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Running head: BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 1
Building Pyramids for Capital: The Precarious Role of Foreign
Workers in Calgary and Dubai
Kelsey Braun, Rahman Ismail, Joel Laforest, Ashley Millar
GEOG 553 Dr. Eliot Tretter
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 2
1.INTRODUCTION:GLOBALIZATIONANDTHELABOURMARKET 3
2.GLOBALIZINGLABOURMARKETSINCALGARY,CANADA 42.1GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:CANADA’SPRACTICE 52.2GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:ALBERTA’SPRACTICE 62.3GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:CALGARY’SPRACTICE 72.4SOCIALCONSEQUENCESOFLABOURMIGRATION:CALGARY 92.4.1TETHERING 92.4.2DEPENDENCEANDSOCIALISOLATION 102.4.3COMMODIFICATION 122.5CALGARY:PARTOFAGLOBALTREND 13
3.GLOBALIZINGLABOURMARKETSINDUBAI,UAE 133.1GLOBALLABOURMARKETS:DUBAI’SPRACTICE 143.1.1SPONSORSHIPPROGRAM 153.2SOCIALCONSEQUENCESOFLABOURMIGRATION:DUBAI 163.2.1POLARIZEDWORKFORCE 163.2.2SPATIALSEGREGATION 183.2.3EXCLUSIVERIGHTSANDINSTITUTIONS 203.2.4PERMANENTIMPERMANENCE1 213.2.5EXCLUSIVESOCIETY 23
4.GLOBALTRENDS:DUBAI,UAEANDCALGARY,CANADA 244.1USEOFFOREIGNWORKERS 254.2FOREIGNWORKERPROGRAMS:KAFALAVS.TFWP 254.3SOCIALCONSEQUENCES 264.3.1IMPERMANENCEANDCOMMODIFICATION 264.3.2TETHERING,DEPENDENCE,ANDEXPLOITATION 274.3.3SPATIALSEGREGATION 28
5.CONCLUSION 29
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 3
1. Introduction: Globalization and the Labour Market
Due to both economic and technological advances, global space is becoming increasingly
unified (Held, et. al, 1999). This global unification has been a catalyst for the flow of both people
and capital, which has had profound effects on cities through the creation of a global economy
and a global labour market (Held, et. al, 1999). This globalization, in addition to increased
autonomy of municipal governments, has initiated an inter-urban competition for capital (Knox,
1996). Cities employ various strategies to create conditions that are attractive to investors and
capital. The success of these strategies determines their position in the global hierarchy (Malecki
& Ewers, 2007). Increased productivity through the development and expansion of labour
markets is one of these strategies, as Dicken (2015) suggests that “access to knowledge and
access to labour” are crucial to being a competitive city (p. 113). Malecki & Ewers (2007)
expand on the importance of labour, arguing that cities that base their strategies strictly on
corporate networks will fail to earn their position in the global hierarchy. They argue that labour
markets act as the jumping off point for cities to make their marks (Malecki & Ewers, 2007).
Labour markets “[provide] the skilled and unskilled workers who are central to the (formal and
informal) economies of world cities” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, p. 468). Globalization and inter-
urban competition, therefore, “have added new dimensions to labour markets and labour
processes”, specifically as local labour pools are reformed to a global scale (Malecki & Ewers,
2007, p. 469).
Globalization has reformed labour markets through flexibilization. As national barriers
are broken down, cities and urban industries are given access a global pool of labour, which
increases the flexibility of supply (Rodriguez, 1986). In particular, cities are provided with a
global range of labour, which varies in terms of “knowledge and skills, wage costs, labour
productivity, and labour controllability” (Dicken, 2015, p. 113-114). Within a more flexible
labour market, cities and firms are able to employ foreign workers of various knowledge levels
and skill-sets, which enables greater specialization of labour, and therefore, increases
productivity (Dicken, 2015). Additionally, countries around the world feature differing wage
rates. Access to international labour markets allows a city to choose from the least expensive
markets available, leading to cost savings (Dicken, 2015). Similarly, the flexibility of a global
labour market increases the ability to discipline and control labour through the use of temporary
contracts (Dicken, 2015). This control is crucial to mitigating labour shortages that may arise
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from periods of intense development. The cost savings and control associated with global
flexibilization of labour has given many cities the opportunity to increase productivity, develop
advanced economies, and compete for global capital (Connell & Burgess, 2011).
Despite the economic development that globalization has facilitated, it is important to
recognize the implications the globalizing labour market has had on society (Vora, 2011).
Increasingly, foreign workers are being treated exclusively as commodities rather than as
citizens. Many of these foreign workers are often subjected to poor living and working
conditions, as well as inadequate recognition in society (Scott, 2001). Both Calgary (in Canada),
and Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)), epitomize this phenomenon.
While Dubai’s rapid development has depended and capitalized on the flexibility of
foreign labour to sustain an surging construction industry (Connell & Burgess, 2011), Calgary
has similarly used contractual foreign workers to fill local labour shortages related to local
construction, as well as regional industrial projects (De Guerre, 2007). More importantly, both
cities demonstrate how global flexibilization of labour can lead to social consequences, such as
commodification, exploitation, and social isolation.
This essay will use case studies of Calgary, Canada and Dubai, UAE to illustrate how
globalization has led cities to increase their productivity and global economic competitiveness
through labour market strategies. Specifically, the essay will analyze the use of contractual
foreign workers as one of these strategies, and the social implications it has had within the city.
2. Globalizing Labour Markets in Calgary, Canada
Calgary is both a national and global headquarters for the oil and gas industry, which has
facilitated an agglomeration of managerial, technical, and financial services related to the energy
industry. As a result, the service sector is currently the biggest economic sector in the city, with
both finance and administration forecasted to grow and remain dominant into 2017 (“Calgary
Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008). Over 82,200 jobs requiring college education
or apprenticeship training are forecasted to be created by 2017, as well as over 18,250 positions
requiring on-the-job training (“Calgary Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008).
Forecasts predict 1.2% growth in the energy sector and 4.5% growth in professional services
from 2007-2017 (“Calgary Employment Demand Forecast 2007-2017”, 2008). The growth of the
energy sector has spurred Alberta to intensify infrastructure and tourism investment (“Boom and
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 5
Bust in Alberta”, 2001). This investment has consequentially intensified the demand for
unskilled labour, especially in the construction and hospitality industries (Fudge et al., 2009). To
satisfy the demands of its growing economy, Calgary has taken advantage of temporary foreign
labour to fill low-skilled service positions and mitigate labour shortages (Ryan, Li, & Langford,
2011). Because of this, Calgary currently features one of the largest proportion of foreign-born
residents for a city of its size, at over 20% of its residents (Price, Benton-Short, 2007).
In order to understand Calgary’s use of foreign labour, it is important to recognize the
role of both Canada and Alberta in controlling the use of contractual foreign workers. For
example, because the Temporary Foreign Worker Program falls under shared federal and
provincial jurisdiction, its implementation in Calgary is a multi-scalar collaboration. As a result,
the city is restricted in its ability to resolve challenges within the program (Nakache & Kinoshita,
2010). In order to understand Calgary’s use of the foreign workers program, a brief background
on Canada’s and Alberta’s roles in the process will first be established.
2.1 Global Labour Markets: Canada’s Practice
The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) originated in Canada in the early
1970’s as a response to the shift from permanent immigration to temporary labour migration
(Fudge et al., 2009). While the program became bifurcated into highly-skilled and low-skilled
workers in the 1990s, it has recently been heavily involved with satisfying low-skilled positions,
especially within the energy sector of Alberta (Fudge et al., 2009). The TFWP has effectively
“[lowered] wages and conditions of employment” in the regional labour market (Fudge et al.,
2009, p. 43). As a result, the labour market has become more advantageous to employers because
industries have easier access to cheap and contractual labour, especially in low-technical-skill
occupations, such as construction and hospitality (Smart, 1997).
Although the TFWP reduces wages in the domestic market, many foreign workers
become dependent on these wages, as do their familial relations (through remittances). Workers
from developing countries are often willing to accept the ‘low’ Canadian standard wage because
this wage remains higher than what they might earn in their home country (Smart, 1997). This
economic incentive keeps them coming back, despite the often dismal living and working
conditions (Smart, 1997). As a result, firms throughout Canada are able to increase productivity
while lowering costs, which allows Canada and its cities to participate competitively in a global
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 6
economy (Smart, 1997). This cost-saving advantage is compelling for many industries, as is
evident in the 400% jump in the number of TFWP applications from May 2006 to May 2007
(Fudge et al., 2009). Alberta, specifically, has used the program to facilitate economic growth,
with the assistance of its federal and provincial ministries.
2.2 Global Labour Markets: Alberta’s Practice
Overall, laws governing the TFWP are set federally, but specific details are negotiated
provincially. Provincial bodies work in cooperation with Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(CIC) on migration issues in their province (De Guerre, 2007). Alberta cooperates with two
federal ministries to process admissions of temporary foreign workers (TFWs). The first federal
ministry, Human Resources & Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), issues Labour Market
Opinions (LMOs). The HRSDC verifies a labour shortage, through LMOs, to confirm the need
for TFWs and ensure jobs are not taken from Canadians. The second federal ministry,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), works in cooperation with the Alberta provincial
government to issue work permits to TFWs and address other migration issues and (De Guerre,
2007). The CIC allows skilled workers to apply for permanent residency, but restricts unskilled
workers to remaining as TFWs (De Guerre, 2007).
Additionally, there are two provincial ministries that regulate the TFWP in Alberta. The
first provincial ministry, Alberta Advanced Education & Technology, assesses TFWs with
international trade credentials to determine if they meet Alberta Journeymen standards (De
Guerre, 2007). The second provincial ministry, Alberta Employment, Immigration & Industry
(AEII), operates the TFW hotline along with HRSDC & Provincial Nominee Program. This
process is one of the steps that allows TFWs to become permanent citizens. Alberta Premier, Ed
Stelmach, created AEII in 2006 to promote “economic immigration” that would alleviate
pressures on the labour force and continue economic success (De Guerre, 2007, p. 10). Through
the implementation of these strategies, Alberta has been successful in sustaining economic
growth.
The TFWP has helped alleviate labour shortages in Alberta, especially since the province
has experienced tremendous growth throughout the last decade. In 2006, Alberta’s economy
expanded by 6.9% and created over 86,000 jobs, the best performance since 1993 (De Guerre,
2007). Approximately 1 in 6 workers found themselves employed directly or indirectly in the
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 7
energy sector (De Guerre, 2007). Alberta’s per capita GDP in 2005 was $66,275, which was
56% greater than the national average and twice as high as it was in 1995 (Ostrovsky et al.,
2008). The employment rate in Alberta reached 70% in 2004, and the province had the lowest
unemployment level in Canada at 3.4%. As a result of this growth, the province faced a labour
shortage of an unprecedented scale in Canada (De Guerre, 2007). Migrant workers responded
more intensely to this economic boom than local Albertans did (Ostrovsky, Statistics Canada, &
Analytical Studies Branch, 2008), especially with the emergence of the TFWP (De Guerre,
2007). Immigration skyrocketed, primarily due to oil and gas exports, accounting for 43% of
Alberta’s recent population growth (Ostrovsky et al., 2008). In terms of foreign workers, over
6,100 TFWs arrived in Alberta between 2006-2010 (Foster & Taylor, 2013). In 1997, the TFW
program involved only 7,473 workers in Alberta; by 2006, this number jumped to 15,172 (De
Guerre, 2007). In order to regulate this influx of workers, the province developed a system that
filters TFW by mediating between the worker and the employer.
The Alberta government has developed profiles on a number of countries to determine
the type of workers available, the level of skill the workforce possesses, and whether or not an
official “reconnaissance” mission is worthwhile (De Guerre, 2007, p. 11). Such profiles have
been conducted for Ukraine, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan. After the provincial government
informs employers when workers are found, the employers attend a hiring fair with the Alberta
government and select their own employees (De Guerre, 2007). This process is beneficial for the
employer because it ensures a higher quality of worker than a recruiter would provide, as well as
a clear understanding of the TFWs’ background. This arrangement also benefits potential TFWs
because the employer-government partnership indicates legality and greater job security (De
Guerre, 2007). Ensuring that the labour market provides an adequate pool of employees
contributes to the ability of Alberta’s major cities, such as Calgary, to flourish economically.
2.3 Global Labour Markets: Calgary’s Practice
In Calgary, the majority of TFWs are unskilled, which disproportionately distributes
them within the city’s workforce. This is especially true for visible minorities, who are “more
likely to be employed in manufacturing, accommodation/food services and other lower-tier
service industries” (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006). More than half of
employers in accommodation, food service, and arts and entertainment reported hiring temporary
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 8
foreign workers, while higher-technically-skilled occupations (oil and gas, professional,
scientific, technical services, and health care) reported employing no TFWs (Alberta et al.,
2006). Similarly, management consultants, live-in nannies, and farm labourers are in the top 10
positions filled by TFWs. In one interesting contrast, nearly 90% of the management positions
are filled by residents of the United States, while 80% of nannies are from the Philippines
(CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006). Jobs filled by foreign workers are
typically lower wage, which makes them less appealing to Canadians and more susceptible to
high turnover (Alberta et al., 2006). This phenomenon is significant because it reinforces a
division in the local labour market. This division and deskilling may generate feelings of
demoralization and stress (Wood, McGrath, & Young, 2011). In addition, this division of labour
is hardly necessary in regards to job vacancy and demand, as “only three occupations, [truck
drivers, general farm workers, and labourers in food, beverage, and tobacco industries] were
found in both the top 20 occupations for TFWs and the top 50 occupations by vacancy rates for
Alberta in 2005” (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006, p. 38). The
disproportionate distribution of TFWs within low skilled sectors of Calgary’s workforce, as
illustrated in Figure 1 and 2, leads to substantial social consequences.
Figure 2: Coal miners in Northern Alberta. Retrieved from http://www.mining.com/hd-mining-favoured-foreign-workers-over-qualified-canadians-minister-17498/
Figure 1. Foreign Construction worker in Fort McMurray. Retrieved from http://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/2014/09/23/atb-survey-finds-alberta-business-owners-split-on-tfws
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 9
2.4 Social Consequences of Labour Migration: Calgary
Although Calgary offers social capital and economic opportunity for highly skilled
workers, evidence suggests that “it’s taking [low-skilled foreign migrants] much longer to catch
up than the average Canadian” (Ryan et al., 2011, p. 51). For example, Calgary features one of
the biggest income inequalities in Canada. Between 1980 and 2005, the city’s Gini coefficient
experienced the greatest increase in Canada, jumping 81% (Mendleson, 2011). Recent
immigrants who are from a visible minority are strongly associated with low pay, concentrating
them at the bottom of Calgary’s income spectrum (Saunders & Canadian Policy Research
Networks, 2005). Many unskilled TFWs face numerous other challenges as well, such as access
to amenities, seeking cultural and recreational activities, and making social connections because
of cultural and language differences (Foster & Taylor, 2013). However, the three most prominent
issues with the TFWP are the tethering of migrant workers to particular positions/employers,
dependence and the subsequent social isolation, and the commodification of workers.
2.4.1 Tethering
The tethering of migrant workers leads to abuse and vulnerability. Legally tying migrants
to local companies and confining them to a specific location means that a TFW cannot be
promoted, transferred (even within the company), or fired-and-rehired without repeating an over
three-month-long approval process (De Guerre, 2007). Because tethering disables TFW from
leaving their position without losing their job, they become vulnerable to exploitation, dismal
conditions, and abuse. With workers tethered, some employers feel empowered and take
advantage of this vulnerability. Despite these undesirable conditions, many TFWs rely heavily
on these jobs, a fact which discourages them from leaving. Tethering consequently causes TFWs
to become dependent on their employer, which further reinforces the social isolation of workers
from society.
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2.4.2 Dependence and Social Isolation
Many TFWs become dependent on their employers, which can be socially isolating,
depending on the context. This dependence includes employer-provided orientation, information
and services (Foster & Taylor, 2013). Similarly, because workers are often housed in isolated
communities, such as the worker camps pictured in Figure 3, they often rely on their employer
for transportation to work (Smart, 1997). Without the ability to drive themselves around the city,
in addition to common language barriers, many TFWs find it difficult to develop social
relationships or integrate into the community (Smart, 1997). According to Foster and Taylor
(2013), the impermanent status of TFWs additionally weakens their connection to the geographic
community and further leads to marginalization. Essentially, TFWs are unable to establish roots
and develop a sense of home or belonging, making it difficult to advance themselves in
Calgary’s society.
It is difficult for foreign workers that enter Canada, especially TFWs, to create a similar
lifestyle to the one that they had in their country of origin (Lamba, 2003). A significant
proportion of refugees, foreign workers, and TFWs in Canada believe that they are of little value
in Canada’s labour market. Four principal variables contribute to this disenchantment with the
Canadian labour market, including former occupations, former education, number of months of
Figure 3: Work camp for workers in Alberta’s oil industry. Retrieved from http://www.cpcml.ca/images2014/Provinces/Alberta/File/110115FortMcMurrayWapasuCampKearlOilSands-JWoodhead-01.jpg
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 11
English-language training received in Canada, and number of months of training/education
obtained in Canada (Lamba, 2003). These patterns can be found more specifically in Alberta,
where foreign workers have reported being overqualified for their current job 60% of the time
(Lamba, 2003). This mismatch is most prominent among those trained as managers. While a
background in management made up 39% of the sample, only 7% were able to find employment
that was equal to their former position before their move to Canada. This phenomenon
demonstrates how insecure many foreign workers are upon their arrival to Canada, including
Calgary. Even having credentials and experience does not always help foreign workers’ secure
employment in Calgary.
Lack of professional networking ability also makes occupational advancement difficult
for foreign workers, and the professional networks that do exist might not be sufficient enough to
ensure occupational success (Lamba, 2003). For example, Lamba reports that 86% of immigrants
came with family to Canada, however, only 25% received help with finding employment from
friends, family, and ethnic-group members (Lamba, 2003). Only 3% of interviewed refugees
reported relying on ties from their former job, and only 5% reported being successful in finding
employment when using government aid (Lamba, 2003). These low numbers suggest that either
the TFWs do not have the connections that assist many local Calgarians in job searches, or that
the resources to create or discover these networks are unavailable to most TFWs. Either way,
TFWs are disadvantaged in job searches because they lack the social networks required to give
them an edge in the labour market. Additionally, many TFWs find it difficult to become
permanent Canadian residents, which further isolates them from society.
The emphasis on their temporary status also keeps TFWs from integrating into society in
Calgary. Low-skill TFWs, in particular, have difficulty qualifying for Canadian citizenship.
Alberta Federation of Labour president Gil McGowan has admitted that the "sad truth is that
most of the low-skill TFWs in question will never qualify for permanent residency” because the
government “gives preference to workers with high skills and high levels of education" (CBC
News, 2015). Of the 192,000 temporary foreign workers who entered Canada in 2011, only
29,000 “made the transition to permanent status” (Government of Canada, 2012). This
impermanence of TFWs is a key component in the flexibility of the globalization of labour, and
the ability to mitigate labour shortages created during development spikes. Taking away the
temporary aspect of the program would not offer the same flexibility for firms and industries,
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 12
and would diminish cost savings. To preserve this cost saving flexibility, Canada discourages
accepting a large number of TFWs as permanent residents. Because only a small number of
TFWs are permitted to become Canadian citizens, preference is given to those with higher
technical skills. This selection process exemplifies how TFWs are considered exclusively as a
temporary and largely disposable labour pool.
2.4.3 Commodification
While all labour is a commodity, TFWs are treated exclusively as labour and not given
agency or rights as citizens. Because the TFWP was created in response to labour shortages, it
provides foreign workers with little rights (Fudge et al., 2009). This is evident through the fact
that there is no single federal or provincial level of responsibility for enforcing contractual rights
of TFWs (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Provincial union organizations have criticized the
government for expanding the TFWP without implementing controls to protect foreign workers.
As a result, TFWs are easily exploitable. Although employers must prove an insufficient number
of Canadian citizens/permanent residents to perform these jobs, and must pay TFWs the
prevailing wage rate, the enforcement of this is inconsistent (Fudge et al., 2009). Similarly,
Employment Insurance, if received, is often cut off due to the tethering of workers to employers
(Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Although TFWs are commonly subject to this exploitation, as well
as dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs, they rarely speak out or challenge this injustice.
Substantial disincentives exist that discourage TFWs from filing complaints about
working conditions. In one study, only 14 out of 4,000 complaints that were investigated were
filed by TFWs (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). While rights are extended to TFWs on paper, in
practice these are often ignored. Government reports indicate that 75% of inspected companies in
Alberta that employed TFWs broke provincial employment rules (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010).
As TFWs are reliant and ‘tethered’ to their employers, TFWs are more likely to suffer the
abusive conditions rather than risk unemployment, especially since they are only entitled to a
single week of termination pay under the Alberta Employment Standards Code (Nakache &
Kinoshita, 2010). Because foreign workers are discouraged to assert their rights, the TFWP
continues to be used as a credulous solution to Canada’s, and especially Calgary’s, labour
shortage.
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2.5 Calgary: Part of a Global Trend
The tethering, dependence, and commodification of foreign workers is not a unique
phenomenon to Calgary. Rather, Calgary is part of a growing trend, where foreign labour is
brought in for short-term periods to fill labour-shortages in low-skilled service positions. With
many cities becoming more entrepreneurial in attempt to compete in a global economy, this trend
has become especially popular. Urban development, especially through infrastructure, is adopted
to attract firms and investment. This development leads to a temporarily high demand for
construction labour, and contractual foreign labour has given cities access to the labour supply
necessary to satisfy this demand. As a result, cities have been able to develop much more
rapidly. While Calgary has joined this global trend, the Arab Gulf is an even more prevalent
example of this phenomenon (Gandia, 2011). Gandia (2011) argues that both Alberta and Dubai
are involved in this trend of exploiting foreign workers to enhance cost savings, rather than
promoting permanent immigration and citizenship. Dubai, however, displays a much more
extreme example of this trend.
3. Globalizing Labour Markets in Dubai, UAE
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was established on December 2, 1971, comprising of
seven emirates — Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and
Fujairah (Zachariah, Prakash, & Rajan, 2004).
Since its establishment, Dubai has experienced tremendous urban growth, especially after
the city began aggressively diversifying its economy (Buckley, 2012). Because of this
diversification, as well as a focus on westernized multinational development projects, the city’s
growth has involved substantial construction of lavish hotels and resorts, iconic architecture,
massive malls, and entertainment attractions (Vora, 2011). This growth agenda was funded
heavily through international debt capital (Buckley, 2012). In particular, the country’s huge
petroleum export earnings allowed Dubai to invest in extensive infrastructure and the promotion
of other economic activities, such as tourism and financial services (Zachariah et al., 2004;
Cooper, 2013). With foreign investment pouring in, Dubai developed into a globally competitive
city, capitalizing on a growing consumer culture. Over the span of three decades, the UAE has
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transformed its traditional subsistence economy to a highly prosperous modern economy
(Zachariah et al., 2004). This economic transformation was accompanied by a radical change to
the city’s economic structure, especially in regards to migrant labour.
Following this development, Dubai’s employment structure became characterised by a
large tertiary sector, including trade, hospitality, transport, finance, real estate business, personal
services, and government services (Zachariah et al., 2004). This tertiary sector accounted for
roughly 58% of Dubai’s total employment in 1998 (Zachariah et al., 2004). Manufacturing,
water supply, construction etc., accounted for 33%, while agriculture, forestry, mining etc.
accounted for 9% of the workforce (Zachariah et al., 2004). Because these labour intensive
industries, construction and services in particular, are crucial to Dubai’s high end consumption
tourism development vision, the city has required a large supply of labour. However, the scope
of this development overpowered the relatively small national population, forcing Dubai to look
globally to fill this labour shortage (Zachariah et al., 2004).
Dubai’s intense demand for foreign workers has been the primary contributor to its global
presence, unlike many other cities that rely on transnational corporations (Malecki & Ewers,
2007). According to the Government of Dubai Statistics Center, 96% of Dubai’s employed
population are foreign workers (Cooper, 2013, p. 67. Cooper cites the Government of Dubai’s
2011 Bulletin of Labour Force Survey Results).
This exponential amount of immigrants entering the country has led the small national
population to become a minority. In order to preserve the superiority of national Emiratis, the
government has implemented policies to provide and privilege its national citizens (Malecki &
Ewers, 2007). Additionally, the UAE government has imposed strict regulations on foreign
worker to control the social hierarchy within the country of the population and ensure nationals
remain at the top (Malecki & Ewers, 2007). As a result, a clear societal division has developed in
the city, distinguishing the national Emiratis from the foreign-born workers. This division
includes a polarization of public space, the workforce, legal rights, and the social sphere.
3.1 Global Labour Markets: Dubai’s Practice
Dubai relies heavily on a global supply of labour to suit its current needs (Hvidt, 2009).
According to the 2009 Dubai Labour Force Characteristics Survey, national Emiratis made up
only 3.2% of the city’s labour force, while the remaining were foreign workers (Connell &
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Burgess, 2011). In terms of the entire population, foreign workers and expatriates account for
more than 90% (Ali, 2010). The impermanence of foreign workers offers extensive flexibility in
both the size and qualifications of the workforce. Furthermore, this flexibility allows Dubai to
make quick strategic changes as new market opportunities or developmental goals arise (Hvidt,
2009). If the federal government wants to establish an airline, or an information-technology
sector, all that is required is to find labourers with relevant experience. This illustrates how
critical globalization has been to the development and maintenance of the city. Without access to
large quantities of labour for low costs, Dubai’s development would have never been completed
with such rapidity and intensity. This flexibility and global labour supply also gives Dubai a
locational advantage, which reinforces the city as a competitor in a global economy (Hvidt,
2009). While access to a global labour supply has allowed Dubai to sustain its booming labour
market despite its low national population, it is argued that workers are similarly dependent on
the employment opportunities that the city offers.
The city proposes to offer foreign workers employment opportunities and a higher quality
of life. For the higher-skilled professional workers, the city provides easier access to amenities
that are considered prestigious in other countries, such as “personal household services” (Ali,
2010, p. 157). Additionally, Dubai is tax-free, which is especially alluring to many workers and
investors (Ali, 2010). While these qualities may intrigue many migrants, this high quality of life
is conditional. Success in Dubai comes exclusively with a certain foundational wealth, which
privileges some migrant workers over others (Ali, 2010). Regardless of this limitation, for many
workers Dubai appears to provide “a freedom and scope for opportunities in their work lives that
[their home country] simply could not match” (Ali, 2010, p. 151). In reality however, this
‘freedom’ of opportunity has limitations due Dubai’s regulations on immigration, which involves
being tethered to a local sponsor.
3.1.1 Sponsorship Program
The UAE governs immigration by a sponsorship-based system of entry, referred to as a
Kafala (Buckley, 2012; Mahdavi, 2011). In order to be legally entitled to work in the country,
every foreign migrant must have a kafeel, or sponsor. This sponsor must be a UAE citizen, and
assume both legal and economic responsibility for the worker throughout the length of the
contract (Buckley, 2012). Along with the legal documents for the migrant, the residential
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 16
documents are also regulated by the migrant’s sponsor, which makes the worker even more
dependent on their sponsor (Mahdavi, 2011).
The Kafala system allows the government to dictate the residency of foreign migrants as
temporary (Buckley, 2012). With 90% of UAE residents being foreign-born, the Kafala is an
attempt to mitigate the need for a large number of foreign workers by restricting migrants from
permanently settling in the country (Buckley, 2012; Ali, 2010). In doing so, the UAE maintains
the superiority of nationals by making citizenship exclusive. Being tethered to sponsors also
reinforces the superior status of nationals by enabling the exploitation of workers, keeping them
in an inferior position.
Many sponsors exploit and abuse their workers (Mahdavi, 2011). Although it is illegal,
many kafeels confiscate the passports of their migrant workers, therefore restricting their ability
to pursue other employment or return home (Mahdavi, 2011). With workers trapped, employers
often lower wages and depress conditions without consequence. In addition to this economic
exploitation, foreign workers are susceptible to many social challenges, including social
exclusion and segregation.
3.2 Social Consequences of Labour Migration: Dubai
3.2.1 Polarized Workforce
Dubai’s workforce is divided into three tiers: (1) the national Emirati population; (2)
skilled or professional expatriates from the United States or United Kingdom; and (3) low-skilled
workers, usually from South Asia, that work in the construction and low-skilled service
industries, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Connell & Burgess, 2011). Tier
one Emirati nationals are typically entitled to the most favourable jobs and lifestyle conditions,
such as government employees, as evident in Figure 5 (Buckley, 2012; Malecki & Ewers, 2007),
followed by North American and Western European expatriates (Buckley, 2012). Tier three
workers, in contrast, receive the lowest pay and face numerous quality of life challenges
(Connell & Burgess, 2011). This tiered labour force privileges Emirati nationals, while leaving
foreign workers more vulnerable to exploitation.
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The labour arrangements that migrant workers face can be compared to slavery or
indentured servitude. Many foreign workers are brought to the city through recruiting services,
which promise them favourable conditions and compensation. However, these deals often do not
hold up upon arrival. Instead, many foreign workers have their passports confiscated and are
degenerated into a contract of significantly lower wages (Connell & Burgess, 2011). The
minimal enforcement and monitoring of recruiter contracts essentially results in forced labour as
a form of human trafficking (Caplan, 2009). Additionally, recruitment fees, which can range
from US$4,000-11,000, combined with low wages, the confiscation of passports, airline tickets,
and identification papers, leave migrants reliant on their employers and forced into work
arrangements (Caplan, 2009). While some are able to repay these fees quickly, impoverished and
lower-skilled migrants often spend years paying off migration debts (Buckley, 2012). Other
practices also contribute to migrant workers’ precarious position, including denial of wages for
the first few months, irregular payments, and wage theft (Cooper, 2013). The slavery that results
from these arrangements is not simply the result of criminal organizations or corrupt businesses,
but due largely to the “corruption and/or ineffectual malaise of the local and state governments in
the region” (Cooper, 2013, p. 65). One journalist describes the phenomenon as a “three-way con,
perpetrated between the recruitment agents, the companies and the UAE government” (Hunt,
2011, p. 24). Through a system of precarious and vulnerable employment, and through non-
Figure 4: Foreign workers in Dubai’s construction industry. Retrieved from http://assets.knowledge.allianz.com/img/dubai_migrants_quer_1_47547.jpg
Figure 5: Emirati nationals often work in government positions, such as in the Police service, which uses expensive supercars. Retrieved from http://trendingnewsroom.com/media/pictures-rich-dubai-4_-_Copy.jpg
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enforcement of existing legal protections, migrant labourers are faced with an extremely
exploitative labour system.
Dismal working conditions increase the misery faced by foreign workers. Most foreign
workers put in long hours, extreme heat, and exceedingly lack recognition as members of
society. The World Safety Organization has noted that many workers work 60 hours a week in
extreme temperatures, as high as 120ºF/49ºC (Caplan, 2009). Human Rights Watch has pointed
to abnormally low numbers of reported injuries and fatalities of migrant workers in Dubai, as
well as discrepancies in the health and safety reports (Cooper, 2013). These discrepancies are
argued as a “gross oversight” and possibly a “cover-up” of working conditions (Cooper, 2013, p.
68). One report indicated a staff of 80 government inspectors overseeing 200,000 companies that
employ migrant workers (Fattah, 2006). The gross outnumbering of foreign workers to
inspectors illustrates the negligence of the UAE government to support foreign born migrant
workers. In addition, workers are not given citizenship rights or a "voice in the workplace",
prohibiting the organization of unions or strikes (Connell & Burgess, 2011, p. 25-27; Zachariah
et al., 2004, p. 2233). Without the ability to stand up for themselves, foreign workers become
trapped in precarious positions and brutal conditions. This inferiority is not confined to the
workforce, but is similarly represented in the geography of Dubai itself.
3.2.2 Spatial Segregation
This polarization of labour is echoed through spatial segregation. Buckley (2013) attends
to how this polarization and segregation is a direct result of the state dealing with a social
dilemma under hyper-neoliberal policy and non-democratic rule. He discusses that, while foreign
workers enabled the construction of Dubai, they blemished the state’s high-end vision of the city
(2013). To mitigate the disruption of the ‘undesirable’ workers on this vision, labour camp-like
barracks were constructed to contain their presence (Buckley, 2013, p. 261). Zachariah et al.
(2004) found that 70% of a sample of 361 workers were accommodated by worker camps (p.
2233). These worker camps are segregated from the workplace and the city, located fifteen
kilometers away in Sonapur (Zachariah et al., 2003). The camps reinforce the division of space
within the city by limiting the interactions between migrants and nationals to business and
service, and isolating foreign workers from the public sphere. Foreign workers are excluded from
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access to certain public or commercial spaces throughout the city. For example, South Asian
migrants are consistently denied access to bars in Dubai based on their ethnicity (Kanna, 2011).
Living conditions for migrant workers in these work camps are also dire. In roughly 25%
of worker camps, basic necessities like water, electricity, air conditioning, and cooking facilities
are unavailable (Zachariah et al., 2003). Additionally, work camps often suffer from broken
sewage systems, improperly desalinated water (causing sickness), overcrowded camps, and
excessive heat (Cooper, 2013). One journalist reported individuals living under plastic sheets on
rooftops and surviving only on charitable donations (Hunt, 2011). It was also reported that 33%
of the rooms housed four people, while 28% averaged more than eight people per room
(Zachariah, 2004). Figure 6 clearly illustrates these dismal living conditions. Higher skilled
expatriates from the United States or Europe are often placed in more expensive residential areas
outside of the old city center, to lure them to Dubai (Vora, 2008). However, this causes
geographical segregation and the ghettoization of older, more congested parts of town (Vora,
2008).
This spatial segregation enabled some unintentional problems for the government,
however. Because workers were concentrated in certain areas, they were given greater
opportunity to assemble a “shop-floor politics” and contestation plans and uprisings (Buckley,
2013 p. 266). Such contestation is illegal, as civil rights and institutions are similarly polarized,
putting migrant workers at a further disadvantage.
Figure 6: Workers sleeping quarters in Dubai. Retrieved from http://imgarcade.com/1/dubai-workers-living-conditions/
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3.2.3 Exclusive Rights and Institutions
Dubai’s institutional structure is highly centralized, and can be thought of as a two-tier
system (Hvidt, 2009). The first tier is involved with the daily functions of the city including, law
enforcement, utilities, infrastructure, etc. The second tier is directed by five individuals who
manage all new developments, such as mega-projects, state-owned companies, investment banks,
among other projects (Hvidt, 2009). Because the economy is controlled by a small minority of
elites, it has developed to cater to particular interests, rather than popular movements. As a
consequence of this exclusive system, and Dubai’s rapid development, there has been little
opportunity to develop civil institutions that are essential to ensuring human rights are protected
(Connell & Burgess, 2011). This lack of regulation makes foreign workers vulnerable to
exploitation. The UAE labour law, developed in 1980, has consistently failed to meet the
standards of Human Rights Watch in regards to worker rights (Connell & Burgess, 2011). For
example, public racial and ethnic discrimination is common, with some newspaper job ads
stating “‘UK/US educated’ or ‘Arabs only’” (Connell & Burgess, 2011, p. 22). Without strict
enforcement of human rights, migrant workers are not protected from discriminatory practices,
and lack the agency and mobility needed to escape from consequential social injustice.
The UAE labour system imposes a number of restrictions on migrants’ labour market
mobility, contract length and workplace conditions (Buckley, 2012). For example, the UAE
continually refuses to implement a minimum wage for foreign workers, as well as any other form
of labour regulations (Buckley, 2013). Following an outbreak of worker protests, many
companies offered to increase wages so they would return to work. The UAE, however, would
not allow it (Buckley, 2013). Additionally, terms for foreign worker visas under the Kafala
system are short. The majority of foreigners working in the UAE typically obtain three-year
renewable visas that entitle workers to be employed only by one specific employer. Workers
remained legally tied for a minimum of two years, and without an official ‘letter of no objection’
from their current employer, workers can not legally change employers (Human Rights Watch,
2006; cited in Buckley 2012 p. 255). Immigration rules stipulated that foreigners could only
legally remain in the country for two months if their work visa expired or was revoked. This rule
increased the workers direct dependence on their sponsors and employers for the right to work
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and reside in Dubai. This dependence is compounded for low-skilled workers, whose residency
is also tied to housing and food (Human Rights Watch, 2006; cited in Buckley 2012).
According to UAE immigration rules, it is the responsibility of employers to meet all
recruitment expenses related to the return journeys of the immigrant, including fees for visas and
airfare (Zachariah, 2004). The only cost the foreign worker is expected to bear is the expense for
a medical check up, prior to arriving (Zachariah, 2004). However, the enormous power that the
kafeels have over their contractual workers fosters an environment of rampant abuses, including
wage repression or theft, and extraction of illegal fees (Human Rights Watch, 2006, 2007, Keane
and McGeehan, 2008; Rajan and Prakash, 2009; cited in Buckley, 2012; Zachariah, 2004).
Although the local and federal governments have tried to combat these issues, especially in the
construction sector, it remains a widespread problem (Buckley, 2012). Most workers never
regain these wages, and become further indebted to money lenders back home (Buckley, 2012).
Combined, these conditions undermine the economic security of construction migrants in
several ways (Buckley, 2012). Firstly, they preclude the possibility of a long term employment
contract, as well as severely restricting one’s labour market mobility. Together, these can greatly
reduce workers’ income security while they reside in Dubai (Buckley, 2012). In addition to this
income insecurity, foreign workers face severe civil insecurities such as being unable to escape
from their temporary status.
3.2.4 Permanent Impermanence 1
In addition to few labour rights, foreign contractual workers and expatriates are excluded
from citizenship. In Dubai, foreign workers and expatriates operate on three-year residency
visas, including second generation expatriates despite being born and raised in the city (Ali,
2010). There are only four possible avenues to obtain residency visas in Dubai; (1) from an
employer; (2) as a dependent family member; (3) as a business owner; and (4) as a benefit of
owning freehold property (Vora, 2008). These visas typically range from one to three years.
Furthermore, in order to reside with one’s family in Dubai, a man has to make a minimum of
4,000 dirhams a month, or 3,000 if he lives in company-provided housing. Women are not
allowed to sponsor spouses or children except in certain professions, such as medicine (Vora,
2008).
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The use of residency visas, rather than citizenship, exemplifies the dedication the UAE
has to discouraging permanent settlement (Buckley, 2013). Expatriate status is made essentially
permanent and hereditary. Children of foreign parents, regardless of where they are born, retain
the nationality of their parents (Vora, 2008). An individual can be born in Dubai and/or live in
the city for decades and never be granted citizenship (Ali, 2010). Even if a child is “born to a
national woman” but fathered by an expatriate, the child is legally and socially an expatriate (Ali,
2010). While a child born to an expatriate mother but national father is recognized as a national,
if it is a male, it loses this bond to his parents and reverts back to expatriate status (Ali, 2010).
From the time the country was first established in 1971, and the following 26 years, only 50,000
expatriate workers were naturalized, and since then the UAE has developed new policy to reduce
this rate (Ali, 2010). Even if an expatriate is naturalized, this does not guarantee them permanent
citizenship, as their status can be revoked at any time (Ali, 2010). Similarly, naturalization of a
foreign expatriate does not make them social or legal equals to nationals. They continue to be
excluded, including from “government benefits such as free education, land grants, housing,
direct cash payments and other welfare benefits” that national Emiratis are provided with (Ali,
2010, p. 137).
There are extensive qualifications to even be considered for ‘permanent citizenship’,
though they do not guarantee admission. Some of these qualifications include having over thirty
years residence; being Muslim, Arab and an Arabic speaker; and having a clean police record,
‘proper’ academic qualifications and a ‘healthy’ bank balance (Ali, 2010, p. 137). By making
permanent citizenship so difficult for foreign workers to acquire, the UAE government is able to
keep tight control of over expatriates and protect the national population from “cultural
extinction and demographic imbalance” (Ali, 2010, p. 139). An increase in the pool of citizens
would also mean that the country would have to spread welfare rights and privileges to more
people (Ali, 2010). Additionally, the rule has enabled the country to indirectly instil a sense of
acceptance in expatriates that they are guests, and therefore they must behave like so. People, in
fear that they could be deported at any time, behave in more refined ways to ensure they do not
spoil their welcome (Ali, 2010). In further support of this acceptance as guests, foreign workers
must retire at age 60, and therefore, lose their visa eligibility (Ali, 2010). By affirming an
imminent end to their stay, this policy discourages foreign workers from putting down solid roots
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and planning on permanent settlement. This also prevents them from developing a feeling of
home, which makes it easier to accept the idea of having to leave (Ali, 2010).
Not only does this reinforce the social exclusion of workers, but illustrates their economic
commodification. Once workers go beyond their use to the economy, they are no longer
welcome. Being seen exclusively as commodities, rather than active citizens, has resulted in a
highly polarized society across Dubai.
3.2.5 Exclusive Society
The exclusiveness of citizenship in Dubai and the UAE inevitably reinforces a polarized
society. While foreign workers are commoditized, national Emiratis are lavished with
commodities. Interaction among the two groups is rare outside of business, especially those
expatriates outside of Arab and European nationality (Ali, 2010). With the proportion of foreign
workers far overwhelming the proportion of Emiratis, the Emirati culture is especially protected
and exclusive (Ali, 2010; Zachariah, 2004). As a way of preserving their suffocating culture, the
majority of nationals “withdraw socially and geographically from expatriates” (Ali, 2012, p.
148). Additionally, Arab Gulf states and their cities have strictly implemented policy to enhance
the presence of Emiratis in society (Malecki & Ewers, 2007).
In response to increased marginalization, the UAE has formulated ‘indigenization’ or
emiratization programs to introduce a greater number of nationals to the workforce (Malecki &
Ewers, 2007). These programs give priority to UAE natives when deciding job placements to
reduce unemployment among UAE nationals (Zachariah et al., 2003). Emirates
Telecommunication Corporation enlisted a new policy that resulted in over half of its workplace
being filled with locals (Zachariah et al., 2003). Other policies include the encouragement of
nationals to work in occupations other than those in the government positions (Zachariah et al.,
2003). In addition, the UAE regulates the high demand for immigration by limiting the inflow of
unskilled labourers, as well as supplying training to aid workers in the changes to technology
(Zachariah et al., 2003). Other measures to reduce migration include rejecting visas for unskilled
workers, deporting illegal and unskilled immigrants, demanding a high school certificate as the
minimum qualification for unskilled workers, replacing foreign labour with local labour, offering
identical benefits to locals working in the labour force and in the government, and stopping the
renewal of labour cards belonging to private sector employees over the age of 60 (Zachariah et
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 24
al., 2003; Zachariah et al., 2004). Additionally, in 2000, the ministry of labour and social affairs
of the UAE government introduced several measures to make the recruitment of unskilled
expatriate manpower costlier. Together, these policies strengthen the small national population
and retain their relevance in the economy.
However, this emiratization does not improve the experience of foreign workers, and
only demonstrates concern for the experiences of Emirati nationals. Kanna (2011) has argued
that the biggest contestation that many foreign workers and expatriates have is not social
polarization, but rather the lack of “economic belonging” (p. 183). Their priorities do not lie in
being socially included in the national community, but rather in being given “a fair shake in the
economic sphere” where “economic inclusion should be based on merit and not on other factors,
such as ethnicity or nationality, over which the individual is seen to have less control” (Kanna,
2011, p. 183). Because many workers migrate to Dubai for better economic opportunities, they
desire a full range of potential in these opportunities, and a chance to be involved in Dubai’s
famous consumerism (Kanna, 2011). This lack of complete economic opportunity debilitates the
city’s “neoliberal promise” because opportunity is not equal (Kanna, 2011, p. 183). The
privileges given to nationals for no other reason than being born are especially muddling of this
neoliberal promise, as it contradicts the meritocratic principles of neoliberalism.
4. Global Trends: Dubai, UAE and Calgary, Canada
Both Calgary and Dubai have entered the global race to become economically
competitive cities. In their pursuit of international investment, both cities have experienced
tremendous growth in the past few decades. This growth and development has been enabled by
the flexibilization of the global labour market. As globalization has improved the flow of people,
it has made temporary foreign workers available to cities during periods of intense development,
where there are sudden spikes in demand for low-skilled labour. Because both cities face labour
shortages, this access to foreign labour has become critical to their growth. While it has led to
many benefits for both Calgary and Dubai, the use of contractual foreign labour has been
accompanied by many pitfalls, including controversy over the role of foreign workers vis-a-vis
the local population, as well as humanitarian concerns for the well-being of workers who face
precarious conditions and exploitation.
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4.1 Use of Foreign Workers
Both Calgary and Dubai have turned to foreign labour to fill labour shortages that occur
due to spikes in development. In particular, the temporary spike in labour demand due to
increased urban development could not be supported by current populations in either city (De
Guerre, 2007; Zachariah et al., 2004). To satisfy this temporarily high demand for labour, both
cities developed programs that capitalize on globalizing labour markets. The greater supply
available through globalization has increased the flexibility of the labour market, as temporary
labour can be hired virtually on demand.
As a result of this flexibility, foreign workers in both Calgary and Dubai are
disproportionately distributed in the workforce. In particular, expatriates from the United States
and United Kingdom that move to Dubai and Calgary are more likely to work in higher-skilled
positions, such as managerial positions (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development,
2006; Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Connell & Burgess, 2011). In contrast, many foreign workers
from developing countries, primarily the Philippines and India, are more likely to fill low-skill
service positions, such as live-in nanny positions and construction labour, in both Calgary and
Dubai (CalgaryWorks & Calgary Economic Development, 2006; Malecki & Ewers, 2007;
Connell & Burgess, 2011). By keeping foreign workers in these lower-technically-skilled
positions, they are not taking highly skilled positions from national Canadian or Emirati citizens
that have put resources into developing these skills. In order to regulate and control the
immigration of these workers, both Calgary and Dubai have established government-run
programs, which define the conditions of employment.
4.2 Foreign Worker Programs: Kafala vs. TFWP
As Steger (2009) describes, many countries have made "significant efforts to control
large migratory flows” through “bureaucratic control” (p. 33). Calgary and Dubai are clear
examples, as both have programs that help to implement and regulate the use of contractual
foreign workers. The Kafala program is used in Dubai, while Calgary follows Canada’s TFWP.
Both the Kafala program and the TFWP are sponsorship type systems, which tie each foreign
worker to a local company, or in Dubai’s case, an individual citizen (Buckley, 2012; De Guerre,
2007). As sponsors, employers are legally responsible for their workers (Buckley, 2012; De
Guerre, 2007). Employers provide workers with living and working arrangement, as well as
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transportation to and from the work site. The sponsorship-based-system of the Kafala and
TFWP, while it regulates the use of contractual foreign workers, it also increases the
vulnerability of workers. As a result, both Calgary and Dubai have experienced major social
ramifications in reaction to the use of contractual foreign labour, including impermanence,
exclusion from rights, exploitation, commodification, and spatial segregation.
4.3 Social Consequences
4.3.1 Impermanence and Commodification
The use of sponsorship-based programs in both Calgary and Dubai emphasizes the
impermanence of contractual workers (Buckley, 2012; Smart, 1997). Sponsors are legally
responsible for workers, rather than workers being given independent agency (De Guerre, 2007;
Buckley, 2012). Foreign workers in either city are unable to work or remain in the country
without a sponsor (De Guerre, 2007; Buckley, 2012). Furthermore, workers who want to
permanently migrate to Calgary or Dubai and become citizens are often faced with additional
challenges. Both cities seek the advantages of maintaining flexible contractual foreign labour,
and granting citizenship to these workers defeats this flexibility. As a result, very few contractual
foreign workers involved in the Kafala program or the TFWP ever become permanent citizens.
In Calgary, only around 15% of TFWs become Canadian citizens (Government of Canada,
2012). In Dubai this percentage is even smaller (Ali, 2010). Foreign-born migrants can live and
work in the city on three-year residency visas for their entire life and never be granted citizenship
(Ali, 2010). Even their children are not given citizenship rights despite being born and raised in
the UAE. While Dubai takes this impermanence to an extreme, Calgary is also a strong example
of how city governments are capitalizing on the flexibility of contractual foreign workers. While
the flexibility of worker impermanence may benefit the government and economies in Calgary
and Dubai, it often leads to commodification, putting contractual workers at a disadvantage.
Commodification of migrant workers is one of the biggest problems in both Calgary and
Dubai’s use of contractual foreign workers. As foreign workers are hired on temporary labour
contracts, often in construction and low-skilled services, they become objectified strictly as
labour. While any labour is essentially commodity, contractual foreign labour differs in intensity.
Because they are only temporary residents, migrant workers are excluded from citizenship rights,
including the right to vote. This disconnect means that temporary foreign workers in both Dubai
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and Calgary are defined exclusively as labourers, and not as citizens in society. In contrast, all
other workers in either city are considered labourers and citizens, giving them greater agency in
society. This absolute commodification limits the rights and agency of Calgary’s and Dubai’s
contractual foreign workers, putting them in precarious positions where they are more vulnerable
to exploitation and exclusion.
4.3.2 Tethering, Dependence, and Exploitation
The legal structure of both the Kafala program and TFWP, where employers are
responsible for their contractual foreign workers, also leads to workers becoming tethered to
their employer. Because much of the foreign workers’ lives are controlled by their employers,
many contractual foreign workers involved in the Kafala program and the TFWP develop a sense
of dependency on their employer as a result. This tethering consequently obstructs the mobility
and agency of workers because they are legally unable to work anywhere else.
As contractual labour, foreign workers involved in the TFWP or Kafala program are
denied the protection of rights, which increases their vulnerability to exploitation. In Calgary,
there is no single federal or provincial body that is responsible for enforcing the rights of TFWs
(Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Similarly, in Dubai, the rapid development of the city provided
little opportunity to develop civil institutions that protect human rights (Connell & Burgess,
2011). As a result, the UAE labour law has consistently failed to meet the Human Rights Watch
standards of worker rights (Connell & Burgess, 2011). Without their rights sufficiently protected,
as well as the lack of agency and mobility from tethering, contractual foreign workers in both
Calgary and Dubai are put in precarious positions in society where they are vulnerable to
exploitation. For example, workers in both Calgary and Dubai become vulnerable to wage theft,
forced labour, as well as illegal fees -- though the degree and severity of exploitation differs. In
Dubai, arbitrary and financially punitive costs create an indebted servitude, whereas in Calgary,
TFWs can be subject to unlimited charges for services that are not explicitly defined as
employment agency business services (Harvey & Gelinas, 2015). In both cities temporary
migrant workers often take on significant debts to gain access to the job market. Migrants often
struggle to repay this debt because of low wages, or simply because of the delayed payroll
schedule, which necessitates they take on debt while working in an unpaid or delayed period. In
Dubai, it is a common practice for employers to withhold the first 3 months salary, after which
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they are never paid, or spend the wages they are paid repaying debts incurred during the initial
unpaid period. The precarious conditions created by this built-in dependence on employers, as
well as the opportunities for exploitation, manifest themselves in the spatial realm as well.
4.3.3 Spatial Segregation
The contractual foreign worker programs used in both Calgary and Dubai lead to spatial
segregation of the migrant workers from the naturalized population. In Calgary, many TFWs are
housed by their employers in isolated locations, such as in suburban outskirts of the city or work
camps (Figure 7). While they are not segregated in the technical sense, their location is not
conducive to building social relationships. Smart (1997) exemplifies this challenge in his
analysis of Mexican agricultural workers working near Calgary. Although many of the workers
had friends living in the city, it often took hours to travel to socialize with them via public
transportation (Smart, 1997). Additionally, the family-oriented and low density suburbs where
they lived did not provide much opportunity to meet people. As a result, they struggled to
integrate socially into society. Foreign workers in Dubai are more extremely spatially segregated
in worker camps, pictured in Figure 8 (Buckley, 2012). While these worker camps often feature
much more brutal conditions than TFWs in Calgary must endure, it similarly restricts foreign
workers from integrating into society (Zachariah et al., 2003). In light of this restricted
integration, both Calgary and Dubai limit the opportunities for foreign workers to develop social
relationships. These social limitations could be a mechanism for reinforcing the impermanent
contract of the workers, and could prevent them from establishing roots that could be difficult to
leave (Ali, 2010; Foster & Taylor, 2013).
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5. Conclusion
While Calgary and Dubai comparably demonstrate both the economic possibilities and
social consequences of globalization, it is important to recognize that there are many dangers in
equating the experiences of two very different cities. While some factors may be similar, there
are many additional and unique factors that lead a city to its particular political, social, and
economic position. Therefore, this essay does not suggest that Calgary is the same as Dubai, or
even demonstrates the phenomenon to the same extent. Rather the comparison of the two cities’
use of contractual foreign labour illustrates how diverse cities from across the world are involved
in the same global trend, though the details of their involvement may differ. Additionally, the
research for this essay was conducted during a time of dramatic reform, or dismantling, of the
TFWP in Calgary and Canada. The country has faced widespread controversy for the
implementation of the program, as local residents believe that it sacrifices Canadians’ jobs for
that of migrants’ - a sentiment that is being used to a political advantage by certain political
actors. This paper does not attend to this controversy or reform in great detail because it has been
an ongoing and evolving situation. Future research might include the analysis of Calgary’s
removal from the global labour trend, and the impact this has on the city’s economy.
A similar shortcoming was the minor difference in the scope of the literature that was
used. Due to a smaller population of TFWs in Calgary, and a wider scope of positions they fill,
Figure 7: Oil Sands Worker Camps in Alberta. Retrieved from http://workabove.com/onthefly/2011/ 07/25/oilsands-camp/
Figure 8: Worker camps in Dubai, UAE. Retrieved from https://dubaization.files.wordpress.com /2011/12/labor-camps-2.jpg
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the respective literature tends to focus on the general trends in the TFW experience. The
literature on Dubai, in contrast, tends to focus on specific industries, such as the construction
industry. Dubai’s rapid and extensive development has created an exponentially large
construction industry, compared to Calgary, which has seen more small-scale and gradual
development. The distribution of contractual foreign workers features some discrepancies as a
result of the different industries that dominate each city. In this sense there is a minor scope
difference that may introduce biases into the analysis presented in this essay.
In addition to these shortcomings, this essay also leaves some unanswered questions. One
of these questions relates to how different political structures might affect the contractual foreign
worker programs. Due to the scope of the paper, the political structure of Dubai and Calgary
were mentioned only briefly. However, it should be recognized that the political structures that
cities are embedded within, have strong influences on urban society. Therefore, future research
may seek to uncover how the democratic political structure of Calgary, and the autocratic
political structure of Dubai, may alter the experiences of contractual foreign workers.
Additionally, the essay does not focus as strongly on the economic results or benefits of
using foreign labour. It does not evaluate and compare which migrant labour program is most
successful or effective at increasing competitive ability in the global marketplace. Rather, this
essay focuses on how the use of foreign labour, as a strategy to become more globally
competitive, leads to social consequences. This leaves some unanswered questions in regard to
which city is more economically successful. The essay does not address whether or not the social
costs associated with contractual foreign labour are outweighed by economic benefits.
Dubai has invested more heavily in multiple sectors and has developed more connections
within a wider range of global markets, such as real estate, architecture, tourism, etc. These
connections have facilitated an intensification of Dubai’s global presence. While Dubai is
arguably a more globally prominent city, receiving greater amounts of foreign direct investment
than Calgary, it also demonstrates extreme examples of social exclusion and worker exploitation.
In contrast, Calgary is a relatively small city with its economy more deeply connected to the oil
industry. As a result of this narrow focus on the oil and gas sector, Calgary is limited to
connections between other global cities that are similarly involved in this aspect of the energy
sector. Although it may have less of a punch in the global hierarchy, Calgary is under less
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scrutiny for its treatment of foreign workers. A closer analysis of the differing success between
the two cities would provide a deeper comparison in future research.
Although there are many unanswered questions and additional topics that have not been
addressed in this essay, the case studies of Dubai, UAE and Calgary, Canada, effectively
illustrate the profound impacts that globalization has had on urban societies. Globalization, in
particular, the increased mobility of people and capital, has influenced both Calgary and Dubai to
pursue global competitiveness. As a result, both cities have intensified development to attract
capital, which has similarly created labour shortages. While globalization has initiated these
labour shortages, it has also provided a solution through the flexibility of a global labour market.
Specifically, foreign workers are hired on temporary contracts to satisfy fluctuations in demand.
While globalization and the flexibilization of the labour market has enabled many cities to
advance as successful economic centers, it has consequently put immigrants in precarious social
positions.
BUILDING PYRAMIDS FOR CAPITAL 32
NOTES 1. “Permanent Impermanence” was used by Syed Ali (2010) to describe the situation of
foreign workers in Dubai.
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