentrights...isthedirect

causeofthe.. .cost[s]unnecessarily[in]curred.. .. And whenthe superiorcourt

reduced the costs award on reconsideration, the court reiterated that [i]t was the

[c]ourtsintentiontoawardonlycoststhatcouldnotbeavoidedbecauseofthedilatory

filing ofthemotiontocontinue. (Emphasisadded.) Thereissimplynoevidenceinthe

record that the superior court intended to punish Dr. Brandner for exercising a

constitutionalright.

Dr. Brandner also argues the requirement that he pay the Anesthesia

Groupscostswithin30dayswasintendedtosanctionhimandwasinconsistentwith

the civil rules. ButRule 40(e)(2) grants the superior court significant discretion to

imposesuchtermsasitseesfitandtorequirethepaymentof...costsbytheparty

atwhoserequestthecontinuancehasbeenmade. Settinga30-daydeadlinewaswithin

thecourtsdiscretioninthismatter.

Dr.Brandnerfinallyarguesthat[i]fthiscostistobeimposed,[he]should

atleastbeallowedtodeposethebillingdepartmentof[theproviders]expertand[the]

Anesthesia Grouptofindoutwhat,ifanything,waspaidandwhat incomewas earned

asaresultofusinga[temporaryanesthesiologist]andDr.Pease[simultaneously]once

trialwascontinued. Dr.Brandnermadethisargumentbefore thesuperiorcourt,which

rejecteditwhilenotingthat[Dr.Brandner] is entitled toacopyof[the]documentary

proof of payment, which defendants shall timely provide. The courts order wasreasonable. Thereislittlereasontothinkthedemandforanesthesianecessarilyincreases

withthe supplyofanesthesiologists. And the AnesthesiaGroupdidprovide proofof

payment,whichalready resulted inthereductionof thecosts award. Thecourt could

-17- 7066


18/21

reasonably conclude that Dr. Brandners request for depositions on this matter was

excessiveandunreasonable.

Forthesereasons,weaffirmtheimpositionofcosts toDr.Brandnerunder

Rule40(e)(2).

D. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding

AttorneysFees.

The superiorcourt awardedattorneys fees to the providers pursuant to

Rule 82,which provides inpart that [i]n cases [resolvedwithout trial] inwhich the

prevailing party recovers no money judgment, the court shall award the prevailing

party . . . 20 percentof its actual attorneys fees whichwerenecessarily incurred.17

Dr.Brandnerarguesthattheawardswereexcessiveandthatthecourtfailedtoprovide

explanationforthereasoningbehinditsawards. Theseargumentsarewithoutmerit.

Asaninitialmatter,Dr.Brandnerarguesthattheprovidersattorneysfees

werefaciallyexcessivegiventhatthecaseinvolved[only]sixdepositionsandalimited

motionforsummaryjudgment. But thisargumentignoresthefactthatthecasenearly

wentto trial,andthatDr.Brandnerclaimeddamagesofapproximately$1,681,065 plus

$466,905yearly infuturelostearningcapacity. Thusthesuperiorcourtcouldreasonablyconclude that the providers attorneys total billings, $240,456, were not facially

unreasonable.

Dr.Brandneralsoraises fourspecificcriticismsregardingDr.Peaseandthe

AnesthesiaGroupsbillings. Werejecttheseargumentsaswell.

First, Dr. Brandner criticizes Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Groups

attorneys for reviewing the same chart notes and medical records . . . on multiple

occasions. Butthesedocumentswerethecriticalevidenceinthiscase,uponwhichboth

AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2).

-18- 7066

17


19/21

sides expert testimony relied. Dr. Brandner has not demonstrated that it was

unreasonable for the providersattorneys to review in depthcritical documents upon

whichbothsidesexpertsrelied.

Second, Dr. Brandnercriticizes the attorneysbillings forjointmeetings

withcounselfor[theMedicalCenter],andworkwithexpertsnotusedinthiscase. But

because the providers interests and legal defenses were largely aligned, it seems

reasonablethattheywouldwanttheirattorneystomeettocoordinatelegalstrategy. As

fortheexperts,Dr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGroupexplainedtothecourtthat[h]adthe

case progressed to trial,each [expert] would have testified. Dr. Brandner does not

explainwhyobtainingtheopinionsofexpertsnotultimatelycalledtotestifyattrialwas

inanywayunreasonable ina case thatwas resolvedbeforetrial and turnedonexpert

testimony.

Third,Dr.Brandnercriticizestheattorneysfortimespentinvestigatinghis

criminalcase,whichheclaimshadnothingtodowiththiscase. ButDr.Peaseandthe

AnesthesiaGrouptoldthesuperiorcourt that[t]hedefendantsweretryingtountangle

Dr. Brandners complicated financial picture as a part of defending [against] his

multimillion dollar loss of earnings claim, and that [Dr.] Brandner . . . used his

criminalissuesasabasisforalastminutecontinuance[,]whichalsorequiredthecourt

andthedefendantstodelveintothose issues . GiventherelevanceofDr.Brandners

criminal indictment to the case, Dr. Brandner has not demonstrated that it was

unreasonablefortheattorneystobilltimespentinvestigatingtheissue.

Finally, Dr. Brandner criticizes the attorneys for billing time spent

preparing the 2012 motion for summary judgment, which was later withdrawn. ButDr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGrouppointedoutthatsummaryjudgmentwaseventually

granted for the same reasons advancedintheoriginalsummary judgment motion, and

they maintained that [a]ll the work whichwent into the original motion was utilized

-19- 7066


20/21

whenfilingthe second, successfulsummary judgmentmotion. Dr. Brandnerhasnot

demonstratedthatthesuperiorcourterredinawardingfeesfortimespentpreparingthe

originalsummaryjudgmentmotion.

InadditiontodisputingDr.PeaseandtheAnesthesiaGroupslegalbillings,

Dr. Brandner argues that the attorneys fees awards should be remanded because the

superiorcourtprovidednoexplanationofthereasoningbehind[theMedicalCenters]

award and granted Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Groups attorneys fees request

withoutrulingon[his]objections.

Thecourtwasnotobligedtoprovidereasonsforrejectingoraccepting18

Dr.Brandnersspecificbillingobjections.19 Itistruethat[i]f the [superior] court

deviates from [the Rule 82(b) percent award] formula, it must provide a written

explanation for doing so.20 But there is no indication here that the superior court

deviated fromthatformula. Instead, itappears that the superiorcourtdeterminedthe

actual attorneys fees which were necessarily incurred,21 accepting some of

Dr. Brandners objections intheprocess,andapplied the proper formula tothat sum.

18 It appears that the superior court did accept some of Dr. Brandners

objections. TheMedicalCenterreportedthatithadincurred$110,355.50inattorneys

fees and was entitled to an award of $22,071.10; the court awarded $20,616.10.

Dr. Pease and the Anesthesia Group reported that they had incurred $130,100 in

attorneysfeesandwereentitledtoanawardof$26,020;thecourtawarded$25,380.

19 Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of fact and conclusions of law are

unnecessaryondecisionsofmotionsunderRules 12or56 oranyothermotionexcept

asprovidedinRule41(b).).

20 Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d300,305 (Alaska2000)

(citingAlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(3)).

21 AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2).

-20- 7066


21/21

[T]he[superior]courtisundernoobligationtogivereasonsforanawardthatcomplies

withthepercentagesexpressedinRule82(b)(2).22

V. CONCLUSION

The superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to the

defendants because Dr. Brandner did not produce any evidence that the defendants

actionscausedhis injuries . Nordidthesuperiorcourtabuseitsdiscretioninordering

Dr.Brandnertopayattorneysfeesandcostsassociatedwithhismotiontocontinue. We

thereforeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourtsjudgment.

Nichols,6P.3dat305.

-21- 7066

22

Date post:	01-Mar-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	scribd-government-docs
View:	221 times
Download:	0 times

Brandner v. Pease, Alaska (2015)

Documents