Date post: | 21-Jan-2017 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | andrew-sanders |
View: | 217 times |
Download: | 6 times |
British Colonial Policy and the Role of Amerindians in the Politics of the Nationalist Periodin British Guiana, 1945-68Author(s): Andrew SandersSource: Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER, 1987), pp. 77-98Published by: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the WestIndiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27862901 .
Accessed: 14/06/2014 10:57
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
University of the West Indies and Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies are collaboratingwith JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social and Economic Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Social and Economic Studies, Volume 36, No. 3, 1987
Andrew Sanders
British Colonial Policy and the Role of Amerindians in the Politics of the Nationalist Period in British Guiana, 1945-68
ABSTRACT
Throughout the colonial period Guyana's Amerindians had a
special relationship with the representative of the colonial power.
Although the nature of the relationship changed radically over this period it always operated to bind Amerindians to the domi nant White sector of the colonial society and oppose them to the Black and East Indian populations. It resulted in Amerindians
being given a unique legal status, while at the same time govern ment acquired immense legal powers over them. In the nationalist
period the strength of their traditional ties to the "White*' establishment and fear of loss of their rights and of control by governments believed to represent Black or East Indian interests caused Amerindians to support what they regarded as anti-Black
and anti-East Indian candidates and political parties. When the United Force was formed they supported it as a "White" party, and their votes ensured that it became a partner in the 1964-8 coalition government. When Amerindians became disenchanted with the United Force, attempts were made to form exclusively Amerindian political organisations. Because of Amerindian dis satisfaction with their situation and fears for the future, these
organisations allied themselves with Venezuela and were used by Venezuela in pursuit of her territorial claim to Essequibo, creat
ing concern about the loyalty of Amerindians to an Independent Guyana and a new problem in Guyana's international relations.
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the political behaviour of Guyana's Amerindian population during the period from the end of the
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
78 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
Second World War to the Peoples National Congress victory in the general election, of 1968, the first election held after Independence. My thesis is that their behaviour was laigely a
consequence of the special colonial policies adopted towards Amerindians during Guyana's long colonial history. In con trast to other Guyanese "racial" groups they always had a
special relationship with the colonial power. Although policies towards Amerindians changed radically during the colonial period, invariably they had the consequence of bind
ing them to the White sector of the colonial society and opposing them to the Black and East Indian populations, and resulted in Amerindians having a unique legal status and
special rights. In British Guiana's nationalist period fear of loss of these rights and the Amerindian conception of Euro
peans as their protectors influenced them to support non
nationalist, non-radical candidates and parties. Amerindians are the descendents of Guyana's abortigines.
They constitute one of Guyana's six official "races". In the
early 1960s they numbered some 35,000, about five per cent of the population2. Whereas the great majority of other
Guyanese live in a densely populated belt of West Indian settlement along Guyana's Atlantic coast, Amerindians are
scattered in small communities in the interior. Approximately half live near the periphery of the area of coastal settlement, and the remainder in the more distant interior, particularly in the west and southwest. Although they are a small proportion of the total population they constitute a large part of the
population living near Guyana's borders. Many live in Esse
quibo, which is claimed by Venezuela. They are the majority population of the Rupununi, which besides being part of the Venezuelan claim is also claimed by Brazil. The inhabitants of the upper Corentyne river are Amerindians, and Suriname claims 6,000 square miles of Guyana's territory at the head waters of the Corentyne.
PRE-EMANCIPATION POLICIES
The Amerindians' long history of relations with Euro peans began in the Sixteenth Century, when the Dutch estab
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 79
lished alliances with them for assistance against the Spanish and to trade for tropical products. Trading posts were estab lished on rivers into the interior, controlled by European post holders appointed to supervise trade and maintain friendly relations with the aborigines [Mendezes 16 p. 56, Mendezes
17, Mendezes 18 p. 53, Rodway 27 vol 1 pp. 2-53]. In the Seventeenth Century the development of a plantationeconomy based upon African slave labour changed the nature of Dutch:
Amerindian relations. Amerindians were used to help main tain the plantation society, while remaining socially peripheral to it. They captured runaway slaves, destroyed maroon
villages, and acted as auxiliaries for putting down slave revolts. Tribes were acknowledged as independent nations, and in 1793 a special ordinance was passed forbidding the enslave
ment of Amerindians [Menezes, 19, pp. XVII-XVIII, 161]. Amerindian racial status was considered superior to that of the imported Africans, and through their relationship with the plantation society they came to regard Black people as their inferiors [Daly 10 pp. 104-5, Schomburgk 28 Vol 1 p. 24].
When Britain obtained the colonies of Demerara?
Essequibo and Berbice she found it expedient to continue the Amerindian policy established by the Dutch [Menezes 17 pp. 65-6, Menezes 18 pp. 44-7]. In 1834 Emancipation ended Amerindian usefulness and the Combined Court of British
Guiana, concerned with the need to find new sources of labour for the plantations, sought to curtail expenditure on Amerin dians as much as possible. This policy was opposed by the Colonial Office, which believed it had a duty to protect and civilize the aborigines. Conflict between the two views was
resolved through an influx of missionaries into British Guiana after Emancipation, part of a new body of expatriate Euro
peans entering the colony with the intention of civilizing the ex-slaves [Smith 31 pp. 234-235]. The Combined Court relinquished the task of civilizing the aborigines to the
missionaries, regarding this as payment to the Amerindians for their past services to the colony [Menezes 18 pp. 208-64,
Menezes 19 pp. XX-XXVII, 58-83, 215-74].
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
80 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
As a result of their contact with the colony Amerindian communities had suffered social disruption and population decline, and this created a situation in which Amerindians were attracted to the missions and susceptible to their teach
ing. On missions situated in the interior, under the control and protection of expatriate Europeans, they acquired many of the values and institutions considered indicies of civiliza tion by the West Indian society developing on the Atlantic coast [Bernau 5 pp. 29, 115-6, 144-52, 200; Brett 6 pp. 80 91, 178-84, 223-9, 255-8, 296-311, 320-36; Schombui^k 28 Vol 1 p. 54; Schomburgk 28 Vol 2 passim]. These included Christianity, literacy, European dress, use of money, English as a first or second language, and monogamy. They also
acquired or were confirmed in the central tenet of West Indian Creole colonial society, the belief in the superiority of metro
politan ("English") culture and institutions, and of European physical characteristics [Smith 30 pp. 49-54, Smith 31 pp. 233-45].
As the Nineteenth Century progressed Amerindians became drawn increasingly into the economy of the colony, pursuing "bush" occupations to obtain money to buy coastal
goods and imports. At the same time the legislature of British Guiana was bringing them into the legal system. Amerindian lands were made Crown lands, at the bequest of the Governor of British Guiana Ordinance no. 9 of 1873, which established the Crown Lands Department, assured Amerindians that their
traditional claims to their lands would be respected, but
made this subject to the discretion of the Governor [Menezes 18 pp. 205-7]. Administration of Amerindian affairs was the responsibility of officials who were usually White expatriates or White members of the higher social strata of the colony. Like churchmen, they were regarded as protectors by the
Amerindians, who looked to them to deal with conflicts
between themselves and non-Amerindians [Menezes 18 pp.
128-53, Menezes 19 pp. 89-117
POST-EMANCIPATION POLICIES
After Emancipation Amerindian status underwent a
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 81
drastic change. Whereas previously they had a relatively high status, all other groups came to accord them the lowest "racial" status in British Guiana. This was validated on the
grounds that they were uncivilized savages, lacking any culture of value [Bernau 5 pp. 144-7, Brett 6 pp. 343-403, Daly 10 pp. 104-5, Schomburgk 28 Vol 1 p.54]. When they required institutions and values characteristic of coastal society it was under conditions which maintained their relative isolation. This helped the coastal population to retain the belief that Amerindians were culturally distinct and inferior, an inferiori
ty viewed in racial terms. For their part Amerindians con tinued to believe they were naturally superior to Black people, helped by the fundamental role of the premise of White superiority and Black inferiority in the ideology of the wider society and the fact that the White missionaries and officials who acted as their protectors believed Black people to be
racially inferior. Relations between Amerindians and mem bers of the lower classes of the coastal society were marked
by mutual hostility and contempt and non-Amerindians often tried to cheat Amerindians, believing them to be naive and stupid. Consequently, while Amerindians were coming to see the higher, White, strata of the colony as protectors, they regarded Black people, and later East Indians, as hostile racial groups which sought their disadvantage [Brett 6 pp. 164,254; Menzes 18 pp. 179-207; Menzes 19 pp. 161-211; Schomburgk 28 Vol 1, p. 53].
By the beginning of the Twentieth Century the problem of estate labour had^been resolved and official interest began to be taken in the problem of the Amerindian. In 1910 the Aboriginal Indian Protection Ordinance set out regulations to protect Amerindians in their relations with other Guyanese [British Guiana 8]. In 1939 the Moyne Commission visited
British Guiana and received complaints from Amerindian
village headmen from the Rupununi that their lands were
being expropriated. The commissioners promised that Amer indian interests would be safeguarded before those of any other section of the population. This resulted in the repeal of the Aboriginal Indian Protection Ordinance and its replace ment by Ordinance no. 22 of 1951, the Amerindian Ordinance
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
82 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
[British Guiana 9, Menzes 16 p. 62]. The Amerindian Ordinance represented a move away from a solely protectionist policy to one aiming at gradual integration of Amerindians into the national society. It combined protectionist legislation with regulations to establish local government institutions in Amerindian communities. The assumption behind the Ordinance was that if Amerindians could acquire sophistica tion and responsibility in local government and develop some business expertise, then they would be able to take their
place as equals in the national society. (This took it for granted that the society was racially equal, and was prepared to accept Amerindians as equals.) Impleminting the Ordinance was the responsibility of the Commissioner of the Interior, working through his local officers. As with previous policies the implementing officials were generally expatriate Euro
peans, "Guyanization" of the Interior service did not take
place until late in Guyana's colonial history.
The Aboriginal Indian Protection Ordinance and its
successor, the Amerindian Ordinance, give Amerindians legal rights possessed by no other group in the colony. It strengthen ed their sense of having a common interest against other "racial" groups. It also supported the Guyanese conception of Amerindians as backward and inferior people, needing their relations with the rest of the society to be legally regu lated. In spite of having special rights, Amerindians did not see themselves as a privileged group. Their low status in the
colony and relations with other racial groups caused them to continue to regard themselves as a cheated and exploited group, with the Amerindian Ordinance their only protection against greater exploitation. But the Amerindian Ordinance
also gave the legislature immense powers over Amerindians, should it choose to use them. In the nationalist period, fear of loss of their rights and of control by Governments believed to represent Black or East Indian interests influenced Amer indian political behaviour, and as Independence became imminent these fears assumed greater proportions. Future
Governments would no longer be subject to control by the Colonial Office.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 83
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
In the Twentieth Century the development of moderniz
ing institutions in the coastal society heightened the contra dictions in its structure, generating new attitudes and political aspirations. This culminated in a widely supported movement
opposed to "White" domination of the status system and to the colonial nature of the power structure [Smith 31 pp. 241-58]. Because their relations with the wider society were mediated by government officials, and because they were located on the geographical periphery of the society, Amer indians were insulated from these developments. As a group, they were not involved in the nationalist movement or in other political developments. When they became involved, as
voters, in national politics the factors I have discussed caused them to ally with groups they saw as "White", or at least anti Black and anti-East Indian. In the 1953 general election they supported anti-Peoples Progressive Party candidates, and in the 1957 general election they supported anti-Jaganite and anti-Burnhamite candidates.
One of the candidates in the 1957 general election was an Amerindian, Stephen Campbell. He was headmaster of an Amerindian school and stood in a largely Amerindian electoral district in the northwest as a candidate for the National Labour Front. This was a conservative party, opposed to both the Jaganite and the Burnhamite Peoples Progressive Parties. Its leadership and support were East Indian as it
opposed British Guiana joining the Federation of the West Indies. Mr. Campbell was its only successful candidate, becoming the first Amerindian member of the British Guiana
legislature [Despres 11 p.210; Graphic Publications 13 pp. 140, 201; Smith 29 p. 180].
In 1960 a Portuguese businessman, Peter D'Aguiar, found
ed a new political party, the United Force. It had a capitalist, anti-communist platform and received support from conser vative elements of the urban middle class and from Amer indians. The United Force cultivated Amerindian support, giving a prominent place to Amerindian policies in its election manifesto and devoting much space to Amerindians in its
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
84 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
weekly newspaper, The Sun. Prominent members of the party had influence with the Amerindian community, and churches
working among Amerindians were opposed to the socialist
ideologies of the two nationalist parties and openly supported the United Force. In the 1961 general election Amerindians voted overwhelmingly for the United Force. They believed it to be the only party concerned about Amerindian problems. But the nature of their support was more fundamental. The Peoples National Congress and the Peoples Progressive Party were regarded as racial parties, African and East Indian res
pectively, concerned with advancing the interests of their racial supporters, which were opposed to those of Amer indians. They regarded the United Force as an anti-Black and anti-East Indian party, and often as a "White" party because its leader was regarded as "White" and it was supported by institutions such as the churches which Amerindians identified as "White". In 1960 Stephen Campbell joined the United Force, and was elected to the House of Assembly in 1961 and 1964 as a United Force Asemblyman [Graphic Publica tions 13 p. 140].
In the 1960s two new factors increased concern among all Guyanese political parties over Amerindian political behaviour. The British Government's introduction of propor tional representation for the 1964 general election increased the importance of Amerindian votes; and fears were raised over the loyalty of the Amerindian population to an Indepen dent Guyana. Dissatisfied with their condition in Guyana, Amerindians had come to believe that the Amerindian policies of Venezuela and Suriname were more enlightened than those of their own Governments. When they became disen chanted with the performance of their "White" party they did not transfer support to the "Black" and "East Indian"
parties. Instead a significant number appeared prepared to
look to a closer association with Guyana's neighbours, and
particularly Venezuela, as offering Amerindians their best
hope of economic development and improved social status. Because they formed the majority population in much of the area claimed by Venezuela, the question of their loyalty was
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 8 5
much more significant then their numbers in the total popu lation of Guyana might suggest.
POLITICAL PROMISES
Because of the introduction of proportional representa tion the People Progressive Party and the Peoples National
Congress attempted to attract Amerindian support. Both
parties made promises of Amerindian development and each
placed an Amerindian relatively high on its list of candidates for the 1964 general election. The Peoples National Congress candidate was Philip Duncan, an engineer and ex-teacher from the Rupununi. The Peoples Progressive Party chose
Eugene Stoby, a shopkeeper and businessman from the Monika river, son of a former Amerindian village headman
[Graphic Publications 13 pp. 140-1, New World (Guyana) 25 pp. 28-9]. Both were elected, but this was not the result of Amerindian support. It was the consequence of their positions on party lists of candidates. As in 1961 Amerindians voted for the United Force.
Amerindian block support ensured the United Force
partnership in the 1964-8 coalition government which replaced Dr. Jagan's Government, and ensured the coalition a substan tial majority in the House of Assembly. The United Force received the Ministry of Local Government, the crucial minis
try for Amerindian affairs, and Stephen Campbell was made
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Local Government with special reference to Amerindian affairs. His role was to
Hase between Amerindians and the Government. (When Mr.
Campbell died in 1966 Mr. Duncan was appointed to this office.) Aware of its dependence on Amerindian support, the United Force consistently presented itself to the Amer indian community as the defender of its interests, and Mr.
D'Aguiar as the leader of the Amerindians, while doing relative
ly little [see for example The Sun 37, issues of 22 April 1967, 3 June 1967, 23 March 1968, 6 July 1968].
The Coalition Government commissioned a Canadian
authority on (Canadian) Amerindian affairs, S. C. Knapp, to
investigate the problems of Guyana's Amerindians. His
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
86 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
recommendations were incorporated into the Government's Seven Year Development Plan, which estimated a total of
$2,983,000 (Guyana) for Amerindian development [British Guiana 7 chapter X]. His report stressed Amerindian fears about ownership of their reserves and other lands on which their villages were located [Knapp 15 p. 1]. As these were Crown lands, ownership would pass on Independence to the Government of an independent Guyana. At the 1965 Inde
pendence Conference in London it was agreed that the
Guyana Government grant Amerindians legal ownership or
rights of occupancy to lands on which villages were situated. In order to achieve this a commission, the Amerindian Lands
Commission, would be appointed to determine the extent of areas occupied by Amerindians and the nature of the land
rights currently enjoyed [New World (Guyana) 22 pp. 32-3].
THE AMERINDIAN ASSOCIATION
The 1964 election returned three Amerindian Assembly men and made the United Force junior partner in the Coali tion Government. Amerindians believed their social status and living standards were about to improve. Because of their naive conception of the wealth a Georgetown Government had at its disposal they had unrealistic expectations of the extent and speed of these anticipated transformations. By 1967, when it had become obvious the Government attached a low priority to Amerindian problems, disillusion with the United Force was widespread. It was against this background that political movements began to develop within the Amer
indian community. Predictably the United Force was anxious that such movements would erode its Amerindian support, but all political parties became concerned that Amerindian discontent might be manipulated by interests outside Guyana against the national interest.
In December 1963 six sophisticated Amerindians, work ing in Georgetown, formed the Amerindian Association of
Guyana. Their aim was to organize as many Amerindians as
possible into a group which could pressure the Government
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 87
to examine Amerindian problems. Full membership was
restricted to Amerindians, with associate membership open to non-Amerindians married to Amerindians or interested in
Amerindian affairs. Stephen Campbell, United Force Assemb
lyman, was made President and Philip Duncan Vice-president. Michael Wilson, an Englishman married to an Amerindian, an
ex-soldier taking casual work, became Press and Public Rela
tions Officer [Amerindian Association of Guyana 1, Amer indian Association of Guyana 3].
The Association's constitution stated that it was not a
political party and would be independent of any political party. Its ultimate goal was integration of Amerindians into an independent Guyana, with the same rights and opportuni ties as other citizens. Among policies proposed to achieve this were an intensive campaign of Amerindian education;
more local government and development programmes for
Amerindian communities; and the appointment of a Board of Amerindian Affairs to examine Amerindian problems [Amerindian Association of Guyana 1, Amerindian Associa tion of Guyana 3, Wilson and Chaves 32]. Branches of the
Association would be established in all Amerindian commu
nities, and the issue chosen on which to canvass for members was that of Amerindian land tenure. The slogan adopted was
"No Independence before the Amerindian land question is
settled".
By the end of 1965 branches had been formed in many Amerindian villages and the Association had a membership of
many hundreds3. Although the executive insisted it was neither racist nor party political [Amerindian Association of
Guyana 2] many joined because they thought its purpose was to defend their interests against Black people and East
Indians, and many believed it to be a section of the United Force. Its leaders sought to publicize issues involving Amer
indians, such as the plight of Amerindians discharged from Georgetown Public Hospital and of the residents of St. Ignatius,
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
88 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
Rupununi, who were being expelled from mission land [Amer indian Association of Guyana 1 ; Amerindian Association of
guyana 3; Guyana Graphic 34, 15 March 1966]. For awhile its spokesmen were reported by the press and received by
ministries, although with little practical effect. In 1965 private ranching interests in the Rupununi
formed the Rupununi Producers' Association, with Mrs.
Valerie Hart, a member of a prominent Rupununi ranching
family and a United Force activist, as its President. Mrs. Hart
claimed her organisation represented the Amerindians of the
Rupununi. This was denied by the executive of the Amer
indian Association, who denounced the Rupununi Producers'
Association as an attempt by the non-Amerindian ranchers to
safeguard their land holdings against possible Amerindian
claims [Guyana Graphic 34, 2 March 1966; Mirror 36, issues of 15, 17 March 1966].
The large membership of the Amerindian Association
remained a paper membership. Despite growing Amerindian
disillusion with the United Force the executive failed to organize the Association into a pressure group. Isolation;
geographical difficulties of communication; and Amerindian mistrust and reluctance to co-operate together, create immense
difficulties for anyone seeking to organize Amerindians. But
in this case the fault lay mainly with the Association's leaders.
They did not maintain any real contact with their supporters. Instead they engaged in vituperative policy disagreements and
personality clashes.
In 1965 the executive expelled Stephen Campbell for trying to link the Association more closely to the United Force. His expulsion was denounced by the United Force as
unconstitutional, the result of a conspiracy by Peoples National Congress supporters on the executive who wished to
subvert the Amerindians from their allegience to the United Force. Two more presidents, including Philip Duncan, were
expelled in quick succession. They left denouncing the
executive, and claiming they represented the constitutional
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 89
Amerindian Association. Increasingly the executive came
under the incompetent direction of Michael Wilson, an English man, and Anthony Chaves, a Portuguese Guyanese married to
an Amerindian, who became General Secretary [Amerindian Association of Guyana 1 ; Ameridian Association of Guyana 3; The Sun 37, 29 April 1966; Wilson and Chaves 32]. As all nationally known members were expelled or left, the Amer
indian Association ceased to receive press coverage and was
no longer taken seriously by government. District Officers were instructed to bar its leaders from entering Amerindian
districts, and churches in the Interior had always been hostile to the Association. All this weakened it further and lessened
its credibility among Amerindians.
THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION
In April 1967 the executive called a secret convention at Kabakaburi on the Pomeroon river. About 35 Amerindian
village headmen and councillors were invited, mostly from western Guyana. The political parties obtained information about the conference and a number of allegations were made
by the news media [Guyana Graphic 34, issues of 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28 April 1967; The Sun 37, issues of 22, 29 April 1967; Sunday Graphic 38, 23 April 1967]. Three airplanes had been used to bring 21 headmen from the Pakaraima mountains and the North Savannahs of the Rupununi to the coast. It was alleged that the conference was funded by a Venezuelan diplomat, who attended the
meeting. The meeting resolved that Amerindians should claim their lands and inform the Government there was no need to appoint the proposed Amerindian Lands Commission. It resolved to form an Amerindian political party to contest the 1968 general election, in the hope of becoming a partner in a future coalition government in which it would represent
Amerindian interests. It supported a recent Venezuelan pro posal for the joint development of Essequibo by Venezuela and Guyana. But the most sensational revelation was that it had supported Venezuela's claim to Essequibo.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
90 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
Two days after the first press accounts of the conference, the membership of the long-awaited Amerindian Lands Com
mission was announced4. The opposition Peoples Progressive Party denounced the timing of the announcement as a cynical attempt by the Government to try to convince Amerindians that it was taking their problems seriously, due to its concern over the Kabakaburi convention. The Ministry of Local Government issued a warning against anyone trying to use
Amerindians for "personal political ends", and particularly for attacks on Guyana's territorial integrity. Thirteen Amer indians who had attended the conference and were still in
Georgetown were summoned to the Ministry to sign a pre
pared declaration of loyalty, in which they rejected the Vene zuelan claim to Essequibo and denied knowingly supporting any resolution upholding the claim. Only the President of the Amerindian Association refused to sign. On 24 April the Parliament of Guyana in special session passed the Expulsion of Undesirables (Amendment) Bill, enabling expulsion of British citizens and of consuls and vice-consuls,. Michael
Wilson, who had been elected General Secretary of the Amer indian Association at the Kabakaburi convention, was depor ted on 27 April and a vice-consul at the Venezuelan embassy, Senor Leopoldo Taylhardat, was asked to leave the country. The Venezuelan ambassador issued a denial that either Vene zuela or Senor Taylhardat had any involvement in the Kabakaburi convention, but said he would inform his Govern ment of the convention's resolution on joint development as it involved his country's interests.
Little more was heard of the Amerindian Association of
Guyana. In 1968 Anthony Chaves, who had been expelled from the Association by the Kabakaburi meeting, gave evidence to the Amerindian Lands Commission claiming to be Secretary of the Amerindian Association. He said it had a membership of 5,000 and branches in 20 Amerindian villages [New World (Guyana) 21 pp. 30-1]. However the Association had been defunct as an organization long before this.
AN AMERINDIAN POLITICAL PARTY
In March 1968 a group of Amerindians from the
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 91
Pomeroon river and northwestern Guyana announced the formation of a new political party, the Guyana National Party [Evening Post 33, 20 March 1968; Guyana Graphic 34,issues of 15, 18 March 1968; The Sun 31,23 March 1968]. It was centred at Kabakaburi and undoubtedly had links with the Kabakaburi conference of the previous year. Its declared aim was to fight the 1968 general election in order to represent Amerindians, and its main policy was support for closer ties
with Venezuela. It favoured joint development of Essequibo
by Guyana and Venezuela, claiming this would benefit
Essequibo's Amerindians, and applauded the Government's
recent move to set up a commission with Venezuela to
examine the possibility of joint development. It was sceptical of the value of the Amerindian Lands Commission, the main
plank of the Government's Amerindian policy, but reserved
its main criticisms for Mr. D'Aguiar and the United Force. It
said Amerindians were disillusioned with the United Force because it had neglected their interests. These would only be
safeguarded when Amerindians had their own political party. At its first press conference the Guyana National Party claimed a membership of 15,000, which can only have been a massive
exaggeration and may have been based on an estimate of the number of Amerindian voters.
The founders of the new party and the members of its executive were more typical of Guyana's Amerindians than the sophisticated Georgetown residents who formed and led the Amerindian Association, but like them they were mainly from Amerindian villages lo cat ed near Guyana's coastal society. This is an indication of the relative sophistication of the members of these communities compared to those of the more remote Interior.
The United Force reacted with a propaganda campaign aimed at Amerindians which took the form of an intensive attack on the Guyana National Party and its leaders [The Sun
37, 23 March 1968]. It claimed the party's formation was
instigated from Venezuela in a deliberate attempt to subvert
Guyana's Amerindians, and said Amerindians had been mis led into believing their Venezuelan counterparts were better
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
92 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
off than themselves. Guyana's Amerindians were better off than those of any neighbouring country, and this was due entirely to the efforts of the United Force. They should continue to vote for the United Force because it was their only hope of achieving their just demands. In particular, it claimed sole credit for the Amerindian Lands Commission. This was a major theme of its campaign for the 1968 general election5, which it began among Amerindians immediately after the shock of the Kabakaburi convention [see for example Evening Post 33, 20 March 1968; The Sun 37, issues of 1, 8 April 1967 ; The Sun 37, issues of 8, 20 March 1968; The Sun 37,6 July 1968; The Sun 37, 8 March 1969].
At the time the Guyana National Party was founded a newspaper, Amerindian News began circulating among the Amerindians of Guyana's North West District. Purporting to represent the views of Amerindians, its theme was the advan tages they would receive from closer ties with Venezuela.
Georgetown newspapers claimed it was printed in Venezuela. Michael Wilson was said to be in Venezuela and involved in both the newspaper and the formation of the Guyana National Party [Guyana Graphic 34, March 1968]. The Guyana National Party denied any connection with Amerindian News, but did not deny support from Venezuela. It argued that, like other political parties, it had the right to ally with sources outside Guyana for financial and other assistance believed to have been received by the United Force and the Peoples National Congress from the United States, to support extra
parliamentary activity during the political conflict of the early 1960s which led to the fall of Dr. Jagan's Government. As the election approached the party claimed its officials were being harrassed by the police and blamed the United Force [The Sun 37, 12 October 1968]. For whatever reason, the Guyana National Party failed to register for the general election.
The Amerindian Association had been an attempt by sophisticated Amerindians to organize the Amerindian popu lation into a political group. When it failed some of its leaders
were prepared to ally with Venezuelan interests as the most
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 93
effective means of achieving their objectives. It appears that the formation of the Guyana National Party involved a further
attempt by Venezuela to use Amerindian discontents in order to obtain support among Guyana's western Amerindians for
her claim against Guyana [Drummond 12, pp. 322-3]. The United Force left the Government before the 1968
election, claiming cavalier treatment by its Peoples National
Congress partner. The election was held on 16 December and the results were Peoples National Congress 30 seats, Peoples Progressive Party 19, and United Force four. The Peoples National Congress acquired an overall majority. The Peoples
Progressive Party ceased to have the largest number of seats. United Force representation was halved. The election results were attacked as fraudulent. It is probable that most Amer
indians again voted for the United Force in the absence of an
attractive alternative, in the hope that this time it would keep its election pledges. Had the Guyana National Party fought the election it might have attracted significant support among western Amerindians who believed their condition would improve form closer ties with Venezuela. The election des
troyed the slight possibility of Amerindians forming any kind of independent political force. Increasingly they would come under the control of the Peoples National Congress Govern
ment.
RUPUNUNI INSURRECTION
On 2 January 1969 an insurrection was attempted in the
Rupununi. It was organized by a number of private ranchers
who were supported by their Amerindian ranch hands. The
ranchers distrusted the Peoples National Congress Govern
ment's attitude to their grazing rights, and believed it intended to distribute land to immigrants from the coast to encourage settlement in the Rupununi. It was claimed that the insur
gents were armed and trained by Venezuela. They intended
to establish an independent Rupununi Republic in political association with Venezuela or Brazil. Mrs. Valerie Hart, Pre
sident of the Rupununi Producers' Association and a United
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
94 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
Force candidate in the December election, was to be Presi dent of the new republic. The revolt was not an Amerindian
rising, although many Rupununi Amerindians probably would have approved seccesion from Guyana. It was organised as a
conspiracy involving about 100 persons, the number being kept small to maintain secrecy while it was being planned and
organised. The leaders believed that if they could sieze con trol of the Rupununi for only three days then they would be recognized by Venezuela The Guardian 35, issues of 5, 18
January \969;New Statesman 20, pA34;New World (Guyana) 23 p. 10; New World (Guyana) 24 p. 9;Sunday Times 39, 19 January 1969; Sunday Times 39, 28 March 1969; The Times 40, issues of 6, 8 January 1969].
The Guyana Defence Force quickly put down the insur rection and its leaders fled to Brazil and Venezuela. Mrs.
Hart, made an unsuccessful appeal to the Venezuela Govern ment for military assistance, claiming that the Amerindians of the Rupununi considered themselves Venezuelans. In his statement on the revolt Prime Minister Burnham accused the ranchers of seeking to manipulate the Amerindians. The
Rupununi w$s declared a restricted area, which cut off the United Force from a large section of its Amerindian suppor ters, and clergymen working among Amerindians in the
Rupununi had to leave. There was a significant movement of Amerindians from the Rupununi into Venezuela and Brazil
following the Guyana Defence Force take over of the area
[Amerindian Lands Commission 4 p. 19].
CONCLUSION
In the nationalist period of Guyanese politics, the Amer indians' long history of special relations with Europeans and their unique legal status influenced them to oppose nationalist parties and candidates. When the United Force was formed they supported it as a "White", anti-Black and anti-East Indian party, the heir to their European protectors. By doing so
they ensured the United Force's membership in the coalition government which replaced Dr. Jagan's Government in 1964.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 95
At the same time Amerindians had come to regard Guyana's neighbours as having more enlightened Amerindian policies than those of their own nationalist governments. When they became disillusioned with the United Force many believed they would benefit from closer association with these countries and some were prepared to ally with external interests in the belief that this would better the Amerindian condition, creat
ing a new problem in Guyana's international relations.
FOOTNOTES
1 Research was carried out into contemporary Guyanese Amerindians be tween March 1965 and July 1968. Where statements are not referenced they are based upon my own fieldwork. I hope soon to begin research into Amerindians under the Peoples National Congress Government.
^Estimates of the Amerindian population vary. International Commission of Jurists [14 p.32] cites a provisional figure of 29,430 for 1964, which was too low. A commonly quoted figure for the same period is 40,000 [Amerindian Lands Commission 4 p. 17] which probably was too high.
3 I have records of 759 persons from 39 villages and localities for early
1966, which was not the total membership at this time.
^The Commission began its examination in 1968 and reported its findings at the end of 1969 [Amerindian Lands Commission 4].
^Ridgwell [26], is an account of the United Force's election campaign by an English participant who helped organize it.
REFERENCES
[1] AMERINDIAN ASSOCIATION OF GUYANA, Minutes of the first congress to the AAG held at Cabacaburi Mission, Pomeroon river on Sunday, December 19th 1965 at 1.30 p.m., unpub ms., (1965).
[2] AMERINDIAN ASSOCIATION OF GUYANA, President's letter to Amerindian villages, 15 March 1966, unpub ms.
(1966).
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
96 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
[3] AMERINDIAN ASSOCIATION OF GUYANA, President's report of 1965; for the Amerindian Association of Guyana, unpub ms. (1965).
[4] AMERINDIAN LANDS COMMISSION,/?epor?i>7^ei4menn?/ia/i Lands Commission, Government Printers, Georgetown, 1969.
[5] BERNAU, J. H., Missionary labours in British Guiana, London, 1847.
[6] BRETT, W. H., The Indian tribes of Guiana, London, 1868.
[7] BRITISH GUIANA, British Guiana (Guyana) development pro gramme (1966-72), Government Printers, Georgetown, 1966.
[8] BRITISH GUIANA, Ordinance no. 22 of 1910 (The Aboriginal Indian Protection Ordinance), Government Printers, British Guiana, 1910.
[9] BRITISH GUIANA, Ordinance no. 22 of 1951 (The Amerindian Ordinance), Government Printers, Georgetown, 1951.
[10] DALY, V. T., A Short History of the Guyanese People, Da?y Chronicle Ltd, Georgetown, 1966.
[11] DESPRES, L.A., Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1967.
[12] DRUMMOND, L, The Outskirts of the Earth, A study of Amer indian ethnicity on the Pomeroon river, Guyana. PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1974.
[13] GRAPHIC PUBLICATIONS, Guyana year book, 1966, Guyana Graphic Ltd., Georgetown, 1966.
[14] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, Report of the British Guiana Commission of Enquiry, Geneva, 1965.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
British Colonial Policy 9 7
[15] KNAPP, S.C., Report on the Amerindians of Guy ana and suggested development programmes, Government Printers, Georgetown, 1966.
[16] MENEZES, . ., "Amerindian captains and constables: a
system of alliance for security and control", Release, October 1972, pp. 55-67.
[17] MENEZES, M.N., "The Dutch and British policy of Indian subsidy: a system of annual and triennial presents", Caribbean Studies, Volume 13, No. 3, October 1973, pp. 64-88.
[18] MENEZES, . ., British policy towards the Amerindians in British Guiana, 1803-73, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977.
[19] MENEZES, . ., The Amerindians in Guyana, 1803-73, Frank
Cass, London, 1979.
[20] NEW STATESMAN, "The Amerindian plight in Guyana", New
Statesman, 28 March 1969, p. 434.
[21] NEW WORLD (GUYANA), "The Amerindian Association - the
Lands Commission", New World (Guyana), Volume 1 No. 1,1969 pp. 30-1.
[22] NEW WORLD (GUYANA), "Amerindian land tenure. Report of the British Guiana Independence Conference, 1965",
New World (Guyana) Volume 1 No. 1, 1969 pp. 32-3.
[23] NEW WORLD (GUYANA), "Excerpts from Mr. Burnham's state ment on revolt", New World (Guyana), Volume 1 No.
1, 1969, p. 10.
[24] NEW WORLD (GUYANA), "A note on 'RupuminT" New World
(Guyana), Volume 1 No. 1,1969, p.9.
[25] NEW WORLD (GUYANA), "Parties plans for Amerindians - a
summary", New World (Guyana), Volume 1 No. 1, 1969, pp. 28-9.
[26] RIDGWELL, W.M., The Forgotten Tribes of Guyana, Tom Stacey, London,1972.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
98 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
[27] RODWAY, J., History of British Guiana, from the Year 1668 to the Present Time, 3 volumes, J. Thompson, George town, 1891.
[28] SCHOMBURGK, R., Travels in British Guiana, 1840-44, .Daily Chronicle, Georgetown, 1922.
[29] SMITH, R.T., British Guiana, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
[30] SMITH, R.T., "People and change", New World, Guyana Inde
pendence issue, 1966, pp. 49-54.
[31] SMITH, R.T., "Stratification, Cultural Pluralism, and Integration in West Indian Societies", in LEWIS, S., andMATHEWS, T.G. (eds), Caribbean Integration, Institute of Carib bean Studies, Puerto Rico, 1967, pp.226-58.
[32] WILSON, M AND CHAVES, A., Amerindians, unpub ms., 1966.
NEWSPAPERS
[33] EVENING POST, Georgetown.
[34] GUYANA GRAPHIC, Georgetown.
[35] THE GUARDIAN, London.
[36] MIRROR, Georgetown.
[37] THE SUN, Georgetown.
[38] SUNDAY GRAPHIC, Georgetown.
[39] SUNDAY TIMES, London.
[40] THE TIMES, London.
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.157 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:57:53 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions