Six Day War: Israel vs. the Arabs June 1967By Joseph Miranda

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Israeli tanks advancing on the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War.

Background

T he Six Day War was the culmination of a series of crises in the Middle East, mainly focused on Israel, though also reflecting the struggle for geostrategic position among the various Arab powers. The First Arab-Israeli War, fought in 1947-49, confirmed

the United Nations’ declaration of Israeli statehood. It also indirectly brought about the overthrow of several of the Arab governments that had led their countries to defeat.

The most notable of those coups was in Egypt, where the “Free Officers Movement” seized pow-er in 1952. One of that movement’s leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser, became president (dictator) two years later and began to promote radical Arab pan-nationalism. He saw Egypt as the center of the overlapping spheres of the Arab states, the Islamic cultural realm and Africa. His objectives were to

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destroy the last vestiges of European colonial power, modernize Egypt and establish a unified front of former colonial countries in Asia and Africa.

A major realignment of interna-tional power relations in the Middle East ensued. Nasser cleared the British from Egypt and nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. He also called on the Soviet Union to provide military and economic support. Those moves had considerable impact on the Cold War, the undeclared conflict between the communist powers and the West.

The United Kingdom had estab-lished the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, made up of a tier of states directly facing the USSR in southwest Asia: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, and supported by the United States. Nasser, by bringing the Soviets into Egypt, effectively allowed Moscow to leapfrog CENTO. Egyptian ports were also opened to the Soviet Navy, thereby allowing it to potentially challenge the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The turning point came later in 1956, when Britain and France, allied with Israel, attempted to retake the Suez Canal in Operation Musketeer. The Anglo-French expeditionary force

easily seized Port Said while the Israelis cleared the Sinai; however, US and international opposition was then suf-ficient to force the withdrawal of those forces from Egypt. With the former imperial powers out of the way, and the Israelis back on their side of the border, Nasser staked claim to the moral leadership of the entire Arab world.

Those events ultimately led the US into a de facto alliance with Israel, as a counterbalance to both the Soviets and radical pan-Arab nationalism. While Washington was moving closer to Jerusalem, though, the Americans couldn’t get too close for fear of fully alienating otherwise pro-Western Arab countries. If nothing else, those countries controlled petroleum resources vital to the Western world.

In 1958 Nasser masterminded a union between Egypt and Syria, calling the new federation the United Arab Republic (UAR). With the founding of the UAR came the implication the other Arab states would ultimately join in order to form one combined regional hegemon.

Underneath the façade of unity there was considerable infighting among Syria’s and Egypt’s leaders. Nasser’s status was also disputed by the heads of the other Arab countries, many of whom had their own claims to make. For example, in 1960 the Syrians sponsored an attempt to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, who was considered by them as too pro-Western. The attempt came close to killing the monarch, who nearly went to war in retaliation. Further, Egyptian dominance of the UAR was increasingly resented by the Syrians, who finally withdrew from it in 1961.

As for Nasser, since he’d declared himself the moral leader of the Arab world, he couldn’t afford to back down without loss of prestige, something that might then easily rebound into a coup or revolt against him in Egypt. Consequently he upped the rhetoric against Israel, reaffirming his creden-tials as the most militant of the Arabs.

Even so, throughout the early 1960s Nasser wasn’t really preparing for war against Israel. Much of the Egyptian Army was tied down in Yemen, sup-porting that country’s government in a civil war against deposed royalists. Nasser was also realistic enough to understand that, until there was a single united Arab military command

The 1956 War

The Six Day War wasn’t the first time the Israelis fought their way across the Sinai. In 1956, Britain, France and Israel formed an alliance to take on Egypt. The governments of all three had reasons to be rid of Nasser. He had nationalized the Suez Canal, a vital strategic thoroughfare for Britain, which still had imperial interests around the globe. France saw Nasser as a threat due to his support of insurgents in their colony of Algeria. The Israelis were dealing with Palestinian guerillas who were infiltrating across the border from Egyptian-administered Gaza.

The plan the three countries adopted was codenamed Operation Musketeer. According to it, the Israelis would drive across the Sinai while an Anglo-French airborne and amphibious force, supported by both those nations’ fleets and airpower, would land at Port Said and advance up the canal. The political and media cover story for that portion of the invasion was that it was a necessity in order to shield the canal from being engulfed in the Sinai fighting. The combined effect was hoped to be a destabilization of the Egyptian government that would force Nasser from office.

Musketeer began on 30 October 1956, with the Israelis driving across the Sinai as planned. British and French airpower then quickly destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, while their airborne and amphibious units seized Port Said. As has often been the case historically, though, military success turned into political disaster. International—par-ticularly American—pressure forced the Anglo-French expeditionary force to withdraw. The Israelis, thereby left isolated, then also evacuated the Sinai. A United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) eventually moved into the peninsula as peacekeepers.

Both sides drew lessons from the 1956 war. For the Egyptians, they proved to be the wrong ones. Nasser was hailed as a hero throughout the Arab world for having successfully defied the former imperial powers of Europe. The defeat of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai was attributed throughout the Arab world as having been due to the need to fight Britain and France as well as Israel. The deficiencies of the Egyptian armed forces were glossed over in the euphoria about the political outcome that had won the day for Nasser.

As for the Israelis, they were impressed by the power of the Anglo-French air forces as well as that demonstrated by their own mobile units on the ground. Over the next decade the IDF built up its airpower and armor, and then used them as a war-winning combined arms force in 1967. b

Israeli civilian militia mobilize to guard their rural kibbutz just prior to the start of the war.An Israeli armor unit mobilizing for deployment.

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Nasser’s rivals exploited that gap between his stated policy and the situation on the ground. They claimed that, while Nasser made propaganda about liberating Palestinians living under Israeli rule, he wasn’t willing to go to war over the issue. In comparison, the Syrians were actively supporting Palestinian raids into Israel from their territory. Tensions escalated to the point where, in April 1967, the Israelis launched some air attacks in retaliation.

Seeing the Syrians taking the lead in the Arab world, Nasser upped the ante. In May 1967 he ordered UNEF out of the Sinai, and on 22 May

declared a blockade of the Straits of Tiran in order to effectively close Israel’s southern port of Eilat. He also ordered mobilization of the Egyptian armed forces, moving several divisions into forward positions in the Sinai. Syria and Jordan followed suit with their own mobilizations. Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Algeria also offered troops to support the coming war.

In response the Israelis mobilized, but in doing so they faced a dilemma. While the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was more combat effective than its Arab opponents, its full mobilization couldn’t be maintained for long with-out considerable negative impact on the country’s economy. Yet to demobi-

Numbers

The relative sizes of the forces engaged in the Six Day War appeared to give the advantage to the Arab powers. There were numerous other factors, however, which mitigated against that. Among all the Arab countries, only Egypt, Syria and Jordan were fully committed to the war, and even the Egyptians had a portion of their armed forces off fighting in Yemen suppressing an insurgency. The Iraqis committed the equivalent of a division, along with a few aircraft, to fight on the Jordanian front. The Saudis, Algerians and Kuwaitis sent only token forces that had no impact on the fighting.

Among the opposing ground forces a good comparison can be made in terms of divisional equivalents, the common combined arms independent maneuver formation for that era. The Egyptians had seven divisions in the Sinai. The Syrians fielded three “brigade groups,” which were administrative agglomerations of brigades each roughly equivalent in size (but not combat effectiveness) to divisions. The Jordanians didn’t use the division echelon but, figuring three brigades as being roughly equal to one division, they could put together roughly three divisions.

The Israelis had available about 25 brigades. From them they organized five ugdah (division-sized task forces averaging three brigades each), with various other brigades committed independently. They could also mobilize several more brigades from reservists, as well as using kibbutz (communal farm) militia

for static defense. All told, then, the Arabs had the edge in the number of divisions, but that seeming superiority was deceptive due to the reasons described in the main article.

As for equipment, both sides had various advantages and disadvantages. For example, the Egyptians deployed modern Soviet armored fighting vehicles, while the Israelis made do with World War II-era American halftracks. Again, though, that simple comparison doesn’t account for the vastly superior Israeli training in handling their older vehicles.

The Israelis had another advantage in superior logistics. For example, around half the tanks in the Syrian Army were out of commission at any one time, even during peacetime, owing to maintenance issues. The IDF was able to keep a higher percentage of its vehicles up and running.

Such discrepancies were especially noticeable when it came to airpower. The Israeli Air Force was highly trained and well supported logistically. Each aircraft could fly a mission, land, be serviced, and then be ready to fly again more quickly than any of the Arab air forces. Often single Israeli aircraft flew up to six sorties (missions) per day. That was further facilitated by the Israelis having more than one pilot per aircraft, thereby minimizing the impact of pilot exhaustion. In comparison, Arab aircraft were doing well if they could fly two sorties per day.

1967 Armed Forces Comparisons

Country Military Manpower Tanks Combat Aircraft Artillery Pieces Warships

Israel 264,000 800 250 200 22

Egypt 240,000 1200 450 600 60

Syria 50,000 400 120 315 15

Jordan 50,000 200 40 72 0

Iraq 70,000 400 200 500 15

Saudi Arabia 50,000 100 20 ? ?

Algeria 60,000 100 100 ? ?

Kuwait 5000 24 9 ? ?

Note. Numbers vary depending on sources. Israeli combat aircraft include converted trainers. “Warships” includes patrol boats. b

(preferably under Egyptian control), a war against Israel couldn’t succeed.

Throughout the Arab world, Nasser’s rivals were maneuvering for position. One of the main criticisms of

him was that, in the wake of the 1956 crisis, he’d agreed to the demilitariza-tion of the Sinai, withdrawing the Egyptian military from the entire peninsula and allowing in the United

Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). With UNEF stationed along the Sinai-Israeli frontier, Nasser couldn’t actually launch a war against the Israelis no matter how hot his rhetoric became.

lize and accept the blockade of Eilat, as well as the threat of Arab armies converging on Israel, seemed only to invite further aggression. The Israeli government, with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Minster of Defense Moshe Dayan in the lead, therefore decided to preemptively launch what already appeared inevitable—war.

The Brink

As June 1967 began, Nasser seemed to have the upper hand, with the Arab world rallying behind him; however, there were weaknesses in his ability to actually wage war. Theoretically there was a United Arab Command (UAC),

continued on page 13 »

Always a popular subject for Western photojournalists in those days: a unit of Israeli female soldiers during the initial mobilization.

Egyptian planes destroyed on the ground during the first Israeli air strikes.

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