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A striking example can be found in modern discussion on Aristotle’sand Theophrastus’ accounts on Parmenides. At the end of the nineteenthcentury, Burnet and Diels had put forward the hypothesis that the physi-

cal theories expounded in the second part of the poem –

the so-calleddoxa part, of which but a few literal fragments have survived – did notactually reflect Parmenides’ own convictions, but rather the theories of earlier philosophers he described for polemical or simply informative pur-

poses (a “doxography ”, as Diels put it, or, on Burnet’s view, a Pythagoreandoctrine criticized by Parmenides himself).5 Cherniss, taking this hypoth-esis for historical fact, argues that Aristotle interpreted the second part of the poem as the author’s own theory just in order to find support for hisconviction that all philosophers regarded the elements as principles6 or for

the claim that almost all ancient philosophers identified knowledge withsensation, in spite of the fact that Parmenides denied the truth of ordinary sense-perception: “Aristotle has misunderstood Parmenides as usual”.7 Si-milarly, McDiarmid blames Theophrastus for basing his account on Par-menides on the supposition that the second part of the poem presentsParmenides’ own views, even though “the care with which he distinguishesthe two parts of the poem shows clearly that he is aware that the second

part of the poem does not represent Parmenides’ orthodox doctrine”: thisfact “reveals how much he is disposed to follow the pattern of Aristotle’saccounts even when … he appears to know that Aristotle’s interpretationis contrary to the Presocratic writings”; and in de Sensibus 3–4 he even“derives his report of Parmenides’ psychology from the Way of Opinion

without giving a hint that the views he is stating are not Parmenides’own”.8 On McDiarmid’s view, it would seem that Theophrastus was ready to carry blind faith in Aristotle’s authority to the point of outright dis-honesty; we should conclude that only the worst can be expected from a historian of philosophy capable of manipulating his sources in so unscru-

pulous a manner.During the last half century, however, a growing number of scholars

have reached the conclusion that the physical theories of the second partof the poem actually were , after all, Parmenides’ own,9 just as Aristotle and

tion”, we should rather think of “reception as determined by the scope of Peripateticdialectic”), 90–94, 168–169 (evidence for Theophrastus’ “serious interpretative ef-fort”), 238 (“The great amount of detail in the reports indicates that he had access togood sources”), etc.

5 Diels 1897, 63; Burnet 1930, 183–196.6 Cherniss 1935, 48, referring to Ph 188a20, GC 318b6, 330b14, and Metaph 986b33.7 Cherniss 1935, 81, on Metaph 1009b12–25.8 McDiarmid 1953, 121–2.9 See Verdenius 1964, 45–63; Clark 1969; Heitsch 1974a, 72–80, 1974b, 416; Finkel-

berg 1986 and 1999; Schmitz 1988, 20–21; Kerferd 1991; Reale and Ruggiu 1991,

Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Parmenides’ Theory of Cognition (B 16) 221

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Theophrastus – and, for that matter, all ancient readers of the poem whoare known to us – took them to be. This would entail that Parmenidesdid not simply deny the existence of the sensible world;10 rather the two

parts of the poem should be read as presenting two different and comple-mentary views on the same reality,11 the physical universe or, as Aristotle would say, the reality of “sensible things”: again, this was exactly how Aris-totle and Theophrastus understood it,12 whatever be their mistakes onother points.

This should suggest the advisability of a more cautious reassessment of our judgment on Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ accounts on Presocratic

philosophy.13 In the present paper, I will limit myself to one particularfragment of Parmenides, B 16 DK, cited both by Aristotle ( Metaphysics Γ

5, 1009b22–

25) and Theophrastus (de Sensibus 3),14

and its context of quotation in both authors. To this end, I will begin with a rather sum-

226–234; Conche 1996, 28; Thanassas 1997, 165–170; Palmer 1999, ch. 9, and2009, 159–188; Cerri 1999, 69–85 and passim; Hermann 2004, 204–208; Graham2006, 172–179; Robbiano 2006; Bollack 2006; Solana Dueso 2006, 21; GemelliMarciano 2009, 62–63. Palmer 2009, 162, states that “it is now generally and rightly recognized that the cosmology must be judged the product of Parmenides ’ own re-flection on the world’s origin and operation”. It should be noted, however, that therehabilitation of the doxa is not unanimous: the contrary view is still defended by Granger 2002 and Cordero 2004, 151–163 (but see now Cordero 2008 for a radi-cally different view: the physical theories, as opposed to the “opinions of mortals”, are

part of the Way of Truth).10 As he is still taken to do, e.g., by Tarán 1965, 283.11 What Parmenides, in the first part of his poem, calls “that which is” is best under-

stood as being “the world of seeming as such when this world is correctly understoodand is stripped by the application of Parmenidean logic and cleansed of the plurality of names which mortals assign to it” (Kerferd 1991, 6). In other words, “ what isdescribed in the Way of Seeming is not a different reality from that described in theWay of Truth, but a different knowledge of the same reality ” (Finkelberg 1986, 405).

I will not try to show here that this view is right (since a detailed discussion of thedoxa problem would largely exceed the limits of this paper, I will deal with this topicin another paper, “Parmenides’ Physics and the Beliefs of Mortals” [in progress]), butit is surely consistent with the interpretation of B 16 I will suggest (see section 4).

12 See, e.g., Metaph 986b31; Cael 298b22–28; cf. Kerferd 1991, and section 2, text cor-responding to ns. 50–52.

13 A valuable advance in this direction has been accomplished by Mansfeld’s (1996) andBaltussen’s (2000) thoroughly well-documented studies on Theophrastus de Sensibusand its relation to the writings of Aristotle. Baltussen (cf. n. 4), however, pays scarceattention to the passage on Parmenides (Sens 3–4) I shall be concerned with here;my agreements and disagreements with Mansfeld’s point of view will emerge through-out this paper.

14 The fragment is quoted also by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph 306, 29–30and 306, 36–307, 1 Hayduck) and Asclepius (in Metaph 277, 19–20 and 24–27);but these quotations depend on Aristotle and therefore lack any independent source

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mary review of the present state of discussion on the problems of interpre-tation posed by the fragment B 16 in itself (this section); then I will pro-ceed to re-examine its context of quotation in Aristotle (section 2) and

Theophrastus. I hope to show that a careful reading of Theophrastus’

report may disclose new possibilities for our understanding of Parmenides’own words at B 16 (section 3) and, to a certain extent, of his conceptionof knowledge as a whole (section 4).

According to a majority of recent scholars (Tarán, Mourelatos, Kirk-Raven-Schofield, O’Brien-Frère, Collobert, and Conche, among others)the text of B 16 should be read as follows:

ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ ’ ἔχει κρᾶσις μελέων πολυπλάγκτωντ ὼς νόος ἀ νθρώποισι παρέστηκεν· τ ὸ γὰρ αὐτ ὸ

ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀ νθρώποισινκαὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τ ὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστ ὶ νόημα.

1 ἑκάστοτ (ε) Theophr. Arist. E1 J: ἑκάστ ῳ A b: ἕκαστος E2 ἔχει Arist. A b J: ἔχη (ἔχε ?)15 E: ἔχειν Theophr. κρᾶσις Stephanus: κρᾶσιν libri πολυπλάγκτων Theophr. FO:πολυκάμπτων Arist. sec. Ross, Coxon, DK: πολυκάμπον sec. Cordero2 παρέστηκεν Karsten (-κε Theophr.): παρίσταται Arist.16

As to the understanding of these lines, we may take O’Brien’s (in O’Brienand Frère 1987) rendering as fairly representative of the present day stan-dard interpretation:

For as at each moment is the condition of the mixture in the wandering limbs, sothe mind turns out to be for men.For what the limbs think of is just the same for all men and for every . For

what there is more of is thought.

For a number of minor problems concerning text and translation, I see noneed to question this consensus. So we may accept for verse 1, with mosteditors, πολυπλάγκτων as making better sense than Aristotle’s πολυκάμπτων,and at verse 2, παρέστηκεν as clearly preferable to the unmetrical (or, if readᾱται, grammatically awkward) παρίσταται.17 At verses 1 and 3, μέλεα is best

value, though they may shed – at least in the case of Alexander – some indirect lighton the manuscript tradition of the Metaphysics itself.

15“ἔχε Arist. E, S, Bb” Cordero 1984, 33, in his app. crit. to the fragment; Ross 1924,app. crit. ad loc., and Coxon 1986, 91, give ἔχη as the reading of E.

16 For a full apparatus criticus to the fragment, see Cordero 1984, 33; Coxon 1986, 91,and O’Brien-Frere 1987, 73–74; here I give only short notice of the main textual

variants relevant to the discussion.17 See Snell 1958; cf. Fränkel 1955, 175; Heitsch 1974a, 191–192, and Coxon 1986,

249. Among recent editors, παρίσταται is still preferred by Cordero 1984, 33, and2004, 190, and Reale and Ruggiu 1991. Alternative conjectures like παρέστηκε· αὐτ ὸ γὰρ αὐτό (Ellis 1902, 269) or παρέστα· ταὐτ ὸ γὰρ αὐτό (García Calvo 1981, 221)might be worth considering, but are of scarce relevance for interpretation.



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understood as “members” (in the Homeric sense of “body ”18), rather than as“organs of the senses”,19 “elements”,20 or even “musical harmonies”.21

The only strictly textual problem that is still to a certain degree con-

troversial concerns the beginning of verse 1. The variant ἕκαστος ἔχει κρᾶ-σιν is all too evidently a lectio facilior .22 At first sight, ἑκάστοτ (ε) seems tobe best supported by the MSS;23 if we choose this reading, we may eitheraccept, with most editors, Stephanus’ correction κρᾶσις, or else supposethat ἔχει depends on some implicit subject (for example, man or νόος, bothmentioned in the next verse).24 On any of these interpretations, these

verses would refer not so much to discrepancies between individuals as tothe inconstancy of each individual’s mind, as in the well-known verses of Homer (Od 18.136–7):

το ῖ ος γὰρ νόος ἐστ ὶ ν ἐπιχθονίων ἀ νθρώπωνοἷ ον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄ γῃσι πατ ὴρ ἀ νδρῶ ν τε θεῶ ν τε,

and Archilochus (fr. 68 Diehl = fr. 70 Bergk):

το ῖ ος ἀ νθρώποισι θυμός, Γλαῦκε, Λεπτίνεω πάι, γίγνεται θνητο ῖ σ ’, ὁκοίην Ζεὺς ἐφ’ ἡμέρην ἄ γῃ,καὶ φρονεῦσι το ῖ ’, ὁκοίοισ ’ ἐκυρέωσιν ἔργμασιν.

Fränkel saw in these verses Parmenides’ source of inspiration for this pas-sage, and hence a compelling reason for preferring ἑκάστοτ ’.25 His argu-

18 It should be remembered that Epic Greek lacks a special term for the living body asan organic whole: in Homer, σ ῶμα means only the dead body, the corpse; what we(and later Greeks) would call a person’s body was usually referred to by plural nounssuch as μέλεα or γυ ῖ α: see Snell 1953, 5–8; for Parmenides, Fränkel 1955, 175; Coxon1986, 248; Conche 1996, 245.

19 Diels 1897, 112.20 Verdenius 1964, 6–7 (but cf. the author’s retraction 1949, 126 n. 51); Schwabl 1953,

70; Bollack 1957, 67; Laks 1990, 6 n. 51.

21 Philip 1958, 64–65.22 Nevertheless, this was the reading of Diels-Kranz, and is still accepted by Cordero1984, 33, and 2004, 190.

23 See Ross 1924, 275; for some critical discussion of this generally accepted judgment,see section 3, text corresponding to ns. 92–94.

24 For Diels 1897, 45; Bormann 1971, 107; Coxon 1986, 248; Cassin and Narcy 1987,288, and Cassin 1998, 142 the implicit subject of ἔχει is νόος; for Schwabl 1953, 70

with n. 22, ἄ νθρωπος, and for Mansfeld 1964, 176–177, the goddess who determinesthe mixture, while Laks 1990, 5 n. prefers “a word like τ ὰ στήθη”. Cerri 1999, 280,conjectures ἕκαστος as an implicit subject, perhaps mentioned in one of the preceding lines; Dilcher 2006, 43, suggests an indefinite τις, “someone”. Gemelli Marciano2009, 94, infers from the context of Theophrastus’ quotation that the subject mightbe “das Warme oder das Feuer”. Palmer 2009, 387, states, more cautiously, that it islikely “that the subject could originally be inferred from the context” of the poem.

25 Fränkel 1955, 174.



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ment, however, is somewhat less cogent than it seems. Both discrepanciesbetween the νόοι of different individuals or nations and the fluctuations of each individual mind were recurrent topics of Greek thought, from

Homer to the sophists;26

moreover, both were of interest to Parmenides, who shows himself concerned with the inconstancy of human affairs, which never remain in the same state (cf. B 8.29 with B 8.38–41), no lessthan with distinguishing the νοε ῖ ν of truth (B 8.8, 34, 36; cf. νόος B 4.1)from the vagrant νόος of mortals who know nothing (B 6.6). Thereforethe mere resemblance of his verses to those of Homer and Archilochusdoes not prove all too much, even if he deliberately imitated them, sinceParmenides habitually uses his – mainly Homeric – models quite freely and sometimes with a sense quite different from the original.27

The last two lines of the fragment are fortunately free of textual pro-blems, but not of syntactical and semantic ambiguities which pose serious problems for interpretation. Thus it is far from evident whether Parme-nides is saying that the nature of the members is the same as that whichthinks, or as what it thinks, or rather that what thinks – or what it thinks– is the same for each and every man, or even that νόος is the same as

what the nature of the members thinks; still other translations are possi-ble.28 And finally, at v. 4, τ ὸ πλέον can be understood as “the more” (theelement which prevails in the mixture),29 or as “the full”.30

Even the general scope and purpose of the fragment is controversial:are we dealing with a physiological theory of sense-perception31 or with a comprehensive theory of knowledge or cognition in general,32 or even witha theory about the general nature of “mental states”33? And if one of thelatter, how does this, as it seems, rather materialistic conception of knowl-edge relate to the knowledge of true Being expounded in the first part of

26 For the first motif in Homer, see Von Fritz 1943, 81–82; a juxtaposition of bothtopics is found in Democritus (68A112 DK = Arist. Metaph Γ 5, 1009a38), Prota-

goras (80A14 DK = Sext. P I 218–219), and Gorgias ( apud [Arist.] MXG 980b9–17).27 The most notorious example is the play of ἀ λλότριον φῶς (B14) with the Homeric

ἀ λλότριος φῶς ( Il 5.214).28 For a detailed discussion of this passage and its interpretations, see section 3, text

corresponding to ns. 95–103.29 This is what we might call the standard interpretation, shared by Zeller 1876–81,

529 n. 2, Diels-Kranz, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, Coxon, and O’Brien-Frère, andstill accepted in the recent works of Conche 1996, 243, cf. 251–252; Cassin 1998,115, cf. 143; Cerri 1999, 159, cf. 281–282; Hermann 2004, 161; Bernabé and Pérezde Tudela 2007, 31, and Palmer 2009, 375 (“the greater”).

30 See ns. 88 and 113.31 See e.g., Vlastos 1946, 66 and 71–72; Cerri 1999, 277–278.32 See Philip 1958; Verdenius 1964, 10; Finkelberg 1986; Laks 1990, 11.33 Hussey 2006, 16.



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the poem? In particular, how would this notion of νόος as dependent onthe mixture of the “ wandering members” fit in with those passages of the

Way of Truth (B 3; B6.1; B 8.3, 34–6; cf. B 4.1) where νόος and νοε ῖ ν

seem to be inextricably connected with what-is and hence with knowledgeof truth?34If one thing should be evident from this rapid overview, it is that the

possible interpretations of B 16, on the basis of the text alone (and eventaking into account the rest of the extant fragments) are far more numer-ous than we would desire. So before engaging in a detailed discussion of the fragment (which I will give in the second half of section 3), it may beuseful to ask what exactly Aristotle and Theophrastus would have under-stood when quoting these lines, even if their interpretations might possibly

turn out to be wrong; but at any rate, this should be carefully proved indetail rather than assumed from the outset. Although Theophrastus’ com-mentary on the fragment is doubtlessly far more informative, I will begin

with Aristotle, since Theophrastus’ account is generally held to be largely dependent on Aristotle;35 some important qualifications on this point willemerge from the discussion (see section 3, at the end).

2 The Aristotelian context

Aristotle cites the four lines of our fragment, rather surprisingly, in thecontext of his polemic against Protagorean relativism. After having out-lined the relativistic argument drawing from the relativity of sense-percep-tion ( Metaphysics Γ 5, 1009a38–b12),36 he continues:

In general it is because they suppose sense-perception to be understanding, and theformer to be alteration, that they say that what appears to sense-perception is neces-sarily true. For it is for these reasons that Empedocles, Democritus, and, one may almost say, all the others have become liable for this sort of opinions. For Empedo-cles actually says that a person’s understanding changes as he changes his state [Aris-

totle quotes Empedocles 31 B 106 and 108 DK], and Parmenides pronounces inthe same sense [here follows the quotation of Parmenides B 16].37

34 See von Fritz 1945, 236–242, and Mourelatos 1970, 175–177 and 253–259.35 It should be pointed out that there is no strictly compelling chronological reason to

prefer this order, since it seems at least probable that most of Theophrastus’ historical writings were composed still during the lifetime of Aristotle (see Steinmetz 1964,350); we might even consider the possibility – suggested by Gigon 1969, 122 – thatAristotle relied for his historical accounts in the Physics and Metaphysics on the spe-cialized research of Theophrastus in his Physical Opinions.

36 For detailed discussion of this argument and Aristotle’s refutation, see Kenny 1967and the commentaries ad loc. of Ross 1924, 273–278, and Kirwan 1971, 108–112.

37 Metaph Γ 5, 1009b12–22: ὅ λως δὲ διὰ τ ὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μ ὲ ν τ ὴ ν αἴ σθησιν,ταύτην δ’ εἶ ναι ἀ λλοίωσιν, τ ὸ φαινόμενον κατ ὰ τ ὴ ν αἴ σθησιν ἐξ ἀ νάγκης ἀ ληθὲς εἶ ναί



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The quotation, as it seems, is meant to substantiate merely the claim thatfor Parmenides, as for Empedocles, “a person’s understanding changes ashe changes his state”. As far as it goes, this may be correct, but is not very

illuminating. The beginning of the passage is frankly disconcerting: “

They suppose sense-perception to be understanding ”. This claim is paralleled inTheophrastus’ commentary on his own quotation of B 16, this time withexplicit reference to Parmenides: “He speaks of perceiving and understand-ing as being the same thing ” (τ ὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τ ὸ φρονε ῖ ν ὡς ταὐτ ὸ λέγει, de Sensibus 4). Theophrastus’ wording reproduces here almost lit-erally that of another passage of Aristotle (de Anima 417a21), where heremarks that “the ancients say that understanding and perceiving are thesame thing ” (οἵ γε ἀρχα ῖ οι τ ὸ φρονε ῖ ν καὶ τ ὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτ ὸ ν εἶ ναί φασιν);

Aristotle supports this claim by the same quotations of Empedocles heused at Metaphysics Γ, although Parmenides is not explicitly mentionedthis time.

We may assume, of course, that Aristotle and Theophrastus meant tosay only that Parmenides and the other ancient thinkers had not yetclearly distinguished thinking or understanding from sense-perception,rather than explicitly asserting their identity.38 But even if this is right,their assertions seem still objectionable. Certainly, in archaic Greek – andin non-philosophical usage frequently even later – the semantic fields of φρονε ῖ ν and αἰσθάνεσθαι were not yet clearly differentiated in the way of a neat opposition between intellectual and perceptual processes;39 so weshould hardly expect Presocratic writers to have used these terms in thespecific sense they were to acquire in Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian

philosophy. But this fact of language would surely not have precludedthem from distinguishing, if necessary, processes of thought or reasoning from acts of direct sense-perception: in fact, there is evidence that at leastDemocritus (68 B 11) and probably Alcmaeon40 actually did make quite

φασιν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλ ῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τ ῶ ν ἄ λλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπε ῖ ν ἕκασ -τος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔ νοχοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλ ῆς μεταβάλλοντας τ ὴ ν ἕξιν μετα-βάλλειν φησ ὶ τ ὴ ν φρόνησιν ..., καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τ ὸ ν αὐτ ὸ ν τρόπον. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Bredlow 2010a.

38 Zeller 1876–81, 530 n. 1; Stratton 1917, 158 n. 7; Ross 1924, 275; Cherniss 1935,81.

39 Thus φρονε ῖ ν could also mean “to be sensible”, “to be in possession of one’s senses”(see LSJ s. v. φρονέω, IV, with references), whereas αἰσθάνεσθαι could sometimes referto mental perception or understanding (e.g., Hipp. Off 1 τ ῇ γνώμ ῃ αἰσθέσθαι; cf. LSJ ,s. v. αἰσθάνομαι, I.2). The fact that αἴ σθησις as denoting the totality of the five sensesis nowhere found in Presocratic writings was already emphasized by Langerbeck 1967, 44.

40 24 A 5 DK = Theophr. Sens 25; cf. Cherniss 1935, 299 n. 32. For other probableinstances of a distinction between intellectual and perceptual processes in the Preso-



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explicitly such a distinction; and so did – at least according to a onceinfluential interpretation – Parmenides when he opposed λόγος to “theunseeing eye and the echoing ear and tongue” (B 7.3–6).41 Moreover, it

has been argued42

that Aristotle seems to contradict his own statements when he speaks elsewhere of Parmenides and Melissus as “ passing oversense-perception and disregarding it, on the ground that one ought to fol-low reason (τ ῷ λόγῳ)” (GC 325a13–15), or of Parmenides as “assuming that what is one κατ ὰ τ ὸ ν λόγον is many according to sense-perception”( Metaphysics 986b31–33).

Now before deciding whether Aristotle’s view is in accordance with itself or with available evidence on Parmenides or other Presocratic writers, weshould try to understand what exactly he meant to say. If we do not want to

assume that Aristotle, when claiming that the ancients failed to distinguishthought from sense-perception, simply ignored what he emphasizes himself in other contexts,43 we might suppose his remarks were meant in some morespecific sense: e.g., that the ancient thinkers did not yet have an elaboratedtheory of sense-perception or of reasoning,44 or – more probably – that they simply considered thought and sensation to be essentially the same kind of natural phenomenon.45 But the most obvious interpretation, I think, wouldbe that he blames the ancients for not having distinguished thought fromsense-perception in the exact terms these should be distinguished on his own

view. And what these terms are is quite plain from the discussion in thefollowing chapters of de Anima (III 4–8). Thought or intellect ( νοῦς) is de-fined there as that which is capable of receiving the “form” of an object (δεκ-τικὸ ν τοῦ εἴ δους, 429a15), or even, with a somewhat Platonic turn of phrase,as “the place of forms” (τόπος εἰδῶ ν, 429a27). Thus by means of the sensitivefaculty we discriminate the sensible qualities (hot and cold, etc.) which con-stitute, e.g., flesh or water; but the fact that something is flesh or water, itsform or essence, is apprehended either by a wholly different faculty or by thesame faculty in a different state (429b10–18).

The distinction between νοε ῖ ν and αἰσθάνεσθαι, as Aristotle under-

stands it, is hence strictly correlative to the distinction between νοητά andαἰσθητά (de Anima 429a17; cf. 431b21).46 And this distinction seems to

cratics (Heraclitus, Xenophanes, and Parmenides), see Lesher 1994; for a similar dis-tinction in the Homeric poems, Lesher 1981, 14, and 1994, 6–7.

41 For a critical discussion of the traditional interpretation of B 7, see the end of thissection, text corresponding to ns. 53–7.

42 Lesher 1994, 12; Mansfeld 1996, 165–166; 1999, 342.43 Mansfeld 1996, 165: “... lui permet d’ignorer ce qu’il souligne dans d’autres contexts”.44 Mansfeld 1999, 342.45 Lesher 1994, 12; similarly Caston 1996, 26, and Dilcher 2006, 37.46 This correlation reflects the general principle – set out in de Anima II 4, 415a16–22

– that each psychic faculty is to be identified in terms of its function, and its func-



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be, in Aristotle’s opinion, what the ancient thinkers cannot account for,since they “suppose thinking to be something bodily, just like perceiving,and that the like is perceived and known by the like” (427a26). The fun-

damental flaw of like by like theories of cognition, as Aristotle sees it, hasbeen pointed out already in the first book of de Anima (409b26–410a13):even if one concedes that each element present in the soul perceives orknows its like when present in external objects – fire is perceived by fire,earth by earth, etc. (cf. Empedocles B 109) –, this will still not explainhow we can perceive or know not only elements but actual objects, such as“man”, “flesh”, or “bone”, which are not simply the same as the elementsthey are composed of, but those elements combined in a certain propor-tion and composition. If we confront this aporetic discussion of the pro-

blem (where Aristotle still avoids introducing his own terminology) withAristotle’s own solution given in Book III, it seems obvious that what likeby like theories fail on his view to account for is knowledge of forms (εἴ δη),i.e., the specific function of νοῦς as distinct from sense-perception.

This should make plain that, when Aristotle says that the ancientstook thinking and perceiving to be the same thing, he does not mean toconvey that these thinkers were unable to see any difference betweenthought or reasoning and direct sense-perception; nor does he mean onlythat they conceived both as physical or bodily processes, although this te-net is clearly one important aspect of the conviction he ascribes to them.

What Aristotle means is, as I take it, that the early philosophers did notconceive thought or intellect as a distinct function or faculty whose speci-fic objects are the “forms” and other intelligible objects; and since no Pre-socratic philosopher is known to have posited any such intelligible objects,in the Aristotelian or the Platonic sense, he might well have been rightafter all.

However, the view Aristotle ascribes to the ancient thinkers in Meta- physics Γ 5, where Parmenides is explicitly included, is not quite exactly that thinking and perceiving are the same thing, but that sense-perception

is φρόνησις. This might simply mean that sense-perception is an instance of thought, knowledge, or understanding – or, as Mansfeld puts it, a speciesof the genus knowledge –,47 without entailing that, inversely, all knowl-

tion in terms of its objects; i.e., what Wedin 1988, 13, calls the “FFO (faculty/func-tion/object) condition”. For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the νοητάinclude, for Aristotle, in addition to εἴ δη, also abstractions (ἐ ν ἀφαιρέσει ὄ ντα) such asnumber or geometrical properties (de An 429b18); but this is of secondary relevanceto the present discussion.

47 Mansfeld 1996, 165. According to Mansfeld (ibid . 166), Aristotle could attribute toParmenides the view that “ perception is (a species of the genus) knowledge” ( MetaphΓ 5), but not that perception and knowledge are identical (de An III 3), withoutflagrantly contradicting his own remarks on Parmenides’ distinction between reason-



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edge is the same kind of thing as sense-perception. Moreover, the morespecific formulation of this view is not that “the like is perceived andknown by the like”, but that sense-perception is an “alteration” (ἀ λλοίω-

σις). Nevertheless, the line of argument is strictly parallel to that of de Anima III 3: just as the like by like theory, the alteration theory of cogni-tion is unable to account for the difference of truth and error,48 and henceleads up to the fatal consequence – surely unforeseen by the ancient thin-kers – that “ what appears to sense-perception is necessarily true”(1009b13).

The parallelism with de Anima III 3, on the interpretation I have sug-gested, becomes even more evident in the passage immediately following in the text, where Aristotle explains that “the ground of this opinion of

theirs was that, in searching for the truth about the things-that-are, they supposed to be things-that-are only the sensible things”.49 This seems tobe a somewhat Platonizing way of saying that the ancient thinkers failedto conceive formal causes: these were, according to Aristotle, the great dis-covery of Plato and his school (cf. Metaphysics 988a34–b1). For Aristotle,after all, τ ὰ ὄ ντα are divided, just like for Plato, into αἰσθητά and νοητά (de Anima 431b21) – with the main difference that for Aristotle the latterare not “separate” but “inherent to sensible forms” (ibid ., 432a4) –, and νοῦς is related to the νοητά just as the αἰσθητικόν is to αἰσθητά (ibid .,429a17). Thus it becomes transparent why the supposition that only theαἰσθητά are ὄ ντα is said to have been, for the pre-Platonic philosophers,the origin or cause (αἴ τιον, Metaphysics 1010a1) of their opinion thatsense-perception is knowledge or understanding: their failure to conceive a distinct ontological domain of thinkable or intelligible objects ( νοητά)made them equally unable to conceive thought or intellect ( νοῦς) as a dis-

ing and sense-perception at Metaph Α 5 and GC I 8. On the interpretation I suggest,

there would be no such contradiction. The more restricted formulation of the an-cient philosophers’ view at Metaph Γ 5 – ”Sense-perception is (an instance of?)knowledge or understanding ” – may be readily explained by the fact that only thisside of the equation is relevant in the context, since the relativistic argument Aristotleis concerned with here (1009a38–b12) draws exclusively on examples of divergentsense-perceptions, with the obvious implication that these are to be taken as represen-tative instances of “knowledge”; and this is the first flaw of the relativistic argumentAristotle wants to point out (though by no means the only nor the most importantone: see his refutation of the argument at 1010b3–26).

48 Metaph 1009b9–11; b25–1010a1; cf. de An 427a29–b6. For an explicit rejection of the view that sense-perception is an “alteration”, see de An 431a4–6; for a more de-tailed argument, ibid ., 417b2–19; cf. also Ph 247b1–13, and the discussion of these

passages in Bredlow 2010a, 214–219.49 Metaph 1010a1–3: αἴ τιον δὲ τ ῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τ ῶ ν ὄ ντων μ ὲ ν τ ὴ ν ἀ λήθειαν

ἐσκόπουν, τ ὰ δ’ ὄ ντα ὑπέλαβον εἶ ναι τ ὰ αἰσθητ ὰ μόνον.



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tinct mental function or faculty correlative to this kind of objects, i.e., asδεκτικὸ ν τοῦ εἴ δους (de Anima 429a15).

On this interpretation, it should be plain that Aristotle does not mod-

ify –

or even contradict –

his general judgment on the pre-Platonic philo-sophers when he speaks elsewhere of Parmenides as “assuming that what isone κατ ὰ τ ὸ ν λόγον is many according to sense-perception” ( Metaphysics986b31). We may doubt whether κατ ὰ τ ὸ ν λόγον means here “according to the argument ” – the famous (and surely apocryphal) “argument of Par-menides”50 reported immediately before (986b28–30) – or rather “accord-ing to definition”.51 But at any rate, there is nothing to suggest that itshould mean “according to reason”, understood as a distinct mental func-tion or faculty, and even less as a faculty concerned with a specific kind of

object distinct from objects of sense-perception. Quite at the contrary,Aristotle explicitly states that for Parmenides the same objects which aremany according to sense-perception are but one according to argument ordefinition; and he is even more explicit on this point when he states else-

where that Parmenides and Melissus supposed only sensible things to bereal, and hence misapplied to these the argument that knowledge orscience requires eternal and unchanging objects – the very same argument

which led Plato to postulate intelligible objects distinct from sensiblethings – , denying generation, destruction, and change in the physical

world.52 But if Parmenides and Melissus, like all other pre-Platonic thin-kers, did not conceive any object of knowledge distinct from things per-ceived, it is evident that, on Aristotle’s view, they could not distinguishthought from sense-perception in the only exact way this distinctionshould be made according to Aristotle himself, i.e., in strict correlation

with the respective object fields of νοητά and αἰσθητά.But this would not mean, of course, that they were wholly unable to

distinguish logical argument from observation; and this latter distinction is what Aristotle has in mind at Metaphysics 986b31, as well as when herefers to Parmenides and Melissus as ὑπερβάντες τ ὴ ν αἴ σθησιν καὶ παρι-

δόντες αὐτ ὴ ν ὡς τ ῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθε ῖ ν (GC I 8, 325a13), i.e., “ passing over sense-perception and disregarding it, on the ground that one ought

50 See Simplicius, in Ph 115,11, Diels (Parmenides 28A28 DK) τ ὸ ν Παρμενίδου λόγον, with detailed reference to the earlier commentators of Aristotle.

51 Cf. 986b19, with Ross’ 1924, 153, commentary ad loc.52 Cael 298b14–25 (Parmenides 28 A 25 DK), esp. b22–25: ἐκε ῖ νοι δὲ διὰ τ ὸ μηθὲ ν μ ὲ ν

ἄ λλο παρὰ τ ὴ ν τ ῶ ν αἰσθητ ῶ ν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶ ναι, τοιαύτας δέ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοιφύσεις, εἴ περ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ φρόνησις, οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκε ῖ θεν λόγους.(cf. the remark on Plato at Metaph 1078b15: ... ὡς πάντων τ ῶ ν αἰσθητ ῶ ν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων,ὥστ ’ εἴ περ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἐτέρας δε ῖ ν τινὰς φύσεις εἶ ναι παρὰ τ ὰςαἰσθητ ὰς μενούσας); for a well-argued defense of Aristotle’s view on this point, seeKerferd 1991.



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to stick to the argument ”, rather than “… to follow reason”. Aristotle is notdistinguishing here two mental faculties, “reason” and “sense-perception”,nor does he ascribe any such distinction to Parmenides and Melissus;

rather he opposes abstract reasoning or argument to elementary facts of observation such as change and plurality of physical objects. This is evi-dent already from the immediately following remark that “although ac-cording to the arguments (ἐπὶ μ ὲ ν τ ῶ ν λόγων) all this [ sc. the supposedEleatic negation of change and plurality] may seem fairly consistent, ac-cording to the facts (ἐπὶ δὲ τ ῶ ν πραγμάτων) it would be next door to mad-ness to believe it” (ibid ., 325a17).

To sum up, on Aristotle’s view, Parmenides and Melissus surely distin-guished logical argument or reasoning ( λόγος, λόγοι) from observation, and

preferred the former to the latter; but they failed to recognize thought asa distinct mental function or faculty, correlative to a kind of object whichis fundamentally different from sensible things; and in this precise sensehe could still maintain, without contradicting himself, that they took thinking and perceiving to be “the same thing ”. Presocratic thought ishere, as usual, thoroughly recast in Aristotle’s own terminology; but if weaccept reading his statements in the precise terminological sense they wereintended, they may appear much less discordant with historical evidencethan on a more superficial reading.

Now before going on, I have to deal with an apparent difficulty for this interpretation which does not arise from Aristotle’s testimony,but from a certain interpretation of Parmenides’ own words. It hasbeen held by many interpreters, both ancient and modern, that Parme-nides explicitly opposes reason ( λόγος) to sense-perception when he

writes (B 7.3–6):

μηδέ σ ’ ἔθος πολ ύπειρον ὁδὸ ν κατ ὰ τήνδε βιάσθω νωμ ᾶ ν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήνκαὶ γλ ῶσσαν, κρ ῖ ναι δὲ λόγῳ πολ ύδηριν ἔ λεγχονἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Let not habit, átooñ full of experiences, drag you along this way áand force youñ toexercise an aimless eye, an echoing ear and tongue; but judge by reason the refuta-tion that has been uttered by me, áa refutationñ arousing much controversy. (Trans-lation O’Brien)

Sextus, when quoting these lines, comments that Parmenides “makes plainthat one ought not to trust in sense-perceptions, but in reason”.53 But thisis not what Parmenides says. As a growing number of scholars have cometo recognize, the “echoing tongue” is not the organ of taste but, quite

53 Sext. M VII 114 (Vors I 233,16): προσδιασαφε ῖ τ ὸ μ ὴ δε ῖ ν αἰσθήσει προσέχειν ἀ λλ ὰ τ ῷ λόγῳ.



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evidently, the organ of language:54 for Parmenides, it is indeed language –or, more exactly, “names” or “naming ” –, not trust in sense-perception,that is at the origin of the error of mortals.55 What Parmenides condemns

in these lines is not sense-perception, but the vulgar attitude which givesmore credit to hearsay and established belief than to what is seen withone’s own eyes.

On the other hand, λόγος is probably to be understood here as “rea-soning ”, “argument”, or “discourse”,56 rather than “reason” as a faculty of rational thought.57 Parmenides, in a word, is not concerned here withmental faculties at all, but with mental attitudes: with judging by argumentand reasoning as opposed to passive acceptance of established belief. A dualism of cognitive faculties (“reason” vs. “the senses”) cannot be attribu-ted to Parmenides, neither on the grounds of his own extant fragments,nor of the testimonies of Aristotle.

3 The Theophrastean context and B 16

Theophrastus’ comment on B 16 should be read taking into account the whole context of the first chapters of de Sensibus. The treatise begins witha schematic classification of views on the subject: “Concerning sensation,the most widespread and general opinions are two: some attribute it tothe like, others to contraries” (de Sensibus 1). Parmenides is ranged, to-gether with Empedocles and Plato, with the representatives of the firstopinion. After enumerating what he takes to be the main reasons support-ing either view, Theophrastus goes on:

περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ τ ῶ ν κατ ὰ μέρος οἱ μ ὲ ν ἄ λλοι σχεδὸ ν ἀπολείπουσιν, Ἐμπεδοκλ ῆς δὲ πειρ-ᾶται καὶ ταύτας ἀ νάγειν εἰς τ ὴ ν ὁμοιότητα. 3 Παρμενίδης μ ὲ ν γὰρ ὅ λως ουδὲ ν ἀφώρικεν,ἀ λλ ὰ μόνον ὅτι δυο ῖ ν ὄ ντοιν στοιχείοιν κατ ὰ τ ὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστ ὶ ν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐὰ ν γὰρὑπεραίρῃ τ ὸ θερμ ὸ ν ἢ τ ὸ ψυχρόν, ἄ λλην γίνεσθαι τ ὴ ν διάνοιαν, βελτίω δὲ καὶκαθαρωτέραν τ ὴ ν διὰ τ ὸ θερμόν· οὐ μ ὴ ν ἀ λλ ὰ καὶ ταύτην δε ῖ σθαί τινος συμμετρίας· ‘ὡς

54 See Gigon 1945, 259; Calvo 1977, 252–253; Barnes 1982, 297; Conche 1996, 121;Curd 1998, 13–14; Mansfeld 1999, 331–333; Narecki 2003, 45–46 and 49–50; Dil-cher 2006, 38.

55 See Parmenides B 8.38–39 and 53; B 9.1; B 19.3. For a pertinent interpretation of these passages, see the fundamental paper of Owens 1975; cf. also Coxon 1986, 256;Conche 1996, 195–196, and Barrett 2004, 282–287.

56 This was already seen by Burnet 1930, 173 n. 1, and Verdenius 1964, 64; cf. Lesher1994, 24 n. 46.

57 As Lesher 1994, 24 n. 46, remarks, “this would move forward the earliest use of λόγοςin this sense by about a century ”; cf. Guthrie 1962–81, I 423–424. Despite this in-sight, Lesher still clings to the other half of the traditional interpretation of B 7.3 –6

when he writes, in the same paper, that Parmenides in this passage expressly contrastsdeductive inference “ with the faculties of sense” (Lesher, 1994, 9); cf. the accuratecritical remarks of Mansfeld 1999, 331–333.



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of the hot in the opening section.59 The names of the elements “hot” and“cold” are, of course, standard Aristotelian terms for what Parmenideshimself named “Fire” (πῦρ B 8.56; B 12.1) or “Light” (φάος B 9.1 and 3)

and “

Night”

( νύξ B 8.64; B 9.1 and 3; B 12.2).60

These might have beenmentioned in the immediate context of the fragment, or just been deducedby Theophrastus from the mention of the “mixture” at B 16.1; however,since in the fragment there is no mention of Fire or Light, nor of its rela-tion to better and purer thinking, it seems necessary to conclude thatTheophrastus must have relied for this specific information on some dif-ferent verses of the poem.

On the other hand, as we have already seen, the statement that Parme-nides “speaks of perceiving and thinking as being the same thing ”61 isclearly paralleled in Aristotle ( Metaphysics Γ 5, 1009b12; cf. de Anima427a21); and so is the general principle of “like by like” (de Anima427a28). This does not exclude, of course, that Theophrastus might havefound – or believed he found – some direct support for this latter claimin the text of Parmenides. At the very least we should expect that what heread would have been in some way consistent with this principle.62

This seems all the more plausible since at least some of the assump-tions underlying the “like by like” principle belonged to the common heri-tage of Greek folk science. The attraction of like by like is proverbial al-ready in Homer;63 in early Greek science this general principle was used to

explain a wide variety of phenomena, from the absorption of food ordrugs by the human body in the Hippocratic writers64 to the movementof fire in Empedocles (31 B 62.6) and of atoms in Leucippus.65 It inspiredthe theories of perception of Empedocles (31 B 109) and of Democritus66

59 See Laks 1990, 5. This was already seen by Vlastos 1946, 68, and Coxon 1986, 247.Verdenius 1964, 23, even conjectured that καθαρωτέραν “ was probably one of Parme-nides’ own terms” (cf. B 10.2 and Empedocles B 110.2).

60 Cf. Metaph 986b34; Ph 188a20.61 As Baltussen 2000, 91, rightly remarks, the qualifying ὡς (“ as if identical”) shows how carefully Theophrastus distinguishes his own interpretation from Parmenides’ actual

wording.62 Unless, of course, we suppose that blind faith in Aristotle’s authority misguided him

up to the point of inflicting overt violence to the texts he read; but this is very un-likely, since Theophrastus proves well capable of critical distance from Aristotle’s

points of view, e.g., when he introduces, correcting his teacher, the group of ancientthinkers who explained sense-perception “by the contraries” (Sens 1); cf. Mansfeld1996, 169–170; for some other instances of Theophrastus correcting Aristotle, seeKahn 1960, 19–20, and Hussey 2006, 24–25.

63 Od 17.218; cf. Arist. Rh I 11, 1371b13–17.64 Hipp. Morb IV 33–4 L VII 544; Nat Hom 6 L VI 44.65 Diogenes Laertius IX 31 = Leucippus 67 A 1.66 Democritus 68 B 164 (Sext. M VII 116–17), A 128 (Aetius IV 19, 3 = Dox 408).



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(in the latter the reference to the folk tradition is explicit), and hence may well have been present in the mind of Parmenides as well.

Moreover, for a theory of perception of like by like there was also a

more specific precedent in archaic beliefs about visual perception. For thearchaic Greeks the eyes not only receive light from the outside, but alsoemit light of their own;67 the association of sight with the emission of lightis patent in the belief that Helios, universal source of light, is also the one“ who sees everything ”68 or “looks down with his rays”.69 From there it

would have been only a short step to the conclusion that vision occurs when the light emanating from the eyes meets with external light. This is what we find in the optical theories of Empedocles and Plato,70 but thebasic assumption may well have been of much earlier origin; so it would

not seem all too surprising that Parmenides should have held some vaguely similar belief.71But Theophrastus says that Parmenides extended the “like by like”

principle to the dark and cold elements also and, generally, to “all thereis”, without shrinking away from the implication that any contact of like

with like must consequently produce some sort of perception: hence hehad to conclude (even if only in order to “avoid the difficulties resulting from this supposition”, as Theophrastus insinuates72) that all there is hassome kind of knowledge or consciousness. We may doubt, of course,

whether this last point was explicitly stated by Parmenides or is Theo-

67 Cf. Onians 1951, 76–7. The “fiery ” nature of the eye, commonly assumed by early philosophers (Arist. Sens 437a22), was already familiar to Homer: eyes are “brilliant”or “sparkling ” (ὄσσε φαεινώ Il 13.3 and 7; φαεινά 13.435; the same adjective appliedto fire [ Il 5.215], dawn [Od 4.188], and the moon [ Il 8.555]) or simply “lights” (φάεαOd 16.5, 17.39, 19.417); they contain “fire”, visible in angry persons or animals ( Il 12.466, 13.474; Od 4.662, 19.446).

68 Il 3.277, 14.345, Od 11.109, 12.323; cf. Classen 1965, 100–101, and Bultmann 1948,14–15. An association of the emission of light with seeing might have been suggested

also by the polysemy (from our perspective) of the verb δέρκομαι, “see”, “look at..”.,and “flash”, “gleam” (see LSJ s. v.; cf. Snell 1953, 1–5).69 καταδέρκεται ἀκτίνεσσιν Od 11.16; cf. h Cer 70.70 Empedocles A 86 (Theophr. Sens 7–8), B 84; Plat. Tim 45b, 67e; see Beare 1906,

44–49, Schneider 1923, 66–8, and Onians 1951, 76–79.71 This does not imply, of course, that Parmenides elaborated an explicit theory of vi-

sion. Aetius (4.13.9.10= Parm. A 48) remarks, somewhat hesitantly, that some peopleattributed to Parmenides a theory of vision similar to that of the Pythagorean Hip-

parchus; but this second-hand notice can hardly be trusted, since Theophrastus statesexplicitly that Parmenides “did not define anything ” about each particular kind of sensation.

72 That this is the difficulty Theophrastus has in mind can be inferred from his objec-tions to Empedocles (Sens 12), Anaxagoras (36), and Diogenes (46): their theories of sensation do not allow for any distinction between animate and inanimate matter; cf.Baltussen 2000, 181 with n. 146.



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phrastus’ own conclusion;73 but I think the former is far more probable,for grammatical as well as logical reasons: grammatically, the infinitiveἔχειν is still dependent on ἐ ν οἷ ς φησι, and hence meant as a part of the

quotation; logically, if Theophrastus goes on commenting that “

by thisassertion” (τ ῇ φάσει) Parmenides tried to avoid the difficulties resulting from his theory, we are to understand that the assertion at issue is Parme-nides’ own and not a courtesy of the commentator. Moreover, the lost

verse of Parmenides referred to by Theophrastus seems to be echoed – likeso many other well-known ones – 74 by Empedocles, when he declares that“all things have intelligence and a share of thought”.75 It might be worthnoting also that a strikingly similar theory was attributed to Democritus:“All things have a share in some kind of soul, even dead bodies, because

they obviously share always something hot and sensitive, even when mostof it has been expired”.76Now in Parmenides’ theory, as Theophrastus summarizes it, each one’s

share of thinking depends on the proportion of “hot” and “cold” in thebody, so that thinking is “better and purer” when hot is in excess. WhenTheophrastus says, rewording another lost portion of the poem, that also“memory and forgetting come from these elements, according to the mix-ture”, we should infer that a better memory corresponds to a greater pro-

portion of heat or Light, while forgetfulness is due to a cooling-down of the mixture, as – according to the doxographers – are sleep and old age.77

Still more extreme is the “loss of fire” in the dead body, whose faculty of perception is minimal. The gist of all this seems to be that there is noexclusive opposition between thinking and sense-perception, betweenmemory and forgetfulness, or even between life and death, but only a quantitative difference in the proportions of the mixture.78

73 As suspected by Calogero 1932, 48 n., and Tarán 1965, 261.74 See the Empedoclean parallels to Parmenides’ verses in the app. crit. of Coxon 1986,

55–91.75 Empedocles B 110.10: πάντα γὰρ... φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶ σαν; cf. B 103 and B107. Coxon 1986, 248, already conjectured that Empedocles B 103 and 110.10 may be “modelled on lines of Parmenides”. As to the sense of these fragments, Verdenius1964, 24, rightly acknowledged that “there is no ground for doubting that Empedo-cles, like Parmenides, attributed the faculty of knowing and knowledge to all reality ”.

76 Democritus 68A117 = Aetius 4.4.7: πάντα μετέχειν φησ ὶ ψυχ ῆς ποιᾶς, καὶ τ ὰ νεκρὰτ ῶ ν σωμάτων, διότι ἀεὶ διαφανῶς τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει τοῦ πλείονος δια-πνεομένου. The belief that the dead still conserve some residual degree of life, sensa-tion, or awareness was rather common in archaic Greek tradition: see Untersteiner1958, CCVIII–CCIX.

77 A 46a (Aetius 5.30 = Dox 443,12): Π. γῆρας γίνεσθαι παρὰ τ ὴ ν τοῦ θερμοῦ ὑπόλειψιν;A 46b (Tert. de An 45): somnum... refrigerationem.

78 Reduction of apparently exclusive oppositions to mere differences of degree (i.e., dif-ferent proportions of the mixture of elements) seems to be a general feature of Par-



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This would give a quite precise meaning to the remark that Parme-nides “speaks of perceiving and understanding as being the same thing ”: inParmenides’ theory, as Theophrastus understands it, sense-perception and

thought are not two distinct faculties, but merely different degrees of oneand the same physical phenomenon, the mixture of hot and cold in thebody. Moreover, this remark should be read in close connection withTheophrastus’ introducing statement that Parmenides “did not define any-thing at all”. Some recent interpreters have taken this to mean that “ whatParmenides did not define at all is not sensation, but the distinctive me-chanism of each of the five senses”.79 But I think it is quite plain from theentire context that what Theophrastus actually means is, just as this phrasehas been traditionally understood, that Parmenides did not define any-

thing at all with regard to sensation or sense-perception, which is the subject of Theophrastus’ study.Indeed, it should be noticed that actually none of Theophrastus’ refer-

ences to the text of Parmenides bear any direct relation to sense-percep-tion. In the verses of B 16 Parmenides speaks of νόος and νόημα. The exactmeaning of these words is certainly problematic: the verb νοε ῖ ν can mean“to know ” or “to understand”80 or simply “to think ”;81 so νόος might be“knowledge”, “understanding ”, or just “thought”. But at any rate, there isnothing to suggest that νόος or νοε ῖ ν could refer, in Parmenides or any-

where else, to what one would normally regard as instances of sense-per-ception.82 I think this should suffice to exclude any possibility of interpret-ing B 16 as a “doctrine of sense-perception”.

On the other hand, Theophrastus’ paraphrases of Parmenides’ text re-fer to “thinking ” (διάνοια), memory, forgetting, and the residual percep-tions of the corpse. Surely none of these is an instance of normal sense-

perception. But Theophrastus was writing, after all, a treatise περὶαἰσθήσεων; so if Parmenides had something to say on this topic, why should Theophrastus have failed to point this out explicitly, instead of bothering to bring up these rather irrelevant quotes on thinking, memory,

menides’ physical world-view; a closely similar pattern can be discerned in his genetictheory: see B 18, with the accurate commentary of Fränkel 1955, 182 n. 2.

79 Laks 1990, 10, followed by Mansfeld 1996, 172 n. 49.80 According to Mourelatos 1970, 164, this would be “the more suitable translation for

νοε ῖ ν” in Parmenides; similarly Kahn 1969–70, 703 n. 4: “a term like ‘cognition’ or‘knowledge’”, and Coxon 1986, 174: “ νοε ῖ ν in Parmenides denotes always intellectualapprehension”.

81 For the text of Parmenides, this rendering is argued for by Barnes 1982, 158–159,and Lesher 1994, 27 n. 54; cf. also Conche 1996, 257.

82 Indeed, as von Fritz 1943, 88, has pointed out, already in Homer νοε ῖ ν is, “if we useour modern terminology …, a purely mental act and does not belong to sensual per-ception proper”.



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and the mental life of corpses? For this time, I think, the argumentum ex silentio is decisive: if Theophrastus does not mention any passage of Par-menides specifically referring to his subject of inquiry, we may safely con-

clude that there was none to be found in his text. Indeed, Theophrastus,far from trying to conceal this fact from the reader, makes it plain fromthe outset: ὅ λως οὐδὲ ν ἀφώρικεν.

Nonetheless, Theophrastus clearly thinks that something can be gotout of the text for his subject, since he expressly remarks that Parmenidesspeaks of φρονε ῖ ν as “the same thing ” as αἰσθάνεσθαι. If taken merely as a comment on Parmenides’ use at B 16, this is probably not right: althoughφρονέειν, in archaic usage, could sometimes refer to sensibility or sensualawareness in a broad sense,83 the connection with νόος and νόημα makes

quite clear that this is not the meaning intended here. But since Parme-nides’ theory of mixture, at least as Theophrastus understands it, refers to“cognition” ( γνῶσις) in general, and since thinking, νόος, memory, and eventhe residual awareness of dead matter count for him as legitimate instancesof γνῶσις, Theophrastus sees fit to conclude that so should normal sense-

perception too, even though Parmenides does not explicitly mention it. Inthis broad sense, he could say that Parmenides speaks of perceiving andunderstanding as “the same thing ”, i.e., as instances of “cognition” depend-ing on the same physical mechanism of the mixture of elements.

If we return now to our initial question of what might exactly corre-spond, in Theophrastus’ summary, to his reading of our fragment B 16,

we are left with the few phrases of the opening section, especially the men-tion of “excess” (τ ὸ ὑπερβάλλον) and “ proportion” (συμμετρία). On this

point, most modern interpreters seem to agree; but the exact relation of the fragment to Theophrastus’ paraphrase is still controversial. On themost widely accepted interpretation, τ ὸ ὑπερβάλλον is taken as referring tothe preponderance of one of the two elements over the other (“the ele-ment which prevails over the other”), and hence as equivalent to τ ὸ πλέον(understood as “the more”) in the last line of the fragment;84 correspond-

ingly, συμμετρία is understood as the proportion of the two elements inthe mixture, supposedly referred to in the first two lines of the fragment.

However, this interpretation is not free from difficulties. Several scho-lars have noted that if τ ὸ πλέον is understood as “the more”, the logicalconnection between the last two sentences, and especially the explanative

value ( γάρ) of the last, remains obscure.85 We might add that, even if τ ὸ

83 See n. 39.84 This interpretation goes back to Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

(307,1–3 Hayduck); cf. Zeller 1876–81, 529 n. 2; Verdenius 1964, 17 n. 3; Coxon1986, 250.

85 Fränkel 1955, 175; Tarán 1965, 256–7; Laks 1990, 8.



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πλέον were to be understood in this sense, thought would not be “that which prevails”, but “ according to that which prevails” (κατ ὰ τ ὸ πλέον):thinking varies in quality according to the relative excess of Light or

Night, but without ever becoming identical to either one of them only;this is at least what Theophrastus insists in when he states that even betterand purer thinking “requires a certain proportion”.86

Furthermore, it seems at least doubtful whether συμμετρία can meanthe proportion between the two elements in the mixture. Fränkel observedthat in Theophrastus’ text the term is regularly used to express the idea that “an organ of perception (e.g., an eye or ear) is “commensurable” withits object (light, sound) and so arranged as to receive it adequately ”;87 so

we should expect it to have the same meaning in this context. Indeed, if

thinking grows “

better and purer”

as hot becomes preponderant over cold,then why should this require “a certain proportion” – i.e., why would not just any proportion do as long as hot prevails – , if not because some proportions are adequate to the object and others are not? This is just plain common sense. But then, does this reading of συμμετρία find any support in the text of Parmenides? Or are we to conclude that Theophras-tus misunderstood his text?

Both these difficulties have been accurately pointed out and extensively discussed by Laks (1990); but I think the solution he proposes raises more

problems than it succeeds at resolving. Laks suggests, following Bollack and Untersteiner, that τ ὸ πλέον at B 16.4 is not to be understood as “themore” (neuter of the comparative πλέων), but as “the full” (neuter of πλέος“full”), just like in the two other occurrences of πλέον in the fragments of

86 This incongruity has been accurately observed by Dilcher 2006, 44, who concludesthat Theophrastus misunderstood the text and changed its meaning by adding the

preposition κατά. But since “ What is more is thought”, if taken as literally identifying thought with only one of the two elements – the one that prevails – , does not seem

to make any acceptable sense (indeed it would virtually annihilate “the explanatory power of the theory of mixture”), he suggests that πλέον should be understood as“that which is more than the mixture” (πλέον τ ῆς κράσεως), i.e., mind as separatedfrom the physical constitution of the body (Dilcher 2006, 45). But I doubt that theGreek can bear that meaning: τ ὸ πλέον τ ῆς κράσεως would be most naturally under-stood as “the greater part of the mixture” (like Il 1.165 τ ὸ πλε ῖ ον πολέμοιο); “morethan [in the sense of “different from and of higher rank than”] the mixture” wouldrather be με ῖ ζον τ ῆς κράσεως. Moreover, since in the world of the doxa “all is full” of Light and Night (B 9.3), there is no room left for there being anything “more thanthe mixture”, just as in the Way of Truth there is no room for anything more than

what-is itself. Therefore, the “first vague formulation of the transcendence of mind”(Dilcher 2006, 46) is probably not to be found in these verses of Parmenides.

87 Fränkel 1955, 175 (see Sens 7–11 = Empedocles A 86; cf. Plat. Men 76c–d; Arist.GC I 8, 324b26–35). This was already observed by Stratton 1917, 157 n. 5; cf. thediscussion in Laks 1990, 15–16.



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Parmenides (B 8.24; B 9.3).88 This reading, however, entails a difficulty which seemed to have gone unnoticed by its former proponents: if Theo- phrastus had indeed correctly understood the role of “ preponderance” (τ ὸ

ὑπερβάλλον) in Parmenides’

theory –

as all of these interpreters seem toagree he had – , where then did he find this expressed in the text of the poem, if not in the last half of B 16.4? Laks suggests that the relevant passage of Theophrastus’ report (up to ἄ λλην γίνεσθαι τ ὴ ν διάνοιαν) paraphrases the first two lines of the fragment, plus some lost verse in theimmediate context of the quotation, where he might have read τ ὸ ὑπερ-βάλλον or its Parmenidean equivalent.89 But this solution gives rise to a fresh problem: if the first two lines of B 16 correspond to the beginning of Theophrastus’ report and not, as habitually understood, to the immedi-

ately preceding remark on συμμετρία, and if, moreover, συμμετρία, as Laksargues (I think rightly), does not refer to the proportion of the elementsin the mixture, but to the adaptation of the perceiving organ to its object,

where then did Theophrastus read in Parmenides about such a theory of adaptation? Laks proposes to understand συμμετρία in an Empedocleansense, as the adapting of emanations from the objects to the sensible“ pores” or “ passages” they are to “fill up”; hence Theophrastus would haveunderstood (correctly, in Laks’ opinion) the last phrase of the quotation(B 16.4b), τ ὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστ ὶ νόημα, as meaning “the full is thought”.90

But this reconstruction is hardly convincing. After all, there is no evi-dence for a theory of pores in Parmenides, except the hardly trustworthy report of Aetius (4.9.6 = A47), where Parmenides is summarily rangedtogether with Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Hera-clitus. If there had been any such notion in Parmenides, we surely shouldhave expected Theophrastus to say so. Instead, Theophrastus explicitly states that Parmenides “did not define anything ” concerning the specificmechanisms of sense-perception. We might understand this to mean, of course, as Laks argues, that Parmenides did not define the distinctive me-chanism of each of the five senses in particular; this would leave him with

the chance of having theorized about sensation just in general terms. Butshould we really believe that Parmenides was able to formulate a generaltheory of sense-perception, including such details like “emanations”, “ pas-sages”, and their “filling up”, without ever referring to how this would

88 Laks 1990, 8–9; cf. Bollack 1957, 68–69, and Untersteiner 1958, CCV n. 134. Thesame reading – anticipated already by Ritter 1836, I 508, who translated “denn dasVolle ist der Gedanke” – has been accepted since by Deichgräber 1959, 71; Mansfeld1964, 191–192, and 1996, 173; Tarán 1965, 256–257; Mourelatos 1970, 253–255;Hershbell 1970, 13; Gallop 1984, 87; Cordero 1984, 42, and 2004, 195; Schmitz1988, 78; Colli 2003, 190, and Gemelli Marciano 2009, 95.

89 Laks 1990, 12.90 Laks 1990, 17–18.



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work for any particular sense? I think this is rather incredible; and with-out such detailed theoretical context, the relation of συμμετρία to “the full”lacks any ground.

To sum up, I think we may retain the idea that συμμετρία means, in a broad sense, the adaptation of the perceiving or thinking organ to its object, though without Empedoclean-style technical details such as emana-tions or passages to be filled up, altogether unwarranted by the fragmentsand testimonies concerning Parmenides. What Theophrastus means is, asI take it, that even for “better and purer” thinking the mixture of elementsin the thinking subject must be “ proportional” to the mixture found inthe object to be known or thought of.91

But where, after all, did Theophrastus find this notion of συμμετρία

expressed in the text of Parmenides? I suggest that the passage of referenceis to be found just where it is most natural to expect it, that is, in the firsttwo lines of B 16. Indeed, almost all modern interpreters agree that thequotation of these two lines was meant to illustrate the immediately pre-ceding remark on συμμετρία. We have seen, however, that this term cannotdenote the proportion of the two elements in the mixture to each other,but must refer to the commensurability of the mixture of Light and Nightin the thinking subject (the “mixture in the wandering members”) withthat of its object.

Now it should hardly be mere coincidence that this is precisely thesense we obtain if accepting, together with Stephanus’ correction κρᾶσις,the Aristotelian variant ἑκάστ ῳ, though understood not as masculine butas neuter (cf. B19.3): “For such as the mixture of the wandering membersis in relation to each thing , so is mind present to men”.92

This reading, I think, is palaeographically far less implausible than itmight seem at first sight. Indeed, ἑκάστ ῳ is the reading of A b (Laurentia-nus 87), a manuscript of the twelfth century AD and hence more recentthan the other two main MSS of the Metaphysics, E (Parisinus gr. 1853)and J (Vindobonensis phil. gr. C), both from the tenth century, but which

according to Christ and Ross “ presents more traces of uncial corruptionand other evidence which points to an original older than that of EJ”.93This would suffice to credit ἑκάστ ῳ as corresponding to the older textualtradition. On the other hand, the variant ἑκάστοτε found in all MSS of Theophrastus can be easily accounted for as a later correction of Theo-

phrastus’ text. It should be remembered that the textual tradition of the

91 On this general sense of συμμετρία in the text, my view is closest to that of Conche1996, 253–254, with some discrepancies in detail I will address later (see text corre-sponding to n. 104).

92 For ἔχω + dat., see LSJ s. v. B II b.93 Ross 1924, CLXI.



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de Sensibus is far more recent than that of the Metaphysics: the oldestextant MSS, P (Parisinus gr. 1921) and F (Laurentianus gr. 87,20), from

which all the others descend, are both of the fourteenth century, and both

seem to be independent copies of a common original.94

Since ἑκάστοτ (ε) isfound in the manuscript tradition of the Metaphysics at least from theninth or tenth century onwards – it must have been the reading already of the archetypus common to E and J – , some four or five centuriesbefore the date of the oldest MSS of de Sensibus, it seems quite possiblethat at some moment of this long period some scholar had corrected histext of Theophrastus, replacing the original reading by what he found inhis copy of Aristotle.

Moreover, the reference of ἑκάστ ῳ, “to each [thing]”, probably explicit

in the immediate context of the fragment, must have been obvious toTheophrastus himself, who had the complete text of the poem beforehim, but was surely opaque to his readers and copyists, who would haveeasily misunderstood these verses – just like most of their modern inter-

preters – as referring only to the mixture of elements in the thinking subject, and therefore may have adjusted the text, deliberately or by distrac-tion, to their own understanding of it.

The lines which follow in the fragment (B 16.2b–4a) are probably themost difficult to relate to anything said by Theophrastus, and perhaps themost difficult to make sense of: τ ὸ γὰρ αὐτό|ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσιςἀ νθρώποισιν|καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί. Scholars disagree as to whether ὅπερ is to betaken (a) as the subject or (b) as the object of φρονέει, and whether τ ὸ αὐτόis to be understood (1) as referring to ἀ νθρώποισιν (“the same for all men”),(2) as connecting ὅπερ φρονέει with μελέων φύσις, or (3) with νόος, or, finally,(4) as pronominal. The resulting possibilities for interpretation are:

(1a) “For that which thinks is the same, namely, the substance of thelimbs, in each and every man”95

(1b) “For the same thing is that the nature of the body thinks in each

and in all men”96(2a) “For the nature of the members is the same as that which thinks,

in each …”97

94 On the manuscript tradition of the de Sensibus, see Diels 1879, 114–118, andMcDiarmid 1962.

95 Burnet 1930, 177–178; similarly Diels 1897, 45; Diels-Kranz; Guthrie 1962–81,2.67; Austin 1986, 171; Collobert 1993, 24; Colli 2003, 189; Hermann 2004, 161;Palmer 2009, 375.

96 Tarán 1965, 169; similarly Heitsch 1974a, 198; O’Brien and Frère 1987, 74; Wiesner1996, 60; Hussey 2006, 18; Dilcher 2006, 43; Gemelli Marciano 2009, 95.

97 Cordero 1984, 42, and 2004, 195 (“for men, both in general and in particular, thenature of the limbs is the same that thinks”); Conche 1996, 243 (“Car, chez les



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(2b) “For the nature of the members is the same as what it thinks, ineach …”98

(3b) “For mind is the same as what the nature of the members thinks,

in each …”99

(4b) “For this is precisely what the nature of the members thinks, ineach …”100

None of these interpretations is satisfactory. Against (1a) and (1b) it hasbeen objected that the identity of what thinks (or of what is thought) “ineach and every man” would hardly agree with the universal variance of minds stated immediately before.101 On the other hand, on interpretations(2a)–(4b) these very same words “in each and every man” become utterly

redundant.

102

This should make us suspect that it is precisely in these words where we have to seek the root of the problem. I suggest that themistake common to all these translations was to have taken καὶ πᾶσιν καὶπαντί as an apposition to ἀ νθρώποισιν, and hence as masculine, withoutnoticing that these datives, if understood as neuter, offer a ready comple-ment to τ ὸ αὐτό. This seems indeed the most natural reading of the pas-sage: for a Greek reader or listener, in a sentence introduced by saying thatsomething is τ ὸ αὐτό, the most normal thing to expect would be a dativecomplement, just as in English, when someone says that “ x is the same...”,

we would normally expect him to continue “the same as…” (even thoughother constructions are equally admissible, in Greek as well as in English).The subject is ὅπερ φρονέει; so we have: “For what the nature of the mem-bers thinks in men is the same as each and every thing ”.103 This seems to

hommes, en tous et en chacun, la nature du corps est cela même qui pense”); Cerri1999, 159 and 281.

98 This interpretation was first proposed in 1930 by Fränkel 1955, 175: “(Der Artnach) dasselbe wie das man denkt ist die Beschaffenheit der Glieder”, and

followed by Cherniss 1935, 80 n. 330, Vlastos 1946, 66 n. 5; Verdenius 1949, 66 n.5; Bollack 1957, 68 n. 39; Finkelberg 1986, 406, and Laks 1990, 7, with n. 18, among others.

99 Mansfeld 1964, 188; Coxon 1986, 90 (“for it [ sc. mind] is the awareness belonging to the nature of the body for all and each”); Thanassas 1997, 187 n. 69.

100 Hölscher 1968, 115 (cf. 1956, 396–397): “Denn dies eben ist es, was die Beschaffen-heit der Gliedmassen denkt”.

101 Austin 1986, 170 n. 35; Conche 1996, 249–250.102 As observed by Fränkel 1955, 175 n. 3, against version (2a); though the same criti-

cism may be applied to his own translation (see n. 98), where these words simply disappear.

103 On this reading, the syntax (and even the sense) of these lines becomes strictly paral-lel to that of Aristotle’s famous sentence (de An 430a19): τ ὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ ’ἐ νέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τ ῷ πράγματι. I would not exclude the possibility of a deliberatereminiscence of Parmenides’ verses, well-known to Aristotle, as his quotation at Me-



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be, after all, the Parmenidean formulation of the principle of “like by like”: the varying mixture of Light and Night in the body can indeed re-

produce any object, so to speak, in a scaled-down version, whenever there

is the right proportion (συμμετρία) between both mixtures; in this sense,thought is “the same” as its object.Now before passing over to the last half verse of the fragment, we will

have to address a difficulty which the interpretation suggested here shares with several others. If we accept as genuine Theophrastus’ notice that forParmenides the preponderance of the hot in the mixture produces betterand purer thinking, and if at the same time we understand the συμμετρίαrequired for this kind of thinking as the “right proportion” between themixtures of the elements in the object and in the thinking or perceiving

subject, then we run into a serious problem. For what should this “

right proportion” consist in? The principle of “like by like” might suggest atfirst blush that the mixture of Light and Night in the members of thethinking subject must simply be of the same proportion as in the objectknown.104 But this will not work, since in this case any increase of Lightbeyond the just proportion would unfailingly entail, instead of better and

purer thinking, a progressively deficient perception, analogous – though ininverted direction – to that which in sleeping persons and in the dead iscaused by lack of Light or heat: a subject suffering from an excess of Light

would become gradually blind to the dark sides of things, just as corpsesare to the bright.

Fränkel, who proposed to understand συμμετρία in the technical senseof an “adjustment” or “commensurability ” between the object and the re-ceiving organ, held that “for Parmenides knowledge which is due to thehot is better and purer, but is not sufficient in itself, since that which is tobe perceived must, in a certain way, fit with the organ (so that the hotelement in the perceiving subject is, so to speak, blind to the cold)”.105The final parenthesis shows that also Fränkel’s interpretation fails to ex-

plain how a kind of perception blind to half of the world could be consid-

ered “better and purer” than another more balanced and comprehensive,albeit less luminous one. If Parmenides really held some version of the likeby like theory, or of a symmetry between the perceiver and the perceived,

taphysics Γ 5 shows; and Presocratic writers were surely present to his mind when writing the last cha

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