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Social and f iscal f raud in Belgium: how t angible is it with a survey?. Brussels, 23 October 2013. Jozef Pacolet & Frederic De Wispelaere HIVA – Research Institute for Work and Society KU Leuven [email protected]. Content. Definition and measurement problems - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Design Charles & Ray Eames - Hang it all © Vitra Brussels, 23 October 2013 Social and fiscal fraud in Belgium: how tangible is it with a survey? Jozef Pacolet & Frederic De Wispelaere HIVA – Research Institute for Work and Society KU Leuven [email protected]
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Page 1: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Des

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Social and fiscal fraud in Belgium: how tangible is it with a survey?

Jozef Pacolet & Frederic De WispelaereHIVA – Research Institute for Work and Society

KU [email protected]

Page 2: Brussels, 23 October 2013

1. Definition and measurement problems

2. The use of a survey: Pros and cons

3. The design of an appropriate survey methodology

4. A pilot study on declared and undeclared income and work in

Belgium: SUBLEC

5. Unfair competition in the construction industry in Belgium : A

business survey on social fraud

Content

2

Page 3: Brussels, 23 October 2013

1. Definition and measurement problems

3

Definition:

Broad definition of evasion, avoidance and non or less taxation – including criminal and illegal activities

Measurement – ‘Making the invisible visible’:

• On a macro level (indirect)• On a micro level (direct): e.g. survey (population, firms, inspection

services, …), • Reconciliation of methods

Page 4: Brussels, 23 October 2013

2. The use of a survey: Pros and cons

4

• EC (2007) concluded from the Eurobarometer on undeclared work “results should be interpreted with great care, in view of the sensitivity of the subject, the pilot nature of the survey and the low number of respondents who reported having carried out undeclared work or having received envelop wages”

• A sensitive subject and threatening questions (= increased chance of a socially desirable answer and (item) non-response);

• Risk of underestimating the size of undeclared work

Nevertheless … one will obtain a detailed view of specific sectors, socio-economic categories, types of fraud (in search of ‘exhaustiveness’)

Page 5: Brussels, 23 October 2013

3. The design of an approriate survey methodology

5

Choice of the survey method: face-to-face interviews- Most frequently used method to measure the size of undeclared work- Lower item non-response- Solving comprehension problems- Interviewer has to ‘sell’ the survey- Most sensitive questions can be answered on a seperate answer sheet .

Survey design: - Using a gradual approach

• Sensitive questions are embedded in related non-sensitive questions• Opinion questions before questions related to ‘own behaviour’ • Demand for undeclared work is more socially accepted than the supply of

undeclared work- Using indirect and implicit questions

• Asking about the behaviour of other people is less threatening than asking about the behaviour of the respondent

• Implicit questions/wording: e.g. ‘unfair competition’ instead of ‘fraud’

Page 6: Brussels, 23 October 2013

4. A pilot study on declared an undeclared income and work (SUBLEC)

6

• Scope: A detailed (exhaustive) questionnaire (opinion; own demand for and supply of undeclared work; other types of fiscal fraud; specific questions for employees, self-employed, benefits recipients and non-active people)

• Methodology: Face-to-face interviews

• Sample: Belgian population aged 18 to 75 (sample of 5 202 persons)

• Response group: 246 persons (response rate of 4.8%) (It became a ‘Pilot Study’)

• Important limitation: Invitation letters were sent to the gross sample by a third party. Persons willing to participate had to send back a letter of consent confirming their willingness to participate.

Page 7: Brussels, 23 October 2013

4. SUBLEC: Micro evidence for Belgium compared with Europe

7

SUBLEC: Belgium (2010)

Eurobarometer: Belgium (2007)

Eurobarometer: EU27 (2007)

Demand for undeclared work: services/goodsGeneral 38.8% 11.0%Services 35.2% 15.0% 9.0%Goods 14.1% 8.0% 6.0%Average amount (€) 1,553 1,050 1,028% GDP per capita 1.9% 0.6% 0.6%Supply of undeclared work: services/goodsGeneral 14.1% 6% 5%Average amount (€) 1,332 1,000 1,119% GDP per capita 0,6% 0,2% 0,2%

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012) and EC, Eurobarometer, 2007

Page 8: Brussels, 23 October 2013

4. It is a matter of questioning: people engaged in undeclared work in the Eurobarometer 2007 compared with a more in depth survey in Belgium

Source: Eurobarometer, 2007 and Pacolet et al. (2012)

8

DK

LV

NL

EE

SE

AT

CZ

HU

LT B

E BE-S

BE-deman

d FR

SK

BG

EU27

LU

P

L SI

EL FI

IE R

O D

E

D-W

E

S IT

P

T D

-E M

T UK C

Y 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Percentage of persons who are 'self declaring' that their doing undeclared work

Page 9: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012)

9

4. SUBLEC: Summary of the Belgian underground economy

Frequency (% of people)

Volume (% of total amount)

Know someone

Demand for undeclared work 38.8% 79.2%Supply of undeclared work 14.1% 78.5%Envelope wage 2.0%Social benefit fraud 5.6%*** 52.1%Benefit cumulated with undeclared work 4.3%***Tax declaration not completely correct 24.1% 2.3%*Inheritance 5.5% 49.7%** 41.3%

* As % income of all respondents** As % income of the respondents committing fraud*** As % of benefit recipients

Page 10: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012)

10

4. SUBLEC: Own behaviour and opinion about other people

• Demand for undeclared work- Own demand: 38.8% of the respondents, good for 1.9% GDP/capita and 4% of

the family expenditure per capita;- Opinion about other people: 41.6% of the population;- Opinion about the size of undeclared work: 23% of disposable income.

• Supply of undeclared work- Own supply: 14.1% of the respondents, good for 0.6% GDP/capita;- Opinion about other people: 38.3% of the population;- Opinion about the size of undeclared work: 27.9% of the labor income.

• Tax declaration not completely correct- Own behaviour: 24.1% of the respondents, good for 2.3% of total income;- Opinion about other people: 37.7% of the population.

Page 11: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012)

11

4. SUBLEC: Determinants of fraud

Parameter Variable Demand for undeclared work

Supply of undeclared work Fiscal fraud

    Estimation Pr> Khi2 Estimation Pr> Khi2 Estimation Pr>Khi2

Intercept   -0.3613 0.3172 -2.1466 0.0001*** 0.5952 0.0752*

Sex Man -0.0331 0.8543 0.6068 0.013** 0.0162 0.9305Region French-

speaking-0.0896 0.6217 0.424 0.087* -0.2762 0.1495

Socio-economic category

Self-employed 0.8488 0.0327** 0.1701 0.6884 0.1999 0.6179

  Benefits recipient

-0.4383 0.0248** -0.7391 0.0094*** 0.3426 0.0932*

  Inactive -0.4079 0.2298 0.3395 0.3443 0.0457 0.8858Know someone (demand)

Yes 0.8468 0.0006***        

Know someone (supply)

      1.1406 0.0106**    

Know someone (fiscal fraud)

          -0.0152 0.9379

Income (1) Difficult -0.3393 0.0710* 0.1508 0.5495 0.0667 0.7337Morality (2) Totally agree -0.5279 0.0661* -0.652 0.0575* 0.3207 0.271  Rather agree 0.261 0.3768 -0.5856 0.0847* -0.0158 0.9571  Disagree -0.1914 0.6261 -0.23 0.6265 -0.1203 0.7575Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

1 Get by on their monthly income?2 The tax burden is too high in Belgium?

Page 12: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012)

12

4. SUBLEC: Opinion about the determinants of undeclared work

10.9%

11.4%

77.7%

Morality, behavior

Inspection, risk of being caught, enforcement

Taxes, regulation, red tape

België

Page 13: Brussels, 23 October 2013

Source: Pacolet et al. (2012)

13

4. SUBLEC: Opinion about the most effective policy measures to fight against undeclared work

6.8%

35.1%58.1%

Morality, behavior

Inspection, risk of being caught, enforcement

Taxes, regulation, red tape

Belgium

Page 14: Brussels, 23 October 2013

14

4. SUBLEC: Some ‘remarkable’ results

• Undeclared work more formal organized in Flanders and more informal in Wallonia;

• What if the undeclared good or service is only available in the regular economy?: 2/3 would have bought it from the regular market and 1/4 would have done it by himself;

• No guarantee in the case of faillure or error is an important reason for not buying goods or services on the black market;

• A positive impact of subsidies on the decision to invoice the work;• Coherence between the supply and the demand of undeclared work; • Coherence between opinion and own behaviour related to

undeclared work.

Page 15: Brussels, 23 October 2013

15

• This detailed questionnaire should be assumed as a ‘good practice’ (e.g. relevant for the national accounts, policy makers, ...)

• Method of contacting influences the response rate considerably (‘good practice’: direct contact – several times)

• Computer assistance (CAPI) is recommendable (will avoid data cleaning)

• A large, exhaustive questionnaire needs a certain size to guarantee representativeness and a detailed analysis.

• Time and cost consuming – repeat with a certain time gap (e.g. every 5 year)

4. SUBLEC: Some conclusions

Page 16: Brussels, 23 October 2013

5. Unfair competition in the construction industry in Belgium: Answer to part not covered by a population survey

16

Type undeclared work

Individual (demand)

Firm(demand)

Individual (supplier)

Covered from demand and supply side

Covered from demand size

Firm (supplier)

Covered from demand size

Not covered

Source: A. Riedmann, Eurobarometer pilot survey,2007

Page 17: Brussels, 23 October 2013

5. Unfair competition in the construction industry in Belgium: Some conclusions

17

• Survey was on unfair competition …or undeclared work• Own undeclared activities: were not asked• Organized as an electronic survey• With the support of the business organizations in Flanders and Wallonia• Willingness to collaborate : 406 respondentsSome remarkable responses:• 12 % of all the offers are suspect • The industry thinks it is used by 27 to 29 % of the firms• 50-60 % say they are confronted with damage because of unfair competition• They observe some 30 % of price cutting• And some 25-30 % loss of volume (1,8 – 2,3 FTE in an industry with especially

small firms of 6 FTE)• Underdeveloped regions are more confronted with it• Leaving us with a picture of a vicious circle of underdevelopment, unemployment,

undeclared work, lack of control

Page 18: Brussels, 23 October 2013

5. Unfair competition in the construction industry in Belgium: Relevance for further continuation

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• Depends on willingness to collaborate with stakeholders • Could stimulate the collaboration and involvement of stakeholders• Advantage of doing combined or mirror research with employers and trade unions• Could be an action research• Could be easily integrated in regular business surveys• Limited questions could be added to regular business surveys• Might be interesting to be replicated in certain Belgian industries (in collaboration

between the controllers, the employers and the employees)• Already suggested industry is catering industry; other thinkable industries are transport,

cleaning, independent workers of all industries• Could be organized in international perspective• Could be concentrated on unfair competition and competitive advantages and

disadvantages

Page 19: Brussels, 23 October 2013

References

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• Pacolet, J. & De Wispelaere, F. (2012), ‘Designing an appropriate survey methodology to reveal social and fiscal fraud’, HIVA Working Paper, 29 p.

• Pacolet, J., Perelman, S., De Wispelaere, F., Schoenmaeckers, J., Nisen, L., Fegatilli, E., Krzeslo, E., De Troyer, M. & Merckx, S. (2012), Social and fiscal fraud in Belgium – A pilot study on declared and undeclared income and work: SUBLEC, ACCO, Leuven, 145 p.

• Pacolet, J. & Baeyens, K. (2007), Deloyale concurrentie in de bouwsector. Een terreinverkenning van mechanismen van sociale fraude, hun omvang en hun gevolgen voor de sector, HIVA – KU Leuven, Leuven, 149 p.

• Pacolet, J., De Wispelaere, F. (2013). The Informal Economy and the Present Economic Crisis in Europe. Is There an Influence?. In: Saitta P., Shapland J., Verhage A. (Eds.), Getting By or Getting Rich? The Formal, Informal and Criminal Economy in a Globalized World. The Hague (Netherlands): Eleven International Publishing, 11-27.


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