BULLINGTON Et Al-1984-Scandinavian Journal of Psychology

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Scandinavian Journal

of

Psychology,

1984, 25,

51-63

In t ro du ct io n t o phenom eno log ica l psych o log ical research

JENNIFER BULLINGTON and GUNNAR KARLSSON

Department

of

Psychology, University

of

Stockholm. Stockholm, Sweden

Bullington.

J. Karlsson,G . :

Introduction to phenomenological psychological research.

Scandinmian Journal

of

Psychology, 1984.25, 51-63.

This report presents an introduction

to

phenomenological psychological research.

A

brief

theoretical section on Hus serls phenomenological philosophy is followed by a comparison

between phenomenological psychology and traditional psychology and a tutorial example

of the phenomenological method in psychological research. The authors argue for the

necessity of a phenomenological descriptive approach to psychological research which

seeks to discover the meaning

of

various phenomena using the descriptions of subjects

experiences. The results

of

a phenomenological psychological study consist

of

a structural

description of the phenomenon in question, which basically describes the wh t and how of

a specific phenomenon rather than the explanatory

why .

G .

Karlsson. Department of Psychology, University of Stockholm. S-106

9

Stockholm,

Sweden.

INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERLS PHENOM ENOLOGY

Phenomenology started with the works

of

Edmund Husserl. For that reason we will begin

our

dicussion with Husserls phenomenology,

at

least briefly, in order to introduce the

main topic of this paper; phenomenological psychology. We will try to show how a

philosophical grounding in phenomenology can be the basis for an empirical human

science (as opposed to a natural scientific) approach to psychology.

Phenomenology is the systematic investigation of subjectivity. Subjectivity, for H usserl,

w a s the indubitable groun d of experience; that

I

am now having the experience of seeing a

blue thing, for example, is lived with a certitude

I

cannot doub t. Th e aim of phenomeno-

logy is to stu dy th e world as it appears to

u s

in and through con sciou sness. Th is is a radical

move away from the objective sciences which take a s their subject m atter the so-called

objective reality of the w orld, which is supposed to exist independently of conscious-

ness and subjectivity. Phenom enology wishes to examine the very ground of such a world,

which is precisely con scio usn ess an d human subjectivity. Husserls point concern ing the

natural sciences

w a s

that although the objective world described by physics and

chemistry is a de rived, constructed world, science wishes to place this constructed world

as prior

or

mo re rea l tha n the subjectively lived world. Husse rl did not wish

to

disparage the findings of the natu ral scienc es, but he maintained that they have no place in

phenomenology, which place s lived exp erienc e prior to scientific formulations abour lived

experience. It is for this reason that phenomenology makes no use

of

natural scientific

methods as such. Because our subject matter as phenomenologists is prior to scientific

formulations about an objective world, we cannot use these very formulations to

account for our field of inquiry.

If

we wish to stud y consciousne ss and sub jectivity, we

cann ot begin by assumin g th e objective reality of the world which conscio usne ss itself

posits. In order to study the realm of subjectivity, Husserl had to develop a completely

new method, which he called the phenomenological reduction.

T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L R E D U C T I O N

The reduction is the cornerstone of phenomenology. Before we can begin our analyses

of

consciousness, we must perfo rm the reduction in order to take ourselves ou t of the


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S 2

J .

Bullington a n d G.

K a r l s s o n

Scand

Psvchol

ZS 1984)

"natural attitude". The natural a ttitud e is the way we take for grante d the existence of a

transcen den t world, which see ms to exis t independently of consciousness. Th is attitude

has a

long

philosophical history; it underlies

all

natural scientific causal explanations of

perception an d cognition. B asically, i t asse rts that there exists a world which impinges on

me (my "mind") and

caicses

me to have this

or

that experience (sensation). We may

further describe the natural a ttitud e as the way in which the world seem s to spread itself

out before

us,

apparently indifferent to our intending t o it. In sho rt, the natural a ttitude is

our belief in the existence

of

the real , t ranscendent world. I t is called the "natural"

attitude because it is our unrefle ctive, natural way of being in the world. To believe in the

reality character of

the

world ha s i ts roots

in

the very nature

of

perception itself.

To

have

something real primordially giv en, and to 'b ecom e aware' of it an d 'perceive' it in simple

intuition are one and th e sa m e thing" (Hu sser l, 1962, p.

45,

first published in German

1913). When we perform the phen ome nological reduction,

i t

is thi s belief in the re ality

character of the world wh ich we must susp end , o r "bracket". It is not that we doubt the

existen ce of the world

for

my direct experience informs me that the world,

of

course , is

always there), but by putting the tran scen dent object in brack ets, we are able to underline

the way

in

which the object appears to consciousness. Thus, the reduction is not a

destruction of the world, but rather, a way in which to focus upon the constituting

of

the

world.

According to Husserl, every such phenomenological reduction can also be an eidetic

reduction. An eidetic reduction is the move from the world of facts

(or

part iculars) to the

world

of

intended invariant m eanin gs or esse nce s). Briefly, the eidetic reduction is our

natural ability

to

intuit

or

prereflectively gra sp the ess ence of a thing through its particu-

lars. Ev ery phenomenological red uction aim s ultimately at an eidetic reduction , but every

eidetic reduction need not be a phenomenological reduction. We may grasp essences

through particulars

in

the n atural attitude . H owever, every time we perform

a

phenomeno-

logical reduction and attempt to do phenomenology, we must make this eidetic move as

well.

To

sum up. in the natu ral attitud e the world that lies in front of us conceals the ac ts of

consciousness which posit the world. In the phenomenological attitude (by implementing

the phenomenological reduction) we can discover two poles of consciousness; noesis and

noema, which make

up

the mo st unique feature

of

cons ciousn ess; namely, intentionality.

Basically, "intentionality" m ean s that conscio usne ss is always con sciousn ess

of

some-

thing.

Let us assume that we have now performed the phenomenological reduction. Under the

reduction we can discern tw o poles

of

expe rience: the subjective pole which H usserl calls

noesis-the acts

of

consc iousne ss, and we also discover the correlate

of

every con scious

act , which Husserl

calls

the noema-the objec t a s intended, as meant, as perceived.

Noesis always refers to the po siting acts,

or in

metaphorical language, to the "streaming"

of consciousness towards the world. On the othe r han d,

the

noema refers to that-which-is-

posi teainte nded . The noem atic pole is that which we used to call the "real world" in the

natural attitude. Husserl 's analyses show that what we used to call the "real object"

presents i tself to con sciousness as a flowing of views, each one flowing and blending into

the next .

For

this reason we can

also

call the noem a

a

"system

of

appearances" . T o clarify

the noema with an exam ple, let

us

say that

I

now have the exp erience of this cu p in front

of

me. What my perceptual experience gives me is

a

perspectival view of the cu p from here

and now.

I

can now see the front

of

the cup.

I

perceive that it

is

round, although

I

cannot

see the back

of

the cup. As

I

move around the cup , I can now see the back, w hich

I

could

not see before. All these pe rspectiva l views point to a whole beyond any one perspect ive.

Th is whole, this system

of

appe arance s is the noema. Th ese appearances mutual ly confirm

one an other and go together coherently

to

give me the whole cup at onc e. This is a paradox


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54

denta l phenomenology. But for now, suflice to say that all essences are grasped und er the

reduction by means of imaginary variation and are direct, intuitive affirmations.

J .

Bull ington and G Karlsson

S a n d

J

Psycho1 5

(1984)

PHENOM ENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

VS.

TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

Before we

go

into the method and subject matter

of

phenomenological psychology, we

would like to briefly contrast phenomenological psychology with traditional psychology.

By traditional psychology we refer to the experimental tradition in psychology dating

from W. Wundt. Wundts aspir ation in seeking to establish psychology a s a natural scienc e

remains even today in conte mp orary psychologys scientific ideals. Suc h ideals are

reflected in the

so

called objective method which psychology adopted from the natural

sciences. Due to the succe sses made in physics and ch emistry, psychology believed that

by adopting their quantitative method, psychology could establish its credibility in the

academic community. The natural scientific project w a s to

explain

phenom ena in term s of

causal laws. Consequently, traditional psychologys guiding principle was also to explain

psychic phenomena following the principles laid out by the natural sciences. A phenom-

enon

w a s

thought to be relevant t o the s tudy

of

psychology only if it could be measured

and tested in some way by these natural scientific means. The contrived laboratory

conditions which became synonymous with psychological research had less and less

in

common with everyday, lived experiences of human subjects. In this way the bias of a

methodology came

to

eclipse the psychologists interest in phenomena which were inac-

cessible through this method, such as the study of consciousness and subjectivity. Th e

psychologist

as

a natural scientist seeks to discover

or

invent abstract, exp lanatory causal

connections between events to account

for

psychological phenomena. The human being is

observed as

a

thing among o ther things, disregarding the unique psychological status of th e

human being. Such physicalistic models move away from concrete subjective experiences

into

abstract, derived formulas, which are

often

unrecognizable in the subjects naive

experience (Giorgi,

1 9 7 0 ~ ) .

Phenomenological psychology takes its app roach from philosophical phenomenology. In

adopting Husserls to the things themselves, phenomenological psychology seeks to

develop

a

rigorous scientific method which would enable the researcher to thematize or

make explicit the immediate lived experience of

a

phenomenon,

as

it is lived, without

resorting to ad h oc, superimp osed theories

about

phenomena. Such an aim brought ab out

a qualitative, descriptive method. This method uses:

1 )

subjects naive, spontaneous

descriptions of phenomena, (2) the psychological phenomenological analysis of the data

and (3) the community

of

researchers

as a

collaborative pool. Com parable to th e verifica-

tion of results in the quantitative approach, we find in the qualitative phenomenological

method , the phenomenological criterion of sp ontaneous, intuitive assent

upon

reading the

findings of a phenomenological stu dy. R esearchers present their findings to eac h othe r, to

the community, and sometimes to the subjects themselves. The problem of subjective

bias do es not

ar ise

for phenomenological psychology in its traditional form ulatio n, since

phenomenology recognizes the subjectivity of the researcher as the very access to the

meanings and themes which constitute the qualitative, descriptive findings. However, the

phenomenological psychological researcher should always be

on

guard against natural

attitude presuppositions which may not have been properly thematized and bracketed by

the researchers reduction. The criteria for a piece of phenomenological psychological

research

are:

a)

idelity to the phen omen a and

b)

a

rigorous phenomenological reduction.

Thus, phenomenological psychology as a human science (as opposed to a natural

scienc e) takes fidelity to the ph enom enon a s it is lived a s its guiding principle in the

formu lation of

a

method . Phenomenological psychologys approach do es not equ ate being


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Scand J Psych01 25 (1984) Phenomenological psychology 55

scientific with being naturally scientific. Rat her than necessarily transforming mean-

ings into quantitative expressions, as natural science does, phenomenological psychology

seeks to ffirmand e lucid ate the pre-reflectively lived world. Given that the rese arch er has

followed these directives, what is the nature of phenomenological psychologys data? It is

the

meaningful, descriptive expression of the subject which will provide the researcher

with the themes and generalities concerning lived phenomena.

Phenomenological psychology, true to its phenomenological origins, sees the world as

already replete with meanings. These meanings are lived everyday, yet may remain

implicit and unthematized. Phenomenological psychological research seeks to make ex-

plicit and thematic these unreflectively lived meanings. Even in traditional psychological

research we may see how these lived meanings are operating; for example, when the

researcher sets up

an

experiment, decides to investigate this or that phenomenon, change

this

or

that variable etc. Such an eidetic (essential) understanding must be present in any

researcher, for how else would he have any direction to his research? Such meanings and

eidetic understandings

are

not explicitely acknowledged in traditional psychological re-

search. The traditional researcher in psychology is himself using intuitions and eidetic

understandings without the rigor of the phenomenological reduction.

The phenomenological psychologist does not concern himself unduly with facts

because he chooses to stay at the level of meaning. His emphasis is always upon the

meaning-for-subject of a phenomenon, whether that phenomenon happened once

or

one

hundred times, at home, or at work etc. In reading 10 descriptions (protocols) from

different subjects on anxiety, for example, the researcher will undoubtedly find a variety

of situations in which anxiety occurred. However, he will also find

a

common theme

or

structure of the meaning of anxiety which will arise from the analysis of these different

protocols. For exam ple, although he may find that anxiety was experienced at school, a t

work

or

on

a

vacation, he does

not

necessarily imbue these facts with psychological

meaning. W hat may emerge from the study as imp ortan t, could be, for exam ple, that in all

these situations the subjects were experiencing an insecurity ab out the ir capability to do

something that mattered to them. As phenomenological psychologists we do not hypoth-

esize beforehand abo ut wh at psychological con stituents

or

meanings we will find, but we

do allow our intutions to pick out thematically relevant material from the protocols. We

may use, ju st for an exa mp le, the above fictional constituent of insecurity rathe r than

at sc hoo l at w ork on vacation bec aus e we intuitively grasp its thematic signifi-

can ce from the totality of the protocol and the sy nthe sis of all 10 protocols. Because of the

insistence upon the priority of meaning, phenomenological psychology considers the

natural scientific accumulation of facts to be an inappropriate task for our purposes.

N o

matter how numero us the facts may be, no matter how sophisticated o ur techniques

of

measuring become , facts canno t leap across the abyss into meanings. As Sartre put

it, In sho rt, psychologists d o not realize that it is jus t as impossible to get essence by

accumulating accid ents (facts

our

comment) as to reach

1

by adding figures to the right of

0 99

(Sartre, 1948, p.

5 .

A common misunderstanding of phenomenological psychology is to confuse it with

introspectionism (W und t Titchner). Briefly, the differences between introspectionism

and phenomenological psychology can be enum erated as follows:

(1) n classical introspectionism, the

S

is asked to observe his impressions upon

receiving certain stimuli. H e is asked to red uce his impressions to the simplest elemen ts

such as sensations, feelings, images and to locate their attributes such

as

intensity,

duration etc. Phenomenological psychology rules out any s uch assum ptions about the

nature of mindconscio usness.

(2) In introspectionism, the

S

is asked to stick to the facts and not to include any


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56

meanings he

may

associate with the stimuli, whereas phenomenological psychology is

precisely interested in the study of these meanings.

(3)

The

S

n introspectionistic e xpe rime nts had to be well trained in orde r to know wh at

kinds of self-observations were acceptable to the researcher. For phenomenological

purposes, the

S

is asked to freely report upon all his experiences pertaining to the

phenomenon in question and uncen sored description s from subjec ts are the raw data for

phenomenological psychology.

An othe r school of psychology which is often associated with phenomenological p sycho-

logy is gestalt psychology. Although there are similarities between the two, the relation-

ship is

a

complex one, and there is no real agreement among phenomenologists about

gestalt psychologys relationship to phenom enology. It is beyond the sc ope of this paper to

describe the differences here

in

detail. However, a few words may be said about the main

difference between the two approaches. While gestalt psychology does place an emphasis

upon w holes-as-given (as opposed to the traditional atomistic psych ology), gestal t psycho-

logy maintains the superiority and priority of physicalistic causes of psychological exper-

iences. They remain in a natural attitude insofar

as

they em brace objectivistic theories

abou t phenomenon (See Merleau-Ponty, 1963).

J Bullington and

G. Karlsson

Scand

J

Psycho1

25 (1984)

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGYS METHOD

At this point we would like to de mo nstrat e the specific method used in a phenomenological

psychological undertaking. Although Hu sserl himself worked mainly with phenomeno logi-

cal transcendental philosophy, he did allow that

a

phenomenological psychology running

parallel to his philosophy was possible. T he difference between phenom enological philos-

ophy and phenomenological psychology has to do with the two different bracketings or

reductions. Under the philosophical

or

transcendental reduction, both the object pole

(world) and the subject p ole (con scio usn ess) are derealized

or

bracketed. This enabled

Husserl to study consciousness-as-such; not any particular con sciousness, but the struc-

tures necessary and sufficient for any c onsciou sness. What remains after the transcend en-

tal reduction is the transcendental ego. This is the positing ego; that is, the ego which

constitutes both the world and the mu ndane , situated ego. For example, in the phrase I

am aware of myself winning a game ofchess. Husserldistinguishes between two different

egos.

I

refers to the transcend ental ego, while the second ego, m yse lf, is the

psychological, mundane ego which is situated in the world. This psychological ego is

perspectival and present to consciou sness in and through its appearan ces, jus t like any

othe r mundane object. There is

a

deb ate within the phenomenological movem ent abo ut the

possibility and validity of

a

trans cen den tal, purely reflective ego which lies outs ide both

the world and the psychological ego. Our main interest as psychologists, however, is the

seco nd ego, the mundane, psychologically situated ego. This is the ego which rem em bers,

desires, has wishes and fears etc. n the case of the psychological phenomenological

brac ketin g, we bracket t he object pole (we put its reality statu s into susp ensi on), but we

leave the psychological ego exactly

as

it is in the world. We d o not susp end its particular-

ities beca use this is what we wish to stud y. We are interested in this situated eg o which h as

desires and fears. The psychological phenomenological reduction takes us out of the

natural atti tude by subsuming the object u nde r subjectivity (object-as-meant) and leaves us

with

a

situated co nsciousn ess intending m eanings. From Husserls standpo int (which

claims the validity of a transcendental ego), we

as

phenomenological psychologists must

adm it the following paradox: T he I which we study (the my self ) which constitutes

th e world is also itself situated in the world. It is both constiuting and con stitut ed. We find

no

difficulty in accepting this premise beca use ou r interests a re

not

philosophical.

For

our


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Scand J Psycho1 25 11984) P h e n o m e n o lo g i ca l psy hology 57

purposes, we need only to discover th e meanings which a re intend ed by the situated ego in

their psychological significations.

A common confusion about the phenomenological method concerns the researchers

use of intuitions t o arrive a t

a

theoretically unbiased und erstan ding of the data (textproto-

cd) .

How is

a

theo retically unbiased understanding possible? In ord er to und erstan d

such a notion, we must first become clear about what a theory is. According to FQlesdal

and Walloe, a theory is a se t of propositions whose inter relatedn ess is made explicit. It

is

therefore characteristic of a theory that it makes clear how the different propositions

which are inclu ded in it depe nd upon each oth er (F#llesdal Wall0e,

1977,

p. 53,

our

translation from Norwegian). The theory becomes the basis upon which the data is

analyzed. What

is

important here is that the

final

comprehension

of

the data on the part of

the researcher is depen dent upo n these previously formulated pro positions. As phenomen-

ological psyc holo gists, we maintain that we d o not make an y use

of

theories in our

understanding

of

the data. T his does not mean,

of

cour se, that th e researcher co nfronts his

data as a blank; we are not unbiased in the sense that we can transcend language and

culture. B ut to be in a culture and partak e of its common p reunderstanding s and meaning-

ful

expressions

is

not the s am e thing as to assert and attemp t

to

prove co nstructed models

or theories. For examp le, take the experience of reading a novel. If one reflects upon o nes

own experience, we think everyone would agree that the understanding

of

what one has

read does not depend upon theories

(in

the above defined sense) about what one has

read. Ra ther, the re ader of the text already sha res a common world with the autho r which

enables him to g rasp the meaning

of

the text.

To

say that the reader has understood

what he has read is to assu m e the possibility of expr essing and grasping m eanings through

the m edium of a shared cultur e and language.

We have chosen t o call the researchers grasping of meaning in the subjects descrip-

tions intuition sticking to the language

of

Husserl (1962). However,

our

intuition is

not Husserls intuition of grasping essences (transcendental philosophy), but is grounded

in

language and cultur e and i s therefore an intuition of

a

hermeneutical kind. (See Ricoeur

1981,

Titelman

1979.)

At this point we shall address the question; what kind of results d o we come up with in

our

research? W herea s Hu sserl discovered es sence s, phenomenological psychology dis-

cove rs psychological signif cation s (generalities). T hes e psychological significations

or

meaning constitu ents are th e theme s which emerge as the structure of a lived psycho-

logical phenomenon.

A

str uct ure understood phenomenologically is that comm on

thread which runs through unique manifestations of the same phenomenon. A meaning

constituent discovered in

a

protocol analysis of

a

psychological phenomenon would be a

part

of

the phenom enon in interaction with other pa rts

or

constituents which in turn

make up the phenomenon in question. It is thus not the case that the phenomenological

psychologist merely p oints o ut d isjointed, unrelated significations, but rather, h e see ks

to

discover the

way

in which

parts or

constituents of

a

protocol relate

to one

another

in a

gestalt. T his gestalt we call

a

general structure. It may

also

tur n ou t that we find two

or

more gestalts which we call typologies of the same phenomenon. We will demonstrate

in practice how

our

analy ses proceed. Th e following method

was

developed by Amedeo

Giorgi at Duquesn e U niversity (see Ciorgi,

19706, 1975,

Wertz, in press).

E X A M P L E O F T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G IC A L P S Y C H O L O G IC A L M E TH O D

The raw data

for

ou r s tudies consist of reports (descriptions) given by subjects of their

experiences

of a

given phenomenon. The format

of

such descriptions can be gathered as

retrospective protoco ls (running narrative), interviews,

or

think-aloud protocols. In this


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58

J .

ullington and

G.

Karlsson

Scand J Psycho1 25

(1984)

paper we will address retrospective protocol analysis, although the method

of

analysis

applies to any type of text. Phenomenological psychology does not exclude the laboratory

set up per se, but the laboratory situation would be used in a phenomenological way:

namely, the subjects own description of his experience while going through the experi-

ment would constitute our data.

For

purposes of clarity, we

will

from now on describe our

method as

it

applies to a retrospective protocol obtained from one subject.

After having decided what we wish to investigate, we approach subjects with the

following instructions: Describe a situation in which you felt (in this case lonely).

Describe the situation, how you felt and what you did

in

as much detail as possible.

Include all details which come

to

your mind. Describe it in as much detail

so

that someone

who

has

never had the experience would understand it after your description.

A

good

protocol is one which is free from psychological jargon or other privileged disciplinary

biases. Such a protocol would be a spontaneous recounting of lived experience, rather

than a self-reflective, explanatory account. We present the following loneliness protocol

and thereafter the following analysis which will be used

in

our discussion to illustrate the

method.

This situation happen ed to me som etime in the recent past, and the circumstances surround ing it were

that the person I

was

living with had moved back to New York, and he told me that he was going to

call me at

OO on

his particular Su nday night to let me know what had happened with him in New

York. 1

myself had been

out

of town and had com e back earlier

on

this particular Sunday. Upon my

arrival

I

discovered that my landlord w a s putting in a heating unit, and the apartment w a s torn apart,

it

was

cold. 1 looked around and saw all his things laying around the apartment. just e xactly whe re he

had left them. I didnt feel at home in the apartment. I felt very uprooted. Without him, I didnt feel

like

I

belonged here. I tried

to

read earlier in the evening, but

I

couldnt concentrate.

1

kept looking at

the clock anticipating his phone call. He didnt call at

I 1 0 0 I

tried to continue t o read. H e didnt call

a t 11.15, a t

11-30

or at 11.45. By

12.00 1

was getting upset, and by

12.15 I

felt jus t horrible. T his w as

a

very crucial phone call for

our

relationship.

I

hadnt had any contact with him since he left for New

York a week ago or so.By this time in th e evening

1

was afraid that he didnt care abo ut me , this o ne

person whom Id been devoting myself to, at the cost of all others, didnt care about me. I looked

around the room, and I thought abo ut living alone here in Y and

1

thought. I havent got a friend

in the world. I tried to think of my friends, I thought, there are people othe r than this person who

know you. you have friends, you have a family. But at that moment they didnt seem real to me. I

couldnt sha ke the feeling that I

was

hopelessly alone. Fo r a while I considered calling his gran dmoth-

er

in New

York,

n case something terrible had happe ned to him. But since it was past midnight and

I

figured it was too late to call, I gave up the idea. And besides

I

still thought he would call. I paced

through the apartm ent, wringing my han ds and feeling very physically agitated. He

finally

called me at

1 00 at night. I felt furious at him, but

after

we talked some I felt calmed down and at home with

myself again.

We divide our analysis of the protocol into 5 steps for pedagogical purposes. Different

researchers may vary the method by a step

or

two, but in essence the phenomenological

psychological analysis contains t he following 5 steps.

S t e p

I

Our first step is to perform the phenomenological reduction.

For

our purposes, as

psychologists, we wish to read the text with an open, theoretically unbiased attitude.

However, we must maintain a psychological focus of interest as we read. (We do not, for

example, read this protocol on loneliness as a sociological text.) We read the text through,

as

many times

as

necessary

in

order to get

a

grasp

of

the

whole text

in

light of the

particular phenomenon we are investigating. We proceed from initial readings to a more

systematic reading where we focus upon discriminating the meaning units that emerge

from

the text. Breaking up the text into meaning units constitutes step 2.


9/13

Scand 3 Psycho1

25

1984) P h e n o m e n o lo g i ca l

psychology 59

S t e p

2

Meaning unit discriminations are divisions of the entire running text into discrete units

of

meaning each of which can stand on

its

own as expressing relevant meaning. We have a

sense already of wh at is relevant by having read the text a number

of

times. We mark

these meaning unit divisions directly on the description in those places where we sense a

shift in the meaning in the expression of the subject, or a transformation of the situation.

Consider the following excerpt from our loneliness protocol as an example of a naturally

occurring break in meaning:

I

myse lf had been out of town and had com e back earlier on this particular Sunday. Upon my arrival,

1

discovered that my landlord

was

putting in a hea ting unit, and the apartment w a s tom apart,

it w a s

cold.() I looked around and saw all his things laying around the apartmen t, just excactly as he had

left them.(5)

We divided th e meaning unit as we did becaus e the first two se ntenc es, although they

contain several ideas, both express

one

psychological meaning, which we could summa-

rize

as

the subjects relation

to

the s tate

of

the apar tment

(4).

Th e last sentence contains

a

new psychological meaning, namely, the introduction of the absent other into the cold,

disarranged apartm ent

(5).

We do

not

interpret these breaks in meaning, we

do

not

impose them, but we do allow

our

intuitions to guide our understanding of th e shifts in

meaning which sp ontaneously em erge upon reading the protocol.

S t e p

3

Step number three is the transformation of these meaning units from the language

of

the

subject into th e research ers language, which focuses upon the significations expressed in

relation to the phenomenon under investigation. Here a word must be said about the

language we use

as

phenomenological researchers.

As

has been hinted at, phenomenology

started out without having any read-made language. This pertains to phenomenological

psychology as well. The language that we use as researchers, first

of

all, reflects the

understanding of the whole protocol. Thus we can let the understanding

of

the entire

protocol influence the transform ations of a particular meaning unit. Th ere are n o laws or

rules about the use of the language, but one should, of course, be mindful not to use a

language th at h as vague

or

multiple connotations. The community to whom o ne addr esses

the stud y is anothe r facto r to take into account in the choice of the researcher language. If

it is phenomenological community

one

is addressing, there may be certain expressions

which have a meaning for them, but not for ano the r audience, and vice versa. T he use of

a n

expert language can often be dangerous. For instance, the expression neurotic

compulsion

is

obv iously theoretically loaded. T his is why a naive, everyday language is

preferable until we have created a bias free, descriptive vocabulary. The difficulty in

comm unicating our results (phenomenological structu res) is cited by D e Boer:

Ordinary language is completely attuned to

the

sphere

of

normal interests, i.e. to objects, and can

describe adequately only this primary objectivity. The phenomenologist must use words that are

attuned

to

the natural attitude. n other words, the un natu ral reflective thought-stance is forced

to

speak the language of the

natural

direction

of

thought. This,

of

course. causes certain difficulties in

communication. One condition for understanding

a

phenomenological analysis

is

that one must be

able

to

transpose himself into

the

typical phenomenological attitude

. (1978,

p. 130 .

A s

we transform the language of the subject into the researchers language, we do not seek

to make the subjects expressions conform

to

any prior hypothesized psychological

constructs. By remaining open to the description, we allow ourselves to be surprised by

whatever cons tituents we may find in

a

protocol. Ou r transformations into the language of

the researcher is necessary to our project becau se the d escriptions of the subjects lived


10/13

60

J .

Bullington and G . Karlsson

Scand J Psycho1 25 1984)

experiences are

not

primarily psychological (nor primarily sociological, biological etc.).

It

is the project of phenomenological psychology to tease out the psychological meanings.

We must go beyond phenomenal level (what is directly lived) to the phenomenological

level (in our example, the psychological logos of loneliness). The subjects descriptions are

phenomenal

in

that they describe what is directly and unreflectively lived. The phenomen-

ological move is that reflective stance taken under the reduction which uses phenomenal

descriptions

in

order to arrive at a structural understanding of experience; the logos of

phenomena. We present only the first five meaning unit transformations here for reasons

of brevity.

Con stituents prese nt in description

1. This situation happened to S in the recent

past.

2.

S

states that the person she

wa s

living with

moved back to New York.

3. The o ther had m ade plans with S o call her

on

a particular da y at a particular time to tell

S what had happened with him in New York.

4.

S

herself had been out of town and amved at

the apt . on the day of the phone call. S dis-

covered that the apt.

was

tom apart by land-

lord repairs. It was cold.

5 .

S ooked around the apt. and saw all of this

persons

hings laying around, just exactly

where he had left them.

Constituents of description expressed

i n

terms revelatory of loneliness

1

2 .

S stated that the circumstances of this occa-

sion of loneliness centered around the ab-

senc e of a significant oth er with whom S had

been living. This other left the S and moved

back t o where he he had been living sometime

prior to living with

S.

3.

S and the other had made plans (a pledge

or

promise) that the other would call

S

on the

phone at a particular time on a particular

night. S xpected to find out from this phone

call what had happened 10 the other since

they last saw each other.

4. S came back from out of town to this apt.

where she and the other had lived together,

on the day of the phone call. Upon amval S

found the apt. in an une xpected s tat e of disar-

ray due to repairs being performed in her

absence.

5 .

S urthermore experienced the a pt . as remind-

ing her of the absent other.

We keep the subjects language (slightly modified, I changed to subject etc.) on the

left hand side and put our transformations directly opposite on the right, to ensure that we

do not lose sight of the subjects original expressions.

We use descriptions of experiences as access into the structure of phenomena, which by

definition must be a more narrow, abstract description. It must be remembered that the

only framework the phenomenological psychologist uses

in

making

his

transformations is

to trace out the implicit (or in some cases, explicit) meanings which he finds in the

protocol(s) themselves. The researcher makes no use of theoretical models because they

merely hinder his discovering what the protocol has to offer. Psychological sensitivity on

the part of the researcher is used to elucidate rather than define the phenomenon being

investigated.For example, we take the subjects language here: I looked around and saw

all his things laying around the apartment, just exactly where he had left them and

transform it into: S furthermore experienced the apartment as reminding her of the

absent other. W e include the word furthermore here because in the overall context of

this protocol, this sentence follows directly a sentence about the

Ss

feeling disoriented

and cold in the apartment. Besides being cold and tom apart, the apartment furthermore

reminded her of the absent other. Both meaning units

(4

and

5

taken together reveal the

Ss reaction to being in that apartment then, under those particular conditions. We arrived

at our transformation here by asking ourselves in imaginary variation, what did it mean in

the context of the entire protocol that the subject looked around and saw all his things


11/13

Scand J Psycho1 25 (1984) Phenomenological psychology 6

laying around the apartm ent , just exactly whe re he had left them? Does she mean that

this state of disarray crea ted a n extr a cleaning burden for her? S uch a transfo rmatio n is not

substantiated in the text . Could her sentence mean that she experienced anger towards the

absent other for not cleaning u p

his

things before

h e

left? Possibly, but we must always

return to the language of the subjec t. We intuit that the phrase just ex actly wh ere he left

them do es not exp ress ang er. The transformations take on their significance in relation to

the en tire proto col o n loneliness.

Step 4

Our next step

as

researchers

is to

synth esize our transformed meanings units into a

situated s truc ture, which re ads like a synopsis of the specific meaning co nstituen ts foun d

in the protocol. A structure, we recall, is a gestalt-like contexture in which the parts

(meaning constituents) relate

to

each other in an interdependent way. T h u s , the full

understanding of a phenomenon

s

not the result of a mere enumeration

of

const i tuents,

but rather, the way in which eac h constituen t relates to each other con stituent. As can be

seen below, the si tuated stmcture is a running text of the transformed meaning units. In

order to reach this stru cture, the researcher may omit

or

shift the transformed meaning

units

in

ord er to be st exp ress psychological significations. He may also wish t o refer back

to the raw data

S s

language) at this point in order to ensure that nothing has been

overlooked. T he si tuated struc ture is the ana lysis of Qne protocol in its specificness. In this

way we have

at our

disposal an easy-to-read, coherently organized text to compare with

our other protocols in the sam e study .

We presen t here the c om plete situated structure of the loneliness protocol we have used

as an example.

Loneliness for this subject

w as

experienced when

S

eturned

to

an apartment where she had been

living with

a

recently departed, significant other. The Ss experience of the apartment as being in a

state of disarray contrib uted to the

Ss

feeling that she was not at home . (This word contribut-

ed is an example of the way phenomenological psychology is sometimes forced to use everyday

language

to

expre ss meaningful associations which we have no phenomenologically descriptive word

fo r at this time.) The perception of the others posse ssions

still

left in the apartm ent rem inded the S of

the absence of this other. T he other had made an agreement (a pledge) to call the S on a particular

night at a particular time.

S

xperienced time, as she was in the apartment,

as

pointing towards the

expected phone call. This

was a

crucial phone call for their relationship. When the other had not

called at the appointed time

nor

after a certain period

of

waiting,

S

felt that this other did not

reciprocate her care and devotion. S began to imagine

her

future without this othe r. S felt herself

to be

in a world without friends. S

was

unable

to

make her friends and family real. The only reality for S

at

that moment

was

the unrealized phone call and the absent others lack of care for her. S could not

herself actively investigate why the o the r had failed to call her (by calling his relative) bec ause she felt

that it was too late to call. She felt physically agitated as she waited passively for this phone call.

When the phone call finally arrived, S xpressed an ger towards the other, but eventually regained he r

feeling of being at home with herself in the apartment.

Step 5

Our final step , then is to move from a collection

of

situated structu res (m any protocols of

the sam e phenom enon wri t ten by different subjects) to what we call a general structure

(see below), which inc orpo rates those essential con stituents

of a

phenomenon which run

acros s all the situa ted struc tures . However, it may turn out that we can not collapse all

our

si tuated structures un der on e general structure. In su ch a case we f ind various types of

the phen om eno n wh ich we call typologies. We prefer, in these ca ses, to write out

general typologies rather than at temp t to force the data under o ne general structure. O ur

criterion for making typologies rath er than one general structure conc erns the nature

of

the

specific co nstituen t(s) in que stion. If those co nstituen ts differ in an essential way from th e


12/13

62

J . Bullington and G.

Karlsson

Scand

J

Psycho1 25 1984)

other protocols, we would be doing violence to the spirit of phenomenology to exclude or

ignore those protocols which do not fit with the others. What we find

in

typologies are

varied structures of the same phenomenon which demand to be treated separately and

in

their own right. It should be stated that before the researcher decides upon typologies on

the basis of one

or

more errant constituent(s1, he should return to the raw data to ensure

that he did

not

overlook those essentially different constituents in the other protocols.

Although in practice

we

do not move from one situated structure to a general structure,

we found it necessary to do so here for didactic reasons. Even this single protocol

analysis, however, can reveal for us a fuller understanding of what loneliness is. Our

general structure reads as follows:

Ss loneliness refers to the absence of a specific significant person. Other people are not able to

compensate for the absence of the missed person. The S eels at a loss not at home) until contact

can be made with the absent other. S ells a detachment from the world and is not able to share her

loneliness with friends or family. S experiences that the action which is required to abate the

loneliness has to be initialed by the absent other. This passivity is justified by an internalization of

norms

hat makes

Ss

situation unchangeable, as far as the

Ss

sense of initiative is concerned.

Our

general structure tells

us

that loneliness

in

this protocol

w a s

more than the factual

absence of the person whom the subject missed. We found that this one protocol ex-

pressed a psychological constituent of passivity which wa s lived by the subject as a

waiting. What the subject called

a

waiting we may term passivity because

our

position as researchers allows us to step back reflectively and view her entire protocol as

an expression of loneliness. We saw how her passivity

w a s

manifested in her inability to

call friends and relatives, her unwillingness to actively investigate the reason for the delay

of the call, and finally, her entire temporal experience expressed a passivity

in

that her

present w a s focused upon the call which would amve

in

the future. We furthermore saw

a

connection between the passivity constituent and what we called an internalization of

norms (phenomenally lived as the Ss justification for her continuing to wait) which was

expressed by the subject as

it

was

too

late to call the grandmother.

Hopefully this brief discussion has provided the reader with a basis for further thought

and discussion. Our results

as

any other scientific results) point to further thematizations

and investigations. Even in

our

general structures we come up with findings which open up

a

field for further reflections and research.

We would like to thank Amedeo Giorgi, arlLesche, William Phillips, Ola Svenson and anonymous

reviewers

for

discussions and valuable comments

on

earlier drafts. This study was supported by a

grant to Ola Svenson from the Swedish Councilfor Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

REFERENCES

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he development

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thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.

Fgllesdal, D. Wall , L.Argumenfasjonsteori og uitensknpsfilosofi Bergen: Universitetsforlaget,

Oiorgi, A. Psychology as a human science. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. a )

Giorgi. A . Towards Phenomenologically based research in psychology. l o u r n o l of phenomenologicol

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Giorgi.

A.

An application of phenomenological method in psychology. In A Giorgi, C. Fisher

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Murray

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Psycho1 25

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