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    ,

    RUDOLPHBULTMANN

    AN INTRODUCTORYINTERPRETATION

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    RUDOLPH BULTMANN

    An Introductory Interpre ta t ionJohn Webster

    @ John WebsterPublished by:

    Religious and Theological Studies Fellowship38 De Montfort Stree tLeicesterLEl 7GP

    RTSF publishes a ser ies of shor t booklets andmonographs on a wide range of f theological topics .For a free catalogue and order form write to theabove address .

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    PREFACE

    This booklet has a two-fold aim: to offer an account ofthe overa l l features of Bultmann's theology, and to give acri t ique of some of the major t rends in his thinking.Most students get the i r f i r s t tas te of Bultmann in thesphere of New Testament studies, ei ther a t f i r s t hand throughhis commentaries or his tor ica l work on the New Testament background, or - more l ikely - through lectures and books ofthose influenced by Bultman: Conzelmann, Hahn, Ful ler , Perr in.Given th i s , it may seem odd tha t I give a good deal of spaceto seemingly abstract theological and philosophical i ssues .But I do so because Bultmann's work on the New Testament -crucial ly , of course, his programme of 'demythologising' -cannot be understood a t a l l adequately without reference toh is existen t ial ism. Fai lure to grasp th is leaves a lo t bfstudents in the dark about what Bultmann is doing. Thisdi f f icul ty could be met by an awareness of the la rger , theological issues with which Bultmann i s dealing, undercuttingwhat has often been an unthinking condemnation of his work bythose Tllho have not properly understood what it is trying todo.The importance of Bultmann's work fo r anyone readingand thinking about theology in the current climate l ies not

    simply in the sheer volume of his writ ings, but in ther igour with which he pursues h is inslghts and the consistencywhich he displays in applying them to many dif ferent f ie lds .Bultmann was a rare example of a deeply ref lect ive mindcoupled with a phenomenal spread of knowledge, not onlyabout the New Testament and i t s Jewlsh and Hellenist ic background, but also about c lass ica l studies, l i te ra ture , phil-osophy and cul tura l his tory . One thing tha t it i s easy tooverlook is tha t in reading his work (and not those ofhis c r i t i c s ! ) , we are in the presence of something profound.Bultmann i s one of the handful of great theologians ofthe century: a New Testament c r i t i c and historian without peer,an outstanding philosopher and historian of ideas, abovea l l , a thorough-going th inker , whose convictions brought himthe censure, not only of tHe Nazis, but also of the off ic ia lsof the church. There can be l i t t l e doubt tha t Bultmann res-tored to Chris t ian theology some of the emphases whichl iberalism had previously obscuredJ but equally, there canbe l i t t l e doubt tha t he often pointed theology along a 'IIrongpath. Because of th is , Bultmann i s to be cr i t i c i sed - butthe f i r s t step to cr i t ic ism must be understanding what he

    says. Which is where we begin.-1 -

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    INTRODUCTION

    Bultmann's l i fe was of a singularly academic nature,and can be recounted simply. Born in Germany in 1884, hespent his school years laying the foundations of what wasto become a quite extraordinary erudi t ion. He studiedtheology with some of the great representat ives of Germanl iberalism - Gunkel and Harnack in Berlin , Jul icher , Weissand Herrmann in Marburg. I t was a t Marburg that his teachingcareer began in 1912, as lecturer in New Testament, andwhere, apart from a brief spel l , he was Professor of New' restament from 1921 unt i l his retirement in 1951. He diedin 1976.I t i s more than a matter of his tor ica l cur ios i ty to look

    a t the background of Bultmann's work. This is because theology does not take place in a vacuum: indeed, very often oneof the keys to understanding the work of a theologian maybe an appreciation of the personal or extrapersonal circumstances in which his work took place. And this i s t rue evenof cr i t i ca l study of the New Testament t ex t . Often exegesisof the Bible i s presented as a neutra l , purely sc ient i f icdiscipl ine , in which personal and his tor ical prejudices aresuspended in the in teres t s of object iv i ty . In fac t , b ib l ica lexegesis is a very sensi t ive guage of the presupposit ionswith which theologians work - as we can see easi ly be comparing a Reformation commentary such as Luther 's on Galatianswith modern lectures or commentaries on the same epis t le .Theology always takes place in a specif ic context: in thecase of Bultmann, too, a good deal of what he has to sayref lec ts the concerns of his era.

    To f i l l in a l i t t l e of the background. Bultmann wasvery decisively influenced by l iberal ism, the dominanttheological school in Germany a t the beginning of the century,when he received his theological t ra ining. Indeed, unt i lthe early 1920's , Bultmann saw himself as very much withinthe l ibera l t radi t ion . That t radi t ion has been very aptlycal led ' culture Protes tant ism' - l ibera l theologians, tha ti s , tended to see the Christ ian gospel as harmonious with,and as the fulf i lment of, a l l the great human civi l isedvalues: love, to lera t ion , peace, freedom, se l f -sacr i f ice ,goodness. In a class ic l ibera l t ext such as Harnack's bookWhat i s Christ ianity? (1900), the essent ial points of thegospel were summarIsed as the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the inf in i te value of the human soul .Chris t iani ty was thus given a predominantly-ethical in te r pretat ion: Jesus, in the eyes of the great l Ibera l thinkers ,

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    was almost more of a dispenser of general moral maxims thana divine Saviour. Whilst it i s important to recognise thatvery rarely i s just ice done to th is older l ibera l theology -indeed, tha t it i s almost never read - it i s di f f i cu l t toescape the feeling that in the t radi t ion from Schleiermacher,the ' f a ther of l iberal ism' , to Harnack, major components ofthe Chris t ian gospel were ei ther excluded or interpreted ina way which failed to do just ice to the breadth of Chris t iant ru th .

    At the beginning of the 1920's , Bultmann, l ike Karl Barth,came to r e j ec t th is l ibera l heri tage; turning his back decisively on i t , he became associated with what was then known as' d ia lect ical ' or 'neo-orthodox' theology. Bultmann came tosee tha t l iberal ism had made the Chris t ian gospel into l i t t l emore than the rel igious counterpart of humanistic Europeanciv i l i sa t ion - a civ i l i sa t ion whose emptiness had beent ragical ly exposed by the events of 1914-18. Liberal theologyhad ceased to take God seriously; i t s ta lk was of man andman's rel igion or man's ethics . Bultmann came to see that inthe New Testament gospel, God and man are not partners in thebuilding of a Chris t ian cul ture : they are a t war.

    An excellent example of the direct ion of Bultmann'sthought in this new departure would be his in terpre ta t ionof the concept of the Kingdom of God. A l ibera l theologianl ike Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) interpreted the Kingdom ofGod in primarily eth ica l and humanistic terms: the Kingdomi s something which men do, it is the organization of humanitythrough action inspIred of love. Bultmann completely rejectsth i s e th ica l view of the Kingdom, since it fa i l s to appreciatethe dist inct ion between God and man which the Kingdom presupposes. He writes in his book Jesus and the Word, whichf i r s t appeared in Germany in 1926, tha t the KIngdom of Godmeans 'deliverance for men. I t i s tha t eschatologicaldeliverance which ends everything ear th ly ' (p.33), and headds that 'This deliverance confronts man as an Either-Or '( ib id) . The Kingdom i s thus not, as the l ibera ls thought,the culmination of a l l tha t men consider good: it is 'whollysupernatural ' (p.34), opposed to man and his e th ica l concerns."The Kingdom of God . is something miraculous, in fac t , theabsolute miracle, opposed to a l l here and now; it i s "whollyother", heavenly' (p.34).

    But alongside this emphasis on the aspects of the Chris t iangospel to which l iberal ism had fai led to give due weight, therecoexis ts Bultmann's highly c r i t i ca l stance towards thetask of reading the New Testament t ex t . Indeed in approachingthe study of the Bible, Bultmann continued to use highlyrefined versions of the tools which had f i r s t been fashionedby the very l iberals he was re jec t ing. Later on we wil l look-3 -

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    more closely a t th is important area of the re la t ion betweenh ~ s cr i t i ca l use of the Bible and his theological c o n c 1 u s i o n ~ :for the present , we need only note tha t precisely a t thetime in which Bu1tmann was coming to question the l ibera lt radi t ion , he published The Histo 'ryof ' the synoEtic Tradi t ion(1921) - the classic tex t of form-crItIcIsm. T Is bOokanaiyses the various l i t e rary forms of the accounts of theminist ry of Jesus in the synoptic gospels (miracle s tor ies ,controversy sayings, prophetic uterances, parables, e t c . ) ,and seeks to show how these forms have been radical lyal tered, and often created, by the act iv i ty of the earlychurch. The conclusion from the book is tha t the synopticaccounts of Jesus are-almost useless as an his to r ica l record.

    The context , then, in which Bultrnann's theology i s to bese t , i s two-fold. There is his radical ly c r i t i ca l approachto the re l iab i l i ty of the New Testament as an his to r ica lrecord: and there i s his equally strong s t ress on theunfashionable aspects of the Chris t ian gospel. I t i s acurious mix, which we cannot explain away eas i ly as in consistency, and which requires careful study before wepronounce judgement. The way in to understanding i s aconsideration of the word which more than any other has becomeinseparably lihked with Bultrnann - demytho10gising.

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    1. EXPOSITIONBultmann's Theological ProgrammeWhat does it mean to 'demythologise' the New Testament?In summary form, Bultmann's answer might run somethingl ike th i s : to demythologise is to real i se tha t the messageof the New Testament does not re s t in the 'mythological 'externals , but in i t s 'kerygmatic ' core . In order toelucidate th i s , we s t a r t with the two notions 'myth'and ' kerygma '

    1. Kerygma and MythBultmann's analysis of the New Testament i s madeup of two components: kerygma and myth. To s t a r t with

    the l a t t e r : Bultmann def ines myth thus: 'Mythology i s theuse of imagery to express the otherworldly in termsof th is world and the divine in terms of human l i f e ,the other side in terms of th i s s ide . For instance,divine transcendence i s expressed as spa t ia l dis tance 'CH W a r 8 c h ~ ed, KerYlma and Myth I , p. 10). And the NewTestament message Is y and large expressed in thesemythological terms. As examples, we might adduce the ideas'o f Chris t as Second Adam or Messiah or Son of Godl. the VirginBirth or the Second Comingl the in terpreta t ion of the deathof Chris t as a sacr i f ic ia l atonement - a l l of these ways ofspeaking are mythological, since they speak of divine r ea l i t i e sin terms borrowed from the human realm. At the outset , i tmust be understood tha t Bultmann does not mean tha t becausethese ideas are mythological they are untrue. Of course, theyare untrue i f they are taken a t the i r s u ~ f a c e level : for example,Chris t wil l not come again on the c l o u d ~ of heaven, as theThessalonian epis t l es maintain. But these myths are t ruewhen they are properly understood, not in and fortnemselves,but as expressions of the message underneath the myth. Themeaning of the New Testament t ex t i s not to be found ini t s external , mythological shel l , which i s the outdatedcosmology of pr imit ive Palest inian and Hellenist ic communities,but in the kernel , which i s the kerygma.

    By the 'kerygma', Bultmann means the essent ia l messageof the New Testament for today, once tha t has been extractedfrom i t s mythological se t t ing . The extract ion is the work ofthe process of demytholgising, which i s thus the methodwhereby we in terpret the inner meaning of the mythologicalstatements we f ind in the New Testament.-5 -

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    The relat ionship between the mythology of the New Testamentand i t s kerygmatic meaning we have already described as tha tbetween the kernel and the shel l : in order to get to thekernel , we have to ge t througb i t s outer casing. . What Bultmannis dOing here is very close to what some of the churchfathers did in trying to use the Old Testament. Takinga s t a r t from Origen (185-254), many of the church fathersread the his to r ica l port ions of the Old Testament asal legor ies - as s tor ies whose meaning l i es not in the' sur face ' t ex t , but in the hidden message which theyexemplify or i l l us t ra t e . Gregory of Nyssa (330-95), forexample, in his Life of Moses, in terpre ts Moses' ascent ofSinai in Exodus 19 as underneath a story about the ascentof the soul to God. So Bultmann: to discover the rea lmeaning of the New Testament we look beneath the pla in ,surface meaning to the hidden kerygma.

    For Bultmann, then, demythologising i s a posi t ive ,not a negative approach to the New Testament . In his essayin Kerygma and Myth I , ent i t led 'New Testament and Mythology',Bultmann Is a t paIns to emphasise tha t he i s not je t t isoningthe message of the New Testament because he f inds it unacceptable, but ra ther he i s seeking to find out what i s therea l meaning of tha t message. In th i s he dist inguisheshimself from the older l ibera ls l ike Harnack who simplypruned the gospel of those elements which the modern worldview found hard to take. Bultmann does not want to reducebut to in terpret - to get to the rea l message, to the rea lstumbling-block.We must keep th is firmly in mind when we t ry to understandthe reasons for demythologising. I t ought a t the outse tto be saId tha t Bultmann's aim i s not apologetic - he i snot trying to make the Chris t ian gospel acceptable beforethe court of human reason. His aim i s rather declaratory -making known what the content of the Chris t ian fa i th i s .Hence it is not t rue , as i s often asserted, tha t Bultmannintroduced the demythologising programme into theologybecause the sc ient i f ic outlook of modern man had made theplain meaning of the New Testament t ex t impossible to

    accept . I t i s of course t rue tha t fo r Bultmann 'modernscience does not believe tha t the course of nature canbe interrupted or, so to speak, perforated, by supernaturalpowers' (Jesus Chris t and M ~ t h O l o g i ' p. 15) - and hence tha tmythological Ideas of t h e l v l n e n t r u s i o n into the naturalrealm are not open to modern man. But th is modern sc ient i f icoutlook only serves to show tha t the rea l meaning of theNew Testament never did res t in i t s mythology, but in thekerygma: 'To demythologise i s to deny tha t the message ofScripture i s bound to an ancient world-view which i s obsolete '(op. c i t , p. 36). Bultmann does not demythologise in order tomake the Christian fa i th eas ier or more acceptable to modernman.

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    Two other reasons for demythologising are more accurateaccounts of wnat Bultmann i s aiming to do. Firs t , he claimsthe the New Testament i t se l f begins the process of demythol-ogising. Paul, for example, demytho10gises the primit ivePalest inian eschatology by speaking (in Ga1atians 4.4) of thefuture as already inaugurated. John especial ly rein terpretsthe future references in eschatology by making the futurejudgement a matter of the here and now, and by seeingthe earthly work of Jesus as the eschatologica1 event whichmore primit ive t radi t ions put in the future. In otherwords, within the New Testament i t se l f there is the pre-cedent for demytho1ogising.

    Witn the second, futher reason we are taken to theheart of what Bu1tmann has to say about the New Testament.The reason i s this : demythologisingis necessary becausemythology speaks of God and man in an i l legi t imate way.Mythology speaks of God, for example, as a worldly object'out there ' l ike any other object - whereas for the kerygmaof the New Testament, God is a matter of personal concern.I t i s th i s - ex is ten t ia l i s t - s tar t ing-point which offersthe clue to what Bu1trnann i s doing when he in terpretsthe mythology of the New Testament in terms of i t s under-lying 'kerygmatic ' message. Before looking a t the pointmore closely, however, it may be worthwhile to summariseso fa r by means of the following proposi t ions:1. The New Testament is composed of kerygma and myth.2. Myth i s the external form of the New Testament.3. The kerygma i s i t s in ternal content .4. We ext ract the kerygma from the myth by demytho1ogising.5. Dernythologising i s not destructive: i t i s demanded bythe New Testament.

    2. Existent ial ism.At the end of the previous section we suggested tha tthe fundamental reason for demytho10gising the New Testamenti s tha t mythology speaks in an i l legi t imate way. What th i smeans is tha t Bu1tmann's question about how to in terpre t themythology of the New Testament is a t heart a question aboutthe proper way of speaking about God and man. To understandthe kind of issues about which th i s question inquires ,and especial ly, to understand Bu1tmann's answer to thequest ion, we need to do a l i t t l e orienteering in the f ie ldof exis tent ial ism: once tha t has been done, the te r r i toryshould be a l i t t l e clearer and we should be able to appreciatemore of the dr i f t of Bu1trnann's thought.When Bu1tmann was f i r s t a professor a t Marburg in the

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    1920's , h is colleague in the department. of philosophy wasMartin Heide9ger, one of the leading representat ives of whathas came to be known as exis tent ia l i sm. Heidegger's thinkingi s complex in the extreme, for not only does it t r e a t highlyabst rac t philosophical i ssues, but it t rea t s them in a mannerwhich even to the t rained philosopher i s a t f i r s t s ight simplybaff l ing, and which demands a great deal of anyone seeking tollnderstand him. part ly th i s i s because of the ent i relynovel se t of concepts and words which Heidegger invents to ex-press his thought. Some consideration of Heidegger i s ,however, essen t ia l to those wishing to understand Bultmann.For a much fu l le r account of the relat ion than wecan give in th is present context, the reader i s referredto Professor John Macquarrie 's excel lent study An Existent-i a l i s t Theoloqy.

    The meeting of Bultmann and Heidegger a t Marburg betweenthe years 1923 and 1928 was one of the in te l lec tua l eventsof the century. For Bultmann, the philosophy of Heideggeroffered nothing less than a new insight into the heart ofthe kerygma of the New Testament. In addi t ion, Heideggerprovided Bultmann with the stock of concepts whereby hecould express his in terpre ta t ion of the rea l meaning oftha t kerygma. What was i t , then, tha t Bultmann found sostimulating in Heidegger's thought, especial ly as it i sfound expressed in his book Being . and Time, which f i r s tappeared in Germany in 19271In order to begin to answer t t iat question it may be helpfulto give a br ief map of the te r r i tory of existent ial ism fo r theless famil iar . A roughly const i tuted philosophical school,existent ial ism i s to a large extent a 20th century phenomenon,although i t s roots l ie in such 19th century thinkers asKierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche. Amongst i t s majorrepresentat ives are Jaspers and Heidegger in Germany, and Sartrand Camus in France. EXistentialism has been of less influencein England, par t icular ly in academic ci rc les where logica land l inguist ic matters have been the staple philosophicaldie t fo r most of the century. Indeed, existent ial ism is notrea l ly an 'academic' movement: by def in i t ion, i t s concern i s

    with ref lect ing on human existence and human ac t ion. Ofcourse, th i s is not to say tha t it has not produced ser ious~ c a d e m i c ' works: Heidegger's Being and Time and Sar t re ' sbooks Being and Nothintness and cr i t ique 01 Dialec t ica l Reasonare l ikely to become p I losophical classIcs . But exIstentIalism i s by no means exclusively an academic af fa i r : it hasstrong l i t e rary connections: both Sartre and Camus are majornovel is ts and playwrights. And it has a pol i t ica l concern,as might be expected from a view of l i f e which puts sucha s t ress on human ac t ion.-8 -

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    Put very Qaldly, the common theme or way of approachwhich unif ies a l l the diverse aspects of existent ial ismmight be s ta ted thus: 'Existence precedes essence' (Sart re) .What, we may ask with jus t ice , does that mean, and how doesit have the remotest connection Vith the New Testament gospel?In order to grasp the concerns of eXistent ial ism, we look a tone specif ic issue to which ex is ten t ia l i s t thinkers have constant ly returned: what is man? In looking a t the w?y in whichHeidegger answers tha t quest ion, we shal l hopefully be ableto discover some of the main themes of exis tent ia l i sm, and thenmove on to see the use made of them by Bultmann in interpret ingthe Chris t ian fai th for today.

    When Heidegger asks the question 'What i s man?', the mostimportant word in the question i s the verb: 'What i s man?'.That i s to say, he asks about the fact tha t man i s ~ a b o u t man's'being ' , about the ' i s -ness ' of man. Put technical ly, h isconcern is to inquire af te r what it means to at t r ibute 'be ing'to man. When we ask 'Whah i s man?', what do we mean by ' i s ' ?At f i r s t s ight tha t may seem a point less question - do we nota l l know what we mean when we say the word ' i s ' ? But on closerinspect ion the question i s very f ru i t fu l : one of Heidegger'smajor concerns has been to show tha t there are many dif feren tanswers to the 'question about being ' , especial ly when we askit in the form 'What i s man?'

    These answers can be put into roughly two groups. Thef i r s t answer or group of answers i s predominantly tha t givenby the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristo t le , but followed,with modifications, unt i l the end of the 19th century. Thisanswer sees man in primarily s t a t i c terms. A good exampleof what is meant here would be the way we ta lk about humannature . In talking th is way of man we suggest tha t man's beingIs something fixed, something constant , something universalwhich obtains everywhere. According to th i s picture of man,a man i s his nature, and th i s nature can be described in ternlsof some-of i t s unvarying character is t ics - man i s SOCial, hei s ra t ional , he makes tools , he possesses the gi f t of language,he i s re l ig ious . All these qual i t ies are seen as the constantsof man's nature . In other words, th i s picture of man definesman by what he i s essen t ia l ly . To inver t the words from Sar t re ,'Essence precedes exIstence ' .

    To give a concrete example, we might look at Plato ' s ideaof man. For plato, there i s a difference between what man isoutwardly, and what he i s inwardly. Man's outer l i f e - hisexternal act ion, his existence - i s less important than hisinner l i f e . And i f we wish to inquire what man real ly i s , wedo not look to the external exis tence, but to the essen t ia lpar t of man, the inner l i fe of which the external act ion i sonly a shadow of l i t t l e rea l importance. plato i s a good-9 -

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    example of th is f i r s t picture of man: man has a fixed naturewhich he inheri ts as p a ~ t and parcel of being human. I t is adefin i t ion of man which i s essent ial ly s t a t i c .The second answer to the question 'What i s man?' i s tha toffered by Heidegger himself. He reverses the direct ion ofPlato 's thought by st ressing ' exis tence ' over ' essence ' .What is most important about man i s his external existence,and not some supposed eternal ly s t a t i c , fixed and preprogrammednature which he possesses in vir tue of being a man. Manmakes himself. By tha t Heidegger means to say tha t man's'be ing' i s created every time man engages in an ac t ofexisi tng. I t i s man's act ions, man's concrete l i fe in thepresent which makes his being into what i t i s . To takea specif ic example, we might ask what i t means to say tha t'man is f ree ' . On the f i r s t , s t a t i c model of man, man'sfreedom would be an at t r ibute which he has because he isa man, and which he would then exercise in specif ic acts

    of freedom. But for the second, more dynamic picture ofman, man's freedom can only be derived from speci f ic actsof freedom. Man is free only as he acts freely. I t i sa man's acts whico-determine his being.Because of th i s , Heidegger places great weight on thenotion of decis ion. Because man i s not fixed, as the Greeksand l a te r t h l n k e ~ s maintained, but must make himself , thenwhat he does matters. The al l - important thing about a manis his acts . For Heidegger, the most important ac t isthe ac t of decis ion. By deciding, we become ourselves.

    Deciding is the way of se l f - rea l i sa t ion , of making ourselvesinto ourselves, because in deciding, we choose betweenone thing and another and thus decide to be somethingspecif ic . Put tersely: man i s his decisions about himself .According to the f i r s t picture of man, man's decisions aredetermined by what he essent ial ly is - a man chooses tobe free because he i s f ree . Heidegger once again reversesthe direct ion: a man i s free because he chooses to be free.This leads to the dist inct ion which Heidegger makesbetween ' au thent ic ' and ' inauthent ic ' existence. This very

    odd-sounding way of talking about man follows on simplyfrom what we have said about the contrasts between the twopictures of man ' Inauthentic ' existence i s existence whichruns away from making decisions. I f i t is t rue, as Heideggerproposes, that man becomes himself by deciding, then therefusal to decide i s the refusal to exis t properly as a man.A man is his decisions, he Comes to be in specif ic acts ofchoice. The refusal to decide may take many forms: i t maybe clinging to one specif ic way of acting in the face of thedemand to change, it may be keeping the world and a l l i t sthreats and questions a t a distance, avoiding the need torespond, crucial ly , for Heidegger, i t can be the refusal to face- 10 -

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    up to the fac t tha t a l l men wil l one day die . A ll theseare examples of running away from decision, of clingingto secur i ty ra ther than running the r isk of exposure tochoice. And tha t means running away from ' au thent ic 'existence.For authent ic existence accepts the exposure to the

    demand to decide - and in so doing, becomes proper existence.I f Inauthentic existence i s not being yourself , authent icexistence i s being yourself , since your se l f i s your decisionsabout yourse l f . Descartes ' famous dictum whicn providedthe s tar t ing-point for the whole of his philosophy was 'Cogito,ergo sum' - ' I think, therefore I am'. For Heidegger theequivalent might be ' I decide, therefore I am'. Or to puti t another way: on the f i r s t picture of man, man's being (the' i s ' of the question 'What i s man?') i s a qual i ty which hepossesses; on Heidegger 's picture man's being i s an event,something which happens when man decides to ex i s t in-an-authent ic manner.

    What is the re la t ion of a l l th is to Bultmann's in terpreta t ion of the New Testament?3. An Exis ten t i a l i s t Interpreta t ion of the New Testament.

    From our br ie f look a t Heidegger, it should by nowbe a l i t t l e clearer what the statement ' exis tence precedesessence ' means. The specif ic example of the way Heideggerta lks about man sought to show tha t man's ' be ing ' isto be discovered in actual moments of exis t ing, in man'sac ts , ra ther than in some ' e ssen t ia l human nature ' . I t isprecisely th i s which Bultmann seizes upon. For him, Heidegger'sexistent ial ism i s nothing other than a rediscovery of themessage of the New Testament kerygma. I t thus offers notonly a possible , but a necessary means of interpret ing theChris t ian gospel . This - and not , as i s often sa id , an unwillingness or inabi l i ty to accept the surface meaning of the NewTestament - i s the fundamental motive a t work in the programmeof demythologising.

    We said ea r l i e r tha t Bultmann's basic problem with themythology of the New Testament i s tha t it speaks of Godand man in an i l legi t imate way. We can explain the pointhe i s t rying to make here by dist inguishing, as Bultmanndoes, between ' ob jec t i fy ing ' and 'non-object ifying' language.'Object ifying' language speaks about i t s subject-Inatteras it were a t one remove. I t speaks f rornout s ide : i m p a r t ~ a l 1 y ,dis in teres tedly , without any rea l engagement with the subJectmatter . That is why i t i s cal led ' ob jec t i fy ing ' language: it

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    makes the matter of which it speaks into an objec t ' ou t t h e r e ~ ~so to speak, an objec t which is apar t from us and which doesnot touch our inmost being.The opposite of th i s is 'non-object ifying' language.This way of speaking ta lks about i t s subject-matter fromwithin personalconcern. The things of which it speaKS"'areseen as matters touchIng the very existence of the speaker- they are matters of urgent concern, and so cannot be spokenabout in a way which keeps them a t a distance: the subjectmatter i s thus no longer an object ' ou t there ' , but somethingwhich cuts into my existence in the present .When we come to look a t the actual shape of what Bultmannsees as the cent ra l message of the New Testament, we sha l l beable to give some concrete examples of the dist inct ion between'object ifying ' and 'non-object ifying' language as applied toGod; but some i n i t i a l unclari ty may be cleared up by a couple ofnon-t.heological examples. The f i r s t , ra ther t r iv ia l , wouldbe the way we would describe a hammer. 'Object ifying' languagewould describe i t s const i tuent par ts , i t s materials , i t s shape,Size, weight and so forth: but we would never get to the rea lpOint i f we fai led to go on to describe the hammer as somethingto he llsed by us in accomplishing cer ta in speci f ic tasks. Thisl a t t e r descript ion would be non-objectifying. A more soberexample: we could speak of death in object ifying terms bydescribing the c l in i ca l processes involved; but non-objectifyinglanguage about death would t r e a t it as a matter which involvedme personally - as one bereaved, as one fear ing his own death.

    To speak adequately of death, we cannot speak about i t withoutbringing our own existence into the centre of concern.For Bultmann, the problem with mythology is tha t it i sobject ifying language. A mythological way of speaking holdsmatters of concern a t one remove, it speaks about them from.a safe dis tance. And th i s i s precisely why the mythology ofthe New Testament has to be interpreted i f the underlyingkerygmatic message i s - to emerge. The mythology i s ' ob jec t i fy ing ' :the kerygma i s non-object ifying . Bultmann writes in hisessay 'New Testament and Mythology' tha t 'Myth should be

    interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, orbet ter s t i l l , eXis tent ia l ly ' (p. 10); and he goes on to sayth i s : the importance of the New Testament mythology l i esnot in i t s imagery but in the understanding of existence whichit enshr ines ' (p. 11).

    From th is perspect ive, we can begin to see why Bultmann Iwants to in terpre t the. mythology of the New Testament wri ters .Demythologising i s not a destruct ive process, not. the j e t t i soning of cer ta in elements of the Chris t ian gospel be.cause modern-12-

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    m&n cannot believe them. Rather, it i s the way of gett ingto the hear t ot what the New Testament has always said ands t i l l says; for the matters of which it speaks are notabst ract issues of which we may speak with impart ia l "detachments they are matters of exis tent ia l concern. Ournext task i s to take a look at some of the resu l t s ofthis sor t of in terpre ta t ion by examining some of the majorthemes which Bultmann t r ea t s .a. Bultmann's Method

    From what we have said so far , it should be cleartha t Bultmann's existent ial ism leads him to in terpre tthe message of the New Testament in non-objectifying terms- in terms which seek to express tha t message as a matter ofpersonal concern in the pract ical business of making decisionsabout our existence. In his l i t t l e book Jesus and the Word,he writes tha t his fundamental way of approachIng the mythologyof the New Testament i s to look underneath the mythology forthe 'conception of man which in the l a s t analysis underliesit' (p. 47). And tha t phrase could serve as a neat summaryof the way in which Bultmann se ts about the task of interpret ingthe gospel message. He makes the same point in his bookPrimitive Chris t iani ty in "its Contemporary Set t ing , when hesays that what the bOok aims to gIve Is an Interpretat ionof the 'understanding of human existence ' (p. 12) in theearly Chris t ian gospel.

    There are two consequences of th i s method which we oughtto take a look a t before we go on to see the concrete resu l t sof the method. The f i r s t is tha t it lends a cer ta in urgencyto a l l Bultmann's writ ings (the exception being the highlytechnical approach of The His to r t o f "the Synoptic Tradi t ion).Bultmann, tha t i s , does not see Is work as exclusIvely anacademic a f fa i r , an abst ract exerdise with very l i t t l e tosay to the pract ica l concerns of the l i fe of fa i th . The thingswhich he t rea t s are matters demanding decision, cutt ing tothe marrow of human existence. Hence the earnestness ofBultmann's prose s ty le i s not simply a matter of l i te ra ryt as te : it points to how he sees h is task as a theologian.

    The second consequence, of greater importance, i s tha t'anthropology' becomes the main concern of a l l theologicals tatements . By anthropology we do not of course mean thesc ient i f ic study of (usually primitive) civ i l i sa t ions , butsomething much more general - the study or view of man (inthe sense, that i s , in which we use the word in the phrase' theological anthropology') . Bultmann, we saw ea r l i e r , lnterprets a l l mythological s tatements , such as those we f ind inthe New Testament, in terms of the view of man which underliesthem. That is to say, he in terprets them anthropologically.-13-

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    And more than th i s ; a l l theological statements are interpretedanthropological ly or exis tent ia l ly . A good example ofth is is the sect ion onthe . theo logyof Paul in the f i r s tvolume of his NeW' Testalnent Theology. In his preliminaryremarks, he says tha t 'paullne theology i s not a speculat ivesystem. I t deals with God not as he is in himself but onlywith God as he is s ignif icant for man, for man's responsibi l i tyand man's sa lvat ion ' (pp. 190f). And he goes on to say 'Forth i s reason and in th is sense Paul ' s theology i s , a t thesame t ime, anthropology' (p. 191). The exposition of Paulwhich follows these remarks bears out the l ine of approach,as it divides the whole of Paul ' s thought into ref lec t ionson man pr ior to the revelat ion of fa i th and on man underfa i th . Theological statements have significance only insofaras they refer to man's existence now.Bultmann takes th is point fur ther when he rejects theidea of 'general t ru ths ' as applied to the Chris t ian gospel.

    By a 'general t ru th ' he means much the same thing as anobject ifying statement: a statement which remains meaningfulindependent of any ' ex i s tent ia l s igni f icance ' i t might havefor men. The Chris t ian kerygma does not speak in a generalway a t a l l - it speaks ex is ten t ia l ly , for the here and now.A couple of examples wil l show tha t his reject ion of 'generalt ru ths ' i s an important component in his method of approachingthe New Testament.Fi rs t , the example of ethics . For Bultmann, the NewTestament does not present us with general moral principles ,

    but with concrete demands to act in speci f ic ways in specif ics i tua t ions (this , indeed, was one of the main areas ofdisagreement between Jesus and contemporary lega l i s t icJudaism). For general moral principles can only be regardedwith the at t i tude of the spectator, and not with tha t of oneact ively involved in get t ing on with the job. When we ta lkabout the ethica l demands of the gospel , those demands mustbe seen as par t icu lar and actual - they cannot be deducedfrom general moral t ru ths . Bultmann writes: 'The cr i s i sof decision i s the s i tua t ion in which a l l observation i sexcluded, for which NOw alone has meaning, which i s whollyabsorbed in the present moment. . Now must man know what todo and have undone, and no s t a n d a ~ f r o m the past or theuniversal is avai lable. That is the meaning of decis ion '(Jesus and the Word, p. 6ar . - To give an example: thecommandment to love one 's neighbour in the New Testamentis not a general moral principle; it is meaningless apartfrom the concrete s i tua t ion of man's being in community withother men. To put it formally: ethics are exis tent ia l .

    The second example of the reject ion of general t ru ths i s-14-

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    Bultmann's i n t ~ r p r e t a t i o n of miracles . According to him,we do not believe in miracles in the SaIlle way tha t we believein the theory of re la t iv i ty - as things which may, indeed,take place, but which do not affec t our exis tence. Miraclesare only meaningful i f they affec t us now. He writes tha t' I f Jesus ' bel ief in miracles i s understood as a generalconv.i.ction tha t cer ta in happenings, which we today areaccustomed to at t r ibute to natural causes, depend uponsome higher, divine cause, then the b9l ief i s understoodas the expression of the fa i th tha t God's wil l i s not ingeneral vis ib le but reveals i t se l f in special and part icularevents, then it belongs of necessi ty to his idea of God'(Jesus and the Word,p. 127). We do not believe in 'miraclesin genera l ' : such a bel ief has no meaning unless it is underneath an expression of actual encounters between God and man.

    These two examples show well what we mean by exis tent ia lin terpre ta t ion a t work. Closely connected with this isanother aspect of Bultamnn's method which has received agood deal of at tent ion in recent years . This aspect wecould describe by using the t i t l e of an essay by Bultmannf i r s t published in 1957: ' I s Exegesis without PresuppositionsPossible? ' (the English t ranslat ion i s to be found in hiscol lect ion Existence and Fai th) .

    I t i s commonplace in exeget ical work on the Bible - or ,indeed, in any other sphere of his tor ica l invest igation -to regard the work we do in a purely detached, sc ient i f icmanner. I t is not the task of the inves t igator to bringh is personali ty into the matter (hence dul l commentaries!):his personal:and extra-personal circumstances should,indeed, be suspended, l e s t they be allowed to influence theaccount which he gives of the object of his invest igation.Thus, for example, in presenting what the New Testamenthas to say about baptism, we should not allow our churchmanshipto colour our account of the Bibl ica l da ta .

    Bultmann, of course, accepts th is sor t of object ivi ty asnecessary - though i t i s a matter of debate whe.ther he isas impart ial as might be wished in presenting some of th i sevidence. But there is another sor t of object iv i ty whi.chhe does re jec t outr ight in the essay we have j us t mentioned.That sor t of object iv i ty i s what we might ca l l ant i -exis tent ia l :it does not allow the subject-matter to be of personal concernto the inves t igator . All we have said so far should makeit clear tha t it i s jus t th is sor t of neutra l at t i tude towardsthe subject-matter of the New Testament which Bultmann wantsto avoid a t a l l costs . And th is is why he claims tha texegesis cannot be without presupposit ions - unless it i sdone by someone less than human. No-one can read the NewTestament without a sense of i t s importance as a document

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    for him as a person. I f we are to encounter what the NewTestament says, we cannot suspend our subject iv i ty , ra ther ,we must take tha t subject ivi ty to the text and allow it tobe questioned by the message we f ind there. As Bultmannputs it in s l igh t ly more technical language presupposit ionsare a f ru i t fu l way of approaching the tex t because in orderto understand it, we must stand in a ' l i f e - re l a t ion ' to i t .To sum up th is f i r s t aspect of Bultamnn's ex is ten t ia l i s treading of the New Testament: the New Testament is to beinterpreted exis tent ia l ly , by looking for the understandingof man which is expressed through the mythology. This meanstha t there we do not have to do with general t ru ths , but withex is ten t ia l t ru ths - which means the at t i tude of ' s c ien t i f i cneut ra l i ty ' i s excluded.

    b. The Nature of Man.We now turn to look a t some specif ic examples of th i smethod in action. Fi rs t , the doctr ine of man.From what we have seen of Bultmann so far , especial lyin his analYSis of New Testament ethics , it should be evidenttha t he sees man in ex is ten t ia l terms: a man is his acts . He

    ~ l r i t e s tha t ' what a man has dbne and does - his decisions -const i tute him in h is t rue n a t u r e ~ he rs -essen t ia l l* atemporal being' (Essays, p. 9). Man's essence Is not ingother than his exIstence in the here and now, in history.That is why he is a ' temporal ' or ' h i s to r ica l ' being: hei s never outside time and change.

    And th i s ex i s ten t i a l def in i t ion of man Bultmann t racesto Jesus himself . He writes tha t ' the nature of a man forJesus i s not determined by his human qual i ty or the characterof his spi r i tua l l i f e , but simply by the decision the manmakes in the here-and-now of his present l i f e ' .(Jesus andthe Word, p. 46), tha t is 'Only what a man does now gIveshim value ' (Ibid) . Not only i s th i s t ru th found in the(carefully demythologised) teaching of Jesus, it can alsobe found in the Old Testament view of man (see PrtmitiveChris t iani ty in i t s Contemporary Set t ing, Pt 1, Ch 3) and,most especial ly , In the theology of Paul (see Theology of theNew Testa.nent, vol 1 , Pt 2) .

    As a concrete example, we might ci te Bultmann's in terpre t ation of what it means for man to be a sinner. Sinfulness i snot a ' s t a t e ' in which man ex i s t s . Alienation from God cannotbe thought in a s ta t i c way a t a l l , s ince it is only in specif icacts tha t a man has being. Bultmann says tha t 'Sin isdisobedience against the demand of the here and now'Prtmitive Chris t iani ty , p. 58): it is not a s ta te of rebell ionagaInst God, hut acts of r e b e l l i o n ~ A clear instance of th i s

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    view of man i s -h i s analysis of the nature of sin in the Gospelof John. Bultmann writes tha t 'When a man commits himselfto fal lenness, he surrenders his authentIc possIbIII ty . . .Man i s a t a l l times cal led to decis ion, to r isk himself . Theworld re jec t s such decision - and in the reject ion it has a lready made the decision and has cut off i t s existence aspotent ia l i ty- to-be i s to have a future ' (Faith and Understanding,pp. l70f) . To elucidate the ra ther complex language here:what Bultmann ear l ie r cal led ' authentic existence ' he cal l shere ' po ten t ia l i ty - to -be ' - tha t abi l i ty to be open todecision and thus to be open to make oneself by makingdecis ions . The resul t of such openness i s having a future(not in the sense of a temporal fu ture ' , but rather a ' fu turef i l led with meaning') . Sin cuts i t s e l f off from this poss ib i l i tyof authent ic exis tence, which i s only opened up again in fai th :'Only in l i s tening to the revelat ion of the Word does fai thexis t . Only in such l i s tening is the poss ib i l i ty of the futureopened' (Faith and Understanding, p. 179).c. The Nature of God.

    About God as he is in and for himself, we cannot speak,nor should we wish to do so. One of the major emphases ofthe ea r l i e r work of Bultmann was on the notion of God as'Wholly Other ' : God is not a t our disposal , cannot be domesticated and brought down to our level . Par t ly th i s wasbecause of his re ject ion of l ibera l theology, which he -along with Karl Barth - believed to have jet t isoned thefact tha t 'God is other than the world, he i s beyond theworld' (Faith and Understanding, p. 40). Like Barth,Bultmann maintains an ' absolute contradict ion' between Godand the world, so tha t the relat ion of the gospel to theworld cannot be one of ' completion' but only of 'abrogat ion' .

    But the hiddenness of God should not lead us to concludetha t God is not our concern. I f we cannot know God as he isin himself, such knowledge is not our concern. Our concern i swith God as he affects the here and now of our existence -anything beyond tha t i s simply not our business. Once again,we see how the underlying exis tent ial ism is a t work - Godis not a 'general t ru th ' , but something which cuts into ourexistence a t specif ic points .

    Put simply: we cannot speak of God without also speakingof man. 'Theology speaks of God because it speaks ofman as he stands before God' (Faith and U n d e r s t a n d i n ~ , p. 52).In another essay, 'The Cris is of Belief h (in Essays), Bultmannsays tha t 'knowledge about the power which creates and l imitsour being i s not theoret ical knowledge but i t i s knowledgewhich breaks in on us in cr i t i ca l moments of our being i t s e l f '(pp. 6f) . In other words, knowledge of God i s not a 'generalt ru th ' , but an ins ight which is grasped in the challenge of

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    the moment, won in the moment of, decls;l,on.This i s a very s i g n i ~ i c a n t theme In Bultmann's work, fo r

    it shows how fa r his exis tent ia l ism penetrates in to h isin terpre ta t ion of some crucia l aspects of the Chris t ianfa i th . In th is respect , .his ..essay.'What.Does it Mean toSpeak of God?' ( in Fai th and understandin1) i s of grea timportance: f i r s t publIshed In 1925, I t m ght almost becalled the hinge on which the w h o l ~ of his thought moves.At the outse t he re jec ts any speaking of God which makes himinto an object of thought ( i f we ta lk of the rea l i ty ofGod we have already los t the rea l i ty of God). Only thoset ru ths about God are meaningful which refer to the ex i s ten t i a ls i tua t ion of the speaker. He says tha t ' it is not legi t imateto speak about God in general statements, in universal ~ r u t h swhich are val id without reference to the concrete, ex i s ten t i a lposi t ion of the speaker ' (p. 53). Or as he puts it morete rse ly , 'It i s therefore clear tha t i f a man wil l speakof God, he must evident ly speak of himself ' (p. 55). Thisdoes not mean of course tha t we speak of man ins tead ofspeaking of God, but ra ther tha t in ta lking of Godwe mustalso ta lk of man because God is only known in man's s i tua t ion .

    A good example of Bultmann's point here i s his in te r pre ta t ion of the notion of the transcendence of God. God'stranscendence i s only known from within our s i tua t ion . Whenwe speak of God as t r ~ n s c e n d e n t , we must also speak of whathe transcends, i f our ta lk i s t ru ly to be non-objectifying.God as 'Wholly Other ' i s only meaningful as a rea l i ty whichdetermines our exis tence. As he puts it in an early essay,'God is the mysterious, enigmatic power tha t meets us inthe world and in t ime. His transcendence i s tha t of someonehaving power over the temporal and the eternal : it is thetranscendence of the power which creates and se ts limit.sto our l i fe ' (Essays, p. 9).

    Bultmann, tha t i s , has an ex i s ten t i a l i s t doctr ine ofGod: God i s meaningful only as a concern for men and notas he i s in himself . In a t e l l ing phrase he says tha t'The rea l i ty of God i s not tha t of the idea but of theconcrete happening'(Essays , p. 16) . And once again he f indsth is ins ight in the kerygma of the New Testament, par t icular lyin the demythologised teaching of Jesus. ' Jesus speaksof God not in terms of general t ru ths , in dogmas, but onlyin terms of what God i s fo r man, how he deals with man I t i s impossible to speak of God in J e s u ~ ' sense withoutspeaking of his ac t iv i ty ' (Jesus and the Word, p. 110) . Inmore technical language, Bultmann.says tha t 'God i s not agiven ent i ty ' (Faith and Understanding" p. 45). He cannotbe spoken of in the same way tha t we speak of worldly objec ts ,but only as he affec ts our existence now.

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    Because o ~ th is , Bultmann has a dis t inc t ive idea ofthe nature of revela t ion . Revelation i s in no way to beseen as the imparting of knowledge about an otherw!se\.tnknowable God. For Bulbnann there can be no notion of'revealed t ru th ' , because th i s would make God into something 'out there ' . Revelation is ra ther to be seen as anencounter with God, as my meeting with God in my presentexIstence. Revelation i s God's acts as they are directedtowards men, and so 'God's revelat ion does not make himknown in the sense of in te l lec tua l knowledge' (Faith andUnderstanding, p. 45).Similarly , Bultmann gives a fresh in terpre ta t ion of themeaning of God as creator . Usually when we ta lk of Godas creator , we refer to specif ic acts which he accomplisheda t a cer ta in time in the pas t , and which are the basisof his lordship over creation in the present . For Bultmannthis makes God in to an object: God's creatorhood i s seen as

    something apart from us. Hence we ta lk of God's creatorhoodon the analogy of a workman: God i s the cosmic a r t i s t ,fashioning the heavens and the ear th . Such a way of thinkingBultmann regards as a Greek intrusion in to bibl ica l-exis tenti a l thinking. To speak of God as the creator is to speak ofGod as an ex is ten t ia l t ru th : the t ru th tha t man and theworld stand every moment in the hands of God. 'Fai th inthe creator i s not a philosophical theory or a world-viewtha t one has in the background of his concrete experienceand act ion , but ra ther something which we rea l ize preciselyin our experience and action as obedience to our Lord.That God is the creator means tha t man's; action i s notdetermined by t imeless pr inciples , but ra ther by the concretes i tua t ion of the moment '(Existence and Fai th , p. 159).

    This i s why Bultmann claims tha t the doctrine of providence has no place in bib l ica l fa i th . Providence sees Godin remote terms as a person or thing outside man, outsidethe universe , sustaining i t from afar l ike a kind of cosmicmechanic: it is a foreign intrusion from Stoicism. God'ssustaining power which i s a t work in the creation i s nota 'general t ru th ' but one which we experience afresh ineach moment of dependence on God: 'To believe in God i s notsimply to believe in his exis tence, but meekly to submltto his wil l and wait upon him in quietness and confidence'(Primitive Chr!s'Uani'ty, p. 36).

    Finally , the' wil l of God i s interpreted in ex is ten t ia lterms: this point nas-already been touched upon in looki.nga t the in terpre ta t ion which Bultmann gives of New Testamentethics . God's wil l meets us in specif ic s i tuat ions wherewe find the demand to act , ra ther than in a legal code whichspeci f ies moral pr inciples . God's wil l i s discovered in-19-

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    encountering my neighbollr, since in such encounters we arefaced with the demand to love; ' ~ o ~ Jesus God's dis t inct ionfrom and transcendence o v e ~ the world mean tha t he i s alwaysthe God who comes. He meets us not only in the futurejudgement, but already here and now in dai ly l i f e , with a l li t s challenges and opportunit ies . In the same way, man \is dis t inc t from the world in the sense tha t he has nosecuri ty in i t . He cannot t ru s t in any tangible rea l i ty .His rea l l i f e consists in his encounter wl thh i s neighbourand his response to the claims of God' (Prim'itive Chris t iani ty ,p . 93) .d. Christology and the Kerygma.

    Anyone with even the sketchiest acquaintance withmodern New Testament study wil l know tha t one of the cent ra lquestions i s tha t of the his to r ica l re l i ab i l i ty of thegospel records. Two questions in par t icular are Significant .The f i r s t is the question of jus t how much history thegospels contain: are they accurate accounts of what happened,or are they largely theological ref lect ions which f i tthe facts to the theology they wish to put across? Thesecond is the question of whether accurate his to r ica lknowledge i s necessary for fai th : i f the gospels are notby and large his to r ica l ly accurate, then does th i s matterfor fai th in Jesus?

    Bultmann gives a negative answer to both these questions.We can, indeed, know very l i t t l e about the events of Jesus 'ministry: once the gospels have been passed through thef i l t e rs of form-crit icism, there i s very l i t t l e l e f t inthe way of sol id his to r ica l data. He writes tha t 'Thereis no historical-biographical in teres t in the gospels , andtha t is why they have nothing to say about Jesus ' humanpersonali ty, his appearance and character , his or ig in ,education and development the gospels lack any in teres tof a sc ient i f ic -h is tor ica l kind ' (The History of theSynoptic Tradit ion, p. 372).

    For Bu1tmann, however, th is lack of in teres t i s somethingposi t ive, and tha t is why he gives a negative answer to thesecond quest ion. Faith in Jesus i s not dependent uponhis to r ica l data , and hence Christology does not have anyhis to r ica l in teres t . We know almost nothing about thehis to r ica l Jesus, and we need to know almost nothing. Bultmannt r i es to support th i s from within the New Testament i t se l f bylooking a t the i n t e res t shown in the his to r ica l Jesus byPaul. In his essay 'The Signif icance of the HistoricalJesus for the Theology of Paul ' (in Faith and Understanding),-20-

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    fie writes tha t ' Jesus ' teach;1n9 ;1s - to a l l in tents andpurposes - i r re levant to Paul ' 223). I f this is t rue ,what is the i f f l ~ o r t a n c e of Jesus fOr Christology?Jesus is not s ignif icant as an his tor ica l person: ofthat person we know almost nothing. And moreover, attempts torediscover the personali ty of Jesus simply ref lec t the presuppositions of the in terpre ter - as in the l ibera l 'Lives

    of Jesus ' , by men such as D. F. Strauss. Nor i s Jesusimportant because of his teaching: once again, we know almostnothing about tha t . We cannot even say tha t Jesus ' signif icancefor us can be stated in terms of the formulations made abouthim by the early church - by seeing Jesus as the Messiah orthe Son of God or the Lord. Even these more expl ic i tChris tological affirmations are not important today, sincethey are expressed in the mythological language of anobsolete rel igious view of the world.There i s , then, no t h i nobec t l v e l about

    Jesus. What matters is Jesus as e meets us n t e ere andnow. The way in which Jesus meets us i s through the kerygma:through the word of Chris t ian proclamation, when careful lystr ipped of i t s mythological dress. Jesus i s only of importance because he is the 'occasion ' of the proclamation whichchallenges us to decide. Speaking of the meaning of thedeity of Chris t , for example, Bultmann says tha t ' in theNew Testament the pronouncements about Jesus ' d ivini ty ordei ty are not pronouncements of his nature but seek to giveexpression to his signif icance pronouncements which confesstha t what he says and what he is do not have t he i r originwithin the world, and are not human ideas nor events in theworld, but that God speaks to us in them and acts towardsus and for us ' ( ~ s s a y s , pp. 280f). Mlen we say ' Jesus isGod', tha t i s , we are .not ta lking about Jesus as he is inhimself - for Bultmann that would be meaningless object i f icat ion .Rather, we are speaking of the signif icance of Jesus forme.

    To ask about the meaning of Christology is to askabout the meaning of the kerygma, not about the his to r ica lJesus or about the enthroned Son of God. About the his to r ica lJ e s u ~ we cannot know, the enthroned Son of God i s simply afigment of the theological imagination. What is the placeof Jesus in th i s kerygma?

    Bultmann puts this l a s t question thus: what i s speci f ica l lyChris t ian about 'Christ ian bel ie f ' ? What does it have to dowIth Jesus Christ? His answer is th is : 'Christ ian bel ief hasi t s pecul iar character in speaking of an event that gives i tthis r igh t (to ta lk to God), in saying tha t it hears a Wordwhich demands tha t it should recognise God as standing overagainst man' (Essays, p. 11). Chris t ian fa i th is Christological ,-21-

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    tha t i s , becauae o ~ the W o ~ d which we h e a ~ now - a W o ~ dwhich f o ~ aultmann ia taomehow) l inked with Jeaua. As anhis to r ica l or mythol09ical t i 9 u ~ e , Jesus is los t to us today:his s ignif icance i s tha t in the k e : r y ~ a , we meet the challengeto decide. As our cri t ique of aultmann wil l point out, th i sinabi l i ty to root Chris t ian fa i th in Jesus has providedone of the areas of s trongest disagreement over histheological proposals.e . The Nature of Fai th .

    I f his to r ica l fac ts are of l i t t l e importance forChristology, they are similarly of l i t t l e importance forfa i th . To aultmann's notion of fa i th we now turn.Faith i s often seen as a species of knowledge: by fa i thwe know certain things to be t rue - for example, tha t Godis three-in-one - which we cannot know natural ly , by unaidedreason. This def in i t ion of fa i th is very fa r from whataultmann wishes to put in i t s place. Fai th is not knowledgeabout certain things , in jus t the same way tha t revelat ion'I"S"ilOt revelat ion of certain things. Faith is not in te l lec tua

    it is ex is ten t ia l . That means to say tha t the meaning offa i th res ts not in the grounds of fa i th , but merely in thefac t of fa i th ' s exis tence. Fai th i s not meaningful becauseit is fai th in cer ta in things , but because it i s an act ofman, a decision in obedience to the ca l l of the k e r y ~ a .

    Because of th iS , fa i th has no grounds. I t cannot be'proved' by looking a t i t s basis - for example, i t s his to r ica lbasis . I t is not possible to argue tha t a man can have fa i thin Jesus because from the gospels we know cer ta in facts abouthim which demand fa i th . Faith i s an act without guarantee.aultmann writes of the "free act" of fai th : ' I t cannot beoffered for invest igation as something "to be proved". Forin tha t case we should be objectifying it and putt ing ourselves outside i t . A free act can only be done and in sofa r as we speak of such doing, the poss ibi l r ry-of it canonly be bel ieved' (Faith and Understanding, p. 63). MoreSimply: 'Only in act i s it sure . (Ibid, p. 65). Faith isan act of man's exis tence, not to be grounded by any dataor proved by any methods.

    That i s why fa i th i s not a possession. We cannot,tha t i s , speak of 'having' fa i th , fo r tha t would make fa i thinto something ' ou t t he re ' . Faith i s an act , to be doneaf.resh in each moment of decision ra ther than clung on toas a means of securi ty: 'Belief in God i s never somethingwe can have as a possession. On the contrary, it implies-22-

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    at decision tO,be taken' ( ~ s s a ' y s , PJ? l4f ) . Bultmann explainshis point by saying tha t faI th is l ike love; we cannot 'have'love, but only exercise i t in specif ic acts . In contrastto such def in i t ions , Bultmann J?roposes this ; 'Adherenceto the gospel message i s cal led "fa i th" , and fa i th involvesa new exis tent ia l understanding of Self . In it man rea l izeshis creature l iness and gui l t . I t i s an act of obedience inwhich man surrenders a l l h is ' boast ing ' , a l l desire to l iveon his own resources, a l l adherence to tangible rea l i t i es ,and assents to the scandalous fac t of a crucif ied Lord'(Primitive Chris t iani ty , pp. 238f). Fai th i s a new se1understandIng on the par t of man, and ceases to be fa i thwhen it i s grounded by something outside i t se l f , such ashis tor ica l facts : 'His tor ica l research can never lead toany resul t which could serve as a basis for fa i th ' ( ~and Understanding, p. 30).

    I t i s this which explains Bultmann's assert ion that hishighly c r i t i ca l reading of the New Testament does not affec tfa i th in the s l ightes t , since he re jec ts any attempt toval idate fa i th by proving the his tor ica l re l i ab i l i ty of thebib l ica l data . This reject ion i s for two reasons. Thef i r s t reason, the nature of fa i th as an exis tent ia l actwithout grounds, we have already looked a t . The secondi s the nature of history. For Bultmann, the establishmentof a body of his to r ica l data by the approved methods ofc r i t i ca l research gets us nowhere. What we would comeup with a f te r such an invest igat ion would not be ' h i s to ry ' ,but an object i f ied sc ient i f ic reconstruct ion. Bultmann'sview of history s t resses not i t s ' ob jec t iv i ty ' , but i t simportance now, i t s meaningfulness for my present existence.'fhe proper at t i tude to history i s not tha t of object iveobsel."vation but dialogue with his tory , as a ' l iv ing complexof events in which he (man) Is essent ia l ly involved' (Jesusand the Word, p : 11. For the whole question, see Bultmann'sbook HlsEora and Eschatol09t)' And he goes on to say tha t'History oes not speak w n a man stops his ears whenhe assumes neutral i ty , but speaks only when he comes seekinganswers to the problems which agi ta te him' (Ibid, p. 12).History i s only of importance i f it affec ts us now, and socannot ground fa i th .

    I f tha t is so, then cr i t i ca l scholarship, inquiring intothe his tor ica l re l i ab i l i ty of the bib l ica l tex ts , can neitherundercut nor support fa i th , for fa i th i s ent i rely freefrom such grounding, and history does not offer i t . To lookhighly cr i t i ca l ly a t the gospel records cannot disturb fa i thfo r fa i th res t s on personal, exis tent ia l decision. 'Thet ru th of Chris t iani ty , l ike tha t of any other rel igion orphilosophy, i s always a matter of personal decision, and thehistorian has no r ight to deprive any man of tha t responsibi l i ty .-23-

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    Nor, as is otten aS$erted, i s it h ~ s b U Q ~ n e s s to end up byassessing the value of what he ha$ been describing. He cancer ta inly c lar i ty the issues involved in the decision. Forit i s his task to in terpre t the movements of history aspossible ways of understanding human existence, thus demonstrat ing the i r relevance today. By bringing the past tol i f e again, he should drive home the fact , tha t here tuar e sag i t u r : th i s i s your business ' (Primi'tbre ChristIa i i i ty ,p . 12) .

    From the account of the shape of Bultmann's interpretat ionof what the New Testament has to say about some major themes- man, God, Christ and fa i th - the profundity with whichhe has thought through the implicat ions of his existent ial ismi s obvious. Our next job i s to offer some c r i t i ca l ref lect ionson what must be for some a most s t a r t l ~ n g account of theChrist ian fa i th .

    2. CRITIQUEThe Gospel and Existent ial ismOur cr i t ique of Bu1tmann wil l look a t the posit ionsanalysed in the f i r s t par t in reverse order: we examine,f i r s t , his conclusions with regard to the New Testament, and

    then, second, we go on to look a t the re la t ion betweenChrist ian fa i th and existentia l ism in a broader perspect ive.1. An Exis ten t ia l i s t Reading of the New Testament.

    What we wish to show i s th i s : tha t the c r i t i ca l posi t ionswhich Bultmann adopts over the New Testament are often notproven, and sometimes in need of ser ious revis ion. Thismeans tha t the support from the New Testament which Bultmannclaims to underlie his thought is in some cases not there,or not there as strongly as his conclusions mightsuggest. Bultmann wishes to show tha t the precedent fordemythologising l ies in the New Testament i t s e l f - buti f it is t rue tha t the New Testament does not s i t looseon the 'mythology' as he claims, then his in terpre ta t ionof the text a t those points wil l be a l l the weaker, andsometimes invalid .

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    a. Cri t i ca l Problems . Bultmann's in terpreta t ion of the New Testament messagein exis ten t ia l ~ e r m s depends upon answers to c r i t i c a l problemswhich are not beyond debate. To eiamine whether th is i st rue , we look a t a t e s t case: h i s ~ a c c o u n t of the developmentof Christology in the New Testament. As we saw ea r l i e r , oneof the motives in the demythologising programme i s tha tDultmann claims a lack of in te res t in the his tor ical Jesusby the l a te r , more 'Chr is to logica l ' strands of the earlychurch. Not only does th is mean a gap between the ' Jesusof his tory ' and the 'Chr is t of fa i th ' : it means in addit ionthat the growth of Christology is to be seen as growthawat from Jesus towards mythological elaborat ion. suchmyt ology cannot and need not be ours , and so we lookunderneath it for the kerygma.Whilst th i s ' evolut ionary' account of the development

    of Christology i s often buttressed with a wealth of his tor icaland cr i t i ca l evidence, other equally plausible accounts havebeen given. We cannot hope in th is space to give even thebr iefes t report on the exegetical and his tor ical work which hasbeen done, but i t may well be t rue , as C.F.D. Moule arguesin h is book The Origin of Christology, tha t the most aptanalogy may not be the emergence of a new species , butra ther the opening of the flower from the bud. In otherwords, the discont inui ty between Jesus and l a te r Christologywhich i s one of the main features of Bultmann's readingof the New Testament may well not be there.To focus the issue on a couple of areas of debate. Firs t ,Bultmann argues that one of the s trongest influences on thegrowth of New Testament Christology was Gnosticism, whichprovided some of the centra l concepts used, especial lyin the Johannine writ ings (see, fo r example, his Theol09lof the New Testament, I , para. 15 , pritnit ive Chr i s t l an fu ,

    1> 4, ch 4, and hIs commentary 'l'he._Gospel of John, e.g. pp.24ff , on Jn l.lf). The problem here is tha t the datingof the Gnostic evidence which i s supposed to paral le l orinfluence the New Testament i s almost insuperably di f f icu l t ,and Bultmann's dating i s one among many options. The detai l sare out of our scope here, but a very good survey of theissue i s provided by Edwin Yamauchi in his book Pre-ChristianGnosticism. After a careful review of the evidence In detaI l ,he concludes tha t 'we have seen how the imposing scholarlyedif ice of Reitzenstein 's (an early Gnostic scholar) andBultmann's pre-Chris t ian Gnosticism i s but l i t t l e more thanan elaborate , mult i -s tor ied , many-roomed house of cards,whose foundations have been shaken, some of whose structuresneed but t ressing and others have collapsed, leaving a massof debris with but few timbers f i t for use in reconstruct ion'(pp. 184f).

    A second example would be the account of the growth" 2 ~ -

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    of N ~ w Testament Christology in terms of a three-stage growth. Stage one ~ s Early ~ a l e s t ~ n ~ a n Chr!stol09Y(the very e a d ! e s t sta

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    t rue and meanin9tul in and for themselves, ~ n d e ~ e n d e n t ofany meaning they may have f o ~ o u ~ ' subjec t iv i ty ' . Bultmann,we reca l l , rejects such o b j e c t ~ v i t y as ' g e n e ~ a l t ~ u t h o ' . Buthow t rue i s th is reject ion to the New Testament? We wil lturn to the l arger theological aspect of th i s question inthe second par t of our cri t ique. For the moment it wil lsuff ice to look a t the New Testament i t se l f to see whetherit does display the lack of in teres t in the object ive whichBultmann claims, or whether it does, in fac t , emphasiseobject ive elements.

    The f i r s t area to look a t i s the importance of thehis tor ica l Jesus. Bultmann claims tha t the person andteaching of Jesus are almost ent i rely absent from l a t e rChristology. What matters about Jesus i s not what he wasbut tha t he was. The detai ls are not i m p o r t a n ~ a l l thati s necessary is the mere fact of his existence as a jumpingoff point fo r the ca l l of the kerygma.A good deal of work has been done on th is issue in recentyears, especial ly by those who have been influenced by Bultmann,and in general the conclusion has been tha t the his to r ica lJesus i s of much grea te r importance as an 'object ive fac t 'fo r the l a t e r par ts of the New Testament than Bultmannallowed. Thus there has arisen what has been cal led the'new quest ' of the his tor ica l Jesus, which seeks to inquireinto j us t how s ignif icant he i s and jus t what continuitythere i s between Jesus himself and the Chris t proclaimedby the early church. I. H. Marshall ' s book I Believe in

    the Histor ical Jesus i s a hel ful introductory report onthe problems raIsed, but most useful i s James Robinson'sThe New Quest of the Historical Jesus, which shows in deta i lhow the conclusIons about ' ob jectIvI ty ' a t which Bultmannarr ived have been subjected to t e l l ing cr i t ic ism.One part icular area could perhaps be mentioned in al i t t l e more deta i l . In looking a t Bultmann we saw tha t heproposes tha t Paul shows almost no in teres t in facts aboutJesus. However, the disjunction between Jesus and Pauli s bet ter seen from the s tandpoint of the growth of salvat ion

    history and in terms of the dif fer ing in teres ts of each,as both H. Ridderbos and F. F. Bruce argue in the i r bookson the i ssue, both ent i t led Paul and Jesus. One study,G. N. s tanton ' s book Jesus of Nazareth In NeW Testamentpreachij)8' i s a model of exegetIcal work on the objectIvefacts a ut Jesus in the kerygma of the l a te r church. Onthe r .elation of Paul and Jesus, for example, he writesthat 'Paul ' s references to the character of Jesus providesupport for the re jec t ion of the view tha t the Paulinekerygma included ono more than the mere Dass ( ' tha t ' ) ofthe his tor ica l existence of Jesus. What:nappened between-27-

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    the bir th and death ot J e ~ u s and what J e ~ u s tau9ht wereboth deeply rooted ~ n h i ~ whole theolo9ica1 t h i n k ~ n 9 '(p . 1 1 0 ) .This must mean tha t Bultmann's ideas on the lack ofobject ivi ty in the New Testament must be heavily qual i f ied.And it means futher , tha t his notions of revelat ion andfa i th are to be subjected to cr i t ic ism, fo r in both these

    areas Bultmann denied an objective element. Revelation i snot revelat ion of : it i s the ca l l to decide, fa i th isnot fai th in :-it i s an ex is ten t ia l ac t . Yet Paul ' ssummary o f ~ f s preaching in Corinthians 15.3-8, fo r example,gives us a clear object ive framework for the Christ iangospel: the major theological points of Paul ' s messageare given object ive grounds, which are the his to r ica lfacts which Paul adduces as support . I t is to thesehistor ical elements which we now turn.

    c . The Gospel and History.Our review of the ' ob jec t ive ' elements in the gospelsuggests a much stronger in teres t in his tory than Bultmannwould allow. In recent years , largely through the influenceof para l le l work in the Old Testament f ie ld , the notion of' sa lvat ion-his tory ' has been applied to the New Testament.'Sa lvat ion-his tory ' i s a term which i s used to show tha tthe God of the Bible reveals who he i s through his ac tsin history: we know what God i s l ike because he has donecertain things on the plane of h is to r ica l experience\-lhich reveal h is character . Examples of such 'mighty \acts of God' would be the deliverance from Egypt, the conquest of Canaan, the deliverance from exi le or - mostespecial ly - the ministry of Jesus , culminating in hisResurrection. Such an approach to the New Testament

    we find in the work of Oscar Cullmann, whose books Chris tand Time and Salvation in History are important studIesof the place of hIstory In the gospel. Another Germanthinker, Wolfhart Pannenberg, puts even greater s t ress ,not only on ' sa lvat ion-his tory ' but also on secular historyas the locus of God's revelat ion, not only in the Oldand New Testrunents, but today also. His ideas are se tout in a book which he edi ted under the t i t l e Revelationas History, and are applied to Christology in hIs veryweIghty Jesus - God and Man. Over against Bultmann, bothCUllmann and pannenberg, whils t in many respects different ,have emphasised tha t God is known, not in pr ivate , exis tent ia lmoments of decision, but in his concrete se l f - revela t ion byhis his to r ica l acts .Evangelicals have been eager to use the insights here,

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    especial ly those of P a n n e h b ~ 9 , wlth hls c h ~ p l o n i n g of thehis tor ic i ty of the Resurrection. I t i s cer ta in ly t rue thatsalvat ion-history i s of value in bringlng theology backto the object ive basis of which the New T e s t ~ e n t speaksand which Bultmann neglects . But there i s a dangerr thatof reducing the Chris t ian fa i th to a species of ra t ionalism,in the following way. Whilst it i s t rue tha t fa i th in theBible i s fa i th in cer ta in his tor ical facts , simply observingthose facts withOut fa i th wil l not yield a revelat ion of God.I f we do not say tha t the facts have to be viewed with fa i th ,we are in ef fec t saying tha t unaided reason i s able to deduceGod's revelat ion from his tor ical data . But fa i th is not sosel f -evident : the objec t ive elements of the New Testamentare only grounds of fa i th - they do not render fa i th superf luous. This danger could be i l lus t ra ted from the work ofPannenberg. But, given the danger, it remains importantto real i se that fa i th does need what Macquarrie ca l l s an'empIrical anchor' (The Scope of demythologising, p. 95) .

    Chris t ian fa i th is fa i th in a God who acted in history,def ini t ively in Jesus. Both ' f a i t h ' and ' h i s tory ' areimportant components, and Bultmann's exclusion of historymeans a reduced account of the Chris t ian gospel. And i tmeans, further , tha t the gulf between 'object ive history 'and ' ex is ten t ia l encounter ' of which Bultmann speaks, i san unnecessary and unjus t i f ied account of what the NewTestament says.

    2. Existentialism and Chris t ian Fai th .From our conclusions about Bultmann's reading of theNew Testament - par t icu lar ly his insuf f ic ien t emphasis oni t s object ive grounds - we now go on to see how th is re la testo the theological use of existent ial ism as a frameworkor se t of concepts for s ta t ing the Chris t ian gospel. Wesaw in our exposit ion tha t for Bultmann, exis tent ia l in te r -pretat ion means tha t only those theological statements areval id which re fer to the exis tent ia l s i tuat ion of the speaker.How fa r i s th i s valid? How fa r , tha t i s , i s i t t rue to saytha t 'non-object ifying' or ' ex i s ten t ia l ' language is theonly legi t imate way of speaking of God?

    At the outse t , we must agree with Bultmann tha t therei s some exis ten t ia l reference in a l l theological language,especial ly bibl ical language. Bibl ical language about Godi s not language which simply describes or gives information:i t does not offer a catalogue of the at t r ibutes of God.Rather, i t is language which, whils t describing who God act ual ly i s , challenges the s i tuat ion of the hearer . I f weread the prophetic books of the Old Testament, it i s clear-29-

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    tha t the way in which those w r ~ t i n g s s ~ e a k o ~ God - torexample, his character as holy judge ~ ts a way w h ~ c h ~ smeant to af fec t -us now. - X a c q u a ~ ~ l e ts thus r ight whenhe says (AA Exis ten t ia l i s t The-olm, l ? ~ . 14,:,22) tha tex is ten t ia l i s t thought does have a certain ins ight intothe authentic thought-world of the Bible, par t icular ly asit speaks of the ' l iv ing God', who i s no philosophicalabstract ion, but act ive among his people. The questiongoes much deeper than th i s , however - as MacQuarrie wouldacknowledge. I t is not whether exis tent ia l i s t readings ofthe Bible are a frui tful-approach to the in terpre ta t ion ofcer ta in parts of i t , but whether they give - as they claim -a fu l l account of the bib l ica l data.

    To answer tha t quest ion, we look a t two i ssues . Fi rs t ,the question of whether in exis tent ia l i s t theology 'God'i s simply a label which we use to describe the subject ivi tyof the man of fa i th ra ther than an object ive divine being.Second, an al ternat ive to Bultmann's account of the natureof God's object iv i ty . I t wil l be seen tha t the tes t -casein both issues i s tha t of the doctr ine of God.a . Reducing God to a cipher.

    By asking whether Bultmann reduces the word 'God' to acipher , what we are asking i s th is . When Bultmann ta lksof God, is a l l 'object ive reference ' lost? Does he speakof God in such a way tha t the object iv i ty which we foundin the New Testament is dissolved, since a l l theologicalstatements come to have an ex is ten t ia l reference? Accordingto Bultmann God i s only known in the act of decision in obedience to the kerygma. I f tha t is t rue , then does Godremain an object ive being, independent of man? Or is theword 'God' simply the labe l which we give to cer ta in s ta tesof human existence, a label which does not refer to anyrea l content outside man?

    For those to whom th i s way of interpret ing the word'God' may seem unfamiliar , we could c i te a para l le l . InHomer, the great hero Achilles is described as a ' l i on ' .Clearly in so ta lking we do not mean tha t Achilles wasactual ly a l ion: we mean tha t he was l ike a l ion , becauseof his bravery or f ierceness . The word ' l i on ' does nothave any 'object ive reference' in the phrasp. 'Achil les i sa l ion ' . Is the same t rue in speaking of God? When Bultmannspeaks of God, does he mean the word in a l i t e r a l sense,or in a non- l i tera l sense, as a way of ta lking of certainhuman at t r ibutes?Bultmann's problem i s very much a real one for a l lChristian theologians: how can we speak of God in such-30-

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    a way tha t he ' is ~ e a 1 7 I t is ~ l l too easy f o ~ d o c t ~ i n e s ofGod to f a i l to s p ~ o f God in a suff icient ly concreteway, and thus to cease to challenge us, in the way tha twe saw bib l ica l lan9uage challenges i t s h e a ~ e ~ s . God iseas i ly los t in conceptual abstract ions, so tha t it isoften di f f i cu l t to recognise the God of the proclamationof the prophets or the teaching of Jesus . How can wespeak of God in such a way tha t he remains real?

    In answer, Bultmann safeguards the rea l i ty of God bysaying tha t God can only be spoken of from within theexis tent ia l si tuat ion of man. God is rea l when he isspoken of, not in objectifying terms as a being 'out there ' ,but in exis tent ia l terms. He sums up th i s way of safeguarding the rea l i ty of God when he writes that 'God is nota given en t i ty ' ( ~ ' a i t h and Understanding, p. 45). There aretwo ways of reading what Bultmann says there: the diff icul tyi s deciding which one he means:The f i r s t (charitable) in terpre ta t ion would say thatBultmann means tha t God cannot be spoken of from a posit ionof neutral i ty , but tha t he must be spoken of as one

    who challenges me. I f Bultmann simply means th i s - thatGod i s not a remote objec t - then that i s a profoundlybib l ica l ins ight . But there i s another ( less chari table)in terpre ta t ion which says tha t Bultmann means tha t God i snot an ent i ty a t a l l : the word 'God' simply describes thechallenges we meetin exis tence. The differen.::e betweenthese two in terpre ta t ions of \'Ihat Bultmann is sayingi s tha t between exis tent ia l and athe is t ic in terpre ta t ion.

    'Atheis t ic ' in terpre ta t ion of the word 'God' maysound strange to many: but tha t i t i s a la ten t dangerwithin ex is ten t ia l i s t theology can be seen from the workof two thinkers who have consciously taken Bultmann'sinsights fur ther .The f i r s t is the New Testament scholar Herbert Braun,who has sought to develop Bultmann's notion tha t God i sonly known in the challenge of the here and now. Braunpushes th is idea to i t s extreme by saying tha t a l l ta lk ofGod's object iv i ty as an independently-exist ing being i sto be se t aside. He writes tha t 'God i s not to be understood as the one exis t ing for himself I can speak ofGod only where I can speak of man, and hence anthropologically . .For even according to the New Testament, God in the f ina lanalysis , i . e . a l l inadequate objectifying of the doctrineof God se t aside, i s where I am placed under obligation,where I am engaged God would then be a defin i te typeof relat ion with one 's fellow-man' ('The Problem of a

    New Testament Theology' , Journal for Theology and Church 1,-31-

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    pp. 182f, cf his essax 'The Meanln9 of New T e s t ~ e n tChristolOC;JX' in vol. 4 of the , s a m e , ~ o u ; r ; n A l ) , .. ",. 'J\galn,lnhis;r;ecentlx-tx-anslAted book: ,J"esUs' 'Of Na'z'A';ret'h:.' The' Man andhis Time, he w;rites t ha t 'When Jesus saxs 'God', he i sthinking of repentance, of radical obedience, of absolutegrace ' (p. 128) and thus tha t 'About God one can onlyspeak in reference to the carrying out of cer ta in actions,the actions of obedience and humil i ty ' (Ibid) . Not onlyi s God only met in the challenge to obedience and repentance:he i s obedience and repentance.

    Similar conclusions are to be found in the work of thesystematic theologian and philosopher Fri tz Buri. He seesfa i th , for example, in purely ex i s ten t i a l terms as a way ofunderstanding man with no reference to any object ive God:' I t i s the primordial in tent ion of fa i th to discover themeaning of our existence and to enable us to act in sucha way as not to miss th is meaning' '(Thinking Fai th , p. 13).Christology is given a s imilar non-objective in terpre ta t ion:'Chr is t ' s rea l i ty emerges for us when we l ive and act ,when we perceive it in pract ice around us ' (Christ ian Faithin Our Time, p. 13) 'God' thus becomes, not a person In"fiimself, but the labe l which we give to our experience ofacting responsibly towards other persons: 'For ourpersonhood God himself is personal in the voice whichsummons us to responsibi l i ty ' (Thinking Fai th , p. 95)

    I t should be c lear from our br ief look a t the NewTestament data tha t ' ob jec t iv i ty ' is one of the cent ra lcomponents of the s t ructure of what it says about God. WhilstGod does affec t me here and now, he only does so as anobject ive, independent being. The weakness of Bultmann'sprogramme of t rans la t ing of gospel into non-objectifyingterms is tha t God's independence i s los t - a danger we see clear lyin the work of Braun and Buri .I t is important to recognise tha t th i s danger i s onlyla ten t in Bultmann: he himself clearly t r i es to avoid allowing

    ex is ten t ia l in terpre ta t ion becoming atheis t ic in terpre ta t ion.This is clear from chapter 5 of his book JesUs Chr'is t 'andM y t h o ~ 0 9 Y , ent i t l ed 'The Meaning of God as ActIng' . HereBultmann se ts out hi$ famil iar assert ion tha t God's act ioncan only be spoken of from within worldly act ion: theologymust abandon mythical ways of ta lking about the act ion ofGod as something which comes from outside (for example,in miracles) . But Bultmann goes on to say tha t th i s doesnot mean tha t God i s ident ical with the world, or tha t hehas no independent being apar t from the world. Thishe cal ls the paradoxical 'nevertheless ' of fa i th . Fai th ,

    -32-

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    whilst it accepts tha t ' there remains no room ~ o r God'sworking' from outside (p. 65), saxs 'nevertheless ' ; iti s nevertheless permisible to speak ot God as mOre thanthe here and now. And so whilst Bultmanh says tha t 'onlysuch statements about God are legit imate as express theexis tent ia l relat ion between God and man' (po 69), th i sdoes not mean atheism: 'From the statement tha t to speakof God is to speak of myself, it by no means follows tha tGod i s not outside the bel iever ' (po 70) . The ambiguityof Bultmann over th i s point makes clear how eas i ly hisinsights could,be developed into the athe is t ic conclusionsof Braun and Buri .b. '1'he Objectivi ty of God.

    Bultmann's answer to the question of how we can safeguard the rea l i ty of God in existence leads him intoambiguities which he can only reconci le by the paradoxical'never theless ' of fa i th . What other answer i s there tothe very rea l problem he is t rying to solve?

    A solution might perhaps be found from the perspectivewhich sees that the way in which Bultmann asks the questioni s i t s e l f fa lse . Bultmann always speaks in terms of ani r reconci lable polar i ty between ta lking of God in ' object ive 'terms and in ' ex i s ten t ia l ' terms. We cannot for him ta lkof God as an objec t and also ta lk of him as something whichcuts into the quick of our present existence7 we cannotta lk of God in exis tent ia l terms and s t i l l retain h is objectiv i ty . But th is polar i ty is surely fa lse . God's object iv i tyand his s ignif icance as an ex is ten t ia l concern of men arenot mutually exclusive opposites. The question could bemore f ru i t fu l ly approached by saying tha t God is onlyof such exis tent ia l signif icance because he i s over andabove a l l tha t a f ree , independent being.

    As an example we could look a t the account of therevelat ion of God to the people of Is rae l a t mount Sinaiin Exodus 19 and 20. In reading the account, there i s anunmistakable element of God's signif icance: God here isa God who confronts h is people in a highly concrete way. Andyet he only does so as the free God who i s apart from hispeople. This would be pointed to by God's sel f -descr ipt ionin Exodus 20.2: ' I am the Lord your God'. The words ' I amthe Lord' point to God as f ree , se l f -ex is t ing , sovereign- objectively independent. Yet the phrase goes on ' I amthe Lord *our God': God's freedom as the object ive God is afreedom w {ch he exercises in choosing to be our God, inchoosing to be God alongside men. In th is way, h is freedom-33-

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    and his ex is ten t ia l signif icance are not contradictory, butare ra ther the same t ru th . The object ive God i s the Godwho meets us - th i s i s the theological meaning-of covenant.Moreover: it i s not t rue tha t to speak o


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