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BUSINESSASSOCIATIONSProf.Miller–Fall2016
FormsofBusinessOrganizations
10questionstoconsider
1. Whatarethedefiningcharacteristicsoftheorganization?2. Howistheorganizationestablished/broughtintoexistence?3. Howarethetermsunderwhichtheorganizationistobecarriedoutdefined?(Governance)4. Whoaretheconstituents(ormembers)oftheorganization?Whoaretheoutsiderswithwhom
theorganizationprincipallyinteracts?(Membership,bounds)5. Whomanagestheorganization?6. Forwhosebenefitistheorganizationmanaged?7. Howaretheinterestsofthebeneficiariesoftheorganizationdefined?8. Howaretheresponsibilitiesofmanagementdefined?9. Howaretheresponsibilitiesofnon-managementconstituents(memberswhoarenot
managers)defined(whereapplicable)?10. Howaretheresponsibilitiesoftheassociationand/oritsconstituentsvis-à-visoutsiders
defined?
I. PARTNERSHIPSA)COMMONLAWPARTNERSHIPSPartnershipsAct,ss.2-5;6-13;15-17;20-22;24-30;32-36SoleProprietorship
• Characteristicso It’snotanorganization,alegalentity.Thereisnoformalorganizationallawthatdealswith
soleproprietorship.Theyarenon-organizations.o Theoldest,simplestwaytoestablishandrunabusiness.o Abusinessownedandoperatedbyoneperson.
• Establishmento Nostepstakentoformallyorganizethebusiness,noformalprocesstoestablishone.Setup
shop.• TermsofAssociation
o Nothingformal• ConstituentsandOutsiders
o Mostbusinessrelationshipsgovernedbycontract• Management
o Thesoleproprietormanagesthebusinessunlesstheychoosetohireamanager.Candelegatemanagerialauthoritybycontract.
• Benefitso Benefitstothesoleproprietor,generallygovernedbypropertylaw.Assetsownedbysole
proprietor.
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o Incomeorlossconsideredpersonalincome/lossofthesoleproprietorinpersonalcapacity.
• InterestsofBeneficiaries• ResponsibilitiesofManagement
o Soleproprietorisaccountabletoherselfo Hiredmanagementisresponsibletosoleproprietorthroughcontract
• ResponsibilitiesofNon-ManagementConstituentso Notapplicable,therearenonon-managementconstituents
• ResponsibilitiestoOutsiderso Soleproprietorbearsfullpersonalresponsibilityforanyandallliabilitiesincurredbythe
businessintheordinarycourseofbusinesso Willhavetodrawonanypersonalassetstomakegoodonanydebtsfromo Thismakessoleproprietorshipthemostriskywaytoconductabusiness.o Canmitigaterisk,however,bypurchasinginsurance.o But,therearealsoupshots–youhaveunlimitedfreedomtomakewhateverdecisionsyou
want,noredtape.But,thisfreedom/flexibilitycomesatacostwithrisk…Youarereallyriskingeverything,ifyouhaveafamily,etc…
PartnershipsActTheNatureofPartnershipPartnership2.Partnershipistherelationthatsubsistsbetweenpersonscarryingonabusinessincommonwithaviewtoprofit,buttherelationbetweenthemembersofacompanyorassociationthatisincorporatedbyorundertheauthorityofanyspecialorgeneralActinforceinOntarioorelsewhere,orregisteredasacorporationunderanysuchAct,isnotapartnershipwithinthemeaningofthisAct.Rulesfordeterminingexistenceofpartnership3.Indeterminingwhetherapartnershipdoesordoesnotexist,regardshallbehadtothefollowingrules:
1.Jointtenancy,tenancyincommon,jointproperty,commonproperty,orpartownershipdoesnotofitselfcreateapartnershipastoanythingsoheldorowned,whetherthetenantsorownersdoordonotshareanyprofitsmadebytheusethereof.2.Thesharingofgrossreturnsdoesnotofitselfcreateapartnership,whetherthepersonssharingsuchreturnshaveorhavenotajointorcommonrightorinterestinanypropertyfromwhichorfromtheuseofwhichthereturnsarederived.3.Thereceiptbyapersonofashareoftheprofitsofabusinessisproof,intheabsenceofevidencetothecontrary,thatthepersonisapartnerinthebusiness,butthereceiptofsuchashareorpayment,contingentonorvaryingwiththeprofitsofabusiness,doesnotofitselfmakehimorherapartnerinthebusiness,andinparticular,
(a)thereceiptbyapersonofadebtorotherliquidatedamountbyinstalmentsorotherwiseoutoftheaccruingprofitsofabusinessdoesnotofitselfmakehimorherapartnerinthebusinessorliableassuch;(b)acontractfortheremunerationofaservantoragentorapersonengagedinabusinessbyashareoftheprofitsofthebusinessdoesnotofitselfmaketheservantoragentapartnerinthebusinessorliableassuch;(c)apersonwho,
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(i)wasmarriedtoadeceasedpartnerimmediatelybeforethedeceasedpartnerdied,(ii)waslivingwithadeceasedpartnerinaconjugalrelationshipoutsidemarriageimmediatelybeforethedeceasedpartnerdied,or(iii)isachildofadeceasedpartner,andwhoreceivesbywayofannuityaportionoftheprofitsmadeinthebusinessinwhichthedeceasedpartnerwasapartnerisnotbyreasononlyofsuchreceiptapartnerinthebusinessorliableassuch;
(d)theadvanceofmoneybywayofloantoapersonengagedorabouttoengageinabusinessonacontractwiththatpersonthatthelenderistoreceivearateofinterestvaryingwiththeprofits,oristoreceiveashareoftheprofitsarisingfromcarryingonthebusiness,doesnotofitselfmakethelenderapartnerwiththepersonorpersonscarryingonthebusinessorliableassuch,providedthatthecontractisinwritingandsignedbyoronbehalfofallpartiesthereto;(e)apersonreceivingbywayofannuityorotherwiseaportionoftheprofitsofabusinessinconsiderationofthesalebyhimorherofthegoodwillofthebusiness,isnotbyreasononlyofsuchreceiptapartnerinthebusinessorliableassuch.
Insolvency4.Intheeventofapersontowhommoneyhasbeenadvancedbywayofloanuponsuchacontractasismentionedinsection3,orofabuyerofthegoodwillinconsiderationofashareoftheprofitsofthebusiness,becominginsolventorenteringintoanarrangementtopayhisorhercreditorslessthan100centsonthedollarordyingininsolventcircumstances,thelenderoftheloanisnotentitledtorecoveranythinginrespectoftheloan,andthesellerofthegoodwillisnotentitledtorecoveranythinginrespectoftheshareofprofitscontractedfor,untiltheclaimsoftheothercreditorsoftheborrowerorbuyer,forvaluableconsiderationinmoneyormoney’sworth,aresatisfied.Meaningof“firm”5.Personswhohaveenteredintopartnershipwithoneanotherare,forthepurposesofthisAct,calledcollectivelyafirm,andthenameunderwhichtheirbusinessiscarriedoniscalledthefirmname.Powerofpartnertobindfirm6.Everypartnerisanagentofthefirmandoftheotherpartnersforthepurposeofthebusinessofthepartnership,andtheactsofeverypartnerwhodoesanyactforcarryingonintheusualwaybusinessofthekindcarriedonbythefirmofwhichheorsheisamember,bindthefirmandtheotherpartnersunlessthepartnersoactinghasinfactnoauthoritytoactforthefirmintheparticularmatterandthepersonwithwhomthepartnerisdealingeitherknowsthatthepartnerhasnoauthority,ordoesnotknoworbelievehimorhertobeapartner.Partnersboundbyactsonbehalfoffirm7.Anactorinstrumentrelatingtothebusinessofthefirmanddoneorexecutedinthefirmname,orinanyothermannershowinganintentiontobindthefirmbyapersontheretoauthorized,whetherapartnerornot,isbindingonthefirmandallthepartners,butthissectiondoesnotaffectanygeneralruleoflawrelatingtotheexecutionofdeedsornegotiableinstruments.Partnerusingcreditoffirmforprivatepurposes8.Whereonepartnerpledgesthecreditofthefirmforapurposeapparentlynotconnectedwiththefirm’sordinarycourseofbusiness,thefirmisnotbound,unlessheorsheisinfactspeciallyauthorizedbytheotherpartners,butthissectiondoesnotaffectanypersonalliabilityincurredbyanindividualpartner.Effectofnoticethatfirmnotboundbyactofpartner
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9.Ifitisagreedbetweenthepartnerstorestrictthepowerofanyoneormoreofthemtobindthefirm,noactdoneincontraventionoftheagreementisbindingonthefirmwithrespecttopersonshavingnoticeoftheagreement.Liabilityofpartners10.(1)Exceptasprovidedinsubsection(2),everypartnerinafirmisliablejointlywiththeotherpartnersforalldebtsandobligationsofthefirmincurredwhilethepersonisapartner,andafterthepartner’sdeaththepartner’sestateisalsoseverallyliableinaduecourseofadministrationforsuchdebtsandobligationssofarastheyremainunsatisfied,butsubjecttothepriorpaymentofhisorherseparatedebts.Limitedliabilitypartnerships(2)Subjecttosubsections(3)and(3.1),apartnerinalimitedliabilitypartnershipisnotliable,bymeansofindemnification,contributionorotherwise,for,(a)thedebts,liabilitiesorobligationsofthepartnershiporanypartnerarisingfromthenegligentorwrongfulactsoromissionsthatanotherpartneroranemployee,agentorrepresentativeofthepartnershipcommitsinthecourseofthepartnershipbusinesswhilethepartnershipisalimitedliabilitypartnership;or(b)anyotherdebtsorobligationsofthepartnershipthatareincurredwhilethepartnershipisalimitedliabilitypartnership.Limitations(3)Subsection(2)doesnotrelieveapartnerinalimitedliabilitypartnershipfromliabilityfor,(a)thepartner’sownnegligentorwrongfulactoromission;(b)thenegligentorwrongfulactoromissionofapersonunderthepartner’sdirectsupervision;or(c)thenegligentorwrongfulactoromissionofanotherpartneroranemployeeofthepartnershipnotunderthepartner’sdirectsupervision,if,(i)theactoromissionwascriminalorconstitutedfraud,eveniftherewasnocriminalactoromission,or(ii)thepartnerkneworoughttohaveknownoftheactoromissionanddidnottaketheactionsthatareasonablepersonwouldhavetakentopreventit.Same(3.1)Subsection(2)doesnotprotectapartner’sinterestinthepartnershippropertyfromclaimsagainstthepartnershiprespectingapartnershipobligation.Partnernotproperpartytoaction(4)Apartnerinalimitedliabilitypartnershipisnotaproperpartytoaproceedingbyoragainstthelimitedliabilitypartnershipforthepurposeofrecoveringdamagesorenforcingobligationsarisingoutofthenegligentactsoromissionsdescribedinsubsection(2).Extra-provinciallimitedliabilitypartnerships(5)Thissectiondoesnotapplytoanextra-provinciallimitedliabilitypartnership.Liabilityoffirmforwrongs11.Wherebyanywrongfulactoromissionofapartneractingintheordinarycourseofthebusinessofthefirm,orwiththeauthorityoftheco-partners,lossorinjuryiscausedtoapersonnotbeingapartnerofthefirm,oranypenaltyisincurred,thefirmisliabletherefortothesameextentasthepartnersoactingoromittingtoact.Misapplicationofmoneyorpropertyreceivedfororincustodyofthefirm12.Inthefollowingcases,namely,
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(a)whereonepartner,actingwithinthescopeofthepartner’sapparentauthority,receivesthemoneyorpropertyofathirdpersonandmisappliesit;and(b)whereafirminthecourseofitsbusinessreceivesmoneyorpropertyofathirdperson,andthemoneyorpropertysoreceivedismisappliedbyoneormoreofthepartnerswhileitisinthecustodyofthefirm,thefirmisliabletomakegoodtheloss.Liabilityforwrongsjointandseveral13.Exceptasprovidedinsubsection10(2),everypartnerisliablejointlywiththeco-partnersandalsoseverallyforeverythingforwhichthefirm,whilethepersonisapartnertherein,becomesliableundersection11or12.Personsliableby“holdingout”15.(1)Everyperson,whobywordsspokenorwrittenorbyconductrepresentshimselforherselforwhoknowinglysuffershimselforherselftoberepresentedasapartnerinaparticularfirm,isliableasapartnertoanypersonwhohasonthefaithofanysuchrepresentationgivencredittothefirm,whethertherepresentationhasorhasnotbeenmadeorcommunicatedtothepersonssogivingcreditbyorwiththeknowledgeoftheapparentpartnermakingtherepresentationorsufferingittobemade.Continuingbusinessafterdeathofpartner(2)Whereafterapartner’sdeaththepartnershipbusinessiscontinuedintheoldfirmname,thecontinueduseofthatnameorofthedeceasedpartner’snameaspartthereofdoesnotofitselfmakehisorherexecutor’soradministrator’sestateoreffectsliableforanypartnershipdebtscontractedafterhisorherdeath.Admissionsandrepresentationsofpartners16.Anadmissionorrepresentationmadebyapartnerconcerningthepartnershipaffairsandintheordinarycourseofitsbusinessisevidenceagainstthefirm.Noticetoactingpartnertobenoticetothefirm17.Noticetoapartnerwhohabituallyactsinthepartnershipbusinessofanymatterrelatingtopartnershipaffairsoperatesasnoticetothefirm,exceptinthecaseofafraudonthefirmcommittedbyorwiththeconsentofthatpartner.Variationbyconsentoftermsofpartnership20.Themutualrightsanddutiesofpartners,whetherascertainedbyagreementordefinedbythisAct,maybevariedbytheconsentofallthepartners,andsuchconsentmaybeeitherexpressedorinferredfromacourseofdealing.Partnershipproperty21.(1)Allpropertyandrightsandinterestsinpropertyoriginallybroughtintothepartnershipstockoracquired,whetherbypurchaseorotherwise,onaccountofthefirm,orforthepurposesandinthecourseofthepartnershipbusiness,arecalledinthisAct“partnershipproperty”,andmustbeheldandappliedbythepartnersexclusivelyforthepurposesofthepartnershipandinaccordancewiththepartnershipagreement.Devolutionofland(2)Thelegalestateorinterestinlandthatbelongstoapartnershipdevolvesaccordingtothenatureandtenurethereofandthegeneralrulesoflawtheretoapplicable,butintrust,sofarasnecessary,forthepersonsbeneficiallyinterestedinthelandunderthissection.Co-ownersofland
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(3)Whereco-ownersofanestateorinterestinland,notbeingitselfpartnershipproperty,arepartnersastoprofitsmadebytheuseofthatlandorestate,andpurchaseotherlandorestateoutoftheprofitstobeusedinlikemanner,thelandorestatesopurchasedbelongstothem,intheabsenceofanagreementtothecontrary,notaspartners,butasco-ownersforthesamerespectiveestatesandinterestsasareheldbytheminthelandorestatefirstmentionedatthedateofpurchase.Propertyboughtwithpartnershipmoney22.Unlessthecontraryintentionappears,propertyboughtwithmoneybelongingtothefirmshallbedeemedtohavebeenboughtontheaccountofthefirm.Rulesastointerestsanddutiesofpartners24.Theinterestsofpartnersinthepartnershippropertyandtheirrightsanddutiesinrelationtothepartnershipshallbedetermined,subjecttoanyagreementexpressorimpliedbetweenthepartners,bythefollowingrules:
1.Allthepartnersareentitledtoshareequallyinthecapitalandprofitsofthebusiness,andmustcontributeequallytowardsthelosses,whetherofcapitalorotherwise,sustainedbythefirm,butapartnershallnotbeliabletocontributetowardlossesarisingfromaliabilityforwhichthepartnerisnotliableundersubsection10(2).2.Thefirmmustindemnifyeverypartnerinrespectofpaymentsmadeandpersonalliabilitiesincurredbyhimorher,
(a)intheordinaryandproperconductofthebusinessofthefirm;or(b)inoraboutanythingnecessarilydoneforthepreservationofthebusinessorpropertyofthefirm.
2.1Apartnerisnotrequiredtoindemnifythefirmorotherpartnersinrespectofdebtsorobligationsofthepartnershipforwhichapartnerisnotliableundersubsection10(2).3.Apartnermaking,forthepurposeofthepartnership,anyactualpaymentoradvancebeyondtheamountofcapitalthatheorshehasagreedtosubscribeisentitledtointerestattherateof5percentperannumfromthedateofthepaymentoradvance.4.Apartnerisnotentitled,beforetheascertainmentofprofits,tointerestonthecapitalsubscribedbythepartner.5.Everypartnermaytakepartinthemanagementofthepartnershipbusiness.6.Nopartnerisentitledtoremunerationforactinginthepartnershipbusiness.7.Nopersonmaybeintroducedasapartnerwithouttheconsentofallexistingpartners.8.Anydifferencearisingastoordinarymattersconnectedwiththepartnershipbusinessmaybedecidedbyamajorityofthepartners,butnochangemaybemadeinthenatureofthepartnershipbusinesswithouttheconsentofallexistingpartners.9.Thepartnershipbooksaretobekeptattheplaceofbusinessofthepartnership,ortheprincipalplace,ifthereismorethanone,andeverypartnermay,whenheorshethinksfit,haveaccesstoandinspectandcopyanyofthem.
Expulsionofpartner25.Nomajorityofthepartnerscanexpelanypartnerunlessapowertodosohasbeenconferredbyexpressagreementbetweenthepartners.Retirementfrompartnershipatwill26.(1)Wherenofixedtermisagreeduponforthedurationofthepartnership,anypartnermaydeterminethepartnershipatanytimeongivingnoticeofhisorherintentiontodosotoalltheotherpartners.Noticeofretirement(2)Wherethepartnershipwasoriginallyconstitutedbydeed,anoticeinwriting,signedbythepartnergivingit,issufficientforthatpurpose.
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Presumptionofcontinuanceafterexpiryofterm27.(1)Whereapartnershipenteredintoforafixedtermiscontinuedafterthetermhasexpiredandwithoutanyexpressnewagreement,therightsanddutiesofthepartnersremainthesameastheywereattheexpirationoftheterm,sofarasisconsistentwiththeincidentsofapartnershipatwill.Arisesfromcontinuanceofbusiness(2)Acontinuanceofthebusinessbythepartnersorsuchofthemashabituallyactedthereinduringthetermwithoutanysettlementorliquidationofthepartnershipaffairsshallbepresumedtobeacontinuanceofthepartnership.Dutyastorenderingaccounts28.Partnersareboundtorendertrueaccountsandfullinformationofallthingsaffectingthepartnershiptoanypartnerorthepartner’slegalrepresentatives.Accountabilityforprivateprofits29.(1)Everypartnermustaccounttothefirmforanybenefitderivedbythepartnerwithouttheconsentoftheotherpartnersfromanytransactionconcerningthepartnershiporfromanyusebythepartnerofthepartnershipproperty,nameorbusinessconnection.Extendstosurvivorsandrepresentativesofdeceased(2)Thissectionappliesalsototransactionsundertakenafterapartnershiphasbeendissolvedbythedeathofapartnerandbeforeitsaffairshavebeencompletelywoundup,eitherbyasurvivingpartnerorbytherepresentativesofthedeceasedpartner.Dutyofpartnernottocompetewithfirm30.Ifapartner,withouttheconsentoftheotherpartners,carriesonabusinessofthesamenatureasandcompetingwiththatofthefirm,thepartnermustaccountforandpayovertothefirmallprofitsmadebythepartnerinthatbusiness.Dissolutionbyexpiryoftermornotice32.Subjecttoanyagreementbetweenthepartners,apartnershipisdissolved,
(a)ifenteredintoforafixedterm,bytheexpirationofthatterm;(b)ifenteredintoforasingleadventureorundertaking,bytheterminationofthatadventureorundertaking;or(c)ifenteredintoforanundefinedtime,byapartnergivingnoticetotheotherorothersofhisorherintentiontodissolvethepartnership,inwhichcasethepartnershipisdissolvedasfromthedatementionedinthenoticeasthedateofdissolution,or,ifnodateissomentioned,asfromthedateofthecommunicationofthenotice.
Dissolutionbydeathorinsolvencyofpartner33.(1)Subjecttoanyagreementbetweenthepartners,everypartnershipisdissolvedasregardsallthepartnersbythedeathorinsolvencyofapartner.Wherepartner’ssharechargedforseparatedebt(2)Apartnershipmay,attheoptionoftheotherpartners,bedissolvedifanypartnersuffersthatpartner’sshareofthepartnershippropertytobechargedunderthisActforthatpartner’sseparatedebt.Byillegalityofbusiness34.Apartnershipisineverycasedissolvedbythehappeningofanyeventthatmakesitunlawfulforthebusinessofthefirmtobecarriedonorforthemembersofthefirmtocarryitoninpartnership.
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Bythecourt35.(1)Onapplicationbyapartner,thecourtmayorderadissolutionofthepartnership,
(a)whenapartnerisfoundtobeincapableasdefinedintheSubstituteDecisionsAct,1992;(b)whenapartner,otherthanthepartnersuing,becomesinanyotherwaypermanentlyincapableofperformingthepartner’spartofthepartnershipcontract;(c)whenapartner,otherthanthepartnersuing,hasbeenguiltyofsuchconductas,intheopinionofthecourt,regardbeinghadtothenatureofthebusiness,iscalculatedtoprejudiciallyaffectthecarryingonofthebusiness;(d)whenapartner,otherthanthepartnersuing,wilfullyorpersistentlycommitsabreachofthepartnershipagreement,orotherwisesoconductshimselforherselfinmattersrelatingtothepartnershipbusinessthatitisnotreasonablypracticablefortheotherpartnerorpartnerstocarryonthebusinessinpartnershipwiththepartner;(e)whenthebusinessofthepartnershipcanonlybecarriedonataloss;or(f)wheninanycasecircumstanceshavearisenthatintheopinionofthecourtrenderitjustandequitablethatthepartnershipbedissolved.
Applicationwhereincapacity(2)Inthecaseofanapplicationunderclause(1)(a),theapplicationmaybemadebythelitigationguardianofthepartnerfoundtobeincapable,onthepartner’sbehalf.Rightsofpersonsdealingwithfirmagainstapparentmembers36.(1)Whereapersondealswithafirmafterachangeinitsconstitution,thepersonisentitledtotreatallapparentmembersoftheoldfirmasstillbeingmembersofthefirmuntilthepersonhasnoticeofthechange.
• Thepartnershipisthemostprimitive(simple,flexible)formoforganization.Verymalleable.• Defaultorganizationalformforcollectiveenterprise.
o Statutoryruleswillapplyevenifyou’vedonenothingtosetupanagreementortakenstepstostructurethebusinessdifferently.
o Lawwillassumetwopeoplecarryingonabusinesstobeapartnershipunlessprovenotherwise.
• Regulatedbyprovincialandterritorialstatutes(nofederalpartnerships).• Usuallywrittenagreement,butdoesn’tneedtobe.• Statutesetsoutdefaultrules.
1)Whendopartnershipsexist?
• Testforexistenceo Governedbyprovincialstatute,s.2ofPartnershipsActofOntario.
§ “Partnershipistherelationthatsubsistsbetweenpersonscarryingonabusinessincommonwithaviewtoaprofit.”
o Don’tneedtopointtopartnershipagreement–don’tneedtohaveonebecauseofpresumptionofpartnership.
o Twoormorepersons,engagedinabusinessincommon,goaltomakeprofit.§ Relationbetweenpersons
• Needtwoormorepeopletohaveapartnership§ Business
• PA,s.1(1):business=everytrade,occupationandprofession§ Viewtoaprofit
• Profitmakingasagoal,mustmakereasonableeffortstoachievethis.§ Carryingonbusinessincommon
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• Partiesactinginconcertbasedonanagreementbetweenthem(express,implied,presumedfromconduct).
• Meaning,however,iscomplicated–it’slessclearwhat“businessincommon”meansthantheothercriteriabecausethereareotherrelationshipsbetweenpeoplewheretheymaybeseekingtomakeprofits(e.g.jointownership).
• Mostcasesre:whetherapartnershipexistsrevolvearoundthisissue.
• àNoteasytodistinguishco-ownershipfrompartnershipso Courtswillbemorelikelytofindthataco-ownershipisnotapartnershipwhenthe
evidenceshowsthatlikeinKamex,thereisashort-termintentiontosell.Volzkelookedmorelikeapartnershipbecausetheyownedashoppingmallandwereinvolvedinactivemanagement,etc…tendtopartnership(Volzek).
o Mainlyaboutiftheyarefreetodealwiththeirinterestsindependently.Or,iftheyareacceptingconstraintsontheirinterests,puttingmoneybackintothepartnershiptorunthebusiness,thenlookslikepartnership.
• Threecases:Kamex,Volzke,andPooleyo Intentionisimportantindeterminingifthereisapartnership.Looktoanyandall
agreementandbehaviourofparties.o Considerindiciaofpartnership(Volzke–jointbankaccount,holdingeachotherout,
referringtoaspartners,sharingincosts,profits,etc…)o Pooley–self-servingindiciawillnotplayanimportantroleindetermining.Evenifyousay
thatit’snotapartnershipbutitreallylooksandfeelslikeapartnership,thelawwillrecognizeitasapartnership,particularlyifthereasonyoudon’twantittobecalledapartnershipistoavoidtheliabilitythatcomeswithapartnership.
o Thoughthedefinitionofapartnershipmayappearsimplere:carryingonabusinessincommon,itisnotinpractice.
A.E.LePageLtd.v.KamexDevelopmentsLtd.(1977,ONCA;1979SCC)Facts
• Twopeopleboughtapartmentbuildingtogether(separateownershipinterests)withintentionofflippingit.
• Hadanagreementthatcostsandprofitswouldbedividedbetweentheco-ownersinproportiontotheirinterests;rightoffirstrefusaltobuytheotherout;majorityvoterequiredtosellbuilding.
• Metmonthly,discussedmanagement/upkeepofproperty,whetherwasrighttimetosellbuilding.• Eventuallydecidedtosell,oneownercontactedrealestateagentandexecutedanexecutivelisting
agreement,purportingtoactforallofthebuilding’sco-owners.• Otherco-ownerclaimshedidnothavetheauthoritytodothisandsoviolateslistingagreement.• Agentsuesforcommissionofproperty.
Issue• Whatconstitutesapartnership?Carryingon(a)abusiness;(b)incommon;(c)withaviewto
aprofit.• Doesbeingco-ownersofapropertymakeyoupartners?No.Mustcarryonbusinessincommon.
Needintentiontoholdpropertyjointly,ratherthanmaintainrightstodealwithrespectiveinterestsinproperty.
• Isthisapartnership?No.Reasoning
• PAs.3(3)–proofthatthereisaprofitsharingarrangementgeneratesarebuttablepresumptionthatthereisapartnership.
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• PAs.3(1)–incertainkindsofrelationshipsthereissharingofprofitsandlossesthatarenotnecessarilypartnerships.e.g.jointownership,etc…
o Rebuttablepresumptionof3(3)thereforedoesnotapplyincasesofco-ownershipthanksto3(1).
• PartnershipsAct,s.2:“Partnershipistherelationthatsubsistsbetweenpersonscarryingonbusinessincommonwithaviewtoprofit…”
o Thefactthattwopeopleco-ownpropertyandmakeaprofitfromitisnotenough.Mustbecarryingonthebusinessincommon.
• Whetherornotthereisapartnershipdependsontheintentionoftheparties.Didtheyintendtocarryonabusiness,orjusthaveanagreementtoregulatetheirrightsandobligationsasco-ownersofaproperty?
o Looktocircumstances,howthepartiesconductedthemselves,howtheyarticulatedtheirrelationship,termsofanyagreementsbetweenthem.
o Considerifthereisevidentofpropertybeingheldjointly,ifthereareconstraintsontheabilityofpartnerstodealwiththeirinterestsfreely.
o Seewhetherprofitshadtobeappliedtothepartnership,orifco-ownerswerefreetotaketheirshareofprofits.
• Needtointendtobecomepartnersinajointventure,notmerelybeco-ownersofproperty(Thrushv.Read,1950).
• Thereisnosuchintentionhere-intendingtoacquire,hold,andsellpropertyforprofitdoesn’tmakeyoupartners.
• Propertyinpartnershipisjointproperty–can’tdealwithyourundividedinterestinthelandasyourown.
o Here,intentionofpartiestomaintainrightsasco-ownersisclear–wantedtomaintainrightstodealwiththeirrespectiveinterestsintheproperty.
VolzkeConstructionLtd.v.WestlockFoodsLtd.(1986,ABCA)Facts
• BonnellandWestlockeachhaveaninterestinamallthatwasbeingdeveloped(80%/20%,respectively).
• Constructioncompany,V,approachesC(agentofW),whoreferstoBashispartner.Cdiesandtherelationshipbetweenthepartiessours.VbringsaclaimagainstW.
Issue• Isthisapartnership?Yes.
JudicialHistory• TrialcourtsaidtherewasnopartnershipherebecauseBonnellwasincontrol.Saidlackofcontrol
ofWestlocknegatedpossibilityoftherebeingapartnership.Reasoning
• Controlisnotlegallyrelevantandhasnothingtodowithwhetherornotthereisapartnership.Thereareoftenactiveanddormantpartnersinapartnership.
o Sharedcontrolisnotanessentialcharacteristicofpartnerships.Canhavesilentpartners.Sharedcontrol,wherepresent,isnotsufficienttofindthatthereisapartnership.
• Again,it’saboutintent–intentionrevealedbytermsofagreementbetweenthemandtheirconduct.
o Clearonthefactsofthiscasethattheywerepartnersinabusinessoperatingtheshoppingcentre.Spokeofeachotheraspartners.
o Intendedtosharethecostsofdevelopingthebusiness,aswellastheprofits,80-20.o Jointbankaccount;sharecostsofdevelopment;sharecosts,profitsandlosses;spokeof
eachotheraspartners;sentclientstoeachother;jointlymanagedtheproperty.Pooleyv.Driver(1876,UK)
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Facts
• TheDriversenteredintoaloanagreementwithapartnership.ThedeeddescribedtheDriversasco-partners,anduntiltheywererepaidtheyheld5partsofthepartnershipandsharedinprofitsaccordingly.
• Thepartnershipwentintobankruptcy,andPooley(plaintiff)seekspaymentonthemoneyfromtheDrivers(defendant),allegingthattheywerenotcreditorsofthepartnershipbutpartnersinthepartnership.
Issue• AretheDriverspartnersofthepartnershiporcreditorsofthepartnership?Partners.
Reasoning• Seekingtodifferentiatebetweenpartnershiprelationshipanddebtor/creditorrelationship.• Again,alwayslooktosurroundingcircumstancesandintentionsofparties.
o Termsoftheloanwereunsual…o Drivershadthesamerightsaswouldbeenjoyedbydormantpartners.o Theyenjoyedcontroloverhowthecapitaltheyprovidedwouldbeused–notthe
ordinarypositionoflenders.Normallylendersarenotinterestedinhowcapitalisusedexceptforwhenitcomestimesforrepayment.
o Loanwasforthedurationofthepartnership–reallyintendedtobeanadvanceofcapitaltothepartnershipforthepurposeofcarryingiton,notanordinaryloan.
o Inanormalloanthebankruptcyofthecreditorwouldn’thaveanythingtodowithanything…Wouldberemarkableforaregularloantobeimpactedbybankruptcyofcreditor.Here,factthatagreementcomestoanendshouldthecreditorgobankruptissignificantinthatitmakesitlookmorelikeapartnershipagreement.
o Lendersagreedtorepayinterestthey’dreceivedifthepartnershipdidn’tturnaprofit.Whatcreditorwouldagreetothat?!None.Lookslikepartnership.
o Arbitrationclausepresent–commoninpartnerships,notcommoninloans.o Hadrightstoaccounting–unusualforlender,standardforpartnersbecauseyouare
concernedaboutwhatothersaredoingwithyourmoney.o Lotsofotherexamples…
• Courtswilllookthroughtoseeinsubstance,whatisthis.Willignoresuperficial,self-servingrepresentations.
o Importantherebecauseloanerswerelookingtomakeitlookliketheyweremorelikecreditorsthanpartners,becausetheydidn’twanttheadditionalliability.
• Therefore,truerelationshiphereoneofdormant/activepartnersandnotofcreditors/debtors.
Holding• Basedonthedocumentsandlookingatthetransactionasawhole,thisisnotaloan–true
relationshipbetweenthepartieswasactiveanddormantpartners,notcreditorsanddebtors.Notes
• Today,thisissuedealtwithbyPartnershipsAct,s.3(3)(d).2)NatureandCharacteristicsoftheCMLPartnership(LegalPersonality)
• Howisapartnershipdistinctfromtheindividuals/entitiesthatmakeupapartnership?o Isisn’t–apartnershipdoesn’tenjoyadistinctlegalpersonality.o Thebusinessiscarriedoutbyallofthepartnersandthepropertyisheldbyallofthe
partnersastenantsincommon.o Profitsandliabilitiesflowdirectlytothepartnersaccordingtothetermsofthe
partnershipagreement.o Liabilityofpartnersissameassoleproprietorship–unlimitedpersonalliability.
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§ Neitherhavelegalstatus,arenotlegalactors.Partnersthroughtheirindividualagencyallowthepartnershiptofunction,inthesamewayasindividualsdoinsoleproprietorship.
o Partnershipscansometimesberecognizedaslegalentitiesforpracticalpurposes(e.g.inalawsuitoftwopartners).
Thornev.NewBrunswick(Workmen’sCompensationBoard)(1962,NBSCAppealDivision)Facts
• Partnerinloggingfirminjuredwhilecarryingoutloggingactivities.Toobtainworkers’compensation,needtobeinjuredasaworkman,asanemployee.
• So,toreceivecompensation,Tneedstobefoundtobeanemployeeofthepartnershipofwhichheisamember.
Issue• Arepartnershipslegalentities/personsdistinctfromtheircomponentmembers?No.• IsitpossibleforTtoenterintoanemploymentagreementwiththepartnershipofwhichheisa
member,therebyallowinghimtoreceiveworkmen’scompensation?No.Reasoning
• Apartnershipisalegalorganization,butintermsofitsstatus,ithasnolegalcapacitytodoanythingofitsownright.
o Itdoesn’tenjoytheattributesofaseparatelegalpersonality.Apartnershipisthereforenotadistinctlegalentityfromitsmembers.
• Asaresult,apartnershipdoesnothavethelegalstatusrequiredtoallowittocontractwithoneofitsmembers.Partnerscannotthereforebeemployeesofthepartnership–youcan’tcontractwithyourselftowork.Thereisnosuchthingas“self-employment”inapartnership.
Ratio• Apartnership,unlikeacorporation,isnotalegalperson.Nolegalagencycanbeattributedtoit,
includingthecapacitytoenterintoacontractwithanyone,letalonethecapacitytoenterintoacontractwithapartnerinthepartnership.
3)RelationshipBetweenPartners
• Thereareanumberofimportantrelationalqualitiesthataresignificanttotheorganizationalformaswellastothepowers,rights,andobligationsofpartners.
• Partner–partnerrelationshipsare:personal,alterelementsofpartneraffairsconsensually,presumptiveequality,reciprocalagency,fiduciary.
• (i)Partnershipsarepersonalinnatureo Createdthroughexpress/impliedagreementorthroughjointconductofpartners.o Personal=tiedspecificallytoindividuals,rightscannotbefullyassignedtothird
parties.o Section31,PA–sharesthathavebeenassignedtoanotherarestrippedofcertainrights
(rightstomanagement,accounting,inspectionoffinancialrecords).Assigneeremainsentitledtoprofitshare.Theymustremainpassive.
§ Why?Becausetheserelationshipsrequireahighleveloftrustbetweenpartners–notjustanyonecanstepinandfillthatrole.
o Becausepartnershipsarepersonal,theydissolveuponthedeathorinsolvencyofapartner(s.33,PA).
• (ii)Partnershipsareconsensualinnatureo It’sallaboutthewilloftheparties,ajointandcommonwill,tobeinbusinesstogether.
Mutualconsent.
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o Canbefoundinsignaturestoapartnershipcontractorinbehaviourofactors.o Termsofthepartnershipwillbeintheagreement,ifthereisone.Ifnot,defaultrulesin
statutewillapply.§ Section20–mutualrightsanddutiesofpartners(defaultrulessetoutin
statute)canbevariedbytheagreementofallpartners,canbeexpressorinferredincourseofdealing.
§ However,youcannevercontractoutoffiduciaryobligationstooneanotherandthepartnership.
• Thisisahardlimitonconsensualism–exceptiontosection20.• Why?Fiduciaryobligationsareatthecoreofpartnerships–it’sabout
thecommonjointinterestofthepartners.Can’thavepeopleactinginself-interest.Ifyouallowedpeopletooptoutofthis,youwouldn’treallyhaveapartnershipanyway.
o Unanimityisrequiredforconsensuality–majorityvotesareinsufficientforanythingotherthan“ordinarymatters”(s.28,PA).
• (iii)Partnersenjoypresumptiveequalityo Inwhatformdopartnersenjoypresumptiveequality?Liability,entitlementtosharesof
profit,managementofpartnership.o Section24.1–equalshareofprofits,losses,liability.o Section24.5–equalrighttoparticipateinmanagementofpartnership.Notmandatoryto
assertthatright,canbepassive.o Partnershipagreementscan,however,modifythesepresumptionsofequality.
• (iv)Partnersareequalinreciprocalagency(onecanactforall)
o Eachpartnerisconsideredinlawtobeanagentoftheotherinconductingthebusinessofthepartnership.
o It’sreciprocalbecauseeachpartnerisboundbytheactsoftheotherandcanbindtheothersthroughhis/heractionsonbehalfofthepartnership.
o Agents=peoplewhohavelegalauthoritytomakebindingdecisions(e.g.contracts)onbehalfoftheprincipal.
o Principalscanalsobeliableforthetortsoftheiragents.§ Itisforthisreasonthatitisintheinterestofpartnerstobeactiveratherthan
passivepartners–shouldtakeanactiveroleinmanagementofpartnershiptoensureavoidingliability.
o Agencycanbelimitedorunlimited.§ Ifthereareanylimitations,theystemfromthepartnershipagreement.§ Limitationstoagencywillonlyapplyifthirdpartyisawareofthem(s.9,PA).
o Whathappensifanagent,lackingauthority,makesarepresentationthattheydidn’thavetheauthoritytomake?
§ Partnerswillstillbeliable–so,what’sthepointofhavinganylimitationsthen?• Well,stillvalueinsettingouttherules,knowingwhereothersstand,etc…
• (v)Partnershavefiduciarydutiestowardeachotherandthepartnership
o Byvirtueoftheiragencyrelationships,partnersarefiduciariestoeachother.o Agency=relationshipsofhightrustandconfidence.Fiduciaryprinciplesprotectthese
kindsofrelationships.§ Fiduciarylawmakesitmorerationaltoplacetrustinanotherbecauseitplaces
constraintsonwhatotherpartnerscando,restrictstheirabilitytoactinself-interest.
o Can’tcontractoutoffiduciaryobligationsbecauseit’ssofundamentaltopartnerships(exceptiontos.20,PA).
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• Involvesadutyofloyalty,goodfaith,avoidanceofconflictofinterestandconflictofinterest.o Generaldutyofloyaltyexpressedthroughtworules:
§ Conflictofinterestrule–partnercan’tallowpersonal/self-interesttocomeintoconflictwiththebeneficiaryofthefiduciaryrelationship.
§ Conflictofdutyrule–can’tundertakeconflictingmandates/obligations.o Partnersmustsubordinatetheirpersonalinterestsandthoseofthirdpartiestothose
ofthepartnership.Mustactinbestinterestofpartnership.§ But,outsideareainwhichfiduciaryobligationsareowed,partnersmaintain
personaleconomicliberty.• Thebeneficiaryofthefiduciaryobligationsisallpartnerscollectively,thepartnership.• Fiduciarydutiesillustratedinss.28-30ofPartnershipsAct.
o 28:Dutytorendertrueaccountsandfullinformationofallthingsaffectingpartnershipo 29(1):Dutytodiscloseallbenefits/profitsderivedwithoutconsentofpartners.o 29(2):29(1)appliestotransactionsafterthedissolutionofthepartnershipduetodeathof
apartnerbutbeforetheaffairsofthepartnershiphavebeenwoundup.o 30:Dutynottocarryonbusinessincompetitionwithpartnership–ifyoudo,haveto
payprofitstopartnership.Olsonv.Gullo(ONCA,1994)àImplicationsofpartners’fiduciarydutiesFacts
• Twoguysinapartnershipre:landdevelopment.Insecret,Gbuysapieceoflandtheyhaddiscussed,sellsit,andturnsahugeprofit.OfoundoutandsuedGfortheprofithemade.
Issue• Doesapartnerwhohasobtainedsecretprofitshaveanobligationtodisclosethemandturnthem
overtothepartnership?Yes–s.29(1)ofPartnershipsAct.• Doesthesneakypartnerhavearighttohisshareofthedisclosedprofitasapartner?Yes–
nothingtosaythathewouldbestrippedofshare.Obtaininghisshareisnotbenefittingfromhisownwrongdoing,justgettinghisshareofprofitsthatshouldhavebeenthepartnership’sanyway.
JudicialHistory• Gfoundliableforbreachoffiduciarydutyandmadetodisgorgeentireprofitmade(didn’tgetto
keephalf).Reasoning
• Threestepsinfiduciaryanalysis:o (1)Showtherewasafiduciaryrelationshipbetweenparties–incontextofpartnership,
meansshowingthereisapartnership.Partnershipsareinherentlyfiduciary.o (2)Dutyofloyalty–seeiftherewasabreachofthedutyofloyalty.o (3)Disgorgementremedy–noquestionthatguiltypartywasliabletodisgorgeprofit,
butquestionwasabouthowmuch.• JudgeagreedthatGandOwereinapartnership(eventhoughonlyagreedtoorally),hadintended
tocarryonabusinesstogether,andthatpurchasingthelandhadbeenpartoftheirbusinessplan.Therefore,purchaseandsaleoflandwassomethingthatconcernedthepartnershipandthe$$shouldbegiventothepartnership,notkeptbyG.
o Section29(1)ofPartnershipsAct–secretprofitsaretobepaidtopartnershipandtermsgoverningpartnershipdeterminewhathappenstothemoney.
• SomethoughtGshouldn’tgethisshare(half)ofthe$$nowtransferredtothepartnershipbecausehewasasneakysonofabitchandstabbedOintheback.
o Thisiswhattheplaintiffargued(withlotsofauthoritytobackhimup):thatdisgorgementremedyistotal–wouldrequirethedisgorgementofalloftheprofits.Thiswouldbetodisincentivizethepartiesfromengagingindisloyalbehaviour.
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• But,judgesaidthere’snothinginthelegislationsayingthatthewrongdoershouldn’tgettheirshareofthepartnership’snewfundsbecauseafterall,theyareapartnerandit’snotexactlyprofitingfromhisdeceit.
o Judgesaiditwouldbecontrarytoprincipleandauthoritytodeprivethedefaultingpartyoftheirportionoftheprofitasamemberofthepartnership.
o àDoesthismakesense,though?Ifthiscanbethecase,whatistheretodiscouragepartnersfrombeingsnakesandbreachingtheirfiduciarydutiesif,atworst,theywillstillgettokeeptheirshareoftheprofit?
• Judgesaidthatpartnershipsareunique–notjustabilateralrelationship,butreciprocalagency.Eachisbothabeneficiaryandaduty-boundparty.
4)RelationshipBetweenPartnership,Partners,andOutsiders
• Therelationshipsbetweenpartnersandthirdpartiesaremainlyaboutliability.• Asageneralrule,eachpartnerissubjecttoliabilitiesincurredbyotherpartnersincurred
duringtheordinarycourseofthepartnership(s.7).Includesliabilityforcontracts,debts,andtorts.
o Theyarepersonallyliableforbusinessliabilitiesofthepartnershiptooutsiders.o Partnersareabletorestricttheabilityofcertainpartnerstobindthepartnership,but
thisisonlyeffectiveifthethirdpartyisawareoftherestriction(s.6).• Jointliability–eachliableforfullextentofthedebt.Creditormustsueallpartnersandif
successful,liabilitywillbeapportioned.• Jointandseveralliability–eachliableforfullextentofdebt.Creditorpermittedtosueany
individualpartnerandsuethemalone.Ifsuccessful,thatpartnerwillbearfullextentofliabilityandwillhavetoseparatelysuetheotherpartnersfortheirshareofthedebtthathe’sbeenforcedtopay.
• Ifthedebtscan’tbepaidoutoftheassetsofthepartnership,havetogoafterthepersonalassetsofthepartnership(becausepartnershipsarepersonal).
• Section6–termsunderwhichpartnershavepowertobindco-partners.• Section7–makespartnersliableforauthorizedactsofagents/partners.• Pre-partnershipliability
o Section18(1)–partnersnotliableforliabilityincurredbythepartnershipbeforetheybecameapartner.
• (a)Liabilityaspartnero Section7–Partnersaregenerallyjointlyliablefordebtsofpartnership.o Section6and9–Defencestojointliability
§ (6)Arguethepartnerhadnoauthoritytoengageintheactionsandthatthethirdpartywasawareofthislackofauthorityorthatthethirdpartydidn’tknowthispersonwasapartner.
§ (9)Ifpartneractedinbreachofagreementandthirdpartyknewtheywerebreaching.
o Section10–Liabilityisheldjointlywithotherpartners.o Section13–Generally,liabilityisjointlyheldforlosses/injuriescausedtothirdparties
duetoactionsofpartnerinordinarycourseofbusinessaswellasformisapplicationofthirdparty’smoney/propertyreceivedincustodyoffirm.Jointandseveralliabilityispossibleincertaincircumstancesandismorefavourabletocreditor.
o Section18(2)–Liabilityisn’tshedwhenyouleaveapartnership.§ Section10(1)–Evenifyoudie,yourestateisheldliableforstufffromwhenyou
wereapartner.• (b)Holdingoutliability
o Section15(1)–anindividualwhoisn’tapartnercanbeheldliableasapartnerifthey’veheldthemselvesoutasapartnerorsufferedthemselvestobeheldoutasapartner
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andthattherepresentationwasrelieduponbyathirdpartyinextendingcredittothepartnership.
o Non-partner(e.g.employees)canbindpartnerships(s.7).o Candosoby“holdingout”liability(s.15).
§ Kindoflikeestoppel–ifyouholdyourselfoutasapartnerandshitgoessouthlater,youcan’tthenturnaroundandsayno,noI’mnotactuallyapartner,dude!Noliabilityformeee!Nah.Youliable,bro.
• (c)Liabilityonwithdrawalo Whataboutliabilityincurredafterapartnerwithdraws?o Section36:Havetobecarefulhowyouwithdraw–willbeheldliableunlessyoutake
caretogivenoticetothirdpartiestostatethatyouareleavingthefirm,makesuretheyunderstand.
Clarkev.Burton(1958,UK)àre:whatconstitutesadequatenoticeofwithdrawalofpartnerforthemtoavoidcontinuingliabilityFacts
• CharlesBurtonworkedforhisfatherWilliamBurton'sinsulationbusiness,Burton'sInsulation&Roofing.
• ThetwohadafallingoutandCharleslefttoworkonhisown,butcontinuedworkingunderthefirmname,Burton'sInsulation.
• Clarke(thirdparty)bringsactionagainstCharlesaspartnerofBurtonInsulationandRoofing.Issue
• Canapartnerwhohasleftthepartnershipandprovidednoticetoathirdpartybeheldliablebythatthirdpartyasapartnerofthepartnershiptheyhaveleft?No.
Reasoning• Noticeisnotneededwhentheindividualwasnotthoughttobeapartnerbythethirdparty.• Noticeisneededwhenindividualknowntobeapartnerbythirdparty–allowscreditorsto
relyonthefactthatthepartnershipremainsunchanged.o Onusisontheretiredpartnertoprovethatthirdpartiesweregivennoticeor
constructivenotice(oughttohaveknown).o Givingnoticedoesn’tneedtobeformal.
• Clarke’sclaimfailsbecauseCharlesinformedClarkehewasnolongerworkingwithhisfather.
o Clarkehadreceivedsufficientnotice–hadfullknowledgethatCharleshadseveredconnectionwithhisfatherandwasinbusinessforhimself.
o Couldn'trecoveragainstCharlesasapartnerofthefirmasaresult.• Whatconstitutes“notice”willdifferdependingonwhetherthethirdpartyhaddealingswith
thefirmbeforethechangeornot.o Iftheyhaddealings,liabilitywillcontinueunless:
§ Noticegivenlikeitwashere.§ Thirdpartydidn’tknowpartnerwasapartner.§ Partnerretiredfrompartnershipbecauseofdeathorinsolvency(s.36(3)).
o Iftheydidn’thavedealings:§ Cantreatany“apparentmember”ofthefirmasacontinuingmemberofthefirm
forliabilitypurposesabsentnotice.NoticeheremustbethroughOntarioGazette.§ Noliabilityifthirdpartydidn’tknowpersonwasapartner.
• (d)Posthumousliability
o Section10(1):Evenifyoudie,yourestateisheldliableforstufffromwhenyouwereapartner.
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§ “…afterthepartner’sdeaththepartner’sestateisalsoseverallyliableinaduecourseofadministrationforsuchdebtsandobligationssofarastheyremainunsatisfied,butsubjecttothepriorpaymentofhisorherseparatedebts.”
o Sections15(2)and36(3):Estateisnotliableforstuffincurredafteryouwereapartner.
§ 15(2):Evenifthedeceasedpartner’snameisstillusedaspartofthepartnershipname,estatenotliableforliabilityincurredafterdeathofpartner.
§ 36(3):“Theestateofapartnerwhodies,orwhobecomesinsolvent,orofapartnerwho,nothavingbeenknowntothepersondealingwiththefirmtobeapartner,retiresfromthefirm,isnotliableforpartnershipdebtscontractedafterthedateofthedeath,insolvency,orretirement.”
5)DissolutionofPartnerships
• Whenwillapartnershipdissolve?o Unlesspartiescontractedotherwise,willdissolveuponexpiryofthetermofthe
partnership.o Willdissolvewhenpartnershaveconcludedtheirundertaking.o Becausepartnershipsarepersonalinnatureifanypartnerdiesorbecomesinsolvent,
thepartnershipwillbedissolvedunlessthepartiescontemplatedthisandmadeotherprovisions.
o Ifitbecomesillegalforpartnershiptocontinue.• Section35:Apartnershipcanalsobedissolveduponapplicationtothecourt–canbedone
unilaterallyincertaincircumstances.o Partnerbecomesincapableo Partnerguiltyofconductfoundtoprejudicethecarryingonofthebusinesso Partnerwilfullyorpersistentlybreachespartnershipagreemento Businesscanonlybecarriedonatalosso Anyothercircumstancesthecourtthinksarevalidreasonsfordissolution.
• Whathappensupondissolution?o Section44:First,payforlossesoutofprofitsofpartnership,thenpartnership’s
capital,thenpersonalassetsofpartners.§ Assetsfirsttocreditorstosatisfyclaims,thentopartnersforadvancecapital
providedtopartnership,thenpartnersreceiveanyremainingassetsaccordingtotheirshares.
B)CIVILLAWPARTNERSHIPSBouchard,“ReportontheLegalNatureofPartnerships:ComparativeLawStudy”CCQ,arts.2186,2189,2215,2219,2204,298-300,2221CCLAarts.352,387,399(cfCCQ298-300)CivilCodeofQuebec298.Legalpersonsareendowedwithjuridicalpersonality.Legalpersonsareestablishedinthepublicinterestorforaprivateinterest.299.Legalpersonsareconstitutedinaccordancewiththejuridicalformsprovidedbylaw,andsometimesdirectlybylaw.
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LegalpersonsexistfromthecomingintoforceoftheActorfromthetimeprovidedtherebyiftheyareestablishedinthepublicinterestorareconstituteddirectlybylaworbyoperationoflaw;otherwise,theyexistfromthetimeprovidedbytheActsthatareapplicabletothem.300.LegalpersonsestablishedinthepublicinterestareprimarilygovernedbythespecialActsbywhichtheyareconstitutedandbythosewhichareapplicabletothem;legalpersonsestablishedforaprivateinterestareprimarilygovernedbytheActsapplicabletotheirparticulartype.BothkindsoflegalpersonsarealsogovernedbythisCodewheretheprovisionsofsuchActsrequiretobecomplemented,particularlywithregardtotheirstatusaslegalpersons,theirpropertyortheirrelationswithotherpersons.2186.Acontractofpartnershipisacontractbywhichtheparties,inaspiritofcooperation,agreetocarryonanactivity,includingtheoperationofanenterprise,tocontributetheretobycombiningproperty,knowledgeoractivitiesandtoshareamongthemselvesanyresultingpecuniaryprofits.Acontractofassociationisacontractbywhichthepartiesagreetopursueacommongoalotherthanthemakingofpecuniaryprofitstobesharedamongthemembersoftheassociation.2189.Ageneralorlimitedpartnershipisformedunderanamethatiscommontothepartners.ItshallfilearegistrationdeclarationinaccordancewiththeActrespectingthelegalpublicityofenterprises(chapterP-44.1);otherwise,itisdeemedtobeanundeclaredpartnership,subjecttotherightsofthirdpersonsingoodfaith.2204.Apartnermaynotcompetewiththepartnershiponhisownaccountoronbehalfofathirdperson,ortakepartinanactivitywhichdeprivesthepartnershipoftheproperty,knowledgeoractivityheisboundtocontributetoit;anyprofitsarisingtherefrombelongtothepartnership,withoutprejudicetotheremediesitmaypursue.2215.Failinganystipulationastothemodeofmanagement,thepartnersaredeemedtohaveconferredthepowertomanagetheaffairsofthepartnershipononeanother.Anyactperformedbyapartnerwithrespecttothecommonactivitiesbindstheotherpartners,withoutprejudicetotheirrighttoobject,jointlyorseparately,totheactbeforeitisperformed.Inaddition,eachpartnermaycompelhispartnerstoincuranyexpensesnecessarytopreservethecommonproperty,butapartnermaynotchangetheconditionofthatpropertywithouttheconsentoftheothers,regardlessofhowadvantageoussuchchangemaybe.§2.—Relationsofthepartnershipandthepartnerswiththirdpersons2219.Eachpartnerisamandataryofthepartnershipwithrespecttothirdpersonsingoodfaithandbindsthepartnershipforeveryactconcludedinitsnameintheordinarycourseofitsactivities.Nostipulationtothecontrarymaybesetupagainstthirdpersonsingoodfaith.2221.Withrespecttothirdpersons,thepartnersarejointlyliablefortheobligationscontractedbythepartnershipbuttheyaresolidarilyliableiftheobligationshavebeencontractedfortheserviceoroperationofanenterpriseofthepartnership.Thecreditorsmaybringanactionagainstapartnerforpaymentonlyaftertheyhavediscussedthepropertyofthepartnership;eventhen,thepropertyofthepartnerisappliedtothepaymentofthecreditorsofthepartnershiponlyafterhisowncreditorshavebeenpaid.
• (1)Contracto CMLemphasisestheconsentbetweentheparties,whiletheCVLemphasizesthattherebe
acontractbetweentheparties.
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o CVLseesapartnershipasadistinctivetypeofcontract–CMLseesitasadistinctiveformoforganization.
• (2)Contributiono Havetomakecontributions–notjustmoneybutproperty,expertise,knowledge…
anythingofvalue.TheCMLdoesnotfocusoncontributions–instead,itfocusesonjointactivitiesofthepartners.Whathaveyoudone?Howhaveyourepresentedyourself?
• (3)Profito Commonventureforsharedprofit.SimilartoCML–bothhavegoaltomakeprofitsand
theysharetheseprofits.• (4)Cooperation
o Theremustbeaspiritofcooperation–similartoCMLrequirementofcarryingonabusinessincommon.Purposeistoenablelegalactorstodifferentiatethepartnershipfromothergroupingsofpeoplewhoareinvolvedtogetherinpursuitofprofit.
• ScopeofEnterpriseo CVLpartnershipsareabitbroader.o Theycanbefunds,vehiclesforpooledinvestment.Doesn’thavetobedirectlyoperatinga
business.o CMLpartnershipshavenottraditionallybeusedinthisway.Why?Becausethereareother
vehicles,suchastrusts.Whichis,remember,notatraditionalCVLtool/vehicle.
• PointsofComparisono Establishment(2186,2189)
§ TheremustbeacontractinCVL,expressorimplied.§ CML–moreaboutintention.
o Authority(2215,2219)§ CMLandCVLsame:partnershavepresumptiveauthoritytomanagethefirmand
enterintorelationshipsonbehalfofthepartnership.Partiesmayvarythisbycontract,stipulateonlyonehastheauthoritytomanage.
o Responsibility(2204)§ CML:fiduciaryobligationsarekeytoitsregulationofpartnersintheirmanagerial
roles.Loyalty,candour,care.Wepaymostattentiontoloyalty.§ CVL:Nounifiedtraditionthinkingaboutfiduciaryrelationships…But,thereisstill
inCVLcode,obligationswhicharethefunctionalequivalenttotheCMLfiduciaryobligations.
§ 2204–partnermaynotcompetewithapartnershiponownaccountoronaccountofthirdperson.
o Entitystatus(352,387,399CCLC;298,299,300CCQ)§ CVL:DifferentfromCMLinabigway.§ Bouchardarticle–historicalviewisthatpartnershipsareconsideredlegalpersons
(notanylongernowthough).§ CCLC–sawpartnershipsasaperson.
• Philosophicalandjuridical/doctrinalreasons• Philosophically–organizationsorassociations,whatevertheirpurpose,
theyhaveorcancometohaveandfrequentlydohaveakindofreal,organicpersonality,socialormoralidentity,theyhaveagency.Theybehaveaspersonssoweshouldtreatthemandholdthemaccountableaspersons.
• Juridical/doctrinal–Traditionally,CVLpartnershipsseenasholdingpropertyinaseparatepatrimony.Recognizingthemasseparatepatrimoniesnecessitatedrecognizingthemasseparatelegalentities.
§ CCQ–Partnershipslackpersonality.BigchangefromtraditionalthinkinginCCLC.
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• Why?Philosophically–recognitionthattherewasprecedentincontinentaltheorythatpersonalityrecognition/attributionisamatterofchoice–it’suptopeopletodecidewhethertherearegoodreasonsforrecognizingpersonality.
• Courtsthereforebegantoquestionthelongstandinglineofauthority.• Riseofanewconcept–riseofapatrimonyappropriatedtoapurpose.
Thereforelinkbetweenseparatepatrimonyandseparatepurposewasseveredand
• Boucharddoesn’tthinkthatcourtshavesufficientlyexplainedhowapartnership,withoutaseparatepersonality,canholdproperty.
• Someseethisasanoverextensionoftheconceptofthepatrimonyappropriatedforapurposewhichwasbroughtabouttoaccommodateforthetrust.
o Liability(2221)§ Partnershipsareaninherentlyriskywayofstructuringanenterprise–bothCML
andCVLpartnersarepersonallyliablefordebtsandliabilitiesofpartnerships.
• LimitedLiabilityandOrganizationalFormo Thereisunlimitedliabilityinpartnerships–makesitveryflexiblebutveryrisky.
§ Personalliability,makestrustandconfidenceessential.Needtodoyourduediligence.
§ Someeconomistsandpolicypeopleseethisliabilityasabarriertobusinessgrowth,etc…Theybelievethateconomicgrowthsuffersasaresultandthatpeopleshouldbeshieldedfrombusinessliability.
o Limitedliability–argumentsinfavour§ (1)InvestorLimitedLiability:Tostimulateinvestmentandproductive
enterprise,thelawshouldaffordlimitedliabilitytopersonswhosupplycapital,toinvestors.
• Theyshouldonlybeexposedtoriskoflosingthecapitalthey’veinvested,shouldn’tgofurtherthanthat.Otherwise,investmentinbusinessenterprisewillsuffer.
§ (2)ManagerialLimitedLiability:Affordlimitedliabilitytomanagers,executives,directors.
• Managementshouldbeexposedtomarketrisk–iftheydoabadjob,theywillbefiredandthemarketwillpunishthemappropriately.
• Don’tthinktheyshouldbeheldpersonallyliableandexpertmanagementwilldeclinebecausetheriskistoogreat.
• Isthisfairtoothers–workers–whoareleftwithoutprotection?§ Availabilityoflimitedliabilityformanagersandinvestorsisthebiggest
advantageofcorporations.§ But,limitedliabilityisnotwithoutitscosts–foreverypersonwhoisshielded,that
liabilityhastobebornebysomeone/somethingelse.• Theorganization?Iftheycan’tpay,it’sexternalizedandimposedonthe
creditor.
II. THENATUREOFTHECORPORATIONA)TheConstitutionoftheCorporationCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.146and247
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QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.213-220and460CCQ,arts.301-303CanadaBusinessCorporationsActUnanimousshareholderagreement146(1)Anotherwiselawfulwrittenagreementamongalltheshareholdersofacorporation,oramongalltheshareholdersandoneormorepersonswhoarenotshareholders,thatrestricts,inwholeorinpart,thepowersofthedirectorstomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporationisvalid.Declarationbysingleshareholder(2)Ifapersonwhoisthebeneficialownerofalltheissuedsharesofacorporationmakesawrittendeclarationthatrestrictsinwholeorinpartthepowersofthedirectorstomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation,thedeclarationisdeemedtobeaunanimousshareholderagreement.Constructiveparty(3)Apurchaserortransfereeofsharessubjecttoaunanimousshareholderagreementisdeemedtobeapartytotheagreement.Whennonoticegiven(4)Ifnoticeisnotgiventoapurchaserortransfereeoftheexistenceofaunanimousshareholderagreement,inthemannerreferredtoinsubsection49(8)orotherwise,thepurchaserortransfereemay,nolaterthan30daysaftertheybecomeawareoftheexistenceoftheunanimousshareholderagreement,rescindthetransactionbywhichtheyacquiredtheshares.Rightsofshareholder(5)Totheextentthataunanimousshareholderagreementrestrictsthepowersofthedirectorstomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation,partiestotheunanimousshareholderagreementwhoaregiventhatpowertomanageorsupervisethemanagementofthebusinessandaffairsofthecorporationhavealltherights,powers,dutiesandliabilitiesofadirectorofthecorporation,whethertheyariseunderthisActorotherwise,includinganydefencesavailabletothedirectors,andthedirectorsarerelievedoftheirrights,powers,dutiesandliabilities,includingtheirliabilitiesundersection119,tothesameextent.Discretionofshareholders(6)Nothinginthissectionpreventsshareholdersfromfetteringtheirdiscretionwhenexercisingthepowersofdirectorsunderaunanimousshareholderagreement.Restrainingorcomplianceorder247Ifacorporationoranydirector,officer,employee,agentormandatary,auditor,trustee,receiver,receiver-manager,sequestratororliquidatorofacorporationdoesnotcomplywiththisAct,theregulations,articlesorby-laws,oraunanimousshareholderagreement,acomplainantoracreditorofthecorporationmay,inadditiontoanyotherrighttheyhave,applytoacourtforanorderdirectinganysuch
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persontocomplywith,orrestraininganysuchpersonfromactinginbreachof,anyprovisionsofthisAct,theregulations,articlesorby-laws,oraunanimousshareholderagreement,andonsuchapplicationthecourtmaysoorderandmakeanyfurtherorderitthinksfit.QuebecBusinessCorporationsActUNANIMOUSSHAREHOLDERAGREEMENT213.Alltheshareholdersofacorporation,whetherornottheirsharescarryvotingrights,mayagreeinwritingamongthemselvesoramongthemselvesandoneormorethirdpersonstorestrictthepowersoftheboardofdirectorstomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation,ortowithdrawallsuchpowersfromtheboard.Asoleshareholdermaymakeawrittendeclarationthatrestrictsthepowersoftheboardofdirectorsorwithdrawsallpowersfromtheboard.Thedeclarationisequivalenttoaunanimousshareholderagreement.214.Totheextentthataunanimousshareholderagreementrestrictsthepowersoftheboardofdirectorstomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation,orwithdrawsallsuchpowersfromtheboard,partiestotheunanimousshareholderagreementwhoaregiventhosepowershavealltherights,powers,duties,obligationsandliabilitiesofdirectorsofthecorporation,whethertheyariseunderthisActorotherwise,includinganydefencesavailabletothedirectors,andthedirectorsarerelievedoftheirrights,powers,dutiesandliabilities,includingtheirliabilityforthewagesofthecorporation’semployees,tothesameextent.215.Thecorporationmust,inaccordancewiththeActrespectingthelegalpublicityofenterprises(chapterP-44.1),declaretotheenterpriseregistrar,forentryintheenterpriseregister,theexistenceorthetermination,includingonthecorporationbecomingareportingissuer,ofaunanimousshareholderagreementthatrestricts,inwholeorinpart,thepowersofthedirectors.216.Ifaunanimousshareholderagreementwithdrawsallpowersfromtheboardofdirectorsandconfersthemonshareholdersorthirdpersons,thecorporationmustdeclaretotheenterpriseregistrarthenameanddomicileofthosewhohaveassumedthosepowers.TheshareholdersareinsuchacasesubjecttotherulesofDivisionsIandII,unlessotherwiseprovidedintheunanimousshareholderagreementortheby-laws.Theshareholdersmaychoosenottoestablishaboardofdirectors.217.Decisionsofasoleshareholderonwhomallofthepowersoftheboardofdirectorshavebeenconferredmaybemadebywrittenresolution.Anyactbysuchasoleshareholderonbehalfofthecorporationisdeemedtobeauthorized.Suchasoleshareholdermaychoosenottoestablishaboardofdirectorsandnottoappointanauditor,andisnotrequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsofthisActrelatingtotheby-laws,shareholdersmeetingsandmeetingsoftheboardofdirectors.218.Apersonwhobecomesashareholdersubsequenttothesigningofaunanimousshareholderagreementisdeemedtobeapartytotheagreement.However,apersonwho,onbecomingashareholder,isnotgivennoticeoftheexistenceoftheunanimousshareholderagreement,may,nolaterthan30daysafterbecomingawareoftheexistenceoftheunanimousshareholderagreement,havethetransactionbyoneroustitlebywhichthepersonbecameashareholderannulled.Thepersonispresumednottohavebeenawareoftheunanimousshareholderagreementifitsexistenceisnotstatedonthesharecertificateor,inthecaseofuncertificatedshares,ifthepersonwasnotgivennoticeofitsexistence.
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219.Aunanimousshareholderagreementterminateswhenthecorporationbecomesareportingissueror,subjecttotheprovisionsoftheamalgamationagreement,whenthecorporationamalgamatesbythelong-formprocess.220.Nothinginthissubdivisionpreventsshareholdersorthirdpersonsfromfetteringtheirdiscretionwhenexercisingthepowersconferredonthemunderaunanimousshareholderagreement.Non-compliance460.Ifacorporationoradirector,officer,employee,mandataryorauditorofacorporationdoesnotcomplywiththisAct,thearticles,theby-lawsoraunanimousshareholderagreement,anyinterestedpersonmay,withoutprejudicetoanyotherrightthatpersonhas,applytothecourtforanorderdirectingthecorporationoranypersonconcernedtocomply.Thecourtmay,tothatend,makeanyfurtherorderitthinksfit.CivilCodeofQuebecEFFECTSOFJURIDICALPERSONALITY301.Legalpersonshavefullenjoymentofcivilrights.302.Everylegalpersonhasapatrimonywhichmay,totheextentprovidedbylaw,bedividedorappropriatedtoapurpose.Italsohastheextra-patrimonialrightsandobligationsflowingfromitsnature.303.Legalpersonshavecapacitytoexercisealltheirrights,andtheprovisionsofthisCodeconcerningtheexerciseofcivilrightsbynaturalpersonsareapplicabletothem,adaptedasrequired.Theyhavenoincapacitiesotherthanthosewhichmayresultfromtheirnatureorfromanexpressprovisionoflaw.SourcesofCorporateConstitutionalLaw
• Firstsourceisprovincial/federalstatues.o Iffederal,looktoCBCA–ifprovincial,looktoprovincialstatute(e.g.QuebecisQBCA).
• Lookforarticlesofincorporation–documentpreparedbylawyers.o Thesecanbequitebrief–oftennotawholelotinthere.If,however,incorporatorsare
nervousaboutsomethingtheymaybemoredetailed.• Otherrelevantdocuments
o Documentsthatmaysupplementthestatueorthearticlesofincorporation,mayalsoinforminterpretationofthesedocuments.
o Havetoberatifiedbyshareholders.• Unanimousshareholderagreement
o Stipulatedtermsforshareholders,typicallyrelatedtosaleofassets,etc…o Notseenofteninlargecorporations,usuallyinsmallerones.
• Internalgovernancerecordso Minutesfromboardmeetingso Financialrecordsproducedwithinthecorporation,havebeenverifiedbyanoutside
accountant.FunctionofCorporateConstitutions
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• Corporateconstitutionsservetwokeyfunctions:o (1)Primaryfunction–toestablishaframeworkforthegovernanceofthecorporation.
Setouthowdecisionsgetmade.o (2)Conflictresolution–thereisalwayspotentialforconflict,andthisisheightenedin
corporationswherepeoplehavecompetingeconomicinterests.§ Establishesstrongdecisionmakingnorm–thatofmajorityrule.§ Provisionstoprotectminorities,particularlyminorityshareholdersbutalso
dissentingdirectors.Grievanceprocedures,setouttochannelconflictandgetcourtsinvolvedtoresolveconflicts.
§ Resolvesconflictbysettingoutthegovernanceofthecorporation.Setsoutwhohastherighttodecide.
àCorporateconstitutionssetbaselinerulesforthegovernanceofcorporations–setsoutpowers,rights,andobligationsofvariousconstituents,variouscategoriesofmemberswithinacorporation.Corporateconstitutionsflagthreeimportantissues:
• Whoisincontrol?(Whohaspower?)• Whogetstheprofit?(Whogetsthemoney?)• Whoisliable?(Whowillpaymoney?)
Corporateconstitutionsdemonstratebroadissuesofpowerandaccountability:
• Whohaspoweroverthecorporationandisthepowerthatthatpersonhas,isitrootedinthecorporateconstitutionorisitakindofpracticaloreconomicpower?
o Howisthatpowerexercisedandwithrespecttowhomandtowhat?• Whoisaccountable?Howaretheymadeaccountable?Inlaw?Insomeotherway?Throughsocial
ormoralnorms?o Towhomaretheyaccountable?o Forwhataretheyaccountable?Howisthescopeoftheiraccountabilitydefined?
• Legalpoweristhoughttojustifylegalaccountabilitywithinthecorporation.• Corporateconstitutionsaregenerallynotveryhelpfulregardingaccountabilitytooutsiders.
Instead,itisgeneralprinciplesofcontractandtortlawthatgoverncorporateaccountabilitytooutsiders.
ConstituentsandOutsiders
• Corporateconstitutionsarefocusedoninternalmattersandinternalgovernance.o So,importanttoknowwhoaretheinternalconstituents,whoaremembersofthe
corporation.• Outsiders=personsorgroupsbeyondtheambitoftheassociationwithwhomitinteracts
o Theylackstandingtoparticipateintheaffairsofthecorporationasperthecorporateconstitution.
o Thosewithwhomthecorporationhasfrequentdealings/relationships.o Mostoftheserelationshipsaremediatedmostly(notexclusively)bycontract.o Keytermsgoverningtherelationshipbetweenthecorporationandtheoutsiderwillbe
foundintheapplicablecontract.o (1)Generalpublic
§ Anamorphouswhole–notpossibletotalkaboutthisrelationshipinaveryspecificway.
§ Lookatconsequencesofcorporateconductonsocialwelfare.§ Poserisksandconferbenefitstothepublic.
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• Theyarethebiggestenginesofeconomicgrowth,sopublicbenefitsthisway.
• Buttheyalsosufferasaresultofcorporationdecisions–cutjobs,closeplants,reduceemployeehours,etc…
§ Generalpublichasprettyweakleverageoverthecorporation.Evenindividually,whileyoucansue,youareoftenout-resourcedbythecorporation.
o (2)Government§ Governmentsupposedtobepromotingindustryandprotectingusfromharmful
decisionsmadebycorporations.§ Saveforthoseoperatinginheavilyregulatedsectors,typicallycorporationsdon’t
interactonadailybasiswiththegovernment.§ But,thegovernmentisverypowerfulandcanhaveasignificantimpacton
corporations.Thispoweriswieldedinafewways:• Fromoutside–actingonitspowerstomakelaw,regulations,and
enforcementactivity.Providesandrevisescorporatelaw.• Frominside–takeashareholdingposition(didthisinwakeof2008–
e.g.GeneralMotors).Canestablishapubliccorporationtocarryoutgovernmentfunctions(e.g.ViaRail,CanadaPost).
o (3)Employees§ Debateaboutemployees–aretheyactuallyoutsiders?Oraretheybetterclassified
asoutsiders?• Productionkeytoprofits–reliesonemployeestocarryoutproduction,so
centraltowhatcorporationsdo.Therefore,somethinkofthemasquintessentialinsiders.
• Also,vulnerabilityofemployees–theyarefarmorevulnerablethanshareholdersinlotsofways(haveall$$tiedupincompany,versusshareholderswhohavediversifiedrisk,etc…).
§ Complicationswithdominantviewofemployeesasoutsiders:• Employeescanbegivenparticipatoryrightsincorporations–e.g.
Alberta,seatontheboardreservedforemployees;Germany,employeerepresentationonboardismandatory.
• Section119,CBCA–smallprovisionmadeforemployeeprotection.Directorsareliableforunpaidwagestoemployees.
o (4)Creditors§ Severalkindsofcreditors(suppliers,banks/lendingcompanies,holdersof
bonds/debtsecurities).§ Dominantview–allconsideredtobeoutsidersdealingwithcorporationon
footingofcontract.Extendcreditandfixedtermsofrepayment.§ Complications–somegrievancemechanismsareopentothem:
• Section247,CBCA–allowscomplainantstogotocourtaskingcorporationtocomplywithtermsofcorporateconstitution.Creditorshavestandingtobringapplicationforreliefhere.
• Constituents=membersofanassociationo Questiontoask–doesthispersonhavestandingtoparticipateintheaffairsofthe
corporationunderthecorporateconstitution?o Personswhobelongtocertaingroupsthathavestandingaspertheconstitutionofthe
corporate.o Importantincorporatelawbecausecorporationsarelegalpersonsandtheyincurliability
asaseparateentity.o Someoneneedstomakedecisionsandrenderthecorporationanimate.Theyarethe
bodieswithinthecorporationwhichenableittomove,tofunction,todowhatitneedstodo.
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o (1)Shareholders§ Supplyequitycapital(money,cash)intothecorporationinreturnfortheirshare.§ Investmentofmoneyincorporationandtheyget,inreturn,nofixedlegalinterest
orrighttore-payment.Theyinvestwithhopeandexpectationthattheywillmakemoney,thatitwillprovetobeagoodinvestment.
§ Whencorporationdoingwell,shareholdershopefordividendpaymentstobemadebyboard–i.e.profitspaidouttoshareholders.
§ Hopethattheirsharepricewillgoupovertimeandthatthevaluewillincreaseandtheycanreceiveavaluewhentheysale.
§ Interestsofshareholders:• Wealthmaximization–theywantasmuchmoneyaspossibleandwant
directorsandofficerstodowhatevertheycansotheycangetthemostmoneyoutoftheirinvestment.
• Thereareotherintereststoo(e.g.moralandethicalinterests).§ Interestingthatshareholdershavenoentitlementinanyformtoanyreturnon
theirinvestment.Theyhavenorighttodividends.Corporateprofitsareownedbythecorporation.
§ Directors,asagentsofthecorporation,havetodecidewhetherit’sthebestthingforthecompanytopayoutsomeoralloftheprofitstotheshareholders.Theirinterestsaresubjecttothediscretionofthedirectors.
§ Shareholdersarenotinpositionakintocreditors–shareholdershaverightsinthecorporation(participateincorporategovernance).Creditorshaverightsagainstthecorporation,tobeassertedprimarilythroughcontract.Theyalsohaveuniqueinterests–theirinterestin$isresidual,onlyhaverighttowhatcorporationpaysoutfromtimetotimeandtovalueoftheirshares.Noclaimthoughovercorporatepropertyorprofits.Creditors,ontheotherhand,havearighttorepayment.
§ Shareholdershavenosignificantday-to-daypoweroverthecorporation.Instead,havepowerbyactingonvotingrightsattachedtotheirshares.
• Righttoelectdirectors,canalsobootthemout.• Righttodecidespecialmattersbyvotethatarereservedforthembythe
corporateconstitute(e.g.saleofsignificantvalueasset).• Righttobeinformed,righttoinformation.Corporationhastomake
financialdisclosurestoshareholders.• Havepriorityofplacere:corporatelawremedies.Theirinterestsare
protectedbythelaw(oppressionremedy,fiduciaryobligations,etc…).• But,canhavedifferentclassesofshares,someofwhichcanbenon-
voting.Oftenhowfamilieswillmaintaincontroloftheircorporations.o (2)Directors
§ Votedin/outbyshareholders.Representativesofshareholders.§ Bearprimaryresponsibilityinlawforensuringcorporationisproperlymanaged.§ Notjustrepresentativesofshareholders–alsoinsupervisoryroleoverofficers
(CEOs,CFOs,etc…).Hireofficersonbehalfofshareholdersandsupervisethem.§ Importantintermediarybetweenshareholdersandofficers.§ Mustreportandaccounttoshareholders.Mostimportantwayisthroughannual
generalmeeting.§ Section102,CBCA–givesdirectorsbroadresidualpowersoverthecorporation.§ Inexercisingtheseveralpowerstheyhave,membersoftheboardaresupposedto
showindependentjudgmentinthebestinterestsofthecorporation.Beingindependent,theyarenotanswerabletoshareholdersonaday-to-daybasis(similartorelationshipbetweenMPstocitizens).Theyareanswerabletoshareholdersthroughelections.
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§ Heldaccountableprimarilythroughdutyofcare(exercisepowersreasonablyandinthebestinterestofthecorporation)andthroughdutyofloyalty(notinself-interestandnotininterestofothercorporation).
§ Havepowertocreateofficestobefilledbyofficers–hireseniormanagerialprofessionals.
§ Havethemostsignificantpositionofpowerinthelegalsense.o (3)Officers
§ Responsibleforday-to-daymanagementofcorporation.§ Havethemostsignificantpositionofpowerinthecorporationinpracticalterms.§ Thesepeoplewilloftennominatepeopletobeontheboardofdirectors.§ Fiduciariesofthecorporation,carryouttheirfunctionsasfiduciaries–abideby
dutiesofcareandloyalty.
• Themanyhatsphenomenono Youdon’thavetobelongtojustonegroup–ashareholderisnotpreventedfrom
becomingadirectororofficerofacorporation.o Verycommonforsomeonetobeallthree.
B)TheCorporationasaLegalPersonCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.15(1)and45(1)QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.10and224CCQ301-303CanadaBusinessCorporationsAct15(1)Acorporationhasthecapacityand,subjecttothisAct,therights,powersandprivilegesofanaturalperson.45(1)Theshareholdersofacorporationarenot,asshareholders,liableforanyliability,actordefaultofthecorporationexceptundersubsection38(4),118(4)or(5),146(5)or226(4)or(5).QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct10.Acorporationisconstitutedasofthedateand,ifapplicable,thetimeshownonthecertificateofconstitutionissuedbytheenterpriseregistrarinaccordancewithChapterXVIII.Thecorporationisalegalpersonasofthattime.224.Shareholdersarenot,asshareholders,liableforanyactofthecorporation.However,theyaredebtorstothecorporationforanyunpaidamountonsharestheyholdinitssharecapital.CivilCodeofQuebec301.Legalpersonshavefullenjoymentofcivilrights.302.Everylegalpersonhasapatrimonywhichmay,totheextentprovidedbylaw,bedividedorappropriatedtoapurpose.Italsohastheextra-patrimonialrightsandobligationsflowingfromitsnature.
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303.Legalpersonshavecapacitytoexercisealltheirrights,andtheprovisionsofthisCodeconcerningtheexerciseofcivilrightsbynaturalpersonsareapplicabletothem,adaptedasrequired.Theyhavenoincapacitiesotherthanthosewhichmayresultfromtheirnatureorfromanexpressprovisionoflaw.
• Boltono Directorsandmanagersarethedirectingmindofthecorporation.
• Macaurav.NortherAssuranceCo.o "[T]hecorporatorevenifheholdsall thesharesisnotthecorporation,and…neitherhe
norany creditorof the companyhasanyproperty legalorequitable in theassetsof thecorporation."
§ i.e. the sole owner of a single-shareholder, single-director company has noinsurableinterestintheassetsofthatcompany.
§ Thecompanyhasaseparatelegalexistence.§ àThisrulewaslaterrejectedinKosmopoulos.
• Kosmopouloso Theseparateentitiesprincipleisnotenforcedwhenitwouldyieldaresulttooflagrantly
opposedtojustice.o K,assoleshareholderofthecompany,wassoplacedwithrespecttotheassetsofthe
businessastohavebenefitfromtheirexistenceandprejudicefromtheirdestruction.Hethereforehadaninsurableinterestinthemcapableofsupportingtheinsurancepolicy.
o Moderncompanylawnowpermitsthecreationofcompanieswithoneshareholder,sothattheidentitybetweenthecompanyandthesoleshareholderanddirectorissuchthataninsurableinterestinthecompany’sassetsmaybefoundinthesoleshareholder.
o RejectsMacaura—soleownerofsingle-shareholder,single-ownercompanyhasinsurableinterestincompany’sassets.
o "Thelawonwhenacourtmaydisregard[theprinciplethatacorporationisaseparatelegalentity]by'liftingthecorporateveil'andregardingthecompanyasamere'agent'or'puppet'ofitscontrollingshareholderorparentcorporationfollowsnoconsistentprinciple."
o "Theidentity…betweentheCompanyand[a]soleshareholderanddirectorissuchthataninsurableinterestintheCompany'sassetsmaybefoundinthesoleshareholder."
o Asoleshareholder,thoughlackinganyproprietaryinterestinthecorporation’sassets,hasan“insurableinterest”inthem.
§ CorporatepersonalitypointfromMacaurawasupheldbuttheinsurancelawpointwasbroadened.
September28,2016CorporatePersonality:GeneralPropositions
• Corporationsarelegalpersons.o Theyaretreatedseparatelyfromtheirmembers.o Havethelegalcapacitiesofotherpersons,includingnaturalpersons.o Canattract,alienate,hold,orexerciselegalrights,legalpowers,andliabilities.o Corporationscanintheirownright,asindividuatedpersons,canacquireproperty,can
own/administerproperty,canacquirelesserinterestsinproperty(lease,licensing),canalienatetheirpropertyinterests.
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o Canformcontracts,canbepartytoacontract,canperformormakegoodoncontractualobligations,canbreachcontractsandthereforebesuedforthesebreaches,canavailthemselvesofcontractualremedies.
o Canbetortfeasors–cancommitcivilwrongs,canbeheldliablebytheirvictims.o Corporationscancommitcriminalwrongs,canbeheldcriminallyaccountable.
• Asartificial(legalpersons),howdocorporationsact?o Corporations,asartificialpersons,can’tdoanythingontheirown.o Theyhavetobemadetoactontheirlegalpersonalityandtheycanonlybemadetoact
throughrepresentatives–personswhoareauthorizedtoactonbehalfofthecorporation(eitheringeneral,orinrespectofcertainfunctions).
o Whoarethesepeople?§ Directorsandofficers–thesearethedirectingmindswhohavetheauthorityto
actonbehalfofthecorporation.§ Officers’authorityisdelegatedfromtheboard.
• Legalpersonalityisaprivilege.o It’saprivilegeaffordedbythestate,affordingabenefitthatisnotconferreduponthose
peopleasamatterofright.o Privateindividualscan’tassertlegalpersonalityontheirown.o It’sartificial,it’snotanunderlyingnaturalphenomenon.o Evenwhenlawtreatscorporationsaspersons,itdoessoinaboundariedway.o Wehavedecidedthatitwouldbeuseful,convenient,beneficial,toalloworganizationsto
existontheseterms.• So,thereisalotofdebateaboutwhetherincorporationisagoodthing…
LegalSourcesofCorporatePersonality
• LegalpersonalityisprovidedforundertheCBCAandQBCA.o CanadaBusinessCorporationsAct
§ 15(1)Acorporationhasthecapacityand,subjecttothisAct,therights,powersandprivilegesofanaturalperson.
o QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct§ 10.Acorporationisconstitutedasofthedateand,ifapplicable,thetimeshownon
thecertificateofconstitutionissuedbytheenterpriseregistrarinaccordancewithChapterXVIII.Thecorporationisalegalpersonasofthattime.
• TherearealsomentionsintheCCQ:o 301.Legalpersonshavefullenjoymentofcivilrights.o 302.Everylegalpersonhasapatrimonywhichmay,totheextentprovidedbylaw,be
dividedorappropriatedtoapurpose.Italsohastheextra-patrimonialrightsandobligationsflowingfromitsnature.
o 303.Legalpersonshavecapacitytoexercisealltheirrights,andtheprovisionsofthisCodeconcerningtheexerciseofcivilrightsbynaturalpersonsareapplicabletothem,adaptedasrequired.Theyhavenoincapacitiesotherthanthosewhichmayresultfromtheirnatureorfromanexpressprovisionoflaw.
ScopeofCorporatePersonality
• Corporationsrecognizedforthepurposeofprivatelaw–toenablethemtoownproperty,dealwithlesserinterestsinproperty,andtoengageincontractualrelations,tobeabletobethesubjectofprinciplesofcivilliability.
• ShouldtheybeprotectedbytheCharter?o UnitedStates–CitizensUnitedestablishesthatcorporationshaveconstitutionalrights.o Canada–wealsorecognizeconstitutionalrightsforcorporations.
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§ FederalInterpretationAct,s.29• Verybroadprovisionforcorporatepersonality.Everylegislative
referencedto“persons”–corporationsaretoberecognizedaspersonsunlessexplicitlystatedotherwise.
§ Yes,theyarecapableofenjoyingCharterrights.But,thatdoesn’tmeantheyenjoyalltherightsofnaturalpersons.
§ ThequestionofwhetheragivenCharterrightappliestoacorporationturnsonlegislativeintent,whetherParliamentintendedforthecorporationtoenjoyagivenright.
§ Courtshavesaidthatwhereagivenrightcouldnotprotectacorporateinterest,thatrightcannotbeheldbyacorporation.
• Sections7(life,liberty,securityoftheperson),2(a)(religion),9(arbitrarydetention),etc…
• Whenarightcouldapplytocorporations,courtshavetolooktotheintentionofthedrafters.
o e.g.Sections2(b)(freedomofexpression),11(b)(righttobetriedwithinareasonabletime).
o Corporationshavenofeelings,thoughts,consciences,desires…(CitizensUniteddissent,JusticeStevens).
§ Theyhelpstructuretheactivitiesofhumanbeingsandtheirpersonhoodcanserveasausefullegalfictionhood.
Salomonv.Salomon(HouseofLords,1897)
• BasicprincipleofcorporatepersonalitysettledinSalomon.Explainedlegalconsequencesofincorporationandlaidcornerstoneofmoderncorporatelaw.
o Havetohaveshareholders.o Onceincorporated,mustbetreatedlikeanyotherindependentpersonwithrightsand
liabilities.o Shareholdersnotliabletothecreditorsofthecorporation.
• Factso Incorporatedcompany–shareholders,therewere7(whichhappenstobestatutory
minimumnumberofshareholders).o Salomonhad20,001sharesandthen1shareeachtowifeandchildren.o Therewasalsoadebentureatissueinthiscase($10,000)–promissorynote,apromiseto
pay.CorporationmakingpromisetopaySonhisdebenture.Wassecuredbycorporateassets.
§ WasmadeouttoSinexchangeforthepersonalassetsthatheinvestedintothecompany.
o Creditorsgotfuckedwhencompanygotbankrupted.SoughttorecoverdirectlyfromSbecausehewasreallythesoleowner/incontrol.
• Issueo WasMr.Solomanliablepersonallyforthedebtsofhiscorporation?
§ Lowercourtsaidyes,thattrueownerofcorporationwasnooneotherthanMr.Saloman.
§ HouseofLordsdisagreed.• Reasoning(LordHalsbury)
o Implicationsofregistration§ Corporationcomesintoexistenceasofthemomentofregistration,whichcreates
aseparatelegalperson.o Implicationsofconcentrationinshareholding
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§ Plaintiffssoughttoarguethatpersonwithsuchaconcentrationoftheownershipshouldmakethatpersonpersonallyliablebecausetheyaretheoneincontrol,theyarethetrueowner.
§ HouseofLordssaidno–acorporationisnotdisqualifiedfromlegalpersonalitybecausethebulkofthecompanyisconcentratedinoneperson.Aslongattheminimumstatutoryrequirementsaremet,thedistributiondoesn’tmatter.
o Legalpersonalityandpre-incorporationenterprise§ Legalpersonalitymeansthatacorporationisatlawadifferentpersonfromits
constituents(directors,shareholders,officers),evenifthebusinessitselfissubstantiallyasitwasbeforeincorporation(aswasthecasehere).
o Corporationasindependentlegalperson§ LowercourtsawcorporationlikethisasanagentofS.§ HouseofLordsrejectedthis–corporationisnotanagentoratrustee.Thisisnot
therelationshipbetweentheconstituentsandthecorporation.It’salegalpersoninitsownrightandmustalwaysbeanalyzedassuch.
o Implicationsofpersonality§ Onceitwasacceptedthatacorporationisanindependentlegalperson,thenitjust
followsthatallliabilitiesincurredbythecorporationarethecorporation’sown.§ àThisistowherewetracethebeginningsoflimitedliability.
• Noteso It’snowpossibletoformone-personcorporations(don’tneed7shareholdersanymore).
§ SeeCBCA,section5.o Corporatepersonalityandlimitedliability–thesetwogotogetherinlockstep,butit’snot
normativelyinevitable.Thecorporationisaconstructsowecanpackagetheattributesinanywaywewant.
o Limitedliabilityisarisk-shiftingdevice–theydon’tgoaway,theygetshifted.Here,theywerebornebythecreditors.
IsCorporatePersonalityReal?
• Fictionaliststhinkit’safiction,createdforfunctionalpurposes.• Realiststhingthere’ssomethingrealthere–corporationshaveasocialagencyinthewaythey
deliberateandbehave.Somethingunderlyingthatgivesthempersonality.Macaurav.NorthernAssurances(HouseofLords,1925)
• Factso Timberyardownedbycorporation.Timberburnedinyard,catastrophicbecausemost
significantasset.Therewereinsurancepolicies,weremadeouttocontrollingshareholderofcorporation.Whenincorporated,transferredassetstocorporationbutforgottoassignpolicytocorporation.
o Companyrefusedtopayoutbecausepropertywasnotthepropertyoftheindividualholdingthepolicy–waspropertyofcorporation.Evenasshareholderhavenoinsurableinterestintheproperty.
• Issueo Whoownscorporateproperty?Thecorporation.
• Reasons(LordBuckmaster)o Inacaselikethis,smallbusinessesespecially,thereisnootherpersonbuttheplaintiff
whoisinterestedintheproperty.o Incircumstanceswhereassetsaretransferredtoacorporation,thecorporationisthe
ownerofthoseassets.
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o Shareholders,whileeconomicallyinterestedintheassets,theyhavenoownership/propertyinterestintheasset.
o Howdowethuscharacterizetheinterestsofshareholders?§ Theyareinterestedinreceivingashareofprofitfromtimetotime(dividends).§ Theyhavearesidualinterestincorporateassets,receivingashareofthatproperty
whenthecorporationiswoundupifthereisanyleft(creditorscomefirst).o Thecontrollingshareholder,thougheconomicallyinterestedintheproperty,hadno
insurableinterestintheproperty.• Notes
o Corporatepersonalitycutsbothways–ifyou’renotcarefulinincorporation,youcangetfuckkkkked.
o WasgoodauthorityinCanadauntil…Kosmopoulos.Kosmopoulosv.ConstitutionInsurance(1987,SCC)
• Factso Smallbusinessownernotwelladvisedbyhislawyer…o Kwassoleshareholderofincorporatedbusiness.Wasn’treallyawareofconsequencesof
incorporation.o Hadinsurancere:material/merchandiseinhisstore.Waspurchasedinhisname,notin
nameofcorporation.Firedamageresultinginlosstocorporateassets,seekstorecover.o InsurancecompanyreliesonMacauraandseekstoescapeobligationtopay.
• Issueo Canashareholderhaveaninsurableinterestincorporateproperty?
• Reasoningo CourtofAppealmovedbytheequitiesofthecase,feltinsurancecompanywasn’tactingin
goodfaithbyrefusingtopayouttoK.Wasatechnicaldifference,thelosswaspreciselythe§ So,heldKhadaninsurableinterestintheassetsofhiscorporation.§ DistinguishedfromMacaurabecauseheretherewasasingleshareholder–there
wereseveralshareholdersinMacaura.§ So,whenyouhaveaone-personcorporation,thedistinctionbetweenthesole
shareholderandthecorporationisartificialtosaytheleast,it’spaperthin.§ Incaseslikethisweshouldthereforebepreparedtorecognizedthatthe
corporationisafiction.o SCC–wasthisavalidbasisonwhichtodistinguishMacaura?
§ UpheldthedecisionthatKhadaninsurableinterest.§ But,anxiousabouttheCourtofAppeal’scommentsaboutveilpiercing.§ WilsonJ
§ Veilpiercingisapartofcorporatelawthatfollows“noconsistentprinciple.”Veilpiercing=disregardingcorporatepersonality
§ Thereisapersuasiveargumentthatthosewhohavechosen§ IFtheveilistobeliftedatall,itshouldonlybedoneintheinterestof
thirdparties,notincorporatorswhohavemadeabaddecision.§ Here,wasanincorporatorseekingadisregardingofcorporatepersonality
–courtdidn’tthinkthisshouldbeallowed.§ So,allowedtheCourtofAppeal’sdecisiontostandontheinsurableinterest
question–blindlyobviousthatwhereallsharesareconcentratedinoneperson,thatpersonhasarealandrobusteconomicinterestinrecoveryfromtheinsurancecompany.
§ Test:Indeterminingwhetherashareholderhasaninsurableinterestincorporatepropertyhavetoaskwhetherthatindividualshareholderhadbenefitoftheexistenceofthepropertyandwhetherthey…
Humphrey|33
§ Courtwasveryreluctanttodisregardcorporatepersonality,evenwhenthereisoneshareholder.So,upheldcorporatepersonality.
Leev.Lee’sAirFarming(1961,NZ)
• Factso Ldiedincourseofemployeedutiesbutwasalsoshareholder,director.
• Issueo Canyoubeanemployee,shareholder,director,officerofacorporationallatonce?Yes–
youcanwearmanyhats.• Reasoning
o Hewasanemployeebecauseemployingorganizationwasacorporation,eventhoughhewastheonemakingthecorporationenterintoacontractwithhimself.
o Thefactthathewasdirector“isnoimpedimenttohisenteringintoacontracttoservethecompany.”Mr.Leewasn’temployinghimself–thecompanywasemployinghim.Itdoesn’tmatterthatMr.LeewasgivingorderstohimselfbecauseMr.Leeandthecompanyaren’tthesameperson.
o Corporationisseparatelegalpersonandcanenterintolegalcontractsoftheirownright.• Notes
o ThisisalogicalconsequenceofSalomon.o Corporationsareindependentpeopledistinctfromthosethatmakethemup.Majority
shareholder/director/employeecanwearmanyhatswithoutconflict.October3,2016PiercingtheCorporateVeil
• Thecourtswillgotogreatlengthstogiveeffecttocorporatepersonality.• But,corporatelaw’sregardforcorporatepersonalitydoeshavelimits–wewillrarelyencounter
situationswhererecognizingcorporatepersonality(especiallylimitedliability)wouldyieldanaffronttojustice.
• Piercingthecorporateveil:attributingtheliabilitiesofthecorporationtotheindividualsbehindtheveil.
• Textbookauthorsarecriticalofthispractice,eventhoughithappensrarely.Criticalbecausenounderlyingtheorytoanswerquestionsofwhereandwhycorporateveilpiercingshouldhappen.Bigdealbecausecorporatepersonalityisanunderlyingcorecomponentofcorporatelaw.
• Thereare,however,trends–kindsofcaseswherethecourtsaremorelikelytopiercetheveilandattributedebtsofcorporationtoindividuals.
o Allegationsoffraudulentconductonpartofprincipalsofcompany–usingcompanytofurtherfraudulentactivities.
o Corporationwasundercapitalized–notenoughmoneyinthetilltosatisfyreasonablyforeseeabledebts.Thisisusuallyintentional.
o Wherecorporationsweresetupfromthegetgoforanillegal/questionablepurpose.o Wheretherearenon-armslengthtransactionsbetweenparentandsubsidiary
corporationsifsubsidiarycompletelycontrolledbyparentcorporation.• Wheredoesthispowerofthecourtcomefrom?
o Casebookseemstosuggestitfallsoutofthesky–judgesjustassertthispower,they’remakingitup.
o Otherpotentialsourcesofthecourt’spowertopiercethecorporateveil:§ Courtshaveinherentjurisdictiontopreventmiscarriageofjusticeorabuseof
right.
Humphrey|34
§ Becausestategrantsprivilegeofincorporation,thenargumentthatthestateretainspowertodefinetheoutsidelimitsofthisprivilege–referredtoastheconcessiontheory.
InducingBreachofContract
• Runsparalleltoveilpiercingbutdoesn’tactuallyinvolveveilpiercing.• Caseswhereaconstituentoremployeeofcorporationhascommittedanintentionaltort–here,
theCMLtortofinducingbreachofcontract.• (1)Whencanacorporationbefoundliableforinducingbreachofcontract?• (2)Whenmaylimitedliabilitybebracketed/circumventedforliabilitytobeplacedona
constituentwhowouldnormallybeprotectedviaprincipleoflimitedliability?• Whencananindividualbedeemedtohaveactedinarepresentationalcapacity?• Whomightthoseindividualsbe?Whocanbeheldtohaveactedinarepresentationalcapacity?
• CMLtortofinducingbreachofcontractstemsfromHouseofLordcase,Quinnv.Leathem.
o Nooneshouldinterfereincontractualrelationshipswithoutgoodreason.Ifyoudo,youareguiltyofatort.
o It’snotjustaboutinducinganactualbreach,butanythingbroader,accordingtothiscase.Anyinterferencewithoutjustification=tort.
• Whereacorporationhasbreachacontractofitsown,thecorporationwillofcoursebedirectlyliableundercontractlawforthebreach.
o Thereisaquestionofwhetherandwhen,inadditiontothiscontractualliability,wemightfindsomeoneelseliable(adirectingmind,officer).Whencouldtheybefoundliableforhavingmadethecorporationbreachitscontract?
o Whooughttobearthetortiousliabilityforinducingthebreach?Thecorporation?Thedirectingmindswhomadethecorporationbreachthecontract?Both?
GarbuttBusinessCollegeLtd.v.HendersonSecretarialSchoolLtd.(1939,ABCA)Facts
• FamousteacherHendersonworkedfortheplaintiffGarbuttCollege.Restrictivecovenantinhiscontractsaidhecouldn'topenarivalschool–non-competeclause.
• Hendersonincorporatedanewrivalschool.Hendersonheldallsharesofthenewcompanyexcept3heldbyhiswifeanddaughter.
• EnrolmentatGarbuttdeclined"asstudentsflockedtotheHendersonname.”• GsuesHforhisbreachofthenon-competeaswellasthenewschoolasacorporationforhaving
inducedHtobreachhiscontractwithG.Issue
• Didthecorporation,throughtheagencyofHenderson,inducebreachofcovenantbyHenderson?Yes.
Reasoning• Courtupheldtherestrictivecovenant–Hliablefordamagesfrombreachofcontract.• Theschool,however,hadnocontractwithGarbuttandthusisnotliableforbreachofcontract.If
theHendersonschoolisliable,wouldbeliableintort.o "[T]hecompanyandallitsofficerswellknewthatwhatitwasdoinginemploying
Hendersonwasinbreachofhisagreementwiththeplaintiff."o [Thecorporation]"aidedandencouragedandpaid"Hendersontobreakhiscontract(re:
Quinnv.Leathem).• Testforinducingbreach(fromQuinnv.Leathem):
Humphrey|35
o Interferencewithcontractualrelationshipswithoutjustification.Needstobewillfulordeliberate–intentionaltort.Butthisdeliberatecriteriacanbesatisfiedbyknowledge.
o Notablybroad–embracesanykindofinterferencewithacontract.Evenifyourmeddlingdoesnotleadtoabreach,youareliable.
• Herethecorporation,throughHenderson,knewthatbyemployingHenderson,itwasinterferingwithHenderson’scontractwiththeotherschool.
o Thisdemonstratestheartificialityofcorporatepersonality.Ratio
• Anycorporationisaseparatelegalpersonthatactsthroughtheagencyofadirectingmind.Ifthroughthisagency,itinterfereswithacontracttowhichitisnotaparty,itshouldbeheldliable.
Einhornv.WestmountInvestmentsLtd.(1969,SKQB)Facts
• BelzbergsincontrolofWestmountcorporation–induceWtobreachcontractwithrealestateagent,Einhorn.
• Asaresultofbreach,Esoughttorecoverlossinrealestatecommissions.KnowingthatEwasabouttoseekrecoveryfromW,theBssiphonedmoneyawayfromWcorporation.MeantWwasincapableofsatisfyingitscorporateliabilities.
• EsuedWcorporationforbreachofcontractbutit’sbroke…soalsosuestheBsforinducingbreachofcontract.
Issue• Whencanadirectingmindbeheldliableforinducingbreachofcontractbetweenacreditorand
acorporation?Whentherehasbeendeliberateinterferenceintheexecutionofthecontract.o Bigquestionsaboutlimitedliabilityandcorporatepersonality.Normallywewouldsay
thattheofficerswereprotectedfromliability.Reasoning
• Moderntest–elaborationofQuinnv.Leathem.ThistestwasthemostcitedinCanadianlawuntilPocklington.
o Toestablishliabilityforinducingabreachofcontracttheremustbe:§ (1)Interferenceinexecutionofthecontract
• Executionisnotconfinedtoprocurementofabreach,itextendstocaseswhereathirdpersonpreventsorhindersathirdpartytoperformtheircontracteventhoughitmightnotyieldabreach.
§ (2)Interferencemustbedeliberate• Personmustknowofcontractorturnablindeyetoitandintendto
interferewithit.Interferencemustalsobedirect.• Courtliftsthecorporateveil.Thedefendants’conductunjustlydeprivedtheplaintiffofhisrights.
o Interferedwiththecontractbymakingitimpossibleforthecorporationtomakegoodonitscommitment.Forthatreason,theBsshouldbepersonallyliableforinterferingwiththatcontract.
• Whilecompanydirectorsarereferredtoasagents,thecoldfactisthattheyhavecontrolofthecompany.Therealityofthesituationisthatindividualscancarryoutintentionaltortiousactsthroughthemediumofapuppetcorporation.Thereforetheycan’tavoidliabilitybypointingtotheveiloftheirownspinning.
Ratio• Directingmindsareagentsofthecorporation.Agentswhoactforcorporationsshouldnot
beallowedtousecorporatepersonalityasashieldtoescapeliabilityforcausingcorporationstobreachcontracts.
Note
Humphrey|36
• Sometimes,however,itwillbeintheinterestofthecorporationtobreachcontractsforbusinessreasons.So,thereareexceptions–ifthedirector/officerisactinginthebestinterestofthecorporation,therewon’tbeliability.Seenextcase,McFadden.
McFaddenv.481782OntarioLtd.(1984,ONtrialcourt)Facts
• Principalsinducedbreachofcontractbyfraudulentlyconveyingmoneytothemselvesasshareholders.
• NandMTaylorweresoleshareholdersofcompanycalledPAMC.Theywerealsodirectorsandofficers.
• Plaintinffhere,employee,hiredbyanothercompanyPAMI.PAMIsoldbusinesstoPAMC.• TermsofemploymentcontractbetweenplaintiffandPAMIextendedbeyondthedateofthesaleof
thecompany.PlaintiffcontinuedtoworkthePAMC,theacquirer,underimpliedcontractonthesameterms.
• AyearlaterPAMIwantstobuyitsbusinessbackfromPAMC.Termoforiginalcontractwithemployeestillnotexpired.ButTaylors,actingatbehestofPAMI,fireemployeewithindaysofthesaleofthecompanybacktoPAMI.
• TaylorsthensiphonmoneyawayfromPAMCsothattheywouldn’thavemoneyinthetilltopayforthewrongfuldismissal
• EmployeesuesTaylorspersonallyintortforinducingPAMCtobreachitscontactwithhim/her.Reasoning
• ReiterationofthetestfromEinhorn.• Directororofficerisunderadutytoactwithaviewtothebestinterestofthecompany.Asa
result,thereisprotectionfortheseofficers/directorsifactingwithinthescopeoftheirduties.Inducementtobreachcontractisjustifiedwheretakenassuchaduty.
o StemsfromBritishcaseSaid&Buttwhichdealtwithsuchprotectionsforemployees–here,thisprotectionextendedtodirectorsandofficers.
• Thedefendantsinthiscasewerenotactinginthebestinterestofthecompany–wereactingstrictlyintheirownself-interest.Thepaymentsweremadespecificallytodefeattheplaintiff’sclaim.
• Taylorsarefoundliablepersonallyasagentsofcorporation.Actingintheirownself-interest,“onafrolicoftheirown”;corporationnotliable.
• Thedefenceof“actingwithinthescopeoftheirduties”doesnotapplyherebecausetheywereactingintheirownself-interest.
369413AlbertaLtd.v.Pocklington(2000,ABCA)
• GainersLtd.wasameatpackingcompanycontrolledbyP–soledirectorandshareholder.• WhenGainersgotintotrouble,itgotabailoutfromtheABgovernment.ABagreedtogivean
extensionforGainerstopayback$5millionowing.• ThedaybeforeABwasgoingtotakeactiononthedebtitwasowed(becauseGainersdefaultedon
theirloan)ownershipofveryvaluablelandheldbyGainerswastransferredtoanothercompanyheowned(soldfornominalconsiderationof$100).
• TheABgovernmentsuedGainersandP.Reasoning
• Newtestforinducingbreachofcontract–hasbeenmoderatelyinfluentialinCanadianlaw.o It’saseven-parttest.o It’sframedintermsofatortofinducingabreachofcontract.Seemsnarrowerthan
“knowinginterference”understanding,butnotclearifthat’swhattheABCAmeanttodo.• Courtalsocommentsontheintentrequirement.
Humphrey|37
o Wilfulordeliberateconductisnotrequired–itdoesn’thavetohavebeenyourprimarypurposeinacting(tocauseorinduceabreach).Intentcanbeinferredwherebreachofcontractwouldbeaforeseeableresultofyourbehaviour.
o Alsosaidthatintentmayalsobeestablishedincasesofwilfulblindness.o Toavoidanaccusationofwilfulblindnessadirector/officerneedstoseeklegaladviceon
theproprietyofwhattheywanttodobeforetheydoit(ifthey’reunsureiftheyareallowed/able).
• Courtalsocommentsondefenceofjustification.o Explainswhyit’simportantinacorporatecontext–extendedfromemployeesto
directors/officers.o It’sallgoodtocausebeachwhenactingunderadutyimposedbylaw.Whentheinterestof
thecompanyarebestservedbybreakingcontractualagreementstheinducementtobreachisjustified.
o àDoesn’texistherebecausehewasn’tactinginthebestinterestofthecompany.• TherewasevidencethatPdeliberatelysoughttoinducebreachofcontractbetweenGainers,
whichheheld,andtheABgovernment.• Pdidn’tmakeanyeffortstoinquirewhetherwhathewasgoingtodo(transferofassets)waslegal.
Didn’tseeklegaladvice.Knewitwasn’ttherightthingtodo.• Whereacorporationlikethisisonthebrinkofinsolvency,anyactbyadirectorthatwould
diminishtheassetsonhandtopaycreditors,thenthatisnotinthebestinterestofthecorporationbecauseatthispointit’saboutthebestinterestsofthecreditors–there’snohopeforshareholdersatthisstageinthegame.
o àSupremeCourthassincerejectedthispremise.• PfoundguiltyofinducingGainerstobreachitscontractwiththeABgovernment.Didn’twantAB
tobeabletorecoverasacreditor–wantedinsteadtheassetstobeavailabletohimassoleshareholder.
Notes• BecauseSaid&Buttrulere:defenceofjustificationextendedfromemployeestodirectors/officers,
directorsandofficersareprettywellprotectednowiftheyareactingwellandmakinggoodstrategicdecisionsaboutwhethertorespectcorporation’sobligations.
ADGASystemsInternationalInc.v.ValtomLtd.(1999,ONCA)Facts
• ADGAandVwerecompetingforacontractwithCorrectionalServicesCanada.Vdidn’tactuallyhavetheemployeesrequiredtocompletethejobsothesoledirectorandtwosenioremployeespersuadedtheemployeesofADGAtocometoV.
• ActionagainstthesoledirectorandtwosenioremployeesofVinpersonalcapacityforinducingbreachofcontractandbreachoffiduciaryduty(betweenADGAemployeesandtheiremployer).
• Vsaidthisactionwasinthebestinterestoftheircompany–defenceofjustification.Issue
• ArethesepeoplepersonallyliableassumingtheactionsweretakeninthebestinterestsofV?Aretheyabletoraisethedefenceofjustification?
Reasoning• Courtheldthatyes,therewasatriableissuehere.• Courtexplainedpolicyreasonsfordefenceofjustification,explainedwhydirectorsandofficers
shouldbeabletoseekprotectionbehindthisjustification.• Thiscase,however,isdifferent.Therearedifferentpolicyconsiderationsraised.
o Wouldbecontrarytopublicpolicytoallowdefenceofjustification.Shouldn’tbeinterpretedsobroadlyastoprotectofficers/directorsfromallliabilitywhencommittingcivilwrongs.
Humphrey|38
• Tryingtodrawboundariesaroundjustificationdefence.o Distinguishesbetweendifferentcategoriesofcreditors.
§ Lineisdrawnbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntarycreditorsbasedonwhatwecanassumeaboutthetermsonwhichtheyengagedinarelationship.
§ Voluntarycreditor–assumptionthattheyareonnoticethattheyaredealingwithacorporateentityandhaverecoveryonlyagainstacorporation.So,limitedliabilityisproperlyassertedagainstavoluntarycreditor.Wanttopreventvoluntarycreditorsfromtryingtogetmorethantheybargainedforbytryingtoholddirectingmindsliable.
§ Involuntarycreditors–theyareinnocentvictims,didn’thaveknowledgeofexistenceofcorporation,didn’tconsenttobethesubjectofatort.Interestinthereforeinrecoveringfromthespecificindividualswhocommittedthetortandwrongedthem.
• àTherefore,wouldbewrongtoallowdirectingmindstoprotectthemselvesbehindthejustificationdefencewhendealingwithinvoluntarycreditors.
• Here,wehadindividualsactingonbehalfofV.ThoughtitwasbestforVtomeddlewithcompetitor’scontractualrelationshipswithitsemployees.
o ADGAcoulddonothingtoprotectitselffromthis,hadnotconsentedtothisbehaviouroranyrelationshipwithVortheindividualsinquestion.
o So,ADGAisinthepositionofaninvoluntarycreditor–sufferedalossandfoundthattheyshouldbeabletosueandrecoveragainsttheindividualswhowrongedthem,irrespectiveofthefactthattheindividualsbelievedtheywereactinginthebestinterestsoftheircompany,V.
October5,2016
• Continuingtothinkaboutwhendirectingmindscanbepersonallyliableforactsofthecorporationdespitetheprinciplesofcorporatepersonality.
• (1)Knowingassistanceinabreachoftrusto Whenmayacorporationbedeemedliableasanaccessorytoabreachoftrust?o Whenmayadirectingmindinsteadofinadditionbefoundliableasanaccessorytobreach
oftrust?• (2)Thincapitalization
o Important,unresolvedsetofcases–raisedifficultpolicy/moralquestions.o Thincapitalization=corporationshaveinsufficientassetsonhandtomeet
existing/reasonableforeseeableobligations.o Whenthecorporationisinsolvent,shouldthedirectingmindsbeheldpersonallyliablefor
nothavingsufficientcapitalonhandtopaytheexpensesitisreasonabletoexpecttoincur?
KnowingAssistanceinaBreachofTrust
• Today’scasesdealwillsecondary,accessoryliability.Whenathirdparty(otherthantrustee/fiduciary)isallegedtobeliablefortheirinvolvement/participationinthebreachoftrust.
• Whenatrustisbreached,twokindsofaccessoryliabilitycanarise–liabilityofso-calledstrangerstothetrust.
o (1)Knowingreceiptoftrustproperty§ Ifathirdpartyacquirestrustpropertyfromthetrusteeinconnectionwitha
breachoftrust,thepropertymustbereturnedunlessthethirdpartywasabonafidepurchaserforvalueandhadnoknowledgeoftheplaintiff’sequitablerights.
Humphrey|39
• Evenifthirdpartydoesn’tholdpropertyanymore,stillliabletothebeneficiary(for$$equivalent)ifitknewthatthepropertywastransferredinbreachoftrust.
o (2)Knowingassistanceinafraudulentordishonestbreachoftrust§ Whatwewillbedealingwithtoday.§ Doesn’tdependonacquisitionofanypropertybythethirdparty.Anactiverole
playedbythethirdpartyinthebreachoftrust–implicatedinsomeway,consideredinequitytobewrongful.
§ Thirdpartyliabilitycannotariseunless:• (a)thetrustee’sbreachwasfraudulentordishonest;and• (b)thethirdpartywhoseliabilityisinissuemusthavehadknowledgeof
thetrustee’sdishonestscheme.§ àThus,thestateofmindoftwodifferentpeopleareatissue.
• Fewquestionstoaskwhenthinkingaboutsecondaryliabilityforknowingassistanceinabreach
oftrust:o Whatstatofmindistheaccessoryrequiredtohaveinordertobefoundliableforknowing
assistanceinthebreachoftrust?Whatisthefaultelement?o Howisfault/thestateofmindestablished?Howdoyouproveitinacasewherethe
corporationissaidtobetheaccessory?o Doesthestateofmindofthefiduciarymattertodeterminingaccessoryliability?Shouldit?
AirCanadav.M<ravelLtd.(1993,SCC)Facts
• M&Lwasatravelagency.PeranagreementwithAC,M&LwastoholdtheproceedsfromticketsalesinatrustaccountforAC.
• Instead,M&Lfailedtosegregatethefundsandinsteadplacedthefundsinageneralaccount,whichtheypaidcompanyexpensesoutof.Duetofinancialdifficulties,creditoroftravelagencyseizedfundsingeneralaccount,whichincludedmoneyM&LowedtoAC.ACsueddirectorsinpersonalcapacitybecausecorporation’smoneywaspaidouttosatisfycreditorsofM&L.Allegebreachoftrust,directorswereaccessoriestoitallegedy.
Issue• DidM&LandAChaveatrustrelationship?Yes.• Ifyes,arethedirectorsoftheM&Lcorporationpersonallyliableforthecorporation’sbreachof
trust?Yes.Reasoning
• Thislookssimilartobasisforliabilitywesawlastclassre:breachofcontract.• Again,thisisnotaveilpiercingsituation–we’renotshiftingtheliability,we’resayingthatthereis
independenttortiousactionatplayonthepartoftheindividualsincontrolofthecorporation.• First,havetoestablishthattherewasatrust/fiduciaryrelationship.
o Foundfiduciaryrelationshiphere,expresstrustbetweenACandtravelagency.o Testappliedtodeterminewhethertherewasatrustwasthe“threecertaintiestest”:
§ Certaintyofintention• Mustbeclearthatpartiesintendedtoestablishatrust.
§ Certaintyofsubjectmatter• Propertythatwassetintrustmustbeascertainable–thatparticular
propertywassubjectoftrust.§ Certaintyofobject
• Beneficiariesofatrustmustbeascertainable–mustbeabletopointtowhostoodtobenefitfromtheestablishmentofthetrust.
Humphrey|40
• Second,youhavetoshowthattherewasabreachofthetrust.o Dutyofloyalty,dutytoaccount,dutytoprudentmanagement…o Courtfoundthatthedutyofloyaltyanddutytoaccountwereimplicated.o Loyalty–havetokeepself-interestoutofitbykeepingseparatetrustaccount.Thatwasn’t
donehere.Thatthenmeantthatthedefendantcouldn’trenderaproperaccount.• Third,thenneedtoprovetheknowingassistanceoftheaccessory.Borrowedatestfromthe
BritishCML.o TestfromBarnes&Abbeycase:
§ Personswhoassistwithknowledge(subjective)inadishonestandfraudulentdeseingonthepartoftrustees,willbeliableasthoughtheywerethemselvestrustee.
o Whatdegreeofknowledgeisrequiredbyaccessory?§ Actualknowledge,recklessness,wilfulblindnessthattherewasadishonestor
fraudulentbreach.§ Carelessnessisnotenough.
o Whatdoestheaccessoryactuallyneedtoknowabout?§ Needtoknowofexistenceoftrust,andneedtoknowthatconductinquestionis
possiblyabreachofduty/involvesbreachofduty.§ Manytimesdifficulttoshowthataccessoryknewaboutthetrust.§ If,however,trustwasestablishedbystatute,theneveryoneandanyoneisassumed
toknowoftheexistenceofthetrust.Thisisrare,becausemosttrustsareofaprivatenature.
o Shouldthenatureofthebreachberelevanttotheaccessory’sliability?§ Thisisimportantbecauseatrusteecaninnocentlyfindthemselvesinbreachofa
trust–conflictofduty,conflictofinterest.§ Thismattersalottothedegreeofliability–whetherthebreachwasinnocentor
not.§ Authoritiesbeforethecourtwassplitonthisissue.
• Englishcasessaiditdidmatter–shouldhavetobebadfaithbehaviourbythefiduciary.
• Therewereothercases,however,thatsaidthatthefocusshouldbeonthestateofmindoftheaccessory.Didtheyknowthisbehaviourwaslikelytobebreachoftrust?Particularlyrelevantifaccessoryisofgreatersophistication(e.g.lawyer)…
§ SCC–JacobbuciJresolvedinfavourofthetraditionalEnglishview.Thestateofmindofthefiduciaryismaterial,theunderlyingbreachmustbedishonest/fraudulentinnaturebeforetherecanbeliabilityimposedonanaccessory.
§ Howdowefigurethisout/proveit?Canbedifficulttoattributemotivestocorporatepersons.Forthisreason,thoughhewantedtoretainthetraditionalEnglishposition,needtodealwithabroaderdescriptionoffraud:
• “Thetakingofarisktotheprejudiceofanother’srights,whichriskisknowntobeonewhichthereisnorighttotake.”
• Aprimarybreachbyacorporatetrusteewillthereforebeconsideredtobefraudulentifthecorporationisknowinglytakingarisktothebeneficiary’sinterests.
§ So,therewillbenoaccessoryfaultwherethebreachoftrustbythetrusteewasinnocent.
• Here,everyoneknewthatmoneywastobeheldintrust;kneworshouldhaveknownthatmoneywouldbesubjecttoseizure,placedatrisk;byputtingmoneyingeneralaccount,theaccessoriescausedthecorporationtoknowinglytakeariskre:moneyowedtoAC.So,thereisfraudonthe
Humphrey|41
partofthecorporationbecausethroughthedirectingmindsthecorporationtookarisktothemoneyforAC.
• Intheirpersonalcapacity,theyknewaboutthetrust;knewthebehaviourwasabreach;weredirectlyimplicatedinthefraud.
Notes• DoyouthinkthatJacobbuciJ’swayofdealingwithdifficultiesofcorporationsandfraud(by
workingwithanexpandeddefinitionoffraud)waslegit?Isthisfraudtrulydefined?o Somehavesaidthatitseemsthatinacaselikethis,whatthetrusteesweredoingwasjust
careless…Weren’tbeingascarefulastheyshouldhavebeen.Notobviousthattheirbehaviourwasfraudulentinthetypicalway.
• Whataboutthesignificanceofthenatureofthebreach?o Englishlawhasmovedinadifferentdirection(RoyalBruneiAirlines)–it’sallaboutthe
stateofmindoftheaccessory,notaboutthetypeofbreachoftrust.Ifwe’refocusedonliabilityfortheaccessory,weshouldkeepfocusedonthestateofmindoftheaccessoryandnotworryaboutwhetherthebreachwasinnocentornot.
TransAmericaLifeInsuranceCo.ofCanadav.CanadaLifeAssuranceCo.(1996,ON)Facts
• ParentcorporationallegedtohavebeenaccessorytoitssubsidiarybreachingatrustwithT.• TmadeloansarrangedbyCLMS,manyofwhichfellintodefault.TallegesthatCLMSowedthema
dutytounderwritetheloans(duediligence,riskassessment,analysis)andthattheyfailedincarryingoutthatduty,whichresultedinlossestoT.
• ThecontractsenteredintobetweenTandCLMSdidnotspecifythatCLMSwouldoweTadutytounderwrite.
• CLMSisawhollyownedsubsidiaryofCLAS,andTallegesthatCLASisliableforthewrongsofCLMSbecauseCLASistheparentcorporation,eitherviaequity(veilpiercing)orasanaccessory.
• CLMShasitsownofficesandbankaccounts,andismanagedseparatelyfromCLAS.JudicialHistory
• Trialjudgemadeseveralfindingsoffact:o NoevidencethatCLASofficerswereinvolvedinanyway.RelationshipbetweenCLMSand
TwasneverdiscussedbyCLASboardofdirectors.Issue
• CanthecorporateveilbepiercedtoholdCLAS(thesoleshareholder)liablefortheactsofCLMS?No.
• CanCLASbeheldliableasanaccessorytoabreachoffiduciarydutybyCLMS?No.Reasoning
• Veilpiercingo Clearexpressionofjudicialscepticismonthepartofthejudge.Reaffirmsimportanceof
corporatepersonality.Veilwillnotbedisregardedwillynillyonthebasisofbroadprinciplesoffairness,justice,blahblahblah.
o Threecircumstanceswhereitmightbeokay(notafinitelist):§ (1)Wherecourtisrequiredtodisregardcorporatepersonalityduetotheexpress
provisionsofastatue(e.g.inIncomeTaxAct).§ (2)Caseswherethecourtisconcernedthatthecompanyinquestionisjusta
façade,puppet,orsham,setuptoenableindividualtoadvancetheirowninterestsandperpetrateafraudorsomethingdishonestuponcreditors.
§ (3)Situationswherethecompanyisanauthorizedagentofitscontrollers/members.Inthosecases,fromlogicofagency,thatcompanyshouldnotbetreatedasaseparateperson.Becauseit’sjustactingasanagentofanotherentity,theliabilitiescanbeattributedtotheprincipal.
Humphrey|42
o #3isatissuehere–whencanasubsidiarybeseenasmerelyanagentoftheparentcompany?
§ Thiswouldrarelybethecase–wouldrarelydisregarddistinctlegalpersonalityofparentandsubsidiarycompanies.
§ LaskininGregorius(sp??)case–subsidiarywillnotbefoundtobealteregounlessundercompletecontrolofparentcorporationandisnothingmorethanaconduitforittoavoidliability.
§ JusticeSharpinthiscaseinterpretsLaskin’swordsasmeaningthatcompletecontrolmustmeanthatparentcompanycompletelydominatesthesubsidiaryanditdoesnotoperateindependently.
§ Didnotfindthattherewasthiskindofrelationshiphere,thereforenogroundsforveilpiercing.
• Accessorytobreacho ReliesonAirCanada,noevidencehere.Wasthereevenatrusthere?Wasthereabreachof
trusthere?Lessofthefocusofthedecision…o Mainfocusisonbehaviourofallegedaccessory,theparentcompany.Noevidencethatit
wasinvolvedinanywayinwhatcouldbeconstruedasabreachoftrust.o Allweknowwasthattheparentcompanyownedthesubsidiary–thisisn’tenough.
Notes• WhatdoesthisaddtoAirCanada?Notmuch…it’sanextensionofthetesttoauniquerelationship
ofparentandsubsidiaryrelationship.• Also,noteworthytoseehowvehementlythecourtrejectstheveilpiercingargument.Creativity
canonlytakeyousofar.
TheProblemofThinCapitalization
• Somecountrieshavesubstantialminimumcapitalizationrequirementsforsettingupnewcorporations.Requirespecificamountofcashorpropertyvaluedatthatamountbegiventothecorporationinexchangeforsharesasaconditionofthestatecreatingthenewcorporateentity.
• NosuchrequirementsinCanada–corporationcanbecreatedwithonesharebeingissuedforonedollar.Cancauseproblems,referredtoasthincapitalization.
• Thincapitalizationoccurswheneveracorporationisinitiallysetupwithanabnormallyhighdebttoequityratio.
o Usuallymeansthatmostcapitalthecorporationhastodealwithisborrowedratherthanbeinginvestedbyshareholders.Thisborrowedcapitalissecureddebt.
• Thispresentsapolicyproblembecausethesecorporationsareinapoorpositiontosatisfyunsecuredcreditors.
o Theseconcernsareheightenedwhenyourealizethatsomeofthesecreditorsareinvoluntary.
• Shouldundercapitalizationlenditselfasagroundfordisregardingthecorporateentityandpiercingthecorporateveil,holdingthedirectors/officerspersonallyliableforthecorporation’sdebts?
• Lookslikeanabuseofincorporation.Valuesthatunderliecorporatelawarebeingperverted.Walkovszkyv.Carlton(1966,NY)Facts
• WwasapedestrianseverelyinjuredbyacabownedbySeonCabCorpwhichwasbeingdrivennegligentlybyadriverM.
• Cisanindividualwhoisashareholderof10corporations,includingSeon.Eachofthosecorporationshasonly2cabsregisteredinitsname(virtuallynoassets).Eachcarryminimumliabilityinsurance($10,000).Intentwasclearlytolimitliabilityandrecoveryagainstthecompany.
Humphrey|43
• Allofthecorporationsareallegedtooperatetogetherasasingleentitywithregardstofinancing,repairs,employees,etc…Thisiswhattheplaintiffalleges.
• Wsuesall10corporationsandarguesthatstockholdersshouldbeheldpersonallyliableforhisinjuriessincethecorporatestructureservesasanunlawfulattempttodefraudmembersofthepublicwhomightbeinjuredinthecabs.
Issue• CanC,asashareholderofSeon,beheldpersonallyliablefortheinjuriessufferedbyW?No.
Reasoning• NocauseofactionherethatcouldbeassertedagainstC.• Majority
o Talksaboutveilpiercing:§ Sayscorporatepersonalityisaprivilegeandthatitshouldbedisregardedin
instancesoffraud,wheredirectingmindusescorporationtofurtherowninterestsratherthancorporation’sinterests.Lookskindagoodfortheplaintiff…Talkingaboutequityandfraud…
§ But,nobasisforveilpiercinghere.StatementofclaimrevealsnoallegationsthatCwasconducingbusinessonhisownpersonalaccount.
o Talksaboutthincapitalization.§ Evenintentionalthincapitalizationisnotenoughforpiercingthecorporate
veil.Can’tdoitmerelybecausetheassets/insurancecoverageareinsufficienttocovertheliabilitiesofthecorporation.
§ Saysit’suptothelegislature…puntsitoverforthemtodealwith.Shouldacttorequirehigherlevelsofinsurancecoveragefortaxisifthey’reconcernedwiththis.
• Dissent(Keating)o Talksaboutthincapitalization:
§ Saidwasintentionaltoavoiddealingwithissuesthatwereboundtohappenwhenoperatingalargetaxienterprise.
§ Givinglimitedliabilityseemstorewardabuseofcorporateform.o Thinksplaintiffshouldbeabletorecoverpersonallybecausecompanieswereintentionally
setuptoavoidliabilityforpreciselythiskindofthing.Notes
• Muchhasbeenmadeofthiscasebecausethecompaniesweresetupthiswayintentionally.Also,becausethecreditorinthiscasewasinvoluntary.Thevictimherewasnotwantingtogetinvolvedwiththecompany,didn’twanttoacceptlimitedliability.
HenryBrowne&SonsLtd.v.SmithFacts
• Voluntarycreditorseekingrecoveryagainstsoledirectorofsmallcorporationonbasisthatcorporationwaspuppetofdirectorandveilshouldbepiercedinthecreditor’sfavour.
• Corporationwasnotadequatelycapitalized.Twoshareholdersandonlyputin2GBP.Reasoning
• Courtwasnotsympathetic,particularlyascreditorwasvoluntary.Hadbeenplacedonnoticethattheyweredealingwithacorporation.It’sonthevoluntarycreditortodotheirduediligencetoseeifcorporationisabletomakegoodonthedebt.Totheextentthatthey’reworried,theyneedtosecureadditionalprotectionsornotlend,etc…
CorporatePurpose(1)Whatisthepurposeofthecorporations?Whoseinterestsmatterforthepurposesofcorporatelaw?
Humphrey|44
• Seemstobetofacilitatebusinessandearnprofitsduetocorporationsbeingvehiclesforinvestmentthatinsulateinvestorsfromliability.
• Whatremainscontentious,however,aretheprocessesbywhichcorporationsseekoutprofits,forwhosebenefitthoseprofitsaresought,andtowhomcorporationsmaybefoundliable.
o Whoshouldbenefitfromcorporateendeavours?• Thequestionofthepurposeofthecorporatepurposearisesinthecontextofconflict.
o Internal–betweenoramongstconstituentso External–betweenthecorporation(asdirectedintheinterestsofshareholders)and
outsider• Shareholderprimacy/shareholdermaximization(Berle–Columbia)
o Shareholdersasthebeneficiariesofcorporations.o Corporatepurposeisequatedwiththeinterestsofshareholders.o Whendeterminingshareholderinterests,lookatshareholdersasagroup,asanaggregate
class(notindividualshareholders).o Interestsofshareholdersasagroupareseekingthegreatestpossiblereturnontheir
investmentthroughincreasedsharevalueandthroughdividendpayments.o Becauseweknowwhereshareholderinterestslie,wehaveaclearandstrongdecision
makingnormthatcomesoutofthisapproachformanagers–wheneveramanageristorn,facingcompetingdemands,themanagermustactasisbestfortheshareholders,dowhatwouldbemostprofitableforshareholders.
o Someobjecttothisbecausethisapproachwillleadmanagerstoignoretheinterestsofallkindsofothergroupsofpeoplewhoseinterestsarealsoatstake(e.g.membersofpublic,etc…)
o Managersarenotallowedtosacrificeprofitsforotherpurposes.• Broaderconstituency(Dodd–Harvard)
o Muchlargerconstituency,includesshareholders,corporateemployees,broadersocialgoals,corporatesocialresponsibility.
o Corporatemanagers“areguardiansofalltheinterestswhichthecorporationaffectsandnotmerelyservantsofitsabsenteeowners.”(--Dodd)
o It’saboutbalancing–rejectnotionthatthere’sacleardecision-makingnormtobeappliedinanysituationofconflict.
o Corporateinterestsareinherentlyindeterminate–itsupforcorporatedirectorstodeterminetheinterestsonacasebycasebasisbybalancingtheinterestsofvariousstakeholdergroupsandcomingupwiththeirownindependentjudgmentaboutwhatwouldbebestforthecompany.
o Whiledirectorsshouldhaveshort-termprofitsintheirmind,thereisnolegalobligationformanagementtomaximizeshort(orlong)termprofits.
o PolicymakersinmostcountriesapartfromtheUStendtofavourthisapproach.• àThisdivisiontendstomimicthedivisionbetweencontractariansandanti-contractarians…
(2)Whatisthecorporation?
• Howshouldthecorporationbeconceptualized?• Isacorporationproperlyunderstoodasonekindofprivateinstitutionthatismoreorlesslike
othersocialorlegalinstitutions?• Or,isitinsteadtobeunderstoodasaproductofprivateordering?Somethingthatdrawson
privatelawconcepts?• Twodominanttheoriestoconsider…
Contractarianvs.Anti-ContractarianTheoriesoftheCorporation
• Contractariantheory
Humphrey|45
o Corporateformasnexusofcontractsbetweeninterestedactors(directors,officers,managers,shareholders,creditors,employees).
o Thereiscontracteverywhere,therewouldbenocorporationiftherewerenocontracts.Whenacorporationisupandrunning,itisdoingeverythingitisdoingviacontract.
o Corporationcomesintoexistenceandachievesviabilitythroughcontract.So,onlyrealistic,inconcreteterms,toseeacorporationasthenexusofcontracts.Theyarethemostimportantlegalrelationships.
o Asaresultofthisperspectiveoncorporations,weshouldthereforeseecorporationsastheproductofprivateordering,privatechoice.Privatelawisprimaryinthinkingaboutwhatacorporationis.
o Shareholdersregardedashavingprimacyamongthecorporatestakeholders.Viewofshareholdersasownersofthefirm.
• Entitytheory(anti-contractarian)o Corporatenotjustaproductofprivatelawbutpubliclawtoo.o Concessiontheory–statehasmadeconcessiontoallowforcorporationstoincorporate.o Corporationscouldn’tdoanyoftheirdoingwithoutthestate–theyaredependentonthe
statemakingthecorporationavailablewiththosefeatures.o Corporateformasmeanstoensuredirectors’andofficers’fidelitytocorporations’
interests.Theseinterestsincludethoseofvariousstakeholders,notjustshareholders.o Rejectshareholderprimacynorm,particularlyshareholdercharacterizationasownersof
thefirm.
• Judgeshaveshownlittleinterestsinthetheoreticaldebate.• Theydo,however,sayalotaboutcorporatepurpose…
Dodgev.FordMotorCo.(1919,USA)àConsideredasprofoundillustrationofcontractariananalysisandshareholderprimacyFacts
• Fordaccumulatedacapitalsurplusof$112million.HenryFord(majorityshareholderandchairofboardofdirectors)wantedtoendspecialdividendsforshareholdersinfavourofmassivere-investmentsthatwouldenableFordtodramaticallyincreaseproductionandnumberofemployees,aswellascutcostsandpricesofcars(sociallymindedobjective).Fordmadeitclearthatthisdecisionwasnotbeingmadeintheinterestofshareholderreturn–shareholdershadhadmorethantheirfairshare.
• Wantedtocreatemorejobs,payhigherwages,makecarsofhigherqualityathighercosttoFordandthenmakingtheseimprovedcarsavailabletothepublicatalowercost.Wantstoexpandbenefitsofindustrialsystemtoasmanyaspossible.
• Hebelievedthiswouldprovidelong-termbenefittoFord,butminorityshareholders(andplaintiffs),theDodgebrothers,claimedFordhadadutytodistributeaccumulatedprofitstoshareholdersandthatitspurposewasnottopursuecharitableends.
• Dodgebrothersseekcourtordertorestorespecialdividendpayments.Issue
• DoesFordhaveadutytodistributeaccumulatedprofitstoshareholders?Yes.Reasoning
• Corporatepurposeo Whenacorporationmakesalotof$,theyaretodeclarelargerdividends.Arefusaltopay
anydividendsisanarbitraryrefusaltodohatshouldbedone–thisisnotanexerciseindiscretionofthedirectors.
§ Thecorporatepurposetherebylimitsthedirectionalauthorityofdirectors.Thecorporatepurposeistocreateprofitforshareholdersanddirectorsonlyhavediscretionre:themeansofattainingthispurpose.
Humphrey|46
• Charitablepurposeo Fordadmittedoneofreasonshedidn’twanttodistributedividendswasbecausehe
wantedtosharetheprofitswiththepublicbymakingcarslessexpensive.Wouldhaveimmediateeffectofdiminishingvalueofsharesandreturnstoshareholders.
§ Arguesthatcorporationscanengageinhumanitarianworksthatareincidentaltothemainbusinessofacorporation.
o Courtfoundthatabusinesscouldonlyengageincharitableactivitiesiftherewasabusinessrationaleforit.
o Courtfindsthatthisisnotthecasebecause“abusinesscorporationisorganizedandcarriedonprimarilyfortheprofitofthestockholders…thisdoesnotextendto…areductionofprofitsortothenon-distributionofprofitsamongstockholdersinordertodevotethemtootherpurposes.”
o “Itisnotwithinthelawfulpowersofaboardofdirectorstoshapeandconducttheaffairsofacorporationforthemerelyincidentalbenefitofshareholdersandfortheprimarypurposeofbenefittingothers.”
§ Directorsmaynotchangethepurposeofthecorporation.Ratio
• Thepurposeoffor-profitcorporationsistomaximizeprofitforshareholdersandcourtsmayinterferewithbusinessdecisionswhereprofitmaximizationisnottheprimarymotivationofdirectors.
• “Abusinesscorporationisorganizedandcarriedonprimarilyfortheprofitofthestockholders.Thepowersofthedirectorsaretobeemployedforthatend.Thediscretionofthedirectorsistobeexercisedinthechoiceofmeanstoattainthatendanddoesnotextendtoachangeintheenditself,tothereductionofprofitsorthenon-distributionofprofitsamongstockholdersinordertodevotethemtootherpurposes.”
• Abusinesscanonlyengageincharitableactivitiesifthereisabusinessrationaleforit.Notes
• ThiscasewasdecidedonthebasisthatFord’smotivationswereashesaidtheywere.ButitturnsoutthathewasmostlikelymotivatedbyreducingshareholderprofitssothattheDodgebrothers,asshareholders,wouldreceivelessmoney,whichtheywerebankingontofundtheirstartupautomobilecompany.Theyallthesame…
• Whiletheydidorderthespecialdividendpayments,thecourtdoesnotactuallyinterferewithFord’sinfrastructureimprovementplans,largelyduetothebusinessjudgmentrule.
o BynotrequiringFordtocompletelyabandonitsplan,eventhoughitdidnotservethegoalofprofitmaximizationforshareholders,thecourtdiddefer,atleastinpart,tothebusinessjudgmentexercisedbyFord’sboard.
o Courtswilldefertothebusinessjudgmentrule.Theyarenotexpertsinbusinessdecisions.• Whilethiscaseisseenasanexampleofshareholderprimacy,itdoesn’tentirelydiscounttheneed
forlong-termplanninginorderforacompanytoprosper.o Whenengaginginsuchplanning,benefitsmaybeconferreduponnon-shareholders.It’s
okayforshort-termprofitmaximizationtobesubordinatedtolongerrangeideasthatdiminishimmediateshareholderbenefitssolongasthelong-termideascanbeshowntoultimatelybenefitshareholders.
àShareholderprimacyisconsistentwithwhatweknowandwhatwewouldexpectaboutshareholdermotivation.àGivesusaclearruleincorporatedecision-making.Claritymakesiteasiertoholdcorporatedirectorstoaccount.àRuleis,however,inflexible–doesn’tgiveofficersordirectorsmuchdiscretion.Failstoaccountforbroadersocial/economicrealitiesthatcorporationsworkin.àThisapproachtomanagementinvolvesexcessiverisktakingandsocialcostsarethereforehigher.
Humphrey|47
Shlenskyv.Wrigley(1968,USA)àDictumofDodgecaseinfavourofshareholderprimacynotbeenuniversallyaccepted–thiscaseisclearexampleofanti-DodgesentimentandemphasizescommunitarianinterestsFacts
• SisminorityshareholderinChicagoNationalLeagueBallClub.Wispresidentofcorporationandowns80%ofshares.
• SseekingdamagesandanorderforcingclubtoinstalllightssonightgamescanbeplayedbecausetheCubssustainedlossesfor4yearswhichSattributestolowattendanceatgames.
• Sallegesthatwithoutlightsandnightnames,Cubswillcontinuetosustainlosses.• Whasrefusedtoinstalllightsbecausehebelieves“baseballisadaytimesport”andworriesabout
theneighbourhood.Sallegesthatthecorporationisthereforeactingforreasonscontraryandwhollyunrelatedtothebusinessinterestsofthecorporation.
Issue• CanaminorityshareholderforcethemajorityshareholdertoputlightsonWrigleyFieldto
increaseprofitsoftheclub?(Canacourtintervenewiththebusinessjudgmentofdirectorsevenifthereisnofraud,illegality,orconflictofinterest?)No,courtnotwillingtointerfere.
Reasoning• CourtnotsatisfiedthatW’smotivesarecontrarytothebestinterestsofthecorporation.The
decisiontoinstallornotinstalllightsisonethatisproperlybeforethedirectorsandthemotivesallegedinthecomplaintshownofraud,illegality,orconflictofinterestintheirmakingofthatdecision.Thereisnolegalbasistointerfere.
• Theeffectonthesurroundingneighbourhoodandonfutureticketsalesisalegitimateconcernofthedirectors.
• Also,noevidencethatnightgameswouldimprovecorporation’spositionandtherewereotherfactorsaffectingtheclub’searnings/losses.
Ratio• Theremustbefraud,illegality,orabreachofgoodfaithwhichdirectorsareboundtoexercise
towardshareholdersinordertojustifyacourtinterveningintheinternalaffairsofcorporations.Courtswilldefertothebusinessjudgmentrule.
• Judgesarenotbusinessexpertsandwilldefertomanagerialdecisions.Presumptionofgoodfaith.Notes
• Thiscaseisanearlyexampleofthebusinessjudgmentrule.UnderUSlaw,startingwiththisdecision,thecourtsshowextremedeferencetoboardofdirectorsre:decisionsthatcourtsproperlyfeelarebusinessdecisions,matterofjudgment.Thisisonthebasisthatitwouldbeillegitimateforthecourtstoreviewthesedecisionswhicharewithinthepurviewoftheboard,andthatcourtslacktheexpertisetoweighinonthis.
• WhataboutDodge?Doesn’tthislooklikethis?PersonalviewsofWinfluencingboarddecisions?o Courtrefusedtoseethesecasesassimilar.Dodge,purposeswereclearlycharitable,
decisionwastotallycountertolegaldutyofcorporationtoreturnprofits.o Here,therewasadifferenceofopinionre:businessmodel.
PeoplesDepartmentStoresInc.(TrusteeOf)v.Wise(2004,SCC)àSCCmakespertinentcommentsonbusinessjudgmentruleandtheassociateddutiesofdirectorsinCanadaFacts
• WandPsupposedtoengageinamergertobringaboutbenefits–buttheWisebrothersfailedspectacularly.
Humphrey|48
• WacquiredsharesofP,whichthenbecameawholly-ownedsubsidiaryofW.WandPamalgamatedtheiroperations,whichwasintendedtoprovidetaxbenefits,butthisconsolidationledtomoreproblemsandeventuallybankruptcyofbothcompanies.
• TrusteeclaimsthatWisebrotherswerefavouringtheinterestsofWovertheinterestsofPtothedetrimentofP’screditorsinthebankruptcyproceedings.
• Trusteebroughtclaimsforbreachofdutyofcare,dutyofloyalty,oppressionofinterestsofcreditors.Here,focusonportionofreasonsdealingwithcorporatepurpose.
Issue• Whoseinterestsshouldbeconsideredwhenconsideringthebestinterestsofthecorporation?
Stakeholders(notjustshareholders)!Reasoning
• Courtacceptsasaccuratestatementoflawthatitmaybelegitimatefortheboardtoconsidertheinterestsofshareholders,employees,suppliers,creditors,consumers,governments,andtheenvironment–i.e.allstakeholders!
• EmergenceofdistinctlyCanadianapproachtoquestionofcorporatepurpose.• Managersanddirectorshaveobligationnottoshareholdersbuttothecorporation.• Courtrejectsshareholderprimacyoutofhand–itisclearthatthephrase“bestinterestsofthe
corporation”shouldnotbereadas“bestinterestsoftheshareholders”.o Itshouldbeaboutthemaximizationofthevalueofthecorporation,butvariousother
factorsshouldberelevantinmakingdecisionswithaviewtothebestinterestsofthecorporation.
• Directorsaretheonestomakecorporateinterestsdeterminateonanongoingbasisbybalancingtheinterestsofvariousgroups.
o Suchdecisionsarereviewablebycourts.Ratio
• Thereisnofiduciarydutyowedbydirectorstocreditorswhenacorporationisinthe“vicinityofinsolvency”–thedutiesofdirectorswillalwaysstaythesame.Directorsandofficersjusthavetodotheirbestforthecompany,balancingcompetinginterestsatalltimes,nomatterthecircumstances.
• Shareholdersdonothaveprimacy.DirectorsmakecorporateinterestsdeterminateBCEInc.v.1976Debentureholders(2008,SCC)àClarificationandamplificationofprinciplesexpressedinPeoplesFacts
• Bell(subsidiaryofBCE)wastoassume$30billionindebtaspartofabuyoutdeal.Somedebentureholdersobjectedtotheplan,arguingitwouldsignificantlydecreasethevalueoftheirbondsandlowerthegradeoftheirinvestment.
• Soughtanoppressionremedyandarguedplanwasnotfairandreasonablebecauseofitseffectsontheirinterests.
Issue• Didtheboardactproperlyre:debentureholders’interests?Yes.
Reasoning• Directorsmustlooktothelong-terminterestsofthecorporation.• AsperPeoples,whiledirectorsmustconsiderthebestinterestsofthecorporation,theymayalso
considertheimpactoftheirdecisionsonshareholdersorparticularstakeholders.o However,iftheseconflict,theinterestsofthecorporationcomefirst.
• Whenconsideringtheseancillaryinterests,courtsshoulddefertothedirectors’decisionsunderthebusinessjudgmentrule,providedthedecisionfalls“withintherangeofreasonablechoicestheycouldhavemadeinweighingconflictinginterests.”
Humphrey|49
• “Thedutyofthedirectorscannotbeconfinedtoparticularpriorityrules,butisratherafunctionofbusinessjudgmentofwhatisinthebestinterestsofthecorporationintheparticularsituationitfaces.”
• Here,thebestinterestsofthecompanywerearguablyservedbyacceptingthedeal.Itcertainlyfellwithinarangeofreasonableoptions,sothecourtwillnotintervene.
Ratio• Thebestinterestofthecorporationmustmotivatedirectors’decisions.Indeterminingthebest
interestsofthecorporation,thedirectorsmayweightheinterestsofcompetingstakeholders.• StakeholderbalancinghastheupperhandinCanada.
III. CORPORATELIABILITY
A)CORPORATELIABILITYINTORTANDCRIMINALLAWCriminalCode,ss.22.1&22.2CriminalCoderepresentative,inrespectofanorganization,meansadirector,partner,employee,member,agentorcontractoroftheorganization;(agent)seniorofficermeansarepresentativewhoplaysanimportantroleintheestablishmentofanorganization’spoliciesorisresponsibleformanaginganimportantaspectoftheorganization’sactivitiesand,inthecaseofabodycorporate,includesadirector,itschiefexecutiveofficeranditschieffinancialofficer;(cadresupérieur)Offencesofnegligence—organizations22.1Inrespectofanoffencethatrequirestheprosecutiontoprovenegligence,anorganizationisapartytotheoffenceif
(a)actingwithinthescopeoftheirauthorityo (i)oneofitsrepresentativesisapartytotheoffence,oro (ii)twoormoreofitsrepresentativesengageinconduct,whetherbyactoromission,such
that,ifithadbeentheconductofonlyonerepresentative,thatrepresentativewouldhavebeenapartytotheoffence;and
(b)theseniorofficerwhoisresponsiblefortheaspectoftheorganization’sactivitiesthatisrelevanttotheoffencedeparts—ortheseniorofficers,collectively,depart—markedlyfromthestandardofcarethat,inthecircumstances,couldreasonablybeexpectedtopreventarepresentativeoftheorganizationfrombeingapartytotheoffence.
Otheroffences—organizations22.2Inrespectofanoffencethatrequirestheprosecutiontoprovefault—otherthannegligence—anorganizationisapartytotheoffenceif,withtheintentatleastinparttobenefittheorganization,oneofitsseniorofficers
(a)actingwithinthescopeoftheirauthority,isapartytotheoffence;(b)havingthementalstaterequiredtobeapartytotheoffenceandactingwithinthescopeoftheirauthority,directstheworkofotherrepresentativesoftheorganizationsothattheydotheactormaketheomissionspecifiedintheoffence;or(c)knowingthatarepresentativeoftheorganizationisorisabouttobeapartytotheoffence,doesnottakeallreasonablemeasurestostopthemfrombeingapartytotheoffence.
Humphrey|50
• Howdoescorporatepersonalityworkintermsofprinciplesofliabilityandaccountabilityinprivateandpubliclaw?
• Corporationisanartificiallegalperson–therefore,inertasanabstraction.Can’tdoanythingonitsownright.Noinherentlegalcapacity.
o Tobecomeanimatethroughthebehaviourofactualpeople(naturalpersons),whoarerepresentativesofthecorporation.
• Today,focusingontort/criminallawandnextclass,contractlaw.
Personalversuscorporateliabilityforcivilwrongs
• Corporateliabilityintort/criminallawturnsnotjustonactionsbutonintention.• Whenandhowisliabilityfixedonacorporationby/throughtheconductofitsrepresentatives?• Doesand/oroughtcorporateliabilityturnonthequestionofwhetherapurportedmemberofthe
organizationhadtheauthoritytoact?• Doesthelawgiveusacoherentbasistoascribeintenttocorporation?
o Wehavestruggleswithhowtoascribeintentiontoacorporation…theyarequitecomplex,notobvioushowtodothis.
Twotheoriesofcorporateliability
• TherearetwotheoriesofliabilityinCanadianlaw.Inotherjurisdictionstheytendtofavouroneortheother,butCanadaismoreofamélange.
• (1)Personalliabilitytheoryo Otherwisereferredtoaspersonificationdoctrine.o Thecorporationisunderstoodtoattractliabilitydirectlyasalegalpersonthroughthe
conductandmentalstate(s)ofitsdirectingminds(thosewhoare,intheeyesofthelaw,corporatebrains).
o ThisstemsfromtheBrits,whostillespouseandlovethisshit.o Howdoesitwork?Throughthecorporatebrain/directingmind,thecorporationattracts
liability.§ Contract–corporationpersonallybindsitselfwhensignedbyadirectingmind.§ Tort/criminallaw–corporationpersonallyattractsliabilitythrough
conduct/intentionofdirectingmind,whopersonifiesthecorporationinhis/herbehaviour.
• (2)Agencyliabilityo ThisisdominantintheUS.o Corporationisnotitselfaperson,sohavetounderstandliabilitythroughagency.o Corporationisprincipalandrepresentativesareagentsandsoliabilitywillalwaysbe
vicariousthroughagencylaw.o Corporationattractsliabilityindirectlybystandinginrelationshipwithagents,andthere
maybemanyagentsauthorizedtoactonbehalfofthecorporation.o Thinksitmakesnosensetothinkaboutacorporationasanactualperson.o Corporationwillbeliablevicariouslyforactsofagents.
Crimeandtort:establishingintent
• Tortsituations–thinkthatvicariousliabilityisenoughtoestablishcorporateliability.o But,thereareafewtortswhereamentalelementisneeded.
§ e.g.Tortofdisparagementofacompetitor’sgoods• Requiresfalsestatementsthatreflectmalice.
§ e.g.Tortofdefamation
Humphrey|51
• Defencetodefamationrequiresthattortfeasorhonestlybelievedthestatementsaidtobedefamatoryandthattherenotbeanymalice.
o Thesemakethecourtsgetinvolvedinthestateofmindoftheaccused.• Criminalsituations–agencyliabilityisanuncomfortablefit.Needtolookforbasistoestablish
personalliabilityforthecorporation.o WedothatinCanadaandEnglishlaw,throughthepersonificationdoctrine.
§ Identifythecorporatestateofmindbylocatingthecorporatebrain.o Raisesalotofquestions:
§ Whosemindpersonifiesthecorporation?Whohasthecorporatebrain?§ Onwhatbasisispersonificationestablished?Howdowedistinguishbetween
corporatebrainsandnon-corporatebrains?§ Isthecorporateconstitutionrelevant?Doesittelluswhoisadirecting
mind/corporatebrain?The“Rhone”v.The“PeterA.B.Widener”Facts
• DefendantcorporationownedashipcalledThePeterA.B.Widener–itcausedashippingaccident.• Atthetimeoftheaccidentitwasunderthecommandofthecaptain,whoworkedforthe
corporationthatownedtheship.• CorporationwantedtolimititsliabilityundertheCanadaShippingAct,whichhadaprovision
allowingashipownertolimitthetortliabilitythatwouldnormallyattachtoitundervicariousliability.Provisiononlyappliesifthedamagewascausedwithouttheactualfaultoftheowneroftheship.Soiftheowneroftheshipwasatactualfaultthenitbearsunlimitedliability.
Issue• Canfaultbeattributedtothedefendantcorporationthroughthecaptain’sconduct?No.
Reasoning• Theonusisontheshipownertoestablishacompleteabsenceoffaultinordertobenefitfromthe
protectionofthelimitedliabilityprovision.• Thequestionisatwhatpointinthehierarchyofacompanyisthefaultofapersonemployedin
theorganizationtobetreatedasthefaultofthecompanyitself.• CanadianDredge&Dock
o Foracorporationtobeheldliable,theemployeewhophysicallycommittedtheoffencemustbethe“directingmind”ofthecorporation.
o Therecanbe,however,morethanonedirectingmind–thisisparticularlytrueinCanadawherecorporateoperationsarefrequentlywidespreadingeographicterms.
o Courtsmustthereforeconsiderwhohasbeenleftwiththedecision-makingpower(notmerelycarryingoutcompanypolicy)intherelevantsphereofcorporateactivity.
• Here,thecaptainwaspartofthemanagementanda“troubleshooter”forthecorporation,butwehavetolookbeyondtheselabelsandconsidertheresponsibilitiesandfunctionsheperformedinthecorporatehierarchy.
• Keyfactorthatdistinguishesdirectingmindsfromnormalemployeesisthecapacitytoexercisedecision-makingauthorityonmattersofcorporatepolicy,ratherthanmerelygiveeffecttosuchpolicyonanoperationalbasis.
o Cometoseethatwhilehehaddecision-makingauthorityre:navigationalmatters,hedidnothavegoverningauthorityovermanagementandoperationofthecorporation.
• Therefore,nofaultonthepartofthecorporation,protectedbylimitedliabilityclause.Ratio
• Thetestfordirectingminds:thecourtwillnotlookatformalhierarchybutatsubstance,askingwhatdiscretiontheindividualwasgivenandwhatdecisionstheywereallowedtomake.
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• Keyfactorthatdistinguishesdirectingmindsfromnormalemployeesisthecapacitytoexercisedecision-makingauthorityonmattersofcorporatepolicy,ratherthanmerelygiveeffecttosuchpolicyonanoperationalbasis.
Notes• Iacobuccifindspersonificationtoorigid/formalistic–unrealisticviewofhowdecisionmaking
workswithinhierarchiesincorporations.Wouldyieldsituationswherewewouldn’tconsidersomeone
o Needasubstantiveapproach,emphasisesubstanceoverform.o Whatmattersforpurposeofpersonificationisnottheofficeheld,butthefunction
performed–nottheirstatus,butwhattheydoasanagentofthecorporation.§ Managerwillnotbeheldtobeadirectingmindwheretheyhaveafancytitlebut
littlediscretion.§ Non-manager,whooccupieslowerposition,maybeadirectingmindwherethey
havemanagerialauthority/discretion.o Chooseanuancedapproach,nottheartificialviewformLordDenning.
• It’saboutdeterminingwhetherthediscretionconferredonanemployeeisadelegationofgoverningauthoritytodesigncorporatepolicyratherthanjustcarryitout.
• ThisisbroaderthantheBritishapproach.• But,stillcriticized…
o Stilltoorestrictivebecausewillbehardtolinkcorporationtobehavioursofseniorexecutivestoinjuriessufferedbyindividuals.Isthisfair?Thatsomeoneshouldn’tbeabletorecoverbecauseit’shardtomakethelinks?
o Concernwiththemethodologyofthepersonificationdoctrine–weshouldbelookingatwhatindividualswithinthecompanyhavedone.
§ Thinkthatthisisaconstrainedwayofthinkingaboutcorporatedecisionmaking.Weshouldtakeamoreorganicperspective,andlookforgenuinecollectivebasisforfault,notjustoneperson.Lookatindiciaoforganizationalculture,organizationalpriorities,implicitnormswithintheorganization,whethertherewassomethingwronginthecompany.Notjustaboutactionsofoneperson.
Defencestocorporateliability
• Supposingthatadirectingmindhasbeenfoundresponsible–aretherecircumstanceswhereacorporationcanpointtoadefenceandavoidliability?
CanadianDredge&DockCo.v.TheQueen
• InCanadianDredge&Dock,theSCCacceptedtheuseofthe“directingmindandwill”test.o However,moreflexibleapproachthanUKcase,Tesco.o SCCsaidthatevenmorejuniorindividualscouldcountasdirectingmindandwillsolong
asthepersonhas“governingexecutiveauthority”,i.e.(asperRhone),“whohasbeenleftwiththedecision-makingpowerinarelevantsphereofcorporateactivity.”
• AnotherissueatplayinCanadianDredge&Dockwasthatthecorporationswereaccusedofbidrigging.
o Corporations’defencewasthattheemployeeswereactingfortheirownbenefitandcontrarytoinstructionsformthecorporationandthatitwouldthereforebewrongtoconvictthecorporations.
§ SCCrejectedtheideathattherecouldbeanydefenceonthebasisthattheconductinquestionwascarriedoutcontrarytoexpressinstructionsfromthecorporation.
o TheSCCaccepted,however,thattherecouldbeadefencethattherelevantindividualwasactingentirelyforhisownaccountandagainsttheinterestsofthecorporation.
Humphrey|53
§ Limitedtosituationswherethecorporationwasnotintendedbytheindividualtoderiveanybenefitfromtheindividual’sactionsanddidnotactuallyderiveanybenefitfromtheindividual’sactions.
• Shouldcorporationsbesubjecttocriminalliability?Doesitmakesense?o Criticsfindholdingcorporationsliableinadditiontoindividualssillybecauseit’s
inconsistentwithtraditionalvaluesre:punishment.Won’tservethesevalues:§ Retribution–normallythinkrelationshipbetweenconviction/sanctiononone
handandwrongdoingonanother.But,acorporationdoesn’tdoanything.Doesn’tenablevictimstofeelliketheirinterestsinretributionhavebeensatisfied.
§ Importanceofdeterrence–deterrencesupposesthattheprospectofconviction/punishmentwouldhavebehaviouralconsequences,makeyoulesslikelytocommitcrime.Unclearfromempiricalstudieswhetherprospectofcriminalsanctionhasanyimpactoncorporatebehaviour.Why?Becausetheburdenofcriminalpunishment(usuallyafine)isbornenotbyindividualsbutbyanorganizationinatrickledownway.
§ Reducingrecidivism• Corporationsnotabletofeelanyemotions–noguilt,shame,regret,doesn’t
haveastablelong-termmemory.Strictliabilityoffences
• Personificationdoctrinetakesabitofatwist.• Tryingtodeterminecorporatebraindoesn’toccurwhentryingtodetermineliability.• Forstrictliabilityoffences,alltheCrownneedstoproveisactusreus–corporationwillbefound
liableunlessitcanshowduediligenceorreasonablecare.Rv.Fitzpatrick’sFuelLtd.Facts
• Corporationwaschargedwithsellingbeertoaminor.PeterFitzpatrickwassoleshareholder,director,officerofcorporation.
• Thereweretwoemployeeswhoworkedalternateshifts,aloneandunsupervised.OneofthemsoldbeertotheminoreventhoughPFhadputupsignsinstructingemployeesnottosellalcoholtominor.Arguedthathehaddoneallhecouldtopreventthisfromhappening,instructedemployeesnottoselltominors.
Issue• Shouldthecorporationbeheldliableforthewrongfulactionsoftheemployee?Yes.Due
diligencedefencedoesnotapplybecauseemployeeisconsideredadirectingmind.Reasoning
• TheoffenceisastrictliabilityoffenceundertheLiquorControlAct.Theonlydefenceisshowingreasonablecareorduediligencetoavoidthecommissionoftheoffence(don’thavetoprovemensrea).
o Differentfromabsoluteliability,wheredefenceofreasonablecare/duediligenceisnotpossible–automaticliability.
• Functionofemployeewastosellthingstocustomers.But,whentheownerwasnotpresent,itwasthegasattendantalonewhorepresentedthecorporationtothepublic.Theattendantwaspersonifyingthecompanyandthat’senoughtomaketheemployeeadirectingmindofthecompany.
• Basedonthis,theemployeewasadirectingmindandsoinfiguringoutwhetherduediligencewasestablishedwelooktotheactionsoftheemployee.And,nohedidnotengageinduediligence.
Notes• Acuriouscase…isitconsistentwithprecedent?No…precedentisnotappliedwell.
Humphrey|54
• Nothinginprecedenttosuggestthatsomeonebeingthefaceofthecompanyortheonlypersonasthefaceofthecompanyisenoughtomakethemadirectingmind.ThetestisfromDredge&Dockandit’saboutthedecision-makingauthorityandcontroloftheperson.
• Also,itisrelevantwhethercorporationmadeinstructionstotheemployee–wouldbeappropriatetoconsiderwhetherPFhaddoneallhecouldtoensurehisemployeesbehavedappropriately.
• Millerthinksthiscaseisutterlybaffling.Statutoryreforms
• AmendmentstoCriminalCodein2004havealteredtreatmentofcorporatecriminalmind,particularlyinrelationtooffenceswherethemensreaelementisoneofrecklessnessorcriminalnegligence.
o OftendifficulttoprosecutethesekindsofoffencesunderCMLrulebecauseinalargeorganizationitmaybeimpossibletofindasingleindividualwhowasnegligentintherelevantway.Morelikelyitisonlytheorganizationasawholethatkneworoughttohaveknownoftherisk,anddidnotreacttoit.CMLruledoesn’tallowforaggregationofmultipleminds.
o Section22.1–criminalliabilityforcorporationsguiltyofoffencesrequiringnegligenceo Section22.2–criminalliabilityforcorporationsguiltyofoffencesrequiringfaultother
thannegligence• Doctoralstudentresearchdeterminedthat12yearssincethesereforms,therestillhasn’tbeena
corporationconvictedundertheseprovisions.Theyhavenothadtheimpacttheywerehopedto.Bigissueis$$requiredbyCrownprosecutorstogoaftertheseguys.
representative,inrespectofanorganization,meansadirector,partner,employee,member,agentorcontractoroftheorganization;(agent)seniorofficermeansarepresentativewhoplaysanimportantroleintheestablishmentofanorganization’spoliciesorisresponsibleformanaginganimportantaspectoftheorganization’sactivitiesand,inthecaseofabodycorporate,includesadirector,itschiefexecutiveofficeranditschieffinancialofficer;(cadresupérieur)Offencesofnegligence—organizations22.1Inrespectofanoffencethatrequirestheprosecutiontoprovenegligence,anorganizationisapartytotheoffenceif
• (a)actingwithinthescopeoftheirauthorityo (i)oneofitsrepresentativesisapartytotheoffence,oro (ii)twoormoreofitsrepresentativesengageinconduct,whetherbyactoromission,such
that,ifithadbeentheconductofonlyonerepresentative,thatrepresentativewouldhavebeenapartytotheoffence;and
• (b)theseniorofficerwhoisresponsiblefortheaspectoftheorganization’sactivitiesthatisrelevanttotheoffencedeparts—ortheseniorofficers,collectively,depart—markedlyfromthestandardofcarethat,inthecircumstances,couldreasonablybeexpectedtopreventarepresentativeoftheorganizationfrombeingapartytotheoffence.
Otheroffences—organizations22.2Inrespectofanoffencethatrequirestheprosecutiontoprovefault—otherthannegligence—anorganizationisapartytotheoffenceif,withtheintentatleastinparttobenefittheorganization,oneofitsseniorofficers
• (a)actingwithinthescopeoftheirauthority,isapartytotheoffence;• (b)havingthementalstaterequiredtobeapartytotheoffenceandactingwithinthescopeof
theirauthority,directstheworkofotherrepresentativesoftheorganizationsothattheydotheactormaketheomissionspecifiedintheoffence;or
Humphrey|55
• (c)knowingthatarepresentativeoftheorganizationisorisabouttobeapartytotheoffence,doesnottakeallreasonablemeasurestostopthemfrombeingapartytotheoffence.
B)CORPORATELIABILITYINCONTRACTLAWCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.16(3),17,18QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.12-15CanadaBusinessCorporationsActRightspreserved16(3)Noactofacorporation,includinganytransferofpropertytoorbyacorporation,isinvalidbyreasononlythattheactortransferiscontrarytoitsarticlesorthisAct.Noconstructivenotice17NopersonisaffectedbyorisdeemedtohavenoticeorknowledgeofthecontentsofadocumentconcerningacorporationbyreasononlythatthedocumenthasbeenfiledbytheDirectororisavailableforinspectionatanofficeofthecorporation.Authorityofdirectors,officersandagents18(1)Nocorporationandnoguarantorofanobligationofacorporationmayassertagainstapersondealingwiththecorporationoragainstapersonwhoacquiredrightsfromthecorporationthat
• (a)thearticles,by-lawsandanyunanimousshareholderagreementhavenotbeencompliedwith;• (b)thepersonsnamedinthemostrecentnoticesenttotheDirectorundersection106or113are
notthedirectorsofthecorporation;• (c)theplacenamedinthemostrecentnoticesenttotheDirectorundersection19isnotthe
registeredofficeofthecorporation;• (d)apersonheldoutbyacorporationasadirector,officer,agentormandataryofthecorporation
hasnotbeendulyappointedorhasnoauthoritytoexercisethepowersandperformthedutiesthatarecustomaryinthebusinessofthecorporationorusualforadirector,officer,agentormandatary;
• (e)adocumentissuedbyanydirector,officer,agentormandataryofacorporationwithactualorusualauthoritytoissuethedocumentisnotvalidorgenuine;or
• (f)asale,leaseorexchangeofpropertyreferredtoinsubsection189(3)wasnotauthorized.Exception(2)Subsection(1)doesnotapplyinrespectofapersonwhohas,oroughttohave,knowledgeofasituationdescribedinthatsubsectionbyvirtueoftheirrelationshiptothecorporation.QuebecBusinessCorporationsActPRESUMPTIONS12.Thirdpersonsarenotpresumedtohaveknowledgeoftheinformationcontainedinadocumentconcerningacorporation,otherthantheinformationspecifiedinsection98oftheActrespectingthelegalpublicityofenterprises(chapterP-44.1),solelybecausethedocumenthasbeendepositedintheenterpriseregisterormaybeinspectedintheofficesofthecorporation.13.Thirdpersonsmaypresume(1)thatacorporationisexercisingitspowersinaccordancewithitsarticlesandby-lawsandanyunanimousshareholderagreement;
Humphrey|56
(2)thatthedocumentsrelatingtothecorporationthataredepositedintheenterpriseregistercontainaccurateinformation;(3)thatthedirectorsandofficersofthecorporationvalidlyholdofficeandlawfullyexercisethepowersoftheiroffice;and(4)thatthedocumentsofthecorporationissuedbyadirector,officerorothermandataryofthecorporationarevalid.14.Sections12and13donotapplytothirdpersonsinbadfaithortopersonswhooughttohaveknowledgetothecontrarybecauseoftheirpositionwithorrelationshiptoacorporation.15.Withrespecttothirdpersons,acorporationisdeemedtobeoperatingincompliancewithanyrestrictionsonitsbusinessactivityimposedbyitsarticles.
• Theoryofliabilityisthroughagencytheory.o Corporationneverdirectlyconcludescontractwithoutsider–contractingalwayshappens
throughagents.• Authorityofagentstobindcorporationsislimitedinsomeway.
o Principalshavepowertosupervisetheiragents.o Astheiroverseeingtheiragents,principalscanissueex-postdirections–cancorrectthe
coursebygivingthemnewdirections.• Wheredodirectorsgettheiragencyauthority?
o Foundincorporateconstitution,statute(CBCA,QBCA).• Officersandseniorexecutivemanagers,whatabouttheiragencyauthority?
o Throughcontract,willgiveusbasisandscopeofthisauthority.• (1)Whethercapacitytohaveanagenttobindacorporationisorshouldbelimitedbythe
constitutionalcapacityofthecorporationitself?Shoulditbelimitedbythecorporation’sownlimitedcapacity?
• (2)Whetherthecapacityofanagenttobindacorporationislimitedbythetermsunderwhichtheyhavebeengivenauthority?
Theoriesre:corporationsgettingoutofcontracts
• (1)Positsthatthecorporationdidnothavethecapacitytoenterintoacontractandthereforethatthecontractneverexisted–ultravires.
o Forsomethingtobeultraviresitmeansthatitwasimpossibleforittohavehappened–i.e.it’snotpossibletocontractformurder.
• (2)Or,authoritytheory–corporationhadcapacitytoenterintothecontractbutitwasunauthorized.Subjectmatterfellbeyondmandateofagent,orarguethatthepersonwasn’tanagentatall.
• àWhoshouldbearthisrisk?Thatcorporationisactingbeyonditscapacityorthatitsagentsareoutsidetheirscope?Whoshouldbemostvigilantaboutthis?Creditors?Shareholders/othercorporateconstituents?
• Lawhasrespondedindifferentwayso CML–lookstocorporateconstitutiono Also,significantlegislativechangethatisfarmorefriendlytocreditorsandtheirreliances
onappearancesinthemarket.RestrictionsintheCorporateConstitutiononCorporateCapacityCommunitiesEconomicDevelopmentFundv.CanadianPicklesCorp.(1991,SCC)Facts
Humphrey|57
• SpecialActcorporation(CEDF)–objectsandcapacitiessetoutinspecialactenactedtobringcorporationintobeing.
• Wasbroughtintoexistencetosupporteconomicdevelopmentinremoteandruralcommunities.o Offeredloansthatmightnototherwisebeattainable.
• CEDFmadeloanscontrarytothecorporation’spowertolendundertheSpecialAct.• Thosewhoreceivedloanswhodidn’twanttopaybacksaidwell…youshouldn’thaveloanedtous
inthefirstplace!YourcontractswithuswereUV.Issue
• Istheloanvoidforreasonsofbeingultravires?Yes.Reasoning
• TheloanwascontrarytocorporateobjectsasstatedintheAct(townwhereCPislocatedisnotremote/isolated).
o Thisisaviolationofs.9(7)oftheAct–butdoesthismeantheloanmustbeultraviresorcouldsomelessdramaticresultbepossible?
• CMLcorporations–UVdoctrinenotbeenappliedtothesebecauseCMLcorporations(establishedbyRoyalprerogative)aretakentohaveallthepowersofanaturalperson.
o IfaCMLcorporationactsoutsidestatedobjects,legalactioncanbetakenbutactsarenotinvalid.
• Corporationscreatedunderstatutes–presumptionthatthesecorporationsonlyhavethosepowersthatareexpresslyorimpliedlygrantedtothem.
o Ifsuchacorporationactsbeyonditspowers,theactionsareUV.o Memorandumcorporations–AshburyRailway:willbeUVifgoesbeyondscopeof
memorandum,contractwillbenullandvoid.o CorporationscreatedbySpecialAct–GreatEasternRailway:Principlearticulatedin
AshburyRailwayappliestothesekindsofcorporations.Legislaturewillhavespecificpurposeinmindandthesecorporationsshouldthereforebeheldtothem.Anythingthat’soutsidethiswillnotbevalid.
o AffirmedbyHoLinBaronessWenlock:powersofastatutorycorporationarelimitedbythepurposeofthecorporationassetoutinthespecialact.
• Corporationsestablishedbybusinessstatutes(CBCA,QBCA)o TODAY–UVdoctrineabolishedforcompaniesincorporatedunderbusinesslawstatutes.
§ Trueinmostjurisdictions–maybeUVdoctrinestillatplayinNSandNWT.o Why?
§ (1)Incorporatorshaveexpresspreferenceforbroadscopeofbusinessinterests.Theydon’twantconstitutionalconstraintsonwhattheycanpursuewiththeirbusinesses.
§ (2)Concernforcreditors–UVdoctrinecreatedatrapfortheunaware,thecreditorswhoarenotawareofconstraintsoncapacity.
• Here,wearedealingwithaSpecialActcorporationsotheUVdoctrineapplies–loanwasUV.o Therearelegitimatereasonsforlegislatorstoimposeobjectclausesandforthemtobe
enforced.Mustpursueonlyobjectivesthattheyweresetouttopursue.Notes
• AshburydecisioncommonlyunderstoodtohaveestablishedUVdoctrineforcompaniesunderEnglishmodelstatute.Rationalewastheprotectionofshareholders.
Re:JohnBeauforte(London)Ltd.(1953,UK)Facts
• Companywassetuptomanufacturewomen’sgownsbuteventuallyswitchedtomakingveneeredpanels.Thiswasnotwithintheobjectsclausebutwasreflectedonnewletterhead(constructivenotice?).
Humphrey|58
• Letterheadusedtoplaceanorderforsupplyoffuel.Companygoesintoliquidationandrefusestopayfuelbill.
Issue• WasthecontractUV?Yes.
Reasoning• Fuelcompanyhadconstructivenotice(correspondence/letterhead),soconstructivenoticethat
thetransactionwasUV.• ConstructivenoticesupportsUV,buttheyarenotthesamething.Distinctivenessofthetwo
explainwhybothhavebeenabolished.Notes
• DemonstrateshowcreditorscangetscrewedbytheUVdoctrine.Exampleofwhywehavemovedawayfromthis.Unfairtocreditors/investors.
StatutoryReformofCorporateCapacity/Incapacity
• StatutorychangesduetoconcernswithUVdoctrine.• RuleshavechangedinmostCanadianjurisdictionssince1970.
o Seess.6(1)(f),15(1),16(2)and(3),17,18(1)(a)and(2)o 15(1)–Corporationhascapacityofnaturalpersono 6(1)(f)and16(2)–Articlesofcorporationcansetoutrestrictionsonbusiness
objects/purposestobepursuedbythecorporationandtheserestrictionsmustberespected/compliedwith.
§ Theserestrictionsfunctionasarestrictiononmanagement,buttheydon’tlimitthecorporationasalegalpersonintermsoftheircapacity.See16(3).
o 16(3)–However,noactisinvalidbyreasonofitonlybeingcontrarytoarticles.§ Sees.247fordifferentremedies.
o 17–Noconstructivenoticeimpliedagainstthirdpartiesforreasonsofcorporatecapacityo 18(1)and(2)–Corporationcan’tassertlackofcorporatecapacityagainstanoutsiderin
ordertovitiateacontractwhentheoutsiderknoworoughttohaveknown.Veryrare.• Thirdpartiesprotectedunderss.12-15ofQuebecBusinessCorporationsAct.
o 13–Thirdpartiescanpresumethatacorporationisactinginaccordancewiththeirrules.Canrelyonappearances,don’tneedtomakeinquiries.
o 14–Creditorsactinginbadfaithorwhooughttohaveknowledgecan’tpointtoviolationsofconstraintsbecausetheykneworshouldhaveknownabouttheseconstraints.
• Legislatorshaveshiftedtheburdenofriskassociatedwithcorporatecapacityfromcreditors(atCML)toshareholdersandincorporators(thankstostatute).
ContractingThroughCorporateAgents
• Corporatecontractsanalyzedthroughagencyprinciples.o Seeindividualasagentofcorporationandaskwhattheagent’sauthoritywas,determineif
theyweretheappropriatetypeofagentthroughwhomtoarrangethesortofcontractthatwasnegotiated.
• Corporationhasrelationshipwithagent;outsidernegotiateswithagent;outsiderclaimsthatnegotiationscreatedacontractwiththecorporation.
• Threedifferenttheories:o (1)Beginningof20thcentury(“actualauthority”theory),plaintiffneededtoproduce
clearevidenceofacorporateagent’sscopeofauthority.o (2)Mid-century(“ostensibleauthority”theory),corporationstreatedalmostlikehuman
principals.o (3)21stcentury,corporateprincipalsdiscriminatedagainstinfavourofoutsidersin
agencymatters.
Humphrey|59
(1)ActualAuthority
• Didthepersonwhomadethecontractonbehalfofthecorporationactuallyhavetheauthoritytodoso?
o Abouttherelationshipbetweentheagentandtheirprincipal.It’snotaboutanykindofrelationshipbetweentheagentandathirdparty.It’sabouttheprincipalgrantingauthoritytotheagent.
• Threewaysforanagenttogetactualauthority:o Expressactualauthorityo Impliedactualauthorityo Actualauthorityretroactively(ratificationbyprincipalofwhattheagentalreadydidthat
wasbeyondtheirauthorityatthetime)• Towhatextentisacorporationabletoprejudicethirdpartiesbycitingafailuretocomplywith
internalcorporateprocedures?
(2)OstensibleAuthority• Creditorsarenottypicallyinapositiontoknowaboutrelationshipsofactualauthoritybetween
agentsandprincipals.• Creditorwillbeclaimingthatagenthadapparentorseemingauthoritytoactonbehalfof
corporation.• Notconcernedabouttheactualrelationshipbetweenprincipalandagent.
o Instead,it’sabouttherelationshipbetweentheprincipalandcreditors.o Inparticular,concernedwithwhatthecorporationenabledorencouragedthecreditorto
believeabouttheagenttheyweredealingwith.Didthecorporationacttogenerateanappearanceofauthority?
• LeadingtestfromFreeman&Lockyer(mostfamouscase,1974UKCourtofAppeal)o Legalrelationshipbetweenprincipalandcontractor.o Ostensibleauthorityexistswhentheprincipalhasmadesomerepresentationthatan
individualhadtheauthoritytoactonbehalfoftheprincipal.o Test:
§ (1)Representationbythecorporationtoanoutsiderthattheagenthastheauthoritytoentreintoacontractofthatkindonthecorporation’sbehalf.
§ (2)Representationwasmadebysomeonewhohadtheactualauthoritytomanagethebusinessingeneralorwithrespecttothesubjectmatterofthetransaction.
§ (3)Outsidermustshowthattheyreliedontherepresentationandthattheywereinducedbytherepresentationtoenterintothecontract.
Schwartzv.MaritimeLifeAssuranceCo.(1997,NFLD)Facts
• SplacedmanyinvestmentswithML,usingRideoutasabroker.• RhadarelationshipwithML,butnoauthoritytobindMLtoanyone.• SgaveR$100,000toplacewithML,Rfuckedofffraudulently.Evenissuedaforgedreceiptfrom
ML.SinquiredwithMLandfoundoutthatRnevergavethemthemoney.• ShouldSorMLbearthelossassociatedwithR’sfraud?WasRanagentofML?
Issue• WasRanagentofMLwhenhereceivedthemoneyfromS?Yes–RappearedtobeagentofML
toSsothelossesshouldliewithML.JudicialHistory
• TJheldthatRhadnoauthoritytobindorcommitMLinanyway.NorepresentationsweremadebyMLthatRwasitsagent.
Reasoning(Majority)
Humphrey|60
• Whetheraprincipal/agentrelationshipexistsdependsonthenatureoftheauthoritygrantedordeemedtohavebeengranted,bytheprincipaltotheagent.Thus,whetheranagencyrelationshipexistswilldependontheexactcircumstancesoftherelationshipbetweentheallegedprincipalanddefendant.
• Inmostcaseswherethereisactualauthoritythereisacontractsettingitout.• Ostensibleauthority–Whereapersonbyhiswordsorconducthasallowedanothertoappearto
theoutsideworldashisagent,withtheresultthatthirdpartiesdealwithhiminthiscapacity.Thispersoncannotrepudiatethisapparentagencyifsodoingwouldprejudicethirdparties.
o Focusisonrepresentationsmadebyprincipaltothirdpartiesastotheauthorityoftheagentthethirdpartyisdealingwith.
• àNothingnewhereinadditiontoorchangingthetestfromFreeman&Lockyer.• ActualAuthority
o Importanttopayattentiontoanycontractsthatexistbetweenpurportedagentandprincipal.
o FindsthatthereisnobasisforanyrelationshipofactualauthorityinthecontractbetweenMLandR.
o RhadhadacontractwithML,Rwasgeneralagentandemployee.Termsofthesecontractsspecificallyexcludeagencyauthority.R’sauthoritywaslimitedtosalesanddrawupbusinessforMLonitsbehalf.
o CourtfindsthereisnorelationshipofactualauthoritybetweenMLandR.• OstensibleAuthority
o IfSistosucceed,hastoestablishthatMLhasdonesomethingwhichwouldleadhimtobelievethatRhadtheauthoritytobindMLandthattherewasreliancetoS’sdetriment.(LanguagefromFreeman&Lockyer).
o LookstoughbecausetherewasnocommunicationbetweenMLandS.So,wheredidrepresentationcomeupwithoutcommunication?
o Oddly,courtpassesoverthisandasks,weshouldaswhetherRdidinanywayholdhimselfouttoSasbeingauthorizedtoenterintoarelationshipwithSonbehalfofML?
§ àThisisashift–lookstowhetheragentdidanythingtoholdhimselfoutasagentofMLversuswhatprincipaldidtoconveyagencytothirdparty.
o FoundtherewasnoholdingoutonthepartofR,savethereceiptfrom1978fromMLhegavetoSwhenhewasregionalsuperintendant.SaidthatwasenoughtoshowRasanagentofML.
§ IfhecouldusethisstationaryfromMLthenpeoplecould§ Thiswas,however,6yearsbeforethe$100,000inquestion.§ Courtdidn’tcareaboutthepassageoftime–nowayforStoknowaboutthe
changeinstatusofRinrelationtoML.Couldn’thaveknownhewasnolongerregionalsuperintendantandjustanindependentbrokernow.
• Corporationthereforeheldliableforthe$100,000Dissent(Marshall)
• Agreeswithmajorityonthelawbutdisagreeswithapplication.• ActualAuthority
o RwasagentofS,hisclient.SecondagencyrelationshipbetweenRandMLwasnotyetformedbecausemoneywasnevertransferred.So,wrongwasdonebyRasS’sagentandsoScanseekrecourseagainstRforR’sfaultashisagent.NorelationshipwithML.
• OstensibleAuthorityo Focusesonrelianceelementoftest–noreliancehere.NoproofthatSgavemoneytoR
relyingonsixyearoldreceiptfromML.o SadvancedmoneytoRbecausehetrustedhim–that’swhathereliedon,notsometoken
ofauthoritygivensixyearsago.Notes
Humphrey|61
• Ostensibleauthoritymostsignificantforcreditorsbecausecreditorslargelyrelyingonappearances.Don’thavebasistoknowanythingaboutactualauthority.
o Companieswillalsooftengiveagentstokensofauthority(businesscards,letterheads,e-mailsignatures).
o àCorporationsneedtobecarefulabouttokensofauthorityextendedtoagentsandhowtheyareused.
§ Corporationscan’treallydothatmuchtoprotectagainstmisuseoftokensofauthority.Theyarerunningtheriskthatcreditorswillrelyonthesetokenseventhoughtherewasnorelationshipofagencybetweenagentandprincipal.
• Weseethishere–sixyearoldletterheadwasconsideredthekey.Prettythintokenbutstill,thatwasenough.
• Areyouconvincedbythis?StatutoryReformre:AuthorityofAgents
• CBCA18(1)and(2)• QBCA12-14
IV.INCORPORATION
A)INCORPORATIONCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.5,6(1),8,9,10(1)and(5),14(1)QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.3-5,8-10,16,19,20,38CCQ,arts.319-320CanadaBusinessCorporationsActIncorporators5(1)Oneormoreindividualsnotoneofwhom(a)islessthaneighteenyearsofage,(b)isofunsoundmindandhasbeensofoundbyacourtinCanadaorelsewhere,or(c)hasthestatusofbankrupt,mayincorporateacorporationbysigningarticlesofincorporationandcomplyingwithsection7.Bodiescorporate(2)Oneormorebodiescorporatemayincorporateacorporationbysigningarticlesofincorporationandcomplyingwithsection7.Articlesofincorporation6(1)ArticlesofincorporationshallfollowtheformthattheDirectorfixesandshallsetout,inrespectoftheproposedcorporation,(a)thenameofthecorporation;(b)theprovinceinCanadawheretheregisteredofficeistobesituated;(c)theclassesandanymaximumnumberofsharesthatthecorporationisauthorizedtoissue,and
(i)iftherewillbetwoormoreclassesofshares,therights,privileges,restrictionsandconditionsattachingtoeachclassofshares,and
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(ii)ifaclassofsharesmaybeissuedinseries,theauthoritygiventothedirectorstofixthenumberofsharesin,andtodeterminethedesignationof,andtherights,privileges,restrictionsandconditionsattachingto,thesharesofeachseries;
(d)iftheissue,transferorownershipofsharesofthecorporationistoberestricted,astatementtothateffectandastatementastothenatureofsuchrestrictions;(e)thenumberofdirectorsor,subjecttoparagraph107(a),theminimumandmaximumnumberofdirectorsofthecorporation;and(f)anyrestrictionsonthebusinessesthatthecorporationmaycarryon.Certificateofincorporation8(1)Subjecttosubsection(2),onreceiptofarticlesofincorporation,theDirectorshallissueacertificateofincorporationinaccordancewithsection262.Exception—failuretocomplywithAct(2)TheDirectormayrefusetoissuethecertificateifanoticethatisrequiredtobesentundersubsection19(2)or106(1)indicatesthatthecorporation,ifitcameintoexistence,wouldnotbeincompliancewiththisAct.Effectofcertificate9Acorporationcomesintoexistenceonthedateshowninthecertificateofincorporation.Nameofcorporation10(1)Thewordorexpression“Limited”,“Limitée”,“Incorporated”,“Incorporée”,“Corporation”or“Sociétéparactionsderégimefédéral”orthecorrespondingabbreviation“Ltd.”,“Ltée”,“Inc.”,“Corp.”or“S.A.R.F.”shallbepart,otherthanonlyinafigurativeordescriptivesense,ofthenameofeverycorporation,butacorporationmayuseandbelegallydesignatedbyeitherthefullorthecorrespondingabbreviatedform.Publicationofname(5)Acorporationshallsetoutitsnameinlegiblecharactersinallcontracts,invoices,negotiableinstrumentsandordersforgoodsorservicesissuedormadebyoronbehalfofthecorporation.Personalliability14(1)Subjecttothissection,apersonwhoentersinto,orpurportstoenterinto,awrittencontractinthenameoforonbehalfofacorporationbeforeitcomesintoexistenceispersonallyboundbythecontractandisentitledtoitsbenefits.QuébecBusinessCorporationsActCONSTITUTION3.Acorporationmaybeconstitutedbyoneormorefounders.4.Anynaturalpersonqualifiedtobeadirectorofacorporationmaybethefounderofacorporation.Alegalpersonmayalsobethefounderofacorporation.5.Thearticlesofconstitutionmustsetout(1)thenameofthecorporation,unlessadesignatingnumberinlieuofanamehasbeenrequestedfromtheenterpriseregistrar;(2)thenameandaddressofeachfounder,orthenameofthefoundinglegalperson,theaddressofitsheadofficeandanexactreferencetotheActunderwhichitisconstituted;(3)theamounttowhichitssharecapitalislimited,ifapplicable;(4)theparvalueofitsshares,ifany;
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(5)iftherewillbetwoormoreclassesofshares,therightsandrestrictionsattachingtothesharesofeachclass;(6)ifaclassofsharesmaybeissuedinseries,theauthoritygiventotheboardofdirectorstodetermine,beforeissue,thenumberofsharesin,thedesignationofthesharesof,andtherightsandrestrictionsattachingtothesharesof,eachseries;(7)anyrestrictionsonthetransferofitsinstrumentsorshares;(8)thefixednumberortheminimumandmaximumnumberofdirectors;and(9)anyrestrictionsonitsbusinessactivity.8.Thefollowingmustbefiledwiththearticles:(1)alistofthedirectorsofthecorporation,containingtheirnamesanddomiciles;(2)anoticeoftheaddressofthecorporation’sheadoffice;(3)unlessadesignatingnumberhasbeenrequested,adeclarationstatingthatreasonablemeanshavebeentakentoensurethatthenamechosenisincompliancewiththelaw;and(4)anyotherdocumenttheMinistermayrequire.However,thelistofdirectorsandthenoticeoftheaddressoftheheadofficearenotrequiredtobefilediftheinitialdeclarationrequiredundertheActrespectingthelegalpublicityofenterprises(chapterP-44.1)isfiledwiththearticles.9.Thearticlesofacorporation,signedbythefounders,thedocumentsrequiredtobefiledwiththem,andthefeesetoutintheActrespectingthelegalpublicityofenterprises(chapterP-44.1)mustbesenttotheenterpriseregistrar.10.Acorporationisconstitutedasofthedateand,ifapplicable,thetimeshownonthecertificateofconstitutionissuedbytheenterpriseregistrarinaccordancewithChapterXVIII.Thecorporationisalegalpersonasofthattime.NAME16.Acorporation’snamemustnot(1)contravenetheCharteroftheFrenchlanguage(chapterC-11);(2)includeanexpressionwhichthelawreservesforanotherpersonorprohibitsthecorporationfromusing;(3)includeanexpressionthatevokesanimmoral,obsceneorscandalousnotion;(4)incorrectlyindicatethecorporation’sjuridicalformorfailtoindicatethatformwhenrequiredbylaw;(5)falselysuggestthatthecorporationisanon-profitgroup;(6)falselysuggestthatthecorporationis,orisrelatedto,apublicauthoritydeterminedbygovernmentregulation;(7)falselysuggestthatthecorporationisrelatedtoanotherpersonorgroupofpersons,particularlyinthecasesandinviewofthecriteriadeterminedbygovernmentregulation;(8)beidenticaltoanamereservedfororusedbyanotherpersonorgroupofpersonsinQuébec,particularlyinviewofthecriteriadeterminedbygovernmentregulation;(9)beconfusinglysimilartoanamereservedfororusedbyanotherpersonorgroupofpersonsinQuébec,particularlyinviewofthecriteriadeterminedbygovernmentregulation;or(10)bemisleadinginanyothermanner.19.Thenameofacorporationmustappearonallofitsnegotiableinstruments,contracts,invoicesandpurchaseordersforgoodsorservices.20.Ifacorporation’snamedoesnotincludetheterm“sociétéparactions”or“compagnie”,itmustcomprisetheabbreviation“s.a.”,“ltée”or“inc.”attheendtoindicatethatthecorporationisalimited-liabilitycorporation.
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RECORDSANDDOCUMENTS38.Inanyactionorproceedingagainstacorporationoranyshareholder,therecordsofthecorporationareproofoftheircontentsintheabsenceofanyevidencetothecontrary.CivilCodeofQuebec319.Alegalpersonmayratifyanactperformedforitbeforeitwasconstituted;itisthensubstitutedforthepersonwhoactedforit.Theratificationdoesnoteffectnovation;thepersonwhoactedhasthenceforththesamerightsandissubjecttothesameobligationsasamandatarywithrespecttothelegalperson.320.Apersonwhoactsforalegalpersonbeforeitisconstitutedisboundbytheobligationssocontracted,unlessthecontractstipulatesotherwiseandincludesastatementtotheeffectthatthelegalpersonmightnotbeconstitutedormightnotassumetheobligationssubscribedinthecontract.àOverarchingquestion–whataretheformalitiesrequiredtobringacorporationintoexistenceunderthestatute?1)Registration
• Acorporationcomestobeonlythroughalegalprocess:processofregistrationforthatparticularcorporation.
• Itisinitiatedbyincorporators–privateindividualsactingasagrouporindividual.• ProcessofincorporationisconcludedwithacertificateofregistrationissuedbytheCBCA
Director.o ExpresstermsofCBCAprovideofficeofDirectormustissuecertificateofregistration
whentheyreceivedanapplicationthatmeetsallthestatutoryrequirements.Iftherequirementsareallmet,thereisnodiscretiongrantedtorefuseincorporation(s.8).
• CBCA:o Section8:Issuanceofthecertificate.Thepersonissuingthecertificatehasnodiscretion
(onlycanrefuseifapplicationnotinorder).o Section9:Acorporationisbornwhentheapplicationsubmittedbyincorporatorsis
approvedandacertificateofincorporationisissued.• Problemscanarisewhenthedocumentallegedtobeacertificateofincorporationbearsadate
otherthanthedateitwasissued.o Section262(3):Dateshownonthebirthcertificateofthecorporationwilleitherbethe
datetheCBCADirectorreceivesthearticlesofincorporationorthedatecouldbeadatespecifiedbytheincorporators.
§ Iftheincorporatorsdonotspecifyadate,bydefaultitwouldbethedatethearticleswerereceivedbytheofficeoftheCBCADirector.
§ However,sometimesittakestimetoprocessarticlesofincorporationsobecauseofthis(processingdelays),itcouldwellbethattheincorporatorsreceiveabackdatedcertificate.Thisraisessomecomplications.
§ Whenthedateofincorporationisindispute,thereisaproblembecauseitisunclearwhenthecorporationgotcorporatepersonality.
§ Shoulditbethedateshownonthecertificateorshoulditbethedateonwhichthecertificatewasissued?
o Section256(2):Certificateasconclusiveproofofincorportion.§ ThisprovisionstatesthatacertificateissuedbyCBCADirectorisafactualproofof
theincorporation.C.P.W.ValveandInstrumentsLtd.v.Scott(1978,ABCA)
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Facts
• SmadecontractualagreementtopurchaseproductfromCPWandmaderequestfordeliveryofproductinnameofcorporation(aspresident)onJune15.
• CertificateofincorporationwasissuedonJune16butwasdatedJune15.• CPWclaimedthatcorporationdidn’texistonJune15becausecertificatewasn’tissueduntilJune
16.Therefore,claimedcorporationdidn’texistwhenorderwasmadeandthatSwasinbreachofcontract.
Issue• Whenwasthecorporationborn?CorporationwasbornonJune16whencertificatewas
issued,notwhendated.Reasoning
• Majority(ClementJA)o Dateofincorporationintegraltopersonality–corporationdoesnotexistasapersonwith
capacitytocontractwithouttheformalitiesbywhichthestaterecognizesitasaperson.o Threepossibledatesofincorporation:
§ (1)DatematerialssubmittedtoCBCADirectorandallrequirementsmetbecauseifallrequirementsaremet,theprocessingoftheapplicationismerelyaformality(CBCADirectorhasnodiscretion).
§ (2)Dateshownoncertificate§ (3)Datecertificateissued
• Thiswillbethedateforthepurposesofcontractlaw.• àIsn’tthisisincontradictionwiths.256(2)?
o Judgesaysnotclearthatlegislatorsmeantforthisarticletoextendbeyondthestatuteandapplytocontractualdisputes.
o Thecertificatedoesnotconclusivelyestablishthedateofincorporation–havetoconsidertheissueofdatingofacorporationinlightoftheentireprocessofincorporation.
o Itisimpossibleforanon-existentpersontoperformalegalactandthecorporationonlyexistedasanideaonJune15.
o Here,therewasevidencethattheregistrardidnotactuallysignthecertificateuntilJune16.Therefore,thecorporationdidnotexistonJune15.
Ratio• Theactualdateofincorporation(notjustthedateonthecertificate)isdecisiveinthecontextofa
contractualissue.Notes
• Thejurisprudenceisunsettledonthisissueandtheauthorityofthisjudgmentisquestioned.• TherehasnotbeenanothercasesincethisoneattheABCA.
2)MinimumRequirementsofCorporateConstitution
• Section5(1):Incorporatorsmustbe…o Naturalperson,ageofmajority,solvent(notbankrupt),ofsoundmind.o Corporationscanalsofileforincorporationofanothercorporation.
• Section6:Applicationtocreatecorporationmustcontaindraftarticlesforthecorporation.o Whileincorporatorshavelotsoffreedominstructuringthecorporateconstitution,there
aresomerequirements/restrictions:§ Neednameofcorporation,locationofheadoffice,numberofdirectors,detailsof
sharestructure(howmanydifferentclasses,whichrightsattachtowhich,andvalueofshares),anyrestrictionsonthepurposeandobjectofthecorporation.
• Section7:Delivery–draftarticlesmustbesignedanddeliveredtofederalbureaucracy(CBCADirector).
o Needtoincludenamesandaddressesofalldirectors
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o Mustalsopayapplicationfee(fewhundred$$)2)Continuance:CorporateEmigrationandImmigration
• Continuance:processbywhichacorporationincorporatedinonejurisdictionemigratesandestablishesanewhomeinanotherjurisdiction.
o Effectissameasifcorporationwasdissolvedinoriginaljurisdictionandsimultaneouslyreincorporatedinnewjurisdiction.
• Generalrequirementisthatthecorporationmustbeauthorizedbythelawsofthejurisdictionwhereitisincorporated.(CBCA,s.187(1)).
3)Amalgamation:CorporateCombination
• CBCA181-186:twoormorecorporationscanamalgamateandcontinueasonecorporation.o Effectisthatoldcorporationsceasetoexistasseparateentities–onlyone
corporationremainsandisgovernedbyownsetofarticleswhichmustbesenttoDirector/Registraraspartofprocess.
o Certificateofamalgamationisissued.• Thefollowingscenariosarenotamalgamations:
o AbuysallofB’sbusinessassetso AbuysallofB’sshareso CbuysallofAandB’sshareso CbuysallofassetsofAandB
4)TheCorporateName
• Therearecertainrequirementsfornamesofcorporations.o Section10(1):Signifiers–corporatenamemustincludewordindicatinghowthe
corporationisbeingdescribed(e.g.LTD.,INC.)§ Why?Creditorshavetoprotecttheirinterestssotheyhavetoknowthatthey
aredealingwithacorporation.Theuseofsignifiersistheprotectionofcreditors.o Section12(1):Namemustbedistinctiveandnotdeceptive.
§ Alsoseeregulations25,256,27,30–namecan’tbeprescribed,reserved,orprohibitedbyanothercorporation.
§ Reg.25:Namemustnotuseprohibitedwordsorphrases• e.g.AirCanada,RCMP,ParliamentHill
§ Reg.26:Namemustnotsuggestanygovernmentalassociation• Furtherprovidesthenamecannotbeobscene
§ Reg.30:Namemustbedistinctiveandnottoogeneralorcannotbemerelydescriptiveofgoodsandservicesprovided
• e.g.Wanttosellshirtsandwanttocallit“WhiteShirtCompany”–CBCAsuggestsyoucan’tdothat
• Whyarealltheselimitationssetoutinthestatute?o Ifnamesarerejected,holdsthingsupandcostsmoremoney.o Iftwosimilarnames,couldbeconfusingwithexistingcorporation’sname.
5)Pre-IncorporationContracts
• Becauseacorporationdoesn’tcomeintoexistenceuntilthedateonthecertificateofincorporation,willbeimpossibletocontractwithcorporationbeforethattime.
• But,incorporatorstendtodothisinordertohavegoods/servicesreadyforwhentheybecomeincorporated–wanttogetthingsgoingandgetofftheground.
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• Whatarelegalimplicationsofthesepre-incorporationtransactionsarrangedonbehalfofacorporation?
o Theyarenotlegallybindingcontracts(Kelnerv.Baxter).o Helpfultothinkofthesemoreastransactionsthancontractsbecausecontractsare
legallybinding.• UsuallyhaveA(personinvolvedinincorporationprocess,purportingtoactonbehalfoffuture
corporation)andO(outsiderwhointendstobuy/sellfromfuturecorporation).Thirdparty–futurecorporation–onlyexistsasafigmentofimagination.
• CMLpositiono Needtwopartiesforcontractàcorporationdoesn’texistyetànon-existentcorporation
can’tbepartytocontract§ EvenifAandOagreethatcontractwillbebetweenOandcorporation,
attempttocreatecontractwillfail.o Alsoneedfundamentaltermsofcontractàpartiesarefundamental.o Result:contractmustbebetweenAandO–can’tbindunborncorporation,mustbe
commonintentionthatAispersonallyliableonthecontract.• ThoughpeopleunderstandthelogicoftheCMLposition,theyfinditinconvenientandunfairto
creditorswhoengageinthesecontractbehaviourbecausetheyrelyontherepresentationofthecorporationactuallyexisting.
o Alsounfairbecausecorporationcannotlaterratifypre-incorporationcontracts.• TheCMLpositionraisesseveralquestions
o Cantheagentwhocommittedthepre-existentcorporationtoacontractbeheldpersonallyliable?
§ Yes–Kelnerv.Baxter§ But…needstobecommonintentionofthepartiesthattheagentwouldbe
personallyliable–Blackv.Smallwood• Again,makesitdifficultforcreditorsbecausewillalmostalwaysbe
possibleforagenttoarguethatheintendedtosignascorporationandnotpersonally.
o Canacorporationratifyanobligationstemmingfromacontractthatwasmadepriortoincorporation?
§ No–Kelnerv.BaxterKelnerv.Baxter(1866,UK)àPre-existentcorporationcannotenterintolegallybindingcontracts.àCorporation,onceborn,cannotsubsequentlyratifypre-incorporationcontracts.Facts
• Bsignedcontractas“Baxter,onbehalfofproposedcorporation”Issue
• IsBliableforbreachofcontractpersonally?Oristhecorporation?Baxterpersonally–attimecontractwasenteredinto,corporationdidn’texistandthereforecan’tbeheldliable.
Reasoning• Ifthecorporationhadexistedatthetimeofthecontractsigning,Bcouldhavesignedasagentof
thecompany.However,nocorporationhere.• Therefore,wherethereisanagentbutnoprincipal,thecontractbindsthepersonthatsignsit
personally.Subsequentratificationofthecontractbythecorporationthatcomesintoexistencecannotrelievethisresponsibility.
Ratio• Iftheprincipaldoesn’texistatthetimeofthecontract,theagentactingonbehalfofthefuture
corporationispersonallyliable.
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• Thecorporationthatcomesintoexistencecannotlaterratifythecontract–liabilityremainswithagent.
Notes• Thiscasehasbeeninterpretedassayingthatanagentisliableforapre-incorporationcontract
onlyifthecontractualcounterpartintendedthattheagentbepersonallyliable/entitled.Millerdoesn’tthinkthisisagreatinterpretation.
Blackv.Smallwood(1966,Australia)àSpinningofKelner–needcommonintentionofpartiestomakeagentpersonallyliableforpre-incorporationcontracts.Facts
• Scontractstobuylandinnameofcorporationthathasnotcomeintoexistenceyet.However,bothSandBthoughtthatthecorporationexistedatthetime.
• BbringsactionagainstSpersonally,tryingtoforcehimtobuythelandhecontractedtobuyasthecorporation.
Issue• IsSpersonallyliabletobuytheland?No–insigningasdirector,clearthatSdidn’tintendto
bindhimselfpersonally.Reasoning
• Generalruleisthatwhereanagentcontractsonbehalfofaprincipalthatdoesn’texist,theagentispersonallyliable(Kelner).
• However,liabilityrequirescommonintention(spinningKelner).o InKelner,wasclearthattherewasnocompanyandsotherewascommonintentionasto
thepersonalliabilityoftheagent.o Here,bothpartiesthoughtthecompanyexistedandwerecontractingassuch.
ImpossibletodemonstratecommonintentiontobindSpersonally.Ratio
• ReinterpretationofKelnerrequiringcommonintentionofpartiesre:personalliabilitypre-incorporation.
6)AttemptsatStatutoryReformre:Pre-IncorporationContracts
• BecauseoftheperceivedunfairnessofCMLpositiononpre-incorporationcontracts,especiallyforcreditors,haveattemptedstatutoryreform.
• Reformershaveattemptedtomaketwochanges:o (1)Triedtoimposecontractualliabilityonagentforpre-incorporationcontracts.
§ e.g.Section21(2)OBCA.o (2)Triedtoenablecorporationto“adopt”pre-incorporationtransactions,makingthe
corporationapartytothecontractandexcusingtheagent.• Section14(1),CBCA:Agentwhoentersintocontractonbehalfofpre-existentcorporationis
personallyboundbythepre-incorporationcontract.• Section14(2):Corporationcanratifycontractsmadepre-incorporation,letagentoffthehook.• Section14(3):Enablescourttoapportionliabilityofagentbetweenagentandcorporation
oncecorporationcomesintoexistence.• Section14(4):Allowsagenttocontractoutofpersonalliabilityviaexclusionaryclausein
pre-incorporationcontracts.7)Pre-IncorporationContractsinCVL
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• Civiliansalreadyhadresponsetotheproblemofpre-incorporationcontractsbeforestatutoryreformsattemptedinCML.
o MillerlovestheCCQarticles–thinkstheyareveryclearonhowtodealwiththisissue.• CCQ320:Liabilityofagents
o Asanagent,havetomakeitpainfullycleartotheotherpartythatyouwillnotbepersonallyliableforthiscontract.
• CCQ319:Ex-postratificationo Ratificationofthepre-incorporationcontractdisplacesliabilityofagents.o ThiscanhappenundertheCBCA,butundertheCBCAliabilitycanalsobeapportioned.
§ Sees.14(3),whichstatesthatcourtcanapportionliabilitybetweenagentandcorporationpost-ratification.
V.CORPORATEMANAGEMENT
A)TheRoleofManagementCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.102(1)&(2),103,105(1),106,109(1),111(4),115,121,124-125QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.106-108,110-113,116-118,144,147-148,153,159-162,198CCQ,arts.327-328CanadaBusinessCorporationActDutytomanageorsupervisemanagement102(1)Subjecttoanyunanimousshareholderagreement,thedirectorsshallmanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofacorporation.Numberofdirectors(2)Acorporationshallhaveoneormoredirectorsbutadistributingcorporation,anyoftheissuedsecuritiesofwhichremainoutstandingandareheldbymorethanoneperson,shallhavenotfewerthanthreedirectors,atleasttwoofwhomarenotofficersoremployeesofthecorporationoritsaffiliates.By-laws103(1)Unlessthearticles,by-lawsoraunanimousshareholderagreementotherwiseprovide,thedirectorsmay,byresolution,make,amendorrepealanyby-lawsthatregulatethebusinessoraffairsofthecorporation.Shareholderapproval(2)Thedirectorsshallsubmitaby-law,oranamendmentorarepealofaby-law,madeundersubsection(1)totheshareholdersatthenextmeetingofshareholders,andtheshareholdersmay,byordinaryresolution,confirm,rejectoramendtheby-law,amendmentorrepeal.Effectivedate(3)Aby-law,oranamendmentorarepealofaby-law,iseffectivefromthedateoftheresolutionofthedirectorsundersubsection(1)untilitisconfirmed,confirmedasamendedorrejectedbytheshareholdersundersubsection(2)oruntilitceasestobeeffectiveundersubsection(4)and,wheretheby-lawisconfirmedorconfirmedasamended,itcontinuesineffectintheforminwhichitwassoconfirmed.Idem
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(4)Ifaby-law,anamendmentorarepealisrejectedbytheshareholders,orifthedirectorsdonotsubmitaby-law,anamendmentorarepealtotheshareholdersasrequiredundersubsection(2),theby-law,amendmentorrepealceasestobeeffectiveandnosubsequentresolutionofthedirectorstomake,amendorrepealaby-lawhavingsubstantiallythesamepurposeoreffectiseffectiveuntilitisconfirmedorconfirmedasamendedbytheshareholders.Shareholderproposal(5)Ashareholderentitledtovoteatanannualmeetingofshareholdersmay,inaccordancewithsection137,makeaproposaltomake,amendorrepealaby-law.Qualificationsofdirectors105(1)Thefollowingpersonsaredisqualifiedfrombeingadirectorofacorporation:(a)anyonewhoislessthaneighteenyearsofage;(b)anyonewhoisofunsoundmindandhasbeensofoundbyacourtinCanadaorelsewhere;(c)apersonwhoisnotanindividual;or(d)apersonwhohasthestatusofbankrupt.Noticeofdirectors106(1)Atthetimeofsendingarticlesofincorporation,theincorporatorsshallsendtotheDirectoranoticeofdirectorsintheformthattheDirectorfixes,andtheDirectorshallfilethenotice.Termofoffice(2)Eachdirectornamedinthenoticereferredtoinsubsection(1)holdsofficefromtheissueofthecertificateofincorporationuntilthefirstmeetingofshareholders.Electionofdirectors(3)Subjecttoparagraph107(b),shareholdersofacorporationshall,byordinaryresolutionatthefirstmeetingofshareholdersandateachsucceedingannualmeetingatwhichanelectionofdirectorsisrequired,electdirectorstoholdofficeforatermexpiringnotlaterthanthecloseofthethirdannualmeetingofshareholdersfollowingtheelection.Staggeredterms(4)Itisnotnecessarythatalldirectorselectedatameetingofshareholdersholdofficeforthesameterm.Nostatedterms(5)Adirectornotelectedforanexpresslystatedtermceasestoholdofficeatthecloseofthefirstannualmeetingofshareholdersfollowingthedirector’selection.Incumbentdirectors(6)Notwithstandingsubsections(2),(3)and(5),ifdirectorsarenotelectedatameetingofshareholderstheincumbentdirectorscontinueinofficeuntiltheirsuccessorsareelected.Vacancyamongcandidates(7)Ifameetingofshareholdersfailstoelectthenumberortheminimumnumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticlesbyreasonofthelackofconsent,disqualification,incapacityordeathofanycandidates,thedirectorselectedatthatmeetingmayexerciseallthepowersofthedirectorsifthenumberofdirectorssoelectedconstitutesaquorum.Appointmentofdirectors(8)Thedirectorsmay,ifthearticlesofthecorporationsoprovide,appointoneormoreadditionaldirectors,whoshallholdofficeforatermexpiringnotlaterthanthecloseofthenextannualmeetingof
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shareholders,butthetotalnumberofdirectorssoappointedmaynotexceedonethirdofthenumberofdirectorselectedatthepreviousannualmeetingofshareholders.Electionorappointmentasdirector(9)Anindividualwhoiselectedorappointedtoholdofficeasadirectorisnotadirectorandisdeemednottohavebeenelectedorappointedtoholdofficeasadirectorunless(a)heorshewaspresentatthemeetingwhentheelectionorappointmenttookplaceandheorshedidnotrefusetoholdofficeasadirector;or(b)heorshewasnotpresentatthemeetingwhentheelectionorappointmenttookplaceand (i)heorsheconsentedtoholdofficeasadirectorinwritingbeforetheelectionorappointmentor
withintendaysafterit,or (ii)heorshehasactedasadirectorpursuanttotheelectionorappointment.Removalofdirectors109(1)Subjecttoparagraph107(g),theshareholdersofacorporationmaybyordinaryresolutionataspecialmeetingremoveanydirectorordirectorsfromoffice.Shareholdersfillingvacancy111(4)Thearticlesmayprovidethatavacancyamongthedirectorsshallonlybefilledbyavoteoftheshareholders,orbyavoteoftheholdersofanyclassorseriesofshareshavinganexclusiverighttoelectoneormoredirectorsifthevacancyoccursamongthedirectorselectedbythatclassorseries.Delegation115(1)DirectorsofacorporationmayappointfromtheirnumberamanagingdirectorwhoisaresidentCanadianoracommitteeofdirectorsanddelegatetosuchmanagingdirectororcommitteeanyofthepowersofthedirectors.Limitsonauthority(3)Notwithstandingsubsection(1),nomanagingdirectorandnocommitteeofdirectorshasauthorityto(a)submittotheshareholdersanyquestionormatterrequiringtheapprovaloftheshareholders;(b)fillavacancyamongthedirectorsorintheofficeofauditor,orappointadditionaldirectors;(c)issuesecuritiesexceptasauthorizedbythedirectors;(c.1)issuesharesofaseriesundersection27exceptasauthorizedbythedirectors;(d)declaredividends;(e)purchase,redeemorotherwiseacquiresharesissuedbythecorporation;(f)payacommissionreferredtoinsection41exceptasauthorizedbythedirectors;(g)approveamanagementproxycircularreferredtoinPartXIII;(h)approveatake-overbidcircularordirectors’circularreferredtoinPartXVII;(i)approveanyfinancialstatementsreferredtoinsection155;or(j)adopt,amendorrepealby-laws.Officers121Subjecttothearticles,theby-lawsoranyunanimousshareholderagreement,(a)thedirectorsmaydesignatetheofficesofthecorporation,appointasofficerspersonsoffullcapacity,specifytheirdutiesanddelegatetothempowerstomanagethebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation,exceptpowerstodoanythingreferredtoinsubsection115(3);(b)adirectormaybeappointedtoanyofficeofthecorporation;and(c)twoormoreofficesofthecorporationmaybeheldbythesameperson.Indemnification124(1)Acorporationmayindemnifyadirectororofficerofthecorporation,aformerdirectororofficerofthecorporationoranotherindividualwhoactsoractedatthecorporation’srequestasadirectoror
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officer,oranindividualactinginasimilarcapacity,ofanotherentity,againstallcosts,chargesandexpenses,includinganamountpaidtosettleanactionorsatisfyajudgment,reasonablyincurredbytheindividualinrespectofanycivil,criminal,administrative,investigativeorotherproceedinginwhichtheindividualisinvolvedbecauseofthatassociationwiththecorporationorotherentity.Advanceofcosts(2)Acorporationmayadvancemoneystoadirector,officerorotherindividualforthecosts,chargesandexpensesofaproceedingreferredtoinsubsection(1).Theindividualshallrepaythemoneysiftheindividualdoesnotfulfiltheconditionsofsubsection(3).Limitation(3)Acorporationmaynotindemnifyanindividualundersubsection(1)unlesstheindividual(a)actedhonestlyandingoodfaithwithaviewtothebestinterestsofthecorporation,or,asthecasemaybe,tothebestinterestsoftheotherentityforwhichtheindividualactedasdirectororofficerorinasimilarcapacityatthecorporation’srequest;and(b)inthecaseofacriminaloradministrativeactionorproceedingthatisenforcedbyamonetarypenalty,theindividualhadreasonablegroundsforbelievingthattheindividual’sconductwaslawful.Indemnificationinderivativeactions(4)Acorporationmaywiththeapprovalofacourt,indemnifyanindividualreferredtoinsubsection(1),oradvancemoneysundersubsection(2),inrespectofanactionbyoronbehalfofthecorporationorotherentitytoprocureajudgmentinitsfavour,towhichtheindividualismadeapartybecauseoftheindividual’sassociationwiththecorporationorotherentityasdescribedinsubsection(1)againstallcosts,chargesandexpensesreasonablyincurredbytheindividualinconnectionwithsuchaction,iftheindividualfulfilstheconditionssetoutinsubsection(3).Righttoindemnity(5)Despitesubsection(1),anindividualreferredtointhatsubsectionisentitledtoindemnityfromthecorporationinrespectofallcosts,chargesandexpensesreasonablyincurredbytheindividualinconnectionwiththedefenceofanycivil,criminal,administrative,investigativeorotherproceedingtowhichtheindividualissubjectbecauseoftheindividual’sassociationwiththecorporationorotherentityasdescribedinsubsection(1),iftheindividualseekingindemnity(a)wasnotjudgedbythecourtorothercompetentauthoritytohavecommittedanyfaultoromittedtodoanythingthattheindividualoughttohavedone;and(b)fulfilstheconditionssetoutinsubsection(3).Insurance(6)Acorporationmaypurchaseandmaintaininsuranceforthebenefitofanindividualreferredtoinsubsection(1)againstanyliabilityincurredbytheindividual(a)intheindividual’scapacityasadirectororofficerofthecorporation;or(b)intheindividual’scapacityasadirectororofficer,orsimilarcapacity,ofanotherentity,iftheindividualactsoractedinthatcapacityatthecorporation’srequest.Applicationtocourt(7)Acorporation,anindividualoranentityreferredtoinsubsection(1)mayapplytoacourtforanorderapprovinganindemnityunderthissectionandthecourtmaysoorderandmakeanyfurtherorderthatitseesfit.NoticetoDirector(8)Anapplicantundersubsection(7)shallgivetheDirectornoticeoftheapplicationandtheDirectorisentitledtoappearandbeheardinpersonorbycounsel.
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Othernotice(9)Onanapplicationundersubsection(7)thecourtmayordernoticetobegiventoanyinterestedpersonandthepersonisentitledtoappearandbeheardinpersonorbycounsel.Remuneration125Subjecttothearticles,theby-lawsoranyunanimousshareholderagreement,thedirectorsofacorporationmayfixtheremunerationofthedirectors,officersandemployeesofthecorporation.QuébecBusinessCorporationsActBOARDOFDIRECTORS106.Theboardofdirectorsofacorporationiscomposedofoneormoredirectors.Ifthecorporationisareportingissuer,theboardofdirectorsiscomposedofnotfewerthanthreedirectors,atleasttwoofwhommustnotbeofficersoremployeesofthecorporationoranaffiliateofthecorporation.107.Thetermofofficeofthefirstdirectorsofacorporationdesignatedbythefoundersinthelistofdirectorsorintheinitialdeclarationfiledwiththearticlesofconstitutionbeginsonthedatethecorporationisconstitutedandendsatthecloseofthefirstshareholdersmeeting.108.Anynaturalpersonmaybeadirectorofacorporation,exceptpersonsdisqualifiedfortheofficeofdirectorundertheCivilCodeorpersonsdeclaredincapablebydecisionofacourtofanotherjurisdiction. 110.Thedirectorsareelectedbytheshareholders,inthemannerandfortheterm,notexceedingthreeyears,setoutintheby-laws.Itisnotnecessarythatallthedirectorselectedholdofficeforthesameterm.Adirectornotelectedforanexpresslystatedtermceasestoholdofficeatthecloseofthefirstannualshareholdersmeetingfollowingthedirector’selection.Ifcircumstancespreventashareholdersmeetingfromelectingthefixednumberorminimumnumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticles,thedirectorselectedatthatmeetingmayexerciseallthepowersofthedirectorsifthenumberofdirectorssoelectedconstitutesaquorum.111.Thearticlesmayprovideforcumulativevotingfortheelectionofdirectors.Insuchacase,theshareholdersarecalledupontoelectafixednumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticles,andeachelectorhastherighttocastanumberofvotesequaltothenumberofvotesattachedtothesharesheldbytheshareholdermultipliedbythenumberofdirectorstobeelected,andmaycastallofthosevotesinfavourofonecandidateordistributethemamongthecandidatesinanymanner.Thefollowingrulesapplytocumulativevoting:(1)aseparatevoteoftheshareholdersistobetakenwithrespecttoeachcandidateunlessaresolutionispassedunanimouslypermittingtwoormorepersonstobeelectedbyasingleresolution;(2)ifashareholderhasvotedformorethanonecandidatewithoutspecifyingthedistributionofvotes,theshareholderisdeemedtohavedistributedthevotesequallyamongthosecandidates;(3)ifthenumberofcandidatesexceedsthenumberofpositionstobefilled,thecandidateswhoreceivethelowestnumberofvotesareeliminateduntilthenumberofcandidatesremainingequalsthenumberofpositionstobefilled;(4)eachdirectorceasestoholdofficeatthecloseofthefirstannualshareholdersmeetingfollowingthedirector’selection;and(5)adirectormayberemovedfromofficeorthenumberofdirectorsmaybedecreasedonlyifthenumberofvotescastinfavouroftheremovalorthedecreaseisgreaterthantheproductofthenumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticlesandthenumberofvotescastagainsttheremovalorthedecrease.FUNCTIONSANDPOWERSOFBOARDOFDIRECTORS
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112.Subjecttoaunanimousshareholderagreement,theboardofdirectorsexercisesallthepowersnecessarytomanage,orsupervisethemanagementof,thebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation.Excepttotheextentprovidedbylaw,suchpowersmaybeexercisedwithoutshareholderapprovalandmaybedelegatedtoadirector,anofficeroroneormorecommitteesoftheboard.113.Unlessotherwiseprovidedinthearticlesorinaunanimousshareholderagreement,theboardofdirectorsadoptsthecorporation’sby-laws.Theby-lawsareeffectiveasofthedateoftheresolutionoftheboard.Theby-lawsmustbesubmittedtotheshareholdersforapprovalatthenextshareholdersmeeting,andtheshareholdersmay,byordinaryresolution,ratify,rejectoramendthem.Theyceasetobeeffectiveatthecloseofthemeetingiftheyarerejectedbyornotsubmittedtotheshareholders.However,by-lawamendmentsrelatingtoproceduralmatterswithrespecttoshareholdersmeetingstakeeffectonlyoncetheyhavereceivedshareholderapproval.Aby-lawadoptedbytheshareholdersonashareholderproposalsubmittedinaccordancewithsubdivision6ofDivisionIofChapterVIIiseffectiveasofitsadoptionandrequiresnootherapproval.Itmayonlyberepealedwiththeapprovaloftheshareholders.Therulesofthissectionapply,withthenecessarymodificationsandsubjecttotheby-laws,totheamendmentorrepealofby-laws.116.Unlessotherwiseprovidedintheby-lawsorinaunanimousshareholderagreement,theboardofdirectorsmaydesignatetheofficesofthecorporation,appointdirectorsorotherpersonsasofficersandspecifytheirfunctions.Theofficersaremandatariesofthecorporation.Theboardofdirectorsmaycreateoneormorecommitteesmadeupofdirectors.117.Unlessotherwiseprovidedintheby-lawsorinaunanimousshareholderagreement,theboardofdirectorsdeterminestheremunerationofthecorporation’sdirectorsandofficers.118.Theboardofdirectorsmaynotdelegateitspower(1)tosubmittotheshareholdersanyquestionormatterrequiringtheirapproval;(2)tofillavacancyamongthedirectorsorintheofficeofauditorortoappointadditionaldirectors;(3)toappointthepresidentofthecorporation,thechairoftheboardofdirectors,thechiefexecutiveofficer,thechiefoperatingofficerorthechieffinancialofficerregardlessoftheirtitle,andtodeterminetheirremuneration;(4)toauthorizetheissueofshares;(5)toapprovethetransferofunpaidshares;(6)todeclaredividends;(7)toacquire,includingbypurchase,redemptionorexchange,sharesissuedbythecorporation;(8)tosplit,consolidateorconvertshares;(9)toauthorizethepaymentofacommissiontoapersonwhopurchasessharesorothersecuritiesofthecorporation,orprocuresoragreestoprocurepurchasersforthosesharesorsecurities;(10)toapprovethefinancialstatementspresentedattheannualmeetingsofshareholders;(11)toadopt,amendorrepealby-laws;(12)toauthorizecallsforpayment;(13)toauthorizetheconfiscationofshares;(14)toapproveanamendmenttothearticlesallowingaclassofunissuedsharestobedividedintoseries,andtodeterminethedesignationofandtherightsandrestrictionsattachingtothoseshares;or(15)toapproveashort-formamalgamation.CESSATIONOFOFFICEANDVACANCYONBOARDOFDIRECTORS144.Unlessthearticlesprovideforcumulativevoting,theshareholdersmaybyordinaryresolutionataspecialmeetingremoveanydirectorordirectors.
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Ifcertainshareholdershaveanexclusiverighttoelectoneormoredirectors,adirectorsoelectedmayonlyberemovedbyordinaryresolutionofthoseshareholders.Avacancycreatedbytheremovalofadirectormaybefilledattheshareholdersmeetingatwhichthedirectorisremovedor,ifitisnot,atasubsequentmeetingoftheboardofdirectors.147.Unlessotherwiseprovidedinthearticles,iftheholdersofanyclassorseriesofshareshaveanexclusiverighttoelectoneormoredirectorsandavacancyoccursamongthosedirectors,thevacancymaybefilledbytheremainingdirectorselectedbytheholdersofthatclassorseriesofsharesor,iftherearenosuchremainingdirectors,bytheholdersofthatclassorseriesofsharesbyordinaryresolutionataspecialmeetingtheycallforthatpurpose.148.Thearticlesmayprovidethatavacancyontheboardofdirectorsmayonlybefilledbyavoteoftheshareholdersentitledtovote,orbyavoteoftheholdersofaclassorseriesofshareshavinganexclusiverighttodoso.INDEMNIFICATIONANDLIABILITYINSURANCE159.Subjecttosection160,acorporationmustindemnifyadirectororofficerofthecorporation,aformerdirectororofficerofthecorporation,amandatary,oranyotherpersonwhoactsoractedatthecorporation’srequestasadirectororofficerofanothergroupagainstallcosts,chargesandexpensesreasonablyincurredintheexerciseoftheirfunctions,includinganamountpaidtosettleanactionorsatisfyajudgment,orarisingfromanyinvestigativeorotherproceedinginwhichthepersonisinvolvedif(1)thepersonactedwithhonestyandloyaltyintheinterestofthecorporationor,asthecasemaybe,intheinterestoftheothergroupforwhichthepersonactedasdirectororofficerorinasimilarcapacityatthecorporation’srequest;and(2)inthecaseofaproceedingthatisenforcedbyamonetarypenalty,thepersonhadreasonablegroundsforbelievingthathisorherconductwaslawful.Thecorporationmustalsoadvancemoneystosuchapersonforthecosts,chargesandexpensesofaproceedingreferredtointhefirstparagraph.160.Intheeventthatacourtoranyothercompetentauthorityjudgesthattheconditionssetoutinsubparagraphs1and2ofthefirstparagraphofsection159arenotfulfilled,thecorporationmaynotindemnifythepersonandthepersonmustrepaytothecorporationanymoneysadvancedunderthatsection.Furthermore,thecorporationmaynotindemnifyapersonreferredtoinsection159ifthecourtdeterminesthatthepersonhascommittedanintentionalorgrossfault.Insuchacase,thepersonmustrepaytothecorporationanymoneysadvanced.161.Acorporationmay,withtheapprovalofthecourt,inrespectofanactionbyoronbehalfofthecorporationorothergroupreferredtoinsection159,againstapersonreferredtointhatsection,advancethenecessarymoniestothepersonorindemnifythepersonagainstallcosts,chargesandexpensesreasonablyincurredbythepersoninconnectionwiththeaction,ifthepersonfulfillstheconditionssetoutinthatsection.162.Acorporationmaypurchaseandmaintaininsuranceforthebenefitofitsdirectors,officersandothermandatariesagainstanyliabilitytheymayincurassuchorintheircapacityasdirectors,officersormandatariesofanothergroup,iftheyactoractedinthatcapacityatthecorporation’srequest.ANNUALSHAREHOLDERSMEETING198.Ashareholderproposalmayincludenominationsfortheelectionofdirectorsiftheproposalissignedbyoneormoreholdersofsharesrepresentingnotlessthan5%ofthesharesor5%ofthesharesof
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aclassofsharesofthecorporationthatcarrytherighttovoteattheshareholdersmeetingtowhichtheproposalistobepresented.Thissectiondoesnotprecludeothernominationsatthemeeting.CivilCodeofQuébec327.Minors,personsoffullageundertutorshiporcuratorship,bankruptsandpersonsprohibitedbythecourtfromholdingsuchofficearedisqualifiedforofficeasdirectors.However,minorsandpersonsoffullageundertutorshipmaybedirectorsofassociationsconstitutedaslegalpersonsthatdonotaimtomakepecuniaryprofitsandwhoseobjectsconcernthem.328.Theactsofadirectororseniorofficermaynotbeannulledonthesolegroundthathewasdisqualifiedorthathisdesignationwasirregular.àTheroleofmanagementàAssumingmanagementpositionsàManagementcompensation1)TheRoleofManagement
• Management=directorsandofficerswhooccupyboardcreatedoffices.• Wehavetraditionallybeenalmostexclusivelyfocusedontheroleofdirectors.• But,mostpracticalpowerovercorporationsisactuallywieldedbyprofessionalmanagers
(officers).Theyhavegainedalotofcontrolovertheboardofdirectors.• Directorprimacytheory(Bainbridge,UCLA)
o Ideathatdirectorsoccupythemostpowerfulrole.• Managerialprimacytheory
o Ideathatprofessionalmanagersarethebestonestooccupythemostpowerfulrole.• UndertheCBCAandQBCA,directorsaretheoneswhoarethelocusandpinnacleofmanagement
control.o Section102CBCA–directorsshallsupervisethemanagementofthebusinessandaffairs
ofthecorporation.o Section112QBCA,basicallysaysthesamething,directorsincharge.o Really,nomentionofofficersorshareholders.o So,directorsenjoyprimacybasedonthelegislation–theyhaveultimatecontroloverthe
affairsofthecorporationandtheywieldthatcontroloverotherparties.Broadestandsuperiorauthority.
• Managersenjoymanagerialpoweroverthecorporationthroughtheirofficesthathavebeencreatedbytheboardandpowersaredelegatedtotheseoffices/officers.
o Managersthereforeenjoyday-to-daypoweroverthecorporation.o CBCA121(a),QBCA112,116o CBCA115(3)–therearelimitstowhattheboardcandelegateawaytoofficers.Boardmust
retaincertainpowers.o QBCA118–similarrestrictionsondelegationofpower.
§ Differentones:• Mustretainpowertoapproveornotapprovetransferofunpaidshares.• Mustretainpowertohire,fire,setremunerationofseniorofficialswithin
corporation(president,chair,CEO,COO,CFO).o Boardmustretainpowertosuperviseofficers,makesuretheyareexercisingtheir
delegatedpowerswell.
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• Traditionalunderstandingofcorporategovernanceo Acorporationistraditionallyunderstoodtobemanagedforthebenefitofshareholders
alone,anditismanagedbydirectorswhoareputtherebyshareholdersandareresponsivetoshareholders.
o Directorselectedbyshareholderstooverseeoperations,hireprofessionalmanagers.o Coreproblem:emergenceofaseparationofownershipinterestsandcontrollinginterests.
§ Groupsofindividualsorganizedintoanykindofassociationhavethreefunctionstheyhavetoperform:
• Thosewhoinvestcapitalandget,inexchangeforinvestment,proprietaryinterest(ownershipinterests/stake)intheinterests
• Thosewhohavepowerovertheorganizationwhosetstrategicobjectives• Thosewhoact,whoenableittoachieveitsobjectives,withoutbeingthose
whoactuallysetthoseobjectives(e.g.employees).• Previously,corporationsweresmall,runbythosewhowerepersonallyacquaintedwithone
another,andfunctionstendedtobeunifiedwithinthissmallgroupwhohadpersonaltieswithoneanother.
• Then,cametoseeownershipandlegalcontroloverthecorporationasconcentratedintheowners.Thosethencarryingoutthebusinesswereemployees.
• 20thcentury,begantoseesomethingdifferenthappening.Inlargerindustrialcorporations,powerandproprietaryinterestsbecameseparated.Happenedasmembersofpublicbecameinterestedininvestingsmallamountsofcapitalincorporations.
o Thesecorporationsbecamewidelyheld,shareswerewidelydispersed.o Inthesecorporations,shareholderswerelosingallpracticalpoweroverthese
corporations.Theybecamepassiveinvestors.Thisisstillhowwethinkaboutshareholderstoday–theyarepassive,notactiveowners.
• Thisdivergenceandseparationofownersandcontrolwasreinforcedandenabledbymodernstatutesofincorporation.
o Directorsgivenprimarypowerovercorporationbutthereisnoobligationforthemtoinvestanycapital.Theydon’thavetohaveanownershipstakeinthecorporation.
o Shareholderscontributecapitalandhaveexpectationofreturninappreciationofshares,theyownthecorporationinthatsense,buttheyhavenocontroloverhowtheaffairsofthecorporationaremanaged.Onlyindirectcontrolthroughrighttovote.
• Thisisnormallyseentobeaproblem,butitisnotinvariablyso…• But,itcanbeaproblembecauseoftheinherentself-interestofindividuals–willagentsreallybut
theinterestsofshareholdersfirst?Onlywaytoavoidthisproblemisforownerstogetcontrolofthecorporationback.
o But,thereareeconomicbenefitstohiringagentstodothegoverningofcorporations.Therearealso,however,agencycoststhatcomewiththisdecisionandtheyareinherent.
o Ifyoucan’teliminatethesecosts,perhapsyoucanmakethemmorebearable…• Thisstoryhasbeensubsequentlywrinkledbythefactthatsincethistheorywasarticulatedby
BurlandMeen(1930s),professionalmanagers(officers)havecometobetheonestoexerciserealmanagerialpoweroverthecorporation.
2)Directors:MythandReality
• Theideaofdirectorprimacyisreallyjustamyth.• Generally,boardsofdirectorsoflarge/mediumcorporationsdon’tactuallysetobjectives,
strategies,andpolicies(whichiswhatthey’resupposedtodo).That’sgenerallylefttomanagement(officers).
o Boardssimplytendtoapprovedecisionsmadebymanagement,usuallybasedonscantevidence.Boardsaregenerallynotcapabletoengageinlong-termstrategicplanning–lackexpertise,don’thavetimeinbetweenoratboardmeetings,
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• Boardsclassicallythoughttoaskdiscerningquestions–doesn’treallyhappen.o Boardsnotseenasintendedtobedebatingsocieties.
• BoardsrarelyrejectchoiceofPresident,usuallysuggestedbyoutgoingPresident.• àThereisamajorpolicyconcernaboutwhatthismeans…
o Ifdirectorsarenotincontrol,notactinginbehalfofshareholders,thennooneisdoinganythingotherthantheself-perpetuatinggroupofprofessionalmanagers.
o Particularlypressingwhenyouthinkthatdirectorsarehandpickedbytheprofessionalmanagers.
o So,reallyprofessionalmanagershaveamassiveroleofpower–theycontroltheleversofpowerwithinthecorporation.
o Mostpeoplepointthefingeratshareholderpassivityasthesourceoftheproblem.Wehaveencouragedshareholderstobecomepassiveandnotgiventhemtheincentivetobecomemoreactive.
§ But,isn’tthisreallyjustinevitable?3)ControlsonManagement
• Controlfrommanagerialmarket–allprofessionalmanagershaveamarkettheyhavetorespondtofortheirskill.
o Ifyou’rereasonableresponsibletopersonalreputation,youwon’twanttodevelopareputationofincompetencebecauseyourownpersonalchancesinthemanagerialmarketwillbe
o Somethoughsaythatthismarketismute–can’tandwon’trespondunlessbehaviourparticularlyegregioustoattractpublicattention.
• Shareholderbehaviour–eveniftheydon’texertlegalpowerovercorporation,theycanasagroupexercisemarketdisciplinethroughtheirbehaviourswithinthatmarket.
o Willgetsignalfrommarketthatsomethingiswrong,willinfluencebehaviour.Iftheywillseetheirinvestmentssufferingtheywillwanttodosomethingaboutit.Mayactonthelegalcontrolstheyhave,makedirectorsandofficersrespondtothem.
o Canvotewiththeirfeet–canselltheirshares.• Corporateraiders–peoplelookingforunderperformingcompaniestoturnthemaroundand
yieldaprofit.Prospectofahostiletakeoveristhereforeasignificantmarketcontrolforshittymanagers.Theywilllosetheirpowerinahostiletakeoverbecausetheywillbefired.Wouldalsohaveimpactonprofessionalreputation.
4)AssumingManagementPositions
• Electionsandappointmentso Initialappointment–CBCA106(1)and(2),QBCA107o Subsequentelections–CBCA106(3)andQBCA110o Termlimits–CBCA106(3)(4)(5)andQBCA110
§ ThreeyearsisdefaultinQBCA§ OneyearisdefaultinCBCA
o Nomination–CBCA137(4),QBCA198§ Whocontrolswhoisontheslateforelections
o Classvoting–CBCA111(3)(4),QBCA147-148§ Directorsmaybeelectedtoservepositionsthatareassignedtoparticularclasses
ofsharesiftheconstitutionsetsoutclassesofshares.o Cumulativevoting–CBCA107,QBCA111
§ Notoftenused,cumulativevotingmaybeprovidedforinarticlesofcorporation.§ Allowsminorityshareholdersgreateropportunitytohavegreaterpossibilityof
havingtheirpreferredpersonelectedtotheboardofdirectors.
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§ Eachvoteattachedtoasharemultipliedbythenumberofpositionsopenforvote.§ Allowsthemtoconcentratevotesintoasinglecandidate.§ Evenwiththisprovision,stillprettydifficulttousesuccessfully.
o Casualvacancies–CBCA111,QBCA153§ Whendirectorsnotabletoservefullterm,casualvacancy,boardwillwanttohave
filled.§ Boarditselfcanfillthesevacancies,canappointsomeoneasstand-in/temporary
boardmember.o Removal–CBCA109,QBCA144
§ Directorscanberemovedthewaytheyarevotedin–byordinaryresolution.• Defectsinqualificationsofappointed/electeddirectors
o Youwouldthinktheactionsofapersonwhodoesn’tmeetthequalificationsshouldbeseenasinvalid…Notthecase.
§ CBCA18(d)and116• 18(d)–can’tassertthattheactionsofadirectorwhohasbeenheldoutasa
directorbutwhodoesnothavetherightqualificationsarenotbinding.• 116–actsarevalidnotwithstandingirregularityinelection/appointment
orproblemswithqualificationsofdirector.• àHowfarcanthisgo…?SeeMorrisv.KanssenandOliverv.Elliott.
§ QBCA13(3)andCCQ328Morrisv.Kanssen(1946,HoL)
• Acurativeprovisionlikes.116CBCAhasbroadeffectsbutitdoeshavelimitations.• Canbecalledupononlytocuretheactsofindividualswhoseappointmenthastechnicallybeen
defective,hasassumedofficeandcarriedoutactionswithsomeappearance/colourofright.• Roguedirectorimproperlyappointedtogetridofotherdirector.Courtdidn’tapplycurative
provisionbecausetherewerenoactsundertaken.Oliverv.Elliott(1960,ABSC)
• Acurativeprovisionlikes.116CBCAhasbroadeffectsbutitdoeshavelimitations.• Curativeprovisionappliestocureactsofdirectorsupuntilthepointthedefectwasrealized.But,
itdoesnotcuretheirappointments.Can’tbeconsideredtobeholdingagoodappointmentgoingforward.
5)ManagementCompensation
• Becameabigdebateinwakeof2008recession.• Thoughtthatbigsalariesàcorporategreed+shorttermperformance+riskydecisions• Itisn’ttruethatthereisacorrelationbetweenhighercorporatepayandbetterperformance.
o Thisisbecausecorporateofficershavecontrolofleversofpowerandsotheycanjustpaythemselvesmore.
o Solutions?§ Increaseshareholderpower,givethemmeaningfulcontroloverboardsof
directors,andthenboardswouldbeincentivizedtoclampdownonofficers.o BecameclearthattherewasaneedforreforminDC.
§ Proposedthatshareholdersshouldbegivennon-bindingvotere:executivecompensation(“sayonpay”).
§ Officersshouldberequiredtoholdsharestheyreceiveincompensationforaspecified,longerterm.
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• Iftheycouldholdthemonlyforashortterm,officerswouldmakeshort-term,riskydecisionswhichwouldyieldhighprofitsnow,theycouldsellsharesshort-term,makeabuck.
§ Executivesshouldn’tbeintheroomwheresalariesareo DoddFrankBill
§ Getnon-bindingshareholdervoteonceeverythreeyears§ Annualdisclosuremustbemadetoshareholders,explaininglinkbetween
compensationpackagesandcorporateperformance.§ Processwherebyfederalgovernmentwouldoverseecompensationpractices.
• Canadao Didn’thaveanyofthisupset/agitationinCanada.o CBCA125,QBCA117
§ Subjecttoprovisionstatingotherwiseinarticles/unanimousshareholderagreement.
§ Haven’tgoneasfarasUSwiththe“sayonpay”rule.
B)THEOBLIGATIONSOFMANAGEMENTi.TheDutyofCareCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,s.122(1)(b)QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,s.119CCQ,arts.322&1457CanadaBusinessCorporationsActDutyofcareofdirectorsandofficers122(1)Everydirectorandofficerofacorporationinexercisingtheirpowersanddischargingtheirdutiesshall(…)(b)exercisethecare,diligenceandskillthatareasonablyprudentpersonwouldexerciseincomparablecircumstances.QuébecBusinessCorporationsActDUTIESOFDIRECTORSANDOFFICERS119.Subjecttothisdivision,thedirectorsareboundbythesameobligationsasareimposedbytheCivilCodeonanydirectorofalegalperson.Consequently,intheexerciseoftheirfunctions,thedirectorsareduty-boundtowardthecorporationtoactwithprudenceanddiligence,honestyandloyaltyandintheinterestofthecorporation.Intheircapacityasmandatariesofthecorporation,theofficersarebound,amongotherthings,bythesameobligationsasareimposedonthedirectorsunderthesecondparagraph.CivilCodeofQuébec322.Adirectorshallactwithprudenceanddiligence.Heshallalsoactwithhonestyandloyaltyintheinterestofthelegalperson.1457.Everypersonhasadutytoabidebytherulesofconductincumbentonhim,accordingtothecircumstances,usageorlaw,soasnottocauseinjurytoanother.
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Whereheisendowedwithreasonandfailsinthisduty,heisliableforanyinjuryhecausestoanotherbysuchfaultandisboundtomakereparationfortheinjury,whetheritbebodily,moralormaterialinnature.Heisalsobound,incertaincases,tomakereparationforinjurycausedtoanotherbytheactorfaultofanotherpersonorbytheactofthingsinhiscustody.Summary
• Evolutionofdutyofcare,fromCMLtoCBCAo Hasbeenmarkedbygreatinconsistency–seemstoreflectunsettledviewaboutwhatwe
oughttomakeofthedutyofcare,whetheritsjustificationissolid.• Amandatorydutyofcarehaslongbeenrecognizedasbeingimportantincorporatelaw.
o But,it’snotalwaysbeentakenveryseriously.• CMLsettledonnon-existentstandardorlowstandard(basically,grossnegligence).• Overtime,policymakersandlawyersbegantoquestionwisdomofCMLapproach,whichwas
informedbyjudicialattitudeofdeferencetowardbusiness(businessjudgmentrule).Cametoquestionthisview.
• InPeoples,courtsaidthatCBCAprovisionsondutyofcarewereenactedtoraisethestandardsofthedutyofcare.InCanada,thestandardisobjectivebuthasacontextualelement.Assessobjectivelyavailableevidencere:circumstances.
• YellowflaginPeoplesre:whattomakeofbusinessjudgmentrule?FirsttimethatSCCacknowledgedbusinessjudgmentrule,butnotclearwhatitamountstoandhowitimpactsdutyofcare/corporatenegligence.WorrythatbusinessjudgmentrulemightunderminedutyofcarebecausethisiswhathappenedintheUS.Businessjudgmentrulemeantthatthedutyofcarewasloweredtogrossnegligencestandardwhichmadeitessentiallynon-existentandwouldtakeusbacktotheearlyoriginaldaysoftheCML.
• But,perhapsweshouldjustleaveriskcalibrationtothemarkets?Perspectivethatit’snotpossibletosetoutastandardofcaresoweshoulddoawaywithit.
• Seemsthatweasasocietythinkthere’ssomethingtothisduty–hasanimportantexpressivefunction.Admonishesdirectors/officerstotakecare.
• Wetendtothinkaboutnegligenceintermsoftortlawandcarelessness/inattentivenesstorisk.• But,whatwe’reconcernedaboutwithnegligenceclaimsagainstdirectorsandofficers(whichare
prettyrare–usuallybroughtunderdutyofloyalty),areallegationsofshirking–thisisonecategoryofagencycosts.Whenyouhireanagentanddelegatepower,shemakenottakeherobligationstoactonyourbehalfseriouslyifyou’renotwatchingcarefully.
o Examplesofshirkingfordirectors:§ Failuretoattendboardmeetings,failtoreviewdocuments(notproperlyinformed
atmeeting),failtoengageinmeaningfulthinking/discussionofmattersbeforetheboard.
o Examplesofshirkingforofficers:§ Failuretocapitalizeonbusinessopportunitiesbecausetoobusydoingsomething
else,failuretoengageinproperoversightofemployees,failuretoimplementbusinessstrategies/priorities.
• Policymakersandlawyershaverecognizedthatthecorporationissubjecttoriskofinjuryforwantofcarebydirectors/officers.So,thereisalegaldutyofcare.
o Wasfirstondirectors,andwithinlast30-40yearsthedutyofcarehasbeenextendedtoofficers.
• Thedutyofcareincorporatelawisnotlikethedutyofcareintortlaw.Notjustanextensionofwhatweseeintortlaw.
• (1)OriginofDutyofCareinCorporateLawo InCML,emergedfromfieldoffiduciaryadministration–extendedfromtrustlaw.
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§ Directorsandofficershavesignificantcontroloverpropertythatisnottheirs–belongstocorporationasalegalperson/theshareholders.
§ So,onlymakessensetoextenddutyofcaretodirectorsbecausetheyoccupyasimilarroletotrustees.
o InCVL,seeart.322–mustactwithprudenceanddiligence.
• (2)ScopeofDutyofCareinCorporateLawo Scopeofdutyappliesonlytodirector’sactionswithintheirofficialcapacity.o So,firstdetermineifbehaviourfallswithinambitofperson’sofficialcapacity.
• (3)BeneficiaryofDutyofCareinCorporateLaw
o It’sacorporatelawobligationintendedtoconstrainbehaviourofdirectorsandofficersincapacityofmanagerialfunction,whichisundertakenforthebenefitofthecorporation.
o But,canalsostandtobenefitshareholders.o But,traditionalviewisthatlegalbeneficiaryisthecorporation,whichwouldthenhave
standingtosueforbreachofdutyofcarebydirectors/officers.o àThishaschangedinCanadasinceSCCdecisioninPeople’s.
• (4)TheStandardofCare
o Includes:diligence,care,skill.§ Differentfromtortlaw–here,careisoneofthreeelements.Alsolooktodiligence
andskill.o Havetoexercisepowerswellandforthebenefitofthecorporation.
§ Mustdothiswithareasonablelevelofskill§ Mustbereasonablydiligent/attentivetodutytoact
o Careelementrequiresforesightofharmtocorporationthatmightreasonablybeexpectedtoariseasaresultofacourseofconduct.Engageinriskcalculus.
o Skillelement–manyofficers/directorsarehiredpreciselybecauseoftheskillsettheyaresupposedtobringtothetable.Therefore,reasonabletoexpecttheseindividualstodemonstratereasonablelevelofskillinmakingtheirdecisions.
• (5)StandardofCareatCMLàStandardofCareunderCBCAo Wassoweakthatsomesaiditwasnon-existentorthatifitdidexist,itwasfrequently
violatedanditwasexceedinglydifficulttoattachliability.o Reflectedpostureofjudicialdeferencetoexpertiseofbusinesspeople.Judgesfeltbusiness
peoplewerefarmorecompetenttomakebusinessdecisionsthantheywereandthereforetherewasariskofhindsightbiasonthepartofjudges.
o Courtrefusedtooutlinestandardofcaresoitcametobeoneofgrossnegligence.o Viewshavesincechanged.
§ Standardofcarehasbeenelevated.§ So,whenCBCAwasenacted,wasanefforttoupgradethestandardofcare.
• DescribedinPeoples.§ Wasthissuccessful?
o RelevantprovisionisCBCA122(1)(b),QBCAis119.Soperv.Canada(1997,FCA)Facts
• Bankruptcorporationfailedtodeductandremitincometaxfromemployees.Canavoidliabilityifexercisedreasonablecare?
Issue• Whatdoesthestandardofcarerequireofadirector?
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Reasoning• Isthestandardofcaremeanttobeanobjectiveorsubjectivestandard?
o Saiditwasahybridobjective-subjectivestandard.• Howmuchattentiondoyouneedtoshowinexercisingyourduties?
o Totalpassivityandirresponsibilityisnotpermitted.o But,hedidn’treallysaymuchmorethanthat.
§ Totalattentionisn’trequiredeither…So,somewherebetweendoingeverythinganddoingnothing.
Notes• Mostcommentatorssaidthatwhilehesaiditwashybrid,itwasreallysubjectivebecauseofits
referencepoints.• Feltthisdidn’treallymovethebaralongbecauseitwasstillessentiallyalowbar,stillsubjective.• Itis,however,atpeacewiththeCMLandreflectedthepreviouslydominantwayofthinkingabout
adutyofcare.Wasaworryofexpectingtoomuchofdirectors/officers.Thoughtitmadesenseforthoseinvolvedwiththerunningofthecorporationtogovernthemselvesorallowthemarkettoregulatethem.Courttotakehandsoffapproachre:regulatingrisk.
• Also,wasseenatthetimeintheCMLthatstandardshouldbeflexibleandnotfixedbecauseunlikeotherfiduciaryduties,directorshaveaverydiversesetofskills–theydon’thaveaunifiedsetoftraining,etc…andthecorporationsforwhichthey’reworkingarewildlydifferent.
o So,becauseofvarietyofqualificationsandvarietyofwork,thensawithazardoustocomeupwithfixedfloor.Besttoleavetomarkettodeterminewhatlevelofriskisappropriate.
Peoplesv.Wise(SCC,2004)Facts
• WiseboughtPeoplesfromM&S,couldn’tdofullamalgamationuntilfullpaymentmade.But,triedtointegrateaspectsofbusinessesandthingsfailedspectacularly.Implementedjointstrategyre:procurementtotryandsolveproblem.
• Jointstrategywentsouuuuuth–didn’thelpmakethingsbetter,madethingsworse.• EventuallyM&SfiledbankruptcyproceedingsagainstPeoples.• TrusteesfilesuitagainstWisebrothersasdirectors/officersofPeoples,sayingthatjointstrategy
wasnegligentandfavouredtheinterestsofthebrothersattheexpenseoftheunsecuredcreditors.• ArguedthattheunsecuredcreditorsenjoyeddutyofcarefromWisebrothersasdirectorsof
Peoples.Issue
• DidWisebrothersasdirectorsofPeoplesoweadutyofcaretotheircreditors?No/yes• Ifso,didtheybreachit?No.
Reasoning• Isthereadutyofcaretocreditors?
o Noandyes.o SCCsaidcreditorscannotsuedirectors/officersdirectlyunderCBCAforbreachof
122(1)(a).Nodirectremedy.o But,breachofstatutorydutyofcaremayfoundclaimofextra-contractualliabilityunder
1457CCQbecausedutyofcarewasarticulatedopenlyre:whoenjoysit.o However,thismakesitsothatoutsideQuebecdoesthisapply?Nosimilargroundtoseek
recovery(no1457).So,narrowlyappliestoCBCAcorporationsthatoperateinsideQuebec.o NotethatQBCAdutyunder119isadutythatisowedonlytothecorporation.
• Standardofcareo StandardofcareatCMLwasverylow.o ConcludedthatdutyofcarereinforcedwhenCBCAenactedandnowmoredemanding.
Howdemandingisitnow?
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o Standardisnotsubjective.It’sobjectivewithacontextualelement–payattentiontothecontextbutitdoesnotimplysubjectivity.Lookatobjectiveinformationre:relevantcontextualfeaturesincontextthatdirector/officermadedecisions.
o Whatevidencedowelookat?Welookatthatrelatedtoprimaryfacts:§ Thosethatrelatetocourseofconductitself(impugneddecision).
• Whatwasthedecisionandwhatarethereasonsgivenforthedecisionatthetime?
§ Also,lookatprevailingsocio-economicconditionsbecausecorporationsoperatingwithinamarketcontext.
• Businessjudgmentruleo Whatimpactdoesbusinessjudgmentrulehaveonthestandardofcare?o It’sanattitudeofdeference–defertoofficers/directorswhomakedecisionsthattheyare
authorizedtomake.Willbemoreorlessunwillingtosecondguessdecisionsmakeinclimateofuncertaintysolongasdecisionwaswithinarangeofreasonablealternatives.
o CourtcitesONCAinMapleLeafFoods–thereisabusinessjudgmentruleinCanada:§ Lookstoseeifareasonable,notperfectdecision,wasmade.Courtoughtnotto
substituteopinionforthatofdecisionsofboardsolongasoneofreasonableoptions.
§ Notclear,however,whatthisreallymeans…• Causation
o Thereisacausationrequirementforcorporatelawdutyofcare.o Eveniftherewasdutyofcarehere,wouldbequestionableaboutcausation–somany
otherfactorswereatplaywhichcouldhavemadethejointpolicysuchaspectacularfailure.
• Defenseso Section123(5)CBCA–argumentthatWisebrothersreliedingoodfaithonexpertiseand
adviceofseniorofficerre:jointpolicy.o Courtsaidno–it’smeanttoprotectadvicegivenbymembersofregulatedprofession.That
wasn’tthecasehere–wasjustthathehadsomebusinesstraining/expertise.Notenoughtocomewithinthisdefence.
• (6)BusinessJudgmentRule
o Suggestionthatit’sjustaruleofdeferenceandthatit’sjustthecourtacknowledgingitsinstitutionalauthority.
o ItstemsfromtheUS–so,questionastowhetherCanadiancourtswillbeinfluencedbytheUSinterpretationofthisrule.
o IntheUS,it’smuchmorerobustthaninCanada–basically,onlygrossnegligencewillbegroundsforliabilitybecauseofextremedeferencetobusinessjudgmentrule.Meansthatdutyofloyaltyanddutyofcarehavebeensignificantlydenuded.
o Isthiswherewe’regoinginCanada?§ Millerdoes’ntthinkit’slikelybecauseitwouldn’tsquarewithwhatwassaidin
Peoples.§ Stillwaiting,however,forCanadiancourtstoclarifywhattheCanadianversionof
thebusinessjudgmentrulelookslike.
ii.TheDutyofLoyaltyCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.122(1)(a),120,122(3)&242(1)QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.119,122-133,120&440CCQ,arts.322-326
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CanadaBusinessCorporationsActDisclosureofinterest120(1)Adirectororanofficerofacorporationshalldisclosetothecorporation,inwritingorbyrequestingtohaveitenteredintheminutesofmeetingsofdirectorsorofmeetingsofcommitteesofdirectors,thenatureandextentofanyinterestthatheorshehasinamaterialcontractormaterialtransaction,whethermadeorproposed,withthecorporation,ifthedirectororofficer
o (a)isapartytothecontractortransaction;o (b)isadirectororanofficer,oranindividualactinginasimilarcapacity,ofapartytothe
contractortransaction;oro (c)hasamaterialinterestinapartytothecontractortransaction.
Timeofdisclosurefordirector(2)Thedisclosurerequiredbysubsection(1)shallbemade,inthecaseofadirector,
o (a)atthemeetingatwhichaproposedcontractortransactionisfirstconsidered;o (b)ifthedirectorwasnot,atthetimeofthemeetingreferredtoinparagraph(a),
interestedinaproposedcontractortransaction,atthefirstmeetingafterheorshebecomessointerested;
o (c)ifthedirectorbecomesinterestedafteracontractortransactionismade,atthefirstmeetingafterheorshebecomessointerested;or
o (d)ifanindividualwhoisinterestedinacontractortransactionlaterbecomesadirector,atthefirstmeetingafterheorshebecomesadirector.
• àBasically,ASAP.Timeofdisclosureforofficer(3)Thedisclosurerequiredbysubsection(1)shallbemade,inthecaseofanofficerwhoisnotadirector,
o (a)immediatelyafterheorshebecomesawarethatthecontract,transaction,proposedcontractorproposedtransactionistobeconsideredorhasbeenconsideredatameeting;
o (b)iftheofficerbecomesinterestedafteracontractortransactionismade,immediatelyafterheorshebecomessointerested;or
o (c)ifanindividualwhoisinterestedinacontractlaterbecomesanofficer,immediatelyafterheorshebecomesanofficer.
• àAgain,basicallyASAP.Timeofdisclosurefordirectororofficer(4)Ifamaterialcontractormaterialtransaction,whetherenteredintoorproposed,isonethat,intheordinarycourseofthecorporation’sbusiness,wouldnotrequireapprovalbythedirectorsorshareholders,adirectororofficershalldisclose,inwritingtothecorporationorrequesttohaveitenteredintheminutesofmeetingsofdirectorsorofmeetingsofcommitteesofdirectors,thenatureandextentofhisorherinterestimmediatelyafterheorshebecomesawareofthecontractortransaction.Voting(5)Adirectorrequiredtomakeadisclosureundersubsection(1)shallnotvoteonanyresolutiontoapprovethecontractortransactionunlessthecontractortransactionunlessthecontractortransaction
o (a)relatesprimarilytohisorherremunerationasadirector,officer,employee,agentormandataryofthecorporationoranaffiliate;
o (b)isforindemnityorinsuranceundersection124;oro (c)iswithanaffiliate.
Continuingdisclosure
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(6)Forthepurposesofthissection,ageneralnoticetothedirectorsdeclaringthatadirectororanofficeristoberegardedasinterested,foranyofthefollowingreasons,inacontractortransactionmadewithaparty,isasufficientdeclarationofinterestinrelationtothecontractortransaction:
o (a)thedirectororofficerisadirectororofficer,oractinginasimilarcapacity,ofapartyreferredtoinparagraph(1)(b)or(c);
o (b)thedirectororofficerhasamaterialinterestintheparty;oro (c)therehasbeenamaterialchangeinthenatureofthedirector’sortheofficer’sinterest
intheparty.Accesstodisclosures(6.1)Theshareholdersofthecorporationmayexaminetheportionsofanyminutesofmeetingsofdirectorsorofcommitteesofdirectorsthatcontaindisclosuresunderthissection,andanyotherdocumentsthatcontainthosedisclosures,duringtheusualbusinesshoursofthecorporation.Avoidancestandards(7)Acontractortransactionforwhichdisclosureisrequiredundersubsection(1)isnotinvalid,andthedirectororofficerisnotaccountabletothecorporationoritsshareholdersforanyprofitrealizedfromthecontractortransaction,becauseofthedirector’sorofficer’sinterestinthecontractortransactionorbecausethedirectorwaspresentorwascountedtodeterminewhetheraquorumexistedatthemeetingofdirectorsorcommitteeofdirectorsthatconsideredthecontractortransaction,if
o (a)disclosureoftheinterestwasmadeinaccordancewithsubsections(1)to(6);o (b)thedirectorsapprovedthecontractortransaction;ando (c)thecontractortransactionwasreasonableandfairtothecorporationwhenit
wasapproved.Confirmationbyshareholders(7.1)Eveniftheconditionsofsubsection(7)arenotmet,adirectororofficer,actinghonestlyandingoodfaith,isnotaccountabletothecorporationortoitsshareholdersforanyprofitrealizedfromacontractortransactionforwhichdisclosureisrequiredundersubsection(1),andthecontractortransactionisnotinvalidbyreasononlyoftheinterestofthedirectororofficerinthecontractortransaction,if
o (a)thecontractortransactionisapprovedorconfirmedbyspecialresolutionatameetingoftheshareholders;
o (b)disclosureoftheinterestwasmadetotheshareholdersinamannersufficienttoindicateitsnaturebeforethecontractortransactionwasapprovedorconfirmed;and
o (c)thecontractortransactionwasreasonableandfairtothecorporationwhenitwasapprovedorconfirmed.
Applicationtocourt(8)Ifadirectororanofficerofacorporationfailstocomplywiththissection,acourtmay,onapplicationofthecorporationoranyofitsshareholders,setasidethecontractortransactiononanytermsthatitthinksfit,orrequirethedirectororofficertoaccounttothecorporationforanyprofitorgainrealizedonit,ordoboththosethings.Dutyofcareofdirectorsandofficers122(1)Everydirectorandofficerofacorporationinexercisingtheirpowersanddischargingtheirdutiesshall(a)acthonestlyandingoodfaithwithaviewtothebestinterestsofthecorporation;andNoexculpation
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122(3)Subjecttosubsection146(5),noprovisioninacontract,thearticles,theby-lawsoraresolutionrelievesadirectororofficerfromthedutytoactinaccordancewiththisActortheregulationsorrelievesthemfromliabilityforabreachthereof.Evidenceofshareholderapprovalnotdecisive242(1)AnapplicationmadeoranactionbroughtorintervenedinunderthisPartshallnotbestayedordismissedbyreasononlythatitisshownthatanallegedbreachofarightordutyowedtothecorporationoritssubsidiaryhasbeenormaybeapprovedbytheshareholdersofsuchbodycorporate,butevidenceofapprovalbytheshareholdersmaybetakenintoaccountbythecourtinmakinganorderundersection214,240or241.QuebecBusinessCorporationsActDUTIESOFDIRECTORSANDOFFICERS119.Subjecttothisdivision,thedirectorsareboundbythesameobligationsasareimposedbytheCivilCodeonanydirectorofalegalperson.Consequently,intheexerciseoftheirfunctions,thedirectorsareduty-boundtowardthecorporationtoactwithprudenceanddiligence,honestyandloyaltyandintheinterestofthecorporation.Intheircapacityasmandatariesofthecorporation,theofficersarebound,amongotherthings,bythesameobligationsasareimposedonthedirectorsunderthesecondparagraph.120.Subjecttotheprovisionsofsection214,noprovisionofthearticles,theby-laws,aresolutionoracontractmayrelievedirectorsfromtheirobligations,orfromliabilityforabreachoftheirobligations.122.Adirectororofficerofacorporationmustdisclosethenatureandvalueofanyinterestheorshehasinacontractortransactiontowhichthecorporationisaparty.Forthepurposesofthissubdivision,“interest”meansanyfinancialstakeinacontractortransactionthatmayreasonablybeconsideredlikelytoinfluencedecision-making.Furthermore,aproposedcontractoraproposedtransaction,includingrelatednegotiations,isconsideredacontractortransaction.123.Adirectororanofficermustdiscloseanycontractortransactiontowhichthecorporationandanyofthefollowingareaparty:(1)anassociateofthedirectororofficer;(2)agroupofwhichthedirectororofficerisadirectororofficer;(3)agroupinwhichthedirectororofficeroranassociateofthedirectororofficerhasaninterest.Thedirectororofficersatisfiestherequirementifheorshediscloses,inacasespecifiedinsubparagraph2,thedirectorshiporofficeheldwithinthegroupor,inacasespecifiedinsubparagraph3,thenatureandvalueoftheinterestheorsheorhisorherassociatehasinthegroup.124.Unlessitisrecordedintheminutesofthefirstmeetingoftheboardofdirectorsatwhichthecontractortransactionisdiscussed,thedisclosureofaninterest,contractortransactionmustbemadeinwritingtotheboardofdirectorsassoonasthedirectorbecomesawareoftheinterest,contractortransaction.125.Inthecaseofanofficerwhoisnotadirector,thedisclosurerequiredbysections122and123mustbemadeassoonas(1)theofficerbecomesanofficer;(2)theofficerbecomesawarethatthecontractortransactionistobediscussedorhasbeendiscussedatameetingoftheboard;or(3)theofficerortheofficer’sassociateacquiresaninterestinthecontractortransaction,ifitwasenteredintoearlier.
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126.Thedisclosurerequiredbysections122and123mustbemadeeveninthecaseofacontractortransactionthatdoesnotrequireapprovalbytheboardofdirectors.127.Nodirectormayvoteonaresolutiontoapprove,amendorterminatethecontractortransactiondescribedinsection122or123orbepresentduringdeliberationsconcerningtheapproval,amendmentorterminationofsuchacontractortransactionunlessthecontractortransaction(1)relatesprimarilytotheremunerationofthedirectororanassociateofthedirectorasadirectorofthecorporationoranaffiliateofthecorporation;(2)relatesprimarilytotheremunerationofthedirectororanassociateofthedirectorasanofficer,employeeormandataryofthecorporationoranaffiliateofthecorporation,ifthecorporationisnotareportingissuer;(3)isforindemnityorliabilityinsuranceunderDivisionVII;or(4)iswithanaffiliateofthecorporation,andthesoleinterestofthedirectorisasadirectororofficeroftheaffiliate.128.Ifnoquorumexistsforthepurposeofvotingonaresolutiontoapproveacontractortransactiononlybecauseadirectorisnotpermittedbysection127tobepresentduringdeliberations,theotherdirectorspresentaredeemedtoconstituteaquorumforthepurposeofvotingontheresolution.129.Ifallthedirectorsarerequiredbysection127toabstainfromvoting,thecontractortransactionmaybeapprovedsolelybytheshareholdersentitledtovote,byordinaryresolution.Thedisclosurerequiredbysections122and123mustbemadetotheshareholdersinasufficientlyclearmannerbeforethecontractortransactionisapproved.130.Theshareholdersofacorporationmay,duringtheusualofficehoursofthecorporation,examinetheportionsofanyminutesofthemeetingsoftheboardofdirectorsorofanyotherdocumentthatcontaindisclosuresbydirectorsorofficersundersections122and123.131.Ifadirectororofficerfailstocomplywiththissubdivision,thecorporationorashareholdermayaskthecourttodeclarethecontractortransactionnullandtorequirethedirectororofficertoaccounttothecorporationforanyprofitorgainrealizedonitbythedirectororofficerortheassociatesofthedirectororofficer,andtoremittheprofitorgaintothecorporation,accordingtotheconditionsthecourtconsidersappropriate.132.Acontractortransactionforwhichadisclosurerequiredbysection122or123wasmademaynotbedeclarednullifthecontractortransactionwasapprovedbytheboardofdirectorsandthecontractortransactionwasintheinterestofthecorporationwhenitwasapproved.Normaythedirectororofficerconcerned,insuchacase,berequiredtoaccountforanyprofitorgainrealizedortoremittheprofitorgaintothecorporation.133.Despitethissubdivision,acontractortransactionmaynotbedeclarednullonlybecauseadirectororofficerdidnotmakethedisclosurerequiredbysections122and123,if(1)thecontractortransactionwasapprovedbyordinaryresolutionbytheshareholdersentitledtovotewhodonothaveaninterestinthecontractortransaction;(2)thedisclosurerequiredbysections122and123wasmadetotheshareholdersinasufficientlyclearmannerbeforethecontractortransactionwasapproved;and(3)thecontractortransactionwasinthebestinterestsofthecorporationwhenitwasapproved.Ifthedirectororofficeractedhonestlyandingoodfaith,heorshemaynotberequiredtoaccountfortheprofitorgainrealizedandtoremittheprofitorgaintothecorporation.440.Anapplicationmadeundersubdivision2or3maynotbedismissedonthesolegroundthatitisshownthatanallegedbreachofarightoforanobligationowedtoacorporationoritssubsidiaryhas
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beenormaybeapprovedbythecorporation’sshareholders,butevidenceofapprovalbytheshareholdersmaybetakenintoaccountbyacourtinmakingadecisionundereitherofthosesubdivisions.CivilCodeofQuebec322.Adirectorshallactwithprudenceanddiligence.Heshallalsoactwithhonestyandloyaltyintheinterestofthelegalperson.323.Nodirectormayminglethepropertyofthelegalpersonwithhisownpropertynormayheuseforhisownprofitorthatofathirdpersonanypropertyofthelegalpersonoranyinformationheobtainsbyreasonofhisduties,unlessheisauthorizedtodosobythemembersofthelegalperson.324.Adirectorshallavoidplacinghimselfinanysituationwherehispersonalinterestwouldbeinconflictwithhisobligationsasadirector.Adirectorshalldeclaretothelegalpersonanyinteresthehasinanenterpriseorassociationthatmayplacehiminasituationofconflictofinterestandofanyrighthemaysetupagainstit,indicatingtheirnatureandvalue,whereapplicable.Thedeclarationofinterestisrecordedintheminutesoftheproceedingsoftheboardofdirectorsortheequivalent.325.Adirectormay,evenincarryingonhisduties,acquire,directlyorindirectly,rightsinthepropertyunderhisadministrationorenterintocontractswiththelegalperson.Thedirectorshallimmediatelyinformthelegalpersonofanyacquisitionorcontractdescribedinthefirstparagraph,indicatingthenatureandvalueoftherightsheisacquiring,andrequestthatthefactberecordedintheminutesofproceedingsoftheboardofdirectorsortheequivalent.Heshallabstain,exceptifrequired,fromthediscussionandvotingonthequestion.Thisruledoesnot,however,applytomattersconcerningtheremunerationorconditionsofemploymentofthedirector.326.Wherethedirectorofalegalpersonfailstogiveinformationcorrectlyandimmediatelyofanacquisitionoracontract,thecourt,ontheapplicationofthelegalpersonoramember,may,amongothermeasures,annultheactororderthedirectortorenderaccountandtoremittheprofitorbenefitrealizedtothelegalperson.Theactionmaybebroughtonlywithinoneyearafterknowledgeisgainedoftheacquisitionorcontract.
• Unlikedutyofcare,dutyofloyaltyiswidelyrecognizedasbeinganecessaryconstraintonpowerofofficers/directors.
• Debateisn’tre:whetherweshouldhavedutyofloyaltyorhowstrongthestandardsshouldbe.• Instead,it’sabouthowweunderstandthedutyanditsbasicparameters.
o Bywhatstandardisloyaltyassessed?Howdowemeasureloyalty?o Whoseinterestisthisdutysupposedtoprotect?Towhomshoulddirectors/officersbe
loyal?
• Introductiono Sealy’sviewofthecorporatefiduciaryrelationship:
§ Therearevarioustypesoffiduciaryrelationships–whatunifiesthem?Whyisaparticularrelationshipafiduciaryone?
§ Viewthatfiduciarylawstemmedfromsloppyanalogicalreasoning,takingwhatwesawfromtrustlawandapplyingittothecorporatesetting.
§ Asaresult,doesn’tthinkthereisafixedsetofrules/principlesatplayhere.It’sacategory,butit’sempty.
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o Anotherview:§ Certaincategorieshavebeenrecognizedashavinganinherentfiduciarynature.§ Keycharacteristicofallfiduciaryrelationshipsisthatthefiduciaryhaslegal
discretionarypowerovertheinterestsofsomeoneelse.• Directorsandofficershavethisdiscretionarypower–theycanonlyfulfill
theirrolebyhavingthesepowers.o FiduciarylawisreallystemmingfromequityintheCML.o NotmuchontheCVLside.o Whataretheimplicationsofarelationshipbeingfoundtobefiduciary?
§ Assumeadditionallegalburdens/obligations• Willvarybasedontheundertakingyou’veaccepted.• Butmanyareratheruniform:
o Dutyofcareo Dutyofcandour/disclosureo Dutyofloyalty
• Mayalsobefoundtohavetopaymoregenerousremediesiftheybreachtheirduties.
o Theextentoftheremedywillbedeterminedbyhowmuchthefiduciarygainedfromtheirbreach,ratherthanbyhowmuchthebeneficiarylostasaresultofthefiduciary’sbreach.
• Remediesincludes:o Disgorgementofprofitso Remedialconstructivetrust–canclaimconstructivetrustoverthe
propertytogetitback(1)DutyofLoyalty
• Camefromequityandtrustlaw• Impliesatveryleast,tworules(conflictrules):
o (1)Ruleagainstconflictsofinterests§ Fiduciarycan’tpermitherownactualorpossibleintereststoconflictwiththoseof
abeneficiary.§ It’sanoutwardlookingbar–can’ttakeonobligationtoserveanotherifyou’ve
alreadygotobligationstoserveanother.§ “Twomastersrule”–youcan’tundertaketoservetomastersiftheirinterests
conflict.o (2)Ruleagainstconflictsofduty/conflictingmandates
• Statutoryincarnationo CBCA,s.122(1)(a)
§ Dutytoacthonestlyandingoodfaithwithviewtobestinterestsofcorporation.§ àConflictrulesdon’tmakeanyappearanceinthisstatutorydefinition…Doesn’t
mentionanythingaboutavoidingconflicts… • Wassomethinglostintranslationhere…?
• Peoplesv.Wise(2004,SCC)o Foundnodisloyaltyonthefactshere.o Thecorporatefiduciaryrelationship
§ Directors/officersandrelationshipwithcorporationlongseenasbeingafiduciaryrelationship.So,SCCdidn’tneedtosaymuchaboutwhethertherewasafiduciaryrelationshiphere.It’sallaboutdiscretionarypower.
o Contentofthedutyofloyalty§ Mostimportantpartthecourttalksabout.§ Adoptsthe“supersoakerstandard”–includeslikeeverythingggg
• Acthonestlyandingoodfaith
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• Respecttrustandconfidenceputinthem• Avoidconflictsofinterestwithcorporation• Avoidabusingpositiontogainpersonalbenefit• Maintainconfidentialityofinformationtheyacquirebyvirtueoftheir
position• Servecorporationselflessly
§ Havingapluralityofstandardslikethiscanmakethingsprettydifficultwhenyou’retryingtoassessdisloyalty…
• Whatshouldwefocusourattentionon?o Establishingdisloyalty:conductormotive?
§ Saidtheywouldlooktomotive.§ Notrequiredthatdirectors/officersavoidpersonalgaininallinstancesasaresult
oftheirhonestandgoodfaithsupervisionofthecorporation.Sometimestheirinterestswillgenuinelycoincidewiththoseofthecorporation.
§ Lessaboutinvestigatingwhethertheywereinastructuralpositionofconflictofinterest.
§ Here,TJfoundnofraudordishonestyandthereforenobasisforfindingbreachoffiduciaryduty.
o Beneficiaryofthedutyofloyalty§ SCCrejectedviewthatdutyisowedtoshareholdersortocorporationandits
shareholders.§ It’sonlyowedtothecorporationasanentity.§ So,loyaltymeasuredbyofficers/directors’behaviourandthecorporateinterests.
• Howdoweknowwhatthecorporateinterestsare…?o Directors/officershavetodecideonacase-by-casebasiswhatthe
corporateinterestsareandbalancetheviewsofvariousstakeholders.
• Howdoweknowwhensomethingisn’tinthecorporateinterest…?
(2)QBCAandCCQre:dutyofloyalty
• QBCA:Dutyboundtoactininterestofcorporation,CCQsaysprettymuchthesamething.• re:motiveorconflict?
o Moretowardconflictovermotive.o CCQ323–notpermittedtocominglepersonalandcorporateproperty,notallowedto
makeprofit,notallowedtomakeuseofconfidentialinformationo CCQ324–conflictofinterestrule–havetodiscloseconflicts,avoidplacingthemselvesin
positionofpotentialconflict.• Beneficiary?
o Directorsshouldbefreetoconsiderinterestsofdifferentgroupsindetermininglong-terminterestsofcorporation.
(3)CorporateFiduciaryDuty:ImproperPurposes
• Allegationthatcorporatedirectors/officersusedtheirpowersforimproperpurposes.• Shareholderswilloftenbringthiskindofclaimbecausetheyfeelthattheywereinapositionofa
conflictofinterest.• Therehavebeentwodifferentwaystoframethesekindsofallegations:
o Oneisfiduciaryframeofreferenceo Theotherisnot
• Non-fiduciaryframe
Humphrey|92
o Focusonpurposeofspecificpowersinquestion–forwhatpurposewerethosepowersgiventodirectors/officers?
o Normallyaquestionofcorporateconstitutionallaw.o So,proprietyofpurposedependsonwhetherapowerwasexercisedfortherightkindof
purpose.o SeeHoggv.Cramphorn
• Overridingfiduciaryobligationo Notaboutconstructionofparticularpowers.Questioniswhetherpowerwasexercisedin
goodfaithefforttoadvanceinterestsofthecompany.o Seesfiduciaryframeasmostimportantframeofreference.o SeeTeckv.Millar
• Hoggv.Cramphorn(1967,UK)o Takeoversituation,directorschallengedforexercisingtheirpowersinappropriately.o Cwasdirector/officeofcompanyandthoughttakeoverwasbadforcorporationand
employees,sosoughttoissuesharestofriendlyinteresttoavoidtakeover,diluteshareholdersvotestryingtolaunchthetakeover.
o Argumentthatpowertoissueshareswasusedimproperly.o Articlesgivebroadpowertoboardtoissueshares.o Courtacceptedthattherewasnofiduciaryproblemhere.Wentontoconsiderwhetherthe
powerwasusedbyboardproperlyornot.o Saidthatboardissuedsharesforimproperpurposeandthereforedecisionofboardhadto
besetaside.o Conclusion
§ Despitefactthattherewasgoodfaithbeliefthatitwasnecessarytoissuesharesbecauseitwasbestforcompany,itwasnotpermittedbecauseitwasanimproperpurpose.Exercisedforthewrongreasons.
§ Improperpurposedoctrineisawaythatcorporateconstitutionallawlimitsscopeofcorporatefiduciarylaw.
• TeckCorp.v.Millar(1972,BCSC)o Juniorminingcompany(Afton)soughtmajorminingcompanyaspartnertodevelop
propertyithad.Twomajorminingcompaniesinterested.o Mwasdirectorofjuniorcompany(A).Believedbestinterestsofcompanywouldbebest
servedbyconcludingagreementwithKlassar,notTeck.o TeckendedupbuyingsharesinAftonandeventuallyheldmajoritystatus.o MillarandotherdirectorsworriedaboutwhatTeckmightto.o So,boardissuedsharestoafriendlysourcetoavoidanunwelcometakeoverbyTeck.o Teckseeksdeclarationthatdecisiontoissueshareswasimproperexerciseofpowers.o HoggandCramphornwouldseemtosaythiswasaclearimproperexerciseofpower…o However,notwhathappenshere:
§ Properpurposesandissuanceofshares§ TreatmentofHoggv.Cramphorn§ Alternativerule:
• Afiduciarystandard• Balanceofpower• Multiplemotives• Establishinggoodfaith• Onus
o Sosaythattheycan’tusetheirpowersinthiswaywouldmeanthattheycouldn’tdoanythingtopreventatakeover.
§ Thefiduciaryprincipleisofhigher/greaterimportance.So,whereyoucanshowfiduciaryproprietyinexerciseofapower,thenthatshouldbesufficient.
Humphrey|93
§ It’snotaboutthepurposesattachedtopowers,butthepurposesforwhichthepowerswereusedbydirectors/officers.It’saboutwhetherthepowerwasexercisedinviewtosatisfyingfiduciaryobligation.
o Shouldbeallowedtoconsiderwhoisseekingcontrolandwhy.Ifbelievesubstantialdamagewillresult,exercisingpowerstodefeattakeoverwillnotnecessarilybecharacterizedasimproper.
o Notjustaboutcorporateconstitution–mostimportantconsiderationiswhat’sbestforthecompanyanddirectorsaretheoneswhodeterminethis.There’salwaysgottobesomeoneinthecontrolroomdecidingwhat’sbestforthecompany.
o Notes§ Showsthatwehaveaconflictbetweenmajorityruleanddirectorial
control/accountability.§ Implicationsformajorityrule?Howfarcanthisgo?Howfarcantheytrenchonthe
rightsofshareholdersbecausetheythinkit’sthebestthingforthecompany?Cantheydoanythingsolongastheyhavethefiduciaryjustification?
§ Multiplemotives?(4)FourWaystoBreachDutyofLoyalty
• Today,focusingonbreachofdutyofloyaltyinparticularcontexts.o Fourtypesofcategoriescomeup:
§ Self-dealing• Thefiduciaryissaidtohaveenteredintoacontractorsomeotherkindof
transaction/arrangementwiththebeneficiaryandhasdonesoforpersonalgain.Fiduciaryinpositionofcontrolonbothsides.
§ Misappropriationofproperty/opportunitiesforprofit• Wherefiduciaryissaidtohavetakenpropertythatbelongstothe
corporation(kindofconversion)orwherefiduciaryisallegedtohavetakenabusinessopportunityforprofit.Insteadofpursuingbusinessopportunitythroughcorporation,hastakenthatopportunityherself.
§ Entrenchment/enrichmentcases• Wherefiduciaryusesposition/powerstoappeartoretainpositionwith
companywhenthecompanyistryingtogetridofhersoastoretaintheeconomicbenefitshegetsfromthecompany,ortomaintainenrichmentfromcompanytoself.Usepositionwithincompanytoenrichthemselves(e.g.involvedindecisionmakingre:remuneration).
§ Secretprofitscases• Fiduciaryusespositiontogainsecretprofit(kickbacks,bribes,otherkinds
ofsecretpayments).• Today,willfocusonself-dealingandmisappropriationofopportunities.
a)Self-Dealing
• Caseswherefiduciaryissaidtohaveengagedintransaction(usuallycontract)betweenthemselvesandthecorporation.
• Concernisthatfiduciariesarepeoplewhoaresupposedtobeactingonbehalfofthecorporation.So,problemisthatFisonbothsidesofthedeal.
• Raiseobviousconflictofinterestproblems:o Fwillhavepersonalinterestingettingbestdealforthem,andcorporationwillhave
interestineithernotenteringintoagreementortoenterintoitontermsthatareinitsbestinterest.
Humphrey|94
o Raisesthequestionofwhetherthemanagerwillbargaintothefullextentofhisabilitiesonthecorporation’sbehalf.
• So,self-dealingtransactionsareconsideredtobeinherentlysuspicious.• Thesearepotentiallythemostinnocentkindofcategory…becauseself-dealingisnotinherently
badforbeneficiaries.• Often,thesedealsaretheonlyorbestmeansthecorporationhastoadvanceitsinterests.
o e.g.Fiduciarymaybewillingtopartforgoods/servicesatbetterratethanavailableonthemarket,orwhatthefiduciaryisofferingisnotbeingofferedtothemarketatlarge.
• So,theeconomicbehavioursaremixed–thereisrisk,butinmanycasesaself-dealingtransactionmightbegoodforthecorporation.
• Historyo AtCML,traditionalapproachreflectscourt’sapproachtofiduciaryloyaltygenerally–a
strictone.o Strictruleagainstself-dealingcontractsbecausetheyinvolvedconflictofinterest.Feltthat
forpolicyreasonswasimportanttoholdastrictlineonconflictsofinterest.o SeethisinHoLdecisionAberdeenRailway:
§ Noonewithafiduciarydutycanenterintocontractsinwhichtheyhaveorcouldhaveapersonalinterestconflictingwiththeinterestsofwhoevertheyareboundtoprotect/actintheinterestof.
§ Verystrictlyapplied–don’tevenraisequestionofwhetherornotthecontractwasfairorunfair.Can’tevenhaveappearanceofconflict,noinquiryintosubjectpermitted.
§ Maymeanthatincertaincircumstancesthecorporationcouldn’tengageinatransactionthatmightactuallybegoodforit.
o “Inordertoprotectthedutytoactinthebeneficiary’sbestinterests,weforbidconflicts;andifthereisaconflict,thefiduciaryisnotevenallowedtotrytoprovethathewas,infact,actinginthebestinterestsofthebeneficiary.Theprophylacticruleisstricterthantheunderlyingdutythatitseekstoprotect.”(p.358)
o CVL,CCQart.324–directorshallavoidplacinghimselfinpositionwherethereisormaybeaconflict.Equallystronglanguage.
• Couldtheserulesberelaxed?Becausesometimesthesecontractsaregoodforcorporations…• So,shouldweeverforgivethesekindsofcontractsif:
o Conflictofinterestwasdiscloseorconsentedtobeforeorafterthedeal;ando Whethertherewasobjectivefairnesstothedealing?
• Somehavesuggestedthatindependentlyofconsent/disclosuresuchcontractsshouldbeforgivensolongastheyareobjectivelyfair.
North-WestTransportationCo.v.Beatty(1887,ON)Facts
• NWTneededashipandBhadashiptosell.• BadirectorofNWT.NWTbuysshipfromB,Bmakespersonalprofit.• Bdisclosedhisinterestsinthetransactiontotheboard.Transactionwasapprovedbytheboardof
directorsofNWT(ofwhichBwasamember)andthenbyshareholdervote.Shareholdervotepassed306-289(ofthose306votes,291werecastbyB,thedirectorofNWTwhosoldtheship).
• Evidencethattheshipwasawesomeanditwouldn’thavebeenpossibletofindsuchadamngoodship.AlsofoundthatpersonalprofitBmadewasnotexcessive–hecouldhavegottenabettersalepriceelsewhere.So,lookedlikethiswasagooddealforthecompany.
• ShareholderofNWTsuesBinnameofNWTonbehalfofallshareholders.Seekstohavesalesetasideongroundsofbreachofloyalty.
Issue
Humphrey|95
• Wasthereavilationoftheconflictofinterestrule?Yes–makingcontractprimafacievoidable.But…couldrulefromAberdeenRailwaybesurmountedbyratification?So…
• Isthecontractvalid?Yes–ratificationofthecontractvalidandcontractnolongervoidable.Reasoning
• Generalruleisthatadirectorcannotenterintoanagreementthatconflictsormightconflictwiththeinterestsofthecorporation.(AberdeenRailway)
• Here,theevidenceshowsthattheacquisitionitselfwasappropriate–pricewasn’texcessiveorunreasonable,forexample.
• Anyconcernabouttheboardofdirectorsratifyingthesalewasremediedbythefactthatitwasthenalsobythemajorityofshareholderssolongastherewasnoproceduralunfairnessorimpropriety.
• ThisistrueeventhoughBwasthemajorityshareholderbecausethecorporationwasconstructedinsuchawaythatBcouldacquirethevotingpowerthathedid–hehadarighttoacquireasmanysharesashewantedandhehadarighttovoteonthemall.RejectingthevotescastbyBwoulddisregardtherightsofthemajorityinfavourofthoseheldbytheminority.
Ratio• Whenadirectorpersonallyentersintoacontractwiththecompanyofwhichheisadirector,
apparentlybreachinghisfiduciarydutytothecompany,ifthecontractissubsequentlyapprovedbyamajorityofshareholders(absentunfair/impropermeans)thesalewillremainvalid.
• Thedirectorhastherighttocasthisownvote(s)asashareholderinsuchacircumstance.Notes
• Normallyboardwillapprovedealbeforehandandshareholderswillengageinratificationafterthedealinordertoavoid/forgivepotentialliability.
o Riskytoaskshareholdersforratificationbecausebylettingthemknowaboutthepotentialliabilityissuetheymaygetpissed,notratifyit,andthensuethecorporationfortheconflictofinterestandtheirallowingittotakeplace.
• Whywasthiscasecontroversial?o Thoughtresultwasperverseonthefacts–fiduciaryforgivinghimselfusinghispowersas
shareholder.o Reasoningdriveninlargepartbyuniquestateofthefacts.Here,theself-dealing
transactionwasclearlygoodforthecompanyandBdidn’toverreach.So,focusingonthefacts/equitiesofthecasethenthecourtwasparticularlywillingtoallowthetransactiontostand.
o WashighlyinfluentialinCanadaandCML–someCanadiancasesrecognizedthecontroversysurroundingthissituationrecognizedthattheratificationwouldonlybegoodifitwasunanimous(Bourbonv.EarlinON).
StatutoryRegimeforSelf-Dealing
• CMLhasbeensupplantedbyastatutoryregime.• CMLapproachwasastrictprohibitionofconflictofinterest.• Hasbeenmodifiedinrecognitionthatself-dealingtransactionsareoftengoodforthecompany,so
sawneedforschemethatallowsthesetransactionstoberegulated.• Canadianreformofthisunsatisfactorysituationbeganinthe1970s.Hasproceededonbasisthat
conflictofinterestsituationsareunavoidableandthatthequestioniswhattodoaboutthevoidablecontractsthatresultfromthem.
• Solutiongenerallytorequireadequatedisclosureand,inthecaseofdirectors,arecusalfromvoting,andthatthetransactionwasfoundtobeobjectivelyfair.
o SeeCBCAs.120,CCQ325-326,QBCAs.122-133.• CBCAs.120–director/officerpartytocontractmustdisclosenatureandextentofinterestASAP
andrefrainfromvotinginanyresolutiontoapprovecontract.
Humphrey|96
o Subsection7–suchcontractsbecomenon-voidableandconflicteddirectorisnotaccountablesolongasdisclosuremadeandnon-conflicteddirectors/officersapproveditandthedealwasreasonableandfair.
§ 7.1–Evenifthissectionisn’tsatisfiedanddisclosureisn’tmade,canhaveratificationafterthefactbyspecialresolutionofshareholders(againsubjecttoreasonable/fairnessrequirement)withsupermajority.
o Subsection5–conflicteddirectorcannotvote.o Subsection8–ifanypartofs.120notcompliedwith,courtcansetasidecontractupon
applicationofcorporationorshareholder.§ Minorityprotectionremedyspecifictoconflictofinteresttransactions.
o Ifcontractismadenon-voidable,fiduciarynotaccountableforanyprofitmadeonthecontract.
• Section120(1-6)CBCAdetailswhatdisclosuremustlooklike:o Disclosuremustbemadeinwritingorenteredintominutesofboardmeeting.o Whathastobedisclosed?Mustbespecificre:natureandextentofconflict.o Allowsongoingdisclosureofconflictsofinterestsinanexpeditedfashion–directorcan
filelistofallpositionswithothercorporationsandlistofpersonalrelationshipsthatmightpossiblygenerateaconflictbetweenherresponsibilitieswithcorporation.
§ Thisissub.6–ifthislistisfiledandiskeptupdated,thedirectordoesn’thavetodoanythingelsewhenaspecifictransactioncomesup.
§ Thisruleisoftenmadeuseofbycorporatedirectorswithinlargecorporations.§ àIsthisreallysufficient?Theinfoprovidedisprettycoarse,doesn’ttellyouthat
muchdetail.• QBCAs.133–incaseofimproperdisclosure,onlyanordinaryresolutionisrequiredbut
shareholderswithaninterestinthecontractmaynotvote.• QBCAs.132–QBCAwordingdifferentfromthatofCBCAre:contractneedingtobe“reasonable
andfairtothecorporation”–QBCAsays“intheinterest”ofthecorporation.o Notengagedinobjectivemarket-basedanalysisoffairnessoftransaction.Instead,courts
havetolookonmorefinegrainlevelatwhetherthetransactionwasgoodinthiscontext,basedonassessmentofcorporation’sowninterests.Morerobuststandard.
• QBCAs.127–conflicteddirectorsarenotonlyprohibitedfromvotingbuttheyareprohibitedfromattendingthemeetingwheretheconflictisbeingdiscussed.
b)CorporateOpportunities
• Whataboutwhenit’snotacontractthatcreatestheconflictofinterest?Say,whenadirectorsweepsinandinterceptsanopportunity/chanceforprofitthatwouldhavebeenavailabletothecorporation?
o Saidthatopportunityforprofitbelongedinsomesensetothecorporationandthatthefiduciaryshouldhavepursuedtheopportunityforthebenefitofthecorporation,notforherself.
• Thelawisjustassternwhenitcomestodisloyaltyforthebenefitofathirdparty.• Cookv.Deeks
o Directorsnotatlibertytosacrificetheopportunitiesavailabletothecorporation.o Oneofkeyrolesasdirectoristoidentifyandpursuecorporateopportunities.
• Thiskindofsituation–themisappropriationofopportunities–isnotspecificallyregulatedintheCBCA.
o See,however,CCQ324,para2.• Establishingliability:
o Ifcanshowbusinessopportunitywasopentothecorporation;wasinlinewithitsbusiness;thatopportunitywasingenuineinterestofthecorporation–then,easytoestablishbreachoffiduciaryduty.
Humphrey|97
• But,howtodetermineifopportunitywaswithinthescopeofthebusinessofthecorporation?o And,howtodetermineif
Regal(Hastings)Ltd.v.Gulliver(1942,HoL)Facts
• Regal(cinemacompany)wantedtoexpandbusinessbyacquiringnewtheatres.Didthisbyacquiringnewtheatreleasesanddidthisthroughasubsidiary(Amalgamated).
• Rrecognizedopportunitytoacquirenewleases,butwereunabletoseizeontheopportunitybecausedidn’thaveenoughcapitaltosecurelease.
• Awascapitalizedtoextentof2000GBPandlandlordwanted5000GBPtosecurelease.• So,directorsofRweretryingtofigureouthowtosolveproblem.Suggestedtheymightpersonally
guaranteerentobligationsofA.But,theyweren’twillingtodothis.• Theydid,however,decidetoriskmoneyandinvestmoneyinanotherway–buyingsharesinA
andasaresultraisecapitalofA.• So,fourdirectorsandthelawyereachinvested500GBPinAbybuyingshares.• Thechairoftheboarddidnot,however,invest,butheconvincedoutsidepeopletofinanceA.A
nowwasproperlycapitalizedandcouldsatisfylandlordtosecureleases.Thisiswhathappened.• DirectorsofRsoldinterestsinAandsoldsharesatsignificantprofit.• Rchangeshands,hasnewowneranddirectors.Theyclaimconflictofinterestofolddirectorsfor
investinginsubsidiary,A.Issue
• WereformerdirectorsofRguiltyofbreachoffiduciarydutyre:appropriationofopportunitiesforprofit?Yes.
• Weretheyobligedtoreturntheprofits?Yes.Reasoning
• Liabilityforappropriation/profito Fiduciariestakingopportunitywhereseemsthatopportunityisboundupincorporate
opportunitythatcouldnothavebeentakenupwithoutthedisloyalbehaviour.• Scopeofliability
o Constrainedbyambitofrolewithinthecompany.o HasthisopportunitycometoFthroughherfiduciarypositionorincontextofherfiduciary
relationship?§ Iffallsoutsidecurrentfiduciaryrelationship,noconflict.Ifoutside,anyonecould
havetakenuptheopportunity.o Here,opportunitycametoindividualsincourseoftheirfiduciaryrelationship–wouldnot
haveoccurredtothemtoinvestinAiftheyweren’ttryingtopuzzlethroughthecapitalissue.
• Liabilitytoaccounto Remedialliabilitytoaccountfollows–it’saknee-jerkreactionifyoucanshowconflictand
anyprofitthatstemsfromit,theywillhavetoaccountforit.o FormerdirectorsofRsaidthiswasadifferentkindofconflictofinterestcase–theywere
justdoingtheirbesttoadvancetheinterestsofthecompany.Knewtherewasanopportunityforthecompanyandcompanycouldn’trealizeitiftheydidn’tinvestandrisktheirpersonalcapital.Sotheydidn’tseeitfairthattheyshouldhavetopaytheirprofitsbacktothecompany.
o Courtjustflatlyrejectedthisargument–it’sasuperflat,strictrule.Ifthereisaconflict,yourliabilityautomaticallyfollowsfromthat.
• Significanceofimpossibilityofrealizationbybeneficiary• Significanceofapproval/ratification
Humphrey|98
o Directorscouldhaveavoidedthisproblemiftheyhadreceivedapprovalbytheboardbeforehand,orshareholderratificationafterthefact.
Notes• Manythinkthiscaseissuuuuperstrictre:whatitexpectsfromfiduciaries.• Nonetheless,hasbeenadoptedbySCCinCanadainZwicker.• Doyouthinkthisisunfairlystrict?
o Economycriticism–incentiveeffectsofstrictnessmeanitisself-defeating.Dutyofloyaltymeanttoincentivizedirectorstodobesttheycanforcompanyandiftheyonlywaytheycandothatisto,say,riskownmoney,thenhowcanthatbebad?Couldsaythattheseguyswerenotjustloyalbutextraordinarilyloyaltothecompanybybeingwillingtoputtheirmoneyup.Ifthisisgoingtobethedeal,thendirectorswillbelesswillingtobesoloyalbecauseitbecomesnotintheirinteresttodoso.
o Whathappenedtomotiverules??SeePeoples–therewasanobviousclaimforconflict,buttheylookedatthemotivesofthebrotherswhowerejusttryingtodotheirbestandactedingoodfaith.Isn’tfiduciary
PesoSilverMinesLtd.Cropper(1966,SCC)Facts
• PSMofferedopportunitytoinvestinspeculativeminingventure.PSMandCasdirectorconsideredproposalandfounditwasn’tinbestinterestofcompany,rejectedit.
• PSMreceivedoneortwoofferslikethisaweekandconsideredthemregularly.• CinvolvedingroupthatcametopurchasetheclaimthathadbeenpreviouslyofferedtoPSM.
o Claimcamebeveryprofitable.• PSMchangeshandsandnewboardfindsoutaboutthisandsuesCforbreachoffiduciarydutyand
topayoverprofitsre:claimthatPSMhadrejected.Issue
• WasthisopportunityforprofitwithinthescopeofC’sfiduciarydutiestoPSM?No.Reasoning
• No,itwasn’tbecausethecorporationhadbeengrantedtheopportunitytotaketheprofitforitselfandPSMdecidedtorefusetheopportunityafterproperdecision-makingprocess,eventhoughCparticipatedinit.
• So,afterhavingpassedonit,theopportunitybecamefairgame.Becauseithadbeenconsideredandrefused,theopportunitywasplacedoutsidetheambitoffiduciarydutyofC.
• CourtdistinguishesthiscasefromRegal–inRegal,theopportunitycametothedirectorsinthescopeoftheirduties.
CanadianAerov.O’Malley(SCC,1974)Facts
• DefendantsareseniorofficersforCA.Theyworkedoncontractfortenderonbehalfofcompany.Whentheyrealizedopportunitywasripe,theydidn’twanttopursueitonbehalfofthecompanybutinsteaddecidedtoleavecompany,formownenterprise,andbyvirtueofknowledgefromCAtheyenteredintothetenderprocess,wonandobtainedprofitsthatwouldhaveother
Issue• Whatdowemakeofresignationinordertogetoutofone’sfiduciaryobligations–canyougetout
ofthembyquitting?No.Reasoning
• SCCreferredtoRegalandsaidthatitshowedthatthereisastrictethicre:conflictofinterestandthatthisstrictethicdisqualifiesadirector/officerfromusurpingforhimselfamaturingbusinessopportunityevenafterresignation.
Humphrey|99
o Millerthinksthisiswrong.• Fiduciarydutydoesnotterminateuponresignationandcannotberenouncedatwill.• Courtgaveuslonglistoffactorstodetermineproximity–ifopportunityiscloseenoughto
constitutebreach:o Positionorofficeheldo Natureofcorporateopportunityo Ripeness,specificityofopportunityo Director/officer’srelationtotheopportunityo Amountofknowledgepossessedo Circumstancesinwhichknowledgewasobtainedo Whetherknowledgewasspecialorprivateo TimeincontinuationofFD,whenbreachhappenedafter(howlongafter)o Circumstancesunderwhichrelationshipterminated–wasterminationmadeforself-
interestedreasons?
Gravinov.Enerchem(2008,QCCA)Facts
• GravinoandCarsonweredirectors,officers,andshareholdersinEnerchem(ETI).Wereinpositionsbetween1990-1996.
• Eintransportationofpetrochemicals,notmanyplayersinthemarket.• GandCwereinvolvedinnegotiationswhileemployedinE.• GandCdecidedtheywantedoutofETI,soldshares,resignedpositions,setupnewcorporation
(PetroNav)anddidsowithacompetitorofETI.IssueReasoning
• Defendantsdeniedliabilityonthefollowinggrounds:o OpportunityinquestionwasnotmaturewhentheyleftETI.o OpportunitywasdifferentfromtheonebeingpursuedbyETI.o Ajointventurerwasinvolvedandthiswaskeyinthemsecuringthedeal,whichmakesit
differentfromwhattheyweretryingtodoforETI.• CCQprovisions
o SimilartothoseoftheCBCAre:directorsbeingfiduciariesofcorporation,dutyofloyalty,makingthemforbiddenfromusingvaluableinformationtheyobtainedintheirroles.
o Saidthatdutiescontinuedforareasonabletimeafterresignation.• Appropriationofopportunityasdisloyalty
o CanadianAeroacceptedaslawandtheircriteriaarethethingsweneedtolookattoconsiderwhetheranopportunityiswithintheFD.
• Countervailingpolicyconsiderationso Publicinterestandfreeandopencompetition–reasonableloyaltytoemployerduring
courseofemploymentbutshouldbefreeonceyouleavetopursueintereststhatmayhavebeenforbiddenwhenyouwereemployed.
o Forthisreason,neitheranon-competitionclauseshouldbeabletopreventapersonfromearningalivingbyusingskills/knowledgefromapreviouscompany.
• Applicationo JudgesaysthiscaseisnotlikeCanadianAero:
§ Noappropriationofpropertyorclients–theyjustusedinformationwhentheywerefiduciaries.
• àWellinmanycasesisn’ttheinformationtheopportunity?• Here,saidthatopportunitywasnotmatureinthehandsofETI,despite
Humphrey|100
• Also,opportunitywasnotexclusivetoETI–wassmallmarket,allplayersknewabouttheopportunitiesoutthere.Anyothercompetitorcouldhavepursuedit.
§ Theydidn’ttakeanyconfidentialorstrategicinformation(documents)withthemwhentheyleft.
§ Therewasnoactualconflictofinterestinanyevent(Millercan’tfigurethisoutatall).
§ Defendantsquitfirstanddidn’tpursueinformationonownaccountfirst–theyquitbeforeanyofthat.
§ Can’tseehowstartingnegotiationssoonafterdeparturewasbad–theywerejustactingascompetitors.
§ Werenotboundbynon-competeclause,werelegallyfreetocompetewithETI.§ OpportunitywasdifferentfromthatpursuedbyETIbecause…whoknows?
• Millerthinksthisisgarbage–samethreeships,sameparties,sameterms,etc…
• Sure,GandChadajointventurer,buttheycouldhavedonethiswithETIandeliminatedthismaterialdifference.
Notes• MillerthinksittakesthecorrectlawfromCanadianAerobutachievesthewrongresult.• Thinkstherearetoomanyfactors,hesays,andtheypointintoomanydifferentdirections.Too
muchdiscretionavailableforjudgestointerpretthemindifferentways.c)Entrenchment
• Entrenchment=whenthefiduciaryattemptstouseherpowertomaintainherpositionofpowerwithinthecompanyforherownbenefit.
• Corporatemanagers,directors,offices(usuallydirectors)areallegedtoviolatedutyofloyaltytocompanyindoingthis.Boardofdirectorssaidtobeexercisingpowersthattheyhave,buttheyareexercisingtheminthecontextofahostilebidtokeeptheirpositions,entrenchthemselves,tomaintaintheirpersonalinterestsintheirpositions(income,pecuniarybenefits).
• Hostiletakeoversthoughttobeimportantmechanismformarketstoexercisedisciplineovermanagers.Hostilebidderssaidtobedrawntounderperformingcompanies.
o Ifahostiletakeovergoesthrough,directorssufferpublichumiliation,suggestionthattheyhaven’tdonetheirjobswellandtheywillofcourselosetheirjobs.
o Therefore,understandablewhymanagementareresistanttohostiletakeoverattempts.• Managementhasdevelopedseveraltoolstoresisthostiletakeoverbids:
o Issuesharestoafriendlyparty,dilutethevotingpowerofincumbentshareholders,makeitlesslikelythatbiddercangaincontrol.
o Poisonpills–exercisepowerofconstitutionalamendmenttochangerightsattachedtosharesinthecorporationtomakeitunattractivetobidders.
o Recognizethatchangeisinevitablesotrytofindadifferent,friendlybidder(thatisfriendlytoincumbentmanager)–lookingforawhiteknighttosaveyourass.
• Ideathatweshouldforbidtheboardtoresistthetakeover,straightjacketthemandallowforapropertransitionofthecompany.
o That’sverydifficulttodo.o So,howdowecontroltheboard,recognizingthatwewillprobablyhavetotoleratethe
poweroftheboardandallowtheboardtorespondasitseesfit,exercisetheirjudgment?• Asaresult,takeoversaresubjecttorigorouscorporateregulationsandsecuritiesregulation.
o Aimedtoprotectmarkets,shareholders,thepublicatlarge.o Regulationsaremeanttostrikeabalancebetweeninterestsofofferor,targetcorporation,
andshareholdersoftargetcorporation.
Humphrey|101
o Takeoverdefinedbysecuritiesregulationasanythingthatwouldallowofferortohave20%ofaclassofshares.
• Resistingahostiletakeoverbidisnotalwaysunjustified–itcouldbejustifiedonthebasisofthedutyofloyalty.
o Couldbejustifiedbecauseyou’retryingtodoyourbestforthecompanybyresistingthetakeover.
• Hostiletakeoversplacetwofundamentalprinciplesofcorporatelawinstarkcontrasttooneanother.
o Courtsarereluctanttointerfereinbusinessdecisionsofcorporation’smanagers.o Atthesametime,theyhavetheauthoritytosupervisetheactionsofmanagementre:skill
andloyalty.§ Onesideisdirectors’skill,expertiseandknowledge.§ Othersideispotentialthattheymayusedthistofurthertheirowneconomic
interestattheexpenseofthecorporation,theshareholders,orboth.Olympia&Yorkv.HiramWalker(1986,OntHCJ)Facts
• HostilebidderproposingtakeoverofHW,willingtopay$32pershareandwouldgeta39%stake.DirectorsofHWresistedthebidthroughverycomplicatedscheme.
o Causedcorporationtosell40%oftheirvaluablebusinessassetstoafriendlybusinessinterest.
o Causednewcorporationtobeincorporatedandsold49%ofsharestothisnewcorporation.
o Takeoverbidwasdefeated.Issue
• Werethedirectors’actionsinbreachoftheirfiduciaryobligations?No.Reasoning
• Courthastoreviewallavailableevidencere:boarddecision-makingandifthere’sanyevidenceoftaintofconflictofinterest,thatconflictofinterestwasactualized,thenthepoweroftheboardshouldbefoundvoidandtheboardshouldbeheldliableforbreachofloyalty.
• AppliesrulefromTeck–directorsdonotbreachtheirfiduciarydutieswhentheyact“ingoodfaith,onwhattheybelievedonreasonableandprobablygrounds,tobeinthebestinterestsofthecompany.”
• Here,heldthatHWdirectorsweremotivatedbydesiretomaximizereturnsforallshareholdersandthattheyreasonablybelievedthattheinterestsofthecorporationasawholewouldbebestservedbyresistingthetakeoverbid.
• Ifthedirectorsactingoodfaithandinthebestinterestsofthecompany,itisirrelevantwhethertheyalsobenefit.Theywerenottryingtoentrenchthemselvesasmanagement,theyweretryingtodowhattheybelievedwasinthebestinterestofthecompany.
Ratio• Directorshavearightandobligationtotakestepsthattheyhonestlyandreasonablybelievearein
theinterestsofthecompanyanditsshareholdersinresponsetoatakeoverbid.• Itisthedirectors’dutytotakeallreasonablestepstomaximizethevalueofsharesforall
shareholders.• Seekingoutindependentadvicefromadvisorswilllendcredencetotheideathatresistingthebid
wasintheinterestofshareholders.• Intheabsenceofbadfaithordishonesty,thecourtwilldefer.
Notes• Theshareholderprimacyruleinsiststhattheinterestsofacorporationaretobeidentifiedasper
theshareholdersasawhole.Evenifyoudon’tagreewiththisviewmoregenerally,thereisagenerallyacceptedviewthatthisshouldbetherulewhendealingwithhostiletakeovers.
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o Why?Becausethisisamomentofexistentialcrisisforthecorporationwhereinvestorsmustdecidewhethertostayorsell.
• Isthereaneedforabrightlineruleonthisissue?o Revlonv.McAndrews(Delaware,1986)
§ HeldthatonceitbecameclearthatRevlonwasforsale,thedutyoftheboardchangedfromthepreservationofthecorporateentitytothemaximizationofRevlon’svalueatasalefortheshareholders’benefit.
o However,inMapleLeafFoodsatONCA–obligationistocompanyasawhole,nojustshort-terminterestorinterestsoftheshareholders.Rejectionofthis“auctioneer”dutyfromRevlon.
o SamekindofrejectionseeninPeoplesandinBCE,whichheldthatthedutyofloyaltyisowedtothecorporationasawholeandnottotheshareholders.
§ InBCEtheboardclearlythoughtitwasgovernedbyRevlonandcouldonlytakeinterestsofshareholdersintoconsideration.
§ SCCcomprehensivelyrejectedthisview,statingagainasitdidinPeoplesthatthedutyofloyaltyisowedtothecorporationasawhole.
o So,inCanada,rejectionofRevlon–it’suptodirectorstodecidewhethertotakelong-term/short-termvieworsomethinginbetween(Revlonstoodforshort-termperspectiveonly).
§ ThereforethereisnobrightlineRevlonstyleruleinCanada.• Possiblealternativestoabrightlinerule?
o Mandateorstronglyrecommendthatindependentcommitteesbeusedtohandleresponsestohostiletakeovers.Ifdecisionistoresistbid,mustprovidereasonswhyandperhapsseekanotherbidder.
d)MultipleLoyalties–ConflictsofDuty
• Recognitionthatbusinessthrivesoninterconnectionandthatdirectorsmightnotserveonjustoneboard.
• AsaresultthereisalaxityintheCMLanddirectorsareallowedtohavemultipleloyalties.• Toleratingthesemultipleloyaltieshingesoninformedconsenttotheconflictofinterest–aslong
asbothpartiestowhomloyaltyisowedisawareofthepotentialconflict,it’sallgood.o InCanada,directorsmustfileandmaintainalistofalloftheirconnectionsandpositions
onboards,etc…(5)IndependentDirectors
• Inanidealworldwewouldhaveindependentdirectorswhoarefocusedexclusivelyontheinterestsofthecorporationwithoutregardforherowninterestsortheinterestsofanyoneelse.Thisis,ofcourse,impossible!
• Inreality,boardsarenotactuallyconstitutedwithindependenceinmind.Directorsarenotindependentofofficers,theyoftenhaveprioremploymentorpersonalrelationshipswithofficers,afinancialstakeinthecompany,etc…
• Howcanweimprovethis?Perhapsbytakingawaydecisionsfromdirectorswhohavethegreatestinterestintheoutcome(e.g.inatakeoversituation)andcreatean“independentcommittee”.
o Wouldbeasubsetoftheboard,madeupofdirectorswhoare“independent”–i.e.havenootherrolesinthecorporation.
o Couldbeusedtorespondtotakeoverbids,dealwithpayofdirectors/officers.• Independentofcommitteemightbeenoughtoremoveanytaintofconflictofinterestandmakeits
recommendationsmorelikelytobeacceptedbyacourtasabusinessdecisionproperlymadeintheinterestsofthecompanybytheboard.
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BrantInvestmentsv.KeepriteInc.(1991,ON)Facts
• Plaintiffminorityshareholdersallegethatindependentcommitteewasnotindependentandthattheadvicetheygavetothecompany’sdirectorswasnotinthebestinterestsofthecompanyanditsshareholders.
Issue• Domajorityshareholdershaveafiduciaryobligationtowardminorityshareholders?No.• Isthereviewofthetransactionbytheindependentcommitteevalid?Yes.
Reasoning• Fiduciaryobligation
o IncertaincircumstancesAmericanlawrecognizesafiduciarydutyfromcontrollingshareholderstominorityshareholders.
§ e.g.Wheretheabusivecontrol/actisattheexpenseoftheminority,thisshouldnotbepermittedbecausetheycanusetheirpowertoinfluencetheinterestsoftheminority.
o ThereisnoprecedentforthisinCanada,however.So,courtrefusestorecognizefiduciarydutybetweenmajorityandminorityshareholders.
o Majoritiesaren’tliketruefiduciariesanyway–whiletheyhaveeconomiccontrolofthecorporationduetotheirshares,theydon’thavetheauthoritytobind/makedecisionsforminorities.
o Therefore,majorityshareholdersshouldbefreetoexercisetheirlegitimatepowerintheirownself-interest.
• Independentcommitteeo Trialjudgefoundthatthecommitteemembersweretrulyindependent–nothingindicates
thatthisfindingshouldbedisturbed.o Courtrulesthattheindependenceofthecommitteeliesintheabsenceofanaffiliation
withtheinterestsofthepartiesinthetransactionwheretheaffiliationwasofthesortwhereitwouldinterferewiththedirectors’capacitytoindependentlyevaluatethetransaction.
Ratio• Businessdecisionsmadehonestlybythedirectorsorindependentcommitteeofacorporation
shouldnotbesubjectedtomicroscopicexamination–thejudgeshouldnotsubstitutehisownbusinessjudgmentforthatofoneofthosebodies.
Notes• Thoughwerecognizeanddefertoindependentcommittees,ourcourtsdon’tactuallyestablish
robustindependentrequirementsorprobeverydeeplyintowhethertheindependentdirectorsaretrulyindependent.
• Thereseemstobealotofenthusiasmforindependentcommittees/directors–butdowereallythinkthatthisindependenceisreal?Canwetrustinitandrelyonit?Ifnot,thenit’sjustadifferentsetofconflictedactorsmakingdecisions.
o Questionsarefairparticularlyduetothefactthatwedon’thavecriteriatodeterminetheindependenceoftheseindependentdirectors/committees.
• Alsoquestionre:whethertheseindependentcommitteesareactuallygoodforshareholders.o Forexample,inthecontextofatakeoverbid,therecouldbeacompetenceprobleminthat
thepeoplewhoarebestpositionedtoknowwhat’sgoodforthecompanyaretheinsiderswhoaretechnically“conflicted”.Theyaretheoneswhoworkonafull-timebasis,knowthestrategies,decision-makingprocess,etc…
(6)ForgivingDisloyalty–Ratification,revisited
• SeeCBCAs.120–permits/regulatesself-dealingtransactions.
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• Ratificationcomesfromequity,effectivelymeansforgiveness.o Canforgiveabreachoffiduciarydutyafterthefact.o Onlyeffectivelydonewithfullinformation.o Canevenapplywhenfiduciarydidn’tpurporttoactonbehalfofbeneficiary.
• RatificationwillhappenfromtimetotimeduringAGMs,whereincumbentmanagerswillaskforforgivenessfromshareholdersforanybreachesoftheirobligationsinthelastyear.
o Questionsre:whetherthesevotesareactuallyeffective.• Canyouratify/forgivebreachesofduty,care,skill?Whatabouttortofbattery?Whatimpactdoes
ratification/forgivenesshaveonthevictim’srights?• CMLresponsehasbeenthatintheory,ratificationcanhappenbutinpractice,notreally.
o Willonlybeeffectiveifit’sfullyinformed–directorsseekingforgivenessneedtoensurethatshareholdersknowwhatthey’reratifying.
o Whenyouthinkaboutit,ifdirectorsaremakingproperdisclosurestoshareholders,whywouldtheyforgive/ratifythefailuresofdirectors?Notreallyintheirinterest,givingawaytheirrighttoholdthecorporationaccountable.
• Mostwouldacceptthataccordingtogenerallegalprincipleitshouldbepossibletoratifyandextinguishmanager’sbreachoffiduciaryduty–buthowcanthisbedone?
o Fiduciaryobligationisowedtothecorporation–howcanavoteofshareholdersontheissuerepresentacorporatedecisiontoforgive?Whoiscompetenttodecidethatthecorporationwillgiveupit’srightre:theclaimagainstthedisloyalfiduciary?
o Canthebreachingfiduciaryvote?• InmostCanadianjurisdictionsanindividualshareholderdoesn’thavearighttobringacorporate
action.Instead,anindividualshareholdermayapplyforspecificjudicialpermissiontobringastatutoryrepresentativeaction(CBCAs.239,seealsoCCQ316).
o Judgehascompletediscretiontograntpermissionornot.o Ifpermissiongranted,shareholdersuesinarepresentativecapacityonbehalfofthe
corporation.
VI.MAJORITYRULEA)MAJORITYRULECanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.103(1)&(2),106(3),107,109(1),111(3),120(7.1),132,133(a)&(b),135(1)&(6),137,139(1)&(4),141-142,143(1)&(6),144,145.1,145(1)&(2),147-154,155(1),157(1)&(2),161,162(1),163,170(1)&(2),173(1),175(2),176,189(3),211(1)CanadaBusinessCorporationsRegulations,ss.44-47,54-69CanadaBusinessCorporationsActBy-laws103(1)Unlessthearticles,by-lawsoraunanimousshareholderagreementotherwiseprovide,thedirectorsmay,byresolution,make,amendorrepealanyby-lawsthatregulatethebusinessoraffairsofthecorporation.Shareholderapproval103(2)Thedirectorsshallsubmitaby-law,oranamendmentorarepealofaby-law,madeundersubsection(1)totheshareholdersatthenextmeetingofshareholders,andtheshareholdersmay,byordinaryresolution,confirm,rejectoramendtheby-law,amendmentorrepeal.Electionofdirectors
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106(3)Subjecttoparagraph107(b),shareholdersofacorporationshall,byordinaryresolutionatthefirstmeetingofshareholdersandateachsucceedingannualmeetingatwhichanelectionofdirectorsisrequired,electdirectorstoholdofficeforatermexpiringnotlaterthanthecloseofthethirdannualmeetingofshareholdersfollowingtheelection.Cumulativevoting107Wherethearticlesprovideforcumulativevoting,
• (a)thearticlesshallrequireafixednumberandnotaminimumandmaximumnumberofdirectors;
• (b)eachshareholderentitledtovoteatanelectionofdirectorshastherighttocastanumberofvotesequaltothenumberofvotesattachedtothesharesheldbytheshareholdermultipliedbythenumberofdirectorstobeelected,andmaycastallofthosevotesinfavourofonecandidateordistributethemamongthecandidatesinanymanner;
• (c)aseparatevoteofshareholdersshallbetakenwithrespecttoeachcandidatenominatedfordirectorunlessaresolutionispassedunanimouslypermittingtwoormorepersonstobeelectedbyasingleresolution;
• (d)ifashareholderhasvotedformorethanonecandidatewithoutspecifyingthedistributionofvotes,theshareholderisdeemedtohavedistributedthevotesequallyamongthosecandidates;
• (e)ifthenumberofcandidatesnominatedfordirectorexceedsthenumberofpositionstobefilled,thecandidateswhoreceivetheleastnumberofvotesshallbeeliminateduntilthenumberofcandidatesremainingequalsthenumberofpositionstobefilled;
• (f)eachdirectorceasestoholdofficeatthecloseofthefirstannualmeetingofshareholdersfollowingthedirector’selection;
• (g)adirectormayberemovedfromofficeonlyifthenumberofvotescastinfavourofthedirector’sremovalisgreaterthantheproductofthenumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticlesandthenumberofvotescastagainstthemotion;and
• (h)thenumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticlesmaybedecreasedonlyifthevotescastinfavourofthemotiontodecreasethenumberofdirectorsisgreaterthantheproductofthenumberofdirectorsrequiredbythearticlesandthenumberofvotescastagainstthemotion.
Removalofdirectors109(1)Subjecttoparagraph107(g),theshareholdersofacorporationmaybyordinaryresolutionataspecialmeetingremoveanydirectorordirectorsfromoffice.Classdirector111(3)Iftheholdersofanyclassorseriesofsharesofacorporationhaveanexclusiverighttoelectoneormoredirectorsandavacancyoccursamongthosedirectors,
• (a)subjecttosubsection(4),theremainingdirectorselectedbytheholdersofthatclassorseriesofsharesmayfillthevacancyexceptavacancyresultingfromanincreaseinthenumberortheminimumormaximumnumberofdirectorsforthatclassorseriesorfromafailuretoelectthenumberorminimumnumberofdirectorsprovidedforinthearticlesforthatclassorseries;or
• (b)iftherearenoremainingdirectorsanyholderofsharesofthatclassorseriesmaycallameetingoftheholdersofsharesofthatclassorseriesforthepurposeoffillingthevacancy.
Confirmationbyshareholders120(7.1)Eveniftheconditionsofsubsection(7)arenotmet,adirectororofficer,actinghonestlyandingoodfaith,isnotaccountabletothecorporationortoitsshareholdersforanyprofitrealizedfromacontractortransactionforwhichdisclosureisrequiredundersubsection(1),andthecontractortransactionisnotinvalidbyreasononlyoftheinterestofthedirectororofficerinthecontractortransaction,if
• (a)thecontractortransactionisapprovedorconfirmedbyspecialresolutionatameetingoftheshareholders;
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• (b)disclosureoftheinterestwasmadetotheshareholdersinamannersufficienttoindicateitsnaturebeforethecontractortransactionwasapprovedorconfirmed;and
• (c)thecontractortransactionwasreasonableandfairtothecorporationwhenitwasapprovedorconfirmed.
ShareholdersPlaceofmeetings132(1)MeetingsofshareholdersofacorporationshallbeheldattheplacewithinCanadaprovidedintheby-lawsor,intheabsenceofsuchprovision,attheplacewithinCanadathatthedirectorsdetermine.MeetingoutsideCanada132(2)Despitesubsection(1),ameetingofshareholdersofacorporationmaybeheldataplaceoutsideCanadaiftheplaceisspecifiedinthearticlesoralltheshareholdersentitledtovoteatthemeetingagreethatthemeetingistobeheldatthatplace.Exception132(3)AshareholderwhoattendsameetingofshareholdersheldoutsideCanadaisdeemedtohaveagreedtoitbeingheldoutsideCanadaexceptwhentheshareholderattendsthemeetingfortheexpresspurposeofobjectingtothetransactionofanybusinessonthegroundsthatthemeetingisnotlawfullyheld.Participationinmeetingbyelectronicmeans132(4)Unlesstheby-lawsotherwiseprovide,anypersonentitledtoattendameetingofshareholdersmayparticipateinthemeeting,inaccordancewiththeregulations,ifany,bymeansofatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacilitythatpermitsallparticipantstocommunicateadequatelywitheachotherduringthemeeting,ifthecorporationmakesavailablesuchacommunicationfacility.ApersonparticipatinginameetingbysuchmeansisdeemedforthepurposesofthisActtobepresentatthemeeting.Meetingheldbyelectronicmeans132(5)IfthedirectorsortheshareholdersofacorporationcallameetingofshareholderspursuanttothisAct,thosedirectorsorshareholders,asthecasemaybe,maydeterminethatthemeetingshallbeheld,inaccordancewiththeregulations,ifany,entirelybymeansofatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacilitythatpermitsallparticipantstocommunicateadequatelywitheachotherduringthemeeting,iftheby-lawssoprovide.Callingannualmeetings133(1)Thedirectorsofacorporationshallcallanannualmeetingofshareholders
• (a)notlaterthaneighteenmonthsafterthecorporationcomesintoexistence;and• (b)subsequently,notlaterthanfifteenmonthsafterholdingthelastprecedingannualmeetingbut
nolaterthansixmonthsaftertheendofthecorporation’sprecedingfinancialyear.Noticeofmeeting135(1)Noticeofthetimeandplaceofameetingofshareholdersshallbesentwithintheprescribedperiodto
• (a)eachshareholderentitledtovoteatthemeeting;• (b)eachdirector;and• (c)theauditorofthecorporation.
Noticeofbusiness135(6)Noticeofameetingofshareholdersatwhichspecialbusinessistobetransactedshallstate
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• (a)thenatureofthatbusinessinsufficientdetailtopermittheshareholdertoformareasonedjudgmentthereon;and
• (b)thetextofanyspecialresolutiontobesubmittedtothemeeting.Proposals137(1)Subjecttosubsections(1.1)and(1.2),aregisteredholderorbeneficialownerofsharesthatareentitledtobevotedatanannualmeetingofshareholdersmay
• (a)submittothecorporationnoticeofanymatterthatthepersonproposestoraiseatthemeeting(a“proposal”);and
• (b)discussatthemeetinganymatterinrespectofwhichthepersonwouldhavebeenentitledtosubmitaproposal.
Quorum139(1)Unlesstheby-lawsotherwiseprovide,aquorumofshareholdersispresentatameetingofshareholders,irrespectiveofthenumberofpersonsactuallypresentatthemeeting,iftheholdersofamajorityofthesharesentitledtovoteatthemeetingarepresentinpersonorrepresentedbyproxy.Oneshareholdermeeting139(4)Ifacorporationhasonlyoneshareholder,oronlyoneholderofanyclassorseriesofshares,theshareholderpresentinpersonorbyproxyconstitutesameeting.Voting141(1)Unlesstheby-lawsotherwiseprovide,votingatameetingofshareholdersshallbebyshowofhandsexceptwhereaballotisdemandedbyashareholderorproxyholderentitledtovoteatthemeeting.Ballot141(2)Ashareholderorproxyholdermaydemandaballoteitherbeforeorafteranyvotebyshowofhands.Electronicvoting141(3)Despitesubsection(1),unlesstheby-lawsotherwiseprovide,anyvotereferredtoinsubsection(1)maybeheld,inaccordancewiththeregulations,ifany,entirelybymeansofatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacility,ifthecorporationmakesavailablesuchacommunicationfacility.Votingwhileparticipatingelectronically141(4)Unlesstheby-lawsotherwiseprovide,anypersonparticipatinginameetingofshareholdersundersubsection132(4)or(5)andentitledtovoteatthatmeetingmayvote,inaccordancewiththeregulations,ifany,bymeansofthetelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacilitythatthecorporationhasmadeavailableforthatpurpose.Resolutioninlieuofmeeting142(1)Exceptwhereawrittenstatementissubmittedbyadirectorundersubsection110(2)orbyanauditorundersubsection168(5),
• (a)aresolutioninwritingsignedbyalltheshareholdersentitledtovoteonthatresolutionatameetingofshareholdersisasvalidasifithadbeenpassedatameetingoftheshareholders;and
• (b)aresolutioninwritingdealingwithallmattersrequiredbythisActtobedealtwithatameetingofshareholders,andsignedbyalltheshareholdersentitledtovoteatthatmeeting,satisfiesalltherequirementsofthisActrelatingtomeetingsofshareholders.
Requisitionofmeeting
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143(1)Theholdersofnotlessthanfivepercentoftheissuedsharesofacorporationthatcarrytherighttovoteatameetingsoughttobeheldmayrequisitionthedirectorstocallameetingofshareholdersforthepurposesstatedintherequisition.Reimbursement143(6)Unlesstheshareholdersotherwiseresolveatameetingcalledundersubsection(4),thecorporationshallreimbursetheshareholderstheexpensesreasonablyincurredbytheminrequisitioning,callingandholdingthemeeting.Meetingcalledbycourt144(1)Acourt,ontheapplicationofadirector,ashareholderwhoisentitledtovoteatameetingofshareholdersortheDirector,mayorderameetingofacorporationtobecalled,heldandconductedinthemannerthatthecourtdirects,if
• (a)itisimpracticabletocallthemeetingwithinthetimeorinthemannerinwhichthosemeetingsaretobecalled;
• (b)itisimpracticabletoconductthemeetinginthemannerrequiredbythisActortheby-laws;or• (c)thecourtthinksthatthemeetingshouldbecalled,heldandconductedwithinthetimeorinthe
manneritdirectsforanyotherreason.Varyingquorum144(2)Withoutrestrictingthegeneralityofsubsection(1),thecourtmayorderthatthequorumrequiredbytheby-lawsorthisActbevariedordispensedwithatameetingcalled,heldandconductedpursuanttothissection.Validmeeting144(3)Ameetingcalled,heldandconductedpursuanttothissectionisforallpurposesameetingofshareholdersofthecorporationdulycalled,heldandconducted.Courtreviewofelection145(1)Acorporationorashareholderordirectormayapplytoacourttodetermineanycontroversywithrespecttoanelectionorappointmentofadirectororauditorofthecorporation.Powersofcourt145(2)Onanapplicationunderthissection,thecourtmaymakeanyorderitthinksfitincluding,withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,
• (a)anorderrestrainingadirectororauditorwhoseelectionorappointmentischallengedfromactingpendingdeterminationofthedispute;
• (b)anorderdeclaringtheresultofthedisputedelectionorappointment;• (c)anorderrequiringanewelectionorappointment,andincludingintheorderdirectionsforthe
managementofthebusinessandaffairsofthecorporationuntilanewelectionisheldorappointmentmade;and
• (d)anorderdeterminingthevotingrightsofshareholdersandofpersonsclaimingtoownshares.Poolingagreement145.1Awrittenagreementbetweentwoormoreshareholdersmayprovidethatinexercisingvotingrightsthesharesheldbythemshallbevotedasprovidedintheagreement.ProxiesDefinitions147InthisPart,formofproxymeansawrittenorprintedformthat,oncompletionandexecutionor,inQuebec,onsigningbyoronbehalfofashareholder,becomesaproxy;(formulairedeprocuration)
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intermediarymeansapersonwhoholdsasecurityonbehalfofanotherpersonwhoisnottheregisteredholderofthesecurity,andincludes
• (a)asecuritiesbrokerordealerrequiredtoberegisteredtotradeordealinsecuritiesunderthelawsofanyjurisdiction;
• (b)asecuritiesdepositary;• (c)afinancialinstitution;• (d)inrespectofaclearingagency,asecuritiesdealer,trustcompany,bankorotherperson,
includinganotherclearingagency,onwhosebehalftheclearingagencyoritsnomineesholdsecuritiesofanissuer;
• (e)atrusteeoradministratorofaself-administeredretirementsavingsplan,retirementincomefund,educationsavingsplanorothersimilarself-administeredsavingsorinvestmentplanregisteredundertheIncomeTaxAct;
• (f)anomineeofapersonreferredtoinanyofparagraphs(a)to(e);and• (g)apersonwhocarriesoutfunctionssimilartothosecarriedoutbyindividualsorentities
referredtoinanyofparagraphs(a)to(e)andthatholdsasecurityregisteredinitsname,orinthenameofitsnominee,onbehalfofanotherpersonwhoisnottheregisteredholderofthesecurity.(intermédiaire)
proxymeansacompletedandexecutedor,inQuebec,signedformofproxybymeansofwhichashareholderappointsaproxyholdertoattendandactontheshareholder’sbehalfatameetingofshareholders;(procuration)solicitorsolicitation
• (a)includeso (i)arequestforaproxywhetherornotaccompaniedbyorincludedinaformofproxy,o (ii)arequesttoexecuteornottoexecuteor,inQuebec,tosignornottosignaformof
proxyortorevokeaproxy,o (iii)thesendingofaformofproxyorothercommunicationtoashareholderunder
circumstancesreasonablycalculatedtoresultintheprocurement,withholdingorrevocationofaproxy,and
o (iv)thesendingofaformofproxytoashareholderundersection149;but• (b)doesnotinclude
o (i)thesendingofaformofproxyinresponsetoanunsolicitedrequestmadebyoronbehalfofashareholder,
o (ii)theperformanceofadministrativeactsorprofessionalservicesonbehalfofapersonsolicitingaproxy,
o (iii)thesendingbyanintermediaryofthedocumentsreferredtoinsection153,o (iv)asolicitationbyapersoninrespectofsharesofwhichthepersonisthebeneficial
owner,o (v)apublicannouncement,asprescribed,byashareholderofhowtheshareholder
intendstovoteandthereasonsforthatdecision,o (vi)acommunicationforthepurposesofobtainingthenumberofsharesrequiredfora
shareholderproposalundersubsection137(1.1),oro (vii)acommunication,otherthanasolicitationbyoronbehalfofthemanagementofthe
corporation,thatismadetoshareholders,inanycircumstancesthatmaybeprescribed;(sollicitation)
solicitationbyoronbehalfofthemanagementofacorporationmeansasolicitationbyanypersonpursuanttoaresolutionorinstructionsof,orwiththeacquiescenceof,thedirectorsoracommitteeofthedirectors.(sollicitationeffectuéeparladirectionoupoursoncompte)Appointingproxyholder148(1)Ashareholderentitledtovoteatameetingofshareholdersmaybymeansofaproxyappointaproxyholderoroneormorealternateproxyholderswhoarenotrequiredtobeshareholders,toattend
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andactatthemeetinginthemannerandtotheextentauthorizedbytheproxyandwiththeauthorityconferredbytheproxy.Executionorsigningofproxy(2)Aproxyshallbeexecutedor,inQuebec,signedbytheshareholderorbytheshareholder’spersonalrepresentativeauthorizedinwriting.Validityofproxy(3)Aproxyisvalidonlyatthemeetinginrespectofwhichitisgivenoranyadjournmentthereof.Revocationofproxy(4)Ashareholdermayrevokeaproxy
• (a)bydepositinganinstrumentoractinwritingexecutedor,inQuebec,signedbytheshareholderorbytheshareholder’spersonalrepresentativeauthorizedinwriting
o (i)attheregisteredofficeofthecorporationatanytimeuptoandincludingthelastbusinessdayprecedingthedayofthemeeting,oranadjournmentthereof,atwhichtheproxyistobeused,or
o (ii)withthechairmanofthemeetingonthedayofthemeetingoranadjournmentthereof;or
• (b)inanyothermannerpermittedbylaw.Depositofproxies(5)Thedirectorsmayspecifyinanoticecallingameetingofshareholdersatimenotmorethan48hours,excludingSaturdaysandholidays,beforethemeetingoradjournmentbeforewhichtimeproxiestobeusedatthemeetingmustbedepositedwiththecorporationoritsagentormandatary.Mandatorysolicitation149(1)Subjecttosubsection(2),themanagementofacorporationshall,concurrentlywithgivingnoticeofameetingofshareholders,sendaformofproxyinprescribedformtoeachshareholderwhoisentitledtoreceivenoticeofthemeeting.Exception(2)Themanagementofthecorporationisnotrequiredtosendaformofproxyundersubsection(1)ifit
• (a)isnotadistributingcorporation;and• (b)hasfiftyorfewershareholdersentitledtovoteatameeting,twoormorejointholdersbeing
countedasoneshareholder.Offence(3)Ifthemanagementofacorporationfailstocomply,withoutreasonablecause,withsubsection(1),thecorporationisguiltyofanoffenceandliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollars.Officers,etc.,ofcorporations(4)Whereacorporationcommitsanoffenceundersubsection(3),anydirectororofficerofthecorporationwhoknowinglyauthorized,permittedoracquiescedinthecommissionoftheoffenceisapartytoandguiltyoftheoffenceandisliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth,whetherornotthecorporationhasbeenprosecutedorconvicted.Solicitingproxies150(1)Apersonshallnotsolicitproxiesunless
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• (a)inthecaseofsolicitationbyoronbehalfofthemanagementofacorporation,amanagementproxycircularinprescribedform,eitherasanappendixtoorasaseparatedocumentaccompanyingthenoticeofthemeeting,or
• (b)inthecaseofanyothersolicitation,adissident’sproxycircularinprescribedformstatingthepurposesofthesolicitationissenttotheauditorofthecorporation,toeachshareholderwhoseproxyissolicited,toeachdirectorand,ifparagraph(b)applies,tothecorporation.
Exception—solicitationtofifteenorfewershareholders(1.1)Despitesubsection(1),apersonmaysolicitproxies,otherthanbyoronbehalfofthemanagementofthecorporation,withoutsendingadissident’sproxycircular,ifthetotalnumberofshareholderswhoseproxiesaresolicitedisfifteenorfewer,twoormorejointholdersbeingcountedasoneshareholder.Exception—solicitationbypublicbroadcast(1.2)Despitesubsection(1),apersonmaysolicitproxies,otherthanbyoronbehalfofthemanagementofthecorporation,withoutsendingadissident’sproxycircularifthesolicitationis,intheprescribedcircumstances,conveyedbypublicbroadcast,speechorpublication.CopytoDirector(2)Apersonrequiredtosendamanagementproxycircularordissident’sproxycircularshallsendconcurrentlyacopyofittotheDirectortogetherwithastatementinprescribedform,theformofproxy,anyotherdocumentsforuseinconnectionwiththemeetingand,inthecaseofamanagementproxycircular,acopyofthenoticeofmeeting.Offence(3)Apersonwhofailstocomplywithsubsections(1)and(2)isguiltyofanoffenceandliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth,whetherornotthebodycorporatehasbeenprosecutedorconvicted.Officers,etc.,ofbodiescorporate(4)Whereabodycorporatecommitsanoffenceundersubsection(3),anydirectororofficerofthebodycorporatewhoknowinglyauthorized,permittedoracquiescedinthecommissionoftheoffenceisapartytoandguiltyoftheoffenceandisliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth,whetherornotthebodycorporatehasbeenprosecutedorconvicted.Exemption151(1)Ontheapplicationofaninterestedperson,theDirectormayexempttheperson,onanytermsthattheDirectorthinksfit,fromanyoftherequirementsofsection149orsubsection150(1),whichexemptionmayhaveretrospectiveeffect.Publication(2)TheDirectorshallsetoutinapublicationgenerallyavailabletothepublictheparticularsofexemptionsgrantedunderthissectiontogetherwiththereasonsfortheexemptions.Attendanceatmeeting152(1)Apersonwhosolicitsaproxyandisappointedproxyholdershallattendinpersonorcauseanalternateproxyholdertoattendthemeetinginrespectofwhichtheproxyisgivenandcomplywiththedirectionsoftheshareholderwhoappointedhim.Rightofaproxyholder(2)Aproxyholderoranalternateproxyholderhasthesamerightsastheshareholderbywhomtheywereappointedtospeakatameetingofshareholdersinrespectofanymatter,tovotebywayofballotatthe
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meetingand,exceptwhereaproxyholderoranalternateproxyholderhasconflictinginstructionsfrommorethanoneshareholder,tovoteatsuchameetinginrespectofanymatterbywayofanyshowofhands.Showofhands(3)Despitesubsections(1)and(2),ifthechairpersonofameetingofshareholdersdeclarestothemeetingthat,ifaballotisconducted,thetotalnumberofvotesattachedtosharesrepresentedatthemeetingbyproxyrequiredtobevotedagainstwhattotheknowledgeofthechairpersonwillbethedecisionofthemeetinginrelationtoanymatterorgroupofmattersislessthanfivepercentofallthevotesthatmightbecastbyshareholderspersonallyorthroughproxyatthemeetingontheballot,unlessashareholderorproxyholderdemandsaballot,
• (a)thechairpersonmayconductthevoteinrespectofthatmatterorgroupofmattersbyashowofhands;and
• (b)aproxyholderoralternateproxyholdermayvoteinrespectofthatmatterorgroupofmattersbyashowofhands.
Offence(4)Aproxyholderoralternateproxyholderwhowithoutreasonablecausefailstocomplywiththedirectionsofashareholderunderthissectionisguiltyofanoffenceandliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth.Dutyofintermediary153(1)Sharesofacorporationthatareregisteredinthenameofanintermediaryortheirnomineeandnotbeneficiallyownedbytheintermediarymustnotbevotedunlesstheintermediary,withoutdelayafterreceiptofthenoticeofthemeeting,financialstatements,managementproxycircular,dissident’sproxycircularandanyotherdocumentsotherthantheformofproxysenttoshareholdersbyoronbehalfofanypersonforuseinconnectionwiththemeeting,sendsacopyofthedocumenttothebeneficialownerand,exceptwhentheintermediaryhasreceivedwrittenvotinginstructionsfromthebeneficialowner,awrittenrequestforsuchinstructions.Restrictiononvoting(2)Anintermediary,oraproxyholderappointedbyanintermediary,maynotvotesharesthattheintermediarydoesnotbeneficiallyownandthatareregisteredinthenameoftheintermediaryorinthenameofanomineeoftheintermediaryunlesstheintermediaryorproxyholder,asthecasemaybe,receiveswrittenvotinginstructionsfromthebeneficialowner.Copies(3)Apersonbyoronbehalfofwhomasolicitationismadeshallprovide,attherequestofanintermediary,withoutdelay,totheintermediaryattheperson’sexpensethenecessarynumberofcopiesofthedocumentsreferredtoinsubsection(1),otherthancopiesofthedocumentrequestingvotinginstructions.Instructionstointermediary(4)Anintermediaryshallvoteorappointaproxyholdertovoteanysharesreferredtoinsubsection(1)inaccordancewithanywrittenvotinginstructionsreceivedfromthebeneficialowner.Beneficialownerasproxyholder(5)Ifabeneficialownersorequestsandprovidesanintermediarywithappropriatedocumentation,theintermediarymustappointthebeneficialowneroranomineeofthebeneficialownerasproxyholder.Validity
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(6)Thefailureofanintermediarytocomplywiththissectiondoesnotrendervoidanymeetingofshareholdersoranyactiontakenatthemeeting.Limitation(7)Nothinginthissectiongivesanintermediarytherighttovotesharesthattheintermediaryisotherwiseprohibitedfromvoting.Offence(8)Anintermediarywhoknowinglyfailstocomplywiththissectionisguiltyofanoffenceandliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth.Officers,etc.,ofbodiescorporate(9)Ifanintermediarythatisabodycorporatecommitsanoffenceundersubsection(8),anydirectororofficerofthebodycorporatewhoknowinglyauthorized,permittedoracquiescedinthecommissionoftheoffenceisapartytoandguiltyoftheoffenceandisliableonsummaryconvictiontoafinenotexceedingfivethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingsixmonthsortoboth,whetherornotthebodycorporatehasbeenprosecutedorconvicted.Restrainingorder154(1)Ifaformofproxy,managementproxycircularordissident’sproxycircularcontainsanuntruestatementofamaterialfactoromitstostateamaterialfactrequiredthereinornecessarytomakeastatementcontainedthereinnotmisleadinginthelightofthecircumstancesinwhichitwasmade,aninterestedpersonortheDirectormayapplytoacourtandthecourtmaymakeanyorderitthinksfitincluding,withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,
• (a)anorderrestrainingthesolicitation,theholdingofthemeeting,oranypersonfromimplementingoractingonanyresolutionpassedatthemeetingtowhichtheformofproxy,managementproxycircularordissident’sproxycircularrelates;
• (b)anorderrequiringcorrectionofanyformofproxyorproxycircularandafurthersolicitation;and
• (c)anorderadjourningthemeeting.NoticetoDirector(2)AnapplicantunderthissectionshallgivetotheDirectornoticeoftheapplicationandtheDirectorisentitledtoappearandtobeheardinpersonorbycounsel.FinancialDisclosureAnnualfinancialstatements155(1)Subjecttosection156,thedirectorsofacorporationshallplacebeforetheshareholdersateveryannualmeeting
• (a)comparativefinancialstatementsasprescribedrelatingseparatelytoo (i)theperiodthatbeganonthedatethecorporationcameintoexistenceandendednot
morethansixmonthsbeforetheannualmeetingor,ifthecorporationhascompletedafinancialyear,theperiodthatbeganimmediatelyaftertheendofthelastcompletedfinancialyearandendednotmorethansixmonthsbeforetheannualmeeting,and
o (ii)theimmediatelyprecedingfinancialyear;• (b)thereportoftheauditor,ifany;and• (c)anyfurtherinformationrespectingthefinancialpositionofthecorporationandtheresultsof
itsoperationsrequiredbythearticles,theby-lawsoranyunanimousshareholderagreement.Consolidatedstatements
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157(1)Acorporationshallkeepatitsregisteredofficeacopyofthefinancialstatementsofeachofitssubsidiarybodiescorporateandofeachbodycorporatetheaccountsofwhichareconsolidatedinthefinancialstatementsofthecorporation.Examination157(2)Shareholdersofacorporationandtheirpersonalrepresentativesmayonrequestexaminethestatementsreferredtoinsubsection(1)duringtheusualbusinesshoursofthecorporationandmaymakeextractsfreeofcharge.Qualificationofauditor161(1)Subjecttosubsection(5),apersonisdisqualifiedfrombeinganauditorofacorporationifthepersonisnotindependentofthecorporation,anyofitsaffiliates,orthedirectorsorofficersofanysuchcorporationoritsaffiliates.Appointmentofauditor162(1)Subjecttosection163,shareholdersofacorporationshall,byordinaryresolution,atthefirstannualmeetingofshareholdersandateachsucceedingannualmeeting,appointanauditortoholdofficeuntilthecloseofthenextannualmeeting.Dispensingwithauditor163(1)Theshareholdersofacorporationthatisnotadistributingcorporationmayresolvenottoappointanauditor.Limitation163(2)Aresolutionundersubsection(1)isvalidonlyuntilthenextsucceedingannualmeetingofshareholders.Unanimousconsent163(3)Aresolutionundersubsection(1)isnotvalidunlessitisconsentedtobyalltheshareholders,includingshareholdersnototherwiseentitledtovote.Righttoinformation170(1)Onthedemandofanauditorofacorporation,thepresentorformerdirectors,officers,employees,agentsormandatariesofthecorporationshallprovideany
• (a)informationandexplanations,and• (b)accesstorecords,documents,books,accountsandvouchersofthecorporationoranyofits
subsidiariesthatare,intheopinionoftheauditor,necessarytoenabletheauditortomaketheexaminationandreportrequiredundersection169andthatthedirectors,officers,employees,agentsormandatariesarereasonablyabletoprovide.
Idem(2)Onthedemandoftheauditorofacorporation,thedirectorsofthecorporationshall
• (a)obtainfromthepresentorformerdirectors,officers,employeesandagentsormandatariesofanysubsidiaryofthecorporationtheinformationandexplanationsthatthepresentorformerdirectors,officers,employeesandagentsormandatariesarereasonablyabletoprovideandthatare,intheopinionoftheauditor,necessarytoenabletheauditortomaketheexaminationandreportrequiredundersection169;and
• (b)furnishtheauditorwiththeinformationandexplanationssoobtained.FundamentalChangesAmendmentofarticles173(1)Subjecttosections176and177,thearticlesofacorporationmaybyspecialresolutionbeamendedto
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• (a)changeitsname;• (b)changetheprovinceinwhichitsregisteredofficeissituated;• (c)add,changeorremoveanyrestrictiononthebusinessorbusinessesthatthecorporationmay
carryon;• (d)changeanymaximumnumberofsharesthatthecorporationisauthorizedtoissue;• (e)createnewclassesofshares;• (f)reduceorincreaseitsstatedcapital,ifitsstatedcapitalissetoutinthearticles;• (g)changethedesignationofalloranyofitsshares,andadd,changeorremoveanyrights,
privileges,restrictionsandconditions,includingrightstoaccrueddividends,inrespectofalloranyofitsshares,whetherissuedorunissued;
• (h)changethesharesofanyclassorseries,whetherissuedorunissued,intoadifferentnumberofsharesofthesameclassorseriesorintothesameoradifferentnumberofsharesofotherclassesorseries;
• (i)divideaclassofshares,whetherissuedorunissued,intoseriesandfixthenumberofsharesineachseriesandtherights,privileges,restrictionsandconditionsthereof;
• (j)authorizethedirectorstodivideanyclassofunissuedsharesintoseriesandfixthenumberofsharesineachseriesandtherights,privileges,restrictionsandconditionsthereof;
• (k)authorizethedirectorstochangetherights,privileges,restrictionsandconditionsattachedtounissuedsharesofanyseries;
• (l)revoke,diminishorenlargeanyauthorityconferredunderparagraphs(j)and(k);• (m)increaseordecreasethenumberofdirectorsortheminimumormaximumnumberof
directors,subjecttosections107and112;• (n)add,changeorremoverestrictionsontheissue,transferorownershipofshares;or• (o)add,changeorremoveanyotherprovisionthatispermittedbythisActtobesetoutinthe
articles.Noticeofamendment175(2)Noticeofameetingofshareholdersatwhichaproposaltoamendthearticlesistobeconsideredshallsetouttheproposedamendmentand,whereapplicable,shallstatethatadissentingshareholderisentitledtobepaidthefairvalueoftheirsharesinaccordancewithsection190,butfailuretomakethatstatementdoesnotinvalidateanamendment.Classvote176(1)Theholdersofsharesofaclassor,subjecttosubsection(4),ofaseriesare,unlessthearticlesotherwiseprovideinthecaseofanamendmentreferredtoinparagraphs(a),(b)and(e),entitledtovoteseparatelyasaclassorseriesonaproposaltoamendthearticlesto
• (a)increaseordecreaseanymaximumnumberofauthorizedsharesofsuchclass,orincreaseanymaximumnumberofauthorizedsharesofaclasshavingrightsorprivilegesequalorsuperiortothesharesofsuchclass;
• (b)effectanexchange,reclassificationorcancellationofallorpartofthesharesofsuchclass;• (c)add,changeorremovetherights,privileges,restrictionsorconditionsattachedtothesharesof
suchclassand,withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,o (i)removeorchangeprejudiciallyrightstoaccrueddividendsorrightstocumulative
dividends,o (ii)add,removeorchangeprejudiciallyredemptionrights,o (iii)reduceorremoveadividendpreferenceoraliquidationpreference,oro (iv)add,removeorchangeprejudiciallyconversionprivileges,options,voting,transferor
pre-emptiverights,orrightstoacquiresecuritiesofacorporation,orsinkingfundprovisions;
• (d)increasetherightsorprivilegesofanyclassofshareshavingrightsorprivilegesequalorsuperiortothesharesofsuchclass;
• (e)createanewclassofsharesequalorsuperiortothesharesofsuchclass;
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• (f)makeanyclassofshareshavingrightsorprivilegesinferiortothesharesofsuchclassequalorsuperiortothesharesofsuchclass;
• (g)effectanexchangeorcreatearightofexchangeofallorpartofthesharesofanotherclassintothesharesofsuchclass;or
• (h)constraintheissue,transferorownershipofthesharesofsuchclassorchangeorremovesuchconstraint.
Extraordinarysale,leaseorexchange189(3)Asale,leaseorexchangeofallorsubstantiallyallthepropertyofacorporationotherthanintheordinarycourseofbusinessofthecorporationrequirestheapprovaloftheshareholdersinaccordancewithsubsections(4)to(8).Proposingliquidationanddissolution211(1)Thedirectorsmaypropose,orashareholderwhoisentitledtovoteatanannualmeetingofshareholdersmay,inaccordancewithsection137,makeaproposalfor,thevoluntaryliquidationanddissolutionofacorporation.CanadaBusinessCorporationsRegulationsNoticeofMeetings44Forthepurposeofsubsection135(1)oftheAct,theprescribedperiodforthedirectorstoprovidenoticeofthetimeandplaceofameetingofshareholdersisnotlessthan21daysandnotmorethan60daysbeforethemeeting.CommunicationFacilities45(1)Forthepurposeofsubsection141(3)oftheAct,whenavoteistobetakenatameetingofshareholders,thevotingmaybecarriedoutbymeansofatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacility,ifthefacility
• (a)enablesthevotestobegatheredinamannerthatpermitstheirsubsequentverification;and• (b)permitsthetalliedvotestobepresentedtothecorporationwithoutitbeingpossibleforthe
corporationtoidentifyhoweachshareholderorgroupofshareholdersvoted.(2)Forthepurposeofsubsection141(4)oftheAct,apersonwhoisentitledtovoteatameetingofshareholdersmayvotebymeansofatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacility,ifthefacility
• (a)enablesthevotetobegatheredinamannerthatpermitsitssubsequentverification;and• (b)permitsthetalliedvotetobepresentedtothecorporationwithoutitbeingpossibleforthe
corporationtoidentifyhowthepersonvoted.PART6ShareholderProposals46Forthepurposeofsubsection137(1.1)oftheAct,
• (a)theprescribednumberofsharesisthenumberofvotingshareso (i)thatisequalto1%ofthetotalnumberoftheoutstandingvotingsharesofthe
corporation,asofthedayonwhichtheshareholdersubmitsaproposal,oro (ii)whosefairmarketvalue,asdeterminedatthecloseofbusinessonthedaybeforethe
shareholdersubmitstheproposaltothecorporation,isatleast$2,000;and• (b)theprescribedperiodisthesix-monthperiodimmediatelybeforethedayonwhichthe
shareholdersubmitstheproposal.
47Forthepurposeofsubsection137(1.4)oftheAct,• (a)acorporationmayrequestthatashareholderprovidetheproofreferredtointhatsubsection
within14daysafterthecorporationreceivestheshareholder’sproposal;and
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• (b)theshareholdershallprovidetheproofwithin21daysafterthedayonwhichtheshareholderreceivesthecorporation’srequestor,iftherequestwasmailedtotheshareholder,within21daysafterthepostmarkdatestampedontheenvelopecontainingtherequest.
ProxiesandProxySolicitationFormofProxy54Forthepurposeofsubsection149(1)oftheAct,aformofproxyshallbeintheformprovidedforinsection9.4(ContentofFormofProxy)ofNI51-102.ManagementProxyCircular55(1)Subjecttosubsection(3),amanagementproxycircularshallbeintheformprovidedforinForm51-102F5(InformationCircular)ofNI51-102,whichform,inthecircumstancesdescribedinItem8ofPart2ofthatForm,includesthestatementreferredtointhatItem.(2)Amanagementproxycircularshallalsosetoutthefollowing:
• (a)thepercentageofvotesrequiredfortheapprovalofanymatterthatistobesubmittedtoavoteofshareholdersatthemeeting,otherthantheelectionofdirectors;
• (b)astatementoftherightofashareholdertodissentundersection190oftheActwithrespecttoanymattertobeactedonatthemeetingandabriefsummaryoftheproceduretobefollowedtoexercisethatright;
• (c)astatement,signedbyadirectororanofficerofthecorporation,thatthecontentsandthesendingofthecircularhavebeenapprovedbythedirectors;and
• (d)astatementindicatingthefinaldatebywhichthecorporationmustreceiveaproposalforthepurposeofparagraph137(5)(a)oftheAct.
(3)Amanagementproxycircularforanon-distributingcorporationisnotrequiredtosetouttheinformationprovidedforinPart1(c)orItem9,10or16ofPart2ofForm51-102F5(InformationCircular)ofNI51-102,orthestatementreferredtoinItem8ofPart2ofthatForm.56Forthepurposeofsubsection150(2)oftheAct,theprescribedformofstatementthatshallaccompanythecopyofthemanagementproxycirculartobesenttotheDirectorunderthatsubsectionisastatementsignedbyadirectororanofficerofthecorporation,totheeffectthatacopyofthecircularhasbeensenttoeachdirector,toeachshareholderwhoseproxyhasbeensolicitedandtotheauditorofthecorporation.Dissident’sProxyCircular57(1)Adissident’sproxycircularshallbeintheformprovidedforinForm51-102F5(InformationCircular)ofNI51-102,whichform,inthecircumstancesdescribedinItem8ofPart2ofthatForm,includesthestatementreferredtointhatItem.(2)Adissident’sproxycircularforanon-distributingcorporationisnotrequiredtosetouttheinformationprovidedforinPart1(c)orItem9,10or16ofPart2ofForm51-102F5(InformationCircular)ofNI51-102,orthestatementreferredtoinItem8ofPart2ofthatForm.63Informationthatisnotknowntoadissidentandthatcannotbeascertainedbythemonreasonableinquirymaybeomittedfromadissident’sproxycircular,butthecircumstancesthatrendertheinformationunavailableshallbedisclosedintheproxycircular.64(1)Adissident’sproxycircularshallcontainastatementsignedbythedissidentorapersonauthorizedbythemthatthecontentsandthesendingofthecircularhavebeenapprovedbythedissident.(2)Forthepurposeofsubsection150(2)oftheAct,theprescribedformofstatementthatshallaccompanythecopyofthedissident’sproxycirculartobesenttotheDirectorunderthatsubsectionisastatementsignedbythedissidentorapersonauthorizedbythem,totheeffectthatacopyofthecircularhasbeensenttoeachdirector,toeachshareholderwhoseproxyhasbeensolicited,totheauditorofthecorporationandtothecorporation.
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FinancialStatementsinProxyCircular66(1)Iffinancialstatementsaccompanyorformpartofamanagementproxycircular,thestatementsshallbepreparedinthemannerdescribedinPart8.(2)Thefinancialstatementsreferredtoinsubsection(1),ifnotreportedonbytheauditorofthecorporation,shallbeaccompaniedbyareportofthechieffinancialofficerofthecorporationstatingthatthefinancialstatementshavenotbeenauditedbuthavebeenpreparedinthemannerdescribedinPart8.ProxyCircularExemptions67Forthepurposeofsubparagraph(b)(v)ofthedefinitionsolicitorsolicitationinsection147oftheAct,asolicitationdoesnotincludeapublicannouncementthatismadeby
• (a)aspeechinapublicforum;or• (b)apressrelease,anopinion,astatementoranadvertisementprovidedthroughabroadcast
mediumorbyatelephonic,electronicorothercommunicationfacility,orappearinginanewspaper,amagazineorotherpublicationgenerallyavailabletothepublic.
68(1)Forthepurposeofsubparagraph(b)(vii)ofthedefinitionsolicitorsolicitationinsection147oftheAct,theprescribedcircumstancesarecircumstancesinwhichthecommunicationismadetoshareholders
• (a)byoneormoreshareholdersandconcernsthebusinessandaffairsofacorporation—includingitsmanagementorproposalscontainedinamanagementproxycircular—andnoformofproxyissenttothoseshareholdersbytheshareholderorshareholdersmakingthecommunicationorbyapersonactingontheirbehalf;
• (b)byoneormoreshareholdersandconcernstheorganizationofadissident’sproxysolicitation,andnoformofproxyissenttothoseshareholdersbytheshareholderorshareholdersmakingthecommunicationorbyapersonactingontheirbehalf;
• (c)asclients,byapersonwhogivesfinancial,corporategovernanceorproxyvotingadviceintheordinarycourseofbusinessandconcernsproxyvotingadviceif
o (i)thepersondisclosestotheshareholderanysignificantrelationshipwiththecorporationandanyofitsaffiliatesorwithashareholderwhohassubmittedaproposalpursuanttosubsection137(1)oftheActandanymaterialintereststhepersonhasinrelationtoamatteronwhichadviceisgiven,
o (ii)thepersonreceivesanyspecialcommissionorremunerationforgivingtheproxyvotingadviceonlyfromtheshareholderorshareholdersreceivingtheadvice,and
o (iii)theproxyvotingadviceisnotgivenonbehalfofanypersonsolicitingproxiesoronbehalfofanomineeforelectionasadirector;or
• (d)byapersonwhodoesnotseekdirectlyorindirectly,thepowertoactasproxyforashareholder.
(2)Thecircumstancesdescribedinparagraph(1)(a)arenotprescribedcircumstancesifthecommunicationismadeby
• (a)ashareholderwhoisanofficerordirectorofthecorporation,orwhoservesinasimilarcapacity,ifthecommunicationisfinanceddirectlyorindirectlybythecorporation;
• (b)ashareholderwhoisanomineeorwhoproposesanomineeforelectionasadirector,ifthecommunicationrelatestotheelectionofdirectors;
• (c)ashareholderwhosecommunicationisinoppositiontoanamalgamation,arrangement,consolidationorothertransactionrecommendedorapprovedbytheboardofdirectorsofthecorporationandwhoisproposingorintendstoproposeanalternativetransactiontowhichtheshareholderoranaffiliateorassociateoftheshareholderisaparty;
• (d)ashareholderwho,becauseofamaterialinterestinthesubject-mattertobevotedonatashareholdersmeeting,islikelytoreceiveabenefitfromitsapprovalornon-approval,whichbenefitwouldnotbesharedproratabyallotherholdersofthesameclassofshares,unlessthebenefitarisesfromtheshareholder’semploymentwiththecorporation;or
• (e)anypersonactingonbehalfofashareholderdescribedinanyofparagraphs(a)to(d).
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69(1)Forthepurposeofsubsection150(1.2)oftheAct,theprescribedcircumstancesarethoseinwhichthesolicitationconveyedbypublicbroadcast,speechorpublicationsetsouttheinformationprovidedforinItems3.2,3.4,5(b)and11ofPart2ofForm51-102F5(InformationCircular)ofNI51-102.(2)Apersonmakingasolicitationreferredtoinsubsection(1)shallsendtherequiredinformationandacopyofanyrelatedwrittencommunicationtotheDirectorandtothecorporationbeforesolicitingproxies.Introduction
• Shareholdershavesignificantlegalpowerandtheywielditlargelythroughtherighttovote.• Shareholdervotingisthesolutiontotheproblemofhowtodecideoncollectivecourseofaction.• Theyhavevotingrightsattachedtoshares.Makedecisionsindividuallyandasagroup.• Usuallyseenwithbothboardsofdirectorsandshareholders.
o Butnote,directorseachgetonevotewhileshareholdersgetonevoteforeverysharetheyown.
• Howpracticallysignificantisit?o Willdependonnatureofcorporationandhowsharesareheldinthecorporation.
• Shareholdercontrolisindirectanditishighlyspecific/particularized.o Indirect–evenifshareholdersareinthemajority,theydon’thaveinputontheday-to-day
operationsofthecompany.o Particularized–it’snotbroadlikethepowersofdirectors.It’snarrower.Thematters
reservedtotheirdecision-makingarenarrowandspecifiedbythecorporateconstitution.§ Righttovoteinandvoteoutdirectors§ Improveamendmentstocorporateconstitution§ Votetoelectionofindependentauditor
• Votingpowerisexercisedgenerallythroughmajorityrule.o Specialmajorityandunanimitywillapplyinrarecases.
• Shareholderscanalsomakedecisionsthroughunanimousshareholderagreements–don’tneedtodecidethroughvotingatmeetings.
o Importantcost-savingdevice,especiallyforsmallercorporations.• Thosewhoareentitledtoparticipateindecisionsbymajorityruleareprotectedbycertain
safeguards:o Requirementthatthedecisionbemadeatameeting.
§ Righttobenotifiedofallmeetings.§ Barronv.Potter(1914)
• Wasn’tameetingjustbecausePottersaiditwas(BarronwasinataxiandPotterwasrunningalongbesideit).
§ So,requirementthatmeetinghasatleasttwopeopleinattendance(unlessauthorizedbystatuteorcorporateconstitution).
§ Alsoneedtohavecommonpurposeforthemeeting–notjustsomethingthathappensbychance.
(1)PerennialProblemsofShareholderControl
• Conflictre:howcorporationshouldbegoverned.• Conflictre:minorityshareholdersfeelinglikethemajorityistryingtoappropriatevalueat
expenseofminorityshareholders.• Conflictre:feelinglikemajorityshareholdersareoverreaching,tryingtopissoff/abuseminority
shareholders.
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(2)Directors
• Generallyboardmustactinthesettingofameeting,withaquorumpresent,followingnoticeofthemeetingbeingprovidedtodirectors.
• Adecisioncanbemadewithoutameeting,butonlyifthedecisionisinwritinganditisunanimous(CBCA117).
• Ifthereisonlyonedirector,theycanactunilaterallyonthebasisofunanimity(CBCA117)orthatthey“mayconstituteameeting”(CBCA114(8)).
(3)Shareholders
• Inanidealizedcontext,shareholderpowerasagroupseemsprettysignificant.Inreality,however,large,widelyheldcorporationshaveahugenumberofsharesthatmakesshareholdercontrolmythical.
o Shareholdershaverightsbutdonotexercisetheminawaythatwillmateriallyinfluencethewayinwhichbusinessisdone.
o Why?Apathy,ignorance,lackofincentive,etc…o Ifyou’readiversifiedshareholder,youholdalittleinalotofdifferentcorporations,you
willtendtobepassiveinalargepubliclytradedcorporation.o Thisisnottrueofshareholdersinsmallcorporations–willbeveryengaged.
• Certainshareholderrightsareancillarytovoting:righttocallmeetings,topresentnon-bindingshareholderproposalsforvote,toinformation,etc…
(4)ResponsestoProblemsre:shareholders
• Abuseandapathyaremainproblemsre:shareholdercontrol.• Lawreformershavebeenveryconcernedaboutthisandhavetakenpolicyaction.• Introductionofstatutoryoppressionremedy.
(5)SHAREHOLDERMEETINGS
• CBCAprovidesthattheycancall“annualmeetings”(CBCA133(a)).• Mainitemsofordinarybusiness:
o Electionofdirectorso Approvalofbylaws(CBCA103(2))o Disclosurebydirectorstoshareholdersre:corporation’sfinancialposition(CBCA155)o Appointmentoftheauditor(CBCA162)
a)Noticerequirements
• SeeCBCA132-138• Issuesre:notice–who,howmuch,when,whatkindofinfointhenotice?• Shareholderswhowillhaveavoteonthematterstobediscussedatthemeetingmustbegiven
noticeandsotoomustdirectorsandtheauditor(CBCA135(1)).SeeGarvie.o Whataboutnon-votingshareholders?Dotheyneednotice?
• Timing–CBCAsetsoutminimumandmaximumnumberofdaysofnoticerequired(seeCBCA135(1)re:regulations,s.44whichstatesminimum21days,maximum60days).
• Noticeisadequateonlywherenoticeissuchthatitprovidesshareholderswithsufficient,detailed,andcomprehensibleknowledgetoenablethemtodecidethematterfordecisionandtoenablethemtoactuallyreachadecision.
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Garviev.Axmith(1961)Facts
• SomeshareholdersofAdidn’treceivenoticere:shareholdermeetingandapplyforinjunctiontostoptheresolutionsadoptedatthemeetingonthegroundsthattherewasnoproper/adequatenotice.
Issue• Wasthereadequatenotice?No.
Reasoning• Noticeshouldbeshareholdersinapositionwhereeachcanjudgeforthemselveswhetherthey
wouldconsenttothedecisionsproposed.• Enoughmaterialneedstobeprovidedalongwiththenotice,namelyenoughtogivethecommon
shareholdertheabilitytoappreciatethefullandcompleteresultoftheadoptionoftheplan.• Here,withoutadequateexplanation,wasn’tpossibleforshareholderstocometointelligent
conclusionre:whethertheyshouldfavouroropposethetransaction.Thatistherightoftheshareholderandthismustbeaccordedtohiminthenoticeofthemeetingsenttohim.
Ratio• Giveadequatenotice,fool.Gottabeabletoknowwhat’supatthemeeting.
Notes• Requirementthateverymattertobeacteduponinthemeetingbeproperlyidentified.• Requirementthatallmatterstobeacteduponmustbesufficientlydescribedtopermit
shareholderstoformareasonedjudgment.b)Locationofmeetings
• Generalrulethattheymustbeheldwithinthejurisdictionofincorporation,buttherecanbeexceptionsinthearticlesorifthereisunanimousconsent(CBCA132).
o So,CBCAcorporationsmustholdmeetingsinCanada.• Ifbylawsspecifyspecificplace(e.g.city,usuallywhereheadquartersare)thenitmustbeheld
there.ReCanadaResourcesLtd.andMinisterofConsumerandCommercialRelations(1978)Facts
• SchemeadoptedatmeetingofcompanythathappenedinCalgary,buttheletterspatentofthecorporationsaytheheadquartersareinToronto.
Issue• Istheschemeinvalidbecauseofthelocationofthemeeting?Yes.
Reasoning• Section194(2)statesthatthecorporationmustsubmittheschemetoshareholdersatameeting
dulycalledbythecorporationforthepurposeofconsideringthescheme.o “Duly”isimportanthere–denotesthatlegislatureintendedcorporationstostrictlyfollow
theprovisionsofthestatute.• Lotsofevidencethattheoutcomewouldhavebeenthesameirrespectiveoflocationofmeeting.
o But,doesn’tmatter–nowaytobesure.• Can’tacceptthisargumentbecauseifwediditwouldimplythattheproceedingsatmeetingsare
reallyjustaformality.o “Afundamentalunderlyingassumptionofourcorporatelawisthatmeetingsof
shareholdersmaybeofsignificance,evenwhereoneshareholdersoragroupownsapredominantportionoftheshares.”
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c)Votingatameeting
• Quorumo CBCA139(1)and(4)o Unlessbylawsprovideotherwise,quorumisestablishedwheremajorityofshareholders
withrighttovotearepresentinpersonorthroughproxy.• Methodofvoting
o CBCA141o Unlessbylawsspecifyotherwise,shareholdersusuallyvotebyraisingtheirhands(CBCA
141(1))orbyballot.Thisispershareholder,notpershare.o Votingcanalsobeelectronic.
• Importanceofprocedureo Complaintaboutameetingre:improprietyofprocedure–whatisacourtsupposedtodo?
Orderanewmeetingtobeheld?o MacDougallv.Gardner–handsoffapproacho Penderv.Lushington–moreactiveapproachtodealingwithprocedural
MacDougallv.Gardner(1875,UK)
• Handsoff,deferentialapproachunderUKCMLeventhoughtherewasclearabuseofoutcome.• Madedecisionbecausetherewasnopointinseizingupontheprocedural• Courtwasassuredthatimproprietyhadnopracticaleffect,sogaveitallapass.
Penderv.Lushington(1877,UK)Facts
• Wasanotherclearinstanceofproceduralimpropriety.Reasoning
• Importantthatcourtsresolveandtakeseriouslyissuesofproceduralimproprietyeveniftheoutcomewon’tchangeasaresultoftheproceduralimpropriety.Ifwedisregardit(evenifitwon’thaveanimpact)what’sthewholepointofprocedureandthesafeguardsitoffers?
Notes• Thisistheapproachthatreflectsmodernlaw–courtsareveryconcernedwithprocedural
impropriety.d)Proxyvoting
• Shareholdersinlargecorporationsarerationallyapatheticbecausetheyhavesuchasmallstakeinthecorporation.
o So,becauseofthat,we’veseenthatonlyasmallproportionofshareholdersshowuptolargecorporationmeetings.
• Policymakersthenbecameveryconcerned.o So,triedtomakeiteasierandcheaperforshareholderstomaketheirvoicesheard.Don’t
makethemshowupinpersonandtravel.Instead,canappointanagent,aproxy.• Proxyvotingallowsashareholdertoauthorizesomeoneelsetocasthis/hervote(s).• SeeCBCA147-154
o 148(1)–Shareholdershavearighttoappointproxy.Authorizedbystatute.o 148(4)–Ifshareholderchangesmind,shecancancelproxyauthorizationinwritingor
justshowup.o 149(1)–Corporationhasobligationtosolicitproxyvotesandmustprovideproxyforms
whensendingnoticeofupcomingmeeting(unlesscorporationhaslessthan50shareholders).
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§ Designedtofurthersecureshareholderfranchise,makeiteasierforshareholderstonominateproxyassuggestedbythecorporation.
• Whoareproxies?o Youcanappointwhomeveryouwish.o But,theywilloftenbeproposedbycorporationsandtheywillaskforfulldiscretion.
§ So,youcanseethatifyou’reasavvycorporationandyouwantmorepowerfromshareholders,youcangetthisthroughproxies.
o Canhaveitsothatamanageristhedefaultproxybutmustbeclearthattheshareholderisatlibertytonamesomeoneelse.
e)ShareholderInitiatives
• Oncemanagerialpowersarevestedintheboardofdirectors,shareholderscannotdirectlydictatemanagementpolicy.But,theycansubmitpetitionstotheboard.
o Probablybeignorediffromminorityshareholdersandproposalsfrommajorityarehardtocoordinate.
• Modernstatutesallowshareholderstoputitemsontheagendaofshareholdersmeetings.o CBCA137–hasmadethispowerlessavailabletoshareholdersbyrequiringminimum
numberofsharesheldforaminimumperiodoftime,etc…o Atsametime,s.137hasmadeiteasierforshareholders–itlimitedthereasonswhy
directorscouldrefusetocirculateproposalandsupportingdocuments.• Evenso,doesthismeanthatthereisarightforshareholderstohavetheirproposalsactuallyput
toavote?Ifitwasaccepted,whatwouldhappenthen?f)TYPESOFMEETINGS:(1)OrdinaryBusiness/AnnualMeetings
• StatuterequiresthatdirectorscallAGMswithsomeflexibilityre:timing(CBCA133).• Thereisaquorumrequirement(CBCA139)whichisroutinelyloweredbybylaws.• AnAGMcanbeavoidedinfavourofawrittenresolution,butonlyifit’sunanimous(CBCA142).• Ifthereisonlyoneshareholderheconstitutesameeting(CBCA139(4)).• Meetingsmaybeelectronic(CBCA132(5)).
• Electionofdirectors
o Iftherearedifferentclassesofsharesanddirectorsforthoseclasses,votingwillhappenbyclass.
o Shareholdershavepowertoelectdirectorsbysimplemajority(CBCA106(3)).o Thiscanbemodified–threecommonmodificationstostrictmajorityrule:
§ Cumulativevoting• Optional,rarelyadopted.• Shareholdergetsnumberofvotesequaltoproductof(i)thenumberof
votingsharesheholdsand(ii)thenumberofvacanciesontheboardthatmustbefilled.Shareholdercanthendividevotesorcumulatethemforallonecandidate.
• Requiresthattherebefixednumberofdirectorselectedforoneyearterms.• Requiresallcandidatesbevotedontogetherandcandidateswithfewest
votesdropoffuntilpositionsarefilled.• AuthorizedbyCBCA107.
§ Classdirectors• Directorswhoareelectedbythevotesofonlyoneclassofshares.
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• Theorythatdifferentclassesofshareswillappealtoandbeacquiredbydifferentkindofpeoplewhoseviewswillbeunderrepresentedonamajorityelectedboardwithoutclassvoting.
• AuthorizedbyCBCA111(3).§ Votingcontracts
• Votingcontractsamongshareholders,commoninsmallcorporations.Constituteswrittenagreementre:howtheywillexercisetheirvotingrights.
• Can’thavethisarrangementbetweendirectorswhoarealsoshareholdersbecauseit’sanattempttoaffectthecastingofvotesontheboardofdirectorsandtheboardhasafiduciarydutytomakedecisionsinbestinterestofcorporation.Can’tfetterdirectors’discretion.
• AuthorizedbyCBCA145(1).
• Approvalofby-lawso Mosteasilymodifiedthinginthecorporateconstitution.o Directorshavepowertocreateandamendby-lawsbuttheymustbeapprovedby
shareholdersatnextmeetingtocontinuetobeineffect(CBCA103).o Shareholderscanproposetheirownbylaws(CBCA103(5)and137).
• Financialdisclosure
o DirectorsmustreporttoshareholdersatAGMre:corporation’sfinancialposition(CBCA155).
o Mustcirculateandpresentfinancialstatementandincludeauditor’sreportverifyingthisstatement.
o Ifshareholdersreadanythingforameeting,itwillbethefinancialreport.o Therecordsthatmakeupthereportmustbemaintainedanddisclosedandmadeavailable
toshareholdersatanytime(CBCA157(1)and(2)).
• Appointmentofauditoro Auditorscertifythatthefinancialrecordsareaccurate(CBCA161).o Anotherprotectionforshareholders,allowingtheauditortobedirectlyappointedby
shareholders(CBCA162(1)).o Expenseofhavinganauditorcanbewaivedbutonlywithunanimousconsent,including
thosenotnormallyentitledtovote(CBCA163(3)).§ Thisrareneedforunanimousconsentshowsprotectiveroleofauditor.§ **Note–auditcannotbewaivedifsharesofcorporationarepubliclytraded.
o Inlargecorporations,though,approvalofauditorisusuallyjustarubberstamptoproposalfromboard.
o ProvisionslikeCBCA161re:auditorstrytomaintainindependence.§ But,usuallyauditorsaremoreloyaltomanagement.§ InAmerica,Sarbanes-OxleyActpassedin2002todealwithcorporatecollapsesdue
toauditorswhowerenotsufficientlyindependentfrommanagement.§ InCanada,newCanadianPublicAccountabilityBoardcreatedtooverseeauditors
ofpubliclytradedcorporations.o HerculesManagement
§ HighlightslackofprotectionfromauditrequirementbecauseSCCfoundthatauditordoesnotoweadutyofcarere:auditdirectlytoanyshareholdersbutratheronlytothecorporation.
§ Lotofcriticismfromshareholderrightsactivists.o Therehavebeen,however,situationswheretheauditorswereheldliabletoinvestors.
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§ CBCA237.1-9addedin2007changesthisrule(237.7)inmanycasesforCBCAcorporations.
g)TYPESOFMEETINGS:(2)ExtraordinaryBusiness/SpecialMeetings
• Directorscancallspecialmeetings(CBCA133(2)).• Socanshareholders(requisitionedmeetings),butonlythosewhomeetaminimumthreshold(i.e.
holdatleast5%ofshares(CBCA143(1)or10%ofshares(QBCA99)).• Somethings,likeremovingadirector,canonlybediscussedataspecialmeeting.• Removalofdirectors
o Ifshareholdersareunhappywithdirectors,canvoteforremovalatarequisitionedmeeting.
• Shareholderapprovalofconflict-of-interestcontractso Shareholderscanapproveself-dealingcontractso CBCA120
• Constitutionalamendmentso Detailedschemeforconstitutionalamendments,ensuresthatanyconstitutional
amendmentsmadereflectaclearanddeliberatechoicebyshareholders.o CBCA173(1)–Articlescanbeamendedthroughspecialmajority(2/3).o CBCA175(2)–Specialnoticemustbegiventoshareholdersre:anyproposaltoamend
articlesofincorporation.Regularnoticeisnotenough.o CBCA176–Ifanamendmenttargetsaparticularclassofshares,thatamendmentmustbe
approvedbyspecialresolution(2/3)ofthatclass,eveniftheclassofsharesisnon-voting.§ Meanttoprotecttheproperty,rights,andsharesofnon-votingshareholders.
• Fundamentalchangewithoutconstitutionalamendmento CBCA189(3)–ifincumbentmanagementwishtosellallormostpropertyofthe
corporation,theyhavetoobtainapprovalofshareholders.Mustbegivenbyspecialmajorityvote(2/3)andnon-votingclassesofsharesareentitledtovoteexceptionallyinthiscontext.
• Corporatesuicideo Ultimatepowerofthemajorityistocompelthecorporation’ssuicide(windingup,
dissolution).o CBCA211–requiresspecialresolutionofeachclassofsharesandallowsnon-voting
shareholderstovote(211(3)).o ProposalcanbemadebydirectorsorbyanyshareholderwhoisentitledtovoteatanAGM
(137).h)ShareholderAccountability
• Howandtowhomareshareholdersaccountableinexercisingcontrolrightsthroughvoting?• Howshouldthelawconstrainthepowersofshareholders?• Inbothcasesbelow,courtseemedtosuggestthatwhenallshareholdersareexercisingtheir
controlrights,theyhavetoactinaquasi-fiduciaryway.Supposedtoexercisepoweringoodfaithandintheinterestsofthecompanyasawhole.
• Difficulty–courtsneverreallyenforcedthisideathatthecourtsarticulatedinthesetwocases.Wouldinterveneveryrarelywheretherewasegregiousbadfaith.
Allenv.GolfReefsofWestAfrica(1990,UK)
• Powerofshareholdersmust,likeany,beexercisedforthebestinterestofthecompanyasawhole,notsimplyinthebestinterestofthemajorityshareholders.
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Greenhalghv.ArdeneCinemas(1951,UK)
• Shareholdersmustproceedwithwhatis,intheirhonestopinion,forthebenefitofthecompanyasawhole(subjectivetest).
VII.MINORTYPROTECTION
A)STANDINGANDTHEREPRESENTATIVEACTIONCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.238-240QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.439-440,445-447,449CanadaBusinessCorporationsActRemedies,OffencesandPunishmentDefinitions238InthisPart,actionmeansanactionunderthisAct;(action)complainantmeans
• (a)aregisteredholderorbeneficialowner,andaformerregisteredholderorbeneficialowner,ofasecurityofacorporationoranyofitsaffiliates,
• (b)adirectororanofficeroraformerdirectororofficerofacorporationoranyofitsaffiliates,• (c)theDirector,or• (d)anyotherpersonwho,inthediscretionofacourt,isaproperpersontomakeanapplication
underthisPart.(plaignant)Commencingderivativeaction239(1)Subjecttosubsection(2),acomplainantmayapplytoacourtforleavetobringanactioninthenameandonbehalfofacorporationoranyofitssubsidiaries,orinterveneinanactiontowhichanysuchbodycorporateisaparty,forthepurposeofprosecuting,defendingordiscontinuingtheactiononbehalfofthebodycorporate.Conditionsprecedent(2)Noactionmaybebroughtandnointerventioninanactionmaybemadeundersubsection(1)unlessthecourtissatisfiedthat
• (a)thecomplainanthasgivennoticetothedirectorsofthecorporationoritssubsidiaryofthecomplainant’sintentiontoapplytothecourtundersubsection(1)notlessthanfourteendaysbeforebringingtheapplication,orasotherwiseorderedbythecourt,ifthedirectorsofthecorporationoritssubsidiarydonotbring,diligentlyprosecuteordefendordiscontinuetheaction;
• (b)thecomplainantisactingingoodfaith;and• (c)itappearstobeintheinterestsofthecorporationoritssubsidiarythattheactionbebrought,
prosecuted,defendedordiscontinued.Powersofcourt240Inconnectionwithanactionbroughtorintervenedinundersection239,thecourtmayatanytimemakeanyorderitthinksfitincluding,withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,
• (a)anorderauthorizingthecomplainantoranyotherpersontocontroltheconductoftheaction;• (b)anordergivingdirectionsfortheconductoftheaction;
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• (c)anorderdirectingthatanyamountadjudgedpayablebyadefendantintheactionshallbepaid,inwholeorinpart,directlytoformerandpresentsecurityholdersofthecorporationoritssubsidiaryinsteadoftothecorporationoritssubsidiary;and
• (d)anorderrequiringthecorporationoritssubsidiarytopayreasonablelegalfeesincurredbythecomplainantinconnectionwiththeaction.
QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct439.Applicationsundersubdivisions2and3maybemadebyanyofthefollowing:(1)aregisteredholderorbeneficiary,andaformerholderorbeneficiary,ofasecurityofacorporationoranyofitsaffiliates;(2)adirectororanofficeroraformerdirectororofficerofacorporationoranyofitsaffiliates;(3)anyotherpersonwho,inthediscretionofthecourt,hastheinterestrequiredtomakeanapplicationunderthisdivision.440.Anapplicationmadeundersubdivision2or3maynotbedismissedonthesolegroundthatitisshownthatanallegedbreachofarightoforanobligationowedtoacorporationoritssubsidiaryhasbeenormaybeapprovedbythecorporation’sshareholders,butevidenceofapprovalbytheshareholdersmaybetakenintoaccountbyacourtinmakingadecisionundereitherofthosesubdivisions.§2.—Authorizationtoactonbehalfofacorporation445.Anapplicantmayapplytothecourtforleavetobringanactioninthenameandonbehalfofacorporationoracorporationthatisoneofitssubsidiaries,orinterveneinanactiontowhichthecorporationorsubsidiaryisaparty,forthepurposeofprosecuting,defendingordiscontinuingtheactiononbehalfofthecorporationorsubsidiary.446.Noapplicationforauthorizationmaybemadeunlesstheapplicanthasgiventhedirectorsofacorporationoritssubsidiary14days’priornoticeoftheapplicant’sintentiontoapplytothecourt.Authorizationmaybegrantedifthecourtissatisfiedthattheboardofdirectorsofthecorporationoritssubsidiaryhasnotbrought,diligentlyprosecutedordefendedordiscontinuedtheaction,andifthecourtconsidersthattheapplicantisactingingoodfaithandthatitappearstobeintheinterestsofthecorporationoritssubsidiarythattheactionbebrought,prosecuted,defendedordiscontinued.Whenallthedirectorsofthecorporationoritssubsidiaryhavebeennamedasdefendants,priornoticetothedirectorsoftheapplicant’sintentiontoapplytothecourtisnotrequired.447.Inconnectionwithanactionbroughtorintervenedinunderthissubdivision,thecourtmaymakeanyorderitthinksfit,including(1)anorderauthorizingtheapplicantoranyotherpersontocontroltheconductoftheaction;(2)anordergivingdirectionsfortheconductoftheaction;(3)anorderrevisingthefunctioningofthecorporationoritssubsidiarybyamendingthearticlesortheby-lawsorbyestablishingoramendingaunanimousshareholderagreement;(4)anordermakingappointmentstotheboardofdirectorsofthecorporationoritssubsidiary,eithertoreplaceallorsomeofthedirectorsortoincreasethenumberofdirectors;(5)anorderdirectinganinvestigationtobemadeunderDivisionI;(6)anorderdirectingthatanyamountawardedagainstadefendantbepaid,inwholeorinpart,directlytoformerandpresentsecurityholdersofthecorporationoritssubsidiaryinsteadoftothecorporationoritssubsidiary;and(7)anorderrequiringthecorporationoritssubsidiarytopay,inwholeorinpart,theprofessionalfeesandotherreasonablecostsincurredbytheapplicantinconnectionwiththeactionorintervention.449.Ifauthorizedbythecourtundersection445toactonbehalfofthecorporation,theapplicantisdeemedtobetherepresentativeofthecorporationforthepurposesoftheproceedingand,tothatend,
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theapplicanthasarightofaccesstoallrelevantinformationanddocumentsheldbythecorporationandtoanydocumentwhichisheldorwaspreparedforthecorporationbyanyperson,includingamandataryoraproviderofgoodsorservices,whorenderedaservicetothecorporationinconnectionwiththeactionorinterventionauthorizedbythecourtorwhichrelatestothefactsatissue.Thecourtmay,onapplication,orderapersonwhoholdsanyinformationordocumentreferredtointhefirstparagraphtocommunicateittotheapplicantifcommunicationoftheinformationordocumentappearstobenecessaryforthepurposesoftheproceedingorinterventionauthorizedbythecourt.Beforegrantingtheapplication,thecourtmustgiveinterestedpersonstheopportunitytobeheard.However,anyinformationordocumentobtainedbytheapplicantunderthissectionispresumedtobeconfidentialandmayonlybeusedinconnectionwiththeactionorinterventionauthorizedbythecourtandsubjecttotheconditionsdeterminedbythecourt,ifany.
• Majorityshareholderscanexercisetheirpowerinawaythatinjurestheinterestsoftheminorityshareholders.
o Concernthatmajorityshareholderswilloverreachandputtheirinterestsaheadofthoseoftheminorityshareholders.
• Willdealwithabuseofpowerandcontrolbymajorityshareholders.• CMLfailedtocomeupwithanswerthatbalancedneedforflexibleminorityprotectionand
recognitionthatshareholdershavetheirrightsbyvirtueofproperty(shares)andtheyshouldbeabletoexercisethoserightsintheirownself-interest.
• Remediesavailabletominorityshareholders:o Complianceandrestrainingordero Representativeactiono Oppressionremedy
• Allofthesehaveabroadscope,weremotivatedbyconcerntoprovidemeaningfulprotectiontominorityshareholdersandalsoservetoprotecttheinterestsofanumberofotherparties:interestsofcorporation,interestsofoutsiders(includingcreditors),whichhassurprisedmanycommentators.
1)ShareholderAccountability:Introduction
• Shareholdershavesignificantcontrolinpracticeandexercisetheirpowerlargelythroughvoting.• Powercomeswithriskofabuse,soquestionatCMLofhowweshoulddealwithabuseofpowerof
oneshareholderrelativetoanother?• CMLresponsehasbeeninconsistentandhaphazard.
o Wouldtendnottointerveneunlesstherewasegregiousandclearabuseofpower.SeeAllenv.GoldReefs.
Allenv.GoldReefs(1900,UK)Facts
• Inthe1800s,corporationshareswereoftenissuedforlessthantheirfullprice.Inthesecases,thecompanycouldmakea“call”onshareholdersforanypartoftheunpaidcapital.
• Theregisteredarticlesofassociationsaid“theCompanyshallhaveafirstandparamountlienforalldebts,obligations,andliabilitiesofanymembertoortowardsthecompanyuponallshares(notbeingfullypaid)heldbysuchamember.”
• Zuccaniheldbothfullypaidandpartlypaidshares.Hehadahabitoffullypayingupsomeoftheshares,andthentransferringthemtoothers,whileleavingothersharesinarrears.Whenhediedhewasinarrearsofcallandinterestoncallsforbothtypesofshares.
• Anextraordinarymeetingofshareholderswascalledforthepurposeofpassingaspecialresolutiontoalterthelienarticle(above)byomittingthewords“notbeingfullypaid”,thereby
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extendingthecompany’slientofullypaidsharesaswell.Zuccani’sexecutor’sseekadeclarationtocounterthis.
Issue• Cantheshareholdersdothis?Yes.
Reasoning• Courtheldthatitwasokayeventhoughithadprejudicetominorityshareholders.Surprisingfrom
amodernpointofview.• Allshareholderswhentheyexercisetheircontrolofrightsarelimitedbyasetoffiduciary
obligationstothecompanyasawhole.Youshouldalwaysbethinkingaboutwhat’sbestforthecompanythatyou’reinvestedin,notnecessarilywhat’sbestforyourbottomlineasashareholder.
• Here,actionsofmajorityshareholderswereconsistentwithactinginthebestinterestsofthecorporation.
Notes• Foratime,thisapproachwasreferredto(butnotstrictlyenforced)insubsequentcases.• Notclearwherethefiduciaryframeofreferencecomesfrom…Howcanthisbereconciledwiththe
ideathatshareholdersareordinarylegalownersofpropertywhoarefreetodowhattheywantwiththeirproperty?
Greenhalghv.ArderneCinemas(1951,UK)Facts
• Aspecialresolutionwaspassedthatpermittransfersofsharestooutsidersifapprovedbyasimplemajorityofshareholders(itusedtobethattheycouldnotbesoldtooutsiderssolongasanexistingshareholderwaswillingtobuythesharesatafairprice.).ThePlaintiffseeksjudicialdisapprovaloftheamendmenttothearticles.
Issue• Istheexerciseofpowerofmajorityshareholdersvalid?Yes.
Reasoning• Againsurprisingbycontemporaryview,courtheldthatthiswasavalidthingtodo.• Thereisaconstraint,shareholder’saren’tjustfreetodowhatevertheywanttodo.• Heldthatthetestshouldbewhethertheshareholdershonestlybelievethatthedecisionthey’re
takingisinthebestinterestofthecompanyasawhole.• Furtherclarified“interestofcompanyasawhole”asbeingtheinterestsof“shareholdersasa
collective”.• Foundthatthisactionwasconsistentwiththistestbecauseeveryshareholdershouldbefreeto
tryandgetasmuchmoneyastheycanfortheirsharesinasale.Notes
• Again,whyisafiduciarytypeobligationappropriateforshareholders?Mostwouldconcludethatthisisnotanappropriatewaytoframeshareholderaccountability?
• Whatelsecouldwedotoregulateshareholderactions…?NevercamearoundintheCML,solefttolegislaturestostepintothebreachandprovideasolution.WeseethisinCBCA.
2)CorporateLawRemedies:Standing
• CBCAs.238/QBCAs.439o Governaccesstonewremediessetoutbystateviastatute.o Gatekeepingfunctionperformedbycourts.o Bothprovisionsdictatewhogetsstanding.
§ Namepersonswhohaveautomaticrighttobringanaction–namedashavingstanding.
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§ Alsogivesjudgesdiscretiontoindividualswhoarenotnamed,don’thavestandingasofright,butwhothecourtsfeeloughttobegrantedstandingtobringanaction.
o Complainantisdefinedasa:§ Namedperson
• Registeredholdersorbeneficiariesorformerholders/beneficiariesofasecurity(includesshareholdersandalsoincludesthosewhoholddebtsecurities).
• Currentorformerdirectorofthecorporation§ Anyother“properperson”
o QBCAissimilartotheCBCAprovisionsabove.§ But,holdersofdebtsecuritiesdonothavestandingasofright.§ Also,judicialdiscretionisdifferent–noreferenceto“properperson”,uses
narrowerlanguage.• “Personwhohastheinterestrequired”
FirstEdmontonPlacev.315888AlbertaLtd.(1988,ABQB)Facts
• FEPsignedaleasewiththenumberedcorporationnamedabove.Thesoleshareholdersanddirectorsofthenumberedcorporationwere3lawyerswhopracticedinassociationwitheachother.Thenumberedcorporationwasa“shelf”company(incorporatedfornopurposeandhadnoassets).
• Asinducementtosignaten-yearlease,FEPgrantedthenumberedcorporationwith18monthsrentfreeperiod,aleaseholdimprovementallowanceof115Kandcashpaymentof140K.
• Thelawyersoccupiedpremiseswithoutenteringaleasewiththenumberedcorporation.Theystayedfortherent-freeperiod,paid3monthsrentandthenleftwithnomorerentpayments.
• FEPsubmitsthatthedirectorsconducteddeliberatebreachesoftheirobligationsasdirectorsofthecorporation.Theywantedtofindsomewaytosuethedirectorsonbehalfofthecorporation.
• FEPisthecorporation’sonlycreditorandseeksalternativeformsofreliefundertheAlbertaBusinessCorporationsAct:representativeactionandoppressionremedy.
Issue• ShouldthelandlordofFEPbegrantedstandinghere?
Reasoning• Thecourtshaveverybroaddiscretiontograntstandingtoindividualswhoshouldhaveaccessto
oneoftheremedies.• But,thisdiscretionisstillvestedforaparticularpurposeandjudgesmustbearthispurposein
mind.Mustseektodojusticeandequitywhereapersonwhowouldotherwisenotbeacomplainantandrightawrongthatwouldotherwisenotberighted.
o So,shouldgrantstandingwherejusticeandequityrequireit.• Havetoshowafewthings:
o Thatyouasanindividualorthecorporationhassufferedawrong.o Thatthereisnootherremedytorectifythewrong.o Thatapplicantisapersonwhocanreasonablybetrustedwithresponsiblypursuing
litigationintheinterestsofthecompany.o Applicantmustshowthatthereissomeevidenceofoppressionforunfairprejudiceor
unfairdisregardforthosewhoareprotectedbytheoppressionremedy.§ Basically,havetoshowthatyouhaveaprimafaciecase.
• Re:givingaccesstoremediestocreditorso Concernthatwemaybegivingcreditorstoomuch.o Mostpeoplethinkthatcourtshouldbeprettyrestrictivere:standingforcreditors.
Creditorsshouldbecarefulintheircontractsandshouldnotnecessarilybeallowedto
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o Here,wehadcreditorseekingstanding.Howcantheyshowthattheyshouldbegrantedexceptionalstanding?
o Twocircumstances:§ Wherecreditoralleging(andhassomeevidencetodemonstrate)thatdirectors
andofficershaveusedcorporationtocommitfraudagainstthemandtheycan’tremedythatfraudotherwise.
§ Wheredirectors/officershavebreachedextra-contractualexpectationsandthecreditorcanthereforenotseekremedyundercontract.
• àButisn’tFEPasophisticatedcreditor?Shouldn’ttheyknowtheirshit?Howmuchsympathyshouldwehaveforthemandthepositionthey’rein?
• Courtfeltitwasrighttograntstandingforthederivativeactiontothelandlord.• Re:oppressionclaim,standingwasdeniedbecausenoevidenceoffraudagainstFEP.Noevidence
apartfromfraudofbreachofextra-contractualexpectations.o Applicantknewdealingwithcorporation,shouldhaveengagedinduediligence,engaged
inmorecautiouslendingpractices.
3)RepresentativeActions:General
• Alsosometimesreferredtoasaderivativeaction.• Aclaimthatisbroughtonbehalfofthecorporation,notbroughtbytheclaimantpersonally.• Individualbringingtheclaim,seekingredressofawrongsufferedbythecorporation.Canbeany
kindofcivilwrong.• Whenleaveisgivenforderivativeaction,therepresentativeisactinginafiduciarycapacityforthe
corporation.• Anyremediespaidifclaimissuccessful,remediespaidintocorporationbecausetheyweretheone
whosufferedthewrong,nottheactualclaimant.• Whydowehaverepresentativeactions?
o Conceptappliesbeyondcorporatelaw,wheneverthereisalegalornaturalpersonwhocannotbringactionontheirownbehalfthereneedstobeaguardiantobringactionontheirbehalf(e.g.children).
o Especiallyobviousre:corporationsbecausecorporationsareartificialpersonsandcan’t• Normallywhenacorporationiswrongedwedon’tgodirectlytorepresentativeactionsbecause
usuallytheboardhiresalawyertobringaclaimtoprotectcompany’sinterests.• Butsometimestheboardwon’ttakeactionandsometimestheythemselvesareimplicatedinthe
wrongdoingagainstthecorporationandtheyobviouslywon’tsuethemselves.• Sothisraisesanobviousproblemofwhowillprotecttheinterestsofthecorporationwhenthe
agentsofthecorporationrefusetotakeaction?• Statutoryschemesdesignedtofixthisproblem.Allowforredressofwrongsevenwhenagentsof
corporationwon’ttakeanyactiononbehalfofthecorporation.• Concernthatpeoplewillusethisremedyopportunistically.So,you’llseethatwiththisandthe
oppressionremedy,thecourtshaveadelicatebalancetomaintain.Theyarethereforegivenalotofdiscretioniffashioningremedies.
• Statutoryframeworko CBCA
§ 239(1)–Entitlementtobringarepresentativeaction• Acomplainantmayapplyforarepresentativeaction.
o May=deferencetothecourts§ 239(2)–Limitsonbringingarepresentativeaction
• Noactionmaybebroughtunlesscourtsatisfiedthat:o Complainanthasgivennoticetodirectors(notlessthan14days)
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o Havetogiveopportunitytodirectorstoknowaboutgrievanceinquestionandthentodosomethingaboutit–iftheydon’ttakeactionwithinthe14days.
o Complainantmustbeactingingoodfaitho Actionmustappeartobeininterestofcorporation.
• Ifallconditionssatisfied,willallowclaimtoproceed.Eventhen,notallhandsoffthen.
§ 240–Powerforcourtstocontrolhowtheactionisbroughtandcontrolledovertime.
• Allowscourttocontrolinaprettyintrusivewayhowaderivativeactionisbrought.Courtmaymakeanyorderthatitseesfit.
o QBCA§ 445–Entitlement§ 446–Limits§ 447–Powersofthecourt
• Minorityprotectionandrepresentativeactionso Representativeactionsarenotreallyaboutprotectingshareholders.Theyareabout
redressinginjurytocorporation.o But,representativeactionsdohavedirectandindirectbenefitstoshareholders:
§ Shareholdersmayindirectlybenefitbecauseactionorthreatofactionwillkeepdirectorsinline.
§ Candirectlybenefitshareholdersifcourtdecidestomakepartofpayouttoshareholdersdirectly.
4)RepresentativeActionsvs.PersonalActions
• Noonewhobringstheactionreallycaresabouttheinterestsofthecorporation…it’sreallyabouthavingapersonalinterestintheissue.
• Alltheseactionsonlygetoffthegroundbecausearealpersontakethisupandpaysfortheproceedings.
• Courtinsiststhatderivativeactionsarekeptseparatefromanypersonalwrongs/claimstheclaimanthassuffered/couldbring.
• Counselareoftennotverygoodatseparatingourpersonalclaimsfromderivativeclaims.• Sowhatdocourtsdowhentheygetastatementofclaimthatmixesthetwo?
o Theycanbeprettycrankyifit’shardtodistinguishthepersonalfromtherepresentativenature.
Farnhamv.Fingold(1973,ONCA)Facts
• Minorityshareholderbringsstatementofclaimthat’sabloodymess,mixingpersonalclaimsandclassactionclaims.
• Sothereisarequestfromthedefendanttostriketheclaimbecausethereisnocauseofactionorinthealternativethattheclaimantdoesn’thavetherequiredstanding.
Issue• Istheclaimallowed?No–shouldbebroughtasderivativeclaim.
Reasoning• Judgecanstrikepartsofclaimtosortoutpersonalfromrepresentative.• Judgecansendclaimbacktolawyertofixtheclaim.• Judgecanthrowthewholethingout.
Ratio
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• It’simportantthatastatementofclaimbewelldraftedandthatthepersonalclaimsbekeptoutofanyrepresentativeaction.
GoldexMinesv.Revill(1974,ONCA)Facts
• WarringfactionsofshareholdersofProbeMinesareincourtforthe5thtime.Allegemisdeedsofdirectorsandshareholders,butdonotspecifyinthewritwhetherdutiesallegedwereowedtoSHortocorp.Plaintiffsdidnotseektobringrepresentativeactiononbehalfofthecorporation.
Reasoning• Therewasapersonalsetofclaimsthatcouldbedistinguishedfromtherepresentativeclaimsand
theactioncouldthenproceedonthebasisofthepersonalclaims.Therepresentativeclaimshavetobepursuedthroughthelegislativescheme.
Ratio• Keepyo’shitseparate.
5)RepresentativeActions:ThePrerequisites
• Supposethatstandinghurdlehasbeencleared–therearemore!• Courtswillnotallowactiontoproceedunlessconvincedofthreethings:
o CBCA239(3)andQBCA446§ Boardofdirectorsgivenadequatenoticesogivenadequateopportunitytorespond
totheclaim.§ NoticeunderCBCAis14days.§ Howmuchdetaildoesthecomplainantneedtogivetotheboardofdirectorswhen
theyprovidethemwithnotice?• Courtshavebeenprettyflexible:
o Enoughthatcauseforconcernisstated.Don’tneedtobeprecisere:causeofactionorallegedfacts.
o Enoughthatboardisputonnotice,theboardthenhasenoughtoinvestigateandfigureoutwhat’sgoingon.
o CBCA239(2)(b)andQBCA446§ Thereisagoodfaithrequirement–hastobesureactionnotbeingbroughtmerely
becausecomplainanthasapersonalgrudge.§ Whatisgoodfaith?
• Goestomotiveoftheaction.Shouldn’tbebroughtjusttosettlegrudge.o CBCA239(2)(c)andQBCA446
§ Courthastobeconvincedthatactionisintheinterestsofthecompany.Won’tallowrepresentativeclaimtoproceedjustbecauseitwouldbegoodforthecomplainant.
§ Ifyoucanprovethattherehasbeenaprimafaciewrongagainstthecorporationbecauseit’sthenlogicaltoextendthatthecorporationhasaninterestintheredressofthatwrong.
B)THEOPPRESSIONREMEDYCanadaBusinessCorporationsAct,s.241QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct,ss.450-451CanadaBusinessCorporationsAct
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Applicationtocourtreoppression241(1)Acomplainantmayapplytoacourtforanorderunderthissection.Grounds(2)If,onanapplicationundersubsection(1),thecourtissatisfiedthatinrespectofacorporationoranyofitsaffiliates
• (a)anyactoromissionofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliateseffectsaresult,• (b)thebusinessoraffairsofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliatesareorhavebeencarriedonor
conductedinamanner,or• (c)thepowersofthedirectorsofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliatesareorhavebeenexercised
inamannerthatisoppressiveorunfairlyprejudicialtoorthatunfairlydisregardstheinterestsofanysecurityholder,creditor,directororofficer,thecourtmaymakeanordertorectifythematterscomplainedof.Powersofcourt(3)Inconnectionwithanapplicationunderthissection,thecourtmaymakeanyinterimorfinalorderitthinksfitincluding,withoutlimitingthegeneralityoftheforegoing,
• (a)anorderrestrainingtheconductcomplainedof;• (b)anorderappointingareceiverorreceiver-manager;• (c)anordertoregulateacorporation’saffairsbyamendingthearticlesorby-lawsorcreatingor
amendingaunanimousshareholderagreement;• (d)anorderdirectinganissueorexchangeofsecurities;• (e)anorderappointingdirectorsinplaceoforinadditiontoalloranyofthedirectorsthenin
office;• (f)anorderdirectingacorporation,subjecttosubsection(6),oranyotherperson,topurchase
securitiesofasecurityholder;• (g)anorderdirectingacorporation,subjecttosubsection(6),oranyotherperson,topaya
securityholderanypartofthemoniesthatthesecurityholderpaidforsecurities;• (h)anordervaryingorsettingasideatransactionorcontracttowhichacorporationisaparty
andcompensatingthecorporationoranyotherpartytothetransactionorcontract;• (i)anorderrequiringacorporation,withinatimespecifiedbythecourt,toproducetothecourt
oraninterestedpersonfinancialstatementsintheformrequiredbysection155oranaccountinginsuchotherformasthecourtmaydetermine;
• (j)anordercompensatinganaggrievedperson;• (k)anorderdirectingrectificationoftheregistersorotherrecordsofacorporationundersection
243;• (l)anorderliquidatinganddissolvingthecorporation;• (m)anorderdirectinganinvestigationunderPartXIXtobemade;and• (n)anorderrequiringthetrialofanyissue.
Dutyofdirectors(4)Ifanordermadeunderthissectiondirectsamendmentofthearticlesorby-lawsofacorporation,
• (a)thedirectorsshallforthwithcomplywithsubsection191(4);and• (b)nootheramendmenttothearticlesorby-lawsshallbemadewithouttheconsentofthecourt,
untilacourtotherwiseorders.Exclusion(5)Ashareholderisnotentitledtodissentundersection190ifanamendmenttothearticlesiseffectedunderthissection.Limitation
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(6)Acorporationshallnotmakeapaymenttoashareholderunderparagraph(3)(f)or(g)iftherearereasonablegroundsforbelievingthat
• (a)thecorporationisorwouldafterthatpaymentbeunabletopayitsliabilitiesastheybecomedue;or
• (b)therealizablevalueofthecorporation’sassetswouldtherebybelessthantheaggregateofitsliabilities.
Alternativeorder(7)Anapplicantunderthissectionmayapplyinthealternativeforanorderundersection214.QuebecBusinessCorporationsAct§3.—Rectificationofabuseofpoweroriniquity450.Anapplicantmayobtainanorderfromthecourttorectifyasituationifthecourtissatisfiedthat(1)anyactoromissionofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliateseffectsorthreatenstoeffectaresult,(2)thebusinessoraffairsofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliateshavebeen,areorarethreatenedtobeconductedinamanner,or(3)thepowerstheboardofdirectorsofthecorporationoranyofitsaffiliateshavebeen,areorarethreatenedtobeexercisedinamannerthatisorcouldbeoppressiveorunfairlyprejudicialtoanysecurityholder,directororofficerofthecorporation.451.Inconnectionwithanapplicationunderthissubdivision,thecourtmaymakeanyorderitthinksfit,including(1)anorderrestrainingtheconductcomplainedof;(2)anorderappointingareceiver;(3)anorderrevisingthefunctioningofthecorporationbyamendingthearticlesortheby-lawsorestablishingoramendingaunanimousshareholderagreement;(4)anorderdirectinganissueorexchangeofsecurities;(5)anordermakingappointmentstotheboardofdirectors,eithertoreplaceallorsomeofthedirectorsortoincreasethenumberofdirectors;(6)anorderdirectingthecorporationoranyotherpersontopurchasesecuritiesofasecurityholder;(7)anorderdirectingthecorporationoranyotherpersontopayasecurityholderalloranypartofthemoniesthatthesecurityholderpaidforsecurities;(8)anordervarying,settingasideorannullingacontractoratransactiontowhichthecorporationisapartyandcompensatingthecorporationoranyotherpartytothecontractortransaction;(9)anorderrequiringacorporation,withinatimespecifiedbythecourt,tomakeavailabletothecourtoraninterestedpersonthefinancialstatementsreferredtoinsections225and226,oranaccountingofthemintheformdeterminedbythecourt;(10)anordercompensatingapersonwhohassufferedprejudice;(11)anorderdirectingrectificationoftherecordsofacorporationinaccordancewithsections456and457;(12)anorderdissolvingthecorporationandwindingitupifithaspropertyorobligations;(13)anorderdirectinganinvestigationtobemadeunderDivisionI;and(14)anordercondemning,notonlyinthecaseofimproperuseofprocedurebutalsowheneverthecourtthinksfit,anypartytotheproceedingstopay,inwholeorinpart,theprofessionalfeesandothercostsofanyotherparty.Thecorporationmaynotmakeanypaymenttoashareholderundersubparagraph6or7ofthefirstparagraphiftherearegroundsforbelievingthatitwouldorcouldcausethecorporationtobeunabletopayitsliabilitiesastheybecomedue.
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Background
• CMLoppressionremedyo Usedwherevershareholdershaveegregiouslyabusedtheirpowershowinglackofgood
faithanddidsoatclearprejudicetominorityshareholder.o Wasanarrowlimitavailabletominorityshareholderstoensurethatmajorityrulewasn’t
beingusedtoinjurethem.o Wasrarelyinvokedwithanysuccess,soconsideredtobeconsistentwithprincipleof
judicialnon-intervention.Courtswouldtendtodefertothecorporateconstitution(majorityrule)andthebasicprinciplesofgoverningcorporatepowerinmanycases.
o However,asaresult,alotofgrosslyunfairconductwentun-remedied.• Legislativeintenttoprovideastatutoryremedy
o WhentheCBCAwasbeingputtogether,wasdecidedthatthereneededtobelegislativereformstodosomethingaboutprotectingminorityshareholders,aswellassomeprotectionsforcreditors.
o Asaresult,theoppressionremedyisbroadandamorphousbydesign.§ TheQBCA,however,ismuchmorenarrowthantheCBCA.
(1)OppressionI:StatutoryFramework
• CBCAs.241andQBCAs.450-451• Highlights:
o Standing§ CBCA,ss.241(1)and238
• Complainantcanbringaclaiminoppressionsolongastheyaresomeonenamedins.238.
o Formerorcurrentholderorbeneficialownerofsecurityofcorporationoritsaffiliates.
o Formerorcurrentdirectororofficerofcorporationoritsaffiliates.o Anyotherpersonwhoisa“properperson”(asperthetestinWest
EdmontonPlace).• ài.e.Thecomplainantmustbeanamedapplicant,orapersondeemedby
thecourttohavetherequiredinterest.§ QBCA,s.439
• Currentorformerholderorbeneficiaryofasecurityofacorporationoritsaffiliates.
• Currentorformerdirectororofficerofacorporationoritsaffiliates.• Anyotherpersonwhohastherequiredinterest.
o Groundsforremedy§ CBCAs.241(2)
• Ifcourtissatisfiedthat:o (a)anyactoromissionofthecorporationeffectsaresult,o (b)businessoraffairsofthecorporationareorhavebeencarried
outorconductedinamanner,o (c)powersofdirectorsareorhavebeenexercisedinamanner,o …thatisoppressiveorunfairlyprejudicialtoorthatunfairly
disregardstheinterestsofanysecurityholder,creditor,directororofficer.
• Whoseconductarewelookingat?o Directors,butseealso(b),whichstates“businessoraffairsofthe
corporation”–suggeststhattheconductofanyonecanbelookedat(directors,shareholders,etc…)
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• Whoseinterestsareprotected?o Directors,creditors,securityholders(equityholderslike
shareholders,butalsobondholdersanddebentureholders).§ QBCAs.450
• Sameasabovebutomitsthe“unfairlydisregards”aspectofthearticle.o Whywasthisremoved?
§ Commentatorsthinkthat“unfairdisregard”wasthebroadestbasisforinterventionandQCwantedtonarrowtheoppressionremedybecausetheseremedieswereopeningthedoortotoomuchlitigation.
• Whoseinterestsareprotected?o Creditorsareomitted–again,tolimitthelitigationvolume.
o Powersofthecourt–whatcantheydoaboutoppression/unfairdisregard,etc…?§ CBCAs.241(3)andQBCAs.451
• Underbothschemes,courtshaveuncheckeddiscretiontofashionwhateverrelieftheydeemtobeappropriate.
• It’snotevenanactualremedy–it’sabasisonwhichtofashionaremedyinwhateverthecourtwants.
• Examplesgivenasaformofguidancetothecourts:o Issuearestrainingordero Mandatory____o ____unanimousshareholderagreemento Requireissuanceofsecuritieso Requirethepurchase/exchangeofsecuritieso Fireandreplacedirectorso Ordervarianceofacontractorrescissionofacontracto Ordercompensationorothermoneyremedy
• LookingatBCE,openquestionofwhetherwewillseemorenarrowdefinitiongiventothesegrounds.
o SinceBCE,itisnotobviousfromthecaselawthatthecourtsaremovingtogiveclearguidanceforeachofthesebasesofintervention.
• Breadthoftheoppressionremedyo Standards
§ Broadscopeofanalysistofigureoutifaremedyiswarranted.Thestandardsarenotclearlydefinedinlawandthecourtsarereluctanttogivemeaningtothegrounds.
§ But,thisisnotintendedtoserveasasetofrulesre:liability.Notsupposedtoprovideex-anteguidance.
§ Theydon’thavethedefinitivecontentthatalegalright/dutywouldhave.Instead,theyarebroadremedialstandardsthatinvitejudicialdiscretion.
o Remedialdiscretion§ Courtshavevirtuallyuncheckedpower–theycanrespondtocircumstancesas
theywish.§ Courtscanstandintheshoesofdirectorstotakethepowerthatdirectorshaveand
dothinkslikedemandtheissuanceofshares,replacementofdirectors,orchangingofbylaws.
§ Courtshaven’tgonecrazywiththis,though.(2)OppressionII:Meaning
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àTheoppressionremedyisaninherentlyflexibletoolenablingcourtstointerveneinlightofconductthatislawfulbutinequitable.àCBCAs.241:Courtscanstructureremedieswhentheacts/omissionsofacorporation,orthebusinessofacorporationhasbeenconductedinamatter,orthedirectorsofthecorporationhaveexercisedtheirpowerinamanner“thatisoppressiveorunfairlyprejudicialtoorthatunfairlydisregardstheinterestsofanysecurityholder,creditor,director,orofficer.”
• Oppressiono OldCML:Oneindividualcomplainanthassufferedaprejudicialeffectasaresultofthebad
faithbehaviourofanother.(It’snotthatanindividualcomplainanthasbeensingledoutinparticular,butthattheirinterestshavesuffered.)
o Modern:It’sabouttheconsequencesofadecision–iftheconsequenceswereharshorburdensome,bearinganoutcomethatisharsh/heavy/unfair.
• Unfairprejudiceo Casesinwhichthecomplainantfeelsthattheirinterestsinthecorporationhavebeen
unfairlysingledoutforharshtreatment.• Unfairdisregard(remember,onlyinCBCA)
o Ifthecomplainant’sinterestshavebeenunfairlyoverlooked,ignored,treatedasunimportant.
• àCourtstendtoignorethemeaningoftheseconceptsthemselvesandspeakinbroadtermsaboutfairness,probityofconduct,importanceofpersonsinvolvedshowingdueregardforthereasonableexpectationsofothers,etc…
• Factorsindicatingoppressiveconduct(Arthurv.SignumCommunicationsLtd.)o Lackofvalidcorporatepurposeforthetransactiono Failureofcorporationtotakereasonablestepstosimulateanarm’slengthtransactiono Lackofgoodfaithonthepartofthedirectorsofthecorporationo Discriminationbetweenshareholderswiththeeffectofbenefitingthemajoritytothe
exclusionordetrimentoftheminority.o Lackofadequateandappropriatedisclosureofmaterialinformationtominority
shareholderso Planordesigntoeliminatetheminorityshareholder
• Summaryofprinciplesre:oppressionremedy(Krynenv.Bugg)
o Overridingprinciple:“Whendeterminingwhethertherehasbeenoppressionofashareholder,thecourtmustdeterminewhatthereasonableexpectationsofthatperonwereaccordingtothearrangementswhichexistedbetweentheprincipals.”
o “Unfairprejudiceto”and“unfairdisregardoftheinterestsof”havealessdemandingtestthatoppression.
o Conductcomplainedofmustgobeyondmereinconvenienceandlackofinformation–it’sthatthecomplainant’sinterestshavebeenunfairlydisregarded.
o Norequirementtoshowbadfaith.o Reasonableexpectationscanchangeovertime.o The“businessjudgmentrule”canbeadefencetoanoppressionclaim–havetoshowthat
thebusinessdecisionsweremadehonestly,prudently,ingoodfaith,andonreasonablegrounds.
o Don’tneedtoshowactuallossinordertoraiseanoppressionclaim.WestfairFoodsv.Watt(1991,ABCA)Facts
• WFhadtwoclassesofshares:(1)votingsharesand(2)non-votingpreferredshares(NVPS).
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o NVPSgot$2/year/sharebutwereentitledtoasliceofthecorporateassetsoncethecorporationweretobewoundup.
o NVPSHsalsohadaninterestinthecurrentvalueoftheirshares.• Historically,thecorporationretainedmostofitsearningsandonlypaidlowdividendstoitsvoting
(common)shareholders.NVPSHsonlygottherequired$2/year.• In1985,thepolicychangedandallthenetannualearningswerepaidtoasinglevoting(common)
shareholder.Thissingleshareholderwasbasicallypayinghimselfandthenloaningthismoneybacktothecompanyinsecureddebt,whichmeantthathewaschangingthemoneyofthecompanyfromequityintosecureddebt.
• Thismeantthatthecorporationwasworthless,whichtherebydiminishedthevalueoftheNVPS(becauseoftheirresidualinterestintheassetsofthecorporation).
• NVPSHsthereforesoughtoppressionremedy.JudicialHistory
• TJconcludedthatnewpolicywasoppressivebecauseitdisregardedtheinterestsoftheNVPSHstoshareinfutureexpansionofthecompany.
Issue• WasthenewpolicyoppressivetowardtheNVPSHs?Yes.
Reasoning• Intentvs.outcomes
o It’snotaboutintent–it’saboutoutcomes.§ Doesn’tmatteriftherewasbadfaithorwhattheintentionwas–it’saboutinjuries
totheplaintiff.• Scopeofremedyandimpactonmajorityrule
o Thescopeoftheremedyisexpansive–itgovernsorrelatestoalloftheactivitiesofthecorporation.
o Shareholdershavearighttobe“insulatedfromanythingoppressive,unfairlyprejudicial,orthatunfairlydisregardstheirinterests”vis-à-vistheirrelationshipwiththecompany.
o Courtrecognizesthatthisremedyisamajormodificationoftheprincipleofmajorityrule.
o Theproblemwiththis,ofcourse,isthatit’sdifficulttodeterminewhatitmeanstobetreatedunfairly,orinanoppressiveorprejudicialmanner.
• Meaningofoppressiono Thesewordscommandthecourtstoexercisetheirdutybroadlyandliberallyand
theychargethecourtstoimposetheobligationoffairnessontheparties.o It’saboutadutytoactintheinterestsofshareholdersasagroup,topayheedtothe
interestsofall.o Alsostandsforthepropositionthatthemajorityshareholderscannotprofitattheexpense
oftheminorityshareholders.• Reasonableexpectations
o Therelationshipbetweenthecompanyandshareholdersisregulatedbyregardtothereasonableexpectationsoftheparties,whicharedeservingofprotection.
o Courtindicatedthatunderanoppressionanalysis,theywillbefocusedonprotectingthereasonableexpectationsoftheparties,whicharenototherwiseprotectedbylaw.
o Indeterminingwhatthesereasonableexpectationsare,allofthewordsanddeedsofthepartiesshouldbeconsidered.It’snotjustaboutwhat’swrittendown,theformalelements–it’sabouttheactualrelationship.
• Thetestfortheoppressionremedyisveryfactspecificandprecedentisoflimiteduse.• Here,oppressionwasfound.
Ratio• Thereasonableexpectationsofthepartiesgroundtheanalysisofwhetherornotaninterest
deservedprotectioninanoppressionclaim.Expectationsdeservingofprotectionaresubjecttoastandardoffairness.
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DeluceHoldingsv.AirCanada(1992,ON)Facts
• ACowns75%ofAirOntario,whichitacquiredfromtheDfamilyin1986;Dstillowns25%ofthatcompany.Initially,DwastocontinuemanagingtheairlinerelativelyindependentlyfromAC.
• InApril1991,ACdecideditwantedtoobtain100%ownershipofAirOntario.AprovisionoftheunanimousshareholderagreementgivesACtheoptiontoacquireD’sinterestinAirOntarioupontheterminationofemploymentofStanleyDeluceandWilliamDeluce,whileanotherprovisionsmandatesarbitrationincaseofdisputeoverthevalueoftheshares.
• In1989,SD’sKwiththeairlineswasnotrenewed,whilein1991WDwasterminated.DallegesthatACimproperlyexerciseditscontroltoterminateWD’semployment,anddidsoforthesolepurposeofacquiringD’ssharesintheairline.Dclaimsthebehaviorisoppressive,andthattheexerciseofthearbitrationclauseisthereforeofnoforceandeffect,as“theactioncallsintoquestiontheveryunderpinningofthearbitrationproceeding.”
• ACarguesthatthetermsoftheagreementwereclear,thattheyaresimplyabidingbythem,andthatarbitrationshouldgoaheadascalledforintheagreement.
Issue• WeretheactionsofACinterminatingWD’semploymentwithAirOntariooppressive?Yes.• Ifso,doesthatpreventthecommencementofarbitrationproceedings?Yes.
Reasoning• ThetruereasonforfiringWDcanbefoundintheinternaldocumentsofA–theywereengagedin
anongoingplantotakecontroloftheirregionalcarriers.o TheirprimaryreasonforwantingtoterminateWDwastotriggerthebuyoutclauseso
theycouldobtain100%ownershipofAirOntario.• Whilethecorporateobjectiveofobtaining100%ownershipofAirOntariowasperfectly
legitimate,itraisesaquestion:o CouldACuseitspositionasamajorityshareholderinAirOntariotocarryoutsuchan
objective,orwasthisconductoppressivetotheminorityshareholders?• àAC’sconductconstitutedoppressionofD’sinterestsasminorityshareholdersinceitwas
unfairlyprejudicialorunfairlydisregardedD’sinterestsasaminorityshareholderinviolationofs.241oftheCBCA.
• Reasonableexpectationso Mustlookattheactualrelationshipsbetweenkeyindividualsandgroupstodetermine
whatexpectationsaroseoutofthoserelationships.o ACcharacterizesitsrelationshipwithDasanemploymentrelationshipandthattheyhad
therighttoterminatehimwithoutcause.o DcharacterizesitsrelationshipwithACinlightofthembeingminorityandmajority
shareholders,arguethatitissomethingakintoapartnership(i.e.involvingmutualtrust,confidence,expectationsofgoodfaith,etc…)
o àCourtfocusesonrelationshipbetweenACandDasshareholdersbutdoesn’tdescribeitasapartnership.
o àCourtexaminedtheagreementandfoundthatthepartieshadboundthemselvestoactingoodfaithandinthebestinterestofAirOntario.
o àCourtthenlookedattheintentionsofthepartiesinlightoftheagreementandfoundthatitwasn’ttheintentionofthepartiestoallowACtotriggerthebuyoutclauseatwillbygettingitsnomineesontheboardofAirOntariototerminateWD’semploymentforthatpurpose.WastheintentionofthepartiesthatWD’semploymentshouldonlybeterminated(aninturntriggerthebuyoutclause)ifitwasinthebestinterestsofAirOntario.
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§ Therefore,DhadareasonableexpectationasashareholderthatWDwouldonlybeterminatedintheinterestsofAirOntarioratherthantofacilitatethetakeoverbyAC.
• NatureofOppressiono Evenactionstakeningoodfaithcanstilloppressminorityshareholderinterestsandbring
theoppressionremedyintoplay.o Theoppressionremedyisnotconcernedwithlawfulconductbutwiththeinterests
engagedbyexpectationsgeneratedbytherelationshipsbetweentheparties.o àEvidenceshowedthatdirectorswereactingtocarryouttheagendaofAC,ratherthan
actinginthebestinterestsofAirOntario.SuchconductwasunfairlyprejudicialtoD’sinterestsasaminorityshareholder.
• Remedyo Thecourthassignificantdiscretioninorderingaremedyinanoppressionclaim.o AllowingACtocontinuewithitsplanandtakeadvantageofitsoppressiveactionwouldbe
unjust.Ratio
• Acourtwillassessthereasonableexpectationsarisingoutoftherelationshipofthepartiesindeterminingwhetherornotconductwasunfairlyprejudicialtoaminorityshareholder’sinterestsandthussubjecttoanoppressionclaim.
BCEv.1976Debentureholders(2008,SCC)àCourtseemedintentonmakingtheremedymorestructured,perhapsmoredifficulttoestablish.àBeforethiscase,wasabroadandamorphousremedy.Facts
• DebentureholdersbecameconcernedaboutamountofdebtthebidderswouldhavetotakeoutinordertosuccessfullybuyoutBCE.Theyworriedaboutlosingvalueofthecompanyasaresultofthis.
• Thisisindeedwhathappened–whileshareholdersgota40%premiumthankstothetakeover,thedebtofBCEwentupandsovalueofdebentureswentdown20%.
• DebentureholderssoughtoppressionremedyagainstBCEunders.241ofCBCA.JudicialHistory
• TJ:Nooppressionhere.FiduciaryobligationsrequireBCEtoactinbestinterestofcorporation.• CoA:Didn’tdecide
Issue• Werethedebentureholdersentitledtoreliefunders.241oftheCBCA?No.
Reasoning• Boardofdirectorshadadutytoconsidertheinterestsofthedebentureholders.• However,reasonableexpectationsweredefinedintermsofthedebentures,andtherewereno
reasonableexpectationstogobeyondthecovenantssetoutinthedebentures.• So,thecourtsawthattheBoarddidwhatithadpromisedtodo–madesuredebentureholders
wereawareofwhatwashappening.(3)OppressionIII:Relationshipwithrepresentativeaction
• Howtounderstandtherelationshipbetweentheoppressionremedyandrepresentativeaction?• Basisforconfusionisbecauseoppressionremedyissobroad–so,whythenbothertobringa
representativeaction?• Concernthatoppressionremedysobroadthatitextendsintoderivativesuitsforbreachof
fiduciaryduty.Asaresult,courtshavecometogivemoredefinitiontotheoppressionremedy.
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• Thinkaboutdifferenceintermsofharmtothecorporation(whichisproperlythesubjectofarepresentativeaction)andharmtotheshareholdersorothercomplainants(whichmayamounttooppressiveconductandwarrantanoppressionremedy).
o SeeFarnhamv.FingoldandGoldexMines.FirstEdmontonPlacev.315888AlbertaLtd.(1988,AB)àNotefocusonimpactoftheimpugnedactions,whethertheycreatedharm,andtowhomFacts
• Issue
• Isthelandlordentitledtostandingtobringaclaiminoppression?No.• Ifso,isthelandlordentitledtoreliefundertheoppressionremedy?
Reasoning• Courtdeterminedthattherewasnobasistoawardaclaiminoppression.• Historyofcorporatelawremedies
o Remediesweretheproductofdeliberatepolicychoicesbythegovernment,wereentitledtobringaboutsignificantchangetocorporatelawinCanada.
o Therewasadesiretoachieveabalancebetweenthosewithcompetinginterestsinthecorporatestructure.Particularconcernforcreditors,minorityshareholders,memberofthegeneralpublic.
o Whatweseeisasetofremediesthatareincrediblybroadandthatgivethecourtsgreatdiscretiontogetatthebalancingproblemandrectifyinginjusticewithinthecorporatestructure.
o Wasn’tjustachangeinblackletterlaw,butachangeinjudicialapproach.Theoldviewthatthemanagementofthecompanywasthesolepurviewofthedirectorsandshareholders.Instead,expansiveviewofcourt’sroleinbalancinginterests.
o Newpublicmindedethic–judgestoplayacentralroleinpolicinginequitablebehaviourthatwouldpreviouslyhavegoneunchecked.
o Thisisadeliberatedeparturefromtheprevioustrendofjudicialnon-interference.o Commonthreadbetweenallofthemajorremedies–commonconcernre:abuseofpower.
§ Millerthinksthisisalittlesimplistic.Doesn’tthinkthatrepresentativeaction,forexample,isalwaysaboutanabuseofpower.Sometimesthedirectorwillbegoingaboveandbeyondtheirdutiesandwillstillfindthemselvesthetargetofarepresentativeaction.Itisindeedawaytogetatproblemswithabuseofpower,butit’snottheonlythingarepresentativeactiondoes.
• Scopeofoppressionremedyandfunctiono Function–oppressionremedygivesthecourtwidediscretiontoremedyvirtuallyany
corporateconductthatisunfair.o Scope–providebroadbasisforintervention.o Onthewhole,courtsarepleasedwiththisbecausetheyseeitasconsistentwithlegislative
intent.o Still,somedefinitionshouldbegiventotheoppressionremedyandtothejudicial
discretionthatfollows.o GivespreviewofwhatistocomeinBCE.Weshouldlooktotheindividualgroundsfor
bringingaclaiminoppression.Notjustaboutrectifyingunfairness,therearethreegroundsforbringingaclaim:oppression,unfairprejudice,unfairdisregard(butnotinQBCA).
o But,becausethesethreegroundsareverybroad,theylendthemselvestoageneralfairnesstest,focusedonreasonableexpectationsofparties,andreasonableexpectationsthatarenototherwiseprotectedthroughlaw.
o Evidencetoexamineincontextofoppressionclaim?Everythingisrelevant.
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o There’snotestforfairness–it’sanequitableremedy.Havetoconsideranothersetofthings:looktounderlyingexpectationsofbothparties,whetherornotcomplainantwouldhavebeenabletoprotectherinterestsinsomeotherway(e.g.bycontract),andwhetherornocomplainant’sinterestshavebeeninjured.
• Creditors’interestso Makesjudgesabitqueasywhencreditorsbringclaimforoppressionremedybecause
usuallytheserelationshipsaregovernedbycontractandshouldbelefttobedealtwithbythetermsofthatcontract.
o Needtobalancetheinterestsofcreditorsre:extra-contractualprotectionandfreedomofcorporatemanagementtomakedecisionsinbestinterestofcorporationthatwillsometimesbetothedetrimentofcreditors.Sometimesit’sthebestdecisionforthecorporationtobreachacontractandpaydamagesthantonot.
o Soapproachistosuggestthatacreditorwillusuallyhavetoshowthattheexpectationtheyhadisanon-contractualonethatwillnormallyhavearisenafterthecontractwasformed.Thereshouldalsobesomerepresentationmadebythecorporationoritsagentstothecreditorthattheyneednotengageinthenormalself-protectivebehaviour.
o àInlightofthistoughloveapproachtocreditorsashavingstandingre:oppression,heresaidtherewasnostandingforFEPasacreditor.NoproofthatFEPhadbeendefraudedorthattheirreasonableexpectationshadbeenviolated.
o àTheywere,however,foundtobea“properperson”tobringaclaim.(4)OppressionIV:Relationshipwithfiduciaryduty
• CasebookauthorsthinkoppressionandFDaresimilarbecausethey’rebothunclearandbecausetheyarebothconcernedwithgeneralfairness.Millerthinksthisisoversimplified.
• Pointsofoverlapo Inmanycaseswillfindthatsetoffactsgivesrisetoclaiminoppressionandclaimre:
fiduciaryduty.(e.g.AirOntariocase)• Pointsofdistinction
o Fiduciaryobligationsarelegaldutiesofofficers/managersaloneandtheyareownedonlytothecorporation.
§ Havefixedstandards,content.Standardsofcare,standardsofloyalty.§ Veryclear,definite,narrowfunction–designedtoensurethatcorporatemanagers
(directors/officers)exercisetheirlegalpowersreasonablyandfaithfullyintheinterestofthecompany.Thattheytakegoodcareandactingoodfaith.
§ Meanttoensurethemanagerswon’tbeswayedbyself-interest.o Oppressionremedyisnotalegalduty–doesn’tprovidesetofex-anteliabilityrules.
§ Notpossibleforofficers/directorstoknowwheretheymightbeexposedtoaclaiminoppression.
§ It’snotjustaboutcorporateinterests–it’saboutanumberofdifferentparties’interests.
§ Oppressionremedyisnotaboutsecuringbasicfunctionofmanagers.Instead,meanttoenablejudgestoexamineex-postthatthereasonableexpectationsofanynumberofindividualsaresecureagainstunfairtreatmentofanysort,recognizingthattheseexpectationswouldnototherwisehavebeenprotectedbythelaw.
§ Oppressionremedyconcernedaboutalotmorethanself-interest.It’saboutmakingsurecorporatestructuredoesnotconcealunfairconduct.
(5)OppressionV:Remedies
• ScopeofremedialpowerunderCBCA241(3)andQBCA451.• Notexpresslysubjecttoanylimitation–courtscandowhatevertheyseefit.
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• Thisraisesquestions–howdowemakethisdiscretiontractable?Howtoweunderstandanypotentiallimitations?
• Courtshavebecomesensitivetodefiningthescopeoftheirdiscretion.• Remedialordersmadebycourtsmustbesensitivetobothsides–mustlookatitinaholisticway,
bearinmindwhatisequitableallaround.• Wouldbeunfairforcourtstomakeanorderandexercisetheirdiscretiontoissueanremedythat
ispunitiveinnature.o Remediesordered,whatevertheyare,oughttobecorrective.o Outrageousbehaviourshouldnotbesanctioned/condemnedinamoralway.
Naneffv.ConcreteHoldingsLtd.(1995,ONCA)Facts
• Familyownedandoperatedcorporationinvolvedinconcrete.Disputeinvolvedthreefamilymembers.
• Mr.Nbuiltupcompanyanddecidedtogivehissons,AandB,a50-50stakeincompanybyissuingnon-votingcommonsharesbecauseMr.Nwantedtoretaincompletecontrolofcompany.So,hehadpreferredsharesthatallowedhimtocontrolcompanythroughrighttovoteandpowertoissuedividends.
• FallingoutwithAandMr.N,whodecidedtopushAoutofthecompany.Issue
• WasbehaviourofMr.Noppressive?Yes.• Andwhat’stheappropriateremedy,particularlyinlightofthefactthatthisisacloselyheldfamily
company?BuyoutofA’sshares.Remedycanonlyrectifyoppression,redressimbalance–cannotbepunitiveinnature.
JudicialHistory• TJfoundbehaviourwasoppressiveandremedywasthatbusinesswouldbesoldandanyofthe
partieswouldhaveopportunitytopayforthebusinessandtheproceedswouldbesplit.o Mr.NwasunhappybecausethisgaveAopportunitytoacquirebusiness,whichwasnever
whathewanted.Reasoning
• Appealallowed–foundoppressionbutremedywaspurchaseofA’sshares.Thatheshouldbepaidoutandgivenanappropriatepriceforhisshares.
• Poweroftrialcourtcandoalmostanythingtorectifyoppression.But,appealcourtcangetinvolvedwherethereisanerror.Here,errorinprinciple(inlaw)inorderingthatbusinessbesold.
• Broad,thoughremedialdiscretionis,canonlybeexercisedonlytorectifyoppression,toredressanimbalance.Theremedialorderscannotbepunitiveinnatureoreffect.
• Importanttoconsider,indevisingremedy,toremindoneselfoftherelationshipofthepartiesandtheirreasonableexpectations.Awasnotjustasonbuta50%shareholder.Whatdidhereasonablyexpectre:hispositionwithinthecompany?Thathisfatherwouldmaintaincontrolofthecompany.Therefore,theremedycan’tgivehimmorethanhereasonablyexpectedasaresultofhisrelationshipwithhisfatherandthecompany.RemedyofTJwasthereforepunitivetoMr.N.
(6)OppressionVI:BCE
• Themostimportantcasere:oppression.Setsoutthetestforoppressionremedy.BCEInc.v.1976DebentureholdersàLast,greatestwordonoppression.FocusontheBCEtestforthepurposesofafactpattern.Facts
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• BellCanada(subofBCE)wastoassumea$30Bdebtaspartofaleveragedbuyoutdeal.• Somedebentureholdersobjectedtotheplan,arguingthatitwouldsignificantlydecreasethe
valueoftheirbondsandlowerthegradeoftheirinvestment.TheyclaimedthattheBCEdirectors,inapprovingthisbid,actedinawaythatwasoppressivetotheirinterests.
• Theysoughtanoppressionremedyunders.241oftheCBCA,andalsoarguedthattheplanwasnot“fairandreasonable”becauseofitseffectsontheirinterests.
JudicialHistory• TJfoundtherewasoppression.• SCCsaidthattherewasnone,thatboardofBCEhadobligationtoconsiderinterestof
debentureholders,thattheirexpectationsweredefinedbythedebentures.Therefore,BCEhadconsideredtheexpectationsofthedebentureholders.
Issue• DidBCE’sactionsgroundaclaimforoppressionunders.241?No.
Reasoning• Lowercourtdecisionsrevealedconfusion/conflictinstateofjurisprudence.
o àMillerthinksthisisbaloney.Didn’tseeanunderlyingconflict.Instead,hethinkscourtjustwantedtodispensewithmushinessofoppressionanalysis,thisamorphousideaof“reasonableexpectations”.Courtthoughtittooamorphous,toomuchlitigation,etc…Wantedtogivegreaterstructure,tomakerecoursemoreburdensome.
• Saidthatthereweretwoapproachesinthejurisprudence:o (1)Emphasizestrictreadingofstatedgroundsforoppressioninthestatute(thethree
grounds)o (2)Focusedonbroaderprinciples,offairness,concernforreasonableexpectationsof
parties.• Courtdecidestodobothallatonce–favouredapproachisonethatcombinesthetwoapproaches.• First,looktoprinciplesunderlyingtheoppressionremedy,inparticularreasonableexpectations.
o Iftherewasabreachofreasonableexpectations,thengotothestatuteandseeiftherewasabreachofanyofthethreeprinciples.
• (1)Determinereasonableexpectationsofcomplainantandwhethertheywereviolated.o (a)Identifyexpectationsoftheparties.o (b)Showwhethertheexpectationswerereasonable.
§ Howtoshowifanexpectationisreasonable?• Objectiveandcontextualanalysis.Expectationmustbereasonable
regardingfactsofspecificcase,therelationshipsatissue,theentirecontext(includingconflictingclaimsre:expectations).
• Listoffactorsthatgotoreasonableness:o Commercialpractice(e.g.departurefromnormalbusiness
practice)o Natureofthecorporation(e.g.size,nature,andstructure)o Pastpractice(e.g.divergencefromsettledpastpractice,past
practicesmaycreatereasonableexpectationthatthispracticewillcontinue)
o Preventativesteps(couldcomplainanthavedonesomethingtoavoidsetback?)
o Representationsandagreementsmadebetweenthepartieso Conflictinginterestsofstakeholders
o (c)Showthatreasonableexpectationwasviolated.• (2)Determinewhetherreasonableexpectations,havingbeenviolatedandhavingbeen
showntobereasonable,iftheyhavebeenshowntobeactionablyviolated.o Expectationsareactionablyviolatedwhenthereis(a)oppression,(b)unfair
prejudice,or(c)unfairdisregard.o (a)Oppression
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§ Oppressiveconductisconductthatiscoerciveandabusiveandsuggestsbadfaith.(LookslikerollingbacktooldCMLremedyofoppression.)
§ Involvesvisibledeparturefromstandardsoffairdealingandanabuseofpower.
o (b)Unfairprejudice§ Entailslessculpablestateofmindthanoppression.Stateofmindthatisbad,
butnotasbadasbadfaith.§ Stateofmindthathasconsequencesthatareunfair.§ Conductthatislessoppressiveandoppression.Prettybadconduct,butnot
asbadasoppression.o (c)Unfairdisregard
§ Involvesignoringaknowninterest.§ Theleastbadofthethree.
• Applicationo Twoexpectationsclaimedbydebentureholders:
§ (1)ThatBCEwouldactpositivelytoprotectvalueofratedvalueofdebentures.• Courtfoundthiswasnotreasonablebecausetheyweregivenwarningsto
thecontrarybyBCE.• Alsonotreasonablegiventhecontextbecauseallthebidswereleveraged,
thiswasverycommon,thereforenotmuchadebentureholdercanbemadaboutbecausetheseleveragedbidsarejustthewaythingsaredoneinbusinessnowadays.
• Courtalsosaysdebentureholderscouldhavenegotiatedprotectedcovenants.
• Also,BCEhadcompetingintereststoconsider,suchasshareholders,andtheboardwillalwayshaveabalancetostrikeinthebestinterestofthecorporation.
§ (2)ThatBCEwouldconsidertheinterestofthedebentureholdersinmaintainingthevalueoftheirdebentures.
• Courtsaiditwasareasonableexpectationbutthisexpectationwasnotviolated.
• BoardofBCEabidedbythetermsofthedebenturesandthatwasallitwasrequiredtodo.
Notes• Wenowhaveastructuredtestforoppressionremedy.• Millerthinksthiswasintendedtobeandhasbeenmoreburdensomeforlitigants.It’slessuseful,
lesspronetoopportunisticlitigation.• Generalconsensus–moredemandingapproachtooppressioninCanada.Meansthatcourtshave
potentiallylostsightofwhatlegislatureintendedre:oppression,thattheyintendedittobeabroadandamorphousremedytodealwithinequitablebehaviour.
EXAMINATION
• Dealwithsimplerissuesfirstinfactpattern.• Don’tgivehimlegalhistoryinfactpattern.• Payattentiontostatutoryprovisionsespeciallywheretheyhavesupplementedorsupplantedthe
CML.• IRAC–spendmostofyourtimeonanalysis• Don’taddresstoomanyissuesinfactpattern.• Sticktotimere:shortanswerquestions(10minseach)• Don’tworryaboutQBCAprovisions