Bucknam (2003) Responsibility of Command - How the UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower Over...

Book Title(s) _______________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Product Rating Service Rating Book Design Rating

_______ Subject Matter _________ Courtesy _________ Cover

_______ Readability _________ Promptness _________ Format

_______ Condition _________ Accuracy _________ IllustrationsUpon Receipt

What would you like to see Air University Press publish? _______________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Other comments: __________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

May we use your comments for our marketing/advertising program?

How did you learn about Air University Press?

Friend/Acquaintance _______________________________________________________________

Display/Exhibit _____________________________________________________________________

Professional Journal Ad ____________________________________________________________

Internet ____________________________________________________________________________

AU Press Home Page _______________________________________________________________

Other ______________________________________________________________________________

Name: _______________________________________________________ Date: ________________

Organization: _______________________________________________________________________

Rank/Title: _________________________________________________________________________

Please fold so our address is on front and tape loose sides before mailing.

Thank You!

May we

publish y

our

commen

ts

on our

web page

?

Air University PressReader Survey

Help us to improve! Tell us how well were doing.

5 4 3 2 1Excellent Good Fair Poor Fail

Yes No

FOLD HERE FOLD HERE

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

Responsibility of CommandHow UN and NATO CommandersInfluenced Airpower over Bosnia

MARK A. BUCKNAM

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2003

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those ofthe author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States AirForce, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for publicrelease: distribution unlimited.

ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Bucknam, Mark A.Responsibility of command : how UN and NATO commanders influenced airpower

over Bosnia / Mark A. Bucknam. p. ; cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-58566-115-51. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995 -- Aerial operations. 2. Command of troops. 3. Air

power -- Political aspects. 4. Military planning. 5. Combined operations (Militaryscience) I. Title.

949.7103dc21

Air University Press131 West Shumacher AvenueMaxwell AFB AL 361126615http:/ /aupress.maxwell.af.mil

To all who serve or have served in our armed forces,and especially to the spouses, children, and other supporting

family members, whose unheralded sacrifices make possible theservice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coasties.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixvii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Existing Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USEOF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Inf luence and Autonomy:The US Military and the Use of Force . . . . . . . . . 28

Deciding to Use Force:Military Reluctance and Influence . . . . . . . . . 29

How To Use Force: Options, Influence, and Overwhelming Force . . . . . . . . 30

Theoretical Bases of Demands forOperational Autonomy: Expertiseand Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Political Constraints on Airpower:Targeting and Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . 39Targeting as Air Strategy:What to Attack, What Not to Attack . . . . . . . . . 40

Bombing Pauses:When to Bomb or Not Bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Rules of Engagement:Circumstances for Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Soldiers and Airmen:Efficacy and Control of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

v

Chapter Page

3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWERIN BOSNIA: 1992APRIL 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957Airpower and Policy Making in the United

States, France, and the United Kingdom . . . . . 958Early USAFE Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959NATO Involvement in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961Enforcing the No-Fly Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962Safe Areas and Lift and Strike . . . . . . . . . . . 964Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967

4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES:MAYDECEMBER 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973

UNSCR 836: Safe Areas andA irpowerExpanding the UNPROFOR Mandate and the Role of NATO: MayJuly 1993 . . . . . . 974UNSCR 844: Implementing

an Ambiguous Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977New Leadership for UNPROFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . 979

NATO Air-to-Ground Missions:JuneAugust 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981

Airpower and Coercion atMount Igman: August 1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987

Command without Control:SeptemberDecember 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991UNPROFOR Commanders Strive to Control NATO Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994

Absent Political Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997Responsibility, Risks, and Accountability. . . . . . . 999

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARYJUNE 1994 . . . . . 115

Commanders and Command Relationships . . . . 116General Rose, Peacekeeping, and Airpower. . . . . 117Command Relationships, Air Strikes,

and Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

vi

Chapter Page

The Sarajevo Ultimatum: February 1994 . . . . . 122Military Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Airpower, Control, and Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . 125

No-Fly Zone Enforcement and First CAS Approval: FebruaryMarch 1994. . . . . . . . . . . . 129NATO Downs Serb Aircraft

in the No-Fly Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Turning Point: Gorazde, April 1994 . . . . . . . . 133North Atlantic Council Decisions

and the Gorazde Ultimatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138UN and NATO Missions in Bosnia: A Matter of Interpretationand Political Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Trust, Expertise, and Forces at Risk . . . . . . . 143Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDSFOR FORCE PROTECTION:AUGUSTDECEMBER 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

NATO Air Strikes and the Clash over Warningsand Control: AugustOctober 1994. . . . . . . . . . 160NATOs First Air Strike, 5 August 1994 . . . . . . 162Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163NATOs Second Air Strike,

22 September 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Attempts to Control Air Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Udbina: Mission AccomplishmentVersus Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Udbina: November 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Targeting Udbina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Interpreting the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Retrospective SEAD and the GrowingUN-NATO Rift: NovemberDecember 1994 . . . . 180Udbina and Otoka: November 1994 . . . . . . . . . 182

vii

Chapter Page

NATO and UN Split over Airpower:December 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3184

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3190Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3191

7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT:JANUARYJUNE 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3203Air Campaign Plans and UNPROFOR Changes:Winter 19941995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3204

Dead Eye. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3204Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3204New UN Commanders andRedefining UNPROFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3207

The Beginning of the End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3210Rupert Smith on theUse of Airpower in Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3211

Pale Air Strikes and UNPROFOR Hostages: 2526 May 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3213

F-16 Downing and Hostage Deals. . . . . . . . . . 217Kicking the Problem Back Upstairs . . . . . . . . 3223US Response to the F-16 Downing . . . . . . . . 3223 NATO Response to the F-16 Downing. . . . . . . 3227


8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONSTO USE AIRPOWER: JULYAUGUST 1995 . . . . 3245

Srebrenica: 611 July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3246The Fall of Srebrenica: July 1995. . . . . . . . . . 3247Expectations and Blame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3249

The London Conference and the Decisions to Use Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . 3251

Decision to Use Airpower toProtect Gorazde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3253

Decision to Use Airpower in Defense ofOther Safe Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3255

Changing Landscape and USPolitical Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3258

viii

Chapter Page

AFSOUTH and UNPFSubject to Close Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . 3261

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3263Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3264

9 DELIBERATE FORCE:AUGUSTSEPTEMBER 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3273

Defense of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3274The Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3275The Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3276The Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3279Collateral Damage and Other Priorities . . . . . 3281 The Bombing Pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3285

Leveling the Playing Field and Coercing the Serbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3288New Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3289Battle Damage Assessment

and Target Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3291SEAD, Option 212, and Coercion . . . . . . . . . . . 3293Aftermath: More of the Same . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3298


10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3313

How UN Commanders Influenced Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3314Why UN Commanders InfluencedAirpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3316

How NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3320Why NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3321

Objectives, Authority, and Responsibility . . . . . 3322Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3327

ix

Page

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3399

IllustrationsFigure

1 Outline of Events around the Timeof the Udbina Air Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3182

2 Six-Day Outline of Attack on Srebrenica . . . . . . 3247

3 Zones of Action and Target Distribution forOperation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3256

4 Time Line of Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . 3289

Photo

Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. YasushiAkashi, and Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose . . . . . . . . 284

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose andLt Gen Joseph Ashy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Lt Gen Rupert Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 11

Gen Jean Cot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 12

Lt Gen Bernard Janvier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 15

Lt Gen James Bear Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 19

x

Col Mark A. Bucknam is chief of the organizational policybranch within the Policy Division, under the director for strate-gic plans and policy (J-5) of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.Colonel Bucknam was born 25 September 1959 in Philadelphia,Pennsylvania. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in physicsand a Master of Science degree in materials science and engi-neering from Virginia Tech in June 1981 and April 1982, respec-tively. He was a distinguished graduate from Squadron OfficerSchool in 1985 and from Air Command and Staff College in1995. In 1996 Colonel Bucknam graduated from the School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies, and in 1999 he was awarded a PhDin war studies from the University of London. He is a distin-guished graduate of the National War College.

Colonel Bucknam earned his wings in May 1983 at SheppardAir Force Base, Texas. His first operational tour was to Royal AirForce Bentwaters, United Kingdom, where he flew the A-10 andserved as an instructor pilot, air show demonstration pilot, andthe wings chief functional check-flight pilot. From October 1987until October 1988, Colonel Bucknam worked in the Pentagon

xi

About theAuthor

as an air staff training (ASTRA) officer in the Inspector Generaland Programming Directorates.

Colonel Bucknams next assignment was as an instructor pilotin the fighter lead-in training program at Holloman Air ForceBase, New Mexico, where he served as a flight commander andlater as chief of wing training. In 1990 he was the Tactical AirCommand instructor pilot of the year for the AT-38 aircraft,and in 1991 he was named by the Big Brothers/Big Sisters ofAmerica organization as the national big brother of the year forthe entire United States.

After completing F-16 qualification training in September1991, Colonel Bucknam flew the F-16 at Homestead Air ForceBase until August 1992, when Hurricane Andrew forced his unitto move to Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. At Shaw, hespent a year as an assistant operations officer, during whichhis squadron transitioned to the newest variant of the F-16,the Block-50. Colonel Bucknam then moved up to head thecurrent operations flight of the 20th Operations Support Squad-ron for a year.

He moved to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where heattended Air Command and Staff College and the School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies. In 1996 Colonel Bucknam wasassigned to Kings College, University of London, where, in1999, he earned a doctoral degree in war studies. His disser-tation focused on the use of airpower over Bosnia duringOperations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force. Colonel Bucknamnext commanded the 8th Operations Support Squadron, Kun-san Air Base, Korea, flying F-16s with the Wolf Pack.

Colonel Bucknam is a command pilot with nearly 2,400 hoursin the A-10, AT-38, and F-16 aircraft. He is married to the for-mer Barbara Ann Russell of Norfolk, Virginia. They have twochildren: eight-year-old Elaine and six-year-old John.

xii

Preface

This book examines the role that theater-level commandersin the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of airpowerover Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end of 1995.It also uncovers factors explaining why top UN and NATOcommanders in the region acted as they did. The central the-sis of this study is that the commanders needs to balance thevarious responsibilities inherent in command powerfullyaffected their actions when they tried to influence the use ofairpower. Stress on these commanders was greatest when theyfelt forced to make trade-offs that put their forces at risk with-out a corresponding payoff in terms of mission accomplish-ment. In attempting to strike the proper balance between mis-sion accomplishment, acceptable risk, and obedience to civilianpolitical control, commanders drew on their own expertise andthat of their staffs. Not surprisingly then the traditional divi-sion between soldiers and airmen over the utility of airpowermanifested itself in a split dividing UN army generals fromsenior NATO airmen. That split also helps to explain the com-manders actions.

Because this case is presented in a chronological fashion, itoffers a coherent account of Operation Deny Flightthe NATOair operations over Bosnia from April 1993 until December1995. From start to finish, theater-level commanders acted asmore than mere executors of policy. They helped to definetheir own missions, strove to control the use of airpower, andgenerally struggled to maintain operational autonomy so theycould fulfill their responsibilities for mission accomplishmentat acceptable levels of risk to their forces.When people are killed in military service, there is a power-

ful need to justify their deaths and to understand why theydied. Even in World War II, where the cause was manifestlyjust and where the stakes were high, good commanders ago-nized over the rectitude of decisions that led to the deaths oftheir troops. The Academy Award-winning film Saving PrivateRyan illustrated this point well. Actor Tom Hanks played CaptJohn Miller, an Army officer who survived the D day landingsof World War II. While the Allies were attempting to secure

xiii

their foothold on Europe, Miller was tapped to lead a squad ofsoldiers on a seemingly impossible mission to find and retrievea private whose three brothers had been killed in combat. Inone poignant scene, at the end of a long, grueling day CaptainMiller sits with a sergeant in a dark, shattered building. Thetwo laughingly reminisce about a particularly amusing youngsoldier who had served with them months earlier during com-bat in Italy. Suddenly, Miller turns somber. Reflecting on a sol-dier who died in the Italian campaign, Miller explains to thesergeant: Ya see, when you end up killing one of your men,you tell yourself it happened so you could save the lives of twoor three or 10 others. Maybe a hundred. . . . And thats howsimple it is. Thats how you rationalize making the choicebetween mission and men. The audience is left knowing thatthe captain is not entirely satisfied with his rationale, but itworked. It justified the deaths of the captains forces.

Imagine, then, the difficulty of rationalizing the loss of onesforces in military actions where nothing is accomplished, whereno vital interest is at stake, or where the cause is ambiguous. Tomany observers, that was the situation in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. It was difficult to explain how events in the Balkansrelated to the national interests of the United States, Britain,France, Canada, or any of the other nations involved in the effortto remedy the humanitarian disaster that accompanied thebreakup of Yugoslavia. The use of force seemed to serve littlepurpose, and outside observers who spent time in Bosniareported atrocities by all three warring factions: Bosnian Mus-lims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. That moral ambi-guity and the lack of a compelling national interest translatedinto an intolerance for costs, a mental attitude that character-ized the policies of Western nations as they intervened inBosnia. Of course, commanders sent to the region were informedby political leaders back home that costs, such as collateraldamage, spent resources, and most importantly, friendly casual-ties, were to be avoided.

And so the situation festered unhappily through 1992, 1993,and 1994. An inadequate force of peacekeepers led by Europeannations did what they could to dampen the fighting. Meanwhile,to protect the Bosnian Muslims, the United States threatened

xiv

to bomb the Bosnian Serbs, who were widely seen as the insti-gators of the war in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs could easilyretaliate against the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, so governmentsof nations providing those peacekeepers strongly opposed bomb-ing. Before long NATOs airpower was checked by Bosnian Serbthreats against UN peacekeepers.

In the summer of 1994, things were going badly for the UN,and the Bosnian Serbs became more aggressive in threateningNATO aircraft enforcing the UN-declared no-fly zone overBosnia. Washington grew increasingly frustrated as leadersthere struggled unsuccessfully to forge an effective policy forBosnia that would be politically acceptable at home and com-patible with the approach of Americas friends and allies inNATO and the UN. Throughout that autumn, the prospects forsuccessful intervention appeared to grow ever dimmer, and byDecember, it seemed likely that the UN peacekeepers wouldhave to be pulled out of Bosnia. That was expected to be amessy operation that would precipitate an even bloodier civilwar than Bosnia had experienced up to that point. Yet, 10months later, a NATO bombing campaign played an importantpart in helping Amb. Richard C. Holbrooke achieve a negoti-ated end to the war in Bosnia. While much has been writtenabout the war in Bosnia and the efforts to end it throughdiplomacy and peacekeeping, this book is the first to analyzethe significant role of military commanders in influencing theuse of airpower during Operations Deny Flight and DeliberateForce, which lasted from April 1993 until September 1995.

For some policy makers and editorialists, airpowerso aptlyemployed in the 1991 Gulf Warhad always promised a quick,clean, and cheap solution to the problem in Bosnia. To thisday some of them believe airpower could have ended the warin Bosnia had it been used properly early on. However, for thevast majority of professional military officers, Bosnia seemedthe least propitious environment for using airpower. For thislatter group, airpower was just one of several necessary ele-ments in a confluence of events leading to an end to the warin Bosnia.

One reason Bosnia presented a difficult environment foremploying airpower is that the intervening nations could not

xv

come to consensus on an appropriate approach to the war inBosnia. Should they try peacekeeping? Should they try a moremuscular form of intervention, such as peace enforcement? Orshould they coerce the warring factions through aerial bomb-ing? Intervening powers could not agree, and the questions ofwhether, when, and how to employ airpower became inextri-cably intertwined with debates over policy for Bosnia.

Because of the disagreement in the international politicalarena, military commanders were dragged deeper into politicalstruggles than they, or some observers, believed appropriate.According to the precepts of democracy, especially the conceptof civilian control of the military, political leaders set policy and,where appropriate, military leaders carry it out. That tidy modeldid not pertain to Western intervention in Bosnia. To be sure,military commanders tried to be responsive to their civilianbosses. However, when those bosses disagreedthat is, whenpolitical leaders in the UN, NATO, and within individual nationsdelivered conflicting guidancemilitary commanders in thefield were left to decide what to do. Time and again, as com-manders tried to reconcile their conflicting policy guidance,they confronted the choice between taking action and avoidingunnecessary risks to their troops. When the mission wasunclear, the objectives ill defined, or chances for successseemed dubious, the imperative to avoid casualties weighedheavily in the balance. How could risks be justified when theconsequences of military action were so much in doubt? Thefollowing account challenges some popular assumptionsabout military leaders, their motivations, and the state of civil-military relations during the conflict in Bosnia. For instance,the supposed American sensitivity to casualtiespurportedlyborn of experience in Vietnamcould be seen in the behaviorof Belgian, French, and British commanders as well.

xvi

Acknowledgments

This research would not have been possible had senior lead-ers in the US Air Force not believed in the value of higher edu-cation for serving officers. It has been my great fortune to bepart of an organization that invests so generously in its people.My special thanks go to the faculty at the School of AdvancedAir and Space Studies for selecting me to pursue my work atKings College, especially Col Phillip Meilinger, who steered metoward London, Col Robert Owen, who supported my use of thevaluable information his team compiled for the Balkans AirCampaign Study (BACS), and Prof. Hal Winton, for his con-stant support and stellar example of scholarship. The menand women at the US Air Forces Historical Research Agencywere a great help during my research with the BACS archivalmaterial, and, in particular, I owe Lt Col Rick Sargent a bigthanks for making my time with the BACS Collection so prof-itable.My deep, sincere, and personal thanks go to Phil Sabin, my

advisor. His patience, high standards, thought-provoking views,and occasional gentle prodding helped to guide me throughthe travails of research. Though I am solely responsible for anydefects or limitations of this study, its merits owe much toPhils mentoring. I would also like to acknowledge the superbfaculty of the War Studies Department. My main regret is thatthe demands on both their time and mine kept me fromspending more hours with them than I did. The chief of the AirStaffs Airpower Workshop acted as an adjunct faculty for mylearning, and I would particularly like to thank Group CaptainsAndy Lambert and Stuart Peach for including me in their intel-lectually stimulating work. In addition, I want to express myappreciation to Chris Hobson, senior librarian at the JointServices Command and Staff College, Bracknell, for his friendlyassistance.

A glance through the footnotes and bibliography wouldreveal the enormous debt I owe to the many military officers Iinterviewed for this studytoo many to recognize individuallyhere. Often their candor was startling, and their enthusiasm

xvii

for my research was an encouraging sign to me of the worth ofmy chosen topic.My deepest affection and gratitude go to my wife Barbara for

her friendship and support throughout this unique and chal-lenging endeavor.

xviii

Chapter 1

Introduction

This thin edge between what is appropriate for the militaryto decide and what the civilians decide is a constantly shift-ing kaleidoscope in history, depending on the circumstancesand political factors. It is the core of the decision on whenyou use airpower.

Amb. Richard C. HolbrookeInterview, 24 May 1996--

This study focuses on the influence theater-level command-ers had on the use of airpower in Bosnia during Deny Flightthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air operationover Bosnia between April 1993 and December 1995. In par-ticular, the aim here is to examine how theater-level command-ers in the United Nations (UN) and NATO affected the use ofairpower and, to the extent possible, to explain why they actedas they did. This is the first in-depth, academic study of DenyFlight as a whole.Military influence on the use of force has often been assumed

but not researched, according to Richard Betts, in his study ofpost-1945 interventions: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold WarCrises.1 Betts broke new ground and found that senior US mil-itary officers have generally been less influential than widelybelieved in decisions over whether to use force. But, when itcame to the question of how to intervene, Betts concluded thatmilitary leaders jealously protected what they saw as their pre-rogative for control over operational matters.2 A decade afterBettss pioneering work, further research by author David H.Petraeus into military influence on the use of force showedthat the military has been far more influential in decisionsover how force is used than whether it is used.3 Moreover,Petraeus found that theater commanders had the greatestimpact when they submitted plans that satisfied the objec-tives of the decision makers in Washington.4 Petraeuss workconsidered intervention decision making prior to 1987, just

1

when congressionally legislated defense reorganization gavetheater commanders a stronger role in controlling decisionsover the use of force.5

A hypothesis tested in this study is that theater-level com-manders were influential in affecting decisions over the use ofairpower in Bosnia, rather than being mere executors of pol-icy. Theater-level commanders are defined here as militarycommanders responsible for a given theater of operations andtheir principal subordinate commanders.6 A theater comman-ders job is to help plan military options to obtain policy objec-tives and, when directed, to translate military actions intopolitical objectives.7 If theater-level commanders sometimesplayed a leading role in shaping policy, rather than just plan-ning for and executing policies on the use of force, it would beinteresting to know why they did so. Some observers have citedthe apparent risk-averse nature of the American military,largely ascribed to experiences of the Vietnam War, as the rootcause for military transgressions into policy decisions.8

Indeed, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen ColinPowell, was a prime example of the Vietnam generation of offi-cers, and his opposition to US intervention in Bosnia has beenscrutinized by commentators interested in civil-military rela-tions.9 However, Petraeus noted that the US militarys increasedreluctance to intervene abroad after Vietnam was an intensifi-cation of existing attitudes rather than a newfound cautious-ness.10 This suggested the basis for risk aversion lay in moreenduring elements of the military profession. Another hypoth-esis tested here, then, is that the role UN and NATO theater-level commanders chose to play, when acting as more thanjust executors of policy in Bosnia, was rooted in military pro-fessionalism and can be explained, in part, in terms of com-manders special expertise and responsibility as managers ofviolence.

The central question of this study is how did theater-levelcommanders in the UN and NATO influence the use of air-power in Bosnia? To analyze this military influence, first con-sider several subsidiary questions. First, what patterns werethere to the military positions on using airpower in Bosnia?Were American commanders more apt to push for forceful

2

RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND

measures than officers from other nations? Were Army gener-als consistently more or less willing than Air Force generals tosupport the use of airpower? Second, what were the primaryfactors that shaped the various military attitudes toward usingairpower? Specifically, how well do expertise and responsibilitytwo elements of military professionalismexplain the deci-sions and actions of the theater-level commanders? Third, howwere the demands for impartiality and proportionality recon-ciled with traditional military principles of the objective, offense,mass, and surprise? Fourth, what methods did military lead-ers use to exert their influence? To what extent were militaryattempts to influence the use of force confined to traditional orprescribed military roles, and when, if ever, did military lead-ers seek unconventional means of influencing policy? Didcommanders work strictly through the chains of command?Did subordinate commanders follow policy decisions andorders from above so as to implement policy, or did they try toaffect the shape of policy? Finally, what happened? In whatways did military advisors and commanders succeed or fail ininfluencing the use of airpower? How was airpower used?

Existing LiteratureOf the books, articles, and other studies on the war in

Bosnia, few focus on Deny Flight, and none takes militaryinfluence on the use of airpower as its central theme. However,other works touch upon the topic studied here and are dividedhere into three categories according to the primary focus takenby their authors: political and diplomatic, UN military, andairpower. Lord David Owen recorded important elements ofthe debates about using airpower in Bosnia in BalkanOdyssey, the detailed accounting of his role as the EuropeanUnions (EU) principal negotiator to the InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).11 Despite hisnumerous references to airpower, though, Lord Owen was pri-marily concerned with providing an accurate and detailedaccount of the attempts by the ICFY to produce a negotiatedsettlement in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, in his book heunderstandably gave pride of place to the role of political lead-ers rather than to operational commanders. However, Owen

3

INTRODUCTION

provided sporadic glimpses of theater commanders serving theUnited Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Of particularinterest here, he noted the political-military friction in early1994 between Gen Jean Cot, the overall force commander, andsenior civilian officials with the UN, including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, over the control of airpower.12

Lord Owen also delivered a snapshot of the tension between LtGen Sir Michael Rose, the UN commander in Bosnia during1994, and US officials over the need for suppressing the BosnianSerb surface-to-air missile threat in November 1994.13 Owencaptured the issue well in the brief coverage he gave to it, buthis anonymous references to NATO missed the important roleplayed by the alliances two theater-level commanders in the

4


Left to right (foreground): Lt Gen Bertrand de Lapresle, UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose

region, Lt Gen Michael Ryan and Adm Leighton Smith. Overall,Balkan Odyssey is a valuable reference book that details inter-national diplomacy in the region, thus establishing part of thebroader context for viewing theater-level commanders strug-gles to control airpower.

Dick Leurdijks The United Nations and NATO in FormerYugoslavia, 19911996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force focusedmore on international efforts to use force in Bosnia thanBalkan Odyssey.14 Leurdijks book also presented the UN per-spective of the conflict, thus complementing the Europeanviewpoint offered by Lord Owen.15 Leurdijk reconstructedevents and important decisions related to the UNs safe areapolicy in Bosnia and NATOs use of airpower. Though full ofinsights into the give-and-take amongst the various nations inNATO, Leurdijk diplomatically sidestepped or downplayed

5

INTRODUCTION

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, British army, commander of Bosnia-HerzegovinaCommand, 1994 (right), shown with US military official Lt Gen Joseph Ashy,USAF, commander AIRSOUTH, 199294

Photo by Tim Ripley

major points of friction that lay at the heart of debates overNATOs use of airpower in Bosnia.16 This masked some of thetension that existed within NATO and glossed over significantstrains in civil-military relations within the UN. Still,Leurdijks work served as a ready reference for documentationon NATO decisions to use airpower in Bosnia.

Amb. Richard Holbrookes memoir, To End a War, told oneside of the story about disputes he had with Adm LeightonSmith, the theater commander of forces in NATOs southernregion, while Holbrooke was serving as assistant secretary ofstate for European and Canadian affairs. Holbrooke wantedmore control over NATO bombing during his coercive diplo-macy with the Serbs in September 1995, but Smith resistedinterference in operational matters from outside the chain ofcommand. Holbrooke recognized the admirals responsibilityfor the lives of NATO airmen, but he interpreted Smiths claimthat NATO was running out of targets during the DeliberateForce bombing campaign to mean: Smith did not wish to letthe bombing be used by the negotiators, and would decidewhen to stop based on his own judgment.17 The thrust ofHolbrookes account was that for his important negotiationshe needed some control over the coercive sticks being used,and Admiral Smith was overly cautious in resistingHolbrookes inputs into bombing decisions.

James Gow, research officer in the Centre for DefenceStudies at the University of London, proposes as his centralthesis in Triumph of the Lack of Will that the internationalcommunity could have intervened before the summer of 1995to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia.18 Echoing a notesounded by Lord Owen, Gow argued that had there been suf-ficient international political will to use force to impose theVance-Owen Peace Plan in the spring of 1993or to imposesuccessive settlement plans thereafterthen much of the vio-lence over the next two and one-half years probably couldhave been avoided. Gow went further than Leurdijk in detail-ing the problems of dual key command and control overNATO airpower, and the friction generated between UN mili-tary commanders and their civilian superiors over the lattersreluctance to use force.19 He also gave a fuller account of the

6


divisions within NATO over air strikes, though, for the mostpart, he focused on differences between the nations ratherthan on the tensions between civilian and military leaders, or thedivisions within the various military organizations involved.20 Ofsignificance to this study, Gow analyzed the change of heart byGen Sir Michael Rose after the failed attempt to use airpower

7

INTRODUCTION

Lt Gen Rupert Smith, British army, UN commander in Bosnia, 1995Photo by Tim Ripley

effectively at Gorazde in April 1994.21 Of General Rose, Gownoted, Like any good commander, his loyalty was with histroops: if the UN could not be relied on to back him and theforce in critical moments, then for the sake of the soldiersmorale and credibility it was simply better not to move to a useof force.22 Gow has also described how Roses successor, GenRupert Smith, precipitated a hostage crisis for the UN thatultimately helped to make a NATO air campaign in Bosnia aviable option.23 Chapter 7 of this study builds on the founda-tion set by Gow.

In contrast to Gow, Jane Sharp, a senior research fellow inthe Centre for Defence Studies at Kings College in London,England, took a highly critical view of General Rose in herreport: Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion. For Sharp, Roseconsistently acted as a surrogate for the British government,and, together their concern for British peacekeepers in Bosniaand alleged sympathy toward the Serbs led them to do every-thing within their power to block NATO air strikes.24 ThoughGow and Sharp believed General Rose played an importantrole in reducing the likelihood of the UNs use of airpower,Sharp saw greater continuity in Roses reluctance to takeenforcement action against the Bosnian Serbs. Sharps praisefor General Smith reinforced Gows argument about Smithsrole in paving the way for NATO air strikes in Bosnia.25 Overall,however, Sharp downplayed the dangers UN forces faced when-ever NATO used airpower, and she did not address legitimateconcerns of UN commanders responsible for those forces.

Two works on political-military interaction during DenyFlight shed a little light on the influence of theater-level com-manders in affecting policy and the use of airpower in Bosnia.Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting of the British army servedas Lord Owens first military advisor in Geneva. AlthoughMesservy-Whiting left his post in Geneva in August 1993, justafter NATO authorized air-to-ground operations in Bosnia, herecorded General Cots role in establishing a NATO liaison ele-ment to compensate for the lack of airpower expertise withinthe UN.26 In a broader look at civil-military relations, MichaelWilliams argued that France and the UK, rather than the UNSecretariat, tended to define UNPROFORs operational mis-

8


sion.27 Williams, who served as director of information andsenior spokesman for UNPROFOR, also claimed that Britishand French officers effectively restricted UNPROFORs missionto humanitarian assistance.28Williams was in a good positionto draw his conclusions but gave few details to support them.

The second category of literature on intervention in Bosniadescribes the UNs peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, thus pro-viding a ground view of events rather than an airmans per-spective. Firsthand accounts by commanders during the earlystages of the UNs presence in Bosnia give excellent insightsinto the ad hoc workings of UNPROFOR and the scope for ini-tiative and influence afforded to commanders by the UN head-quarters lax oversight and its inability to manage events so faraway from New York.29 UNPROFORs first commander, GenSatish Nambiar of India, particularly praised the French forbringing to Bosnia five times the number of armored person-nel carriers authorized by the UN.30 Canadas Maj Gen LewisMacKenzie, the first UN commander in Bosnia, recounted hisJuly 1992 role in securing extra firepower for Canadian peace-keepers by working around the UN bureaucracy and dealingwith his own government:

The UN never did authorize us to bring the missiles for the TOW [anti-tank weapon]. We were authorized to bring the vehicle [it was mountedon]. In the end, we cheated and brought the missiles anyway. Can youimagine telling soldiers to bring the weapon but not the ammunition?We were also told we could bring mortars, but not high-explosiveammunitiononly illuminating rounds to help us see at night. Weignored that order also. (Emphasis added)31

Interestingly, these early UN commanders had next to nothingto say on the topic of airpower, even though a public debateabout using airpower in Bosnia was underway during theirtours of duty in late 1992 and early 1993. When they did com-ment on possible air operations, their views were mixed. InJuly 1992, MacKenzie urged Nambiar to refuse offers for closeair support, writing the use of air power on our behalf wouldclearly associate us with the side not being attacked, andthereafter we would very quickly be branded an interventionforce, as opposed to an impartial peacekeeping force.32 GenPhilippe Morillon of France commanded UN troops in Bosnia

9

INTRODUCTION

after they had been given a more muscular mandate underchapter 7 of the UN Charter. In his memoir, Morillons onlyremark about airpower was more positive than MacKenzies.It is not sufficient to be passively protected against the threats,it is necessary to be able to make them stop by responding tothem . . . against artillery, the use of aviation is essential.33

However, Morillon, like the other early commanders, left theformer Yugoslavia before NATO airpower was ready for air-to-ground missions in Bosnia.

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont of Belgium succeeded GeneralMorillon, and Briquemont had much more to say about NATOairpower in his memoir, Do Something, General! 34 The title ofhis book characterized the specificity of the political guidancegiven to Briquemont and his superior, General Cot of France,during most of their time in Bosnia.35 They were the first UNgenerals to exercise some influence on the use of airpower inBosnia, as is discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5 of thisstudy. However, no bombs fell while either of them served withthe UN. Briquemonts replacement, General Rose, also wroteabout his experiences as head of the UNs Bosnia-HerzegovinaCommand.36 Though generally restrained in his remarksabout the limitations of airpower37 during and just after histour in Bosnia, in his memoir Rose vented some of the frus-tration from his run-ins with the theater-level commanders inNATO who wanted to use airpower more aggressively.38 Rosesbook also gave his version of the large role he played in shap-ing NATO air action through the end of 1994a topicaddressed in chapters 5 and 6 of this study.

In Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, Jan Honig and NorbertBoth revealed the divergence of views between the two princi-pal UN commanders, French general Bernard Janvier and hissubordinate British commander in Bosnia, Gen Rupert Smith,during 1995.39 During the spring of 1995, UN commandersdisagreed over whether to take more forceful action in Bosnia,including air strikes. Of special interest were the authors rev-elations about the role of Rupert Smith in helping statesmenin the UN and NATO confront the impossibility of simultane-ously attempting to do peacekeeping and enforcement.40 ThoughHonig and Both provided excellent evidence and analysis on

10


11

Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Belgian army, commander of Bosnia-HerzegovinaCommand from July 1993 to January 1994

Photo by Tim Ripley

the role of UN commanders in influencing the use of airpowerin Bosnia, that was not the principal focus of their book. Theydid not discuss the role of NATO commanders, and in the finalfootnote of the book, the authors erroneously concluded, airattacks, which the Clinton administration so favoured andexecuted, proved relatively ineffective in September 1995. TheNATO air forces quickly ran out of targets and, in 750 attackmissions, bombed the same 56 targets over and over again.41

Such a misconception by these otherwise well-informed schol-ars was indicative of the paucity of information on NATO airoperations available at the time they wrote. Another book onSrebrenica by investigative journalist David Rohde, providedsupplementary evidence and worthwhile analysis of the rolesplayed by the top UNPROFOR officials in decisions over theuse of airpower during the summer of 1995.42

Hans-Christian Hagmans PhD thesis, UN-NATO OperationalCooperation in Peacekeeping, 19921995, examined theefforts by the two international organizations to work together

12


Gen Jean Cot, French army, commander of UNPROFOR from July 1993 toMarch 1994

Photo by Tim Ripley

in Bosnia.43 In 1994, Hagman was a staff officer withUNPROFOR. For that reason he was an authoritative source onUNPROFORs views on the use of airpower, and he marshaledsome of the staff analysis he himself produced as evidence forhis research. Because his focus was on peacekeeping ratherthan on enforcement, he devoted very little attention toNATOs responsibility to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia.Moreover, throughout the thesis, the term air strike is oftenpreceded by the word punitive or followed by the word retribu-tion. Air attacks, other than close air support requested by theUN, were virtually illegitimate in Hagmans view, because oneof his key assumptions was that NATO air operations weresubordinate to UNPROFORs mission. As such, airpower wasreally meant to be supporting UN peacekeeping. That was oneview of what NATO should have been doing in Bosnia, but, asHagman noted, NATO officers held different views.

Only a handful of works have focused specifically on air-power in Bosnia; however, in research theses and reports pro-duced after Deny Flight, several air force officers took an alter-native view from the one taken by Hagman of NATOs role overBosnia. According to Maj George Kramlinger, in SustainedCoercive Air Presence (SCAP), from February 1994 onward,NATO was in a struggle with the UN over whether to coerce theBosnian Serbs.44 As with the other researchers, Kramlingercaptured the high points of Deny Flight, but did not dwell onor analyze decisions over the use of airpower. Norwegian com-mentator Per Erik Solli also saw Deny Flight as an exercise incoercion rather than as a peacekeeping venture.45 Similarly, inBombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina,Maj Michael O. Beale aimed to provide an account within thepolitical and historical context of the war in Bosnia of DenyFlights evolution from constrained deterrence to more proac-tive coercion.46 By going out of his way to consider the Serbviewpoint, Beale revealed many of the complexities of usingforce in Bosnia. Finally, a pair of research reports on airpowerin coalition operations built on the assumption that NATO air-power was over Bosnia for coercion and that the UN was largelyin the way.47 In addition to their informative texts, these reportscontained useful bibliographies.

13

INTRODUCTION

One of the earliest treatments of airpower in Bosniaappeared as a book chapter in Air Vice-Marshal Tony MasonsAir Power: A Centennial Appraisal.48 The air vice-marshalsdescription of the airpower debates at the policy-making levelwas informative, and he documented the debate in Britainparticularly well. At the time of the books writing though,NATO and the UN had used airpower primarily to enforce theno-fly zone over Bosnia, and NATO attempts to affect the fight-ing on the ground were just beginning. Masons later contri-butions on the use of airpower over Bosnia have been mostlytheoreticalextracting the broader lessons about using air-power in peace-support operations.49 Therefore, while Masonidentified and discussed issues such as proportionality,impartiality, and consentwhich lay at the heart of the air-power disputeshe did so in an attempt to generalize from theexperiences of Bosnia, rather than to document the actions ofthe theater-level commanders.

Tim Ripley, a journalist and photographer who covered mil-itary operations in the former Yugoslavia, purveyed a solidoverview of Deny Flight in his book, Air War Bosnia.50 The booksupplemented Ripleys many magazine articles,51 providing awealth of detailed information about air operations duringDeny Flight.52

Col Robert Owen headed a team of researchers to producethe Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) sponsored by AirUniversity, the center for professional military education inthe US Air Force. The BACS report is the most comprehensivework on the planning and execution of Operation DeliberateForcethe brief NATO bombing campaign in late August andSeptember of 1995. Though the study deals primarily withDeliberate Force, which was technically a part of Deny Flight,it also reveals many previously unpublished aspects of DenyFlight stretching back to 1993. The message of the report isthat airpower played a significant role in coercing the BosnianSerbs to comply with UN and NATO demands, thus ending thethree and one-half-year siege of Sarajevo and paving the wayfor the Dayton peace talks. Because the study was directed byand for the US Air Force, its strengths are its practical focusand its wealth of information from American sources. These

14


strengths, however, tend to eclipse the role played by UN advi-sors and commanders in influencing the use of airpower, andthe study does not analyze events before the Pale air strikes inMay 1995. Two summary articles appeared in AirpowerJournal,53 and a final report was published in 2000.54

15

INTRODUCTION

Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, French army, commander of UN Peace Forces, 1995Photo by Tim Ripley

MethodThis study employs a single case study method befitting a

contemporary history. The techniques of identifying, access-ing, ordering, and evaluating evidence that one would employfor writing history were enriched with interviews and first-hand observations.55 This single case was addressed becausethe use of airpower over Bosnia fits what Robert Yin called anextreme or unique caseto be used when a situation is sorare that any single case is worth documenting and analyz-ing.56 Deny Flight is worth documenting and analyzing for anumber of reasons. Others have studied it in order to drawtheoretical lessons about the employment of airpower in peacesupport activities,57 but no one has yet studied the roles of thetheater-level commanders and their influence on the use ofairpower. Deny Flight was unique in that divisions at the polit-ical level within the UN, within NATO, and between the UNand NATO made it impossible for political authorities in eitherthe UN or NATO to give clear instructions to their theater com-manders about the objective for employing airpower. As isargued at the outset of chapter 4, this left the operational com-manders a great deal of leeway in helping their political mas-ters sort out who would control NATO airpower, and to whatend. Moreover, the divided command chain between the UNand NATO left army generals serving with the UN to contendwith senior NATO airmen about how to use airpowera strug-gle for control that has been ongoing for many years.

To test the hypotheses on the influence of theater-level com-manders, this study endeavors to find the origins of the plansthey used, the objectives served by those plans, and the com-manders methods of and success in promoting their plans. Foruses of airpower that were responses to provocations ratherthan planned operations, this study attempts to determinewho made the targeting decisions and how targeting choiceswere constrained in advance. To determine the role that expert-ise and command responsibility played in affecting the actionsand decisions of commanders, commanders were asked toexplain their concerns and frustrations. They also were askedif there were any actual or potential issues over which theyconsidered resigning. More importantly, in evaluating com-

16


manders actions, this study looks for patterns reflecting theirapproaches to using airpower and checked for changes overtime. Interviews and documentary evidence sought to estab-lish the causes of the apparent patterns and any changes. Inanalyzing evidence, the focus is on cases where commandresponsibilities and military expertise were likely to lead tocourses of action different from those predicted if other factorswere driving the commanders decisions; for example, nationalpolitical pressures, peacekeeping doctrine, personal advance-ment, and UN or NATO organizational biases.

Evidence for this case study was gathered from pressaccounts, secondary studies of Deny Flight and UNPROFOR,investigative journalists accounts, memoirs, and transcriptsfrom press conferences and press releases from the WhiteHouse, the Pentagon, NATO headquarters in Brussels, andAllied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. The aca-demic version of Lord Owens encyclopedic CD-ROM compan-ion to Balkan Odyssey provided useful data, as did thearchival holdings for the BBC/Discovery Channel program,Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, held at the Liddell Hart Archives,Kings College, University of London. Sources included UNdocuments, including records of Security Council debates,resolutions, and reports from the secretary-general.58 Alsoinformation was drawn from US congressional and UnitedKingdom (UK) parliamentary reports, unclassified portions ofmilitary studies (mainly US), organizational histories, brief-ings, and reports. Extensive travel in Britain, Belgium,Germany, France, Italy, and the US to interview diplomats,NATO and UN staff officers, and participantspeacekeepersand pilotsallowed identification of important events, majordecision points, and actors involved in shaping Deny Flight.Theater-level commanders and other senior officials in the US,UK, France, and Belgium were interviewed. Accessing Frenchsources and securing and conducting interviews in Parismeant learning French. In all, over 60 separate interviewswere conducted, roughly half of them with general officers oradmirals. Two separate two-week-long visits to the US AirForce Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) were made to con-duct documentary research and to review oral histories held in

17

INTRODUCTION

the BACS collection. The second of those trips netted over 100pages of notes from classified sources, which were reviewed forclassification and then declassified as necessary.

In five of the interviews conducted, including the interviewswith General Janvier and Air Force general James BearChambers, the limitations of interview data were reducedsomewhat because the interviewees kept journals and otherdocumentary evidence from their tours of duty, and theyreferred to those notes during the interviews. In addition, aninterview with the commander of NATO air forces for thesouthern region, Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, was based on a detailedclassified briefing, and the redacted transcript of the interviewcontained 66 pages of text accompanied by more than 40 over-head slides. It included a verbatim mission statement from theNorth Atlantic Council, concepts of operations for differenttypes of missions, and air orders of battle for the Balkanstates. Interviews with principal decision makers also revealedinformation unlikely to be captured in documents, such asdetails of important meetings, briefings, and phone calls.When several individuals from different organizations withpotentially different interests at stake provided similaraccounts of events that were also consistent with publiclyavailable information, the information was considered reliable.Where accounts differed, interviewees were invited to explainthe apparent contradictions or to elaborate on the differencesin perspective. Sometimes this helped to clarify what tookplace. In other cases this resulted in conflicting or incompleteversions of what had occurred. The text and endnotesthroughout this study indicate where differing accounts of thesame events were not reconciled or where alternative explana-tions should be considered. Unfortunately, some of the offi-cials interviewed spoke only on the condition of anonymity.Others asked to see the work before agreeing to be cited byname. Both the anonymous interviewees and those who mightbe named later are cited in the endnotes as Military Official A,MOD Official B, and so on. Regrettably, Gen Rupert Smith, theUN commander in Bosnia during 1995 was not interviewed.Given General Smiths pivotal role, the absence of an interviewmay have implications for the absolute reliability of certain

18


19

Lt Gen James Bear Chambers was the first director of NATOs Combined AirOperations Center as a theater-level commander.

judgments. However, General Smiths NATO counterpartswere consulted and, at his suggestion, so were some of hissubordinates. The consistency of these supporting interviewslends credence to the findings.

This study assumes that all theater-level commanders weresubjected to political pressures from their respective nationalcapitals.59 All of the commanders in the UN and NATO weresure that other commanders were receiving guidance fromhome, though most of them denied receiving explicit ordersthemselves.60 In NATO, direct political pressure probably didnot reach below the regional commander, the four-star admi-ral in charge of Allied Forces, South (AFSOUTH). However, thisstudy also assumes the two- and three-star Air Force generalswho were subordinate to the AFSOUTH commanders wouldhave been aware of guidance from Washington.

StructureChapter 2 discusses background theory concerning military

influence on the use of airpower. It first explores the findingsof Betts and Petraeus on the subject of military influence onthe use of force and then goes on to propose a theoretical basisfor military demands for autonomy in operational matters,focusing on the special expertise and responsibility command-ers have for managing violence. Chapter 2 also examines thecountervailing political controls that constrain a commandersautonomy when using airpower. The chapter ends with a briefdiscussion of the traditional division between soldiers and air-men over the utility and control of airpower.

Chapter 3 briefly describes the background to Deny Flight,giving special attention to the national policies of the US, theUK, and France for using airpower in Bosnia. The organizingprinciple of chapters 4 through 9 is chronological, with thebreak points between chapters determined by changes of UNcommanders in Bosnia or turning points in the missions ofeither UNPROFOR or the Deny Flight air forces. Those chapterspresent the case study evidence and analysis. The final chap-ter states conclusions, answering the questions set out aboveand addressing the hypotheses of whether and why theater-levelcommanders influenced the use of airpower in Bosnia.

20


Notes

1. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977; reprinted with newpreface and epilogue, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 1.

2. Ibid., 1112.3. David H. Petraeus, Military Influence and the PostVietnam Use of

Force, Armed Forces and Society 15, no. 4 (summer 1989): 495; and DavidH. Petraeus, American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study ofMilitary Influence and the Use of Force in the PostVietnam Era (PhD diss.,Princeton University, 1987), 24953.

4. Petraeus, American Military, 255.5. Some observers believed legislation went too far in empowering theater

commanders. See Robert Previdi, Civilian Control versus Military Rule (NewYork: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 123; and Christopher Bourne, UnintendedConsequences of Goldwater-Nichols: The Effect on Civilian Control of theMilitary, Essays on Strategy XIV, ed. Mary A. Sommerville (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1997), 24956.

6. The UN side focuses on the overall force commanders headquarteredin Zagreb and their subordinate commanders for operations in Bosnia. ForNATO, the focus is on officers filling the positions of Supreme AlliedCommander, Europe (SACEUR), Commander in Chief Allied ForcesSouthern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and Commander of Allied Air ForcesSouthern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH). This study also includes GeneralChambers, the first director of NATOs Combined Air Operations Center asa theater-level commander, because he was the US joint force air componentcommander until his departure in November 1994.

7. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995,III4 and III5. The UKs Defense Doctrine, published after Deny Flight, envi-sioned the planning function taking place at a higher level, though still withinput from the operational commanders. JWP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine,1.81.9.

8. Previdi, 91; Peter D. Feaver, CivilMilitary Conflict and the Use of Force,eds. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.:Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 114 and 122; RichardH. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, The NationalInterest, no. 35 (spring 1994): 317; Edward N. Luttwak, WashingtonsBiggest Scandal, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 10922.

9. Michael R. Gordon, Powell Delivers a Resounding No on UsingLimited Force in Bosnia, New York Times, 28 September 1992; Colin L.Powell, Why Generals Get Nervous, New York Times, 8 October 1992. Forclaims of a crisis in civil-military relations, see Russell F. Weigley, TheAmerican Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan toPowell, The Journal of Military History, Special Issue 57 (October 1993):2758; Kohn, 317; and Luttwak, 2933. For examples of commentatorsuncomfortable with Powells actions but who stop short of declaring a crisis,see Andrew J. Bacevich, Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction? Joint Forces

21

INTRODUCTION

Quarterly, no. 6 (autumn/winter 19941995): 7679; and Thomas E. Ricks,The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, The Atlantic Monthly280, no. 1 (July 1997): 6678.

10. Petraeus, American Military, 258.11. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Indigo, 1996).12. Ibid., 26465.13. Owen, 329.14. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia,

19911996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (The Hague: The NetherlandsAtlantic Commission, 1996).

15. The London Conference of August 1992 established the ICFY, whichwas cochaired by a UN and an EC/EU negotiator. The UN chairman wasCyrus Vance until 1 May 1993, then Thorvald Stoltenberg. The EC/EUchairman was Lord Owen until 12 June 1995, then Carl Bildt. For anoverview of NATOs role and perspective, see Gregory L. Schulte, FormerYugoslavia and the New NATO, Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 1942.

16. For instance, Leurdijk provides little discussion on the dual keycommand and control arrangements whereby NATO and the UN jointly con-trolled the authority to authorize air strikes.

17. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998),146.

18. James Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacyand the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 17.

19. Ibid., 13739 and 14954.20. Ibid., 136 and 146.21. Ibid., 151.22. Ibid.23. Ibid., 26769.24. Jane M. O. Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in

Former Yugoslavia (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993),3234 and 4246.

25. Ibid., 5054.26. Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference on Former

Yugoslavia: The PoliticoMilitary Interface, London Defence Studies 21(London: Brasseys for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1944), 16.

27. Michael C. Williams, CivilMilitary Relations and Peacekeeping(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institutefor Strategic Studies, 1998), 46.

28. Ibid.29. Maj Gen Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo

(Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993); Gen Philippe Morillon, Croire etOser: Chronique de Sarajevo (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1993); Lt Gen SatishNambiar, A Commanders Perspective on the Role of the Developing Statesin Peace Operations, in Meeting the Challenges of InternationalPeacekeeping Operations: Assessing the Contribution of Technology, ed. AlexGliksman (Livermore, Calif.: Center for Global Security Research, June

22


1998); and Col Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the BosnianConflict (London: HarperCollins, 1993).

30. Nambiar, 89.31. MacKenzie, 310.32. Ibid., 428.33. Morillon, 213.34. Lt Gen Francis Briquemont, Do Something, General! Chronique de

BosnieHerzgovine, 12 juillet 199324 janvier 1994 (Bruxelles: ditionsLabor, 1997).

35. Gen Jean Cot, Dayton ou la Porte Etroite: Genese et Avenir dunDsastre, Dernre Guerre Balkanique? ed. Jean Cot (France: ditions LHarmattan, 1996), 11338; Gen Jean Cot, LEurope et lOtan, DfenseNationale 53, no. 4 (October 1997): 8997; and Gen Jean Cot, Les Leonsde lex-Yugoslavie, Dfense, no. 65 (March 1995): 8586.

36. Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London:The Harvill Press, 1998).

37. Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, Bosnia Herzegovina 1994 - NATO Supportfor UN Wider Peacekeeping Operations, NATOs Sixteen Nations 39, no. 3(1994): 811; Idem, A Year In Bosnia: What Has Been Achieved, RUSIJournal 140, no. 3 (June 1995): 2225; Idem, A Year in Bosnia: What WasAchieved, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 3 (JulySeptember1996): 22128.

38. Rose, Fighting, 177.39. Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War

Crime (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).40. Ibid., 14159.41. Ibid., 186.42. David Rohde, A Safe Area, Srebrenica: Europes Worst Massacre Since

the Second World War (London: Pocket Books, 1997).43. Hans-Christian Hagman, UNNATO Operational Co-operation in

Peacekeeping 19921995 (PhD diss., Kings College, University of London,1997).

44. George D. Kramlinger, Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP)(Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University, Air Command and StaffCollege, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996), 4876.

45. Per Erik Solli, In Bosnia, Deterrence Failed and Coercion Worked,in Use of Air Power in Peace Operations, ed. Carsten F. Ronnfeldt and PerErik Solli, NUPI Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations Report no. 7(Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997); and Solli, UN andNATO Air Power in the Former Yugoslavia, NUPI Report no. 209 (Oslo:Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1997).

46. Maj Michael O. Beale, Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower inBosnia-Herzegovina (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).

47. Group Capt Stuart W. Peach, Royal Air Force (RAF), Air Power inPeace Support Operations: Coercion versus Coalition, MPhil thesis (DowningCollege, University of Cambridge, 1997), 7076; and Maj Peter C. Hunt,

23

INTRODUCTION

Coalition Warfare Considerations for the Air Component Commander (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 4865. Also see Matthew C. Waxman,Coalitions and Limits on Coercive Diplomacy, Strategic Review 25, no. 1(winter 1997): 3847.

48. Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, RAF, Air Power: A CentennialAppraisal (London and Washington: Brasseys, 1994), 16897.

49. Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, RAF, Operations in Search of a Title:Air Power in Operations Other than War, in Air Power Confronts an UnstableWorld, ed. Dick Hallion (London: Brasseys, 1997), 15777.

50. Tim Ripley, Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower (Osceola, Wisc.:Motorbooks International, 1996).

51. The articles by Ripley include: Operation Deny Flight, WorldAirpower Journal 16 (spring 1994): 2029; Blue Sword over Bosnia, WorldAirpower Journal 19 (winter 1994): 1825; NATO Strikes Back, WorldAirpower Journal 22 (autumn/winter 1995): 1827; Operation DeliberateForce, World Airpower Journal 24 (spring 1996): 2029; AirpowerVindicated, Flight International, 17 January 1995, 3135; Reasons forBeing, Flight International, 2430 January 1996, 2528; A Deliberate Forceon the Mountain, International Defense Review 28 (October 1995): 2730;NATOs Air CommandBacking Up the Blue Helmets, International DefenseReview 28 (November 1995): 6162; and Bosnia Mission Stretches AirborneEyes and Ears, International Defense Review 27, no. 1 (1994): 5456.

52. In 1999, Ripley published a book on intervention in Bosnia. The bookpresents a lot of new information on the ground campaigns in Bosnia andCroatia during 1995. Tim Ripley with foreword by Nik Gowing, OperationDeliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campain in Bosnia 1995 (Lancaster,England: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999).

53. Robert Owen, The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1, Air PowerJournal 11, no. 2 (summer 1997): 424; and idem, The Balkans Air CampaignStudy: Part 2, Air Power Journal 11, no. 3 (autumn 1997): 626 (hereaftercited as Owen, Balkans: Part 1, and Owen, Balkans: Part 2).

54. Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in EffectiveAir Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000).

55. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London:Sage Publications, 1984), 1820.

56. Ibid., 44.57. For instance, see Mason, Operations in Search of a Title, 15778; and

Group Capt Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson, eds., The Dynamicsof Air Power (RAF Staff College, Bracknell, UK: HMSO, 1996), 10573.

58. A valuable compendium of UN Security Council resolutions, debates,and UN secretary-general reports prior to May of 1994 is contained in DanielBethlehem and Marc Weller, eds., The Yugoslav Crisis in International Law,General Issues Part I, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 5(Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

59. Williams, 46.

24


60. General Briquemont appears to have been the exception, though hewas pressured by the European Community (EC) at a time when his coun-try, Belgium, filled the rotating post of EC president.

25

INTRODUCTION

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Chapter 2

Military Influenceon the Use of Airpower

The military in the postVietnam period have exercisedconsiderable influence over how force has been usedparticularly in those cases in which the missions have beenespecially demanding and complex, thereby increasing thedependence of civilian policy makers on military judgment,expertise, and information.

David H. PetraeusMilitary Influence and thePostVietnam Use of Force,PhD diss.,--Princeton University, 1987 -

Airpower was the central military component in the US pol-icy for intervention in Bosnia. Airpower has also been at thecore of a long-running debate in the United States over howmuch influence the military should exercise vis--vis theircivilian masters when it comes to using force.1 To frame thediscussion in this study about the influence of theater-levelcommanders on the use of airpower in Bosnia, the first sectionof this chapter briefly addresses the larger issue of militaryinfluence on the US use of force. The second section narrowsthe focus to look at political controls on the use of airpower,namely targeting controls, bombing pauses, and rules of engage-ment. In addition to the political-military dimension of con-trols on the use of airpower, soldiers and airmen have tradi-tionally held contending beliefs about how best to employ thistype of military force.2 The third section, therefore, highlightsthe major causes and consequences of the disparate militaryviews on airpower. This chapter provides a theoretical constructfor analyzing the various dimensions of the struggle by theater-level commanders to influence the use of airpower in Bosniabetween the summers of 1993 and 1995.

27

Influence and Autonomy:The US Military and the Use of Force

This section explores American military influence after 1945on when, how, and with what constraints on military auton-omy force has been used. Since World War II, American mili-tary leaders have usually played only a minor role in decisionsover whether the United States should employ military force.Once decisions to use force have been made, military influenceover how force is used has been relatively more significant.Furthermore, when force has been called for, military officershave lobbied hard to preserve their autonomy in operationalmatters. Two elements of military professionalismexpertiseand responsibilitycreate the foundation for military demandsfor autonomy. Contrary to the militarys desire for autonomy,American political leaders have felt the need to constrain oreven control the use of force in military operations since 1945.Balancing the imperatives of policy against the demands formilitary autonomy has often led to tension in civil-militaryrelations.

This study uses the word influence in a rather ordinarysense. Influence is the power to sway or affect based on pres-tige, wealth, ability, or position.3 This avoids unnecessaryrestrictions found in more technical definitions. For instance,Roger Scruton excludes coercion from the definition of influ-ence. However, if a military commander attempted to coerceother military or political authorities in order to shape the useof airpower, that would certainly be of interest here.4 DennisWrong makes a distinction between intended and unintendedinfluence. The focus here is on intended influence though adopt-ing Wrongs definition would be impractical since intended influ-ence is what Wrong calls powerthe definition of which takesup two chapters of his book.5 Richard Betts defines influenceas causing decision makers to do something they probablywould not have done otherwise.6 Though generally compatiblewith the definition used in this study, Bettss definition couldbe interpreted to mean that military influence had to be causal.This would exclude military influence that served merely as acatalyst, enabler, or shaper of action that decision makerswould have taken anyway. Finally, the ordinary definition

28


adopted for this study is somewhat broader than Samuel Finersconcept of influence, which, in his typology, is the lowest levelof military intervention into politics for countries with devel-oped political cultures.7 For Finer, influence meant the effortto convince the civil authorities by appealing to their reason ortheir emotions. This level is the constitutional and legitimateone, entirely consistent with the supremacy of the civil power.8

However, Finers definition would exclude influence withinmilitary organizations themselves and would presuppose thelegitimacy of military influence. For this study, the simple def-inition of influence will work best.

Deciding to Use Force: Military Reluctance andInfluence

In the period since World War II, the American military hasbeen neither as belligerent nor as influential in intervention deci-sion making as popular stereotypes suggest.9 In fact, the militaryhas become quite the opposite of the hawkish image once popu-larized in movies and books. Writing in 1960, Morris Janowitzdescribed and decried this stereotype in his classic sociologicalportrait of the American military elite, The Professional Soldier.10

But in the recriminations over Vietnam, the limitations of themilitary mind and the military stereotype found renewed outletin the United States.11 Writing in 1973, Bernard Brodie arguedthat a Chief of Staff is one who shares with his colleagues agreat belief in the efficacy of force in dealing with recalcitrantpeoples or regimes abroad.12 Though the stereotype was cer-tainly exaggerated and far from universal, the pugnacious atti-tudes of certain military leaders of the early 1960s, especially theAir Force generals at the top of Strategic Air Command, tendedto lend credence to the popular images.13

Contrary to the view of American military leaders as belli-cose elites who have pushed their reluctant civilian mastersunwillingly into foreign interventions, military leaders havenot been particularly warlike or influential when it comes todecisions over whether or not to use force.14 That professionalmilitary officers would normally caution against using militaryforce was a point argued by Samuel Huntington in The Soldierand the State,15 and subsequent research has tended to confirm

29

MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER

Huntingtons claim.16 In the first systematic study of the mili-tarys role in intervention decision making, Richard Bettsexamined decisions during the period from 1945 until 1972.He discovered that American military leaders tended to be lessbellicose than the most aggressive civilian advisors to thepresidents.17 Moreover, military leaders tended to be leasteffective when they advocated the use of force and most effec-tive when they united in opposition to armed intervention.18 Adecade after Betts debunked the myth of military warmonger-ing, David Petraeus found that the Vietnam War had had achastening effect on the American military.19 By the late1980s, US military leaders were even less likely to advocatethe use of force than either their predecessors or the seniorcivilian advisors of the day. Thus, Petraeus concluded that Inshort, the military since 1973 had conformed more closely tothe Huntington view (originally presented in 1957) than theyhad during the period of Bettss analysis.20

How to Use Force: Options, Influence, andOverwhelming Force

As Richard Haass has argued, decisions about whether touse force should be inextricably linked to considerations aboutwhat force is available and how that force is to be used.21

Bettss study countered the bureaucratic revisionists whosuggested that military capabilities drove foreign policy.22 Healso noted that the traditional theoretical modelwherebyclearly articulated foreign policy served as a basis for militarystrategywas too neat for the real world.23 Describing the mil-itary role in foreign policy making, Betts observed that

military officials task was not simply to study a policy, deduce theappropriate strategy and forces to implement it, and recommend theresults to political leaders. Instead they were often in the positionwhere their advice on what could be achieved was to determine whatwould be achieved.24

As American involvement in Vietnam began to escalate, seniorofficers saw untested theories of limited war substituted fortheir professional advice on the use of force.25 This was espe-cially true of the bombing of North Vietnam, where a strategyof graduated pressure was employed to convince Hanois leaders

30


to abandon their support for the insurgent Vietcong guerrillasfighting in South Vietnam.26 A vignette from the outset of thebombing operations illustrated the disparate civilian and mil-itary views:

In early 1965, Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald had returnedfrom a White House meeting where, over the objections of the JointChiefs who favored heavy and decisive bombing, the civilian policymakers were planning the program of limited and graduated bombing.He reportedly told his aide that graduated response was militarilysenseless and that when the war was over, the civilians responsiblewould no longer be in office and the only group left answerable for thewar would be the military.27

Air Force plans called for hitting the entire list of 94 strategictargets in North Vietnam within a month.28 Regardless of onesviews on the wisdom of either bombing strategy, the point tobe noted here is that even when the questions of whether andhow to use force were considered together, the answers did notalways reflect the preferred military options. This left militarycommanders to implement a strategy that they believed couldnot succeed.29

As Petraeus studied the period after Vietnam, he found thatmilitary influence over how force was used surpassed theinfluence that uniformed leaders exercised on decisions overwhether force was to be used. Petraeus concluded that

the military have exercised the most influence, however, once the deci-sion to use force has been madewhen the focus has become how touse force, and when decision makers have turned to consideration ofthe options available to accomplish the objectives established by thepresident. Options are the militarys area of expertise, and expertise,particularly when concentrated in one institution, yields influence.30

Thus, with responsibility for formulating plans, the militarygains influence. In describing the militarys unique expertisein this area Petraeus averred that

the development of military options is a complex undertaking thatrequires knowledge, experience, and creativity. Detailed and timelyinformation about ones own forces is essential, as is current intelli-gence on the target of the military action. An understanding of thesystems established for planning, coordination, and command andcontrol of military operations is necessary as well. Military operations

31

MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER

are complicated affairs, and only senior military officers fully mastertheir conduct.31

These observations are axiomatic rather than lessons of anyparticular conflict, but they again underscore the importanceof expertise in giving the military influence over how force getsused.

From the Vietnam War, Army and Air Force officers drewsomewhat different lessons about the use of force. Petraeusfound that the American military emerged from Vietnam withan acute and lasting awareness of (1) the finite limits of pub-lic support for protracted military operations, (2) doubtsabout the efficacy of military force in solving certain interna-tional problems, and (3) greater disillusionment with, andheightened wariness of, civilian officials.32 The Army andMarine Corps bore the deepest scars, according to Petraeus,while the Navy was the least affected service.33 However,Petraeus did not elaborate on the US Air Force. MarkClodfelter has argued that Air Force leaders concluded fromVietnam that since Linebacker II demonstrated bombingeffectiveness, political leaders must realize that bombing canwin limited wars if unhampered by political controls.34 Thissuggested that senior Air Force officers might be just as waryof civilian officials as their Army counterparts, but they wereless pessimistic about the utility of airpower. Edward Markssstudy of the Vietnam generation of professional military offi-cers found that career officers from all of the services firmlysupported civilian supremacy, insisted on clear-cut politicaldecisions and clear objectives for using force, and wanted toknow that risks taken with American lives would be for aworthwhile purpose.35 Markss study also found that theVietnam generation of officers believed that once the militarywas given clear objectives, it should then be free from politicalinterference in achieving those aims; that is, the officersbelieved they should be given operational autonomy.36 So,while soldiers and airmen drew different conclusions aboutthe effectiveness of airpower in Vietnam, both groups agreedthe military should control decisions about how to use force infuture operations.

32


The lessons of Vietnam were reinforced by American experi-ences in Lebanon, Operation Desert Storm, and Somalia. Thesecombined experiences produced a military culture averse toengaging in small wars, and committed to ensuring rapid suc-cess whenever and wherever military force was to beemployed.37 As Frank Hoffman has pointed out, the articula-tion of this military doctrine owed much to Gen Colin Powell,who formally propounded the ideas in the 1992 NationalMilitary Strategy.38 This preferred approach to employing forcewas called Decisive Force by its authors. Less charitably,Cong. Les Aspin labeled it the all-or-nothing school ofthought.39 Aspin, who was then chairman of the House ArmedServices Committee, claimed the most important tenet of theall-or-nothing school stipulated that military force should beused only in an overwhelming fashion.40 He criticized the all-or-nothing school, which he associated with Colin Powell, andstated that his own views were more closely aligned with whathe called the limited objectives school.41 For Aspin, compel-lence and airpower lay at the heart of the limited objectivesargument, and Operation Desert Storm had demonstratedairpowers potential to deliver limited political objectives throughprecise applications of force.42 Aspins comments about how touse force, especially airpower, were made with an eye towardUS intervention in Bosnia. For now, one should note that asUS policy makers considered whether to get involved inBosnia, they were dealing with a generation of military officerswho expected the freedom to decide how to use force once thedecision to use it was made.

Theoretical Bases of Demands for OperationalAutonomy: Expertise and Responsibility

Military commanders demand autonomy in operationalmatters because they are experts in the employment of forceand are held account

Date post:	01-Oct-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	mirjanaborota
View:	16 times
Download:	2 times