Caesar 27 - Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped Countries

8/4/2019 Caesar 27 - Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped Countries

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2007.,. .. .

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28 April 1961OCI No. 1803/61

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C#R,FNT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY. 1.-SOVIET POLICY TOWARD TR[E UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(Reference Title: CAESAR XIII-61)

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-INQ THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF TH E UNITED STA TESWITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TOAN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON I S PR OHIBITED BY LAW.TITLE 18,USC, SECTIONS 793 AN D 794, THE TRANSMIS-

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CURRENT INTELLIGEXCE STAFF STUDY., I , 'ii Ab. .

-? ' SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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This is a workdng paper. I t t r a ce s ch rono log ica l ly thedevelopment of a s p e c t s of Soviet po l icy toward co lon ia l areasand the countries regarded by Moscow a s having achieved vari-ous degrees of independence from rfim per ial ism .l? The Sino-addressed t o Lyman Wilkison, who wrote t he paper , or t o t hea c t i n g c o o r di n a t or of th e group , i n Room 2549 "Bb" Building

. S o v i e t Stu die s Group would welcome comment on t h i s pa per ,

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SUMMARYM & C o w f s prebccupat i&n i n t h e p e r i o d 1945-55 w i t h t h et a sk o,f r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e Soviet homeland, w i t h t h e incor-pora t ion of Eas tern Europe in t o t h e bloc , and w i t h develop-ments i n Western Europe-the main foc us of East-West f r i c -t ipnL-for it decade precluded a dynamic po l i cy i n per ip hera lareas: non-Coknmunist A s i a , Afr ica, and Lat in America. A l -though on numerous public occasions Lenin and Stalin had ex-pressed grea t o p t i m i s m over t r e n ds i n c o l o ni a l areas, Com-mun is t a g i t a t i o n a nd S o vi e t a c t i o n i n t h e s e areas- -un t i lWorld War I1 sha t te red t h e e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i nlarge s e c t i o n s of A s i a and speeded up t h e tempo of p o l i t i -

ca l , economic, and soc ia l change on a world-wide scale-- 'had been s ipgular ly unsuccessfu l .The USSR's f a i l u r e i n l a t e 1945 t o adopt a bold programt o capture o r guide t h e ant ico lon ia l i s t movements which hadmatured during t h e w a r ref lected not on ly t h e Soviet Union'sdes i re no t t o embit te r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West on secondarymatters, bu t a l s o u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of non-communist leaders and movements and t h e g e n e r a l lack of aSoviet "presence. '? S t a l i n a p p a r en t l y e v a l ua t e d t h e new gov-ernments as t r a n s i t o r y , s o o n t o gi ve way before popular pres-s u r e s i n a n i n e v i t a b l e e v o l ut i on of p o l i t i c a l power t o t h el e f t . The worsening of S ov ie t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West wasaccompanied by a s t i f f e n i n g of MOSCOW'S l i n e i n A s i a . With

t h e founding of t h e Cominform i n September 1947, moderationtoward non-Communists w a s repudiated conclusively--a deci-s i o n which was re f l ec ted i n 1948 in t h e widespread outbreakof Communist-led s t r i k e v io lence , terrorism, and armed rebel-l i on s no t only i n r emain ing co lo n ia l areas bu t a l s o i n t h enewly independent s t a t e s of A s i a . T h e Kremlin apparent lybe l i eved t h a t nothing further could be gained by Communistr e s t r a i n t or c o n c i l i a t i o n , a n d t h i s view w a s abe t ted by Com-munist suc ces ses i n China and by a cons i s t en t overeva lua t ionof Communist party prospects elsewhere i n A s i a . Asian Com-munist pa r t i e s , fol lowing MOSCOW~S l ead , began f r e e l y t o pre -sc r ibe a "Chinese way'' f o r t h e a nt ic o l on ia l i s t movement; i nessence t h i s meant t h e encouragement of peasant and workers'armed revolts , : as w e l l a s i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e .The subsequent supp res sion of Communist-inspired rev olts --w i t h t h e no tab le excep tion of Indo-China--with heavy lossest o Communist asse t s w a s a s e r i o u s setback t o M O S C O W ? ~ genera ll i n e t h a t t h e t i m e was r i p e f o r revolu t ionary upheavals i n A s i a .

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The world-wide crisis touched off in June 1950 by theSoviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSRto mobil+ze world Communist and non-Communist *?peacefforcesin supnOrt of its Korean holicy. Moscow, however, was slowin rec,kignizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and%eutralism" could be turned against the West; even afterthe war turned into a military and political stalemate andt w oviet Union's general attitude toward Asian non-Corn-munist goverhnlents moderated, Stalin continued to rebuffneutralist efforts to bring about a compromise.

At a September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Sovietdelegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics,offered to help promote the economic development of Asiancountries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw ma-terials. At the UN, the Soviet Union's consistent anti-Westernism now was combined with limited overtures to non-Western delegations, a change reflected also in Sovietworld-wide diplomatic activity--suggesting that Moscow hadupgraded the possibilities for expanding its influencethrough traditional government-to-government channels, Theextensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference(sponsored by the World Peace Council) in April 1952 sug-gested that Stalin also looked to increased economic con-tacts as a promising avenue for breaking out of the USSR'ssemi-isolation. The year 1952 also featured a shift towardgreater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabsagainst Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists. Sta-lin's last major theoretical pronouncements pointed toward agreater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interest be-tween the industrially developed Western powers and the weak-ly developed or undeveloped "capitalist dependencies," buthis continued rejection of a settlement on Korea acted as apowerful brake on Soviet efforts to get a friendship campaignroll ngStalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discardedhis methods and attempted to bring about a limited improve-ment in relations with the non-Communist world. The cumula-tive effect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders inthe six months following StalinOs death made it apparent thata fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward under-developed countries was in progress. For the first time theSoviet Union announced its willingness--although qualified--to contribute to the UNvs echnical assistance program, and


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Soviet Premier Malenkov declared a "good neighbor" policy and"a new approacht1 n economic aid t o Asian countries.Thd' USSR s subsequeng economic overtures attempted toplay oji local popular and governmental concern over exportmarkets and desires for rapid economic development. Mos-cow's main attention in late 1953 and 1954 was to Asia, al-though interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempoof political; 'economic, and social change in the area. TheSoviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to LatinAmerica--a tacit admission that they were more or less ef-fectively sealed off from its influence.A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way

since 1950 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear ofatomic warfare and generate pressures against military orpolitical cooperation with the West, was intensified in 1954.The USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support to coun-tries involved in disputes with the West on territorial is-sues and other matters and stepped up its efforts to introducedetachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asianand Arab countries. The Soviet Union's tactical support fornationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, andNasir was based on the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect ofreducing Western influence and, to a degree, discreditingWestern leadership.with Asian and Arab nationalist,regimes was made clear by itsFebruary 1955 agreement to help finance and construct a ma-jor steel plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of itsefforts to identify itself with the views and objectives ofthe neutralist-convened conference of Asian and African gov-ernments at Bandung in April 1955. MOSCOW'S attempts to ac-commodate its public posture t o neutralist-nationalist senti-ment was underlined dramatically in connection with the Junevisit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; having form-erly attacked him for his anti-Communist and t*pro-imperialist"policies, Moscow now praised him for his "spiritual" and po-litibal leadership of Asia.USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promiseof an improvement in East-West relations and a general

T h e USSR's intention to seek a closer working agreement

On the eve of the 1955 Geneva summit conference, the

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r e d u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , not j u s t i n Europe butthroughout t h e world. Concurrent w i t h co nci l i a tor y moves,however,, the Soviet Union ,set Pn motion a cha in of secre tarm n g g o t i a t i o n s w i th a ,group of Asian and Arab s t a t e s de-s ignef f t o o f f se t pro-Western a l l i an ce s in t h e area, a t a c t i csu r f aced w i t h t h e announcement t h a t September of C a i r o ' s armsdea l w i t h t h e bloc.i .The Bul$srnian-Khrushchev v i s i t t o Asia i n November andDecember 1955 w a s Moscow's f i r s t b ig chance t o b i d fo r sup-por t among Asian pe op le s. The t w o leaders dropped t h e i rGeneva smiles and a t tempted t o g i v e Asian neu t r a l i sm a moreant i-Western s l a n t by ident i fy ing t h e USSR w i t h Asian neut ra l -is t aims and "peace" and t h e West w i t h "colonialism'' and in-tervent ion, Agreements on i nc r eased t rade , t echn ica l and

cu l t u ra l exchanges , and c r e d i t s reached dur i ng t h e t o u r l a i dt h e groundwork fo r a considerable subsequent expansion ofSov i e t i n f l uence i n t h e area.The Khrushchev-dominated 20th p a r t y congress i n February1956 sought t o create t h e impression t h a t a new era w a s open-i n g , b r i g h t w i t h prospects of Communist v i c t o r i e s . The newformulat ions of t h e congress w e r e intended t o a d d c r e d i b i l i t yt o t h e Sovie t Union 's genera l l i n e of "peaceful coexistence"and t o f a c i l i t a t e long-term co op era tio n between t h e USSR andnon-Communist c o u n t r i e s . Khrushchev cdnfirm ed t h a t a i d t oAsian, Afr ican, and La t i n American co un tr ie s fo r t h e i r eco-nomic, p o l i t i c a l , and cu l tu ra l deve lopment was an importantp l ank i n Sov i e t foreign po l i cy , de si gned t o p rov i de ''a ma -

j o r s tumbling block'' t o i m p e r i a l i s m . ,J u l y 1956 of Cairo 's ne got ia t ion s f o r Western economic as-s i s t a n c e t o build an Aswan high dam and Nasir ' s s w i f t na-t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouragedCairo t o res is t Western demands. The So vi et Union 's dip lo -m a t i c and propaganda footwork following t h e a t t ack on Egyptwas intended t o h a l t t h e f i g h t i n g and embarrass t h e a t t ack -ing co un tr ie s wi thout commit ting t h e USSR t o a l l - ou t suppor tof Nasir. Af t e r t h e cease-fire, Communist propagandistsfeasted on t h i s "evidence" of i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e rven t i o n andmagnified t h e Sovie t role as p r o t e c t o r of Arab i n t e r e s t s .

In t h e series of crises touched off by t h e col lapse i n

MOSCOW~S e f f o r t s i n e a r l y 1 95 7 t o d i s t r a c t w orld a t -tention from bloc internal t r oub l e s cen t e r ed on a campaignt o counter Pr esi den t Eisenhower 's "?diddle E a s t Proposals'*--i . e . , t o f r u s t r a t e t h e ex t ens i on of pro-Western defense- i v -.sv. - -..... .


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arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influencein some of the Arab countries, The Soviet Union's own grow-ing foreign economic program could point to increased diplo-matic @Id economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arabstatesf, o dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communistcountries, and to a generally enhanced impression that ,theUSSR,was a serious economic as well as political competitorwikh'the Wes$., Only a handful of countries, however, hadagreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and militaryaid or of economic aid alone.

Following the frustration in June 1957 of efforts bythe "anti-party" group to break his control of the Sovietgovernment and party;, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolderforeign moves. Behind a facade of Soviet security interestin Syrian developments and in the context of intense polit-ical-psychological pressures following Soviet tests of anintercontinental ballistic missile and claims of a new worldbalance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactionsand Western resolution. After two months of efforts to in-tensify and prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abruptreversal reflected apparent disappointment that it w a s theArab states--rather than the lest--which buckled under East-West pressures.

The USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations and subsequentmeetings of world Communist parties in November 1957 re-flected an effort to make direct political and propagandacapital out of changes wrought domestically and internation-ally in the years of Soviet rule. The'essence of the newformal policy pronouncements was a call for an intensifiedstruggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Westerninfluence, with top priority to peace forces for a driveagainst the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons.The practical effect of the party discussions on Soviet pol-icy was slight, with the USSR continuing to profess willing-ness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West andto assist politically and economically in the development ofcountries seeking to break away from dependence on the West.

Moscow began 1958 riding the wave of optimism engenderedby World-wide reaction to its military and space achievements,and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over a pe-riod of years of the blocvs political, economic, and militaryaid program--combined with people-to-people contacts, intensive

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propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation--to make agrowing number of the underdeveloped countries materiallydependen,t on the .bloc and,,politically ractable.Nasir's/precipitous move.towarda merger of Egypt and Syriapoint.e'd up the Soviet problem of maintaining good state rela-tions with nationalist governments while supporting the spreadof Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet Unionended by grudgingly accepting the formation of the UAR--withits disastrobd effects on the Syrian Communist party-andturned its attention to heading off any rapprochement betweenNasir and the West, on the one hand by increasing its eco-nomic and military support to Cairo and on the other by con-tinuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populace.

However,

The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on 14July 1958 and the subsequent American and British landingsin Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that thesemoves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensiveagainst Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. As inthe earlier Syrian r r r l sk , .Moscm attempted to intensify theair of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force animmediate big-power conference to bring about a detente. TheSoviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations withthe new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effectiveinstrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs.Adtk-leftist coups in the fall of 1958 in Pakistan, Burma,.and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples and gov-ernments of the underdeveloped countries a more resolute standagainst reactionary influences, both domestic and internation-al. I ,

At the 21st party congress in early 1959 Wrushchev per-sonally spotlighted ideological and political differenceswhich had arisen in MOSCOW*S political, economic, and mili-tary support of selected non-Communist countries--supportbased principally on parallel anti-Western interests ratherthan on compatible ideologies or common long-term goals.Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for more con-sistent support of Soviet foreign policy in exchange for So-viet favors. The congress' endorsement of a more active linein underdeveloped countries was reflected in signs of a broad-ening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairsand of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and culturalcontacts with Latin American countries. The general strategyoutlined at the congress reflected the USSROs apparent belief

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that the.stalemate in East-West relations facilitated ratherthan hampered its policy of driving a wedge between the West-ern and neutralist camps;,,support or the latter was justi-fied on!'the basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed'them .t'o be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward thebloc.

'In mid-1959, under the exigencies of its drive for detentewith the West'and in reaction to unfavorable developments with-in key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarilys e t aside its activist line in favor of overtures for strength-ening friendly government-to-government relations. Moscow ap-parently hoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United Stateswould help build irresistible popular pressure for an earlysummit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions. Khru-shchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly ses-sion in New York, which included the promise of vastly great-er economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America fromboth the bloc and the West once the arms race was over, wasa transparent bid for support for immediate talks on disarma-ment.In a different vein, MikoyanOs November 1959 visit toMexico pointed up the new stage In Soviet efforts to exploitthe economic difficulties of Latin American countries in thedirection of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc;Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 reinforced thistactic; at the same time it called attention to MOSCOW'S ap-praisal that Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedentedopportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout LatinAmerica. KhPushchevvs wn highly publicized Asian trip inFebruary and March 1960 probably was intended to halt theerosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had sufferedparticularly as a result of friction between Peiping and oth-er Far Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Soviet po-sitions and prestige.

apparently in reaction to the U -2 incident and the dimmingof prospects for Western concessions on any of the major out-standing international issues, prompted a major effort bySoviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to con-vince the world public that the United States alone was re-sponsible. The U-2 incident was used as a pretext for a cam-paign to frighten Americags allies into restricting the use,

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks' n May 1960

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and press ing f o r t h e evacua t ion , of American bases from t h e i rt e r r i t o r y under t h e t h r e a t of a S ov ie t s t r i k e i n t h e e ve nt oft h e i r us,e by an y- fu tu re ipvader of Sovie t a i r space . Releaseda t 1eas.k t emporar i ly f rom - inhib i t i ons der iv in g from t h e de-s i r e .$or neg ot ia t ion s w i t h t h e US, the Soviet Governmentadopted a bold l i n e on Cuba w h i c h went w e l l beyondany.pm.ViousSovie t move i n L at in America, although Khrushchev's 9 Julyt h r e a t t o use rockets a g a i n s t t h e US i n t h e event of 'IPentagon''i n t e r l e n t i o n a h Cuba w a s p a t e n t l y a b l u f f t o impress non-Corn-munis t Lat in America w i t h th e might and dar ing of t h e S o v i e tUnion. T h e S t ro n g er l i n e w a s a l s o ev id en t. i n Moscow's t r e a t -ment of t h e RB-47 i nc i den t and i t s breaking off disarmamentt a l k s .

Moscow seized on t h e c r i s i s i n t h e Congo fol lowing i t sachievement of independence on 30 June a s a w i n d f a l l t o d i s -cr ed i t th e West not o n l y i n t h e Congo but throughout Africaand t o e s t a b l i s h a Soviet presence through heavy support t oLumumba-controlled el eme nts i n t h e Leopoldvil le government.Khrushchev's pledge of u n i l a t e r a l a i d w a s implemented dramat-i c a l l y i n a f a sh i on t o undermine t h e UN program, which cameunder heavy Sovie t a t t a ck fo r t limproperlyl l suppor t ing co lo nia l -i s t i n t e r e s t s . Mobu t u ' s 15 September order e x p e l l i n g a l lbloc dip lomats and t ech nic i ans brought t h e USSR's Congo ex-per iment t o an abrupt h a l t and forced the Soviet Union t of a l l b ack on diplomat ic and propaganda exploi ta t ion of t h econt inuing p o l i t i c a l , economic , and mi l i t a ry chaos .Khrushchev's performance a t t h e 15 th G eneral Assemblys e s si o n i n N e w York i n September and October 1960, wh i ch man-aged t o keep t h e i dea of a summit meeting a t t h e f o r e f r o n to f w or ld p u b l i c o p i n i o n a t t h e same t i m e t h a t Moscow cont inuedt o play up s i tu a t io ns making an ea r l y meeting of Sovie t andAmerican leaders seem impera t ive , w a s a n e f f o r t t o i n f l u e n c eth e cdunt r ies of non-bloc A s i a , Afr i ca , and La t i n America--s i n g l y and i n conce r t- - to a he igh tened a s s au l t on co l on i a l i sm,Khrushchev's o f f i c i a l and un of f i c i a l conduct , and Sovie tmaneuvers general ly , added up to a m a j o r e f f o r t t o impresson t h e leaders of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s t h a t i n t h e 15 y e a r s s i n c eWorld War I1 t h e r e h a d been a fundamental change i n t h e worldba lance of power--a f a c t wh i ch had no t ye t been r e f l e c t e dpropor t i ona t e l y e i t h e r i n t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e i r i n di v id u al

governments or i n t h e s t r u c t u r e an d o p e r at i o n s of t h e UN .

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In sum, the assumption underlying MOSCOW'S policy towardthe underdeveloped countries--to which it has clung despiteheavy pr,essuresfrom both..inside nd outside the bloc-isthat tbk world is passing?through an interim period of un-certain but fairly short duration, perhaps a decade, duringwhich political, economic, and ideological forces now inmotion will bring about a basically new world situation:' t h e predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian, A f -rican, and L&t!in American countries will reflect the corre-lation of world forces, resulting in a gradual eliminationof political, economic, and ideological ties with the West.In this period, growing bloc economic and political supportto underdeveloped countries will help their governments main-tain a neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc and in-

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-.- -creasingly opposed to Western- olicies and interests.

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I . THE STALINIST LEGACY: August 1945 - February 1953, IMciscow's preoccupat ion in the immediate postwar yearswi th .$he massive t as k of reco ns t r uc t i ng t h e S ovie t homeland,wi th the incorpo ra t ion of Eas te rn Europe i n to th e b loc , andwith cr uc ia l developments i n Western Europe--the pr in ci pa lfocus of East -West differences--precluded a dynamic policyi n p e r i p h er s l ' areas: non-Communist Asia, Afr ica , and Lat inAmerica. Never t he l e s s , t he extreme f l u i d i t y of t h e As ianp o l i t i c a l scen e aroused Moscow's rev olu t ion ary opt imism andc a l l e d f o r a n up d at in g an d c l a r i f i c a t i o n of i t s views on.Com-rnunist world pro spe cts . Although S t a l i n a t every par ty con-g r e s s s i n c e t h e e a r l y 1920s--as Lenin had before him--express-ed o f f i c i a l op timism over developments i n " the c o l on ia l areas , "

Communist agitation and Sov i e t meddli ng i n t h e a f f a i r s o f non-Communist Asia , Africa, and Lat in America had i n f a c t beens i n g u l a r l y u n s uc c e ss f ul . World War 11, b y s h a t t e r i n g t h ee x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i n l a r g e areas of A s i a and speedingup t h e tempo of pol i t i ca l , economic , and s o c i a l change through-o u t most of t h e world , opened new v i s t a s f o r t h e expansion ofSov i e t i n f l uence .Moscow's f a i l u r e a t t h e end of the w a r t o s t e p o ut imme-d i a t e l y w i th a c l e a r - c u t s t r a t e g y t o guide or c a p t u re a n t i -colonial , anti-Western movements, re f lec ted t h e USSR's d e s i r eno t t o e m b it t er r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West on matters which i tconsidered secondary t o t h e o v e r r i d i n g n e c e s s i t y of a r r ang i nga s u i t a b l e se t t l em en t i n Europe . I t tu rned a l s o on uncer-t a i n t y i n t o p S o vi et c i rc l e s whether /to cooperate with non-communist l eader s and movements--and on what terms--or t o en-courage l o c a l Communists t o a t tempt t o seize power. The scar-c i t y of s o l i d i n fo rmat i on , t h e l ack of a Soviet "presence,"and a record s t udded wi t h ove ren t hus i a s t i c appra i s a l s of a n t i -colonial developments a l l counseled caut io n. Al though Lenin 'svau nte d t h e s i s t h a t t h e c a p i t a l i s t c h a i n c ou ld be broken a ti t s weakest l ine--the areas under " imper ia l i s t oppress iont t - -and S t al in ' s formula fo r overcoming imperial ism by revolu t ion-i z i n g i t s c o l o n i a l "rear" were considered still v a l i d , n e i t h e rserved as a p r a c t i c a l g u id e f o r S o v ie t p o li c y in t h i s p er io dof widespread revolut ionary change.

chaotic and near-chaot i c condi t ions i n South and Southeas t A s i a ,Moscow was stymied by t h e f a c t t h a t r e l a t ions between localWhatever Sovie t in te n t i on s concern ing ex pl o i ta t i on of t h e

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Communist and non-Communist independence movement s--seldom ,if e v e r , good--had been embi t te red i n most areas over t h ei s s u e 04 wart ime,support f o r t h e A l l i e s . Moscow's 1935 adop-t i o n a& subsequent concentrat ion on Popular Front t a c t i c s 'i n Eu*ope--which viewed fascism as a more pressing dangerthan colonial ism--had co ntr ibu ted t o t h e estrangement of Com-.munists from inc ip ien t na t iona l i s t movements by committingMoscow t o co l l abora t i on w i t h t h e Western colonial powers.S t a l i n ' s p a d t ' w i t h H i t l e r removed t h e s e i n h i b i t i o n s , b u t f o l -lowing Germany's a t t ack on t h e So vie t Union i n June 1941, t h ev i r u l e n t an t i co l o n i a l campaign w a s suddenly moderated by t h erequirements of t h e w a r t i m e a l l i a n c e . With t h e Japanese de-f e a t , t h e two- f ront s t ruggle of Communists and nationalistsa g a i n s t t h e colonial powers--and each other--reached a newpeak of in tens i ty . 'by e f f e c t i v e mater i a l o r p o l i t i c a l a i d , d i r ec t ed a s t e a d ystream of charges a g a i n s t B r i t i s h , French, and Dutch mili taryac t i o ns unde rt aken i n an e f f o r t t o mainta in t h e i r c o l o n i a lpos i t i ons , bu t i t s a t t i t u d e toward non-Communist movementscoming t o power i n t h e new Asian s t a t e s v a c i l l a t e d . Moscowwas pub l i c l y cool toward t h e i r leaders , and Soviet spokesmenquest ioned t h e "genuineness" of t h e i r an t i co l on i a l i sm, i nl i g h t of t h e compromises which had made ea r l y independence pos-s i b l e . Well i n t o t h e postwar period, Moscow cont inued t o d i s -cuss Asian developments i n t e r m s of eve r -de t e r i or a t i ng p o l i t i-tal and economic conditions and openly p r e d i c t e d t h a t e x i s t -ing governments and t h e i r programs would soon g iv e way be fo ret h e i n e v i t a b l e e v o l ut i o n of p o l i t i c a l . p o w e r t o t h e l e f t .St a l in not only minimized t h e immediate prospects of Asiann at io na li st movements, but he appa ren t l y a l so e n t e r t a i n e dhopes t h a t d i f f e r e n t view s on colonialism, combined w i t h anta-go ni s t i c economic se l f - i n t e r es t s , would lead t o a s e r i o u s r i f tbetween t h e United Sta tes and i t s Western colleagues. As aconsequence of these views, So vi et propaganda downplayed t h eAmerican ro l e i n a t t empt ing t o s t a b i l i z e areas r e c e n t l y f r e e dfrom Japanese occupat ion, co nce ntra t ing i t s a t t a c k s on othe rWestern powers a c t i v e i n Asia.ment i n t o p Sov i e t academic c i r c l e s as t o t h e meaning of t h echanges brought about i n t h e c o l o n i a l world by w a r , Unanimouson l y i n t h e i r a p p r a i s a l s t h a t "tremendous" and "r ev olu tio na ry"developments had taken and were t ak i n g p l ace , Sov i et scholars

Moscow, i n no p o s i t i o n t o i n f l uence l o c a l developments

MOSCOW'S unsure diplomat ic hand was ref lec ted i n disagree-

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and pub l i c i s t s , i n t h e absence of f i r m guidance f rom the top,a r r i v e d a t no consensus which would f i t th e needs of S ovietpo l i cy , ' .'

,$ ) z-The i r cons i de r ab le d i f f e r ence s were under l ined by t h econ trov ersy which spr ang up over t h e September 1946 pub lica -t i o n of Changes i n t h e Economy of Capital ism Result ing FromtAe'Second qor ld Wa r by Moscow s . l e ad i ng po l it i o-economicth eo re ti ci an , ' Academician Eugene S. Varga. Va rga 's monumentalsurvey of t h e war's e f f e c t s on wor ld capi ta l i sm , inc luding ana t tempt t o assess t h e "far-reaching changes i n t h e r e l a t i o n -sh ip s between th e colo nie s and th e mother cou nt r i es ," concludedt h a t on t h e bas i s of indust r ia l development and lessened f i -nancial dependence,, the war year s i r rev ocab ly had reduced th eeconomic dependence of t h e maj or i t y of t h e colonies on t h e i rme tro po lis es. Varga, i n company w i t h o t he r Sov i e t ana l ys t s ,c i t e d t h e growth of a n i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t i n a whole s e r i e sof colo nies and th e supply of arms t o co l o n i a l peop le s du r i ngt h e war--a pa r t of which they were ab le to r e t a i n and u s e f o rt h e c r e a t i o n o f r e v o lu t i on a r y armies--as f a c t o r s f a c i l i t a t i n gthe development of Communist i n f l uence .

Although Varga' s views found co nsi de rab le supp ort , t h ei m p l i c a t i o ns of h i s f a v o r ab l e a p p r a i s al o f economic develop-ments i n t h e c a p i t a l i s t w orld were increas ingly unacceptableas cold war ten sio ns mounted. Publ ic re b ut ta l of Varga 'sviews was considered necessary . Publ ished d i sc uss i ons a t aj o i n t confer ence of Economics I n s t i t u t e and Moscow Un iv er si tyt heo re t i c i ans i n May 1947 r e f l ec t e d Sov i e t ho s t i l i t y t owardboth t h e Western powers and t h e Asian. nat ional is t movements .Varga 's f ind ings on t h e degree of economic independence a t -t a i ned by ce r t a i n co lonies and "semi-colonies" ( im per ia l i s t"dependencies" such as the Lat in American countr ies) w e r echal lenged, and i t was den i ed t ha t a b as i s had been l a i d i nsome co lo ni es f o r independent economic development. Althoughth e regime-sponsored coun terat tack on Varga served no t ic e th a tt h e area for i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of world even t s hadnarrowed considerably, both Varga supporters and Varga de-t rac to rs d i sp layed unce r t a i n t y toward developments i n A s i a ,f i n d i n g as much to condemn as t o p r a i s e i n t h e c u r r e n t s ce ne .The founding of t h e Cominform i n September 1947 markedthe conc lus ive repudia t ion of modera t ion as a l i n e t o be f o l -lowed toward non-Communists. Zhdanov's ke yn ot e sp eech empha-s i z e d t h e e x t e nt t o which Moscow was t o commit i t s e l f t o t h e

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d o c t r i n e ' o f t w o a n t a g o n i s t i c world systems, completely exclud-i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a t h i r d , or n e u t r a l i s t , p o s i t i o n .Zhdanov;s speech'and t h e e a r l y Cominform propaganda had l i t t l et o say,::tibout A s i a and served t o under l ine t h e fac t t h a t MOSCOW~Sprimapy concern remained w i t h s e c u r i n g a f avo rab le se t t l emen tof European i s s u e s , Asian Communist p ar t i e s wi th in a s h o r tt ime,began t o r e f l e c t t h i s harsher l i n e and t o adopt a morevfgorous as sa u l t on remain ing Western co lo n ia l i n te r e s t s andon non-Communist Asian n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s . The year 1948w a s marked by a widespread outbreak of Communist-led s t r i k ev io lence , t e r ror i sm, and armed r e b e l l i o n s n ot o n l y in t h e re-maining co lon ies , bu t also i n t h e newly independent s t a t e s .Moscow's encouragement of such t a c t i c s apparen t ly stemmed fromt h e bel ief t h a t no tb ing fu r the r cou ld be gained by Communistr e s t r a i n t toward t h e West nor f r o m a d d i t i o n a l attempts t o con-c i l i a t e non-Communist Asian gover nme nts , a view abet ted byCommunist su cc e ss e s i n China and by con si s te n t overevaluat ionof Communist party prospects elsewhere i n Asia,

An obvious e f f o r t was made t o e x p l o i t Chinese p res t i gewhich bal looned i n A s i a on t h e hee ls of t h e 1948 m i l i t a r y v ic -to r i e s . Asian Communist p a r t i e s , fo l lowing Moscow's l e a d , be-g a n f r e e l y t o presc r ibe a "Chinese way" as proper anticolon'i-a l i s t s t r a t e g y f o r A s i a . The con ten t of t h i s "Chinese way"w a s n o t s p e l l e d o u t , b u t in essence i t meant t h e encouragementof armed re vo lt s by pea san ts and workers, as w e l l a s i n t e n s i -f i e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u g gl e t o draw ad di t io nal e lements of t h en a t i o n a l b ou r ge o is i e i n t o t h e " a n t i - i mp e r i a l i s t " s t r u g g l e .The foundering of t h i s policy--as evidenced by t h e general sup-p r e s s i o n of t h e Communist-inspired revo l t s w i t h heavy and i nsome p l a c e s ca tas t roph ic losses t o l oc a l Communist a s s e t s ,w i t h t h e notab le except ion of Indochina--was a s e r i o u s setbackt o Moscow's g e n e r a l l i n e t h a t t h e ' . t i m e w a s r i p e f o r r evo lu t ion -a r y upheava ls i n A s i a .

Post m o r t e m s on f a i l u r e s of t h e resor t t o open fo rce- - i , e . ,t h e :, edj,t;or.ial-. i n t h e Apri l 1949 issue of Problems - -f W i s --ory--at tacked t h e degree of cooperat ion "exposed" betweenarea governments and t h e " c o l o n i a l i s t s " and f r e e l y p r e d i c t e da g e n e r al d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e Asian p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n whichwould gi ve Communist p a r t i e s an othe r chance under m o r e favor-ab l e circumstances. Soviet scholars w e r e charged w i t h conic e n t r a t i n g t h e i r e f f o r t s on t h e suppor t of Soviet and Commu-n i s t g o al s i n Asia by greater a t t e n t i o n t o present-day devel-opments and t o combatting t h e f a l se theses of non-Communists.

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I .

I .

In Apr i l 1949 a ' three-day meeting of P a c i f i c a n d O r i e n t a l In-s t i t u t e s p ec i a l i s t s w a s h e l d i n Moscow t o improve t h e con ten tof Soviet propaganda on As,ian developmentsand i n Ju ne t h e r ewas a j b i n t c o n f e r e n c e ofz- the Pa ci f i c and Economics In s t i t u t es .The p r , inc ip a l r epo r t a t both meetings w a s de l ive red by t h ed i r e c t o r o f t h e - P a c i f i c U s t i t U t e , Academician Eugene M. Zhukov,s i n c e 1943 a t o p spokesman on Sovie t Asian p o l i c y ,

The pro6e'edings of th e two conferences poi nt up t h e con-s i d e r ab l e d o c t r i n a l ba ck in g and f i l l i n g which was going on int h e Communist movement a t t h i s t i m e . Having j u s t s u f f e r e d de-' f ea t s a t t h e h a n d s o f t h e bou rge ois ie i n many of t h e new Asians t a t e s , Moscow w a s i n no mood t o examine dis pa ss io na te ly cur-r e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o r p la y i ng up e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s betweent h e new s t a t e s and t h e West, and ins tea d increased i t s isola-t i o n from Asian n a t i o n a l is t movements by heaping abuse on t h e i rleaders and id eo lo gi es . Zhukov, however, made it clear t h a tMoscow even then w a s l ess concerned w i t h t h e s o c i a l r o l e ofv a r i o u s c a p i t a l i s t elements in t h e new Asian s t a t e s t han w i t ht h e "main qu es t on" :

i

t h e progress iveness of one s o c i a l movement or another ,t h e r e v o l u t io n a r y n a t u r e OP r e a c t i o n a r y n a t u r e of onepa r t y o r ano the r , i s . . .de t e rm ined by t h e i r r e l a t i o n sw i t h t h e Soviet Union, w i t h t h e camp of democracy andsoc ia l i sm .The conferees ' expos i t ion of an Asian s t r a t e g y weld inga n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s , p e ti t -b o u rg e o is , and middle-

bourgeois e lemen ts w i t h a m i l i t a n t ' p r o l e t a r i a t ar id 'peasant ryl a r g e l y i g n o r e d r e c e n t defea t s of Communist-led i n su rr ec ti on sand, because of "fundamental changes" caused by t h e war andt h e "new a l ignment of po l i t i c a l forces ' ' i n Asia r e s u l t i n g fromthe Communist sweep of t h e Chinese mainland, co ns id er ed Com-munist chances i n Asia bright enough f o r t h e continued advocacyof violence . The gene ra l l i n e cont inued t h a t a u t h o r i t a t i v e l yse t by Zhdanov a t t h e founding of t h e Cominform i n September1947--aggressive Communist l e ade r sh i p o f a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s tc o a l i t i o n s and across-the-board a t t ack on a l l evidence of West-e r n i n f l u e n c e . Area Communist p a r t i e s were slow i n comingaround t o t h e Moscow-charted course; less caught up in i n t e r -n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , t h e y p r e f e r r e d t o a t t ack l o c a l c l a s s enemies.The Communist party of I n d i a , t h e most im po rt an t i n non-Com-munist Asia fo l lowing t h e s u i c i d a l u p r i s i ng of t h e Indonesianp a r t y in 1948, was s p l i t i n t o f a c t i o n s ov er t h e q ue s ti on whethe r

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- . .

t o c o nt i nu e p ea sa nt g u e r r i l l a warfare, which had f a i l e d i nTelengana, or t o r e t r ea t t o more peaceful forms of p o l i t i -ca l ag i t , a t ion i n an attemp$ t o win over d i s s a t i s f i e d elementsi n the, .Congress p a r t y .Commundst p a r t i e s i n t o l i n e were pointed up by an e d i t o r i a li n i t s January 1950 j o u r n a l a t t a c k i n g t hose Ind ian Commu-n i s t p a r ty leaders who continued to ques t ion t h e d i rec t ap-p l d c i b i l i t y qf t h e "Chinese experience" t o t h e i r own strug-gle f o r power, 'and t h e Japanese Communist party f o r advocat-ing "peacefu l revo lu t ion" f o r 'Asia.

On t h e occasion of S t a l i n ' s 7 0 t h b i r t h d a y , Pro fesso r I .I . Potekhin, long a principal spokesman on African a f f a i r s ,summarized t h e S t a lA n i s t p o s i t ion on "Colonial Revolutionand t h e National-Liberation Movement : t

Cdminform e f f o r t s t o br in g Asian

Comrade St a l i n warned, and t h e l a s t q u a r t e r of acentury f u l l y confi rmed, t h a t t h e complete andf i n a l ' v i c to r y of t h e c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n is pos-s i b l e only under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t .Pet i t-bourgeo is na t i on a l i s t o rgan iza t ions andp a r t i e s have a l r e a d y proven t h e i r i ncapac i ty t oaccompl ish n a t i o n a l 1 b e r a t ion. They 1 m i t them-s e l v e s t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms and t h e achieve-ment of formal , bourgeois democracy which do n o tand cannot ensure a complete break I r o m t h e s y s t e mof i m p e r i a l s m .In St a l i n ' s name, Potekhin went on t o record "bourgeois be-t r a y a l s " of t h e independence movement not only by t h e Chinesebourgeois ie , bu t a l s o by t h e b i g bourgeo i s i e of India, Indo-n e s i a , t h e Phil ippines, and Egypt .South Korea i n June 1950, which quick ly became a p o l i t i c a lcon f ron ta t ion of t h e major powers, provided a new focus f o rSoviet Asian pol icy and pre-empted a t t e n t i o n from t h e otherareas . Sta l in ' s Korean gambit showed h i m a t l e a s t t emporar i lyw i l l i n g t o use Communist armed forces, a t t h e very consider-a b l e r i s k of a genera l w a r , t o achieve h i s p o l i t i c a l objec-t i v e s . The move obvi ousl y stemmed from a monumental rniscal-c u l a t i o n of t h e Western mood.

The Moscow-created c r i s i s touched o ff by t h e invas ion of

The war made academic fu r t he r d i scuss io ns wi th in t h e Com-munist world over h a r d o r s o f t t a c t i c s t o be followed i n t h ea n t i c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e . What counted now was t h e success of- 6 -


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I

l o c a l su pp or te rs i n mo bi liz in g Communist and non-Communist"peace" forc es i n suppor t of o f f i c i a l p o s i ti o n s . The war a l s omarked the f i n a l s t e p i n t h e ev olu t ion of Communist propagandatoward .%ingl ing out th e United Sta tes as t h e p r i n c i p a l " im-p er ia l i s t " enemy, not only of Communist in te re s t s bu t a l l eg -ed l y o f those of t h e independence movements as w e l l . Presum-a b l y , t h e a t t a c k o n So ut h Korea was i n i t i a t e d as a r e s u l t ofM O ~ C O W ' S estim,ate t h a t a m il i t a ry shock br in gin g down one of Ithe 'weak Western-oriented s t a t e s i n Asia would t r igger a cha i nr e a c t i o n of r e v o l t s elsewhere. By'-the summer of 1951 i t hadbecome obvious t h a t t h e f i g h ti n g would c ontinu e deadlocked un-l e s s one s i d e o r t h e o t h e r was wi l l i ng t o t ake much g r e a t e rr i s k s .With the drawing t o a close of t he mi l i t a ry phase of t h ewar, Moscow began t o back away from i t s previ ous l i n e . Theclash of Korean pol ic ies had exposed considerable Asian es-trangement from t h e West. Statem ents by Indian and Arab lead-e rs i n p a r t i c u l a r , and v o t i n g r e c o rd s i n t h e United Nationsn o t h o s t i l e t o b l o c p o s i t i o n s , p oi nt ed up t h e cons i de rab l e es-trangement which had developed between t h e "peace" pol ic iesof a number of Asian governments and t h o s e of t h e p r i n c i p a lWestern powers. In re t r os pe ct , Moscow, which had ac ted prompt-l y t o organize world-wide condemnation o f t h e UN e f f o r t i nKorea, w a s s l o w i n r e c og n iz i ng t h e e x t e n t t o which ant iwarsen t i men t and "ne u t r a l i s t " f o r e i gn po l i c i e s of Asian non-Com-munist governments could be t u r n e d a g a i n s t t h e West, To t h ee nd , S t a l i n r eb uf fe d n e u t r a l i s t e f f o r t s t o br ing about a com-

promise on Korea, a problem in'which he was too pe r sona l l y andemotional ly involved t o perm it &en t h e t a c i t admission ofe r r o r .The t r a n s i t i o n t o a more pea cef ul s ta g e i n Communist andSov i e t r e l a t i on s wit h t h e former co l on i e s o f Asia was gradualand uneven. The ye ar 1951 was marked by a cons iderable t a i l -i n g o f f of Communist-led guerri l la wars i n Asia--except f o rIndochina--and renewed em ph asis o n p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n by t h el oc a l pa r t i e s , bu t t h e changeove r i n t a c t i c s w a s not accom-panied by unmis takable publ ic s igns such as t hose od: t h e i rado pti on i n mid-1947. Bolsh evik i n June 1951 commented favor -a b l y o n t h e newly adopted program of t h e Ind ian Communist p a r tywhich turned i t s back Q%lurther encouragement of peasant re -

v o l t s a n d se t t h e pa r t y ' s p ri mary pu rpose a s t h e c r e a t i o n ofa revo lut i ona ry blo c comprised not only of th e working c la s sand th e peasant ry , bu t a l s o progre ss ive e lements of t h e- 7 -


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. .

i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and of t h e Indian bourgeois ie . Indi a has con-s i s t e n t l y been t r e a t e d as a special problem by Soviet t a c t i -c i a n s . :If Moscow intendeqk i t s endorsement of t he Ind i an Com-munist ,$ar ty ' s s h i f t as a t s i g n a l t o Asian Communist p a r t i e sgene ra i l y , the message was s l o w i n t a k in g e f f e c t , f o r i t wasl a t e summer 1952 be fo re t h e l a s t p a r t i e s f e l l i n l in e .e. ' A t t h e September 1951 ECAFE meet ing i n Singapore t h e So-v i e t de legates' , i n a n abrupt r e ve r sa l fr om t h e i r p r ev i ous ha r-rassment of pa r t ic ip at in g Asian governments, o ffe red t o pro-mote t h e economic development of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s by t h e ex-change of Sovie t indus t r i a l machinery for l o c a l raw mate r ia l s--a move which had a l l the earmarks of a propaganda gambitr a t h e r t h a n a p o l i c y s h i f t . B e t t e r e vi de nc e t h a t S t a l i n ' s i n -n e r c i r c l e of advisers had concluded there w a s l i t t l e l i k e l i -hood of an ea r l y Communist vi ct or y i n gen eral Asian revo lut ion ,t h us c a l l i n g f o r a major change i n s t r a t e gy , is presented int h e r ep or t s of d i s cus s i ons a t a 12-day co nf ere nce i n November1951 of S o vi e t A sia n s p e c i a l i s t s of t h e I n s t i t u t e of O r i e n t a lStudies and of t h e pa r t y Cen t r a l Committee's Academy of SocialSciences .

Zhukov aga in fu l f i l l e d t h e r o l e of regime spokesman. Theburden of h i s argumentation w a s t h a t Asi an pa r t i e s cou l d no tcount on coming t o power everywhere through,"revolutionaryarmies," and that t h e main s igni f i cance of t h e Chinese revolu-t i o n fo r o ther Asian countr ies w a s i t s blending 6f ant i - imperi -a l i s t and ant - feudal e lements in to a s i n g l e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s tf r o n t s t r u g g l i n g toward independence. Resort t o arms as ap o l i t i c a l t a c t i c w a s not sp ec i f i c a l ly d isavowed, a l though itwas cons ider ably downgraded by t h e conferen ce ma jor i ty . Witht h e pendulum now swinging i n t h e di re ct io n of in te ns i f ie dp o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n , t h e c on fe re es s t r u g g l e d t o g iv e more pre-cise content t o the concept of a n o n c a p i t a l i s t p a t h of devel-opment f o r As ian count r i es , r eopening the deb a tes of t he e ar ly19 20s o ve r t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of organ i z ing a " s o c i a l i s t " o r d e rout of semi- feudal , semi -cap i ta l i s t soc ie t i e s .A des i re t o open a new s t a ge i n Sov ie t r e l a t i o ns w i t h non-communist A s i a w a s apparen t i n Moscow's behavio r i n th e UnitedNat ions , where consis tent ant i -Westernism w a s combined withl i m i t e d o v e r t u r e s t o th e smal l -country delegat ions--an apparent

r e f l e c t i o n o f a worldwide upgrading of p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r ex-panding Communist influence by manipulating tradit ional methodsof diplomacy, Greater S o v i e t a t t e n t i o n t o i n t e rna t i ona l and- 8 -


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domestic developments having no immediate bear ing on Soviets e c u r i t y or on t h e main arenas of East-West c o n f l i c t w a s re-f l e c t ed ,.in t h e ap'pearance,*of a symposium prepared by t h e In-st i tu td 'of Economics on The Peoples of L a t i n America i n t h eStr ugg le Against American Imperialism, t h e f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n tmonograph devoted t o t h i s s u b j e c t i n t h e postwar per iod . Not o u r . d e fo r c e such as Varga's 1946 work, t h i s book i n def in-in tg . t h e t ask ,q t hand as t h e ''unmasking of t h e economic, pol i t i -c a l , m i l i t a r y , and ide olo gic al expansion of American im p e r i a l -s i m " is t y p i c a l of Sov ie t scho la r sh ip of t h e per iod : t h e sub-s t i t u t i o n of quotat ions f r o m t h e c l a s s i c s of Marx-Lenin-Stalinfor o r ig inal analys is and heavy dependence on second-hand ac-counts in t h e l o c a l Communist press . The January 1952 Leninanniversary speech of p a r t y t h e o r e t i c i a n P e t r N. Pospelov,surveying t h e curaen t "cr is is of t h e e n t i r e c o l o n i a l s ys te mof imperial s m " i n optLmist i c terms, claimed t o see "hundredsof mi l l i o n s of formerly backward and supp re ss ed people" nowbeginning t o p l ay an a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l ro l e , i n f u l f i l l m e n tof Len in ' s p red ic t ions .

T h a t S t a l i n looked t o increased economic con tac ts as oneof t h e promising avenues f o r break ing ou t of t h e semi-isola-t i o n t h e USSR s u f f e r e d a s a r e s u l t of i t s r o l e i n Korea issuggested by t h e Soviet bu i ldup f o r t h e A p r i l 1952 World PeaceCouncil-, sponsored 'Moscow -Econorbic'Conference . ;:Communilt- par -t i e s and peace council groups throughout t h e wor ld a t t emptedt o drum up in vi te es , ind ivi dua l businessmen who might s e r v eas f u t u r e t rade c o n t a c t s or might serve as focuses f o r l oca lag i t a t ion aga in s t Wes te rn t r a d e co nt ro ls . Moscow sought t os t i m u l a t e i n t e r e s t i n i nc re a se d ' t r ad e 'with t h e Soviet Unionby a f ew h igh ly se l ec t ive t r a d e o f f e r s , o v e r t u r e s t o e s t a b l i s hcomprehensive economic relations, and l i m i t e d o f f e r s of tech-ni ca l ass i s tan ce. Although in f requent o f f e r s t o exchange So-viet indust r ia l equ ipment and c a p i t a l goods f o r r a w mater ia l sand foodstuffs produced in t h e former co lon ia l areas had beenmade previously, they had m e t w i t h genera l s k e p t i c i s m i n v iewof Moscow's g e n e r a l h o s t i l i t y t o non-Communist governments.was ac t i ng from manife st ly economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l objec-t i ves . The USSR's desire t o break t h e West's t r ade r e s t r i c t i o n sand open up Asia and Africa, i f n o t L a t i n America a s w e l l , assou rces of materials v i t a l f o r Soviet s t r a t e g i c reserves andto f a c i l i t a t e i t s breakneck indust r ia l expansion w e r e undoubt-e d l y c o n t r i b u t i ng f a c t o r s . D e s p i t e heavy propaganda dttention

In seek ing t o expand t r ade and technical contacts, Moscow

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c o n tr o l s, . a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e Soviet Union no longer had a needfor imports but could compete wi th t h e West on t h e bas i s of i t sown resgurces.1 9 t h p d ' t y c on gr es s which,'Lfollowed i n October 1952genera l pover ty of t h e peoples of "co l on i a l and dependent"areas and f o r e c a s t a pe r i od of con t i nued dec l i ne i n t h e economyof t h e underdeveloped countr ies which, i n combination w i t h agenera l shr in king of world markets f o r Western manufacturedgoods, wouldAWragdown t h e economy of t h e c a p i t a l i s t wor ld l ikea dead weight ." S t a l i n ' s sh o r t concluding speech t o the con?gres s w a s devoted exc lus ive ly t o problems of t h e world Commu-n i s t movement, t o exh ort in g more in te ns e e f f o r t , and f o r reas-s u r i n g t h e f a i t h f u l t h a t grea te r succes ses were i n t h e offing.S t a l i n and Malenkov',s s tat em en ts, i n combinat ion w i t h M OS COW ~ Sstepped-up p o l i t i c a l and economic overtures t o t h e Asian andneglect--had come t o an end. For obv iou s re as on s, Moscow d i d 'n ot s p e l l o u t i t s r o l e i n t h e i n t e n s i f yi n g t r o u b l e s forecas tf o r t h e c a p i t a l i s t world, but by implication, Communists woulds t ep up e f fok t s t o e x p lo i t p o l i t i c a l and economic di f ferenceswhenever and wherever t h e y appeared. In t h e November 1952General Assembly session, Moscow moderated i t s previous s t a n don se ve ra l minor measures involvin g a United Rations economica s s i s t a n c e r o l e . S t a l i n , i n a C h r i s t m a s l?interview" w i t hJames Reston, declared h i m se l f i n f a v o r of inc rea sin g economicand p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e smaller coun-t r i e s . S t a l i n ' s c on ti nu ed r e j e c t i o n of I nd ia n e f f o r t s t o b r in gabout an East-West compromise on Korea, however, acted as apowerful brake t o Sovie t e f f o r t s t o g et i t s f r i e n d s h i p campaignr o l l i n g .p l o t , " Moscow's fo re ig n countenance, mi r ro r i ng i t s domesticone , abrupt ly became more h o s t i l e .

S ta l i n he j r -apparent Malenkov's rep or t t o t h ec i t ed t h e

tArab s ta tes , suggest ed t h a t t h e pe r i od of relat ive calm-and I

With t h e January 1953 +discov eryof t h e "doc tors '

P a r t i c u l a r l y d u ri n g h i s l a s t yea r s , S t a l i n appeared t oe x e r c i s e a "dead hand" on Sovie t po li cy w i t h h i s inherent sus-p i c i ousnes s of a l l f o r c e s which were not under h i s c o n t r o l .Postwar changes i n Moscow's l i n e , as also post-Korea changes,were made i n t h e f a c e of r a d i c a l l y changed Asian circumstances--which took place w i t h l i t t l e o r no influence from Moscow--which S ta l i n under took w i t h r e l u c t a n c e .

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11, COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: March 1953 - January 1955iI ,d' ISddl in 's sudden demide shook t he whole of Sov i e t soc i e t y .S i n c e * S t a l i n dominated a l l aspects of So vie t policy-making andimplementation, and s in c e he had t a k e n o n l y rudimentary s tepst o prepare f o r an o rde r l y succes s i on , h i s abrupt depar turele ' f t h i s succegsors as s tunned a s was t h e ordidiiary 'Sovietc i t i z e n :and on the.*deferisive. , . The unsteady coal i t ionwhich now assumed command turned f i r s t t o a r educ t i on of ten-s i o n w i t h t h e West i n o rd e r t o provide a b r e a t h i n g s p e l l forconso l i da t i ng t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y as w e l l as t h e i r in-d i v i d u a l p o s i t ions .

F i r s t of a l l , t h e new leaders sought t o d i s p e l t h e blackclouds, domest ic as w e l l a s i n t e r na t i o na l , gene ra t ed du r i ngt h e d i c t a t o r ' s f i n a l two months of r u l e , a n d t o r e v i t a l i z e t h emoves made t h e preceding year toward a l i m i t e d improvement i nr e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e non-Communist world. Molotov 's funeralo r a t i o n a t tempted t o a f f i rm t h e new regime's ded i ca t i on toc a r r y i n g o u t a "S t a l i n i s t peace- lovi ng fo r e i gn po l i cy , ' whichhe i n t e r p r e t e d as a des i r e fo r t h e development of "cooperation"and "business t i e s " w i t h a l l co un tr i es . Malenkov's speech t ot h e Supreme Soviet on 15 l a r c h 1953--just t e n days a f t e r Sta-l i n ' s dea th-- sought t o r e a s s u r e t h e Soviet people and empha-s i zed h i s i n t e n t t o pursue peace. By t h e end of March, Moscowhad i n i t i a t e d a se r i es of minor moves and token s t eps intendedt o clear t h e a i r of t h e h o s t i l i t y e ng en de re d e a r l i e r i n t h eyear and t o suppor t t h e genuineness o f , i t s professed desi refor improved relat ions w i t h t h e ' w e s t . A number of Sovie t s t a t e -ments culminat ing i n Bulganin 's May Day speech emphasized t h eneed f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e r i s k of war and ca l l ed on t h e Westt o respond t o Soviet peace over tures by abandoning the armsrace and d i smant l ing Western mi l i t a ry bases close t o Sovie tt e r r i t o r y .

t

As th e new leade rsh ip became more confident of i t s au-t h o r i t y , t h e tempo of reform and improvisat ion in i t s f o r e i g nr e l a t i o n s i n cr e as e d. I n s u c c es s i o n Moscow succeeded i n "nor-ma l i z i ng" r e l a t i ons w i t h Greece, I s rae l , and Canada T e rr i-t o r i a l c la im s a g a i n s t T urkey were abandoned, and new e f f o r t swere made t o i n c r e a s e diplomatic and t rade c o n t a c t s , e s p e c i a l l yw i t h Asian and Arab s ta te s . The Sov iet peace of fen siv e broughtdiplomacy and propaganda t o bear i n a com binatio n unknown i nS t a l i n ' s day. I n t h e i r handl ing of v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s ,

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t h e new leaders d i sp layed a c o n si d e ra b l e f l e x i b i l i t y and amarked i n c r e a s e i n s o p h i s t i c a t i o n as they sought by t h e verynumber ahd variety of t h e g r moves, many of which were merelyt h e redbrsal of S t a l i n ' s ' k r a t u i t o u s ma n i f e s ta t i o n s of i l l . w i l l ,t o cruate t h e impression of a major s h i f t of Sovie t poldcy i nt h e d i r e c t i o n of de ten te . Sov ie t d ip lom ats abroad undertooka widespread demonstrat ion of good fe l lowship for t h e i r West-ex% colleaguerj. The new l e a d e r s i n Moscow, who s topped shorto f o pe nl y r e j e c t i n g S t a l i n ' s methods i n r e af f ir m i ng h i s goa l s ,dared p r i v a t e l y t o de pl or e "excesses" which had c r e p t i n t oS o vi et f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s a s a r e s u l t of S t a l i n ' s p e r s o n a l di-r e c t i o n of day-to-day diplomacy. The new more canciliatoryf e a t u r e s of S o v ie t f o r e i g n p o l i c y were i n t e r p re t e d f o r t h e homeaudience as tes t imony of t h e Soviet Union's growing sel f -as-su rance and s t r e n g th . T h i s s y n t h e t i c o f f i c i a l optimism wasnot accompanied by any appreciable l e t -up in domestic propa-ganda h o s t i l e t o t h e W e s t , however.

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e p ea c e o f f e n s i v e , which occupied MOSCOW'Spr imary a t t e n t i o n , t h e regime s t ep p e d o u t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n ofincreased economic contacts w i t h t h e whole ca p i t a l i s t world.A t t h e Geneva meeting on East-West trade, S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s .toned down t h e i r propaganda ro l e and showed a marked business-l i k e approach t o t h e d i scuss ions . A May-1953 Kommunist re vi ewof t h e m ajor l i nes of Soviet economic policy placed Moscows q u a r e l y on t h e s i d e of "widening economic cooperation and nor-m a l t rade r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l coun t r i e s" and fo r an ove r -a l li n cr e a se i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade . A t t h e same time, t h e au thor ,A. Nikonov, a leading Sovie t economis t , re i t e ra ted t h e p r i n c i -p a l l i n e s of Moscow's attack on 'wes te rn trade po l i c i e s , whichhe he l d t o be r e s p o n s i b l e fo r hold ing doyn t h e volume of t rade ,and on Western s t ra teg ic commodity controls, which he wanteddropped i n fav or of t h e "re-establ ishment of a s i n g l e i n t e r -n a t i o n a l market."nels showed t h a t Bioscow was l ook ing toward an expanding exchangeof goods w i t h t h e major c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s as w e l l as w i t ht h e independen t cou n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Stepped-up e f f o r t s through diplomatic chan-

I n J u l y it became apparen t t h a t t h e new regime was pre-pared t o c a r r y i ts o v e r t u r e s t o t h e underdeveloped c a p i t a l i s tc o u n t r i e s w e l l beyond th e l i m i t s impl ied in ear l ie r over tu res .A t t h e 15 Ju ly meet ing of t h e UN Economic and So ci al Coun cil, .Soviet delegate Arutyunyan announced Moscow's w i l l i n g ne s s f o rt h e f i r s t t i m e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e Uw's t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c eprogram. While a t t a c k i n g t h e Western approach t o t e c h n i c a l

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. ..

a s s i s t a n c e a nd r e p e a t i n g t h e s t an d a rd S o vi et p o s i t i o n t h a te l i m i n a t i o n of Western t r ade r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d on t h eweaker c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s and the development of "normalt r a d e " . ; t i t h a l l countr ies"wou1d do more t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i reconomic development than any l ikely UN program, Arutyunyannevertheless announced t h a t the Soviet Union had se t a s i d efo u r , mi l l io n rubles- -supplemented l a t e r by token amounts fromtbe Ukraine aqd Belorussia--for t h e u " s t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c eprogram.* The impact of Moscow's offer w a s reduced by Arut-yunyanss g rudg ing endorsement--"it is be t t e r t o l e t themtrade normally w i t h 6 the r c o u n t r i e s and ge t t h e money theyneed t h a t way that t o r ender them so-called aid"--and by t h eg r a d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e "cont r ibut ion" i n e f f e c t couldbe s p e n t o n l y w i th in t h e USSR or for sel 'vices of Sovi et spec-i a l i s t s abroad and d i d not conform to : t he requi rements of t h eUN program. The i n i t i a l fo ur m i l l io n rub le s , as a r e s u l t ,went unused. The st at em en t is su ed on 25 J u l y 1953, on t h e oc-cas ion of t h e 50th Anniversary of Bolshevism, ref lec ted t h econs ide rab le degree t o which t h e regime w a s w i l l i n g to l i n kbelief i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l a s t i n g c o e xi s te n c e w i t h t h ec a p i t a l i s t world to a d r i v e for increased economic t i e s w i t ha l l c o u n t r i e s

The "good neighbor" policy which Malenkov advanced i n h i sThe Soviet Union has no t e r r i t o r i a l claims a g a i n s tany s t a t e whatsoever. . e . Dif fe rences in t h e s o c i a land economic system... annot serve as an obstaclet o t h e s t re n g th e n in g of f r i e n d l y ' r e l a ti o n s . .. .

8 August 1953 spe ech t o t h e Supreme Soviet,

was in tended t o follow up Moscow's e a r l i e r overtures--such asi t s wel l -pub l i c i zed su r render of nuisance c la ims aga ins t Turkeyand Iran-and t o pave t h e way f o r a bolder across-the-boardapproach t o t h e newly independent s ta tes of Asia and Africa.Malenkov's remarks w e r e keyed t o a r e a s s e r t i o n o f S o v i et s t r e n g t h ,which wi th in two weeks were b u t t r e s s e d by p u b l i c claims t o pos-s e s s i o n o f t h e hydrogen bomb, as p a r t of a n e f f o r t t o r e in v ig o r-a te t h e Communist movement, which had become somewhat l e t h a r g i c*Always constrained t o show i t s p o l i c i e s as cont inuousand unchanging, Moscow l a t e r at tempted t o cover up i t s y e a r s

of o p p o s i t io n t o t h i s program by f a l s e l y d a t i n g t h e i nc e pt io nof t h i s program as 911953-1954tt, instead of 1950, and allegedt h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e USSR, t h e Ukraine, and Be lor uss iafrom t h e beginniqg, - 1 4 -


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..*-. . .-. : . _...


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of A s i a , .Varga"s work d i d not r e f l ec t t h e e v o l u t i o n which hadbegun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's p o l i c i e s towardpr ev ai l i ng moods +n t h e underdeveloped countr ies nor providea r a t i o Idle f o r t h e new tflick.f o r a l f m i t e d re-evaluat ion of MOSCOW'S views on "colonial ' 'd eve lopmen ts in - t h e gu i se o f scho la r l y c r i t ic i sm of Varga'sbook car r i ed ou t over t h e succeeding s i x months.I t d i d , however, provide a focus

i Followingethe September 1953 plenum of t h e c e nt ra l commit-tee , which confirmed Khrushchev as p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y a nds e t o f f t h e o f f e n s i v e on t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l f r o n t , t h e d e c i s i o nt o s t e p up t h e foreign economic program w a s endorsed publ ic lyi n unmis takably o f f i c i a l tones . Fol lowing up M o s c o w ' s g r a n tof one b i l l i o n r u b l e s f o r North Korean rehabi l i ta t ion , PremierMalenkov on 19 September c a l l e d f o r "a new approach t o s o l v et h e ques t ion of c o n s t r u c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e aid" t o Asian coun-t r i e s by "many s t a t e s , " imply ing Soviet wi l l ingness t o a s s i s tt h e economic development of f r i e n d l y non-Communist Asian coun-t r ies . Malenkov's cautious s t e p w a s fol lowed by diplomatice f f o r t s t o s p a r k mu tu al ly r e i n f o r c i n g d r i v e s f o r increasedt r ad e and f o r the "exchange" of te ch ni ca l information and t r ai n-ing .

Although t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a so n f o r MOSCOW'S t rade d r i v eprobably w a s t h e need for greater imports of consumer goodsen ta i l e d i n bialenkov s "new course" promises t o ra ise consump-t i o n l e v e l s i n t h e USSR, Moscow made a major e f f o r t t o e x p l o i ti t s i n t e r e s t i n i n c re as e d t r a d e as proof of i t s good w i l l anda s a demonstrat ion of So vie t economic pr ogr es s. Newly exp res s-ed desi res t o import consumer gqods were used as a peg fo rf u r t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e r i d i c u l o u s n e s s of Western res tr ic-t i o n s on t r a d i n g w i th t h e bl oc . Mikoyan's 17 October announce-ment of a new program on r e t a i l t r ade and product ion of consum-e r goods unde rlin ed Moscow's i n t e r e s t i n increased impor ts .A t t h e same t i m e , Mikoyan's statement was es pec ia l ly notewor thyf o r t h e l e n g t h s t o which he went i n at tempting t o j u s t i f y t h enew program--as w e l l as t o b i d f o r added i n t e r n a t i o n a l p re st ig e- -by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e USSR's postwar s t r i d e s i n economic recon-s t ru c t i o n and i nd u s tr ia l development, Moscow ha i l ed a growingl i s t of new and revised t rade agreements as proof of t h e f r u i t sof i t s new program.ment w i t h Ind ia po in ted up t h e rapid rapprochement which hadbeen developing between t h e two countr ies, speeded by t h e

Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a f ive-year t rade agree-

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of Asia, .Varga"s work d i d no t r e f l ec t t h e e v o l u t i o n which hadbegun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's p o l i c i e s towardpr ev ai l i ng moods +n t h e underdeveloped co un tr ie s nor providef o r a 3 mited re-evaluat ion of MOSCOW'S views on "colonial"developments i n - t h e g u i s e o f s c h o l a r l y cr i t i c i sm of Varga'sbook carried ou t over t h e succeeding s i x months.

tale f o r t h e new t +ck . I t d i d , however, provide a focus

' Fol low inge the September 1953 plenum of t h e c e nt r a l commit-t ee , which confirmed ghrushchev as p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y a nds e t o f f t h e o f f e n s i v e on t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l f r o n t , t h e d e c i s i o nt o s t e p up t h e foreign economic program w a s endorsed publ ic lyi n unmistakably o f f i c i a l tone s. Following up Moscow's g ra nto f one b i l l i o n rub les f o r Nor th Korean reh ab i l i t a t io n , P remis rMalenkov on 19 September c a l l e d f o r "a new approach to s o l v et h e ques t ion o f co ns t r uc t i ve and e f fec t iv e a id" t o Asian coun-t r i e s by "many s t a t e s , ' imply ing Soviet wi l l ingness t o a s s i s tt h e economic development of f r i e n d l y non-Communist Asian coun-t r i e s . Malenkov's ca ut i ous s t e p w a s followed by diplomatice f f o r t s t o spa rk mu tu al ly r e i n f o r c i n g d r i v e s f o r i n cr e as e dt r ade and f o r t h e "exchange" of t ech n ica l i n fo rmation and t r a in -ing .

Although t h e principal reason for Moscow's t rade d r i v eprobably w a s t h e need for greater imports of consumer goodse n t a i l e d i n Idalenkov's "new course" promises t o r a i se consump-t i o n l e v e l s i n t h e USSR, Moscow made a major e f f o r t t o e x pl o iti t s i n t e r e s t i n i nc re as ed t r a d e as proof of i t s good w i l l anda s a demonstrat ion of So vi et economic pro gre ss . Newly expr ess -ed des i res t o import consumer gqods were used a s a peg forf u r t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e r i d i c u l o u s n e s s of Western res t r ic -t i o n s on t r a d i n g w i t h t h e bloc. Mikoyan's 17 October announce-ment of a new program on r e t a i l trade and product ion of consum-e r goods underlined Moscow's i n t e r e s t i n inc reased impor t s .A t t h e same t i m e , Mikoyan's statement was especia l ly no tewor thyf o r t h e l e n g t h s t o which he went i n a t t em p t i ng t o j u s t i f y t h enew program--as w e l l as t o b i d f o r added i n t e r n a t i o n a l pres t ige- -by r e f e r r i n g to t h e USSR's postwar s t r i d e s i n economic recon-s t r u c t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l development. Moscow ha il ed a growingl i s t of new and rev ised t r ade agreements as proof of t h e f r u i t sof i t s new program.ment w i t h Ind ia po in ted up t h e rapid rapprochement which hadbeen de velo ping between t h e two count r ies , speeded by t h e

Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a f ive-year t rade agree-

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moderation of Moscow's Korean s t a n d fo ll ow in g t h e death ofS ta l in . The agreement, look ing toward increased exchange ofa wide range of goods, contained i n a d d i t i o n a vague clauseconcernding fu tu re Soviet t ec hni ca l a id . A t about t h i s t i m e ,Moscow;.apparently made o v e r t u r e s t o e xt en d t e c h n i c a l as s i s t -ance to Egypt and pressed s i mi l a r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Afghanistan.A handfu l of Sovie t tec hnic ians had been s en t t o Kabul t h e .prpceding A p r i l in connect ion w i t h p lann ing fo r t h e construc-t i o n of g r a in s t o ra g e f a c i l i t i e s , r e vi v in g a prewar t a c t i cwhich had l e d S t a l i n t o e n t e r i n t o c o n tr a c t s f o r t h e construc-t i o n of s e v e r a l i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b li s h me nt s i n Turkey a nd I r a nand t o l l lendl f tec hnic ians t o f r ie nd ly Afghanis tan . The an-nouncement on 21 December of t h e appointment of f i v e new deputychairmen of t h e USSR Council of Ministers--Saburov, Pervukhin,Tevosyan, Malyshev, land Kosygin--foreshadowed a broad i nc reasei n f o r e ig n as w e l l as domestic economic a c t i v i t i e s . Malenkov,i n r e p l y i ng on 31 December t o qu est ions submit ted by KingsburySmith, renewed bids f o r expanded East-West t r ade as both ameans 6f exp re ss ing and of promoting peace and i n t e r n a t i o n a lcooperat ion. m

Moscow's economic ov e rt ur e s atte mpt ed t o p l a y on loca lpopu lar and governmental concern ove r expo rt markets and t h eproblems of r a p i d economic development, accompanied by exten-s i v e propaganda e f fo r t s t o d i s c r e d i t Western economic andpo l i t i c a l i n f luence and t o exacerba te commercia l as w e l l asp o l i t i c a l f r i c t i o n between t h e l i t t l e developed Asian, Africa n,and Latin American countries and t h e major Western powers.Soviet spokesmen continued to r e j e c t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a nycompromise w i t h c a p i t a l i s t methqds of economic development andrepeated stapdard a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e i n e v it a b le f a i l u r e ofbourgeois e f f o r t s to i n d u s t r i a l i z e t h e " E a s t , I f The . f i r s ts e r i o u s p o s t - St a l i n s t u d y of t h e problems of economic growthi n t h e f o rmer c o l o n i e s appeared i n t h e November 1953 ProblemsLf Economics. The au tho r , L . F i t u n t a s p e c i a l i s t i n nonbloceconomic developments, continued Moscow's a t tacks on Western-oriented economic pol icies but veered away from past Sovietcondemnation of fore ign economic as s i s ta nce per se , concedingwi thou t e l abo ra t ing t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e ex tens ion of economica i d under proper cond it io ns ' lpromotesl ' in te rn at io na l under-s t and ing . A December review of t h e prospec t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a lt r ade i n t h e same j o u r n a l asserted t h e "great p o s s i b i l i t i e s "blo c c ou nt r i es now had of developing t rade I t w i t h a l l c a p i t a l i s tc o u n t r i e s d e s i r i n g t o do so under mutually advantageous terms,"'*peace" offensive and w i t h moves t o "aid t h e economic develop-and l inked t h e S o v i e t t r a d e d r i v e w i t h Moscow's cont inu ingment of backward c o u n t r i e s. *- 17 -

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I n r e s p on s e t o t h e need for a thoroughgoing reassessmentof Sovie t v iews on developments i n th e former ly co lo ni a l areasand t o explo re th e proces ses of economic change abroad, aspecial , ,bonferenc 'e of e c o q o m i s t s a n d o r i e n t a l i s t s of t h e Acade-my of dbiences and of t h e -p ar ty c e n t r a l committee's Academy ofSoc iaYSc iences was h e l d i n February 1954 , os t en s ib ly t o d i s -c u s s t h e theses of Varg a's Basic Problems.. . . The conf eren ceproceedings and lengthy c r i w s of t h e book i n b ot h Kommunistan 3 Problems.o,f Economics were in tended t o p resen t an up-to-date summary w[oscow's cu rr en t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such bas icproblems as t h e shor t - run p rospec t s of wor ld cap i t a l i sm andof r e l a t io ns between t h e Western powers and t h e i r p o l i t i c a land economic "dependencies I' Untenable, as undermining t h every bases of Communist evaluation of cap i t a l i s t -wor ld deve lop-ments, were Varga's ,views l tminimizing'? t h e ex te nt and t h e i m -minence of t h e +*crisis" n world capi ta l i sm. Soviet economistsseized on s igns of a gene ra l economic de cl i ne i n 1953 as prooft h a t t h e s t an d ar d t h e s i s was no t overdrawn. Re luc tan t t o g iveup a theme v i t a l t o t h e i r p r o se l y ti n g e f f o r t , they encouragedt h e expec ta t ion t h a t t h e t r o u b l e s of t h e b ig powers would l e a dt o economic disas te r i n t h e underdeveloped areas.

A t t h e same t i m e , Varga w a s c r i t i c i z e d f o r u n d er es ti ma t-i n g the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e p o s i t i o n of "young capital ism"i n t h e former c o l o n i a l areas , which w a s looked on as a favor-able development because i t increased economic and pol it c a lantagonisms wi thi n world capital ism. A concurrent review ofworld c a p i t a l i s t developments in 1953 pub lis he d i n Kommunistp r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e 1953 economic downturn would l ead t h e Westt o s t e p up i t s e f f o r t s t o balance i t s ,shaky economies by "in-t e n s i f y i n g t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of backward co un tr ie s and colon ies"--buying raw mater ia ls i n these c o u n t r i e s at lower p r i c e s ands e l l i n g them i n d u s t r i a l p r od u ct s a t m o r e exhorb i t an t p r i ces - -and foresaw o n l y f u r t h e r r e d u c ti o n s i n t h e s t andards of l i v i n gof' t h e peoples i n th e underdeveloped cou nt r ies most a f f ec te d .

Pa r ty Sec re t a ry and the or e t i c i an Pospelov 's 21 January1954 Lenin Anniversary speech--echoing h i s remarks on t h e samev u l n e r a b le p a r t of imper ia l i sm" and just i f ied opt imism amonghis l i s t e n e r s by c i t i n g the continued growth of t h e l lpopularresistance" movement throughout t h a t continent . Although Mos-cowgs a t t e n t i o n s t o t h e Arab world had increased over t h e p a s tni ne months, t h i s t o a cons ide rab le degree w a s a measure ofthe inc rea s in g tempo of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l change

occas ion t w o y e a r s e a r l i e r - - s i n g l e d o u t Asia as t h e %est c

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' there as t h e Sovie t l eaders continued t o be s u s p i c i o u s of t h er e v o l u t i o n a r y regime i n Egypt . Moscow h a i l e d Masir's s t r u g g l ef o r "immediate withdrawal" of Engl i sh forces as a n e s s e n t i a le lemen$f' in a t ta in in g "t ru e independence, " bu t attacked t h ep o l i c i e s of Egypt ' s " ru l ing ci rcles" f o r t h e i r r e p r e s s i o n ofCommunists and o t h e r l lprogress ives , ' ' f o r us ing force and meagerl a n d reform t o qu i e t peasan t un re s t , and fo r t h e i r pro-Germani g c l h a t i o n s . T h e s l i g h t a t t e n t i o n l a i d t o non-Arab Africaand Lat in America was a t a c i t admission t h a t these areas, p a r tof t h e "colonia l reserve" of imperial ism, were more o r l esse f f e c t i v e l y sealed o ff f rom Soviet inf luence.and technica l ass i s tance agreement w i t h Afghanistan s e t off anunpre cedente d propaganda campaign t o convince underdevelopedc o u n t r i e s of t h e genuineness of Sov i e t ove r t u r e s t o i n i t i a t et rade and broad economic relat ions of a mutually advantageous,a p o l i t i c a l na t u re . A t t h e 1 0 t h ECAFE meet in g i n Colombo, So-v i e t delegates again pressed Asian delegates for commercialt i e s , f o r i n i t i a t i o n of exchanges, and f o r acceptance of tech-n i c a l a s s i st a n c e. M OSCOW ~S numerous s p e c i f i c o f f e r s , p u b l i cand p r i va t e , were intended t o whet l o ca l interes t which govern-ments would f i n d themselves unable t o res i s t . In March t radeagreements were nego t i a t ed w i t h both-Egyptrrtt~@ Jsr-1. t - .

'

The co nclu sion on 28 January 1954 of a $3,500,000 c red i t

'

The incr ease i n economic over tu res w a s more than equa led .by t h e i n c r e a s e i n p o l i t i c a l and propaganda at tent ion t o Ameri-, c an e f f o r t s to form Asian count r ies in to an an ti -Sovie t coa l i -

t io n . The dec i s io n to b r i n g a rearmeg Germany i n t o t h e West-' e r n a l l i a n c e and t o extend t h e anti-Communist defe nse s t r u c t u r ethroughout A s i a posed a d i r e c t cha l lenge to Moscow's year-longe f f o r t f o r a de t en t e on i t s own terms. Moscowss p u b l i c re-a c t i o n t o rea l o r rumored negotiations between Western govern-ments and Asian s t a t e s on defense pacts and p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r ya i d re f lec ted grea t s e n s i t i v i t y o ve r these developments whichra i sed t h e prospect of t ransforming areas close t o t h e USSR'ssouthern border i n t o c e n t e r s o f p r e s s u r e on t h a t extendedf lank . The USSR's se r i es of diplomat ic demarches backed upby propaganda pyrotech nics proved in ef fe ct iv e in heading off' t h e p r o je c t e d a l l i a n c e s in t h e main, but it d i d succeed inpolar iz ing As ian and Arab government and popular sentimentaround t h i s 3ssue and making it t h e c r u c i a l t e s t of Asian andArab government re l a t i o n s with one anoth er and w i t h both Eastand West.

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I

F i r s t of a l l , Sovie t po l i t ica l countermeasures fe a t ure de f f o r t s t o draw Ind i a i n t o a s t r on gly an t i-Western , an t i -American p o s i t i o n . Moscow has always accorded India grea ti n t e r e s t and pred ict ed Iqdian developments would pla y a v i t a lr o l e i d t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t "imperialism'r i n t h e E a s t , , Thesheerrvolume of material devoted t o Ind i a i n Sov i e t pub l i ca -t i o n s o v er t h e 'years h a s been impressive. Both t h e f i r s t e d i -t ion: of t h e l*Bolshaya'* encyc loped ia, pub lish ed i n 1937, andt h e s econd e d i t i o n , pub l i shed i n 1953, gave almost 208 pagest o India,, much of it highly propagandis t i c . If developmentsf lowing out of t h e Korean war had awakened Moscow t o advan-tages o f a f r i e n d l y In d ia n n e u t r a l i t y , these views were r e i n -for ced by Indi an at t i t u d e s toward Indochina and concern l e s tt h e c o n f l i c t t he re become an even more s e n s i t i v e foc us of E a s t -West r i v a l r y and en gu lf g r e a t e r areas, p o s s i b l y a l l of Southand Southeast A s i a , i n t h e h o t w a r . Moscow's concern w a s t oencourage India and Nehru in to an ever - s t ronger s ta nd i n favo rof t h e b loc ' s "peacevc rogram. Kommunist i n F e b r u a r y 1954could now h a i l

. . . the important r o l e of modern India in t h e worldarena , t h e p o s i t i v e c o n t r ib u t i o n of t h e Indian peo-p l e i n t h e matter of peacefu l se t t l em ent of cont ro-ve r s i a l i n t e rn a t i o na l probl ems, and Ind i a ' s attemptst o conver t t h e United Nat ions into a genuine forumf o r a l l t h e peoples of t h e world.The pr i n c i pa l f ac t o r work ing fo r Soviet-Indian rapprochement,however, was t h e deep-seated an t ip at hy between Ind ia and Paki-s t a n which prompted New D e l h i ' s v i o l e n t l y a dv e rs e r e a c t i o n t ot h e gradual unfo ld ing of an impending American m i l i t a r y a i dprogram f o r Pakis tan . In a s o l i d note of approva l f o r t h ecourse of India n f or ei gn pol icy , Moscow welcomed t h e "vigi-l ance d i sp l ayed by t he Ind ian leaders i n connec ti on w i t h a t -tempts of f o r c e s of aggres s i on i n A s i a . "

The unmistakable build-up of E a s t ' - W e s t t e n s i o n a s t h e re-s u l t of developments i n bo th Western Europe and A s i a prompted .a n i n t e n s e p o I i c y debate i n t o p S o vi et c i rc l e s revolv ing a roundhow f a r Moscow cou ld go i n an t agon i z i ng t h e West. Malenkov's1 2 March 1954 "e le ct io n speech" warning t h a t atomic war mightmean t h e '*destruct on of world c i v i l i z a t o n" -- ra th er t h a n j u s tc ap i t a l i s t soc ie ty --marked t h e h i gh po i n t i n h i s e f f o r t s t oconvince h i s co l l eagues of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r an accomodationw i t h t h e West. His re t rea t t h e fol low ing month t o t h e o l d- 20 -


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. -.,

....

!

. , '. ...

f o r n u l a t i o n ref lected h i s f a i l u r e t o c a r r y t h e maj or i t y o fSovie t l eaders along w i t h him on t h i s issue--and w i t h i t t h edefeat of Walenkov's e f f o r t s t o dominate t h e r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n , *At the;$ame t i m e , Soviet propaganda re f lec ted concern t h a tpub1 c '"sta tements of Wes tern in ten t io ns i n re la t i o n to in ten-s i f i c d t i o n of t h e f i g h t i ng i n Indoch ina gave rise t o t h e pos-s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e USSR and t h e United Sta tes might be drawni q t o : a t omi c war without e i the r s i d e r e a l l y i n te n di n g i t .

Speeches by bo th Malenkov and Khrushchev a t t h e A p r i l 1954s e s s i o n of t h e Supreme Soviet t i e d b i d s f o r a r educ t i on ofi n t e rn a t i on a l t ens i on and t l coex is t ence" w i t h a s s e r t i o n s ofgrowing s t re ng th , implying no weakening of Sovie t oppos i t iont o t h e West nor any concession on i t s p a r t . Moscow's di pl a-m a t i c and propaganda support t o cou n t r i e s i nvo lved i n d i s p u t e sw i t h t h e West i n t e n s i f i e d , A t t h e United Nations, Moscowheightened i t s suppor t for Sy ria n com plai nts growing o.ut ofborder c la shes w i t h I s r a e l and over I s r a e l i p la ns t o d i v e r tJordan Biver water, making a p l a y f o r g e n e r a l Arab favor bydemanding t h a t "measures"--unspecified--be ta ke n ag ai ns t I s r ae l .A t t h e Geneva Conference, Moloto v's atte mp t t o champion "peo-p l e s s t ruggl ing for independence" was d i rec ted toward tyingWestern hands i n A s i a . I n a s s e r t i n g t h e " f u l l r i g h t of Asianpeoples to s e t t l e t h e i r a f f a i r s themselves" and ado ptin g t h e

- I

p o l i c y which would p r ot e c t re ce nt ga in s i n Indochina. Moscowus ed t h e Chou-Nehru t a l k s t o f u r t h e r t h e p i c t u r e of c l o s eInd i an co l l abora t i on w i t h t h e bJoc and ex t rac ted t h e "FiveP r i n c i p l e s of Coex istence "--the '?Panch Shi1a"--expressed i nthe preamble t o t h e Sino-Indian agreement on T i b e t s i g n e d 29A p r i l as a ch a r t e r f o r Asian-

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Caesar 27 - Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped Countries

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