Bullitin for Field Officers

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DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS

225TII INFANTRYIVISION,IA, No. 5200 SEPTBMBER, 1918.

Pursuant to the dispositions made by General Headquarters con-cerning the experiences in the last defensive engagements, the follow-

main points for anti-tank operations are set fortl~. Regimentaltalion, and company and battery cornmanclers are enjoined to give

their respective troops thorough instruction on these points :

A. IN GENERAL

The infantry must be insistently in str~ctecl hat enc ay tanks

in themselves have no figlrting powers whatever, and that theirshooting is inaccurate; their effect is principally a moral cffoct.Bxgerlencc has shown tliat infantry on its own initiative, with the



cut off just the s mie as, lor csamplc, nlnclii~~c -gunrews that have

been stoppcel in our rcar b y tanks (as has often lmppened); they are

citl~rr1cr;tn)ycclbyour firc or put out cf action by 011.j. hrompt counter

:~ttaclr. l h t so much the inorc is i t absolutely esscntial that tlic

infantry isai~ltainhe s1i;upcst observation totvi~rtl ho fron t, in orcler

io rccogdih in tiine and to bring u~lclcrdcstrucWvc fire the enemyill at nlay be clangerous to us-thc cncmy ipfantry-which eithe r

follo? ,close behind t he tanlrs or else after a considerable interval.

R. TR RBXIIAVIORF TIT15 X N ~ ~ A N T R I I AND ,I\'~ASUIIIWOI BE TAKEN OR COMBATTINGNKMV~ A N K S

I: T h e ilafnlztry conzhafs tanks at closa rnqp-son nletms at

rnost-with armor-piercing ammunition, and a t still closer rang(:

wit11 Iland grcnacle balls ( two hitnd grenadc heads bound with tvirp,

to another hand grenadc) by throwing thc lattcr on the citterpillar

chains or against the perpendicular surfaces of tltc tank. Hand-grcnade balls will be copi o~~ slyl:~Cccl along t he line of 1nail-iresistance

(Nauptruiecierstnltdslinie) whicll is cspccially exposcd to ta nka tta cks ,

m d in t he rcar weas (alcrng lines, in machhic-gun ~nc sts ). Single

hand grcnarics arc without elfect. When tanlrs arrivc at our lines in

spite of precautions, infmtry will give way to eithcP sirlc.Expcricnce Lcachcs that idantry often opens fire too sou11, ancl

shoots wild. Hence the principle: Onl y by well-ninced Blre nt closem z g e can t d i s bc put out of action. The nzen mnst bc instructedwith picturcs exactly a t what points t hc tanlrs arc vulncrnblc to ulcir

wcapcms.

2 . Measures o f n passive matzwd.-Tank tr aps cIistriL~utcc1 nrlopth Ior blocking tho Mosclle Valley roacl ih question, tlw lJcy-et\-

hay^.--Norroy road, swamping l hc 'L'rcp VallQy, blowing up of roads

leading out of villages, briilgcs, laying out mine-fields wltliin the

scctor, arc J re ad y unclcr w:~y. 'Tho Commaaclcr of Pioacel-s is made

responsible for th e clircction and speccly executicnl of the work. MapsoI thc worlcs undcr construction (passive tank dcfcusc) iu conaectioil

with thc active ta nk tlelCnsct (Art.,M. G's., 'L'. M's.) will br @yyn t o 111o

units. C. CONCLUSIONS

In all cnenzy attaclts in which tanlrs are ngecl th e cnemy inf antry

rcmains our principal opponent, Tanlrs will be attenrlccl to by ourscar cloienses, By rcason of tllcir smoll fighting powers thcy a re

unable to execute an encircling movement, o r to gain a ny tactical

advantage. Eve ry ntcitns must, tbcrclore, be used to raise tho con-

fidence of our infan try in our woapons and moans of clofcnse. Divi-sions th at have becn atlaclrctl many iirnes by tanlrs dcclare that t he

in fa nt ~y , cforc thc first tanlc attaclc, considers tllc tarlks as much

worse tha n they r edl y arc. The sple~lclicl ire effect ol our defensivemeans, which has dcstroyecl one tan k af ter anothcr, has t aught thcm

better. Thcrcfore, thc men mtlst tmclcr no circunlstntlces losc thcir

LESSONS LEARNED I N A N T l - T A N R F1 G H T I N G 3

ncrvc upon the first appearance of tanlrs. Fur ther , whcn tanlts hava

broken through our positions, these positions must still be clefendedaccording t o arclers; in no case cloes the breaking thr ough of tanks

offer a reason for withdrawal. This must be nmde thoroughly clear

to every infantryman.

(Signed) JUNG.

LESSONS LEARNED IN RECENT ANTI-TANK IGHTING

No. 32 2 SWT. 18.

Not to be taken i d o he front l ine Ivenches

A widc use is t o be made of th e megaphone and of the signal of

attention by buglc. Wireless: the post must bc occnpiecl day and

night. Visual signals: bengal flares used up t o now are too wcalr foruse in foggy weather. Stacks of fire wood, sprinlclccl with gasoline,

kerosene and other inflammable liquids will be lighted at particularl ysuitable points. Streams of fire will be shot vertically ancl rcpcateclly

by tho flame projectors. Mobile observation systems : motor-cyclists,cyclists, cav alry patro ls and telephone shall be usccl. A large nnm-

bcr ol megnphoncs a nd bugles will be in rcadi nc~swithin the villages.

Tank Trenches.

Tllcsc will be prepnrecl in thc laws through which tlzc tank is

obligcil t o pass, across tlic cntirc width of t he road (a t lcnst fivr

nmtcrs) and be well conccalcd by camoufiage; tlic boarding mnst bc

such that only light vehicles, ~vcighing our tans a t the most, can

cross thcm. If possible, the clitches ar e to be filled with watcr to atlcpth of two meters as t he water stops th e motor, or anti-tank mincs

placccl a t the bot tom with an automa tic clcvicc for clischarging.

'She routcs available for hoavy artillery will be dearly ~narkc tl ut.

Awli-2nn.W Bawiers .

l~ermancnt arriers which nligllt hinder our own traflic will notbc constructecl unncccsserily. The new Vrencll tanlrs, sniall moilcl,

ar c only 1.70 meters widc. Obstacles will conscqncntly l ~ c on-structetl. Care will be ta ken th at the concrcte blocks arc firmly sct;otherwise Lhe ta nk will displace thcm. Thc tank cnnnot bc stoppctl bybloclis lcss than two nietcrs high. I t is ntlvisnhlc tlm1 n ditch onc

lnclc r c1cc.p he (lag in h n t of llw slapping l h r k in suvh n wa g t h a t



i t forms an acutc angle at t lic brtsc with t l ic concrcti l lh c k :inti tll;ltth e stopping block bc sturltlccl with rails o r T-irolis in th e ilircction fronlwhic l~ lic knlk is cspcctecl. (Sce sltclrll.)

If harricrs arc constructetl out of a gricultura l nmchiaes i t isnecessary to join tli c~ u ogether with a qen nti ty of iron wire; tak eadvantage of tlic pointed nletal parts, snch as harrows, cic., whichw ill c ~ t c hn th c caterpillar tread. Tllcsu kin d of barric rs will fulfil1their purpose only if constructed on narrow roads to a depth of 10

t o 20 meters. Strctcliccl iron wirc is useloss ns tlie tuilr rolls over it ,

Trnprovisecl barricrs ar c ma de of barricades wi th vi~r ious andyrnatcrial os of stopping blocks fornzcd out of trce-trunks inzhctltledin thc ground and coverctl with earth or slonc.

A vehicle placcd across the ro ad can only stop tlic Lank if of largesize and loaded with stone. Small orcl in~ry chiclcs arc not suifi-

cient.

All barriers can s top thc prugc ss of the a r~ kor a longer o r ~h or lc rpcriod only; tlicy cannot stop it dcfiuitcly nor destroy it. lJnr thisreason tlic system of passiva dcfensos will ho complcmcntetl bypwticularly uctivc clcfcnsivc mctl\ods.

3. A c n v e Dr'.E hNSE

The effcct of S aznnwmition is nil; that of T i : i~laa~unit lonarmor-piercing) against tank s of ncw n~ otlcl s doubL[ul. "l'lir bulltlt of thi?ant i-tan k riflc passcs Illrough th e present arurror p h t r ;&t maxirnum&tance of goo motors; it is nccrssary, tlicrcforc, to lot tllo el~tlksapproa ch. Groups of anti-tan k siflclswill ba Eolmctl; tlicsc .rvoapnns

will be cntrustad only to experioncccl :md cud-hcitclotl riflemen.Bomb-tlvowcss will br, couritetl on only Ins clu~ ncr* its in vosy

vulncmablc pa rt s of th a tnnlr.

I g M r cn c li r no rt ar s p ie rc e t l ~ c r n ~ o r - p l d c ; p cch l soft-nosotlprojectiles have jus t bceu i~~tr ocli~c cd.i ortlor to dinii~lisll lispcr-sion , tlic firing is to bo cltrtie Srarn Lhc plxlfami as much ns yoasiblo.

Guns t m h e ~ r c a t c s tnemics of tm l i s . C;ootZ r c a ~ ~ l l src ol,Cairzedwith tho field gun nm lel 196 using brass ccirtrlclgc c;isr. ITp LO rgoomctcrs every artillcry projcclilc is cll'ct'livr; for tlistanccs over 1500lnetcrs soft-nosed proicclilcs will he uscrl, On ~ cc o nn t f i ts Io\v r i l t~of fire th e field m o d d 1x6 is lcss sui lalh . SZrcl r w t r i r l p ~- ;~s t~sn.cnot s i~iis factory s thcy jn ni l o o frcqucully.

GERMAN ESTIMATE O F T A N K S 6

Ilxccllcnt results are obtained with flamc projectors by directingtho firc on the loop-holes. This weapon is particularly suitablc forthe defcnse of villages. The crcw awaits thc tank under covcr bchindtlie honsos, ctc. One arm y proposes, when the terrain is providedwith good points for observation, to group all the means for active

tlcfense in such a way as to form ant i-tan k redoubts. All thc meansfor acti ve defonso arc collected there under t hc sole commancl of anenergotic officer, all men being rcsolvcd to hold out to .the last and todestroy all thc tanlrs coming witliin range. Th e composition of suchrctloubts would be : one or tw o guns, one or two light trench nzortars,two macliinc guns, three or four anti-tank riflcs, one or two flameprojectors; obstacles will be constructccl around the group.

The ta nk s arc always follo\vccl by hostile infan try ancl oftcn bycavalry.

Tllc main point to be observed in ilefcnsc is that nobody lose hishcad :wtl that cv ery nnit bc held firmly in hi~ntl y an encrgctic lcadcr.

GERMAN ESTIlVTATE OF TANKS

C:otnnzeqbt by G c r r n m (1flicrr.s of the .pth I*rzfnutvv l?~girncwt,

28th IJiuisiow.

'Lhc Germ im Ar my untlercstimatecl th c val ue o f tanlcs, r~n dhere-fore when we hav e necrlrtl them tlicrc havc bccn none available. Th ciirst tanlrs intmclucecl by tllc British c arlier in tlic wa r worc so licavilyconstructccl an d so slow in movemcnt th at from our p oint of viewthc y were practica lly valuclcss. 170s these reasons, the German

Govcmment consiilered the employment and construction of tanlcsof no aclvantage, but in thc course of time the Briti sh sleadily irnprovetlon their or iginal ~nncl~inesntil th ey now a rc in possession of anrxtreu~zclyeikctivc wcapon against which wc havc an inacleqnatcckfcnse consisting mercly of li ght field gnns wllicli a t best arcimpracticable. I t has talccn us a long tinle to realize what; powerfulweapons tanks really arc, so tha t now, wlicn i t is probably to o Into.we are attempting to bring up, to tlic line machines tha t measure u pto tlic British stanrlartl but which in actual practice arc far below it.'I.lm failure of ou r own original tanl ts was cxcnscil by t he phasc "Onlyt11c)sc troo ps w llo l iav c los t th cir 17GrVC ncerl t ho s upp ort of lanlrs",nurl having pcrsuarlctl oarselvcs tlmt this was I r n c wc ni;~rlc o fnr l l inIMP 01 our r l ~ ~ n ~ s y~ ~ n s t ~ ~ i c i i o n s .



ORGAMXZATXON OF REGIMENTAL PI NE NW ER FE R COM-PANIES-TH EIR US E TO COMBAT TANKS

It is apparent from various signs that the Gcrnu~n ommand

found th at divisional hf , W. conipanics do not meet t he nccds of t he

1wescnt warfarc, an d with a view to releasing n ~ c nor inhnt ry scrvicr

has ilccidctl to abolish divisionttl M. W. companies and form rcgi..

nicntal companies.

From a captured German c.locumont of August ~ 7 t ht is cviclcut

h a t his reorganization is basccl on the following principles :1st. Assignment of t he personnel f rom tll c i1ivision;~l onqmnies

;tn~ong he reginwntal companics.

zrl, Using tllc esistiug rcsonlccs of tllc inlnn try R4. I\",dctacll-

ments for the formation of rcgimcntnl coiiipanics.

I t seems th at bcsiclcs lllc itlca of amel iora ting t11t~ lolicicncy in

lllc inlant ry pcrsonncl, tllc Ccsnxm high con~man tl n fonning tllcwb

rcgimcntal M.W. companies has had in nsintl forming spucinl units

co~1ntcr a illcans of combat tha t i s giving il: Inure and nztrrr

anxiety.

An orclcr of I,uciontlorff clatecl August 7, I Q I N , is quotctl :"In order to eI~cctiv cly ombat tanks t21c grcntcst ilqwr tiz nc~

must be attachcd to the iustrl~ctiollof the persor~ncl n t hc us^ of

ligl~t .W, with flat trajcctorics mcl itnti-hnlr rifles.

More than one soldicr of tllc gJlant U. \V. forces will rcgrcl

seeing tho divisional companies tlissolvccl; howcvur, T :mi suro tllitt

ovary om fainilar will1 the tactical conditions which maltc this c l i i ~ n g ~imperative will rcjoicc in seeing tho beginning of n morc iutiintitc

ini ion with the infan try. Tllc fight agsinst tanlcs, wllicll is assaxniug

nu extraorclinary iiuportancc, bccomos th e first cnusi( 1w~tionf N. W.

~lnits.''

'lhc Sollowing armament is given to rCgini cnta lM. W, cslnpanios :2 111cdiumM. .t) light M. W.9 anti-tank riflcs.

'l'hc n~ccliumM. W. arc cxclnsivoly iutcnclctl lor position 'ivnrIt2rc

nncl dcfcnsive war far e. All illc light M. W , must Iw ~~rrwitlctlit11

flat trajectory carriages.

'Ih cn should have* pmctic-r in firing ligllt M, , against wondcu

CAUSES OF DEFEAT OF THE I X d GERMAN ARMY 7

tml rs a t clistanccs of from 20 0 to 300 meters. Practice firing should

also hc conducted with medium and heavy M. W. upon the lanes

tl~ro11g11 hich tanlcs must follow.

THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT OF TH E IId GERMAN ARMY

According to the reports of tllc oIGcers sen t by the High Commancl

into the zono of b attl e of tho I Id Army, t he dcfetlt of this army is due

to t he following Eacts:

I . 'rho troops dlowcd thc~u sclvcs o be talrcn by surprisc by

c~tts~clrsf t;ullcs in large nunzbcis, ant1 above al l, lost all cliscipli~lc

when ttmks, which llad succccdccl in brealring th rough owing lo a~r nt wa l r artificial log, appeared suclclenly bchincl tl~en i.

2. '111~ nclvanccd zonc of combat a s well as the positions and

scctors n~orcn tlic scar had neither positions nor supplcnzcntary

tlcfcnscs sufic ien t to offer a metllodical resislance.

3 , l3atLalir)ns n reserve and the reserves of larger units ilicl not

11i~vcuou~11~rtilloryrnmctliatclv ava ilable to enable tlleni to oppose

atltlil ional arli llcry rosist:tncc against the cncmy nncl t:~nlrs vllic11 lad

1)roltcn through .

'l'l~c following is I-horcfore ticccssary :

I, As I lmvc alrcncly prcscribcil in my onlcr In Nn . 9.7~8,ecret,op. , Angust 8, i t is nccessnry to t ake niorc care t han I)c.forc to fiml

out tllc tlisposition LIE tllc cnclny by taking prisancrs, by matching tlw

terrain lr o n~ pecial observatories of the ccntew of information, bynorid rcconnaissancc, by listening posts, etc. In t he prcscnt situation

we must oxpect surprise nttaclts in other scctors or the front.

?'he grcat cst vigilance is necessary n t d ;~ y rcalr. and cluring tho

ct~ rly ours ol tlw inoming, as surprisc attaclcs arc gcrren~lly lartctl

:LC t lds t h e , In r the tcnsion of th e night px lu ce s a certain rclasn-tion of th r nerves and slrengtb of thc men. Ilcct!nC csporicncc llns

p u ) v ~ d1111t an ii lq~ccti on S tll(> rot)11s ixt this tinw is p:~r licularly

nccvss:lry.



be attac hcd to t he defense agajnst tanlcs and. the tmops' dislilrc of

digging should be overcome in every way possible.

II in certain places in the advanced zoae, in an activc scctor and

bcfore a vigilant enemy, the organization of trenches am1 the siting

of supplementaly defensive positions is of neccssity a slow opcrnt ion,

commanding oficers must, nevertheless, sec to it that the infantrydigs itself in quiclcly, and protec ts itself b y supplementary clefenscs,

so small works conceded from view will change littlc by little into

continuons clemants and finally int o lines.

But i t is absolutely necessary t ha t work shoulcl go ahcntl more

rapidly on the terrain further back, which is not altogetlicr under fire

of the enemy artillery. Above d l attention must bc paid lo Lhc

construction of points of support n ~ ~ t u a l l ylalllcing caclr other, in

organizing with networlrs of wire cntan glencnts for a detcrminctl

clcfense, of villages, farms, woocls, and roa ds, a ~ l d stnblishing anti-

tank clefenscs. Even in rear positions continuit y must bc sought fo r

(fire support, visual comlmmication ctc.). I t is beyond all rcason

to assnmc that ttanlcs, having pcnetratccl aclvauccd positiotzs witlrout

lneeting either obstacles or resistance, shoulcl bc ablc t o continuc

several lrilometers on the roads o r alongside of them , right n p todivisional headquarters.

3. The idea that troops even though surronnclecl slroulcl, in

clofault or othcr orders, clcfcnd their battlc scctor to the vcry last

n1an and t o the very last cartriclgc, sccrns to havo been cntirc ly 6)s-gotten. The cnemy who executes an e~lci rcliug zoveaicnt is hinrrclr

turncd , and a11 parl s of a break through must be closecl,

Our Inen are not justified in falling back w l~ cn i~lglc nnks urldcnvalry cletachn~ents reak tl lr ou gl ~ 'Lhey will be put o u t o f action

by skilful1 tacti cs of tho rcservcs.

4:A largc numnber of our troops fight badly a gainst tanks. Tn-

structlon on this subjcct should be pushed.

a. A tank: falls an casy prey t o artillery of all mlibms. Tlic

first thing ncccssary is that part of th e Ficld Artillcry s l d l not be

in fortified c~nplaccments,which lattcr makcs t hc use of each g un inany clirection impossilAe, It slzould be placccl in such a position tlzi~L

it can assist in repulsing a, tanlc attack as well as a cavalry atta ck,

th at is to say , in t hc open or on t he cclge of woods with aground obser-vation station near by, The rcmnining artiller y clemcnts should also

be clisposcd in suc h a lrlanncr that their guns may tlcfeutl thcmsclvcs

against thc tanlrs.

I n addition single guns shonltl be lalrcn several kilometers belzii~il

the principal line of rcsistance, t o sc~cllpoints as are particularlyimp ort mt, the entrance to villages, etc. Thc duty of tllesc RUIIS IS

to put out of action rluicltly and a t short rmge such tanlcs as ~ n ~ y11avr 1)rolron through. Op cn in ~ ir e prcrnilt~~rrly arns t h e tank.

1). ' I ' r t ~ d ~ort;vs givc the sitlllr rcsi~lts. 'I'llcir lack of prc-c % ) ~ r ( I ~ W ; L I ~ ~ Hiri* a t short rangrt.

111 :ltltlition, i nlnutry will gct out of t11v way to permit tlle firc

O F the arlillcry a r i t l of thix lrclnrli mork~rs, nrl will take up tlie fight

against the rllcnty illfiullry, \.irllich gcil~~rdlyollows quite :L disklncc

bcliintl tllc tarilzs. 'l'lic use of nv~chitir uns against tsnlrs ; ~ tollgruugt* is Ear1)irldcn; it is uwlcss i l~ l i lW[LS~CS ~n~nl~x~itioll .

11. I:iti:~lly r l o 110t fo rg ~t ~ I S S ~ Y ~ CO ~ O I ~ S C S ,arricildes, tro11chcs,clrstruction o f lwidgl% ntltl of mads, placing of fougasscs and contact

mines. Ilvcn iE L ~ I C S C cltlfenscs:m bmlrcn clown, or crossed by the

tanks , t1ic.y will ~it ~vc ~.L lio li~ sselay tliem oncl n~ ak e ur work of dcfcnse

easier. 'l'hc greatvst rr~ ~c~ ura ge~ ~zc tlthould be given to the active:LI~(It ~ v w t i v ~ ~~ li il ts f ~ ~ l l > i ~ l t ~ r l l ~n tlic construction of thesc works.



ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE

In our last account of opcrntions on th e Wcstern Fron t (paxiqdilct

No. 3 "Lessons 'Taught by the Atta ck of March ~ 1 s t " ) e clcnlt withtllc beginning of the grcat offensive which the Rritisll Army has suc-ceeded in maintain ing from tlie beginning of August down l o th epresent date. I t is already clear tha t this operation will mnlr as oncof th e outstanding features of the war . 30s sustainecl vigor, for thcx

great material a d mechanical nleans emnployecl, for its clccisivrinfluence on the Gcrinan arm y hi France, its iaiportancc can hardlybe exaggerated. And Anlcrican clivisions [lave shown u p to greatadv t~n tagc n fighting among tlic I3ritish. I3ut for tlie nioment nv

have not tlic space at our disposal tu give :~tlequatc ccount ol tlwsccvcnts and must come rapidly to what concerns inorc iinm~diatrlythe American Army viewed. as n whole.

For bcl~inil he working out of the strilring opemiions o f thr lastthree months on the front, wr mus t not losc sight of Ilic fact th atbehincl Lhe line of ba tt le a nlil itary eve nt was occuring of quite asmuch significance as the combats tl~cn~sclvrs.Llis was the fonna -tion of th e American Arniy. I-Iowcver grca t a par1 our troops ancl

our cnininancl may have playccl during tllc critical moment whru thrtitle tunle d in July, wc were then still playing an undeveloped pa rtin the war,-mcrcly llelpiilg our allics with a division llorc i ~ ~ t l1

division there. Since then, wcclc by wcclc, througll th e height of t11cstruggle, deteriniilecl policy and hard work were mpitlly aggrcg:~lingour divisions into what became abon 1 he miclclle or th c closc o f AugusLtlic First American Arnzy.

Witho ut discussing the reasons for this, i t ha d long bee11 r ~ r r a n g r t lt1i:~I:when forinccl our armies slioulrl operate on t ha t par t of Lhc Frontwhich may roughly be describccl as lyin g to thc east of the Ar gonnr.In that direction wcre some outslanrling features: th e ancient lortrcssof Vercl~m, he scene of th e terrific Ggliting of 1 9 ~ 6 ;11c remarlmblrsalient of St . Mihicl, one of t he str ong points of the (;ernznn line inli'rance; and just back of the Gcrman linc th e Bricy lirlils which 1i:~vcbeen one of the grcat f actors in Lhc conilu rt ol operations and just bytl~einMetz, the grc at aclvancc concentration po int which (Ecrnmny fora gm~eration ast h t ~ l elcl like the point of a sword towartls I'nris.It was natural that it shoulcl hxvo bcon in this direction that thosrrcsponsiblc for the hnuclling ol our First Arniy sho ul~l ~a vc nolwl.

Thc Chrm;~n osilion at St. Milliol prcscutrd a rrii ~:~rlcnl~lcin -bination of natural a nd military features.

The Cotes d e Meusc., bordering iliat rivrr on Llic cast, lomi ;I

strilring chain of hills rising al ~u ut 50 feet w r y sharply Irom ll irhilcuse valley lo th r wrsl and thr 1Vocvrc.s 011 ll1r casl. ' S ~ Pills arc

licavily wuorlctl and ikcply cut by ravines in all tlirectiuns; i n otlicrwords what.will1 good clr.~inagc nd dense u ~iclcrbrush hey arc admir-

d>ly ~cla~pLetlor tlefelise in truuclz warfare. The Gcnnan positionsstrctclicd froirt n conical Id11 just suutli of St. Mihiel, the Camp iles

lioinnus, right along th e Cotes for about 20 lalis. nortliwarcl a t whichp h t the y desccnclctl ~zort heast crly nto the lowlanils. St. Millie1itself lay a t the b ot to n~ f a natural cup and sul'ferecl throug 1~)ui om-

pnr:ttively littl e damage save from aerial boir~bart lment. The JVocvrcsis the n turol counterpart of th e cllain of hills,-an ill drained lowlantlfull oC niarslics ant1 pontls, ill atlaptccl to clefensivc works, and indccclto any Eom of n~i lit ary perations. Immediately cast o l St. BiIihiel,lio~vevcr, L prc)j~cti ng p r of hills reduced the widtli t r I this tlistrictto only a few lrilonietcrs of bad ground beyond mliicli, still movingabo ut tluq east , onc renclieil the next rise of hills, Lortlcring on thoMoselle., I k m i St . hIiliic1 to th e Moselle is about 30 lrnis.; ratlicr moretha n olne-half of thi s t1ist;~ncc s clifticult ground, but roughly r~b outmidway a fairly gootl front could be found where troops could behantllcc~ n th e at ta ck and where clcfensive positions wcre not to ostrong.. ' This pi~rt f th e southorn lace of t he salient was thereforeclearly id$icated a s a poinl: of attaclc.

Coming. now to th e lines of com~nunicntionwithin the salient,tlie m ap intlicatecl in th e clearest possible way tha t a n attac k fromlllc soutll face should be ~i ln cd t reaching %hiancourt extending asfar to t hc west as possible in th e direction of Vigneulles. 'I'hcse twopoint s were tho knot s of roads controlling th e apex of th e salient someI or 15 Icilonzc~tcrs outheasterly towar ds St. Mihiel. Assunling a

reasonable clcgpc of success it was apparent, lzowcver, that Thiau-curt multl be q 6 x c asily rdnchcd than Vigneulles, while tlie imi nroad St . Mihicl-Vigneulles woulrl give thc Gerninns a sufficient incanslor witliil rawiug the ir troopb if leEt uninter ruplecl long enough. 'Vhc

clucs"tian tluxefor~ rose wliclhcr it might not bc possible to force the~mt .hcrnntl oI tl lc Gcrn~a.nrl osition across t lic Cotes do Meuse ant1 to1)rcak tlimugh along th e~ hi ll s outlleasterly some 13,000 yards fromnew Lcs Kparges t o Vigneulles. 111this way the cl~anc csf cutting tlic

main Gcrnx~nine r )l co~smunicatioriwould bc ilclublcd.

It could not, of course, havc heen Inrscc~z t t he tiinc when theopcmtion was plantzed wllcther or not the C~crn\i~nommand woulddecide to mdce a fig111 lor th e salicnt. Tllc general situat ion gave

some i~lclication s to what was probnblc; and tlic claily work of tlicZntelligcnce Section cnablerl our IIigll Command to lcccp the closcstsort of check on tho eize~ay's utcntions in this regard. Still it tvns

necessary to plan the operation 011 the basis tllat a consiclcrablcaniou nt of rcsistnncc would have Lo be overcome. I t WLS also of the

utiuost inzporta~nci~l~ nl lic linc ' T l l i a ~~ c on r t - V i g~~ c ~~ l l e shoalil bcrfnched wi th gre:bt r,~p irlil y,1)ccnusc cvery llonr th at tlw rontlu rc-inzinctl o p u i i~cauthnL just so many Inore (:rrnz;~n troolrs could lic



1% BULLETIN FOR FIELD OFF IC J i R S

brought out of th e salient. Tllercforc it was important to use the

fullest number of tro ops th at could be usefully enlployecl under a ny

conclitions; and it was equally important to surprise the enemy.

The surprise element was most succcsslully murkeil, nncl in rnorc

tlmn one way. Sufiice it to say th at t he at tack came off about q8hours before it had been anticipated by th e enemy and th at ou r move-

ment on the western face towards Vigiieulles was appare ntly not Sore-

seen a t all. Our Staff functioned rcmarltably well, The attack beenalong familiar lines on thc rzth. At r o'cloclr: in th e morning a n

intense artillery preparation was opened, followed soon after dawn by

the adv ance of th e infantry. Meanwhile, however, th e Gcr111aus hail

becoine aware of t he imillinence of t he dangcr an d having clcternzinccl

upon withdrawal rath er tllan deleasc, orders wcrc issued for th e move

went t o take place on the very night selected for our attack; and our

artillery preparalion came a t the worst possible mo~lzcnt or th c

Germans, upsetting their acljusti~lcnts for ret reat. 'The encnly a t

this moment had in position the following divisions : 77th R, roth,

5th Lw., rgzcl and p art of thc 35th AX .Undcr th e conclitions already noted, and in view oE tllc k~ctha t

with one exception the German divisions ~vcrc hird class, a strcmgrcsistniice was hardly t o be expected. The aclvancc of our troops

procectlecl with great success, The at tac k on the suuth facc of 111~

salie nt with seven clivisions in linc between Ricllccourt nntl Vcy enI-layo, 14 Irilomcters, reachecl Thiaucourt and n consitlcwblc tlistaucr

west by the 1;1tc afternoon. On the wcstcrn facc the (;cr~unu s lfcrctl

vary littlc rrsistance, but on the otlicr hantl t h ~rtm~clwas so

naturally strong ancl the woolls so C ~ C I ~ S Ghat the I L ~ V ~ L I ~ O Cils 11w

rapicl. TIM1 evening the progress n~ nil r rft the divisions cup~ gotl

only a bout llalfwa y to Vignculles.

On th e 13tl1, the opcrtttion oil tho su uthern face coi~sistctl n Iit llr

more than mopping up and closing in on the scconcl Gcrinnn linc of

clcicnse, n linc which ra n roughly nortl~wcstwnrcls rom I'agny on t1wMoselle n t an average clistancc of from 5 to xo Bms, back of the first

line. On tllc othe r side, the i~clvnllcoowards Vigncullrs was resuil-rcd.Our infantry rcncllcd tlic edge of th e l~il lsust north oI Vigncullcs nl

about hd l past ten in tho morning and Vigacullos itself ;L few li(wr!;

Inter. This marlred the find rwliing oTC oC thc St . Mihirl siilitwl.

The rcsnlt of th e opcratio;l :IS a wliolc was t o str:~ighLcn11111Allicrl

line betwccn the Nloselle and tho Argonnc in such :Lwily ;IS o give! ;I

fr on t facing Bricy mlrl Metz. It gave our 1s t Anuy :LII i u v i ~ l ~~ ; t l ~ l ( ~

cxpcrioucc in large troop movcnients ant1 corn1)ii~atl ~ t t ~ l i .1

netted a total of i~ bo nt 5,ooo pris011ers ~vi1.h v w I W O li~i~~clr(\(llins,

machine gnns and. n-rortars, rolling stock ant1 o l wr 111~Icricl.

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Bullitin for Field Officers

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