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What Consumer Research Is...Author(s): Bobby J. Calder and Alice M. TyboutReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jun., 1987), pp. 136-140Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2489251 .

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What Consumer Research

Is

.

BOBBY J. CALDER

ALICE

M. TYBOUT*

esearchers

requently

have explicitly or

implicitly

posed the question:

What

is consumer

research?

(Belk

1986; Jacoby

1975; Holbrook

1987).

While a

for-

mal definition

of consumer

research

may be

of little

value, since

consumer research will ultimately

be

de-

fined by

what researchers

achieve,

there is a

need for

direction.

We begin

with the premise

that

consumer

research,

whatever

form it might

take, seeks to

produce

knowledge about

consumer

behavior.

Although

simple,

this premise points up the fact that consumer research

is

a means to

an end.

Of course consumer

research

is

about

consumers and about

behavior,

but this is hardly

limiting or even

informative.

After

all, anything can

be

construed as

the consumption

of something

and con-

sumption

must entail

some kind of behavior.

Emphasis

should

be on the

knowledge produced:

What possible

kinds of knowledge

could be

created by consumer

re-

search?

KNOWLEDGE

AND CONSUMER

RESEARCH

We suggest that

at least three broad types

of

knowl-

edge

can be produced

by consumer

research.

These may

be

labeled and briefly

described

as

follows:

Everyday

knowledge

onsistsof

the

shared houghtspeo-

ple have about

their

own consumer

behavior.

It is how

they interpret

and

give

socialmeaning

to their behavior

using

theirown terms

and their own

framesof reference.

Scientific

knowledge

onsists of theories

hat

are

capable

of and have been subjected

o rigorous

empirical

esting.

These

theories

should not

be regarded

s

proven

or

true;

rather,

hey

have scientificstatusbecause

of and

subject

to attempts o

refutethem.

Interpretive

nowledge

usesa system

of

ideas developed

by

a

particular

group

to

analyze

consumer behavior.

It

provides

an understanding

f behavior n terms of this

systemof

ideas and

from its frame

of reference.

Each of these

distinct

types

of knowledge

has

its own

approach

o consumer

research.

Each represents

a

dif-

ferent

path

leadingto different

orts

of knowledge.

Be-

fore elaborating

on

the researchmethodology

mplied

by theseknowledge

ypes, it may

be helpfulto

illustrate

each

typewith a

simple example.

Supposea

researcher

ame across

some people

who

eat

large quantities

of

dirt. These people

even sell

dirt

to one

another.

A

researcher

might

well aspireto

ev-

erydayknowledge

about

this

consumption,and

might

thus ask,

Whatdo

people hink

they

aredoing by

buying

and eating

dirt?Qualitative

researchmight

reveal

that

these people

believe

that the dirt makes

them

healthier.

They

are observed

o

say

to each other, You

are

what

you

eat, and you

must therefore

eat

basic, natural

things.

Eating

dirt

is

thus explained

in the people's

own

terms and their

own frames

of reference.

A researcher

might alternatively

aspire

to scientific

knowledge.

A physiologist

might entertain

a theory

hat

the minerals

n

the

dirt,relative

to the

people's

overall

diet,

provide

needed nutrition.

This theory

would

be

subjected

o empirical

esting

andeither

refutedor

ac-

cepted

pending

further esting.Or,

a

psychologist

might

theorizethateatingdirt reflectsa generalprincipleof,

say, cognitive

consistency.

If not

eating

dirt would

be

inconsistent

with

other

beliefs hat the

peoZle

hold,

then

they

will maintain the

belief

that dirt

is

healthy

in

the

absence

of

any apparent

vidence. Such

a

theory

could

also

be

subjected

to empirical

testing.

Note that

the

constructs

of

both theories,

mineral

balanceand

cog-

nitive

consistency,

are theoretical

and

not necessarily

accessible

to the

consumers

themselves.

Nor are

the

constructs

real.

They

are theoretical

concepts

that

are

accepted

subject

to

subsequent

refutation.

A

researcher

might

alternatively

spire

o interpretive

knowledge.

A historian

might ook

atthe

habitof eating

dirt as a

reflection

of

practices

growing

out

of food

shortagesoccurringat an earlier ime. Or a psychoan-

alyst

might nterpret

ating

dirtas an

aggressive

mpulse.

People

say you

are

what

you

eat.

But from the

his-

torian

or

psychoanalyst's

outside

view the people

eat

what hey

are. The

key is that

a paiticular

et of

ideas-

the

historian's

record

of

previous

practices

or the psy-

choanalyst's

Freudian

account

of motivation-is

used

to

provide

insight

into

the

eating

of

dirt.

This

insight

would

not ordinarily

be available

to

the participants

*BobbyJ. Calder

s A. Montgomery

Ward

Professor f Marketing

and Psychology

nd

Alice M.

Tybout s Professor

f Marketing,

oth

at J. L.

KelloggGraduate

choolof

Management,

Northwestern

Uni-

versity,

Evanston, L

60201.

136

?

JOURNAL

OF CONSUMER

RESEARCH

Vol.

14 * June 1987

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WHAT CONSUMER RESEARCH

IS ... 137

themselves; nor would it necessarily lend itself to sci-

entific empirical esting.

EVERYDAY KNOWLEDGE

IMPLIES

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

If the

researcher's oal is everydayknowledge,

then

s/he must focus on the sharedthinking of consumers.

Part of any

consumer's hinking will be idiosyncratic,

but part also

will

representa commonway of

thinking.

Consumersmust after all share a strong

reciprocityof

perspectives

or

consumption o be meaningful o them.

If

drivingaEuropean ar means high statusfor

a group,

the

individual must believe not

only that the

car indi-

cates status but that others

will

have this

perception

too.

Above

all

else, to the membersof

the group

within

which the sharedperspective exists, their

thinking is

regardedas natural.

It is not subject to question. One

simplyknowsthata car that is European shigh-status.

The knowledgethe researcherdesires is the knowl-

edge consumers

n

the

group naturally

have. It is man-

ifested n theirsocial ives-their verbal

communication

and

theirbehavior

n

daily

life. To

acquire

this knowl-

edge, the

researcher

must

be able

to participate

n the

group to the

extent of being able to share their per-

spective.Closeobservation,and ideally participantob-

servation,

s

thus the best method of

acquiring veryday

knowledgeof consumers.The researchermust

be able

to recordand

document the experienceof being

a con-

sumer (Calder1977).

We believe that

the

most

suitable term

for such

methodology

s

qualitative.

This is

not to deny

that

suchresearchmaybe quantified; ather, he term re-

flects he sort of

qualitative

knowingbeing sought.

This

may be explicatedvia a familiarproblem

n

philosophy,

the

inverted

spectrum.Suppose

hat the color

spectrum

was shifted so that everything hat now appearsredap-

peared green

and vice versa.

Although

quantitatively

this

changes nothing,

there

is still the

question

of

whetherred grass s the same as greengrass.Qualitative

methodology

deals with such

questions

of

experience.

Although qualitative

researchcan be conducted

in

different

ways,

all

qualitative

methodology,

as here

de-

fined, s distinguishedby the reflexiveuse of

data rather

than the form of the data

per

se.1As

illustrated

n

the

Figure,

n

qualitativeresearch,people'sthoughtsabout

their consumption,manifestedverbally or otherwise,

are

both the data and

the result

of

research.

FIGURE

THE ROLE OF DATA FOR DIFFERENTTYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

ABOUT CONSUMER BEHAVIOR

Qualitative

Sophisticated Critical

Methodology

Falsificationist Relativistic

Methodology Methodology

a.

Everyday

b.

Scientific

c.

Interpretive

Knowledge Knowledge

Knowledge

The type of everyday knowledge that qualitative

methodologyyields canobviouslybe useful. If

one were

selling European

cars, for example, knowing that the

cars connoted status would have many marketing

m-

plications.

It also has been suggested that scientific

theories

should be

grounded

n

everyday knowledge (e.g.,

Glaser

and Strauss 1967).

As

will be

discussed

in

the

next section, there is certainlyno reasonthat

scientific

theories cannot be stimulatedby everydayknowledge.

There is, however,real concern that everyday knowl-

edge not masquerade

as scientific knowledge. Only

needless confusion results when everyday ideas are

dressedup as higher-order

onstructsand presentedas

scientificwithout rigorousempirical esting (see

Calder

1977). Qualitative

research eads to everydayknowl-

edge, and this is

in

itself a valuablegoal.

SCIENTIFIC

KNOWLEDGE IMPLIES

SOPHISTICATED

FALSIFICATJONIST

METHODOLOGY

A

common view

of

science is that empirical

data are

used

to accumulate

evidence for

a

theory

until it is

proven.This view of science s, of course,unacceptable.

No

amountof empirical

observation

llowsus

to

induce

a

theory.

Observation tself

presupposesheory,

and

in-

ductive

proof

is

logically

impossible (see Calder,

Phil-

lips, and Tybout

1981). Followingthe majortrend

in

the

philosophy

of

science,

we must

view

scientific

knowledgeas not proven and scientificprogress

as

not

guaranteed.

The key featuresof scientificknowledge rethat there

have been

empirical attempts

to refute

a

theory and

that the

theoryhasperformed

better

han

any

available

competitors.

Refutation necessarily

comes from

em-

pirical

data. And the use of data requires

consensus

about its

interpretation.

Because the consensus about

data can

be

wrong,

it

follows that scientific

progress

s

not inevitable;

f

researchersmake mistakesabout data,

we

will

have only the

illusion of progress.Nonetheless,

because

the

process

of

testing

is

never-ending,

t

will

ideally

be self-correcting.

'The fact that qualitative

understandings sought does

not deny

issues of

reliabilityand validity.

The focus group

nterview, or in-

stance, is often used

for qualitativeconsumer research

and many

reliabilityand validity ssues arise with such

usage. Nor is the term

qualitativeresearch

ntended to

imply

a

single procedure or data

collection. ndeed,

n

addition o focusgroup

nterviews,muchsurvey

research

work allswithinqualitative

esearch s heredefined

Calder

1977;Calder1986).

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138 THE

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

The

view of science

we have

sketched implies a

methodology of

sophisticated

falsificationism (SF;

Lakatos

1970; Popper 1959).

Researchers

may make

some

effort to

protect a new

theory or to reserve

udg-

ment

because of the

possibility of erroneous

nterpre-

tationof data. Evenso, the goalof research s to expose

a

theory to

possiblerefutation

to give

alternative he-

oriesa chance.

The specific

deas of

LakatosregardingSF

are sum-

marizedby Leong

(1985). We use

the term more

gen-

erally,

as it has

come to cover

the explicit

admission

that

interpretations f data are

potentially

fallible and

that the use

of data

necessarily

entails some

consensus

among researchers.The

logic

of

science,

and the

pos-

sibility of scientific

progress,

rests on the

implicationis

of

empiricaldata for

theory.

Of

course,

there

are

many unresolved issues at

the

level ofactually

conducting

empiricalstudiesand

judg-

ing

tests of theory

(see Sternthal,

Tybout, and

Calder

1987for a relateddiscussion of such issues.) Our con-

cern

here,

however,

is that

several researchers

have

challenged

sophisticated

alsificationismas the

general

methodologyof science.

Both

Anderson

(1983; 1986) and Peter and

Olson

(

1983) have argued

hat what is

called scientific

knowl-

edge is the

product

of a

relativistic

methodology.

Ba-

sically they

contend that because

falsification

depends

on

data and consensus about

data,

which

may be

fal-

lible,

this

methodology s

untenable.

Accordingly, t is

reasoned

hat SF must

be supplanted

by a critical

rela-

tivistic view

in

which

theories are scientific

because

a

particulargroup

of

researchers

t

a

particular

point

in

time say

that they are.

Peter and Olson

go

so

far as

to viewscienceas a matterof marketing,of persuading

a

group of scientists that

a certain

conception

of

con-

sumer

behaviorshould be

acceptedby

them.

We

believe that relativism

retreats

unnecessarily o

the

position

that

scientific

knowledge

s

based

not on

empirical

esting

but on social

agreement.

Such a

view

undermines

the

concept

of

science

and rests

upon

a

clear

fallacy.

The

observation

hat consensusabout data

may be erroneousdoes not

imply

that

it is

preferable

to

avoid the

use

of

data and

instead

rely

on

consensus

per

se.

We

need not

give

up

the

primacy

of

empirical

data

n

confronting

heory

and

relegate

cientists o

the

role

of

theory peddlers.

Indeed, SF,

as

already

noted,

does

not contend that

empirical

data

will

always

lead

to scientificprogress.Researchersuse empiricaldata

with no

guarantees.But

confronting heorieswith

data

does

hold the

logical

possibility of

scientific

progress

(whereaspure consensus-driven

heory

selection

seems

unlikely to producesuch a

result).

Whether

progress

s

achieved becomes

apparent

ultimately only

with

the

application

of

theory (see Calder

et

al.

1981).

Moreover,

he

relativist's

scape

fromdatais

illusory.

This

becomes evident when

one asks:

If

relativism is

true,

then what

do

scientists

persuade

ach other

about?

Might

hey argueabout

the

usefulnessof

theory

as

Peter

and

Olson (1983,

p.

121) claim? But isn't

usefulness a

form of

empiricaldata?2And

shouldn't,

f

possible,the

primary ssue

for consensushave to

be empirical

data?

Once we

recognize that the need

for consensus

is

a

factbut

that this is only

in

the

service

of using

empirical

data, we are right back to sophisticated falsification-

ism-the logic,

once again,

being thatscientificknowl-

edgecomes from

the confrontationof

theory

with

data,

but is not

provenknowledge,

and

cannot be

guaranteed

in

advance of actual researchwork.

INTERPRETIVE KNOWLEDGE

IMPLIES

CRITICAL

RELATIVISTIC

METHODOLOGY

There s a

strong nterestamong

manyconsumer

re-

searchersn

encouraging reater

diversity

amongstudies

(Belk 1986;Holbrook

1987;Sherry

1986). It is

argued

thatdisciplinessuch as history,anthropology,popular

culture,

and literarycriticism should

all be

represented

in

consumer

research.We

believe that such

diversity

is, on the face of it,

laudable.There

may be a

tendency,

however, o seesuch

disciplinesas an

alternative o em-

pirical

science as we

have discussed

t-or to what Belk

(1986) loosely

refers o aslogical

positivism-and

about

this

we are less

sanguine.

Perhaps hedesire o

equate

nterpretive nd

scientific

knowledge stems from a belief

that

empirical science

rejects

otherdisciplines

and denies

their claim to

legit-

imacy.This is

not thecase. As

we have argued,

cientific

knowledge

implies its own

methodology. It does

not

claim

that other

methodologiesare

nherently

bad.

The

issue should be posed as: What type of knowledge do

these

disciplinesseek?

We

contend thatmuch of

the

research-from

he

dis-

ciplines that consumerresearchers re

now

discovering

aspires o

interpretive

nowledge.3

The

hallmark

of

this

research s

the applicationof a

given

conceptualization,

or

way of

viewing, to

consumer

behavior. The

appli-

cation

of this

conceptualization

may be purely logical

or

it

may

involve

empirical

data. If

it

involves

data,

however, the

relationship

between the data and the

conceptual

argument

s not

the same as with

scientific

knowledge.As illustrated

n

the

Figure,

with scientific

knowledge,dataare

being used to

subject heory

o

pos-

sible

refutation.

With

interpretive

knowledge,

he con-

ceptual argument is used to give an account of the

data-an effort is

made

to show

that

the

conceptual-

2That

hese data might

not be

optimal

for

theory esting

s a

point

furtherconfused by Olson

and Peter

(1984). For our

view of

the

differencebetweentheory testing and

application,

see Calderet al.

(1981).

3It must be recognized hat each of the

disciplines

we refer to

is

itself composedof different pproaches.

Anthropology, or instance,

certainly ncludes esearch imedat everyday nowledge

nd research

seekingscientificknowledge.

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WHAT CONSUMER RESEARCH

IS

- - -

139

ization

fits the data. Because

data may be used selec-

tively and multiple

interpretations of them may coexist,

there is

no

intention

of

comparing interpretations

in

order to choose

among them.

The interpretive

approach takes many

forms.

For ex-

ample, it has been suggested that semiotics may be used

to

interpret consumer

behavior.

This

approach

is

no-

where more evident than in Holbrook

and Grayson's

(1986) interpretation

of the consumption

behavior de-

picted by actors in the movie Out

of Africa. These be-

haviors are viewed as

symbolic of the

characters' phil-

osophical

perspectives

and

vulnerabilities.

For

example,

Karen Blixen's

attachment to her worldly

possessions

is viewed

as indicative

of

a more

pervasive desire

for

control and

ownership.

Likewise,

the

fragility

of

those

same possessions is seen as

conveying the

limits on

what

one is able to

control

in

life. This

article makes

pro-

vocative and entertaining

reading because the authors

selectively interpret

data

to make

their

points.

There

is

no pretense of searching for refuting evidence or com-

peting

explanations

for

the

same data.

The point is not that

the search

for

such

interpretive

knowledge

conflicts with

empirical science, but that it

simply implies its

own

methodology.

That

methodology

is critical

relativism.

In

employing this methodology, a

group of researchers sharing a

particular conceptual-

ization agrees that an

argument based on the concep-

tualization does indeed

give

additional

meaning

and

insight into a

particular consumer behavior. It is rec-

ognized

that this insight is

subjective and relative to a

particular

time, setting,

and

group

of

researchers.

The

process by which

researchers agree and

persuade each

other

of an

interpretation is of

primary rather than sec-

ondary importance. Empirical data do not play a self-

correcting role. Debate concerns

reasoned opinions

as

to

whether

the conceptualization

yields

new

under-

standing, and, again, this

is relative to the researchers

involved. The

immediate goal is support and

confir-

mation

of the

conceptualization. Other

conceptualiza-

tions are viewed as

providing

their

own

insight and

not

as

competitors.

Several

points

related to

interpretive

knowledge

and

critical relativistic

methodology

must be made.

First,

there

is no

reason that the

conceptualizations

of

inter-

pretative knowledge cannot be

submitted

to

sophisti-

cated falsificationist

methodology; they may,

in

fact,

be

a

good

source of

scientifically

testable

hypotheses.

But

unless such testing in fact occurs, such conceptualiza-

tions

should not be

equated

with

scientific

knowledge.

Critical relativism is not

the methodology of

scientific

knowledge. Again, however,

this does not mean that

interpretive

knowledge

is of

little

value

in

its own

right.

Next,

it

may

be

that much

work

now

purporting

to

be

scientific

is in

fact

interpretive. This

has,

for

instance,

long been a criticism of

psychoanalytic

work

(Schafer

1976).

Freudian ideas are

embraced by analysts without

a

serious

attempt

at

empirical

refutation and

are

then

used to

interpret

behavior. Such

work

is

bogus

from

the standpoint of scientific knowledge and, to the extent

that

it

masquerades

as

scientific, may

result in poorer

interpretive knowledge than avowedly relativist re-

search. The consensus

of researchers

may

result

more

from dogmatic acceptance than critical

debate

and

agreement.

Finally, the distinction between everyday knowledge

and

interpretive knowledge requires

close attention.

Consumers have everyday knowledge

but

they

need

not,

indeed typically

would

not,

have access to an interpre-

tivist's view of their world. Conversely,

when

a re-

searcher

imposes

an

interpretive

structure

on

data,

the

resulting knowledge cannot be viewed as everyday.

Thus, several anthropologists have expressed

a concern

that much of field research

may

not

yield

everyday

knowledge so much as relativistic interpretation by

a

particular group

of

anthropologists (Shweder

1986).

While both types of knowledge are valuable,

their dif-

ferences should

be

recognized

and maintained.

Thus, we concur with Holbrook's (1987) view that

the

broadening

of consumer research

to

encompass ef-

forts

aimed at interpretive knowledge

has the

potential

to enhance the ways

in

which we understand consumer

behavior. At the same time,

it

should be recognized

that the

relativist methodology

of

interpretive

knowl-

edge poses

a

considerable challenge.

In

an extreme form

it could lead to anarchy. If construed as the

anything

goes and why not call it science of a Feyerabend,

there is

little to stop researchers from

indulging in any-

thing

that

suits their fancy

in

the name

of scientific

knowledge. Expressiveness could become

the order of

the

day. Studies could be valued for their weirdness

rather than for the knowledge they yield.

Differences

in research methodology could be taken for a matter of

style and not for differences

in

the nature of knowl-

edge they produce.

As

a consequence,

the field could

lose any coherence.

Anarchy and paroxysms of self-expression

need not

be

consequences

of relativistic

methodology.

It is up to

researchers seeking interpretive knowledge to

discipline

their work within a

community

of

scholars.

Although

Anderson (1986) provides a conceptual framework for

critical

relativism, specific

criteria

for

critical relativism

as a

methodology

are

yet

to be

presented. These

are

sorely needed.

CONCLUSION

It is our

view

that

consumer research

is best under-

stood

by examining the

various

types

of

knowledge

it

can

provide about consumer

behavior. We

have iden-

tified three

types

of

knowledge: everyday, scientific,

and

interpretive.

Each can

provide insight

into consumers'

behavior,

but each is

distinct,

as

reflected

in

the

treat-

ment of

data

associated

with each

type's implied

meth-

odology. When everyday knowledge is sought, the data

are the

end,

the

goal.

When scientific

knowledge

is

sought,

the

data

are

the

means of

exposing

a

theory

to

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THE JOURNAL OF

CONSUMER RESEARCH

refutation,

of choosing

between competing

theories.

When interpretive

knowledge is

sought, the data

are

selectivelyusedto

build a persuasive

argument or

the

view

being espoused.

We contend that

each type of knowledge

has value

and may be helpfulin solving practicalproblems. But

only

scientific

knowledgerests on a

methodology

that

offers

he

possibilityof scientific

progress.

t

is

important

to

recognizethat

unless subjectedto the rules

of

em-

pirical science,

everyday and

interpretive knowledge

must standapart rom

science, each on its

own merits.

[Received

February

1987.]

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