by Amitai Etzioni

«Is it alright to cast one Christian to the lions, if it will provideconsiderable pleasure to many Romans?» was a question posed to aseminar. Students were reassured that if they sense that there were notenough Romans in the Coliseum to justify the «trade-off », they couldassume the Christian/lions confrontation was broadcasted on television.Those who subscribe to the utilitarian notion that distribution of resourcesshould aim at generating the greatest happiness for the greatest number, willbe hard put to provide a principle that would suggest why such a trade-off isunacceptable 1. The principle ofPareto-Optimality is sometimes brought tobear to argue that one ought to increase everybody's happiness as it does notdiminish anybody else's. '

However, this principle is not desirable from utilitarian ethics: why notreduce, to some extent, the happiness of one person, if this increases thehappiness of many considerably? In addition, there seem to be insurmount-able difficulties in operationalizing the Pareto concept. And, there is also thequestion of whose happiness (or preference) is to be taken into account: onlythat of this generation? Future generations? How far into the Future?Minors? Mental patients? Criminals? Aliens? Members of other nations? 2.That is, whatever is deemed « optimal » reflects one's value judgments as towhom one chooses to embrace in one's community, rather than an objectivecriterion. Yet the students in the seminar, and probably most readers are

Amitai Etzioni: George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

.This article draws on several previous publications by the ~uthor.I In effect, much cost-benefit analysis is based on such a calculus of gains and sacrifices. See

S. KELMAN, «Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique», Regulation, Jan/Feb. 1981, pp.33-40.

2 In this connection, see D. WHITTINGTON-D, MACRAE, «The Issue of Standing on Cost-Ben-efit Analysis », Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1986, Vol. 5, pp. 665-682.

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searching for a principled reason to oppose the sacrifice of a single humanlife for the sheer pleasure of many. The reasons are to be found in anotherethics, deontology, which recognizes, at least in its Kantian version, ulti-mate (absolute) values, categorical imperatives and the claim that peopleshould treat one another as ends and not just as means. The discussionproceeds by briefly reviewing the deontological position before its potentialfor a new paradigm for economics, and more generally for social science, isindicated. The article closes with a discussion of the implications of the newparadigm for economic development.

-Moderate Deontology

Deontological ethics is often compared with utilitarian ~thics; the firstfocuses on intentions, the second on consequences. (The ethical trouble withcasting a person to the lions stems directly not from the loss of human life,a distressing but very common occurrence, but from the deliberate, intend-ed nature of the act). However, there is reason to view the two ethicalphilosophies as if they were partially reconcilable. Moderate deontologyrecognizes intentions -as a secondary consideration. While an extremedeontologist may argue that it is ethical to donate blood (if the sole intentionwas to help another person), even if the patient soon died and the donationhad no direct beneficial consequence. At the same time, most would filewith moderate deontologists who might argue that if the donor had knownahead of time that the donation would be futile, it would be more ethical todonate blood to those who are likely to benefit rather than to those who arenot. From here on this moderate version of deontology, not too remote frommoderate utilitarianism, is applied.

While it is common to identify deontology as an ethics of intentions,usually the focus is on moral intentions rather than on the larger universalof all possible intentions. This is indicated in the term deontology itself,which is derived from the Greek term Deon, meaning « binding duty». Thefact that one may recognize intentions but not identify those as amoral insource or form stands out when one follows Frankfurt 3, who asked: whatdistinguishes a person from other beings that have mental capacities andcorporeal characteristics? He finds the answer in their ability to form« second-order desires », to want to be different than they are, includingchanging their first-order desires.

.J See H.G. FRANKFURT « Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person », Journal ofPhilosophy, 1971, Vol. 68, pp. 5-20.

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Hirschman 4, who directly draws on Frankfurt, refers to the second-or-der desires as meta-preferences. He stresses that there is a continuousconflict between preferences and metapreferences. If the preferences pre-vailed all the time, the meta-preferences would have little meaning; theywould reflect a kind of lip .service paid to values, of little importance.Similarly, if the meta-preferences prevailed all the time, there would be littlepoint in drawing the distinction; urges would have little or no role; valueswould dominate.

Sen 5, uses the term commitment in a similar manner. «Commit-ment », not formally defined, is contrasted with concern for others when itis based on one's own welfare. Sen gives the following example. If you seeanother person being tortured and it makes you sick, you act out ofsympathy. But if you think such action is wrong, you act out of« commit-ment ». « Commitment is, of course, closely connected with one's morals »,Sen explains 6. The significance of the concept of commitment, he elabo-rates, is that it points to a source of preference, or value, other than being« better off ».

Note, though, that none of the three authorities identifies their conceptwith moral duties or values. For Frankfurt, the second-order faculty is akinto the first order one; both are « desires ». Hirschman's meta-preferencescould be based on aesthetic considerations, or enlightened (longer run)self-interest. Sen's commitments come close but are not outright moralderivatives. Indeed, there is no reason to doubt that second-order consider-ations may be derived from many sources, and may be justified on manygrounds. However, we suggest that moral commitments are a major, if notthe major, source of second-order judgments, and a major way they areevaluated.

Deontological ethics, with its preoccupation with intentions and theirethical standing, is particularly suited to explore the source and standing ofthese moral commitments. Above all, we suggest, adding the dimension ofmoral intentions, moral commitments, and duties to one's paradigm enrich-es the foundations of social sciences in general and of development econom-ics in particular, as we shall attempt to show next.

(Deontological ethics encompasses many positions on other issues.These are not explored here because one can draw on the basic perspective,as just outlined, without necessarily subscribing to those other positions.

-.See A.O. HIRSCHMAN, « Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some

Categories of Economic Discourse », Bulletin: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences,1984, Vol. 37, pp. 11-28.

5 See A.K. SEN, « Rational Fools », Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1977, Vol. 6, pp. 317-344.

.Ibidem, p. 329.

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For example, one can be a deontologist without accepting Kant's view thatonly the noumenal self has a free will).

2. -The Significance for Human Nature and Social Order.

At the core of most social science paradigms is an explicit or implicitconcept of human nature and of social order. We explore first the concept ofhuman nature. The major social science paradigm in the West is theneoclassical one, which is utilitarian both in origin and in much of itscontemporary content. At the core of the neoclassical paradigm, shared byneoclassical economics, «exchange» sociology, Public Choice politicalscience, and several other social science theories, is the concept of a unitaryperson, a well ordered bundle of self-directed urges, expressed in the actot'spreferences. The actor is viewed as an autonomous individual, acting on hisor her own, the well known homoeconomicus.

What concept of human nature emerges from the deontological posi-tion? First of all, a view of the person as a divided self The person is inperpetual conflict between two or more internal forces. Kant distinguishesbetween two « men », found within each of us. One is instrumental, seekingefficient means, directly observable. The other is the seat of free-will andvalues, the world of « reason », which leads to recognition of moral impera-tives. The first «man» acts out inclinations; the second -in pursuit of whatis right. The first is determined by nature, the second is free. Freud'sdistinction between an id and super-ego capture the conflict between urgesand socially introduced morality. (Internalized, and individually honed,morality is placed in the ego itself). Schelling 7 collected numerous examplesof individuals who find themselves simultaneously subjected to conflictingpreferences. Elster 8 provides an excellent overview of various theoriesabout the nature and dynamics of the divided self.

The question raises itself, if both urges and moral commitments reflectto a significant extent social forces (socialization and social control), and tosome extent one's individual development, why do they tend to diverge?Why are the urges not « socialized » to the point they conform to morallyprescribed

behavior? The observed fact is that urges and moral commit-ments are often in conflict 9. Indeed, most moral duties and commitments

7 See T. SCHELLING, « Self-Command in Practice, in Policy and in a Theory of Rational

Choice », American Economic Review, 1984, Vol. 74, pp. I-II.s See J.B. ELSTER, (edited by), The Multiple Self, Cambridge, 1985.

9 In this connection, see A. ETZIONI, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, New

York, 1988.

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are expressed in terms of prohibiting acts individuals would be otherwiseinclined to engage in (e.g. adultery, theft) or require acts they wouldotherwise not perform (e.g. giving to charity). Among the possible explana-tions is that urges are closer to the biological base of human behavior thanmorality, i.e., reflect a lesser extent of socialization and internal develop-ment. Another possible explanation is that they reflect different stages ofsocialization (urges precede moral education, in that sense, are moreinfantile).

Aside from being of general interest, the concept of the divided selfhassignificant implications for the understanding of economic behavior. Ithelps explain why all items (commodities, resources, transactions) have twovaluations: their economic value and their moral standing. For instance, astolen product can be used like one that has been legitimately acquired, butits moral standing is hardly equivalent. It has been suggested that thisdistinction does not hold for most, mundane, purchases. But a moraldimension is often readily discernible and always present. It affects allpurchases that are considered « sinful » but not illegal, for example alcoholand cigarettes (as reflected, for instance, in special taxes imposed on them);it is evident in illegal work (in the underground economy) and trade (e.g. incontrolled substances); it is reflected in preference for American vs. « for-eign » products; it can be discerned in the condemnation of « junk » food,food high in calories, salt, and cholesterol (considered irresponsible towardself); in the production of products that are environmentally dubious; inmarketing via persuasive advertising; and in the propensity to save, toconserve energy, to pay taxes, to work hard and so on 1°.

In still other areas, moral commitments go beyond influencing transac-tions -they taboo exchange behavior and market orientations. Variousphilosophers have identified numerous areas in which exchanges are« blocked» 11, for example those covered by constitutional rights. Thus,First Amendment rights cannot be sold or bought and contracts to enslaveare not enforceable. The recent court battle over the question whether or notcontracts to « sell » babies conceived by surrogate mothers are enforceableis, in effect, on the question where the market zone ends and blockedexchanges begin.

Next to drawing on a concept of human nature, social scienceparadigms build on a related concept, that of a social order, on the ways theindividuals -given their nature -combine into sustainable wholes. Indeed,historians of science suggest that the social sciences evolved once religious

--10 For evidence, see A. ETZIONI" op. cit..

II See A. OKUN, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-off, Washington, D.C., 1975;M. WALZER, Spheres of Justice, New York, 1983.

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conceptions of social order broke down and the quest began for secularaccounts of order in society.

At the heart of the question what accounts for order, is the questionwhether order must be introduced, say by force, by a powerful authority, or-does it arise naturally? Deontological social sciences find the answer, firstand foremost, in the moral order. Individuals' interests are not assumed tobe naturally harmonious, i.e. mutually supportive and compatible, or madeto be so by an invisible hand. Nor is there a reason to assume order must beimposed on individuals who are, in Hobbes' term, wolf to one another. Thesocial realm and its order are based on the assumptions that individualshave acquired a set of shared moral commitments that legitimate the socialorder that lead them to treat others the way they seek to be treatedthemselves.

The logical next step for a deontological social science is to deal with thequestion: what are the sources of the moral commitment? This is a questionutilitarian social scientists need not deal with because they take individualpreferences as their starting point (e.g., in the concept of consumer sover-eignty). The deontological answer is a dual one: in part, the sources ofindividual commitments are moral values shared by the community ofwhich individuals are members; in part, they are the result of internal moralindividual developments.

Regarding communities' values, the main point is that individualsinternalize those and make them part of their inner self; they are turnedfrom constraints (matters the community demands, one more externalcondition the actors take into account in their deliberation) into meta-pref-erences and preferences (criteria the actors use to judge the course of actionor form, in part, their decision in the first place). In contrast, utilitarians, tothe extent they recognize community values at all, see them as externalfactors. For example, according to utilitarian social psychology, an actorwho faces group pressures to conform, say to donate blood, will calculatewhether or not the costs of disregarding these moral expectations, or notconforming, exceeds the benefits (let's say of being socially accepted).Deontologists recognize that values are treated that way on some occasions,but also recognize that on other occasions, following internalization, indi-viduals either see the donation of blood as the right thing to do from theirviewpoint or something they are compelled to do. That is, one cannot arguefrom the existence of expedient morality that authentic moral commitmentsdo not exist, or are insignificant. Moreover, to deny that internalizationoccurs is, in effect, to deny the existence of education. It leaves theneoclassicists with the odd implicit assumption that persons are bornbiologically and psychologically mature, roughly at the age of 18 to 21 if notolder.

While the community often accounts for a significant part of a person'smoral commitments, in part these moral commitments are internallydeveloped. One important source for such individualization, is the fact thatin many societies individuals are frequently subject to conflicting societal

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demands (often from different social groups, such as immigrant, kin, andethnic groups vs. the encompassing community). This leaves the individualsfreer to choose which moral code to follow. Also moral socialization andsocial control are often far from complete, leaving room for individuals todevelop their own position (often more in the extent of adherence, than incontent). Finally, exceptional individuals rise, who fashion their own codesand -affect that of the community (e.g., Luther). Still, all these individualdevelopments are best studied against the backdrop of shared social values,and the examination of the societal structures that encourage or discourageindividualization, because they account for most of the vari~nce.

What are the implications of these divergent views of moral codes forthe specific views of social order? Utilitarians see individuals as au-tonomous, psychologically self-sufficient, as « under-socialized » 12. Theysee the social order as arising out of either a deliberate contract amongfree-standing individuals, or as a natural result of each pursuing his: or herself-interest. Groups and communities are either ignored, or deemed to haveno attributes of their own and « reduced» to aggregations of individualchoices.

In contrast, deontological social scientists recognize that because indi-viduals have a debased element, a « lower» self, they may be prone to warwith one another, and hence there is a need to foster a social order. Thequestion is: how and to what extent is this achieved? The notion that ordermay be imposed by a government, is found to be unsatisfactory becausecoercion leads to alienation and rebellion, and because of practicallimita-tions on the ability to govern those opposed. There are never enough policeto control a community whose members are actively opposed to an author-ity, and -who shall police the police? are familiar arguments that applyhere. That is, only a government that is viewed as legitimate by a significantpart of the community, and -to a significant extent of the total scope ofaction, can provide a social order. Legitimacy, in turn, rests on being in linewith accepted moral values. Hence, ultimately the social order rests on themoral community, not on the government.

The moral community benefits from social bonds that tie people to oneanother. Individuals, as psychic entities, are not self-sufficient but requireone another, are in part intertwined in ways they do not use to relate toobjects. Their sense of identity and direction, their ability to function as

12 See M. GRANOVE1TER, «Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of Embeded-ness », American Journal oj Sociology, 1985, Vol. 91, pp. 481-510.

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individuals, their sense of inner stability and self-esteem, are all anchored inother persons and in groups. They are each other's keepers. These bonds ofmutuality, are the sociological bases of their treating one another as endsand not merely as means, on which the moral, and in turn the social order,build.

3. -Opening the Preferences Can Be Operationalized

The position outlined so far has a major methodological implication:we need to study the sources of individual preferences. Neoclassicists takethese preferences as given and as stable, that is, a person's desires are takenas fixed. The extent to which a person is able to act on his or her preferences,is able to realize them, the factors that account for differences in actualbehavior, are seen as due to differences in constraints (given a particularlevel of income). For example, a person who desires to «buy» highereducation, is viewed as likely to buy less (given his or her income) the higherthe price, the more requirements are imposed for obtaining each degree, thelonger the commute to college, the fewer child care facilities are availableand so on.

Neoclassicists have opposed «opening uP» the preferences, to seewhether behavior may also change over time because preferences havechanged, say because the valuations individuals accord to what they arebuying, higher education, have changed. One reason given to this oppositionis that neoclassicists argue that the factors that modify preferences cannot bestudied empirically because they are irrational (such as value changes,impulses, eruption of social movements). Our response is that one shouldnot confuse the irrationality of the subjects (or the actors), or their valuecommitments, with those of the observers. That is, we can study scientifical-ly, non-rational and even irrational behavior. Thus, we may examine theeffects of bright colors on people shopping, without being swayed to buy asingle item ourself. We may observe that once the lead lemming jumps off acliff others will follow, while we still remain standing at the top.

Neoclassicists also argue that values «cannot » be measured, or, thatstatements about them are based on « ephemeral » data, data about states ofmind rather than observable behavior, for example, attitudes and surveydata. This criticism is, in part correct. These data, do not provide reliablepredictors of behavior, although predictions based on economic data oftendo not fare better. However, there is no reason in principle that the samebehavioral data, of the kind used by economists, cannot be used to deter-mine the effects of values. We need to go into this matter here in some detailbecause the charge of «cannot be operationalized» is a serious one. It istantamount to stating that to study the sources and dynamics of preferences,one must leave the realm of science.

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To highlight the ways economic behavioral data can be used to studyvalues, we draw on Lancaster's idea of disaggregating the attributes ofconsumer goods, as long as we have repeated observations over time.Lancaster 13 points out that if we have numerous observations about theprice people are paying for a product, say autos, that vary in several ways,such as color, design, and size, we can establish how much these people arewilling to pay for each attribute, say red color, four vs. two door, accelera-tion to 55 miles per hour in less than six seconds, and so on. We suggest thatmoral and other social valuations can be treated as one or more suchattributes. For example in the post World War II era, it was consideredunpatriotic to buy foreign cars; in some parts of America there werespecially strong anti-Japanese and anti-German valuations. This should bereflected and be measurable in the price like any other attribute of a car.Furthermore, a comparison of the price of similar American and foreigncars over time would allow us to test the hypothesis that values were at work,because we know that over the years between say, 1955 and 1970, anti-Ger-man and anti-Japanese valuations have declined significantly. (Furthervalidation could be achieved by another form of disaggregation, by compar-ing groups within the U.S.A.. For example, Jewish groups were in someyears slower to accept German cars than other ethnic groups).

Some neoclassicists argue that values are reflected, like many otherfactors, in the preferences, and there is hence no reason to single them out.They treat, as Mike McPherson put it, a « taste » for peanut butter and the« taste » for God as interchangeable. I provided elsewhere some argumentswhy it seems productive to distinguish between the utility of consumptionand that of the affirmation of moral values; deontological ethics providesadditional reasons for the distinction as we already outlined. Here amethodological reason comes into focus: to develop a satisfactory theory ofeconomic behavior, indeed of behavior in general, one needs to know, what« drives » preferences rather than take them as God sent or « given ». Valuesturn out to be a major factor shaping and reshaping preferences. The nextstep is to ask what accounts for value changes? Here the role of education,leadership, the mass media and social movements, all macro -not intro-in-dividual but collective, historical, institutional factors -come to the fore-front. Without a systematic understanding of these, the dynamic study ofbehavior is deeply lacking.

'3 See K. LANCASTER, « A New Approach to Consumer Theory », Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 1966, Vol. 74, pp. 132-157.

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4. -Relevance to Development: Development for What?

Neoclassical economists assume that all people are basically the sameand that their preferences are revealed in their behavior. Practically thismeans that all people are assumed to seek consumer goods and services -the« Western » life-style. Recently, developments in Eastern Europe and main-land China seem to lend confirmation to this viewpoint. We, in turn, arguethat while peole all do have the same basic human needs, (these include needfor affection, self-respect and self-actualization) to some extent such needscomplement, and to some extent compete with consumeristic tastes andvalues. This requires some elaboration.

The fact that many people in very different cultures seem to want thesame basic goods 14, does not necessarily indicate that this is all that peopleare after. This holds for the recent developments in Eastern Europe whichshow that when people are deprived of basic creature comforts or have greatdifficulties in ensuring a steady flow of them (as in Soviet shopping), theygrant them high priority. One would though expect, as the experience ofScandinavia, the U.S. and affluent classes in other affluent societies shows,that once these needs are satiated to. a significant extent, and securelyprovided for, people will shift their priorities to other concerns. The wellknown findings that the proportion of people satisfied at higher levels ofincome and development does not grow, attests to this point 15.

While human needs, we hold for reasons spelled out elsewhere 16 areuniversal, their cultural modes of fulfillment are not. Thus, while all peopleseek self-respect, what they consider respectful is affected by sets of valuesincorporated into their culture and sub-culture, which in turn are internal-ized to varying degrees, and then further honed by individual development.

When it comes to economic development, all people may well aspire toa secure supply of creature comforts and seek ever higher levels of consump-tion (however with less intensity, more willing to trade these off for otherachievements).

14 See A. INKELES-D.H. SMITH, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six DevelopingCountries. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974.

IS See R.A. EASTERLIN, « Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some EmpiricalEvidence », in Nations and Households in Economic Growth. Essays in Honor of MosesAbramowitz. (edited by) P.A. David and M. Reder, New York, Academic Press, 1974, pp.89-125. .

16 See A. ETZIONI, «Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity», AmericanSociological Review. 1968, Vol. 33, No.6, pp. 870-884.

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All this would suggest that what people want is what has been called anAmerican, Western, or affluent way of life. Many do, but as will becomeincreasingly evident in "the next years in Eastern Europe, and as we havealready seen elsewhere, they may not necessarily be willing to pay for themin the coin of hard work and the other costs capitalism exacts. (We havealready seen in Yugoslavia that local workers quit in droves in McDonald'shamburger outlets because they rejected the American pace of work). Thereis no necessary connection between aspiring to a high standard of living anda willingness to sweat for it.

Neoclassical economists assume that people can be motivated by theirconsumer goals to work strenuously. Actually many people socialized innon-Western cultures (and quite a few socialized in several sub-cultures inthe West), would much rather have the consumer goods without hard labor(via welfare, foreign aid, drug running among others). (Note that manypeople are on welfare due to others' fault, that countries need foreign aidbecause they were previously or recently exploited, and so on. The result -regardless of who is to blame -is still a preference for income over strenuouswork).

More is entailed than disinclination to work strenuously. There is atleast an equally strong opposition to face the discipline of the market, aboveall the anxieties and indignities involved. Particularly feared and resentedand opposed is the entailed loss in job security, in previously communistsocieties the fear of losing one's constitutional right to have a job, and withit a positively identified social role (an answer to the question by strangers,family and self -who are you?), with a right to residence, to stay in business(in the case of shop or factory owners) and so on.

There is no way a country can have in the longer run an ever higherstandard of living for the masses and relatively lax work habits andlittle market discipline. In effect all these developing countries areseeking their own balance, determining how much of one they will trade offfor the other, while paying largely lip service to the merits of the Westernways.

The intellectual, social and cultural needs to make such a choiceis further reinforced by the great difficulties in attaining a Western standardof living. That is, even if a people would choose to work their back offand readily subject themselves to the dislocations and anxieties the marketentails; they still would not be able to achieve a Western standard ofliving anytime in the foreseeable future. This is the case for severalreasons, in particular lack of infrastructure and capital needed for stableeconomic growth. These factors are almost universally present butbest examined in the context of a specific country, in this case Poland (nota very underdeveloped country at all, but nevertheless, very much a case inpoint).

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5. -Infrastructure

Poland la-cks much of the infrastructure necessary for a rapid shift to afree market economy. While state banks exist, there is no system for clearingchecks and most business is done on a cash basis, a typically precapitalistcondition.

Furthermore, the radical change called for in the work-mix will entailmajor shifts in population. In the U.S., when the auto industry wasshrinking and the oil industry was expanding, workers moved from Michi-gan to Texas; and in later years, when these fortunes were reversed, laborfollowed in the opposite direction. Although in the U.S. such movementsentail considerable economic and human costs, in Eastern Europe suchrelocations are even more difficult. First of all, there is much less traditionalprecedent for people to leave their families and communities in order tomove about; and second, the housing shortage is such that it is very difficultto relocate -not to mention the costs of building new schools, hospitals, andthe other facilities required by new concentrations of the work force. Manyother parts of the infrastructure are similarly quite underdeveloped.

6. -The Importance of Capital

Next is the matter of capital. While productivity is affected by workers'morale, work ethic, and dedication, the amount of capital available perworker is critical. Needless to say, Poland and other such countries are veryshort of capital. It might be said that the West, through economic aid, credit,and private investments could provide the capital needed for a newinfrastructure and capital goods. But first, it must be understood that thenecessary amounts are much larger than the transitional aid usually cited;after all, $ 24 billion in aid was given to Poland in the 1970sand was usedup without leaving much of a trace, other than $ 40 billion of accumulateddebt. To get a sense of the magnitude of the sums involved, Business Weekreports that East Germany, the most productive and well-financed commu-nist economy, would need $ 800 billion to bring its technology and economyup to par.

Moreover, Western banks and other investors are unlikely to ignore therisks involved. There are very strong reasons to believe that sometimeduring the next decade there will be a major traditionalist reaction to therecent changes in the USSR and at least in some of the Eastern Europeancountries. It does not take a full return to Stalinism for the Westerninvestors to lose all or most of their investments -as they did in recentdecades in scores of countries. We already have a case study of whathappens when, as Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder put it, Americans grabdeals in the East they would walk away from in the West. A study by JimMann shows how Americans lost their shirts in China trying to build a« Beijing Jeep » (the name of his book) the result of which is well summa-rized in the book's subtitle: The Short, Unhappy Romance of American

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Business in Cfzina. Most Western investors are unlikely to repeat the samemistake on a large scale.

It follows that Poland and other Eastern European countries will haveto prove their political stability over years and accumulate more capital oftheir own if economic development on a higher level is to take place. Inshort, progress will be, at best, gradual.

REFERENCES

EASTERLIN, R.A. «Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evi-dence », in Nations and Households .in Economic Growth. Essays in Honor of MosesAbramowitz. (edited by) P.A. David and M. Reder, New York, Academic Press, 1974,pp. 89-125.

ELSTER, 1.B. (edited by), The Multiple SelJ: Cambridge, 1985.ETZIONI, A., The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, New York, 1988.ETZIONI, A., «Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity», American Sociological

Review, 1968, Vol. 33, No.6, pp. 870-884.FRANKFURT, H.G.,« Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person », Journal of Philosophy,

1971, Vol. 68, pp. 5-20.GRANOVETTER, M., «Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of Embededness »,

American Journal of Sociology, 1985, Vol. 91, pp. 481-510.HIRSCHMAN, A.O., « Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of

Economic Discourse », Bulletin: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1984, Vol.37,pp.II-28.

INKELES, A.-SMITH, D.H., Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries,Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974.

KELMAN, S., «Cost-Benefit Analysis: Arl Ethical Critique », Regulation, lan/Feb., 1981, pp.33-40.

LANCASTER, K.,« A New Approach to Consumer Theory », Journal of Political Economy, 1966,Vol. 74, pp. 132-157.

OKUN, A., Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-off, Washington, D.C., 1975.SCHELLING, T., «Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice »,

American Economic Review, 1984, Vol. 74, pp. I-II.SEN A.K., «Rational Fools »,Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1977, Vol. 6, pp. 317-344.WALZER M., Spheres of Justice, New York, 1983.WHITTINGTON, D.-MAcRAE, D., «The Issue of Standing on Cost-Benefit Analysis », Journal of

Policy Analysis and Management, 1986, Vol. 5, pp. 665-682.

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