BRAZILIAN MARITIME AUTHORITY
DIRECTORATE OF PORTS AND COASTS
COLLISION WITH A FATAL VICTIM BETWEEN THE VESSELS
FAST TITAN AND EVILAZIO
6 of March 2011
MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT
Supply “FAST TITAN” - Courtesy Shipspotting.com
Reference: IMO Casualty Investigation Code - MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.2 13 June 2008/ Resolution MSC.255(84)
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
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INDEX
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS ........................... 2
I - INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 3
II - SYNOPSIS .................................................................................................................. 3
III – GENERAL INFORMTION ..................................................................................... 4
a) Characteristics of Supply “FAST TITAN” .......................................................... 4
b) Documents of Supply “FAST TITAN” ................................................................. 5
c) Characteristics of Fishing Vessel “EVILÁZIO” ..................................................6
IV – SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ....................................................................................... 7
V – CREW..........................................................................................................................9
VI – DATA OF THE PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT...................................................11
VII - POST-ACCIDENT SURVEY...............................................................................12
VIII - ANALYSIS OF THE DATA GATHERED AND CAUSAL FACTORS.........18
IX - PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNT AND CONCLUSIONS.........................20
X - RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................21
ANNEXES..........................................................................................................................22
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Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS
2ON – 2nd Officer
AIS – Automatic Identification System
AIT – Certificate of Temporary Registration
AMB - Brazilian Maritime Authority
CIR – Seaman´s book
COLREG - Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions At Sea, 1972
CPRJ - Captaincy of the Ports of Rio de Janeiro
DHN - Directorate of Hydrography and Navigation
DPC – Directorate of Ports and Coasts
FV – Fishing Boat or Fishing Vessel
GPS - Global Positioning System
IMO - International Maritime Organization
ISM Code - International Safety Management Code
MNC – Deck Hand
MOP – Fishing Machinist
PEP – Specialized Professional Fisherman
POP – Professional Fisherman
SMC - Safe Manning Card
STCW 78 - International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of
Seafarer, 1978
TIE – Certificate of Registry
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Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
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I - INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of effecting the collection and analysis of evidence, the identification of the
causal factors and the elaboration of safety recommendations that should be necessary, in order to
prevent that in the future occur similar maritime accidents and/or incidents, the Captaincy of the
Ports of Rio de Janeiro (CPRJ) carried out a Marine Safety Investigation, in compliance with that
laid down in the Casualty Investigation Code of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
adopted by Resolution MSC. 255(84). This Final Report is a technical document that reflects the
result obtained by CPRJ regarding the circumstances that contributed or may have contributed to
trigger the occurrence, and not refers to any proving procedures for determination of civil or crim-
inal liability. Also, one should emphasize the importance of protecting the individuals responsible
for providing information regarding the accident, and the use of information contained in this re-
port for purposes other than the prevention of future similar accidents could lead to erroneous in-
terpretations and conclusions.
II – SYNOPSIS
On the March 6th
, 2011, around 01h10, occurred the collision involving the United States flagged
Supply vessel “FAST TITAN”, IMO 9579937, 55 metres length, 4949 tons gross tonnage, built in
2010, and the fishing vessel (FV) “EVILAZIO”, Brazilian flag, registered in the port of Vitoria
with Nº 3410234675, wooden hull and 18,50 tons gross tonnage, at the coordinates 24º 03’01”S /
042º55’28W, distance 60 nautical miles from the coast of Rio de Janeiro. The supply “FAST TI-
TAN was sailing on autopilot from the Bay of Santos heading Rio de Janeiro. The fishing vessel
“EVILAZIO” had left Jurujuba – Niteroi and was headed to the fishing area when the accident oc-
curred.
The Captaincy of the Ports of Rio de Janeiro (CPRJ) was advised of the accident by means of ra-
dio communication indicating that the Supply “FAST TITAN” was entering the port of Rio de Ja-
neiro with the crewmembers rescued from the another vessel onboard. Naval Inspectors of the
CPRJ went to the place of berthing and verified that the crewmembers rescued belonged to the FV
“EVILAZIO”, that as a result of the collision suffered many damages and was in danger of sinking,
reason for which carried out an operation for its recovers and afterwards towage to the beach of
Jurujuba in Niteroi.
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The present procedure started immediately after the principal interest parties had been formally
notified by the CPRJ (Annex E) in compliance with the provisions of the IMO Casualty Investigati-
on Code. The United States Coastguard (USCG) declared itself as representative of the Substantial-
ly interested State, once the “FAST TITAN” was United States flagged.
III – GENERAL INFORMATION
Characteristics of the vessels involved in the accident
a) Supply “FAST TITAN” (Photo 01)
Name: FAST TITAN
Flag: United States
Gross tonnage: 449 tons
Displacement: 226 tons
Area of Navigation: Open Sea
Maritime Support
Type: Supply Propulsion: Motor
Activity: Transport of Passengers
IMO: 9579937
Length 51.13m
Built: 2010
Call sign:
(IRIN) WDF4842
MMSI 367456420
Port of Registry: Rio de Janeiro (AIT381E007171
Owner: NAUTICAL SOLUTIONS LLC
Operators: Bram Offshore Transportes Marítimos Ltda
Classification Society: American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
P&I: Assuranceforeningen Skuld – Norway
Crewmembers on the Certificate: 10 Crewmembers onboard: 9
Propulsion: diesel Motor ( 4) CAT 3512 Diesels,1810HP/
1349.71 KW (each)
Bow Thruster: (2) Tunnel Thruster 250 HP
(each)
Builder : Breaux Brothers Enterprizes Inc Place where built: Loreauville, LA – USA
Annex A) has the technical particulars (Ship´s Particulars) of the ship.
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Photo 01 – Supply “FAST TITAN” berthed at the Caju Terminal RJ
b) Documentation of “FAST TITAN”
Title Issuing
Authority
Date of
Validity
Date of
Validity
Radio Certificate Country of Flag 6/10/2010 6/10/2020
International Certificate of Prevention of
Pollution by Oil (IOPP)
ABS
28/10/2010
28/01/2011
Load Line ABS 1/10/2010 30/9/2015
Document of Conformity – DOC/ISM ABS 9/9/2010 4/11/2013
Certificate of Management of Safety
SMS/ISM
ABS
23/10/2010
22/4/2013
Safe Manning Card CPRJ 30/6/2010 22/10/2011
Certificate of International Measurement GL 30/6/2010 -
International Certificate of Protection for
Ships ISPS (Code)
Country of Flag
27/9/2010
21/5/2015
Certificate of Class ABS 1/10/2010 1/3/2011
Certificate of Registry Country of Flag 15/7/2010 31/7/2011
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The Certificate of Class and the International Certificate of Prevention of Pollution by Oil
(IOPP) were expired. The remaining certificates were up to date, as may be verified from the copy o
the Report of Inspection of the Ship carried out on 06 March of 2011, Annex B) of this report.
The crewmembers of the vessel did not present to the investigators, the Safety Management
Manual with the instructions for operation in emergency situations and instructions for night-time
navigation, use of detection electronic equipments and surveillance.
c) Fishing Vessel (FV) “EVILÁZIO” (Photo 02)
Name: EVILAZIO Brazilian Flag Gross tonnage 18.80 tons
Type: Fishing vessel Propulsion: Motor Activity: Fishing
Area of navigation Open Sea No 3410234675 Material the hull: Wood
Classifier IRIN Port of Registry: Vitoria
Breadth 4.38 metres Depth 1.80 metres Length 12.87 metres
Owners: Artur Benedito Motta Vos and Marcelo Nascimento Ayres
Built in 2002. Artisanal building.
The Certificate of Registry of craft – TIE no 341-023467, shown in Annex C) provides other
information on the vessel.
Photo 02 –FV “EZILAZIO” grounded on the beach of Jurujuba after the rescue
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According to information provided by the crew, part of the vessel´s documentation was lost on
the occasion of the accident. From copies further obtained and through consultation to the Report of
National Craft, the investigators ascertained that the documentation of the vessel was in order, regu-
larly registered in the Captaincy of the Ports of Espirito Santo with Certificate of Registry (TIE)
number 341-023467, holding a Safe Manning Card (CTS) and a Term of Responsibility of Safety of
Navigation.
According to the Brazilian Maritime Authority Standard to Vessels Employed in Open Sea Na-
vigation (NORMAM-01/DPC), the Certificate of Registry (TIE) is the document proving the regis-
tration of the vessel on the Brazilian Maritime Authority, with the allocation of name and number of
registration. The vessels which are not subject to surveys shall have on board a Term of Responsibi-
lity of Safety of Navigation. In this document the owner or operator take responsibility for compli-
ance with the items allocation and other safety requirements specified for his boat.
IV – SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS
The information of the occurrence of the accident was received by the CPRJ by means of ra-
dio communication indicating that the Supply “FAST TITAN” was entering the port of Rio de Ja-
neiro carrying the rescued crewmembers of another vessel. A team of investigators immediately at-
tended the vessel in order on gathering as much evidence as possible to build up a clear picture of what
happened, to support the elaborating of the present Report. At the berthing site it was confirmed that
these shipwrecked sailors were the crew of FV “EVILAZIO”.
In accordance with the information obtained and the registers consulted by the investigators,
around 01h10 of March 6th
, the supply vessel “FAST TITAN” was sailing on autopilot on the
programmed course 345o, coming from the Santos Basin towards the port of Rio de Janeiro. Fur-
thermore, in accordance with the testimonies, on the day of the accident, the sea was with waves
of approximately 1.5 to 2m height, the weather was cloudy without rain, 50% visibility and wind
of 10 knots.
The FV “EVILAZIO” had sailed from Jurujuba, Niteroi on March 5th, 2011, around about 12h00
and was sailing towards the fishing area, located around 70 miles distance from the shoreline of Rio de
Janeiro, when occurred the collision. One crewmember was on watch and all the others were sleeping
at the moment of the accident. This sole awake crewmember on the FV “EVILAZIO” died as a result
of the accident, making difficult the collecting of more detailed and precise information by the inves-
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tigators. According to statements, the average speed of the vessel sailing was from4 to 4.5 knots and
the course adopted was between 210º and 220º, but there are no records or information about the cour-
se really employed at the moment of the accident. The vessel was not engaged in fishing.
According to testimonies of crewmembers of the Supply “FAST TITAN” the FV “EVILAZIO”
was was detected visually by the bow to port at approximately 400m distance, but there was not time
to change the course of the autopilot or issue any alert to avoid the accident. The “FAST TITAN” spe-
ed was around 19 or 20 knots and there was an attempt to reduce speed and change the control of the
autopilot to manual, without success. Also according to testimonies given to the investigators the per-
sonnel on watch on the “FAST TITAN” would had seen only the deck lights of the FV “EVILAZIO”
and it was not possible for them to confirm if the navigation lights were on. Up to this sighting no o-
ther surface contact or alarm was detected onboard the “FAST TITAN” that announced any vessel on
a collision course. The investigation ascertained that there was not any type of communication betwe-
en the vessels, alleging that the accident occurred rapidly. The crewmembers of the “FAST TITAN”
could not inform if when sighted, the FV “EVILAZIO” was sailing or was stopped and, if sailing what
was its course.
As the only crewmember awake on the FV “EVILAZIO” died as a result of the accident, it
was not possible for the investigators to ascertain if the Supply “FAST TITAN” was sighted and
accompanied, or if there was an alteration of course of the FV moments before occurred the acci-
dent. According to the information of the crewmembers of the FV, the boat was equipped with a
GPS, VHF radio and SSB radio, which were switched on during the night of the accident, and it
was routine the vessel sail with only one crewmember on watch during nights of calm weather.
Only during storms another crewmember used to be employed as lookout.
As a consequence of the collision the fishing boat was seriously damaged with flooding and
partial sinking. The “FAST TITAN” maneuvered immediately after the collision to give assistan-
ce and rescued all the crewmembers of the FV “EVILAZIO”, which was adrift in the area of the
accident until being towed in direction of the beach of Jurujuba. During the rescue of the fishing
boat crewmembers it was found that there were personal accidents, one rescued crewmember with
light corporal injuries and another unconscious. The injured crewmember was transferred to the
platform “CIDADE DE SANTOS” where he received attention and was removed to a hospital by
a helicopter. The other crewmember of the fishing boat, who was unconscious, died during the
rescue. The body of the crew member died and the other four surviving crew members were taken
to the port of Rio de Janeiro by the “FAST TITAN”.
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After the accident the fishing boat was kept afloat, with the use of plastic barrels and towed
afterwards to Jurujuba beach by another fishing vessel which was operating nearby and rendered
assistance (placement of plastic barrels to improve the buoyancy and towing of the damaged bo-
at).
V – CREWS
From the analysis of the data gathered and the documentation presented, it was found that the
navigation was being conducted in routine form and without problems with the two vessels in good
conditions of operation and with all the equipment functioning.
Supply “FAST TITAN”
The investigators found that, on the occasion of the accident, the crew of the Supply “FAST
TITAN” met that foreseen in the STCW 78 Convention ( International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers 1978) and that in the Safe Manning Card
(SMC) as much in quantity as in the qualifications required. The crew of the “FAST TITAN” ac-
cording to the Crew List (Annex D), is made up of 9 seafarers, being 1 North American and 8 Bra-
zilian. The working language onboard is Portuguese.
The ship had good accommodations for all the personnel embarked and operated normally with
this number on board.
The Captain (Officer of the Watch at the time of the accident) is qualified in the category of 2nd
Officer (2ON), with three and a half years of experience in the command of other vessels, having
embarked on Feb 11th
, 2011.
The sailor who was with the Captain at the moment of the accident was qualified as a Deck
Hand. He was onboard for 60 days and had 13 years of experience.
FV “EVILAZIO”
Neither the Crew List or the Seamen´s books were presented to the investigators, with the alle-
gation that they were lost in the accident. However, as discovered by the investigators, the Safe
Manning Card (SMC) of the vessel established a manning of 4 crewmembers, being one Speciali-
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zed Professional Fisherman (PEP) as Captain, one Fishing Machinist (MOP) and two Professional
Fishermen (POP). At the moment of the accident there were onboard 6 crewmembers (5 qualified
in the category of POP and 1 not qualified).
According to the Brazilian Maritime Authority's Standards for Seafarers (NORMAM-13/DPC),
a Fishing Machinist (MOP) belongs to the "Fishermen Group – Engine Section" category
(subordinates category), and is able to pilot small boats.
None of the crewmembers were qualified as Specialized Professional Fisherman (PEP), mini-
mum category stipulated by the SMC to act as Captain of the vessel.
The crewmember who held the function of Captain for the first voyage is qualified in the cate-
gory of Professional Fisherman, has 15 years experience on the sea and was onboard since Feb 2nd
,
2009 in the function of fisherman.
The crewmember that was at the helm and died as a result of the accident also was qualified in
the category of Professional Fisherman, possessed 12 years of experience and was embarked since
June 21st, 2010.
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VI – DATA OF THE PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT
The place of the accident is located at the point of coordinates 24º 03’01”S/ 042º 55’28”W, dis-
tance 60 nautical miles from the coastline of Rio de Janeiro (Nautical Chart DHN 1601 (Photo 03),
edited by the Directorate of Hydrography and Navigation - DHN).
Photo 03 – Extract of the Nautical Chart 1601 – point of the accident (24º03'01"S / 042º55'28"W).
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Photo 04 – aerial view of the point where occurred the accident (Google maps)
Environmental conditions: In accordance with the information obtained and records consulted
by the investigators, on the day of the accident the weather conditions were good, despite being
night with closed weather. The sea was with waves of approximately from 1.5m to 2m in height,
cloudy weather without rain, 50% visibility and wind of 10 knots.
VII – POST-ACCIDENT SURVEY
The investigation onboard the supply vessel “FAST TITAN” started right after the berthing of
the vessel at the terminal of Caju – Rio de Janeiro, and it was found that the ship was in a good state
of conservation (Photo 05). On the bow of the vessel were observed marks of the collision with
scratches in the paintwork (Photo 06), but without affecting the hull.
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Photo 05 – Supply Vessel “FAST TITAN” berthed at Caju terminal
Photo 06 – Bow of the Supply Vessel “FAST TITAN”
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The Life-saving appliances were in accordance with the respective Safety Plan. Damages re-
sulting from the collision were not observed, nor related by the crewmembers.
The main engines, diesel generators and the steering system were in good condition. There are
no records of damages before or after the collision, nor were any reported. The navigation lights
were working normally, with a good level of luminosity. The two radars were working normally,
with good image resolution. By the information of the crewmembers, the lights and the radars were
switched on at the time of the accident.
The allocation of the navigation and communications equipment existing is made up by au-
tomatic pilot (autopilot), two Raytheon radars with 8 miles (Port) and 24 miles (Starboard) scale of
sweeping, compass, GPS, AIS, Nautical Charts, collision alarm system (ARPA), VHF radio, SSB
equipment, whistle and searchlight. In accordance with the accounts of the crewmembers, the fol-
lowing equipments were on and functioning properly at the moment of the collision, although there
are no records to confirm the information provided:
a) in navigation: radar, GPS, AIS and automatic pilot; and
b) in the communications: radio, VHF and telephone via satellite
It was not possible for investigators to define whether the anti-collision system “FAST TI-
TAN” worked integrated with the radar and there is no records of faults in the equipment onboard,
because the vessel does not possess a Logbook for entries, as specified in the ISM Code.
The FV “EVILAZIO” was surveyed on the Jurujuba beach - Niteroi, after her towing to the
site by an unidentified vessel. The boat was in a bad state, without crew onboard and presenting
big damages on the stern to starboard which provoked her flooding and partial sinking. In accor-
dance with the posterior statements, the vessel was equipped with a GPS, VHF radio and SSB radio.
Furthermore, in accordance with the witnesses, the damages were caused by the impact of the
bow of the vessel “FAST TITAN” with the boat´s side, causing the breaking of the woodwork and
the displacement of the superstructure to port (Photos 07, 08, 09 and 10). In the photographs we can
observe the blue drums, used to assist the flotation of the craft during her rescue and towage.
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Photo 07 – FV “EVILAZIO” aground on the beach of Jurujuba after the rescue.
Photo 08- FV “EVILAZIO” damages on the stern and on the superstructure.
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Photo 09- FV “EVILAZIO” side to STBD damaged and superstructure displaced to PORT
(view from the stern)
Photo 10 – FV “EVILAZIO” side to STBD damaged and superstructure displaced to PORT
(view from the bow)
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It was not possible for the investigators to carry out tests with the steering and propulsion sys-
tem, as well they were unable to check the working of the navigation lights and the VHF radio due
to the vessel being without energy and partially submerged. The vessel was not equipped with ra-
dar. It was not possible to check if there was life-saving apliances onboard and its condition.
The structure of the vessel is built of wood and was equipped with a small radar reflector
installed on the masthead.
VIII – ANALYSIS OF THE DATA GATHERED AND CAUSAL FACTORS
Observing the navigation area and the sketch of the situation on the chart DHN 1601 (Photo
03 page 12) made by the investigators based on the information supplied by crewmembers of the
two vessels, it is verified that there are divergences difficult to be clarified once that the only
crewmember of the fishing boat that was awake at the moment of the accident, qualified in the
category of Professional Fisherman (POP), died. On the FV there was no equipment which preserve
records of routes and engines (or helm) maneuvers, effectively executed.
The succinct records in the Supply “FAST TITAN´s” Deck and Engine Room Logbooks did
not contribute with details that permit to evaluate the conduct of the crewmembers and the relative
movement of the vessels. The ship has radar but according to statements given nothing was detected
and there was no trigger of the anti-collision alarm. The manuals with the technical characteristics
of the radars were not presented, as well as there are no records that permit identifying if they were
switched on and operating normally, which scale was employed and if the adjustments of resolution
were well executed. As there is no images backup system, nor audio and video recording, it was not
possible to analyze and confirm the statements. The navigation on autopilot may have led to the
lack of attention to possible obstacles.
The information of the crewmembers that the supply “FAST TITAN” was sailing on autopilot
toward 345º and the general direction of navigation from the origin to the destination of the vessel
are consistent.
The information of the crewmembers of the FV “EVILAZIO” that the vessel sailed from
Jurujuba to carry out fishing does not permit tracing her precise course. Both the general sailing
course and the eventual manoeuvres carried out by the fishing vessel are not shown in any record. It
is recalled here that the only crewmember who was on duty at the helm when the accident occurred
died without reporting what happened. There is no way of knowing what manoeuvres the
helmsman may have executed with the absence of registering equipment of courses and commands
to the engines.
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The bow of the "FAST TITAN" hit the fishing vessel to starboard, but since that were not set
out the course of the vessels, there is no way to define which one should maneuver when seeing the
other to starboard, to comply with Rule 15 of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREG) as described below:
Rule 15
Crossing situation
When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of
collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side
shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case
admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.
On the supply “FAST TITAN” there were two crewmembers on watch at the time of the
accident, one of them the Captain himself, in the function of Officer on Watch, qualified in the
category of Second Officer, and one crewmember qualified as Deck Hand in the role of helmsman
and look-out. The vessel was on autopilot and according to the allegations of the crewmembers, the
radars were switched on and working well. Thus, the fishing vessel should have been detected in
time to allow a maneuver in order to avoid the collision.
It also quote Rule 17 of the COLREG establishing that the vessel that has preference may
manoeuvre to avoid a collision when that which is required to maneuver does not do it properly.
Rule 17
Action by stand-on vessel
(a)
[..]
(II) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by
her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the
vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate acti-
on in compliance with these Rules. [..]
On the other hand, Rule 5 of the COLREG (Look-out) establishes, “inter alia”
“Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight
and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the pre-
vailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal
of the situation and of the risk of collision.”
A Bridge Resource Management (BRM) should efficiently manage all the resources that are
available for the bridge and promote a good communication and work in a team. The accident
occurred due to failure in the surveillance and the failure by both vessels, of the COLREG rules
mentioned. The failure of vigilance on the part of both vessels resulted in delay in taking preventive
measures in a timely manner to avoid the collision.
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Face of all that has been found, it is concluded that the main causal factors of the accident
have originated from operational failures in the maneuvering of the vessels and the delay in
adopting preventive measures in a timely manner to avoid collision, and failure on the part of the
crewmembers on watch.
IX - PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNT AND CONCLUSIONS
Investigations into the circumstances of casualties that have occurred have shown that acci-
dents on board ships are in most cases caused by an insufficient knowledge of, or disregard for,
the need to take precautions. Statements by those involved in the accident have been taken into ac-
count in compiling this report. A lot of factors indicate that the safety culture and safety
management on the part of those involved in the accident were not strong. From the findings of
this investigation came up the following lessons and conclusions:
1. The high speed developed by the Supply “FAST TITAN” (20 knots) recommended a
redoubled vigilance by the speed of approach in relation to the other vessel. On the other hand, the
low speed of the fishing vessel also recommended attention to monitoring because of the lower
capacity quick reaction in an emergency.
2. The night sailing of the fishing vessel with only one crewmember on watch at the
helm is a risky situation the prejudices vigilance. Despite not having evidence that prove it, the
crewmember of the fishing boat may have been overcome by fatigue, sudden illness, or distraction,
that could have resulted in a reduction of his vigilance. The fact that it is not formally foreseen that
the fishing vessel has a crewmember to assist in the tasks of surveillance and monitoring of con-
tacts that could offer some obstacle to navigation increases the risks.
3. The “FAST TITAN” radars installed on the bridge are fitted with an alarm for targets
that approach at distances previously selected but, according to the crew, there was no warning
about the approaching of the fishing vessel. As the investigators did not receive the Safety
Management Manual from the crewmembers of the vessel and as there is no records of defects in
the equipments onboard, once that the vessel does possess a Logbook for such records, it is
difficult to prove if indeed the alarm for vessels operated normally on the occasion of the accident.
Likewise it can not be confirmed the existence of adequate instructions for night-time navigation
and surveillance, especially in dense traffic areas.
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
21
4. There was no report of factors related to adverse meteorological conditions or mecha-
nical failures, and evidence was not produced that could prove fatigue or health problems on the
part of the crewmember of the supply involved in the accident.
5. Regarding the breach of the rules of the International Regulations to Avoid Collisions
at Sea, 1972 (COLREG), as it was not possible for investigators to accurately define the course of
the fishing vessel, it is not possible to evaluate which vessel should have compulsorily maneuvered
to avoid collision, or if the accident would have been the result of some sudden maneuver of some
or of both vessels.
By the evaluation of this accident it may be proved that the elementary lesson of a permanent
and effective surveillance is the best way to prevent accidents at sea. There is no doubt that, even
for vessels equipped with detection equipment, the vigilant posture of the crewmembers on watch
shall be permanent, while for vessels that do not have electronic equipment vigilance should be
redoubled.
Another lesson that may extracted is that the navigation lights should be in a good state and
lit during the nocturnal periods or of low visibility and during the day in bad weather, to enable
the vessel to be sighted at a safe distance.
Once sighted another vessel, maneuvers and safety procedures recommended by COLREG
should be immediately put into practice in order to define the maneuver as soon as possible, using
the phony contact for questions if needed.
XI – RECOMMENDATIONS
First of all, safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liabil-
ity.
The accident investigated pointed out the necessity for an improvement in the objectives of
the Company Safety Management, in conformity with that laid down in the International Safety
Management Code (ISM Code). In the case of the Supply “FAST TITAN” the ISM records rela-
ting to audits, inspections and corrective measures are susceptible to verification and establish the
scope of knowledge assumed by the administration.
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
22
A good Safety Management System should establish and keep procedures to control all do-
cumentation and data that are relevant. The companies (owner of the ship or any other organizati-
on or person such as the manager) must ensure that the importance of effective Bridge Resource
Management (BRM) be reflected in its ISM documentation. The internal auditors should measure
with precision the level of this compliance.
Considering the potential hazards associated with navigation of a vessel that develops high
speeds, transporting passengers and sailing in waters of dense traffic, it is recommended that she
has a redundant surveillance and tracking targets system with the use of electronic, human and
organizational resources. A Bridge Resource Management contributes effectively to eliminate the
risk that a human error can result in a dangerous situation. It is recommended to carry out internal
audit to check the records of non-compliance, and whether adequate monitoring is being held in
situations similar to those reported.
On the other hand, as generally the fishing boats have a reduced speed on the majority of
their courses, their crews should be trained to visually sweep the horizon frequently and increase
the vigilance when not equipped with electronic detection equipment.
LIST OF ANNEXES:
ANNEX A - Characteristics of Supply “FAST TITAN”
ANNEX B & B1 - Report of Inspection of the ship (FORM A and FORM B)
ANNEX C - Certificate of Registry of vessel (FV “EVILAZIO”)
ANNEX D - Crew List (Supply ”FAST TITAN”)
ANNEX E – Copy of Notification about the accident
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
23
ANNEX A
Characteristics of Supply “FAST TITAN”
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
24
ANNEX B
Report of Inspection of the ship (FORM A)
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
25
ANNEX B1
Report of Inspection of the ship (FORM B)
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
26
ANNEX C
Certificate of Registry of vessel (FV “EVILAZIO”)
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
27
ANNEX D
Crew List (Supply ”FAST TITAN”)
Brazilian Maritime Authority - Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Surveys, Naval Inspections and Technical Expertise Management Maritime Casualty Investigation Department (CIPANAVE)
Collision with a fatal victim between the vessels “FAST TITAN” and “EVILÁZIO”
Marine Safety Investigation Report
28
ANNEX E
Copy of Notification about the accident