Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power_ Action, Choice and Responsibilities

8/11/2019 Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power_ Action, Choice and Responsibilities

1/21

Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and ResponsibilitiesAuthor(s): Maria Regina Soares De Lima and Mnica HirstSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 82, No. 1,Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great Powers (Jan., 2006), pp. 21-40Published by: Wileyon behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs

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2/21

Brazil

s an intermediatetate

nd

regional

power: ction,hoice ndresponsibilities

MARIAREGINA SOARES DE LIMA

AND MONICA

HIRST*

Since

the

early

years

of

the twentieth

entury

Brazil's

major

foreignpolicy

aspiration

as been to achieve nternational

ecognition

n

accordance

with ts

belief

hat t should assume ts

natural'role as a

'big

country'

n world

affairs.

Brazil's

desire

o influence

nternationalules nd

regimes

nd to be considered

a

majorplayer

has been understood

rincipally

n

terms

f

ts oft

ower:

it

has

consistently

schewed the

development

of hard

power,

and

especially

of

military ower.

Rather,

ts claim to

greater

nfluence

as been

associatedwith

other classical

power

attributes,

uch

as

territory,

opulation

and economic

profile.

ts location in a

relatively eaceful

regional

environment,

he

early

settlement f its territorial emands and

border

disputes,

nd its

consequent

position

as

a

status

uo power

withinthe

regionalso

help

to account

for

ts

aspiration

o

what

one

might

all a

middle

ground

nternationalole.

Although

the bases for an

autonomous

foreign olicy

have

become

more

restrictedn the

post-Cold

War

period,

Brazil

still seeks to

preserve

an

independent

oice withinthe

international

ommunity

nd a certain evel

of

independent apacity

to determine

ts actions.

In

addition,

the

country

has

demonstrated clear ntention f

wanting

o

expand

the roles that t

plays

nd

the

responsibilities

hat t

assumes-in

regional

olitics,

n

Third

World

agendas

and

in

multilateralnstitutions. ecent indications

f this nclude

ts nitiative

towards he

creation

f a

South America

Community;

tsactivist

olicies

and

positions

n

both

hemispheric

rade

negotiations

nd

global

trade

ora;

ts fforts

to

deepen

relations

with

major

world

powers

such as

as China and

Russia;

its

desire to build

up

South-South

coalitions,

particularly

ith

India and South

Africa;

he

promotion

f its own candidates

o

head

both the

WTO and

the

Inter-Development

ank;

and ts

campaign

o

become a

permanent

member

f

an

expanded

UN

Security

ouncil

(UNSC).

Moreover,

s

democracy eepens

itsroots

within he

country,

razil

has

attempted

o linkan

increasingly

ctivist

stance

n world affairs ith

political

upport

t home for more active

partisan

involvement n

foreign olicy.

In this

context,

he

government's ight

gainst

poverty

nd

unequal

income

distributiont

home

and its assertive nd activist

foreign

olicy

can

be

viewed

as two sides of the same coin.

International

ffairs2,

I

(2006)

21-40

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3/21

Maria

Regina

oares e Lima and

Monica

Hirst

Althoughmany

ommentators ave noted the

ong-term tability

f

Brazil-

ian

foreign olicy,

there s no

question

that,

ince the

nauguration

f the

Lula

administrationn

January

003,

change

has

predominated

ver

continuity.

he

inclusion fthe socialagendaas a majortopicofforeignffairs as one of the

first

ndmost

mportant

nnovations.

n

addition,

Brazil has come to

lay

much

greater

mphasis

n the need for

both the

conceptual

evision

nd the

practical

reformf

major

multilateral

nstitutions,

specially

he

UN,

and has

expressed

particular

oncern over

the

unequal

distributionf

power

and wealth within

such nstitutionsnd the

distortionshat he

existing

ramework

mposes.

In this

rticlewe

provide

n

overview f the core features

fBrazilian

oreign

policy,focusing

upon

four

aspects:

i)

the

instrumental ature of

Brazilian

foreignpolicy and its close relationshipwith the country's conomic and

development

bjectives;

2)

the

country's

ommitment

o

multilateralism;

3)

the

growing

mportance

orBrazil

of

regionalpolitics

nd

security;

nd

(4)

the

recentevolution

of Brazil's

relationswith the

United States.The

conclusion

will

review the main

challenges

facing

Brazil

and the

difficulty

f

matching

increased

mbitionwith concrete

results.

The

eterminantsf

oreign

olicy

nd he

rimacy

f

evelopment

One of the

most

mportant

actors

haping

Brazil's

foreign

olicy

has been its

location n

the

western

emisphere.

he

regionhas

historically

een

subject

o

US

power

and

to

high

evels of

US cultural nd

economic

influence.

Never-

theless,

xcept

during

he

Second World

War,

South America

has been

of

only

limited

trategic

alue to

Washington.

At

thesame

time,

he

regional

ontext

has

represented

source of

stability

orBrazil.

By

the

early art

f

thetwentieth

century

razil

had

peacefully

ettled ll

of its

outstanding

erritorial

isputes

with neighbouring ountries. As a result,for over

I oo00

yearsBrazil has

considered

tself

'geopolitically

atisfied'

ountry

nd,

in

marked

ontrast o

other

states n

the

region,

ts

state-building

rocess

has

been

the

result

of

successful

iplomaticnegotiation

ather

han

engagement

n

military

isputes.

This

peculiar

combination f location within

the

backyard

f the

United

States and a

stable

regional

environment

xplains

many

of the

perceptions

shared

by

the

Brazilian

elites

who

constitute he

foreign

olicy

community.'

Foreign

hreats

nd

risks

re

perceived

o be driven

basically

y

economic

and

notmilitary/securityotivations. he mainexternal ulnerabilitiesreecono-

mic,

and

foreign

olicy

has

always

hada

strongly

evelopmentalist

omponent.

As a

result,

he core

of theBrazilian

oreign olicy genda

has

been

very

heavily

shaped

by

the

prevailing

conomic

model,

and the

evolutionof

foreign

olicy

has

been linked o

critical

unctures

n

the

development

f that

model. Critical

Forthe

oncept

f

foreignolicy

ommunity,

ee

Amaury

e

Souza,

A

agenda

nternacional

o

Brasil: m

estudo obre

comunidade

rasileira

e

politica

xterna',

entre or razilian

nternational

Relations

CEBRI),

Rio de

Janeiro,

imeo,

002.

It ncludes

membersfthe

xecutive,

ongress

nd

judiciary,

eading

ocialmovements

nd nterest

roups,

on-governmentalrganizations,

businesspeople,ournalistsndacademics.

22



4/21

Brazil as an

intermediatetate nd

regionalower

junctures

re

brought

bout

by

a combination f

systemic

nd

domestic hange:

they

are momentswhen the

prevailing

attern

f both

domesticeconomic

development

nd international

resence

reach

their

exhaustion nd when a

new winningcoalition is constituted hat eads to changesin both foreign

economic

policy

and

foreign

olicy.2

Two of

these ritical

onjunctures

an

be

identifiedn the

past century:

he firstn

the

1930s,

with thecrisis fthe

agro-

exporting

model and its

replacement y

an

import

ubstitutionmodel

(ISI);

and the

second

in the

I990s,

with the

exhaustion of the

'protected

industrialization'

egime

and

its

replacement

by

a model of

competitive

integration

nto the

globaleconomy.

Brazil ndustrialized

apidly uring

he second half

f the

twentieth

entury

and thecountrywas one ofthemost uccessfulxamples f mport ubstitution

industrialization.

he

major

characteristicsf this

development

model were a

central ole forthe state n

regulation,

n the

provision

of

incentives,

nd in

production;

elative iscrimination

gainst

mports;

nd

large-scale

articipation

of

foreign

irect nvestmentn a

wide

range

of

industrial

ectors.

n

the

I96os

and

1970s

an

export component

was added

to this

development

strategy.

Foreignpolicy

became an

important

nstrument

f the

ISI

model,

and this n

turn

helped

to fuelBrazilian

demands

for

differentialreatment

or

developing

countriesnthetrade egime, or hecreation f a Generalized ystem f Prefer-

ences

GSP)

for

developing

ountries'

xports,

nd

also for he

opening

of new

markets nd the

expansion

ofeconomic

cooperation

with southern ountries.

Development paths

create new

ideas,

interests nd

institutions. nce

a

country

moves down a

particular

ath,

these become

very

hard to

dislodge.

The

international

onditions hat ontributed o

the

emergence

f a

particular

development

path

may

evolve or even

disappear,

ut

without

changing

he

institutions,

nterests nd ideas

linked to that

trajectory.

Development

trajectoriesre therefore ath dependent.This is certainlyrue n the case of

Brazil,

and it

is this

which

helps explain

the

stability

nd

continuity

f the

country's

oreign olicy during

he

SI

period. Analytically,

his

ontinuity

as

been

understood

n

various

ways:

in

termsof the

material nterests f the

dominantsocietal

coalition that

supported

SI;

as a function

f the relative

bureaucraticnsulation

f

the

foreignministry,

tamaraty,

nd its

promotion

f

a

particular

et of

foreign

olicy

deas;

as theresult f

paradigmatic

esilience'

and the

way

in

which

past

ideas continued to influence

he world-view of

Braziliandecision-makers;nd as a consequenceof the close linkbetween the

international

dentity

f Brazil

and its

foreign

olicy

orientation.3

he

role of

2

For

the

oncept

fcritical

unctures,

ee RuthCollier nd David

Collier,

haping

he

olitical

rena:

critical

unctures,

he

abor

movement,

nd

regimeynamics

n LatinAmerica

Princeton,

J:

Princeton

University

ress,

99I).

3

Fordistinct

xplanations

f

Brazilian

oreignolicy's

elative

tability

nd

continuity,

ee

Maria

Regina

Soares e

Lima,

Institui6coesemocriticas

politica

xterior',

ontextontemacional2:

2,

July-Dec.

2000,

pp.

265-303;

MarcoAntonio

Muxagata

e

Carvalho

ieira,

Ideias

institui6coes:

ma

reflexao

sobre

politica

xterna

rasileirao inicioda

decadade

90o',

ontexto

nternacional

3:

2,

July-Dec.

2001,

pp.

245-91;

Celso

Lafer,

identidade

nternacional

o

Brasil

a

politica

xterna

rasileira

Sao

Paulo:

Editora erspectiva,

001).

23



5/21

Maria

Regina

oares

e

Lima

nd

Mdnica

irst

Itamaraty

s

especially

mportant. lthough

t

was not

an

institution

reated

by

the

ISI

development

model,

it

was

central to the model's

domestic

consolidation nd international

ecognition.

close andvirtuousinkwas seen

to be established etween thegoals of ISI and theobjectiveofdeveloping n

autonomous

foreign olicy.

Two

consequences

follow

from his. n the

first

place,

Itamaraty enerated

onsiderable

omestic

egitimacy hrough

ts

roleas

one of the main nstrumentsor he

country's

evelopment.

econd,

Itamaraty

acquired

a

powerful

'institutional

memory'

in which

many

of the

characteristics

nd

values associated with ISI retained their influence and

attractivenessven

after he decline

of

that

particular evelopment

model.4

The

nextcritical

uncture

ame

as

recently

s the

1990s,

when

policy

hifted

as a resultof both severeeconomic conditions nd the systemic onstraints

producedby

the

fiscal

risis f the

state-although

tshouldbe stressed hat he

process

of structural

djustment

nd the

progress

f

economic

reformwere

more

gradual

and incremental han

in other Latin American states uch

as

Argentina

nd Mexico.

The

crisis

n the

development ath

took

place

within

the

context

f

both

the end

of the Cold

War and the

final

tages

f the

military

regime

hathad ruled he

country

rom

964

to

I985.

Shiftsneconomic

policy

and the

emergence

of

a new

domestic

political

and constitutional rder had

importantmplicationsor oreign olicy.A majorconsequenceof these hanges

was the

development

f the idea of

autonomy

through

articipation'.

With

this

conceptual

nnovation

foreignpolicy

retained ts desire

for

autonomy'

but,

at

the

same

time,

ought

o remove the

egacy

of

authoritarianism

nd

to

respond

to the international

ower

of

global

liberalism.

uring

the

military

period

the

country

had

adopted

a

very

defensive

posture

towards

many

international

egimes, specially

hose

dealing

with human

rights,

he

control

of sensitive

echnology

nd nuclear

non-proliferation.5

uring

the

I99os

this

defensive osturewas replacedbytheview that t had become imperative or

Brazil to

participate

ully

n all international

egimes.

Although

he I99OS can be considered new critical

uncture

for

Brazilian

foreign olicy,

his

has

not been

followed

by

the

creation f

a clear or uncon-

tested consensus.

A

survey

conducted

with membersof the

foreignpolicy

community

t the end of the Cardoso

government

n

2002 showed an

elite

consensus round the

aspiration

or

the

country

o

play

an

influential ole

in

international

ffairs,

ut a cleardivision

with

respect

o

the

meansof

achieving

thisgoal. Two alternativemodels could be identified. he first ould be called

the

search

for

credibility,

nd

placed

emphasis

n the need to see the

country

from

he outside.On this

view,

Brazil

does not have a

'power surplus'

nd,

n

4

Jose

Maria

Arbilla,

Arranjos

nstitucionais

mudanca

onceitual as

politicas

xternas

rgentina

brasileira',

ontextontemacional

2:

2,

July-Dec.

000,

pp.

337-85.

5

Forthe

oncept

f

autonomyhrougharticipation',

ee Gelson

onsecaJr,

Alguns spectos

a

politica

externarasileira

ontemporanea',

n

Gelson

onseca

r,

legitimidade

outras

uestoes

nternacionais.

Poder etica ntres

nafoes

Sao

Paulo:Paz

e

Terra,

996),

p.

353-74.

Forthe

ontrasting

desire or

autonomy',

ee Leticia

inheiro,

Traidos

elo

desejo:

umensaio obre teoria a

pritica

a

politica

externarasileiraontemporinea',ontextonternacional2:

2,

July-Dec. 000,pp.305-35.

24



6/21

Brazil

as an

intermediatetate nd

regional

ower

consequence,

increasing

national

autonomy

'derives

from

the

capacity

to

cooperate

n

the creationof rulesand

institutions'.6

ecovering

international

confidence nd

credibility

s also

dependent

pon

successful omestic conomic

stabilizationndpolicyreform. he other trategyaysmore direct mphasis n

the

goal

of

autonomy,

and seeks both

greater

projection

of the

country

internationally

nd the maintenance

f

foreign olicy flexibility.

t

defends n

'active

development

policy',

collaborationwith

countries f similar nterests'

and the

need

to 'articulate national

project

focused

on

overcoming

omestic

social

mbalances'.7

Although

the Lula

government

as

adopted

an

orthodox macroeconomic

policy

that

s

actually

quite

similar o

that of

the Cardoso

government,

ts

foreign olicyhas moved significantly,lthoughnot completely, owards his

more

autonomy-focused

trategy.

hus,

developmentgoals

have once more

been

reincorporated

n

Brazil's

foreign olicy.

The

IBSA

initiative,

aunched

n

June

2003

and

drawing ogether

ndia,

Brazil and

South

Africa,

emonstrate

not

only

the renewed

centrality

f

developmentgoals

but also a

renewed

emphasis

on

South-South

cooperation.

This initiative riesto

combine the

classical

themes of

South-South

cooperation-especially

development,

the

fight gainst

overty

nd

the defence f

multilateralism-with

he

commitment

to institutionsnddemocratic alues. n thecontext fgrowing rotectionism

and of

increasingly

ifficult ccess to

northern

markets,

he economic

and

commercial

gains

from

ooperation

with

southern

ountrieshave

become of

increased

trategicmportance

o Brazil.8

A

strongreference

or

multilateralism

Active

nvolvement

n

multilateral

nstitutionsnd

arenashasbeen

a constant

characteristic f Brazilian foreignpolicy since the end of the nineteenth

century.

razil was

the

only

South

Americannation

to take

part

n

the

First

World War

as

a

belligerent

ountry,

nd

this

ssured

ts

presence

at the

Paris

peace

conference n

I919.

Brazil

sought

to reform

he

incipient

collective

security

ystem

reated

by

the

League

of

Nations. t

presented

tself

s

a

medi-

atorbetween

the

greatpowers

and the

smaller

ations,

efending

he

rights

f

the atter

nd,

simultaneously,

ositioning

tself o

assume status

quivalent

o

that

of

the

former.9 razil

also

participated

ctively

n

the main

conferences

that led to the multilateral rder created after 945. The countrywas a

founding

member

f

the

United

Nations and

one of the

23

founding

athersf

GATT,

as well as one of

the

56

nations

epresented

n

the TO

(International

6

See

de

Souza,

'A

agenda

internacional o

Brasil',

p.

22.

7

See de

Souza,

'A

agenda

internacional o

Brasil',

pp.

23-5.

For a defence

of South-South

cooperation

along

these

ines,

see

Celso

Amorim,

A

politica

externa

do

governo

ula',

paper resentedy

Ambassador

elso

Amorim t

a

conference

n the

London

choolof

Economics,

in

Pol'tica xterna

3:

I,

June-Aug.

2004,

p. I6I.

9

See

Eugenio

V.

Garcia,

Brasil a

Liga

das

Nafoes

1919-1926)

Porto

Alegre/Brasilia:

d. da

Universidade/UFRGS/FUNAG,

000).

25



7/21

Maria

Regina

oares

e

Lima and

MOnica irst

Trade

Organization)

n

Havana.

In

general,

eveloping

ountries'

articipation

in

the institutional

ramework

f

the

post-1945

order was influenced

y

the

dual

objectives

of

promoting

conomic

development

nd

deepeningpolitical

autonomy.Brazil certainly itted hispattern, lthough tspoliticalactivism

within he Third World

coalitions f

the I96os

and

1970s,

particularly

ithin

UNCTAD and

GATT,

tended

to

concentrate

on

economic ratherthan

political bjectives.I?

During

the

Cold War Brazil

adopted

a

low-keyposition

n matters f nter-

national

peace

and

security

nd

it

was

only

in the

followingperiod

thatthe

country

ame to assume

a more

proactive

tance.

n

contrast,

ts role

in

trade

and

developmentnegotiations

asbeen

consistently

ctive since

1945.

Along-

side countries uchas IndiaandMexico, Brazilplayed prominent art n the

coordination

f

Third World

coalitions,

aking leading

role

especially

n the

Group

of

77.

From the

I96os

to

the

beginning

f

the

I98os,

Brazil

did not

assume the

role

of demandeurn the

trade

regime,

nd its

nvolvement n the

negotiation

f

specific

rade ssueswas limited.

Nevertheless,

t

stood

strongly

for

he defence

f

certain

rinciples,

uch as

a

preference

or trade

egime ased

on the norm of

cooperation

nd

development

as

stressed

within

UNCTAD)

in

opposition

to

the

open

market

principles

hatdominated

GATT;

strong

support or radenorms uch as non-discriminationnd most favourednation

(MFN)

status

s a

way

of

seeking

o curb the

arbitrary

easures nd unilateral

and

protectionist

ction

of the

ndustrialized

ountries;

trong

upport

or

the

implementation

f

rules

favouring

eveloping

ountries,

specially pecial

and

differential

reatment,

nd

non-reciprocity;

nd

political

alignment

with the

G77

on other

multilateral

gendas.

From

the late

1970S

Brazil's dominant

position

has been one of

damage

limitation,

s

it

has tried o

delay,

or even

to

block,

the

introduction f

new

trade rules and proceduresthatwould

(i)

introduce differentiationmong

developing

countries;

2)

weaken multilateral

ules;

and

(3)

make domestic

policies

and

substantive omestic

practices

more

tightly ubject

to the

legal

disciplines

f the

international

rade

regime.

During

the

Tokyo

Round,

for

example,

ne of

the mainBrazilian

goals

was to avoid

the

elimination f differ-

ential treatement

or

the more

developed among developing

countries.

Another

majorgoal

in

negotiations

was to

strengthen

he

multilateral

ystem,

especially

he MFN

clause

n

the various

non-tariffarrier odes

(NTB),

some

of them of great nterest o Brazil,such as thoseon anti-dumpingmeasure,

subsidies nd

countervailing

uties,

and

safeguards.

etween the end of the

Tokyo

Round and the

beginning

f the

Uruguay

Round,

countries uch as

Brazil and India

actively ooperated,

n the

Gio,

on a

coordinated

damage

IO

See

Marcelo e Paiva

Abreu,Brazil,

he

GATT,

and theWTO:

history

nd

prospects',aper

resented

to seminar

n The

internationalelations

fBrazil: ew

possibilities

ndold

constraints',

entre or

Brazilian

tudies

f

Oxford

niversity,

t

Antony's

ollege,

Oxford,

5-6

March

999.

See

Ricardo

U.

Sennes,Brasil,

Mexico

e

India

na

Rodada

Uruguai

o

GATT e no Conselho e

Seguranqa

a

ONU:

um estudo obre s

paises

ntermediarios',

octoral

issertation,

niversity

f

Sao

Paulo,Brazil,

00I,

p. 157.

26



8/21

Brazil

as an intermediate

tate

nd

regionalower

limitation

trategy

o

counter he

US

initiative o include

a

range

of new issues

(intellectual

property,

services and

investments)

in

multilateraltrade

negotiations.

he

Uruguay

Round

demonstrated he limitsof this

damage

limitation trategynd highlightedhedangerofpolitical solationwithin he

'coalition of the weak'.

During

the

Uruguay

Round,

the trade

agenda

became

wider and more

complex,

and

the

very

structure

f the

negotiationprocess

was modified.

Negotiations

moved

beyond

traditional

order measures

mutual

tariffon-

cessions)

and

increasingly

nvolved

new

policy

commitments hat would

inevitably

ave

major domestic

epercussions.

hese

changes

ed to

the

crisis f

the

G77

and

political

division

mong developing

countries,

nd

to the emer-

gence of new coalitions nvolvingboth developingand developed countries,

such as the Cairns

Group.I2

From

I988

onwards,

developing

countries ntro-

duced

greater lexibility

nto their

negotiating osture,mainly

s a result f the

generalized

risis

f

their

revious

development aths

nd

bargainingtrategies.

The

politicaldisintegration

f the

G77,

together

with the

bandwagon

effect f

the new

changes,

rought

ome the imits f the old Third

Worldist

rinciples

and

positions

nd underlined he

degree

o which

material

nterests,

ather

han

simply

hared

principles,

re needed to hold coalitions

together.

At

least to

some degree,the formation f the G20 coalition at the Cancfunmeeting n

2003

represented

revivalof the Third

World coalition

spirit, lthough

now

focused

on

the

specific

gricultural

nterests

f the

developing

countries.The

creation of the

G20

was an

opportunity

or Brazil

to

renew

its

role

as an

'indispensablentermediary'

etween the weak' and the

'strong'.

But if

the

G20 involves choes of

the

past,

t also

puts

Brazil n a new

position

during

he

Doha round as

a

demandeur

n

agricultural

ssues.

This,

in

turn, s theresult f

the

strong ompetitiveness

f ts

agricultural

xports,

s

well

as the

emphasis

t

has traditionally laced on procedural ssues within the WTO, on norms

regarding

market

ccess,

and on the

importance

f

strengthening

ultilateral

rules.

3

The

current tate f

global

governance

oses

a

series f difficult

ilemmas or

the new

influentials'

n

the

South.

It is

certainly

hecase

that urther

evelop-

ment

of the

multilateral

rade and

security

ystemdepends

on their

active

participation,

nd

this should

give

them

a

significant

egree

of

influence.

However,

their

osition

s

challenged

oth

by

the fact hat

hey

an

no

longer

count on thefull upportof the coalition of the weak' and by therangeof

other mechanisms

bilateral,

egional

or even

unilateral)

y

which the most

powerful

tates re able to defend

heir nterests.

Over the

past

few

years

he United

Nations has faced

ncreasing

ressure

or

institutional eform nd for

the democratization f its

decision-making ro-

cesses.Brazil

has

arguedpowerfully

hat

he UN should

add social welfare

nd

12

See

Sennes,Brasil,

Mexico e India

na Rodada

Uruguai

o

GATT e no

Conselho e

Seguranca

a

ONU',

p.

I48.

13SeeAbreu,Brazil,heGATT, and theWTO'.

27



9/21

Maria

Regina

oares e Lima and M6nicaHirst

economic

development

o its

well-established

oncerns or

ntemational

eace

and

security.

n the 96os

Brazil

was an active

participant

fthe discussions f the

Disarmament

Committee,

but refused o

sign

the Non-Proliferation

reaty

(NPT), which it saw as a clear-cutexpression f the tendency owardsthe

'freezing

f world

power'.

After he end

of the Cold

War, however,

Brazil

abandoned tsdefensive tance owards nternational

on-proliferationegimes,

joining

the

Missile

Technology

Control

Regime

(MTCR)

in

I994

and

ratify-

ing

the

NPT

in

1998.

At the same

time,

Brazilalso

supported

heenhancement

of multilateral

nitiatives,

articularly

he

expanded

role of the UN in

peacekeeping perations.

razil

participated

n the

UN ObserverMission

n El

Salvador

(ONUSAL),

in the

UN Observer

Mission

in

Mozambique

(ONUMOZ) and in the UN Mission nAngola (UNAVEM) to which tsent

1,300

soldiers-the

largest

military

orce t

has

sent

abroad since the Second

World

War. Brazil

also contributed

olice

forces

o the

999

UN

peace

opera-

tion

n

East

Timor

and in

2004

led the UN

peacekeeping

mission

n

Haiti.

As a

non-permanent

member,

Brazil was absentfrom he

Security

ouncil

for

20

years

etween

968

and

I988.

The first ate

coincideswiththe

Brazilian

refusal o

sign

the

NPT,

the second with the

re-establishment

f

democracy

n

Brazil n

the

form f a new

constitution. ince

then,

he

pattern

f

ts

nvolve-

menthas changed dramatically. ogetherwith ndia,Brazil s one of thetwo

non-permanent

membersthat have

occupied

seats on

the

Council for the

greatest

ength

of

time between

1945

and

I996:

14

non-consecutive

years

n

the case of Brazil and

12 in

that f India.'4

Brazilian oncerns

egarding

he UN

reform

genda

have focusedon three

main

aspects,

ll of

which

reflect

ong-standing

oncerns:

he

reinforcementf

multilateral

rinciples

nd

norms,

articularly

n

respect

f authorization or he

use of coercive

nstruments,

s foreseen

n

Chapter

VII of

the

UN

Charter;

he

needto findwaysto re-establishheconceptual rontieretweenpeacekeeping

and

peace

enforcement;

nd a reformulationf the

decision-making

tructure

of the

Security

Council

in order to increase ts

representativeness

nd

legiti-

macy

in the

post-Cold

War order.15

he

country's elf-image

s

a

mediator

between

weak

and

strong

nd

its use of

parliamentary'iplomacy

re

seen as

viable means of

achieving

more nfluentialole.'6

For

Brazil,

the

reinforcementf the

uridical

and

parliamentary

tructure

f

the UN

system

s more

necessary

han ver

given

the

present nipolar

rder.'7

Thus it hasexpressed oncern t the erosionof the distinctionetweenpeace-

keeping

nd

peace

enforcement

perations

n the

definition

f

coercive ctions

undertaken nder

ChapterVII,

and has

strongly

efended he

principle

f

non-

I4

See

Sennes,

Brasil,

Mexico

e Indiana Rodada

Uruguai

o GATT

e no

Conselho

e

Seguranca

a

ONU',

p.

96.

IS

See Celso

Amorim,

Entre

desequilibrionipolar

a

multipolaridade:

Conselho

e

Seguranca

a

ONU

no

periodo 6s-guerra

ria',

n

G.

Dupas

and

T.

Vigevani,

ds,

0 Brasil

as novas imensoesa

seguranfa

ntemacional

Sao

Paulo: Editora

Alfa-Omega,

I999),

pp.

87-98.

I6

See

Lafer,

identidadenternacional

o

Brasil

a

politica

xterna.

i7

SeeAmorim,Entre desequilibrionipolar a multipolaridade',. 93.

28



10/21

Brazil as an intermediate

tate nd

regional

ower

intervention,

he

pacific

esolution f

disputes,

nd an

emphasis

n the economic

roots of

security

ssues.Brazil

has been concernedabout

the

multiplication

f

sanctions

regimes

and has stressed he

necessity

hat sanctionsreceive both

authorizationndappropriateegulation. razil has also underlined heneed to

improve

nternational

ooperation

for

development,

within the set of non-

coercive

mediating

ctions.

Finally,

Brazil's

support

orthe reform f the

decision-making

tructure f

the

Security

Council

is intertwined

with

its insistence n

the

need

to

give

substance

nternationally

o the democratic alues cherished

y

the

nternational

community.

Brazil's

aspiration

o

occupy

a

permanent

eat

on

the

Security

Council

was

officially

nnounced

n

I994

by

the

Foreign

Minister,

elso

Amorim.

ExpansionoftheCouncil has been ustified ythe need to adapt nstitutionso

the new

reality

f the

post-Cold

War world and

by

the

argument

hat

nlarge-

ment and more

balanced

representation

ould

increase its

legitimacy

nd

improve

the

effectivenessf collectivedecisions.

The

Lula

government

as

made

the

issue

one of the

priorities

f

its

foreign olicy agenda.

Brazil,

ndia

and South

Africa

demand

permanent

eats based on

the

principle

of

geo-

graphical epresentation.

exico and

Argentina

dopt

a

different

osition

nd

argue

for

more

non-permanent

members. Given

the near

impossibility

f

reaching regional onsensus n this oint, ince

2002

Brazilhas beenfostering

support hrough

he

expansion

of bilateral

ontacts utsideLatinAmericawith

countries that

have

already

expressed

sympathy

or

Brazil's

candidacy.

In

addition,

ecurity

ouncil reform eatures

s

one of the

principal oints

on

the

programme

f the BSA initiative.

The

pportunities

nd

constraints

f

regionalolitics

Ever sincethedemocratizationrocess f the ate I970s andearly

98os,

Brazil

has dentified elations

with

other

Latin

American ountries s

a

major

foreign

policypriority. p

to the

mid-I99os,

the main

focus

ofBrazilian

policy

was on

the

promotion

of

regional ntegration

nd,

in

particular,

he

development

f

Mercosur,

he southern ommon market reated

n

I991.

Ties withthe Andean

countries

eveloped

either s

part

of

Mercosur's

nterregional

egotiations

as

in the case of Mercosur's

negotiations

with the Andean

Community

CAN)),

or as a reflection f

specific

bilateral nterests.

specially

once the

NAFTA

negotiations ad gone ahead,Brazilianpolicy-makersncreasingly uestioned

the dea

of a

single

region

abelled

Latin

America'.

Brazil's

regional

nd

inter-

national

presence

has been

increasingly erceived

as

a

process

intimately

connected o the

emergence

f'South America' s a

particular rouping

within

the

international

ommunity.I8

razil's

identity

s a Latin American

country

I8

See

e.g.

Lafer,

A identidadenternacionale Brasil a

politica

xtema',

pring

000;

Andrew

urrell,

'An

emergingecurity

ommunity

n

South

America?',

n Emanuel

Adler

nd

Michael

Bamett, ds,

SecurityommunitiesCambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress,

998).

29



11/21

Maria

Regina

oares e

Lima and M6nicaHirst

has therefore

een

increasinglyeplacedby

the dea of

the

country

s

a

South

American

power.

During

the second

Cardoso administration

I996-2002)

Brazil

assumed a

more activepresence nSouthAmerica ndmovedtowards eveloping more

overt

eadership

ole in

the

region.

As

well

as

inaugurating

seriesof

South

American

presidential

ummits

n

2000,'9

Brasilia lso became more

active n

regional

risis

management.20

ttempts

eremade

gradually

o

inject

more ife

into

the

Amazon

Pact,

a

grouping

hathad been

created n

1978

betweenBrazil

and its Amazon

neighbours,

nd Brazil also

sought

to

develop

a

cooperative

agenda

with

Bolivia,

Peru,

Venezuela andColombia.2' At

first,

razil

appeared

to

be more concerned

with

deepening

cooperation

n trade and

promoting

cooperation n infrastructurerojects especially ransportnd energyinks). t

appeared

nxiousto avoid

giving

he

mpression

hat t was

attempting

o

forge

a unitedfront n

negotiations

with

the United States.

Despite

such

caution,

Argentina

nd Chile weremore

suspicious

han

enthusiasticowards

Brazilian

diplomatic

moves n

South

America,

while other

ountries,

uch as

Venezuela

and

Bolivia,

became

quite

supportive

f Brazilian

nitiatives.

In this rea

too,

significanthange

took

place

after heLula

administration

came into

power.Itamaraty

ecame

much more

explicit

bout

tsdesire

nd

its

determinationo move rapidly owards outhAmerican eadership. ecision-

making

has

also become more

complex.

On

the one

hand,

Itamaraty

as

insisted

trongly

hat South America

should be

placed

at the

top

of

Brazil's

foreign

olicy priorities.

n the

other,

the

President

nd those around

him

have

taken

more

interest,

nd become

more

directly

nvolved,

n

regional

politics.22 his has

involved both

much

closer inksbetween domestic

party

politics

nd

diplomacy,

nd

a

much

greater

ffortn the

part

of Brazil to

pull

strings

nd influence

domestic

political

outcomes within

South

American

countries.23t has led to an expansionand diversificationf communication

with

political

ctors n

mostof the countries f the

region-although

there

has

beencriticismnsideBrazil

s to the

ppropriateness

fthis

parallel iplomacy'.24

In

addition to

the

inauguration

f

the South American

Community

of

Nations,

the Lula

administrationas laid

greatemphasis

n

the

expansion

of

'9

In

August

000,

all SouthAmerica's eads

f tate ttendedhefirstouthAmerican

residential

summit,

hich

ook

place

n Brasilia. he

agenda

etfor he

meeting

ncluded

ive

opics:

efence

f

democracy;egional

rade;

egional

nfrastructure;nformation,

cience nd

technology;

ndthe

fight

againstrug rafficking.

20

Special

mention

hould e

made

fthe

995

warbetween

cuador

nd

Peru nd

the

996

political

risis

in

Paraguay.

n

October

998

the

governments

fEcuador nd

Peru

igned

peace

treaty

n

Brasilia,

finallynding

ostilities.

ith

egard

o

Paraguay,

razil as

onsistently

oordinated

iplomatic

ction

with

Argentina

o

contain

acksliding

nto uthoritarianism.

21

It should enoted hat or razil he

geopolitical

nd

geoeconomic

mportance

f

theAndean ountries

is

connected

o

the nterstatend ntersocietal

inks n

the

Amazon rea.

22

The

period

ince 002has een

major

eallocation

lan

within

tamaraty,

ith henumber f

diplomats

n South

America

lmost oubled

ndthe

number

f

those

n

European

ountries

rastically

reduced.

23

At thePlanalto

presidential)

alace

his unction

as

been

ssumed

y

MarcoAurelio

Garcia,

s

chief

adviser o the

president

n

internationalffairs.

24

RubensRicupero,O atacado o varejo adiplomacia',olha eSaoPaulo, 6June 005.

30



12/21

Brazil as an intermediatetate nd

regional

ower

businesselations

ithin

he

egion,

nvolving

oth tate nd

private

nterprises.

Three

major

ssumptions

ave

guided

Brazil's outhAmerican

olicy:

irst,

that

more

rominent

resence

n

the

region

wouldbe

compatible

ith loser

political ieswithArgentina;econd, hat he mpact f Lula'spresidencyn

Brazilian

emocracy

would

have

a

spillover

ffect

n

promoting

egional

political

tability;

nd

third,

hat he successful

xpansion

f

Brazil's

olitical

presence

nthe

region

would

automaticallytrengthen

razilian

lobal spira-

tions,

llowing

he

ountry

o consolidateegional

upport

or

he

xpansion

f

the

ountry'sresence

n

world

ffairs.

The first

ssumption

as inked o the dea hat loser elations

ith

Argentina

would

nd should e achieved

with he

trengthening

fMercosur.

lthough

Mercosur addeveloped apidlyuringhe

990s,

with henegotiationfan

unprecedented

et

of

commitments,

fter

999

it entered

period

of

crisis,

indeed

aralysis.

s a

result,

razil nd

Argentina

nitiatedn intense eries f

bilateral alks

o

try

o

untangle

he knots nd to settle ome

of the

many

disputes

hat ad accumulated

ver he

previous

ive

years.25

or

the

recently

inaugurated

irchnerdministration

n

Argentina,

owever,

t

became

sine

ua

non f

ny

revived

Mercosur hat he

regional

rrangement

houldmove

way

fromts arlier

spousal f'open

regionalism'

nd hould eassertmuchmore

openly evelopmentalisttrategy.orArgentina,his ranslatedntorenewed

expectations

hat

razil hould

make

oncessions,

speciallyegarding

nvest-

ment

olicies

ndthe

cceptance

f

afeguard

echanisms.hese

expectations

led

rapidly

o a new round f often itter

isagreements.

he

impossibility

f

reaching greementdversely

ffectedhe results f the Ouro Preto

ummit

held

n

December

004,

nd

postponed

nce

again

successfulevitalizationf

Mercosur. n

theother

and,

ven

thoughntergovernmental

alks

avenot

lived

up

to

initial

xpectations,

rade

mong

Mercosur'smembers

as re-

coveredignificantlyn the ast woyears;ndthere as lsobeen nexpansion

of investment

mong

members,

s well as visible

deepening

f

cultural,

educationalnd ntersocietal

ies.

The

key oint egarding

he

econd

remise

s the

xtraordinary

omplexity

of

regional

olitics

nd

of the

possible olitical

cenarios. he idea that razil

should

xpand

ts

responsibility

or he maintenancef

political tability

n

South

America

hrough

he

promotion

f

tronger

emocraticnstitutionsnd

valueshasnotbeen able

to withstand

he

urbulence

f

regional

olitics.

ne

mightskwhether razilwouldhavewished otry o assume uchresponsi-

bilities

f

t had understood

n

advance

ust

how unstablend difficult

olitical

conditions

n

theAndean ountries ouldbecome.

Whatever

he

conclusion

of uch

peculation,

his s

probably

he

most

mportanthange

nd

represents

significant

ove

way

rom

revious

ehaviour,

hich

had

always

eenbased

firmly

pon

the

principle

f

non-interventionnthe

ffairs

fother

tates.

25

In

theBuenosAires

eclaration,

rgentina

nd

Brazil

romised

o

ntensifyooperation,trengthen

both

democracy

nd

ntegrationrocesses,

mprove

Mercosur's

nstitutions,

enerate

ustainable

rowth

andfightgainst overty.

31



13/21

Maria

Regina

oares e

Lima and

M6nica

Hirst

Assuming

the

role

of a

regional power

has

generated unprecedented

demands n Brazil and seemsto

require apabilities

hat

go

beyond

tamaraty's

unquestioned

diplomatic

kills.Since

2003

Brazil has

intervened

n

political

crisesnVenezuela, Bolivia,Ecuador and Haiti. Brazil ed the groupoffriends

of Venezuela'

(which

also included

Chile, Colombia, Mexico,

Portugal, pain

and the

US).

The aim

was to

try

o

bridge

he

misunderstandings

etween the

Chavez

government

nd

the

oppositiongroups

nd find

political

olution hat

would not

violate democratic

principles.

n

Bolivia, Brazil,

together

with

Argentina,helped

mediate

in

the Lozada-Mesa transition nd acted as a

stabilizing

orce

during

he

2005

riotswhich

finally

ed to a new

presidential

replacement

nd

the

call

for

general

elections.

In

Ecuador,

Brazil

quickly

became involved n thepolitical urmoilwhich ed to thesudden nterruption

of

the Gutierrez dministration.n

Haiti,

Brazil has led a

UN

peacekeeping

mission

(MINUSTAH),

in

which other

countries

have

participated,

ince

2004.26

This

international

resence

in

Haiti involves a broad set of tasks

including

the

monitoring, estructuring

nd reform f the Haitian national

police; assisting

he

transitional

overnment

ith

disarmament,

emobilization

and

reintegration

rogrammes

or rmed

groups;

ssisting

ith the

restoration

and

maintenance

f the

rule

of

aw,

public

safety

nd

public

order n

Haiti;

and

protecting nited Nationspersonnel nd installationsnd local civilians.

Brazil's

presence

n

South America has not

been

associated

only

with

its

recently

cquired

vocation as

a

regional

irefighter

nd crisis

manager. tronger

political

ties have been establishedwith the SouthernCone

governments

f

Uruguay

and

Chile

as a

consequence

of

networking

etween

the Workers'

Party

the

PT)

and

the

socialist oalitions

n

power

in both

countries.Close

relations ave also

been

developed

with Chavez in Venezuela. These

links

have

generated

imilar eactions

mong

Brazilian lites o those

of the

1950s

regard-

ing the risksof close ties with anti-American opulist eaders.27Domestic

opinion

towards

Brazil's

policy

n

the

region

has

tendedto divide

along

party

lines: onservative

pinion

has

generally

pposed

the

abandoning

f

the

country's

non-interventionist

radition,

hile

progressive

ntellectual

nd

political

ircles

have welcomed

a

bolder and more committed nvolvement

n

regional

ffairs.

The

third

ssumption

akes s to themost mbitious

spect

f

Brazil's

egional

diplomacy-and

the mostuncertain

n

terms

f tsoutcome. The

expansion

f

Brazil's

political

nvolvement n

local

crises,

ogether

with

growing

rade nd

investmentctivitieswith tsSouthAmericanneighbours, as not led to any

easy

or automatic

cknowledgement

f the

country's

egional

eadership

n

world

affairs. first est

was failedat the occasion

of electionsfor the

new

director-general

f the

WTO,

where

intra-regional

egotiations

were

far

ess

26

MINUSTAH

involves

he

participation

f

Argentina,

olivia, hile,

Uruguay, araguay,

eru,Canada,

US,

Croatia,

cuador,

rance, uatemala,

ordan,

alaysia,

orocco,

Nepal,Philippines,pain

ndSri

Lanka.

27

In

the

arly

950s

a

rapprochement

etween

argas

nd

Per6n,

ndthe

uspicion

hat n alliance

etween

Brazil,

Argentina

ndChile hadbeen

negotiated,

enerated

vociferousnd hostile

eaction

y

oppositionorces hich ontributedodestabilizinghedomesticoliticalituation.

32



14/21

Brazil as an

intermediatetate

nd

regionalower

smooth than

expected.

Regarding

ts

candidacy

for a

permanent

eat

at

the

UNSC,

Brazil

managed

to obtain an

important

egree

of

regional support,

withthe

exception

of

Argentina

nd

Colombia.

For

differenteasons oth have

been reluctanto endorseBrazil's spirationo become a regional ower. In the

case of

Argentina

his ollows historical

attern

elated,

n

one

side,

to the

old

rivalry

etween

the

two

countries, nd,

on the

other,

o the

difficulty

aced

by

Brazil n

making specialrelationship

ith

Argentina

ompatible

with

tsmore

ambitious

global

and

regional

goals.

As for

Colombia,

the reasons are

connected o

its

lignment

with

the US and the

perception

hat he

presence

f

the

United States

nd Brazil

in

the

region

nevitably

ollows he

pattern

f a

zero-sum

game.

This

bring

us to the

topic

of the next section.

Relationsith he

Unitedtates:

ess

hange

han

ontinuity

US-Brazil

relationshave

gone through

different

hases,

oscillating

etween

'good'

and cool' without ver

tipping

nto

open hostility.

he

two

states

ave

shared a notion

of

'limited

divergence'

which,

while

always

avoiding open

confrontation,

as resulted

n

frustrationsn both

ides

hathave

ong

dominated

their

elationship.

S-Brazil

relations ave

faced

cyclical

rises f

expectations

caused by erroneous alculations n both sides.Nevertheless, ll through he

twentieth

entury,

ilateral elations

layed

a

crucial role

in

Brazil's

foreign

affairss

well

as

in

the

US

hemispheric genda.

Though

US-Brazil relations

have

always

been

dominated

by

an

intergovernmental

genda, non-govern-

mental ctorshave

recently

xpanded

their

resence

nd

grown

n

importance.

NGOs,

cultural nd educational

entities,

s well as a

diverse set

of

private

economic

interests,

ll now contribute o a

complex

and

increasingly

ntense

bilateral nteraction.As

US-Brazil relationshave

become more

complex

on

both sides,military,conomic, politicaland cultural nterests ave led to a

more

open

agenda

and

introduced broader

ange

f

concerns

nd

pressures.

For the

United

States,

the

importance

of

Brazil in world

politics

and

international

ecurity

s

small,

specially

when

compared

o

crucial llies uch as

Canada

and the

UK,

or

to

other

tates uch as

Germany,

apan

nd

Russia. For

Brazil,

the

picture

s

very

different. razil

keeps

a

permanent

watch on the

United States nd what

t does

in

world

politics,

nd

its

foreign olicy

decisions

consistently

nvolvean

assessment f the costs

nd benefits f

convergence

with

or divergence rom heUS.

Such

cautionhas ncreased n the

unipolar

world,

particularly

ince

September

i

i.

Differences etween Brazil

and the United

States over

the latter's nter-

vention n

world and

regional riseshave been visible n

such

episodes

as the

GulfWar

(i99

),

the crisis

n

Haiti

(1996)

and the

Kosovo

tragedy

1998).

In

all

cases,

the

US would have

welcomed Brazil's full

upport.

n

summary,

tate-

to-state

olitical

relations

etween

the

United States nd

Brazil

primarily

im

for

prudent

coexistence,

possible

collaboration nd

minimal

collision.While

theUnited Statesmoves ahead towards he consolidation f an uncontested

33



15/21


16/21

Brazil as an

intermediatetate nd

regionalower

Of the

many

factors hat contribute o

US-Brazil

differences

egarding

regional ecurity,

he most

mportant

elate

to

the

link established

y

the

US

between ts

participation

n theColombian conflict nd the war

against

error-

ism.While the US government as tended to deepen its militarizedpproach

to deal with the

war in

Colombia,

Brazil has

made

explicit

ts

preference

or

political

process

nvolving

nternational

mediation,

with the

participation

f

the

UN,

based

upon

the

premise

hat

ll

parties

t war should

participate

n

the

negotiations. ndoubtedly

here re

major

differencesf

political

nd

deological

affinity

etween

Washington

nd

Brasilia

which

reflect

pon

their

respective

relationswith Caracas and

Bogota.

Relations between the Uribe

government

in

Colombia and

the Bush

administration

ave

been

far

more

friendly

nd

cooperative han those withChavez in Venezuela,while exactly heopposite

can be said n the

case

of the Lula

government.

razilunderstandshe

problems

of

regional

ecurity ery

differently

rom he Uribe

government

nd

fears he

consequences

of

Colombia's clear

alignment

with the United

States.

The

foreign

policy priorities

f the Bush administration

ince

9/I

have

inevitably

had an

impact

on bilateral ies.

On the

negative

side,

Brazil

has

maintained ts distancefrom

Washington's

policy

on international

errorism,

while the

US

has

paid

ittle ttentiono

goals

that razil ees

as crucial

economic

development, nvironmental rotection nd the strengtheningf multilater-

alism

n

world

security).

n the

positive

ide,

the

deterioration

n

the

quality

f

US relations with the

region

as a

whole

(graphically

llustrated

y

the

hemispheric

ummit f March

2005)

increases he

importance

f

maintaining

an

open

channel of

understanding

ith Brazil.29

For the Lula

government,

there s some

hope

that

positive

relationship

ith

the US

may

contribute

o

the

consolidation f Brazil's

status s a

regional

power.

However,

while

differ-

ent

priorities

ill

not ead

inevitably

o

collisionor

confrontation,

here s

little

signof a deepening onvergence etween the twocountriesn the nearfuture.

The

hallenges

head

While the

nnovations

n

foreign olicy

ntroduced

y

the

Lula

administration

have

undoubtedly

ontributed o

increasing

he

visibility

f Brazil

in

inter-

national

ffairs,

hey

have also

brought

o the surface

ew

challenges.

South-Southelations

Since

the

nauguration

f the

Lula administration

razil has

laid

a

very trong

emphasis

n the

expansion

of

South-South

relations,

nd this

has raised

high

expectations.

ne of the

administration'sirst

teps

was to

underscore he ink

29

The

Fourth ummit f

theAmericasook

place

n

Mar del

Plata,

Argentina,

n

4-5

Nov.

2005.

Immediately

fterwards,

residentush

visited razil or

ilateralalks. or

evaluationfthe

visit ee

'The

boys

n

Brazil',

Wall

treet

ournal,

Nov.

2005;

Brazil,

S look ahead o world

rade

alks',

ew

York imes, Nov.

2005.

35



17/21

Maria

Regina

oares

e Lima and

MonicaHirst

between

social

policy

at

home and

North-South ssues.Brazil's

eading

role

n

the UN

campaign

Action

against

Hunger

and

Poverty'

was

emblematic.

Simultaneously,

he

governmentought

o

build

up

new coalitionswithin he

Third World. In June

2003,

Brazil, ndia and SouthAfrica ignedtheBrasilia

Declaration

which created he BSA Forum.

The

purpose

ofthis nitiative as

to

develop

a

strategic artnership

mong developing

countries

round

three

shared nterests:

i)

the

commitment o democratic

nstitutionsnd

values;

2)

the efforto link the

struggle gainst overty

o

development olicies;

and

(3)

the convictionthat

multilateralnstitutionsnd

procedures

hould be

streng-

thened n

order

o

cope

withturbulence n the

economic,

political

nd

security

fields.

The noveltyof this nitiative, n outstanding xample of a South-South

coalition,

stems

partly

rom

the

fact that t involvesa

group

of

developing

countries

hat re

regionalpowers.

Brazil,

along

with

South

Africa,

as been

explicit

in

its intention

to assume new

responsibilities egarding

egional

security,

he defence f

democracy

nd the consolidation

fregional

ntegration

schemes,

nd IBSA has been

the

most

mportant

f tsSouth-South

nitiatives.

Other

steps

n

the same direction

have been Brazilian nvolvement

n

the

creation

of the G20

within he framework f the

Doha

Round;

its effortso

increaseties with Arab and Africancountries;and its leading role in the

creation

f a South

American

Community

f Nations.

For

Brazil,

one of the main

motivations ehind

the creation f BSA

was the

reform f

the

UN

system, specially

he reform

f its

Security

Council,

as

discussed

bove.

India has been more

activethanSouth

Africa

longside

Brazil

in

promoting

a

larger

and more

inclusive UNSC.

Although

this

goal

is

couched

in

terms

f the need

to democratize

nternational

ecision-making,

t

is

important

o

acknowledge

that,

n

fact,

he

proposal

to

expand

the UN

Security ouncilwould imply herecognition fsouthern eterogeneity-and

hierarchy-and

ead to the nstitutionalization

f those

differences.

From

Brazil's

point

of

view,

the G2o

represented significant

ove to

give

renewed

priority

o the

development genda

following

he end

of the

I970s-

style

Third World coalitions

such

as

the

G77)

and the

debt and fiscal rises f

the

I98os.

The

promotion

by

Brazil of

closerrelations

with Arab and

African

nations s

a further oticeable

feature f current

oreign olicy,

and one that

brings

back

old memories.

Ever since the

I96os

Brazilian

foreign

olicy

has

from ime to timesought o buildup thecountry'sAfricandentity,lthough

this

mpulse

has been

based more

upon

symbolic

historic

nd cultural ffinities

than

on shared

conomic interestsnd

political

values.

n the case of the

Arab

community,

revival

of

previous

attempts

o

deepen

common

interests as

recently

een

obstructed

y

the connection

established

etween

the Middle

East's

strategicmportance

nd the

war

against

error onducted

by

the US.

Both

in the case of

the Arab countries

nd

in thatof the

black

African oun-

tries,

here s a clear

connection etween

the

espousal

of closer

relations nd

the

supportof Brazil's UNSC candidacy.Contraryto Brazilian expectations,

36



18/21

Brazil as

an

intermediatetate nd

regionalower

however,

nd as

developments

n the

UN

2005

Assembly

evealed,

diplomacy

within

he Third World is not

always

driven

by

South-South

solidarity.

t

has

also been

difficult or Brazil to

harmonize ts southern'

diplomacy

with its

regionalpolicyand interests.n fact, he dea of Brazil as a regional eader has

not

yet

been

quite

accepted

by

its South

American

partners.

South-South

cooperation

could

become a

costly

venture orBrazil. In

the

first

lace,

the

country

must assume the

consequences

of

collective ction. A

clear

example

of

this

is

providedby

the

difficultiesaced

by Itamaraty

n

keeping

the G20

together

n

face of

pressure

rom

he ndustrialized

ountries,

particularly

he United

States.

Second,

domestic

upport

has not been

easily

gained by Itamaraty,

nd

public

opinion

at home has been

more

vigilant

han

ever as to theprosand cons of Lula'sactivist iplomacy.This introduces third

challenge

hat s

closely

onnectedto the

democratic

ontext

n

which

Brazil-

ian

governments

mustnow function.

What

will

the

mpact

be on the

balance

between

continuity

nd

change

in

Brazil's

foreignpolicy

of the

political

leadership hanges

hat

democracy

s

ikely

o

bring?

razil's

foreign

ffairsave

now become a matter

f

controversy

n

domestic

politics

n

a

way

that

they

were not

in

the

past,

and intra-bureaucratic

ivergences

ver the

priorities

f

the

country's oreign olicy

have also become

more

frequent.

These differ-

ences reflect profound ebate thathas been taking lace inBrazil as inmany

other

developing

countries),

n

which local

elites

view

relationswith

the

industrialized ations s more

profitable

nd viable

than the

expansion

of ties

with the South.

International

ecurity

Brazil's stance

n

security

matters

as two strands.

n the one

side,

the

country

defends tsprerogative o maintain strongnotion of sovereignty hich is

reflected

n

many

of

the axioms of ts

defence

policy,

uch as the

mportance

f

protecting

erritorial

ntegrity

nd national

nterests.3?

n the

other,

t

has

become clear hat

more

promising ption

for

he

country

n

global

nd

regional

security

matters

as been to

enhance

multilateralism.

razil has

become

fully

committed o

non-proliferation

egimes

nd

acknowledges

he

mportance

f

multilateral

nstitutionsn

world and

regional

ecurity.

s has

been

underlined,

Brazil

has been

among

the

most vocal of

intermediate tates

nd

emerging

30

On

30July

005,

the

National

efence

olicy

aunched new

decree

5.484)

pproved

nd

igned

y

President

ula. This

decree

epresents

he fficial

tatementf

Brazil's ision f

national

efence nd

regional/international

ecurity. ccording

o this

ocument,

hemain

trategic

riorities

or razil

re:

(i)

Amazonia

impact

f

war n

Colombia,

rug

raffic,

uerrilla

roups,

tc.);

nd

2)

the

SouthAtlantic

(for

ts

role n

trade,

nd ts

gas

nd

petroleumesources).

t

argues

hat,

n a

world

haracterized

y

growingnterdependence

nd

globalization,

t

s

mportant

o

develop

n

appropriate

ational

efence

sector

ecause,

n

the

future,

he

ountry's

atural

esources

ay

needto be

protected

rom

xternal

ambitions.

his ector

must ave

ppropriate

uman nd

economic

esources,

dequate

echnology

nd

weapons.

he

document

lso

recognizes

he

growing

resence

f

non-traditionalhreatsuch s

terrorismnd

organized

llicit

ctivities,

nd

gives riority

o

3)

the reation

f

rapid

eployment

forcend 4) a growingolefor razil npeacekeepingperations.

37



19/21

Maria

Regina

oares

e Lima and M8nica

Hirst

powers

n its nsistence

n the

need for

broad nstitutional

eform

f the UN

syste

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Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power_ Action, Choice and Responsibilities

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