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Globalization,TechnologyandSustainableDevelopmentBookSeries
SeriesEditor
ProfessorAllamAhmedSchoolofBusiness,ManagementandEconomics
UniversityofSussex,UK
BRIDGINGTHEDIGITALDIVIDE?PROSPECTSFORCARIBBEANDEVELOPMENTINTHENEWTECHNO-ECONOMICPARADIGMcanbeorderedfromWASD:
WORLDASSOCIATIONFORSUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT(WASD)
SPRU-ScienceandTechnologyPolicyResearch
TheFreemanCentre
UniversityofSussex
BrightonBN19QE
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16CHARLOTTESTREET
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Website:www.worldsustainable.org
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Copyright©2010WorldAssociationforSustainableDevelopment(WASD)
ISBN978-1-907106-12-5(Print)978-1-907106-13-2(ebook)
ISSN1747-1036
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NoresponsibilityfortheviewsexpressedinthisbookisassumedbytheAuthororWASD..
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TableofContents
AbstractAcknowledgementsDedicationListofAcronymsandAbbreviationsListofFiguresListofTablesListofAppendicesChapterI:Introduction
TheProblematiqueoftheDigitalDivide
DecodingtheMyths
TheSpecificitiesoftheCaribbean
Structureofthebook
ChapterII:TechnologicalChangeandPeripheralDevelopmentTechnologicalChangeandPeripheralDevelopment
TheTechno-OptimistView
LongWavesandTechnologicalChange
The(new)techno-economicparadigmofdevelopment:aNeo-Schumpeterianview
PeripheralAscentinTheGlobalEconomy
“SeizingtheChance”
ChapterIII:TheNewTechno-EconomicParadigm:Froman“Industrial”Paradigmtoan“Information”Paradigm?
Whatis“new”aboutthe“neweconomy”?
Theneweconomy:newplayers,newparadigmsandnewpossibilities?
Whatisnotsonewaboutthe“neweconomy”?
ChapterIV:ThePeripheryandtheDigitalDivideTheGlobalDigitalDivideUncovered
ThePeripheryandtheDigitalDivide
TheIndianExperience
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Pro-ICTfordevelopmentgovernmentpolicies
TheIntra-national“Divide”inIndia
Concludingremarks:Growthwithoutdevelopment
TheSingaporeanExperience
Conclusion
ChapterV:GlobalTechnologyGovernanceandtheDigitalDivideLackofcommitmentfromtheNorth
GovernmentPolicyResponse
TechnologicalDependenceontheNorth
TheabsenceofSouth-Southcooperation
Plusçachangeplusc’estlamêmechose?
ChapterVI:TheCaribbeanandtheDigitalDivideTheCaribbeaninthecurrentGlobalPoliticalEconomicContext
OnWhatSideofWhatDivide?
MeasuringtheDigitalDivideintheCaribbean
TheAccessDivide
TheSkillsDivide
“Socialcapability”divide
TheEconomicOpportunityDivide
CausesforthedigitaldivideintheCaribbean
Monopolizationofthetelecommunicationssector
AffordabilityofICTtoolsandservices
Lowpenetrationlevels
Highilliteracyande-illiteracyrates
Dearthofhighlyskilledlabor
Structureofthenationaleconomy
Unavailabilityof(venture)capital
Markedabsenceofaninnovativecapitalistclass
RiskAversion
LegalandRegulatoryFramework
ChapterVII:ICTsandSocio-EconomicInclusion:Prospects,ScopeandLimitationsEmergingEconomicOpportunities
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SeizingtheChance?ChallengesandMitigatingConcerns
Amovetowardsdigitalinclusion:aneconomicimperativefortheCaribbean
E-GovernmentandE-Govemance
ObstaclestoimplementingE-Government:Somerealconstraints
Towardimplementinge-government:TheHardandSoftSolutions
E-Commerce
ChapterVIII:ICTsandTourismintheNewTechno-economicContext:ACasestudyofSt.Lucia
TheGlobalTourismMarket:AmovetoE-Tourism
ICTsenhancingcompetitivenessinTourism?AcasestudyofSt.Lucia
ICTsandSMMTEs:Themissinglinks?
TheNatureHeritage/Eco-TourismSector
TheArtsandCraftSector
HarnessingICTstoEnhanceDiasporicTourisminSt.Lucia?
Conclusion
ChapterIX:WithergoestheCaribbean?Findings
ThecontinuingrelevanceofGlobalism
Recommendations
ChapterX:ConclusionBibliography
BooksandJournals
Magazines,ConferencePapers,WorkingPapers,NewspapersandReports
InternetSources
Usefulwebsites
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ChapterI
Introduction
TheProblematiqueoftheDigitalDivideThe“digitaldivide”representsasubstantialasymmetrybetweentwoormorepopulationsintheproduction,distributionandeffectiveuseof informationandcommunicationtoolsand services, and the varying abilities of these groups to employ ICTs for developmentpurposes.Itisareflectionofthe
“… uneven diffusion of technology and inequality in access to technologies with significant social,economicandpoliticalconsequences.1(ITU2006)
Andforsomeitisthecontinuationofthesameunderlyingsystemicanddomesticforcesthat create “technological dualism”2 (James 2003, ix). The concern is that“despite therapidgrowthoftheInternet,manygovernments,businesses,andindividualsstillremainunconnectedtoitsbenefits”(Mann2000,73).
Oneoftheunintendedconsequencesofthemostrecenttechnologicalrevolutionistheexorbitantsocio-economiccostofnotbeingconnected (orbeingdisconnected) fromtheartifacts (andassociatedprocesses and services)ofmodern ICTs.Thisphenomenonhasbeen represented variously as the technological gap or the digital divide. This workrecognizesthattheuseofthelatterlabelisbutareflectionofthenatureofthetechnologyoftheday,thatis,digitaltechnology,outofwhichthedescriptorforthegapbetweenthosewhohaveaccessandthosewhodon’t,isderived.
Roughlytenyearsago,the2001UNDPHumanDevelopmentReport(HDR)presentedacomparisonofcountriesbasedontheTechnologyAccessIndex(TAI)andrevealedthatessentially most of the developing world is “technologically disconnected” from thebenefitsoftheelectronicage.3Lowpersonalcomputer(PC)andInternetpenetrationrates,(Internet penetration in the English Speaking Caribbean4 measures between 3% -10%;whilePCpenetrationisbetween5and13%),lowteledensityratesinthedevelopingworldcomparedwiththedevelopedworldsubstantiatethisclaim.Regrettably,onedecadeonthesituationhaschangedverylittle,ifatall,andthiswillbeaddressedingreaterdetailintheforthcomingchapters.Moreover,totheextentthatthedigitaldivideisareflectionofothergaps,onewonderswhetheritisreasonabletoexpectamarkedimprovementintheindicesgiventhatotherfundamentalsocio-economicgapshaveyettobeaddressed.
Therealityofthedigitaldivide,dullstheexpectationthatduetothehighmobilityofICT capital and knowledge intensity, the new techno-economic paradigm may offeropportunities to “leap frog” (Choucri 1998) traditional linear paths to development5(Ishaq, 2001).“Leapfrogging” implies overcoming the impediments to realizing higherproductivityandgrowth,therebynarrowingtheproductivitygapsthatdistinguishbetweendeveloped and developing countries. According to Singh (1999, 5) “Leapfrogging”connotes that telecommunications can help developing countries skip stages of
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development,propellingthemuntoagrowthpathleadingtopost-industrialsocietystatus.Italsoimpliesthepossibilityofacceleratingthepaceofdevelopmentbyemployingnewtechnologies,inparticulartelecommunicationstechnologies.
The dominance of techno-optimistic perspectives in analyzing the problem of thedigitaldivideisblindtoorrelativelysilentonsomeofthewiderstructuralandhistoricalrealities;realitiesthathaveimplicationsforwhoproduceswhatandwhere.TheproductiveuseofICTsintheeconomyisnotnecessarilyuniversal.Certainsectorslendthemselvesmore readily to theapplicationanduseof ICTs,andasa result somesectorshavebeenmoreaffected,forexample,travelandtourism,pornography,booksandmusic.
A historical survey suggests that the presumption that ICTs can enable countries toescape the development trap is largely unfounded. Aseniero (1984), Thomas (2000),Cardoso(1993)Felipe(2000)havelongarguedthatthereislittle,ifanyatall,historicalorempirical evidence to support the convergence theory that assumes that technologydiffusesquicklyandeasily.Hence,forLutzkerthisisagrosslymistakenassumptiongiventhehistoricalexperienceofperipheralnations(Lutzker2003,764).Forexample,basedonempiricaltestingoftheconvergencehypothesistheresultspromptedFelipe(2000,54)toargue,
“…disparities among rich and poor countries have not shown a tendency to diminish during the lastthreedecades,notevenamongtheeighthigh-performingcountries.”
Infact,hearrivedatsomeverygrimconclusions,assertingthat“The late entry of most less-developed countries into the economic race may prevent them from evercompetingwith the developed nations; instead theywill just fade furtherand furtherbehind” (Felipe2000,65).6
Hence, the techno-optimism that pervades current development literature ignores theproblematique of “catching up” and the stark reality that many peripheral nations areinsteadbeing“leftbehind”.TherearethosewhovehementlydenythattheemergingICTshaveushered insignificantopportunities tocorrect thesocioeconomic illsof theglobalpoor or new poor, among them (Aseniero 1984, 1985; Cardoso 1993; Castells 1993,1996). Moreover, there is an even greater doubt about the potential of ICTs to assistdevelopingcountriestrappedinthebowelsofunderdevelopmentespeciallyiftheyarenotappropriatetothesocio-economiccontext(Grant2003;Heeks2002).
It has long been argued that rather than alleviate the socio-economic woes ofdevelopingnations,ICTshavedeepenedtheextensiveexternalrelianceontheNorthforFDI,loans…technology(Gereffi1993,319);andentrenchedthedependencysyndromeof the periphery, resulting in a new dependency (Cardoso 1993). Schiller, for example,argues that the new digital capitalism aggravates existing social inequalities. (Schiller2000,xiv)Moreexplicitly,Schiller(1999,209)contends that“…digitalcapitalismhasstrengthened,ratherthanbanished,theageoldscourgesofthemarketsystem:inequalityand domination.”Moreover, many have fallen victim to the economic costs associatedwiththedigitaldivide.
This argument is made against the backdrop of a widening income, wealth anddevelopment gap (See for example theUNDESA report “The Inequality Predicament”)characterizedinpartbytechnologicaldisparities.7Over2.8billionpeopleliveonlessthanUS$2.00perday.Morethanhalftheworld’spopulationhasnevermadeaphonecalland
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lessthan5%oftheworld’spopulationbenefitfromadvancesinICTs.Lessthan15%ofInternetandICTusersliveindevelopingcountries.AfricahasthelowestICTpenetrationrate,wherelessthan5%ofthepopulationusestheinternet.ThisisinsharpcontrastwithdevelopednationssuchasEuropeandtheAmericaswhichboastratesof43and44%.8Forexample,90%oftheglobaltechnologysectorisindevelopednations,anditistheywhoattract a large share of the investment capital (Hammond 2001). Therefore, we neednecessarilybecognizantofthestructuralconsiderationsthatdeterminetheextenttowhichtechnological“leapfrogging” can be realized. One must be mindful that access to theInternetorrelatedICTtoolsalonewillnotalleviateorbridgethedevelopmentordigitaldivide.Severalother“divides”togethercharacterizethedevelopmentdivide!Theincome,literacy,education,skills,knowledge,socialcapabilityandtechnologyproductiondivideallgivedimensiontotheeconomicopportunitydivide.
Theproblematiqueofnarrowingthedigitaldivideismadeevenmoreacutebecauseoftherateatwhichnewtechnologiesarebeingintroduced.Forthisandotherreasonstobeexploredfurther,thereismuchscepticismsurroundingtheabilityofperipheralcountriesto“catchup”(despitegrowingdebatesthatsuggesttechnologycycleshaveshortenedandhenceincreasedthechancesof“catchingup”).ContrarytotheveryoptimisticHDRs(forexample 2001 HDR Report entitled “Making New Technologies Work for HumanDevelopment”) it is argued here that contemporary technological developments are nopanaceatothedevelopmentproblemsoftheThirdWorld.
Where economic and human development are concerned, there have been noappreciablegainsintherelativepositionofsmalldevelopingeconomieslikethoseoftheCaribbean,whencomparedwiththemoreadvancedeconomies,regardlessofthetechno-economic paradigm of the day. The general dismal pictures of the region’s historicalexperienceswithtechnologyarewelldocumented.9Perhapspartoftheproblemresidesinthefactthattheregionhasconcentrateditseffortsonissuesoftechnologyandknowledgetransferversustechnologyandknowledgecreationorproduction,thataretherealwealthgeneratingactivities.
DecodingtheMyths“Farfromdeliveringusintoahigh-techEden,infactcyberspaceitselfisbeingrapidlycolonizedbythefamiliar workings of the market system. Across their breadth and depth, computer networks link withexisting capitalism to massively broaden the effective reach of the market place. Indeed, the Internetcomprises nothing less than the central production and control apparatus of an increasinglysupranationalmarketsystem”(Schiller2000,xiv).
ThereisageneralviewthatICTshavefar-reachingchangesineverysphereandcanbeapowerful enabling force, shaping “new frontiers in developing societies” (Hanna 1991;Choucri 2000). It is argued that theworld economyhas changed in a fundamentalway(Castells1993;Coyle2001),andthatitprovidesgreatopportunitiesforthetransformationofthesocio-economicconditionofmany(MansellandWehn1998).
OtheranalystsrefertotheubiquityofICTs,changingproductionpatterns,innovationstaking place at a dizzying pace in support of their claim (Hammond 2001; Alamango2000;Souter2000).Theseviewsarepremisedonthenotionoftechnologicalconvergence,and the automaticity of the market in diffusing the benefits of ICTs. These techno-
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optimistic postulations contend that upward mobility on the technological gradient ispossible, once certain prerequisites such as innovative capacity (Research andDevelopment), access to the emerging technologies, industrial policy, capacity buildingandphysicalandintellectualinfrastructuresaresatisfied.
DespitetheoptimismthatpervadesmuchoftheliteratureaboutthepotentialimpactofICTs on development, the reality of theworld’smajority tells another story: still up to96% of Internet host computers reside in the highest income countrieswhich represent16%oftheworld’spopulation.TherearemoreInternethostsinFinlandthanthewholeofLatin America and the Caribbean, more in New York City than on the entire Africancontinent.10
ArecentECLACstudyofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC)revealedthatfrom1998to2004thenumberoffixedtelephonesgrewfrom53milliontoalmost93million,anear 200% increase,whilemobile phonesmultiplied 8.5 times (from20million to 172million) and the number of Internet users multiplied 12 times (from 6 million to 72million). In several of the region’s countries, per capita spending on information andcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs)asapercentageofpercapitaincomehasevenreachedworldaverages:8.4%inBraziland7.8%inChileandtheDominicanRepublic.However,inabsoluteterms,eachcountryonlyspendsUS$400peryearpercapitaonICTs,afigurethat is six times larger indevelopedcountries (ECLACJune2005).While these figuresindicate some measure of progress, they simultaneously highlight the extent of thetechnologicalandincomegaps.Thepointisthatthediffusionisuneven.
Therefore,theprimaryconcernhereiswithissuesofdigitalexclusionversusdigitalinclusionandthesocio-economicimplicationsof these,withaparticularfocusonsmallstates of the Caribbean. More importantly is whether digital inclusion presents a newopportunityforrealizingdevelopmentinperipheraleconomies.
A major contention here is that the faith attributed to and the novelty ascribed totechnological solutionsvia ICTsaremisplacedandmisguided.Despite thenotionof a“networked society” (Castells 1996, 2003); a “global village” (Giddens 1999); “digitalcapitalism” (Schiller 1999); the “death of distance” (Cairncross 1997); a “weightlessworld”(Coyle1999);“newcapitalism”(Coyle2001),strangelytheseworksaresilentinthemain on global inequality and the unchanging plight of the developingworld. Theemergenceofanewtechno-economicparadigmoraneweconomyandallthatitimplies,has given rise to new problems or exacerbated existing ones. The existence andimplications of a global and intra-national technology gap, therefore, challenge theaforementionedoptimisticpostulations:fuelingskepticismsaboutthedevelopmentimpactofICTsthatareembodiedinnotionssuchasthe“productivityparadox”11and“thedigitaldivide”.
The main argument is that the digital divide is not a new phenomenon in its structural and socio-economic elements, but is rather the contemporary context of the disparity between thosewho occupydifferent occupational, economic and political roles in the international division of labor (IDL). Theexcitement evoked over a century ago by the “emerging technologies” of the day, is similar to theoptimistic assertions about the developmental impact of ICTs being touted today. We were told thenthat,“…Steamships, railroads, automobiles, and airplanes transformed the ability tomove people andmaterialsvastdistancesinever-shorteramountsoftime.Telegraphy,radios,andtelephonestransformedtheability tocommunicateoverimmensespacesevenfaster thanpeoplecouldmove” (SteeleandStein2002:26),
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Back then, the world was being “revolutionized” by the combustion engine, electricpower,andthetelephone,withsignificantimprovementsinproductivecapacitiesandtheattendantoptimismforimprovementsinthehumancondition.WhatistodayperceivedastheICTrevolutionbearsastrikingresemblancetoperiodicphasesoftechnologicalchange(i.e.swarmingofnewinnovations)thatoftenescapementionintheburgeoningliteratureonICTs.
Theahistoricism that characterizes current debates on ICTs and development, notonly fails to explain how the now developed countries got there, it also diminishes theeffortsofperipheralstatestoachievehigherlevelsofdevelopment,byluringthemintoafalsehope,whilethedeepsystemicandregionalelementsthatshapethepossibilitiesforchangehavelargelygoneunquestioned.
Theapproachusedhereispremisedonlongwavemethodologicalapproachdrawingon World-Systems Analysis (WSA) and Neo-Schumpeterianism. Both theoreticalapproaches are premised on cyclical change, for example, conjunctural shifts in thetechno-economic paradigm (Freeman 1984; Perez 1983, 1985, 1988; and Hopkins andWallerstein1982).
While both WSA and Neo-Schumpeterians argue that global capitalism has someinherent tendencies such as the swarming of technologies and innovation cycles,WSAgoes further in articulating long-term secular trends like the polarization of incomes,concentration of capital and the incorporation of peripheral areas (Hopkins andWallerstein1982).TheworkoftheNeo-Schumpeteriansisrelativelysilentonthatscore.12Conversely, the Neo-Schumpeterian School emphasizes national transformation, forexample,nationalinnovationsystems(FreemanandSoete1997;CarlotaandPerez1988).However,theirprescriptionstendtofocusinthatarea,anddonotfactorinadequatelythedynamicsofthewiderglobalpoliticaleconomy(GPE).Thisisreflected,forexample,in Carlota Perez’s work, where she highlights the importance of the socio-institutionalframework,butfallsshortofoperationalizingitwithinawiderglobalpoliticaleconomicframework.
The arguments put forward here are distinguishable from much of the groundlessoptimismandahistoricalconclusionsthatstemfromtheuniversalapplicationofnotionsof developmentalism, imbued with neo-liberal dogma (Addo 1985, 1986 and 1996);Hence, the critique of Eurocentric notions of development and the techno-optimisminherentintheseassumptions.ThedigitaldivideasitismanifestedintheCaribbeanandindeedinmuchofthedevelopingworldcannotbeadequatelyexplainedorunderstoodbyemployinguncriticalneo-liberaltheoreticalframeworks.
Optimisticpronouncementsaboutthepossibilityofbridgingthedigitaldividedonotaccordwiththehistoricalrecordofascentinglobalcapitalism,andareinconsistentwiththeworkingof capitalism,which is inherently asymmetrical.Moreover, the optimisticperspectivesmissanimportantfact:bridgingthedigitaldividecannotbeanendgoal,astheproblemsofglobal(andindeedintranational)inequalityandinequitypersist.Alongterm historical analysis of the peripheralization of the Caribbean and its political andeconomicrelationswiththehegemonicpower:firstGreatBritainandlatterly(postWorldWar II) the United States of the America (USA), indicates that though the region hasplayedacriticalroleintheIDL,ithasindeedbeenasubordinateone.Hence,onecannot
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understand the digital divide in its present manifestations without understanding itshistoricalantecedents.
Thework, therefore, raises questions about theuniversalismof the techno-optimistdiscourse.This,however,doesnottranslatenecessarilyintoawholesalerejectionoftheirespoused formula for growth. The work recognizes the specificity of the Westernexperience of growth and development, and the inability of peripheral countries toreplicate that experience. The development of the West was possible because of theprotectionistandmercantilistpoliciestheypursued.Notonlyarethesepoliciesnolongerfeasible in the context of free trade economics (especially for fragile, import dependenteconomies like theSIDsconsideredhere)moreover, theyarediscouraged in thecurrentglobal economic context.13 Hence, the difficulties these nations experience in trying toexercisetheirautonomyindefiningindigenousgrowthstrategies.
While there are several works that treat with one or more of the above-mentionedissues,thecomplexityofthedigitaldivideanditsimplicationsfordevelopmentinsmalldevelopingeconomieslikethoseoftheCaribbean,canonlybeunderstoodintheirtotalityiftheissuesraisedaboveareconsideredensemble.Thereasonisthatinmanyrespectstheproblem of the digital divide is symptomatic of a wider multifaceted developmentdisparity.
Several realitiesbecomeimmediatelyapparent.Adigitaldivideexists inspiteof theprogress being made in the development and use of ICTs. The digital divide isrepresentativeof amuch larger anddeeplyentrencheddevelopmentproblem.These arereflected in other gaps, such as the wealth, income and health gaps, for example.Therefore,thedigitaldividemirrorsthesehistoricalandemerginggapsbetweenthehavesandhave-nots.
Thecausesforinequalitiesinaccessto,andthedisparitiesintheproductionanduseofICTsaremanyandareattributabletovaryingextentstotheexistenceofadigitaldivideboth intra-and inter- nationally. In assessing the dimensions of the digital divide in theCaribbean, the focus is on the most significant factors that determine technologyproduction,diffusionanduse.Theseare:
1.Accessdivide
2.Skillsdivide
3.Socialcapabilitydivide
4.Knowledgedivideand
5.Technologyproductiondivide
These inform and are shaped by the economic opportunity divide. Emphasizing theserespective dividesmakes intelligible the complexities of an emerging dimension of thebroader development divide, which is of primary concern to the developing world.Differences in these variables explain the variation in national economic performancebetweenthecountriesofthecoreandthoseoftheperiphery(andwithintheserespectivecountry groupings aswell). The focus, therefore, is on these parameters, and assessingtheir impact on the feasibility of an (e)-development strategy that has at its core theefficientandproductiveuseofICTs.
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Technologyisnotanautonomousforceofchange,butisitselfpartofawiderglobalsocio-economicandpoliticalcontext.Thisworkrepresentsaresponsetotheurgentneedforenquiryintothestructural,technological,regulatory,humanresourceneedsandsocio-institutionalpreconditionsforstimulatingnationaleconomicgrowthintheneweconomy.
Theinterrogationoftheeffectsoftheneweconomyisinspiredbytheconcernthattherapid growth in technological advancement over the last few decades has beenaccompaniedby
“…wideningNorth-Southgapsinallkeyeconomicindicators:incomewealth,production,consumption,investment,savingsandtrade.Unfortunately,nowherearethegapswiderthaninscience,technologyandknowledge.TheNorth-Southgapinscientificandtechnologicalcapacityiswideningatafasterrate,and“catchup”hasbecomeanevenmoredistantprospectthanbefore”(Thomas2000,55).
PerhapsthisrealityvalidatesAseniero’s(1984)earlierclaimthat“technicalchangeisanasymmetry-creating process”, hence raising further doubts about the leveling of theplayingfieldthroughtheapplicationofICTs.Infact,theargumentisthatICTsconsolidatethestructuresofdependence(capitalandtechnologicaldependenceforexample)therebymaintaining theasymmetrical interdependence (hence reproducing theglobalhierarchy).Moreover, the politics of transition from monocultural economies to e-economies isnotablyabsentfromconventionalliterature.
TheSpecificitiesoftheCaribbeanThe islands of theCaribbean likemuchof the rest of the developingworld have toyedwithvariousapproachesorstrategiesaimedatachievingeconomicdevelopment.InLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC)inparticular, thesecountrieshaveexperimentedwithand abided by amyriad of polices (some ofwhichwere dictated “from above” by theinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)),withoutreapinganysignificantsocio-economicbenefits: Import substitution industrialization (ISI), Industrialization by invitation (IBI),Exportledindustrialization(ELI),andExportOrientedServices(EOS).
Ineffect, theICTstrategy is, therefore,oneof theneweststrategiesbeingproffered.Theyall,however,have thesame intrinsicproblem, that is, that theyareallextrovertedindustrial strategies that in effect, have low value-added, and external dependency andcontrol are built in (Nurse 1998; Reinert 2005). Reinert (2005) illustrates that thesedecreasing return activities can in part explain the continuing underdevelopment of theregion or according to Nurse (1998) the reproduction of underdevelopment from onehistorical epoch to the next. The issue is really one of investing in increasing returnactivitiesthatcouldimprovetheregion’sindustrialcompetitivenessandraiseitsshareofglobalvalue-added.
Witheachoftheaforementionedexperiments,itwasfeltthatanewpanaceahadbeenfound.Countriesintheregionmovedfromcottontosugar,tobananastobauxite,tooiltomanufacturing (ISI) toExportOriented Industrialization (EOI) to services (for exampletourism and banking and financial services). Each time yielding the same results: lowvalue-added,lowprofits,lowsalaries,lowinvestment,lowretentionofforeignexchange,high repatriation of profits, capital flight, unsustainable debt repayments, and chroniclevels of unemployment and poverty. In essence, the socio-economic problems of theseperipheral economies have persisted despite the many promises of each strategy. The
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question must be asked, therefore, is it that the Caribbean needs to engage in newactivities? Or does the region need to engage in increasing returns activities, therebymoving up the commodity chain (or even better controlling a larger share of thecommoditychain).
Caribbeaneconomiesaremono-cropormonoculturaleconomies(i.e.theseeconomieshaveaheavy relianceononeorvery fewcommodities forgenerating foreignexchangeearnings). Recently there has been a steady erosion of commodity prices on theinternationalmarket.14Theexportvalue inanumberofkeycommodities (sugar, cocoa,riceandbananas)exportedoutoftheregionhasdeclinedduetoacombinationoffactors:erosionofpreferentialtreatment;dropinproductionlevelsorsignificantdeclineinglobalprices; the introduction of phytosanitary standards; compounded by the incidence ofnatural disasters. In the case of the agriculture industry, all of these factors combine tocreateadireeconomicsituation.
Theregionalsosuffersfromhighlevelsofchronicunemployment,rangingfrom5%inTrinidadandTobagoto22.2%inSt.Lucia.Whatisevenmoretroublingisthatyouthemployment accounts for nearly half of total employment in the OECS territories inparticular.High levelsof illiteracyandevenhigher levelsofe-illiteracy,combinedwithlow access to primary and tertiary education evoke serious concerns about capacitybuilding.
HighlevelsofexternaldependencyontheNorthhasbeencompoundedbytheerosionof preferential arrangements and the introduction of new trading rules as devised andinformedbythefreetradeideologicalconstructofWTOandtheIFIs.Thissituationdoesnotaugurwell forCaribbeancountrieswhichhaveexperiencedunprecedented increasesin theirdebt-toGDPratios;between1995and2005 theaveragedebtstockforCaricomincreasedfrom65%to83.7%ofGDP;fortheOECS,thedebtstockexpandedfrom75%to 105% of GDP between 2000 and 2005. Debt repayment is proving to be a heavyeconomicburden in thefaceofdecliningforeignexchangeearnings,anderodingglobalcompetitivenessintraditionalmarketsespecially.
AccordingtoECLAC,in2007and2008,theCaribbeaneconomygrewby3.10%and0.8% respectively.However, preliminary forecasts suggest that the regioncontractedby2.1%mainly as a result of theworld economicmeltdown.15 In addition, the agriculturesector continues to performbadly,This decline can be attributed to deterioration of thetermsoftradefortraditionalexports,thedevastativeimpactsofnaturaldisasterssuchasHurricaneIvanthatwagedmassivedestructionintheregionparticularlyintheislandofGrenadawherethedamagecost239%ofGDP(SeetheimpactonGDPinAppendix5),andlowordecliningproductivity.16
Whileonecannotdenythatsignificantprogresshasbeenmadeintermsofeducationand health, political, institutional and infrastructural development, it has come at atremendouscost.Moreover,theseadvancementshaveyetcatapultedtheregionoutoftheabyss of debt and the chronic socio-economic problems characteristic of a fledgingdevelopingeconomy. It isnowonder therehavebeenvociferouscalls foranalternativedevelopmentmodel(Pantin1987,1993,1994,2005;Best1998,2002;Levitt2005),onethat is reflective of the historical evolution of these islands and their particularvulnerabilitiesintoday’spolitico-economiccontext;moreimportantly,onethatavoidsthe
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pitfallsofanever-wideningdigitaldivide.
Itisagainstthebackdropofthoserealitiesthatweexplorethepossibilitiesforsocio-economic growth and development in the current techno-economic paradigm. Moreimportantly, there is very littlemerit in embarkingupon a study such as this one if the“how”question is not sufficiently addressed.That is howcandeveloping countries likethose of the Caribbean bridge the digital divide and harness ICTs for socio-economicgrowthanddevelopment?
The proponents of ICTs (as critical precursors to development) perceive them asimportant (seemingly automatic and inevitable) triggers of socio-economic growth –among them theUnitedNations (UN)and its affiliates.However, thisworkemphasizesthatevenwiththeadventofICTs;upwardmobilitywithintheworld-systemisrestricted.Thefundamentalchallengefordevelopingcountries,likethoseoftheCaribbean,ishowtointegrate ICTs into their existing and/or new production structures to improve theircompetitivenessandfostersocio-economicdevelopment.
StructureofthebookThepurposeofChapter1istointroducethefundamentalelementsoftheproblembeinginvestigated,thatis,thedigitaldivideandtheimplicationsforperipheraldevelopment.Itestablishes the rationale for the undertaking and deconstructswhat is here described as“the problematique of the digital divide”. The problem of the digital divide issymptomaticofawiderdevelopmentalproblematiquebetweentheNorthandtheSouth.Hence,thedigitaldivideisbutthecurrentmanifestationofahistoricaldevelopmentalgapbetween the North and the South. For that reason, the current techno-optimisticprescriptionsfordevelopmentarenotcongruentwiththedynamicsofhistoricalcapitalismandtheinequalitiesandinequitiesthatcharacterizethecapitalistworld-system.
TheoverarchingconcerninChapterIIisthedevelopmentalpotentialofICTsandhowperipheralcountriescanbenefitfromemployingICTsintheirdevelopmentstrategies.Theworkassessesthesystemicandhistoricalcurrentsthatcharacterizethepresentdichotomybetweenthehavesandthehave-nots.
Theargumentspresentedherearecontrastedwiththeviewsofthosewhoespousethattechnological diffusion, transfer and convergence will enable developing countries(otherwise referred to as latecomers or stragglers) to leapfrog stages of development,facilitatingtheirascentintoahigherstratumofdevelopment.
Chapter III discusses the elements of the new techno-economic paradigm, onecharacterized by ICTs. However, more importantly the chapter seeks to unearth thedistinctiveelementsofthecurrenttechno-economicparadigmascomparedwithprevioustechno-economicepochs.Whereasthecurrenttechno-economicparadigmmaydifferfrompreviousonesintermsofkeyfactorsofproductionandtypesoforganizationalstructure,forexample, thestructuralrelationsanddynamicsbetweenthecountriesofthecoreandtheperipheryhavenot.Therefore,theso-callednewtechno-economicparadigminasenseismerelycosmeticforthoselookingonfromtheSouth.
The “digital divide” is the focus of Chapters IV and V. The first seeks to make
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intelligiblethedimensions,causesofandresponsestotheglobaldigitaldivide.Thedigitaldivideasmanifestedintheperipheryformsasubstantiveportionofthischapter.Twocasestudiesarehighlighted thatof IndiaandSingapore.The rationale is simply that India,alargeunderdevelopedeconomy,hasmadesignificantstridesincarvinganicheforitselfinwhathasbeendescribedasthe“neweconomy”or“knowledgeeconomy”.Inmanyways,Indiahasbeendubbedthe“backoffice”oftheworld,andmorerecentlythe“frontoffice”,inrecognitionofitsincreasingroleintheprovisionofICTrelatedservicesinparticular.
However, the skewed impact of the growth in the ICT industry in India, and theconcentrationofwealthinthehandsofthefewwhoparticipateinthatsector,leadbacktothe historical argument about growth without development; issues of inequality andinequityandthedifficultieswithwealthdistribution.Forthisreason,thereisaheightenedresistancetothenotionthatIndiahasmadesignificantstridesintheknowledgeeconomy,with the concomitant broad-based social and economic growth and development.Moreover,thedatapresentedsuggestthatIndiahasyettomoveuptheIDL,insofarasitsparticipationintheknowledgeeconomyisstillverymuchlimitedtotheproductionoflowvalue-addedICTgoodsandservices.
Inmanyrespects“size”,“smallsize”tobemorepreciseandresourceshortageshaveoften been touted as some of the primary reasons for underdevelopment in the LACregion.TheexampleofSingaporeisinstructiveinthisrespectasithighlightstheextenttowhich small size and lack of physical or natural resources are not necessarily cripplingcharacteristics. Moreover, both examples, that of, India and Singapore highlight theimportanceofpolicyformulationgeared towardsgenerating“humanresources” thatcanrespondtotheemergingopportunities,withEducationpolicyinparticularbeingatellingvariable. This is critical as thework places strong emphasis on the “skills” and “socialcapability”dividesascontributingtothebroaderdigitaldivideandmoreimportantlytheeconomicdivide.
Theparticularitiesof thedigitaldividein theCaribbeanarecentral to thediscussionthat ensues in Chapter V. The work assumes that much of the current socio-economicrealityof theregioncannotbeadequatelyexplainedwithoutfocusing,albeit inbrief,onthe historical evolution of the region. It is in having an understanding of the region’shistorical evolution17 that in part one is able to explain the present reality, and givemeaning and dimension towhat is feasible, permissible and practicable now and in thefuture. Much of that prognosis rests on the critical understanding of the role of theCaribbeaninthewiderglobalpoliticaleconomy(GPE).Onlythencanonebegintodelveintoananalysisofthedigitaldivideasmanifestedintheregion;ananalysiswhichleadstoanecessaryinterrogationof theextent towhichtheaxiom“plusçachangeplusc’est lamémechose”isanadequaterepresentationof theCaribbeandevelopmentproblematiquedespitethepromisesofeachtechno-economicparadigm.
ChapterVIaddressestheissueoftechnologygovernanceinthenewtechno-economicparadigm. It examines global and national institutional frameworks that facilitate theproductionanduseoftechnology.Issuesoftechnologyproduction,diffusionandusearecentraltoconcernsabout“leapfrogging”,“seizingthechance”,andultimatelytriggeringsocio-economic development inwhat has been dubbed the knowledge economyor neweconomy.The fundamental issue remains, how peripheral economies canmaximize the
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institutional, regulatory and legal frameworks available to them in their pursuit oftechnological advancement and economic growth. Alternatively, is it that these veryframeworks present barriers that inmany respects have led to the conclusion that theyhaveresultedinadeepeningoftechnologicaldependenceoftheSouthontheNorth,andanexacerbationofahistoricallywidetechnologicalgap,betweentheNorthandtheSouth.
WhileupuntilthatpointmanyofthechallengesconfrontingtheCaribbeaninitsquesttoharnessICTsfordevelopmentwouldhavebeenhighlighted,itisnecessarytoidentifyalsotheeconomicgrowthopportunitiesthathavebeenusheredinwiththeemergingICTs.Therefore,chapterVIIseekstounraveltherealopportunitiesthatexistandareemerging,and how the region can best (re)position itself to embrace these opportunities. Theexperiencewith e-commerce and e-government in the region are documented,with theaimofacknowledgingtheprogressmadeintheseareasandtohighlighttheimpedimentstofurtherprogress.
Inthefollowingchapter,ChapterVIII,thecaseoftourisminSt.Luciaishighlighted.ThecriticalissuehereistheextenttowhichICTscanbeharnessedtoboostproductivityandenhancetheprofitabilityofkeyactorsintheTourismsector.Specialattentionisgivento the Small Medium and Micro Tourism Enterprises (SMMTEs), an often-neglectedsegmentofthesectorwhosemostpressingneedsdeserveurgentattention.Theirplighthasbeenheightenedintheageofe-commerceande-tourism,withmanybeingtrappedinoldbusinessmodelsthatdonotactivelyrespondtothechangingparadigmofbusiness,whichhas ICTs at its center. The chapter also highlights the costs associated with digitalexclusion, for theseplayers. It alsohighlightshow imperative it is thatdigital inclusionassumesacentralroleinthedevelopmentstrategyofthetourismsector.
ThecoreargumentinChapterIXisthatdespitetheautomaticityimpliedinmuchofthetechno-optimisticdiscourseonICTsanddevelopment, thedigitaldivide,asreflectedin theCaribbeanand indeed in thewiderdevelopingworld, is really amanifestationofglobalinequality.Therefore,thefocusofeffortstobridgethedigitaldivideshouldengagemore critically with historical structural asymmetries. To treat the issue of the digitaldivide as if it were a stand-alone problem misses the wider problematique of(under)development entirely.Hence, a case ismade for the continuing relevance of thecriticaldiscourseinexplainingthedevelopmentconundrumoftheregion.
Naturally, the work gives serious consideration to the policy implications of thefindings, and provides recommendations that are respectful not only of the structuralconditionsoftheGPEandthetermsofengagementbetweentheNorthandtheSouth,butalsooftheinternaldynamics(endogenousfactors)withintheeconomiesoftheregion.
The conclusion reaffirms the findings and recommendations made in the earlierchapter, andmakes a case for a holistic approach to e-development in the region, fullycognizantof thehistorical, social, geographical, cultural andeconomicparticularitiesoftheregion.Moreover,thelargerconcernistheeconomicroleoftheCaribbeanintheIDLand the possibilities for ascentwithin the confines of an asymmetric capitalisticworld-system,evenagainstthebackdropofanewtechno-economicparadigm.1 www.itu.int/osg/spu/digitalbridges/materials/hameed-paper.pdf. (Paper presented by Tahir Hameed at the DigitalOpportunityForum2006,Seoul,Korea.
2 SomelikeSinger(1970)hadlongarguedthatthe“…internationalimbalance,ordualism,inthefieldofscienceand
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http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/digitalbridges/materials/hameed-paper.pdf
technologyexplains toa largeextentwhythegrowthof theunderdevelopedcountrieshasnotbeenas fastasonetheoreticallywouldexpect.”(Singer1970,63)“Dualisminthesenseofpersistentandincreasingdivergencesexistson various levels, internationally in relations between richer and poorer countries and internally within thedevelopingcountriesthemselves.”(Singer1970,60)
3 UNDP Human Development Report 2001. Technology Access Index (TAI) data http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/techindex.pdfCited16January2005.
4 The“Caribbean”asusedhere refers to theCommonwealthCaribbean,whichconsistsof twelve (12) independentnation states, and several associated states which share a common history and colonial past as former Britishcolonies.OnoccasionreferencewillbemadetothewiderCaribbeanforcomparativepurposes,thatgroup,includesCentralandLatinAmerica,andiscapturedinthegroupingLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC).
5 “Leapfrogging”wasintroducedinthe1980storeflectthecausalrelationshipbetweeninformationtechnologiesanddevelopment.Itimpliedthattelecommunicationsinparticular-ifappliedproductively-couldenablecountriestotranscendRostow’s“StagesofGrowth”.SeetheoristssuchasNeilDiasKarunaratne1982“TelecommunicationandInformationinDevelopmentStrategy”inMehrooJussawallaandDMLamberton,eds.Communications,EconomicsandDevelopment.Honolulu:East-WestCentrePergamonPolicySeriesonInternationalDevelopment.
6 Theemphasisisthatoftheauthor.
7 “The Inequality Predicament: Report on the World Social Situation 2005”. United Nations, New York, 2005.CitedSeptember24,2005.
8 MeasuringtheInformationSociety:theICTDevelopmentIndex2009.Availableonlineathttp://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/idi/2009/index.html
9 See, for example, theworkofCaribbean scholars such asDennisPantin,HilbourneWatson,NormanGirvan andCliveThomas,whoin theirrespectiveworkslamentedthefailureofCaribbeanstates(regardlessof theeconomicstrategiespursued)tobenefitfromtechnologytransferandthecommensurateboostinsocio-economicdevelopment,forexample,Pantin,Dennis.“Techno-IndustrialPolicyintheRestructuringoftheCaribbean:TheMissingLinkinCaribbeanEconomicThought.” InTheCaribbean in theGlobalPoliticalEconomy.Edited byHilbourneWatson.London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.; Pantin, Dennis. (ed.) The Caribbean Economy : A Reader. Kingston,Jamaica ; Miami: Ian Randle, 2005.; Thomas, Clive, “How can South-South Cooperation Contribute to aKnowledge-basedDevelopmentStrategy?”CooperationSouth1,2000,49-59.
10 “FastFacts:DrivingInformationCommunicationsTechnologyforDevelopment.”http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/ICT0211e.pdfCited7July,2003.
11 Thisisahighlydebatedissue,thatis,doinvestmentsinICTs(necessarily)resultinsignificantproductivitygains?The“SolowParadox”suggeststhattherecanbewidespreadevidenceofcomputerusebutthatdoesnotnecessarilytranslateintowidespreadproductivitygrowth.RobertGordon’sassertionsupportsthatclaim.Heportendsthat….theproductivityperformanceofthemanufacturingsectoroftheUnitedStateseconomysince1995hasbeenabysmalratherthanadmirable.Notonlyhasproductivitygrowthinnondurablemanufacturingdeceleratedin1995-9comparedto1972-95,butproductivitygrowthindurablemanufacturingstrippedofcomputershasdeceleratedevenmore.”
12 ThoughthereissomeattemptbyPereztodosointracingtechnologicalrevolutionsandthechangingbehaviorofcapitalinherbook,TechnologicalRevolutionsandFinancialCapital(Cheltham:EdwardElgarPublishingLtd.,2002).
13 Oratleastseeminglyso.TheuseofagriculturalsubsidiesbytheUSA,SwitzerlandandotherEuropeancountries,forexample,inpartaccountsforthedemiseoftheDoharoundofWTOnegotiations,andthecollapseoftheCancuntalks,withtheThirdWorldnations,ledbythebigSouth,BrazilandIndiainparticular,championingthecauseoftheG77+.
14 RefertoAppendix2,whichdepictstheslidingpricesofprincipalcommoditiesintheregion.
15 PreliminaryOverviewofCaribbeanEconomies2009-20010,ECLAC.Availableatwww.eclac.cl/portofs-pain/noticias/bolnoticias/8/39748/FocusJanMar2010Is1Re.pdf-2010-06-04
16 ThedeclineinsugarproductioninBarbadosandTrinidadandTobago,andbananasintheWindwardislandsarenotableexamplesofthistrend.
17 InthetraditionsetbytheintellectualarchitectsofNewWorld,PlantationEconomy,DependencyTheoryandlatterlyWorld-Systemsanalysis.
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TitleCopyrightContentsAbstractAcknowledgementsDedicationList of Acronyms and AbbreviationsList of FiguresList of TablesList of AppendicesChapter I : IntroductionThe Problematique of the Digital DivideDecoding the MythsThe Specificities of the CaribbeanStructure of the book
Chapter II : Technological Change and Peripheral DevelopmentTechnological Change and Peripheral DevelopmentThe Techno-Optimist ViewLong Waves and Technological ChangeThe (new) techno-economic paradigm of development: a Neo-Schumpeterian viewPeripheral Ascent in The Global Economy“Seizing the Chance”
Chapter III : The New Techno-Economic Paradigm: From an “Industrial” Paradigm to an “Information” Paradigm?What is “new” about the “new economy”?The new economy: new players, new paradigms and new possibilities?What is not so new about the “new economy”?
Chapter IV : The Periphery and the Digital DivideThe Global Digital Divide UncoveredThe Periphery and the Digital DivideThe Indian ExperiencePro-ICT for development government policiesThe Intra-national “Divide” in IndiaConcluding remarks: Growth without developmentThe Singaporean ExperienceConclusion
Chapter V : Global Technology Governance and the Digital DivideLack of commitment from the NorthGovernment Policy ResponseTechnological Dependence on the NorthThe absence of South-South cooperationPlus ça change plus c’est la même chose?
Chapter VI : The Caribbean and the Digital DivideThe Caribbean in the current Global Political Economic ContextOn What Side of What Divide?Measuring the Digital Divide in the CaribbeanThe Access DivideThe Skills Divide“Social capability” divideThe Economic Opportunity DivideCauses for the digital divide in the CaribbeanMonopolization of the telecommunications sectorAffordability of ICT tools and servicesLow penetration levelsHigh illiteracy and e-illiteracy ratesDearth of highly skilled laborStructure of the national economyUnavailability of (venture) capitalMarked absence of an innovative capitalist classRisk AversionLegal and Regulatory Framework
Chapter VII : ICTs and Socio-Economic Inclusion: Prospects, Scope and LimitationsEmerging Economic OpportunitiesSeizing the Chance? Challenges and Mitigating ConcernsA move towards digital inclusion: an economic imperative for the CaribbeanE-Government and E-GovemanceObstacles to implementing E-Government: Some real constraintsToward implementing e-government: The Hard and Soft SolutionsE-Commerce
Chapter VIII : ICTs and Tourism in the New Techno-economic Context: A Case study of St. LuciaThe Global Tourism Market: A move to E-TourismICTs enhancing competitiveness in Tourism? A case study of St. LuciaICTs and SMMTEs: The missing links?The Nature Heritage/Eco-Tourism SectorThe Arts and Craft SectorHarnessing ICTs to Enhance Diasporic Tourism in St. Lucia?Conclusion
Chapter IX : Wither goes the Caribbean?FindingsThe continuing relevance of GlobalismRecommendations
Chapter X : ConclusionBibliographyBooks and JournalsMagazines, Conference Papers, Working Papers, Newspapers and ReportsInternet SourcesUseful websites
Appendices
