Company Update Egypt Telecom 21 December 2011
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
1 Ahmed Adel
+202 3300 5100 Ext.2203 [email protected]
Buy new OTH, avoid OTMT, play Mobinil for the put
The demerger of Orascom Telecom (OT) into Orascom Telecom
Holding (OTH) and Orascom Telecom Media & Technology
Holding (OTMT) and the subsequent listing of the companies
on the EGX is expected before year-end. We are buyers of the
OTH post demerger, as we continue to see substantial upside,
driven mainly by a favorable outcome in Algeria. Initial trading
action is likely to see the new shares adjust to implied pre-
suspension market values, from a book-value split (OTH up,
OTMT down) and thereafter towards our respective fair values
of USD3.6/GDR (EGP4.3/share) for OTH and USD0.9/GDR
(EGP1.1/share) for OTMT. The demerger will impact Mobinil
too, owing to the Sawiris put option. We upgraded Mobinil to
buy, acknowledging the impact of the put despite a gloomy
operating outlook.
► The key to OT’s fair value remains the outcome relating to its
subsidiary Djezzy in Algeria. Djezzy constitutes c. 80% of OTH’s
post-demerger value. OTMT, meanwhile, should trade as a
proxy for Mobinil shares, as c. 70% of its fair value is from this
source. The Sawiris put option over Mobinil shares should also
positively influence OTMT’s shares.
► Initially, the new shares should trade immediately towards their
implied pre-suspension “market values”, which, according to
our valuation, imply a ratio of 80:20 (vs. 58:42 on a book value
basis). The immediate moves may be rapid, although up and
down circuit–breakers may see it take several days for the
shares to trade normally at the new levels. Thereafter, expect a
gradual move towards fair values as the fundamentals assert
themselves.
► If the EFSA does not take action before end-2011 (this cannot
be ruled out given the recent decision making paralysis within
Egypt’s public bodies) or a new court cases delay the
demerger, a contingency plan outlined under the VIP-WIND
deal could be triggered, under which VIP-WIND will be
required to buy OTH’s remaining assets for USD600m, plus a
further USD170m conditional upon the Mobinil put option
being exercised.
► We are buyers of relisted OTH, downside is limited, but see
significant upside if a solution can be reached in Algeria. We
continue to argue that the best outcome for OTH is for Djezzy
to be allowed to operate normally again (including being
permitted to repatriate dividends), and that an outright
purchase of Djezzy by the Algerian government is now less
likely. Based on the last locally traded share price of OT prior to
suspension and our fair value estimates for OT’s other assets,
the market currently implies an EV for Djezzy (100%) of
USD1.6bn or just 1.5x 2012f EBITDA.
OTH
Recommendation BUY
Opening Price on EGX (EGP) 1.73
Fair Value (EGP/share) 4.34
Upside Potential (%) 151.3
Fair Value (USD/GDR) 3.60
Reuters Code ORTE.CA/ORTEq.L
Bloomberg Code ORAT EY/OTLD LI
OTMT
Recommendation HOLD
Opening Price on EGX (EGP) 1.25
Fair Value (EGP/share) 1.10
Downside Potential (%) (12.3)
Fair Value (USD/GDR) 0.91
Reuters Code na
Bloomberg Code na
Mobinil
Recommendation BUY
Market Price (EGP) 86.5
Fair Value (EGP/share) 114.7
Upside Potential (%) 32.7
Market Cap (EGPm) 8,646
Reuters Code EMOB.CA
Bloomberg Code EMOB EY
ORTE vs. EGX30 (rebased)
Source: Bloomberg, NAEEM Research
OT Closing price as of 27 November 2011
EMOB Closing price as of 20 December 2011
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3
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Dec-1
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Feb-1
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Mar-
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Ap
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May-1
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Jun
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Jul-
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v-1
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ORTE EGX30 Rebased
Price (EGP)
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Contents
The OT demerger ................................................................................................................................................ 3
First few days of trade ........................................................................................................................................ 4
What if the demerger was halted? .................................................................................................................... 5
OTH valuation ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
Algeria – where the juice is ................................................................................................................................ 6
OTMT valuation .................................................................................................................................................. 7
How do things differ for GDR holders? .......................................................................................................... 7
Process details for GDR holders ....................................................................................................................... 8
Implications for Mobinil – play the put ........................................................................................................... 8
Appendix 1 - OTH assets' operational and financial KPIs ........................................................................... 10
Appendix 2 - OTH's Revenue, EBITDA and Capex breakdown ................................................................ 11
Appendix 3 - OTMT assets' operational and financial KPIs ....................................................................... 12
Disclosure Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 13
Figure 1: Abbreviations and acronyms used in the report
OT Orascom Telecom Pre-Demerger EFSA Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority
OTH Orascom Telecom Post-Demerger OTC Over The Counter
OTMT Orascom Telecom Media & Technology
Holding NTRA
National Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority
VIP Vimpelcom ARPU Average Revenue Per User
SOTP Sum Of The Parts LSE London Stock Exchange
3
The OT demerger
Should the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) approve the OT
demerger (it likely will), local OT shareholders prior to the suspension will receive
shares in two listed companies (OTH and OTMT). The former will retain most of the
assets under the old OT, while OTMT will include OT’s stakes in Mobinil, Koryolink,
and other internet and cable assets.
Figure 2: The OT demerger
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
Prior to the VIP-WIND merger, the key determinant of OT’s fair value was the
outcome relating to its subsidiary Djezzy in Algeria, this hasn’t changed. Djezzy
constitutes c. 80% of OTH’s post-demerger valuation. OTMT, meanwhile, will
become a proxy for Mobinil shares, as c. 70% of the fair value will come from this
source. The presence of the Sawiris put option over Mobinil shares should
influence OTMT’s share price (see below).
We value OTH and OTMT (both on an SOTP basis) at EGP4.3 and EGP1.1,
respectively, implying 151% upside potential for OTH shares and 12% downside
potential for OTMT shares (from the re-listing prices).
OT
OTMTOTH
Split
42% of Book value58% of Book value
Djezzy (Algeria)
Mobilink (Pakistan)
Bangalink (Bangladesh)
Telecel Globe (Africa)
Wind (Canada)
Mobinil Telecom (Egypt)
ECMS (Egypt)
Koryolink (North Korea)
ORABANK (North Korea)
MENA for Sea Cables
Trans World Associates
Med Cable Limited (UK)
Orascom Telecom Ventures
ARPU for
Telecommunication
Services
96.8%
100%
100%
95%
c. 95%
28.755%
20%
75%
95%
100%
51%
100%
99.99%
1%
OT shareholders to receive 1 OTH
share and 1 OTMT share
Algeria is still key to OTH’s value
OTMT will be a Mobinil proxy…just
less liquid
4
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
First few days of trade
Following the demerger, previous OT shareholders will be entitled to one share in
OTH and one in OTMT. In accordance with Egyptian regulations, the split will take
place based on the book values of the underlying assets, with the ratio deemed to
be 58:42. Therefore, based on the last closing price of OT (prior to the suspension
on the EGX) of EGP2.98/share, the opening price for OTH should be EGP1.73/share
and for OTMT EGP1.25/share.
Once trading commences, there should be a move towards the shares’ respective
fair values in two phases:
► Initially, the shares should move immediately towards their implied pre-
suspension “market values”, which, according to our valuation, imply a ratio of
80:20 (vs. 58:42 on a book value basis). (See Fig 3 and 4 below).
► OTH’s assets (post-demerger) will represent 80% of OT’s (pre-demerger)
group value. Therefore, based on the last closing price of OT shares prior to
the suspension on the EGX of EGP2.98/share, the first stabilization point for
OTH shares should be c. EGP2.38 (38% above the opening price of
EGP1.73/share). A strict application of the same calculation implies sharp
downside for OTMT shares. However, given that OTMT will be a close proxy
for Mobinil, expectation of a tender offer on the shares and the influence of
the Sawiris’s put option over Mobinil shares (exercisable from September
2012), we believe that OTMT shares may initially adjust downwards to our fair
value of EGP1.1/share and then to c. EGP1.17/share, on the assumption that
there is a subsequent OTMT tender offer (see OTMT valuation below).
► The immediate moves of the respective shares may be rapid, although up and
down circuit-breakers could mean that it takes several days for the shares to
trade normally at the new levels. Thereafter, we expect a more gradual move
towards our fair values as the fundamentals assert themselves.
► Our fair value for OTH of EGP4.3/share implies a 151% upside from the
opening price, while our fair value for OTMT of EGP1.1/share indicates its
shares should sink 12%.
Figure 3: New shares’ interim equilibrium price and
NAEEM’s fair values
Figure 4: Expected share price movements post-demerger
OTH OTMT
OT closing price 24 Nov (EGP/share) 2.98
Book value ratio 58% 42%
Opening prices (on book-value basis) 1.73 1.25
"Market value" ratio - based on last
done price 80% 20%
Expected equilibrium price on relisting
(EGP/share) c. 2.38 c. 1.10
Upside/Downside (initial trading days) 37.9% -12.1%
Our target price (EGP/share) 4.34 1.1
Upside/Downside (12-month view) 151.1% -12.1%
Source: NAEEM Research Source: NAEEM Research
1.73 2.38
4.34
1.251.10 1.17
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 Intial trading days 12 Months View
OTH OTMT
Price (EGP)
Immediate move to “market value”
prices, from book value listing prices
Fair value for OTH of EGP4.3, and
OTMT of EGP1.1
5
What if the demerger was halted?
We still have no official confirmation that the EFSA has approved OT’s demerger
into OTH and OTMT. Nevertheless, on 14 December, OT’s shares were split into
OTH and OTMT on the Misr for Central Clearing, Depository and Registry (MCDR);
we see this as tacit indication that the EFSA may have approved the demerger. OT
had earlier implemented all accounting adjustments recommended by the General
Authority for Investment (GAFI), and these and the split were approved by OT's
shareholders on 23 October (with >99% of the vote). The split was also earlier
approved by OT's shareholders on 17 April (again with >99% of the vote).
On 17 December, the Egyptian Administrative Court delayed deliberations over
OT’s split for the third time. The case was filed by a number of OT’s shareholders
opposing the EFSA’s approval of OT’s 17 April EGM decisions. The court has
delayed the case yet again, pending an independent report from the Board of
State Commissioners on the case.
If the EFSA does not take action before end-2011 (cannot be ruled out given the
recent decision making paralysis within Egypt’s public bodies) or the court case
delays the demerger, a contingency plan outlined under the VIP-WIND deal is set
to come into play under which VIP-WIND will be required to buy OT’s remaining
assets for USD600m, plus a further USD170m conditional upon the Mobinil put
option being exercised. Management, however, states that VIP and Weather could
simply agree to extend the deadline for the split to be concluded if the process is
at a fairly advanced stage (which it appears to be).
In the event of the contingency’s coming into play, France Telecom could exercise
its call option over OTH's stake in Mobinil at a “fair market value plus 5%
premium” (see implications for Mobinil below).
OTH valuation
We value OTH on a sum of the parts basis (SOTP) as set out in the table below.
Further details of individual company forecast KPIs is shown in Appendix 1
Figure 5: OTH Sum of the Parts Valuation
Company EV (USDm) OTH stake Value to OTH (USDm)
Djezzy (Algeria) 4,102 96.8% 3,971
Mobilink (Pakistan) 1,155 100.0% 1,155
Banglalink (Bangladesh) 400 100.0% 400
Telecel Globe (Africa) 423 100.0% 423
Globalive (Canada) 623 65.0% 405
Sum 6,354
OTH net debt (2,500)
OTH EV 3,854
Fair value (USD/GDR) 3.60
Source: NAEEM Research
Signs are EFSA will approve
demerger, but still risk of delay
VIP-WIND contingency plan
triggered, if split delayed…
…but deadline may be extended
6
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
Algeria – where the juice is
We recommend OTH as a BUY, as we believe downside from current levels is
limited, but see significant upside if a solution can be reached in Algeria. We
continue to argue that the best outcome for OTH is for Djezzy to be allowed to
operate normally in the country again (including being permitted to repatriate
dividends), and that an outright purchase of Djezzy by the Algerian government is
now less likely.
Based on the last locally traded share price of OT prior to suspension and our fair
value estimates for OT’s other assets, the market currently implies an EV for Djezzy
(100% stake) of USD1.6bn or just 1.5x 2012f EBITDA. Anything paid above this
price will provide upside to the new OTH shares. We comment on the various
outcomes for Algeria as follows:
► Under a scenario where Djezzy is able to operate normally and repatriate
dividends, the company is more realistically worth USD6bn-7bn (EV basis),
based on recent transactions and peer multiples
► Even with all the various hurdles currently in its way, we value Djezzy at c.
USD4bn (EV)
► Operationally, the company has been performing well despite all the
headwinds. This emphasizes just how good the Djezzy franchise is
► Relations between Egypt and Algeria have thawed since Egypt’s revolution,
and there have been some small concessions to the restrictions imposed on
Djezzy (e.g. Djezzy reached an agreement to advertise on national TV again
starting June 2011, after being banned since March 2010).
► We believe that OTH’s new management, with the help of VIP-WIND
executives, is talking with Algerian authorities, with a view to enabling Djezzy
to return to a level-playing-field operating environment (this is OTH’s
preferred outcome).
► While Shearman & Sterling (S&S) have yet to report, we believe it is highly
likely that they will produce a valuation range based on international peer
multiples (say, at >5x EBITDA), ); however, there is no guarantee that the
Algerian authorities will accept or act on S&S’s findings. If, however, the case
goes to the International Court of Arbitration, a fair value by S&S would work
in OTH’s favour.
► A low-ball offer by the Algerians would almost certainly result in OTH’s
resorting to the International Court.
► The relative silence from Algeria and the seemingly long time for S&S to
report, could indicate that S&S has shown an initial valuation indication to the
Algerians and that they have baulked at the price tag and so are now looking
for other options (e.g. a negotiated settlement).
► The advent of 3G licenses in Algeria could also be trigger point for a
negotiated settlement. We believe Djezzy will seek and be granted a 3G
license. But, for it to operate the license, it would need to be free to import
equipment. This would call into question the current import restrictions for
the 2G network.
► Djezzy has paid nearly all the tax demanded under various tax reassessments
(this amounts to c. USD1bn). One neat solution, in our view, would be to trade
the disputed tax amount for a stake in Djezzy, i.e. the tax demands cancelled,
and in return, the Algerian government is given a stake in Djezzy. (Assuming
S&S values Djezzy at say USD6bn, the tax amount would give it a stake of c.
15-16%).
Market implied EV for Djezzy just
USD1.6bn, only 1.5x 2012f EBITDA
Relations with Algeria have
thawed a bit
Algeria may not buy out Djezzy
completely, but could still take a
stake
A return to normal operating
conditions is best outcome for OTH
share price
7
OTMT valuation
According to Weather Investments II (a Sawiris family investment vehicle that will
become a 51.7% majority owner of OTMT), within a fairly short time after OTMT is
listed, it will launch a tender offer for the minority shares. OTMT shareholders will
be offered a combination of cash plus shares in Mobinil.
Until the tender offer is made, we will not know the exact mix of cash and Mobinil
shares. For now, we have assumed that the ratio will be close to 1 Mobinil share
for 151 shares in OTMT and EGP0.6/per OTMT share in cash (the ballpark number
intimated by Weather at the time of the VIP-WIND deal). Based on Mobinil’s
closing price yesterday of EGP86.46/share, this combination indicates that the
buyback offer for OTMT shares could be at c. EGP1.17/share, 7% above
EGP1.1/share (our fair value for OTMT).
Assuming the tender offer comes in roughly as noted above, we recommend that
OTMT shareholders accept the tender offer. This would give them cash
immediately, while offering upside potential from the impact of the exercise of the
Sawiris put option over their Mobinil shares. This is preferable to ending up as
small minority holders in a very illiquid stock.
We currently value OTMT at EGP1.1/share.
How do things differ for GDR holders?
As a reminder, the demerger process, from the point of view of OT GDR holders, is
more complex. The risk of owning OTH (OTLD) now is higher than waiting to buy
the new OTH shares on the EGX or GDRs on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) post
the demerger.
As part of the demerger transaction, current GDR shareholders will, for a time
(possibly into 1Q12) end up owning GDR shares in OTMT that are not listed on the
LSE and may only trade OTC, if at all. This increases the risk of owning OT GDRs
now. Further, as we approach a point when the demerger becomes final, OTH
shares may trade lower if GDR shareholders are unwilling to end up holding
illiquid OTMT GDR shares for a lengthy period (some mandates may prevent it).
Since the suspension of OT shares on the EGX, the GDR has traded at a higher-
than-average premium to the local share. We believe this will revert to the mean
as the demerger approaches. We do not recommend entering the GDR shares at
this juncture.
OTMT may be short-lived
Weather II to cause OTMT to make
tender offer
Demerger is more complex for GDRs
8
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
Process details for GDR holders:
► Trading in OTH's GDRs on the LSE is unlikely to be suspended during the
demerger process
► The record date for GDR holders to be eligible to receive OTMT GDRs is
currently planned to be one day prior to the resumption of trading of ordinary
shares on the EGX
► The OTH GDRs (post-demerger) will continue to be listed on the LSE under
the symbol "OTLD".
► OT GDR holders who do not provide the requisite certification to the
depositary will not receive OTMT GDRs
► Instead, the underlying OTMT ordinary shares will be sold and the proceeds
(net of the depositary's fees and any applicable taxes and expenses)
distributed to the shareholders by the Depositary in accordance with the
applicable GDR deposit agreement.
As for OTMT GDSs,
Following the demerger, OTMT intends to apply to list its GDRs on the London
Stock Exchange. Until such listing is effective, the OTMT GDR holders' ability to sell
OTMT GDRs could be limited. The Company currently anticipates such a listing
process to be completed during the 1Q 2012.
Implications for Mobinil – play the put
Mobinil continues to face a difficult operating environment. Although 4Q11 results
may recover from a seasonally weak and Twitter-incident-impacted 3Q11, we see
strong competition hampering Mobinil’s strategy of focusing on customer
profitability rather than additions. In 3Q11, Mobinil was forced to sacrifice its ARPU
and margins to defend market share (down 4.3pps YoY by end-September). We
expect further market share loss in early-2012 and ARPU to remain pressured.
Despite this gloomy backdrop, investors should recognise the influence that the
Sawiris put option would have on Mobinil’s shares in 2012. If the OTH/OTMT
demerger goes through, the scene will be set for Mobinil’s share price to arbitrage
towards the put strike price of EGP239.6/share on the first exercise date (15
September 2012).
We have upgraded our Mobinil call to BUY in the expectation that the demerger
will take place on time and avoid implementing the contingency plan.
Nevertheless, even if this was not the case, FT’s call option (which would be
triggered by the contingency plan) still indicates a price 24% higher than Mobinil’s
closing price yesterday.
OT’s demerger would shift OTH’s stake in Mobinil to the newly-formed entity
OTMT (51.7% owned by Sawiris’s Weather Investments II), which is subsequently to
be taken private. This means that OT’s stake in Mobinil, which carries the put
option, would end up in the hands of the Sawiris family. The put option enables
the holder to put the entire holdings (34.66%) in Mobinil to France Telecom at a
price between EGP221.7 and EGP248.5/share for the first time between 15
September (at this date, the strike price would be EGP239.6/share) and 15
November 2012 and at any time until 15 November 2013, in a limited number of
deadlock situations.
However, even if the put is in the money at the exercise date, there is no guarantee
that the Sawiris family would exercise the option. Nevertheless, as we move into
2012, we believe the looming exercise date will still positively influence Mobinil’s
share price, as the exercise of the put (according to EFSA rules) would trigger a
mandatory tender offer by FT at the exercise price.
GDR still trading and unlikely to be
suspended
Owning GDR now risks being trapped
in OTMT GDRs not listed on LSE
Mobinil faces a difficult operating
environment
Put option exercisable from 15 Sept
2012 at first strike price of
EGP239.6/share
Put exercise would trigger mandatory
tender offer by FT
9
While the operating environment for Mobinil is undoubtedly gloomy, there
are a few chinks in the clouds;
► Data revenue as a percentage of revenue is growing. Although Mobinil has
not disclosed details, we estimate that mobile data revenue currently
constitutes c. 4-5% of mobile revenue. We expect this to increase to over 10%
within five years. More data volumes should help bolster flagging ARPU.
► Subsidiary LINKdotNET (LDN) is a bright spot. LDN's 3Q11 revenue was up
16.8% YoY and 1.3% QoQ. LDN holds an estimated 35% share in Egypt’s retail
ADSL market, and we expect continued strong subscriber and revenue growth
in this market. LDN should break even at the EBITDA level by 2013.
► Roaming recovery. Mobinil’s roaming revenue has been hurt by a lack of
tourists post the revolution, but is showing signs of recovery on a QoQ basis.
3Q11 roaming revenue was down 50% YoY but up 27.8% QoQ and accounted
for 1.9% of total revenue (up from 2Q11’s 1.5% but still well below the 3.7%
reported in 3Q10). While the Maspero events on 9 October may have had a
negative impact on tourists’ arrivals, the fact that elections have so far been
conducted peacefully, gives hope of a stronger recovery in arrivals next year,
which would feed through into stronger roaming revenues.
► Wholesale deal with Telecom Egypt (ETEL) still on the cards. Mobinil is in
discussions with Telecom Egypt (ETEL) over a comprehensive longer-term
wholesale deal, which may possibly cover IGW access, leased-line rates, and
interconnect charges. The successful conclusion of such a deal would be
positive for Mobinil and should improve margins.
► More than 10% EPS growth forecasted in 2012, given the base-year effect
from a weak 2011.
Some positives for Mobinil
10
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
Appendix 1
OTH assets' operational and financial KPIs
Figure 6: Djezzy (Algeria) - Solid performance given the headwinds
Financial KPIs (USDm) 2009a 2010a 2011e 2012f 2013f
Revenue 1,868 1,747 1,893 2,030 2,085
EBITDA 1,067 982 1,115 1,190 1,225
EBITDA margin 57.1% 56.2% 58.9% 58.6% 58.8%
Capex 261 90 28 41 42
Operational KPIs
Subscribers (m) 14.618 15.087 16.693 17.390 18.094
Market share 59.4% 57.6% 57.9% 58.0% 58.0%
ARPU (USD) 10.5 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.6
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
Figure 7: Mobilink (Pakistan) - Showing recovery
Financial KPIs (USDm) 2009a 2010a 2011e 2012f 2013f
Revenue 1,058 1,107 1,148 1,313 1,490
EBITDA 385 438 465 530 600
EBITDA margin 36.4% 39.6% 40.5% 40.4% 40.3%
Capex 157 143 195 118 119
Operational KPIs
Subscribers (m) 30.800 31.794 34.382 36.101 37.906
Market share 31.5% 31.4% 31.0% 32.0% 33.0%
ARPU (USD) 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
Figure 8: Banglalink (Bangladesh) - Reduction in SIM tax to help
Financial KPIs (USDm) 2009a 2010a 2011e 2012f 2013f
Revenue 351 457 513 569 608
EBITDA 117 128 195 222 243
EBITDA margin 33.3% 28.0% 38.0% 39.0% 40.0%
Capex 122 235 118 171 152
Operational KPIs
Subscribers (m) 13.89 19.33 23.10 26.79 27.86
Market share 26.8% 28.5% 26.5% 28.0% 29.0%
ARPU (USD) 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
11
Appendix 2
OTH's Revenue, EBITDA and Capex breakdown
Figure 9: OTH’s revenue breakdown
Figure 10: OTH’s EBITDA breakdown
Figure 11: OTH’s capex breakdown
Source: NAEEM Research
Djezzy47.0%
Mobilink28.5%
Banglalink12.7%
others11.8%
2011e
Djezzy45.8%
Mobilink29.6%
Banglalink12.8%
others11.7% 2012f
Djezzy62.7%
Mobilink26.1%
Banglalink10.9%
others0.2%
2011e
Djezzy60.7%
Mobilink27.0%
Banglalink11.4%
others0.8%
2012f
Djezzy6.2%
Mobilink43.2%
Banglalink26.2%
others24.4%
2011e
Djezzy8.4%
Mobilink24.1%
Banglalink34.9%
others32.7%
2012f
12
ORASCOM TELECOM DEMERGER
Appendix 3
OTMT assets' operational and financial KPIs
Figure 12: Mobinil (Egypt) - Undoubtedly gloomy, but we see a few chinks in the cloud
Financial KPIs (USDm) 2009a 2010a 2011e 2012f 2013f
Revenue 1,790 1,752 1,695 1,623 1,646
EBITDA 848 711 598 608 616
EBITDA margin 47.4% 40.6% 35.3% 37.5% 37.4%
Capex 433 346 331 298 282
Operational KPIs
Subscribers (m) 25.354 30.225 32.376 35.376 38.376
Market share 45.8% 42.8% 39.2% 38.0% 37.0%
ARPU (USD) 6.5 5.1 4.1 3.6 3.3
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
Figure 13: Koryolink (North Korea) - Full marks. Well done!
Financial KPIs (USDm) 2009a 2010a 2011e 2012f 2013f
Revenue 26 66 140 206 293
EBITDA 17 58 115 155 205
EBITDA margin 65.4% 87.9% 82.1% 75.2% 70.0%
Capex 27 47 56 82 88
Operational KPIs
Subscribers (m) 0.092 0.432 0.096 1.672 2.648
Market share 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0% 90.0%
ARPU (USD) 12.2 14.0 13.2 11.8 10.5
Source: Company data, NAEEM Research
13
Disclosure Appendix
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Stock Ratings
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NAEEM assigns ratings to stocks on the following basis:
Rating Upside/Downside potential 21 December 2011 Rating distribution as of
BUY >20% 65%
ACCUMULATE >10% to 20% 23%
HOLD +10% to -10% 12%
REDUCE <-10% to -20% 0%
SELL < -20% 0%
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