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Aerodrome Manual Cambridge International Airport Aerodrome Manual Edition 14 ver 0.3 - Issued Jan 2017 Page: A1 of 159 This Document is Uncontrolled if Printed or Downloaded Cambridge International Airport Aerodrome Manual
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Page 1: Cambridge Web viewThe composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard in the worst ... Safety Cell MADG Head of ... criteria and the effects of

Aerodrome Manual

Cambridge International Airport Aerodrome Manual

Edition 14 Ver 0.3

Issued Jan 2017

Document Owner: Airside Assurance Manager

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Cambridge International Airport Aerodrome Manual

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Aerodrome Manual

Document Layout

Part A – General

Part B – Aerodrome Management System

Part C – Aerodrome Site Description

Part D – Aerodrome Information Reported to the Aeronautical Information Service

Part E – Aerodrome Operational Policies and Procedures

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Aerodrome Manual

ContentsPART A: GENERAL..................................................................................................................................9

1. List of Effective Pages..................................................................................................................10

2. Manual Administration................................................................................................................11

2.1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................11

2.2. Glossary...............................................................................................................................12

2.3. Abbreviations.......................................................................................................................16

3. Manual Amendment and Revision...............................................................................................19

3.1. Record of Amendments.......................................................................................................19

3.2. Document Amendments......................................................................................................19

3.3. Manual Distribution.............................................................................................................20

4. General Information....................................................................................................................20

4.1. Purpose and Scope of the Manual.......................................................................................20

4.2. Legal Requirements.............................................................................................................20

4.3. Aerodrome Conditions of Use..............................................................................................21

PART B: AERODROME MANAGEMENT SYSTEM...................................................................................22

1. Aerodrome Management System................................................................................................23

1.1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................23

2. Safety Policy and Organisation....................................................................................................26

2.1. Management Commitment and Responsibility...................................................................26

2.1.1. Safety Policy.....................................................................................................................26

2.2. Safety Accountabilities.........................................................................................................27

2.2.1. Management Structure....................................................................................................27

2.2.1.1. Key Post Holders..........................................................................................................27

2.2.1.2. Deputising for Absence................................................................................................27

2.2.1.3. Deputising Outside of Normal Working Hours.............................................................27

2.2.1.4. Unforeseen Circumstances..........................................................................................28

2.2.1.5. Staff Long-term Absence..............................................................................................28

2.2.1.6. Exceptional Circumstances..........................................................................................28

2.2.2. Organisation Chart...........................................................................................................29

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2.2.3. Safety Accountabilities and Responsibilities....................................................................30

2.2.3.1. Airport General Manager.............................................................................................30

2.2.3.2. Airside Assurance Manager.........................................................................................31

2.2.3.3. Airside Operations Manager........................................................................................32

2.2.3.4. Manager Air Traffic Services........................................................................................33

2.2.3.5. Senior Airport Fire Officer............................................................................................34

2.2.3.6. Aviation Security and Compliance Manager................................................................35

2.2.3.7. Airport Duty Managers................................................................................................36

2.2.3.8. All Cambridge Airport Personnel..................................................................................37

2.3. Safety Governance...............................................................................................................38

2.3.1. Purpose............................................................................................................................38

2.3.2. Scope...............................................................................................................................38

2.3.3. Responsibilities................................................................................................................38

2.3.4. Terms of Reference..........................................................................................................39

2.3.4.1. Airport Safety Committee (ASC)...................................................................................40

2.3.4.2. Employee Safety Forum (ESF)......................................................................................42

2.3.4.3. Emergency Planning Group (EPG)................................................................................44

2.3.4.4. Manoeuvring Area Safety Team (MAST)......................................................................46

2.4. Emergency Response Planning............................................................................................50

2.5. Document Control...............................................................................................................51

2.5.1. Purpose............................................................................................................................51

2.5.2. Scope...............................................................................................................................51

2.5.3. Responsibilities................................................................................................................52

2.5.4. Applicability.....................................................................................................................52

2.5.5. Document Structure........................................................................................................52

2.5.6. Process.............................................................................................................................52

2.5.7. Document creation and Approval....................................................................................54

2.5.8. Format.............................................................................................................................54

2.5.9. Controlling Information...................................................................................................54

2.5.10. Review.............................................................................................................................54

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2.5.11. Storage.............................................................................................................................55

2.5.12. Document Control Register..............................................................................................55

2.5.13. Numbering and Version Control......................................................................................55

2.5.14. Obsolete Documents.......................................................................................................55

2.5.15. Communications..............................................................................................................56

3. Safety Risk Management.............................................................................................................57

3.1. Hazard Identification............................................................................................................57

3.2. Hazard Reporting.................................................................................................................58

3.2.1. Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) – EASA Regulatory Requirement....................58

3.2.2. Internal Safety Reporting – MADG ‘Safety Report’ system..............................................60

3.3. Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation................................................................................61

3.3.1. Circumstances for Risk Assessment.................................................................................61

3.3.2. Risk Assessment Process..................................................................................................62

3.4. Level of Safety Risk..............................................................................................................63

3.4.1. Safety Risk Probability......................................................................................................63

3.4.2. Safety Risk Severity..........................................................................................................64

3.4.3. Safety Risk Tolerability.....................................................................................................65

3.4.4. Escalation.........................................................................................................................66

3.4.5. Unforeseen Circumstances - Dynamic Risk Assessment..................................................66

3.4.6. Safety Risk Review...........................................................................................................66

3.4.7. Risk Assessment Competence..........................................................................................66

3.5. Human Factors.....................................................................................................................68

3.6. Safety Culture......................................................................................................................70

3.7. Internal Safety Investigation................................................................................................70

4. Safety Assurance..........................................................................................................................71

4.1. Safety Performance Monitoring..........................................................................................71

4.1.1. Key Safety Performance Indicators..................................................................................71

4.2. Management of Change......................................................................................................73

4.3. Audits...................................................................................................................................75

4.4. Alcohol and Other Drugs......................................................................................................76

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4.5. Contracted Activities............................................................................................................76

5. Safety Promotion.........................................................................................................................76

5.1. Safety Communications.......................................................................................................76

5.2. Training and Education........................................................................................................77

6. Facilities and Equipment Requirements......................................................................................78

7. Record Keeping............................................................................................................................78

8. Air Navigation Order Article 257..................................................................................................78

PART C: AERODROME SITE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................79

1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................80

2. Aerodrome Local Area Plan.........................................................................................................80

3. Aerodrome Boundary Maps........................................................................................................81

4. Aerodrome Chart.........................................................................................................................83

5. Airfield Map.................................................................................................................................84

6. Aerodrome Physical Characteristics............................................................................................84

8.1. Aerodrome Location, Elevation and Reference Temperature..............................................84

8.2. Aerodrome Pavement Classification Strength.....................................................................84

8.3. INS Checkpoints...................................................................................................................84

8.4. Visual & Non-Visual Aids......................................................................................................84

8.4.1. Visual Aids........................................................................................................................84

8.4.1.1. General........................................................................................................................84

8.4.1.2. Signals..........................................................................................................................84

8.4.1.3. Surface Markings.........................................................................................................85

8.4.1.4. Signs.............................................................................................................................85

8.4.1.5. Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL).............................................................................85

8.4.1.6. Approach, Runway, Taxiway and Apron Lighting.........................................................85

8.4.1.7. Obstruction Lighting.....................................................................................................85

8.4.1.8. Non Standard Taxiway / Apron Local Markings...........................................................85

8.4.1.9. Uncontrolled Pedestrian Taxiway Crossing Points.......................................................86

8.4.2. Non-Visual Aids................................................................................................................86

8.5. Obstacles.............................................................................................................................86

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7. Rescue Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) Level of Protection...............................................................86

8. Aerodrome Operations................................................................................................................86

PART D: AERODROME INFORMATION REPORTED TO THE AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICE..87

1. Name and Address.......................................................................................................................88

1.1. Aerodrome Name and Address............................................................................................88

2. Aerodrome Location....................................................................................................................88

3. Aerodrome Elevation...................................................................................................................88

4. Aerodrome Beacon......................................................................................................................89

5. Aerodrome Dimensions...............................................................................................................89

5.1. Runways...............................................................................................................................89

5.2. Length, Width and Surface Type of Strip.............................................................................89

5.3. Runway End Safety Area......................................................................................................90

5.4. Stopways..............................................................................................................................90

5.5. Taxiways..............................................................................................................................90

5.6. Aprons.................................................................................................................................91

6. Approach Procedures Visual Aids................................................................................................91

6.1. Approach and Runway Lighting...........................................................................................91

6.2. Marking and Lighting of Taxiways........................................................................................91

6.3. Marking and Lighting of Aprons...........................................................................................92

6.4. Lighting Standby Power Availability.....................................................................................92

6.5. VOR Checkpoints.................................................................................................................92

6.6. Standard Taxi Routes...........................................................................................................92

6.7. Obstacles (Current list published via UK AIP and NOTAM)..................................................93

6.8. Altimeter Pre-Flight Check Locations...................................................................................93

6.9. Disabled Aircraft Removal....................................................................................................94

6.10. Rescue and Fire Fighting..................................................................................................94

6.11. Aerodrome Derogations..................................................................................................94

PART E: AERODROME OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES............................................................................95

Introduction.........................................................................................................................................96

AOP 01. Airside Security......................................................................................................................96

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AOP 02. Control of Vehicles Airside.....................................................................................................96

AOP 03. Control of Airside Works........................................................................................................97

AOP 04. Aerodrome Maintenance.......................................................................................................98

AOP 05. Aerodrome Inspection and Reporting....................................................................................98

AOP 06. Apron Management.............................................................................................................100

AOP 07. Aviation Fuel Management..................................................................................................101

AOP 08. Engine Ground Runs and Compass Calibrations..................................................................102

AOP 09. Night Operations..................................................................................................................103

AOP 10. Operations of Aircraft with a Higher Code...........................................................................103

AOP 11. Integration of Unusual Aviation Activities............................................................................104

AOP 12. Low Visibility Operations.....................................................................................................104

AOP 13. Adverse Weather Operations..............................................................................................104

AOP 14. Winter Operations and Snow Plan.......................................................................................105

AOP 15. Airside Safety Management.................................................................................................106

AOP 16. Safety Incident Reporting and Investigation........................................................................107

AOP 17. Aeronautical Information Notification Process and Aerodrome Survey..............................108

AOP 18. Aerodrome Safeguarding.....................................................................................................108

AOP 19. Wildlife Hazard Management..............................................................................................109

AOP 20. Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS).............................................................................110

AOP 21. Calculating Reduced Runway Declared Distances................................................................110

AOP 22. Removal of Disabled Aircraft...............................................................................................110

AOP 23. Aircraft Noise Abatement....................................................................................................111

AOP 24. Detention of Aircraft............................................................................................................111

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Aerodrome ManualPart A: General

PART A: GENERAL

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Aerodrome ManualPart A: General

1. List of Effective Pages

Page Insertion Date

Effective Date

Page Insertion Date

Effective Date

Page Insertion Date

Effective Date

A-1 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-43 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-85 01.08.16 01.08.16A-2 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-44 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-86 01.08.16 01.08.16A-3 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-45 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-87 01.08.16 01.08.16A-4 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-46 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-88 01.08.16 01.08.16A-5 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-47 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-89 01.08.16 01.08.16A-6 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-48 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-90 01.08.16 01.08.16A-7 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-49 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-91 01.08.16 01.08.16A-8 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-50 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-92 01.08.16 01.08.16A-9 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-51 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-93 01.08.16 01.08.16

A-10 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-52 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-94 01.08.16 01.08.16A-11 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-53 01.08.16 01.08.16 D-95 01.08.16 01.08.16A-12 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-54 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-96 01.08.16 01.08.16A-13 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-55 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-97 01.08.16 01.08.16A-14 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-56 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-98 01.08.16 01.08.16A-15 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-57 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-99 01.08.16 01.08.16A-16 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-58 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-100 01.08.16 01.08.16A-17 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-59 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-101 01.08.16 01.08.16A-18 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-60 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-102 01.08.16 01.08.16A-19 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-61 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-103 01.08.16 01.08.16A-20 31.01.17 31.01.17 B-62 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-104 01.08.16 01.08.16A-21 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-63 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-105 01.08.16 01.08.16A-22 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-64 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-106 01.08.16 01.08.16B-23 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-65 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-107 01.08.16 01.08.16B-24 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-66 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-108 01.08.16 01.08.16B-25 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-67 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-109 01.08.16 01.08.16B-26 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-68 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-110 01.08.16 01.08.16B-27 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-69 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-111 01.08.16 01.08.16B-28 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-70 01.08.16 01.08.16 E-112 01.08.16 01.08.16B-29 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-71 01.08.16 01.08.16B-30 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-72 01.08.16 01.08.16B-31 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-73 01.08.16 01.08.16B-32 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-74 01.08.16 01.08.16B-33 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-75 01.08.16 01.08.16B-34 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-76 01.08.16 01.08.16B-35 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-77 01.08.16 01.08.16B-36 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-78 01.08.16 01.08.16B-37 01.08.16 01.08.16 B-79 31.01.17 31.01.17B-38 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-80 01.08.16 01.08.16B-39 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-81 01.08.16 01.08.16B-40 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-82 01.08.16 01.08.16B-41 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-83 01.08.16 01.08.16B-42 01.08.16 01.08.16 C-84 01.08.16 01.08.16

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2. Manual Administration

2.1.IntroductionThe Cambridge Airport Aerodrome Manual describes clearly and concisely the systemic approach to the operational use of the aerodrome. It demonstrates our commitment to managing the aerodrome safely and effectively and as such, the manual forms part of the Safety Management documentation.

This manual reflects the certification basis and as such the contents complies with all applicable requirements and with the terms of the certificate. The manual encompasses information for the safe use, operation and maintenance of the aerodrome, its equipment, as well safeguarded obstacle and surface limitation protection.

In order to achieve the above aims the manual will contain:

Instructions from the aerodrome licensee to aerodrome operational staff.

Details of persons responsible for safety management and their safety accountabilities and responsibilities.

A record of the physical characteristics of the aerodrome and any agreements reached with the regulator on deviations from the applicable standards.

Identification of the Operating Policies and Procedures in use at the aerodrome that are to be complied with by airport staff, stakeholders and users.

The Aerodrome Manual is distributed to all airport departments, as well as 3rd party and external stakeholders that have a role in the safe operation of the aerodrome. The holder is responsible for ensuring the manual readily available for immediate reference, amended to date and for ensuring that all members of their department/ organisation are familiar with its content.

Nathan DeverellAirport General Manager

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2.2.GlossaryAccelerate–Stop Distance Available (ASDA): The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aeroplane can commence its take-off run to the nearest point in the direction of take-off at which the aeroplane cannot roll over the surface of the aerodrome and be brought to rest in an emergency without the risk of accident.

Accident: An unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.

Aerodrome: A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure or surface movement of aircraft.

Aerodrome beacon: An aeronautical beacon used to indicate the location of an aerodrome from the air.

Aerodrome elevation: The elevation of the highest point of the landing area. This is the highest point of that part of the runway used for both landing and take-off. See also ‘Landing Area’.

Aerodrome Reference Point (ARP): The aerodrome reference point is the geographical location of the aerodrome and the centre of its traffic zone where an ATZ is established.

Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ): The airspace specified in Article 258 of the ANO 2009 as being airspace in the vicinity of an aerodrome notified for the purposes of Rule 45 of the Rules of the Air Regulations.

Aeronautical ground light: Any light specifically provided as an aid to air navigation other than a light displayed on an aircraft including lights specifically provided at an aerodrome as an aid to the movement and control of aircraft and of those vehicles which operate on the movement area.

Apron: A defined area on a land aerodrome provided for the stationing of aircraft for the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, the loading and unloading of cargo, fuelling, and for parking.

Analysis: The process of identifying a question or issue to be addressed, modelling the issue, investigating model results, interpreting the results and possibly making a recommendation. Analysis typically involves using scientific or mathematical methods for evaluation.

Cleared and Graded Area (CGA): That part of the Runway Strip cleared of all obstacles except for minor specified items and graded, intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the runway.

Critical area: An area of defined dimensions extending about the ground antennae of a precision instrument approach equipment within which the presence of vehicles or aircraft will cause unacceptable disturbance of the guidance signals.

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Declared distances: The distances declared by the aerodrome authority for the purpose of application of the requirement of the Air Navigation (General) Regulations in respect of aeroplanes flying for the purpose of public transport.

Hazard: Any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to an accident or incident.

Hotspot: A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary.

Incident: A near-miss episode with minor consequences that could have resulted in greater loss. An unplanned event that could have resulted in an accident, or did result in minor damage, and indicates the existence of, though may not define a hazard or hazardous condition.

Instrument runway: A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using non-visual aids providing at least directional guidance in azimuth adequate for a straight-in approach.

Intermediate holding position: A designated position intended for traffic control at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop and hold until further cleared to proceed, when so instructed by the aerodrome control tower.

Landing area: That part of a movement area intended for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

Landing Distance Available (LDA): The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome above which the aeroplane can commence its landing, having regard to the obstructions in its approach path, to the nearest point in the direction of landing at which the surface of the aerodrome is incapable of bearing the weight of the aeroplane under normal operating conditions or at which there is an obstacle capable of affecting the safety of the aeroplane.

Likelihood: The estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative or qualitative terms, of an occurrence related to the hazard.

Manoeuvring area1: That part of an aerodrome provided for the take-off and landing of aircraft and for the movement of aircraft on the surface, excluding the apron and any part of the aerodrome provided for the maintenance of aircraft.

Movement area1: That part of an aerodrome intended for the surface movement of aircraft including the manoeuvring area, aprons and any part of the aerodrome provided for the maintenance of aircraft.Nonconformity: Non-fulfilment of a requirement. This includes, but is not limited to, noncompliance with CAA regulations. It also includes company requirements, requirements of operator-developed risk controls, or operator-specified policies and procedures.

1 Manoeuvring Area and Movement Area are generic terms intended to describe the ‘airside’ part of an aerodrome, rather than just those pavements or surfaces on which aircraft movements take place.

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Non-instrument runway: A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures or an instrument approach procedure to a point beyond which the approach may continue in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

Non-precision approach runway: A runway served by visual aids and a non-visual aid(s) intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operation Type A and a visibility not less than 1000 m.

Obstacle: All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft or that extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight, or that stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.

Obstacle free zone: A volume of airspace extending upwards and outwards from an inner portion of the Runway Strip to specified upper limits which is kept clear of all obstructions except for minor specified items required for air navigation purposes, of low mass and of a frangible mount.

Precision approach runway: A runway intended for the operation of aircraft using precision instrument approach aids that meet the Facility Performance requirements defined in ICAO annex 10 appropriate to the Category of Operations. These runways are divided into three categories; Cambridge International Airport has a Category I (cat 1) operation - a runway served by visual aids and non-visual aid(s) intended for landing operations following an instrument approach operation with a decision height (DH) not lower than 60 m (200 ft) and either a visibility not less than 800 m or a runway visual range not less than 550 m.

Residual safety risk: The remaining safety risk that exists after all control techniques have been implemented or exhausted and all controls have been verified. Only verified controls can be used for the assessment of residual safety risk.

Risk: The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard in the worst credible system state.

Risk control: Refers to steps taken to eliminate hazards or mitigate their effects by reducing severity and/or likelihood of risk associated with those hazards.

Runway: A defined rectangular area, on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off run of aircraft along its length.

Runway end safety area (RESA): An area symmetrical about the extended runway centreline and adjacent to the end of the strip primarily intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aeroplane undershooting or overrunning the runway.

Runway holding position: A designated position intended to protect a runway, an obstacle limitation surface, or an ILS/MLS critical/sensitive area at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop and hold, unless otherwise authorised by the aerodrome control tower.

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Runway incursion: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

Runway strip: An area of specified dimensions enclosing a runway intended to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the runway and to protect aircraft flying over it when taking off or landing.

Runway threshold: The beginning of that portion of the runway usable for landing.

Safety: Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management.

Safety assurance: SMS process management functions that systematically provide confidence that organizational products/services meet or exceed safety requirements.

Safety culture: The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, the organization’s management of safety. Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.

Safety Management System (SMS): A systematic approach to managing safety including the necessary organisational structure, accountabilities, policies and procedures.

Safety risk: The composite of predicted severity (how bad) and likelihood (how probable) of the potential effect of a hazard in its worst credible (reasonable or believable) system state. The terms safety risk and risk are interchangeable.

Safety risk control: A characteristic of a system that reduces or mitigates (lessens) the potential undesirable effects of a hazard. Controls may include process design, equipment modification, work procedures, training or protective devices. Safety risk controls must be written in requirements language, measurable, and monitored to ensure effectiveness.

Sensitive area: An area extending beyond the Critical Area where the parking and/or movement of aircraft or vehicles will affect the guidance signal to the extent that it may be rendered unacceptable to aircraft using the signal.

Severity: The consequence or impact of a hazard in terms of degree of loss or harm.

Shoulder: An area adjacent to the edge of a paved surface so prepared as to provide a transition between the pavement and the adjacent surface for aircraft running off the pavement.

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Stopway: A defined rectangular area beyond the end of the TORA, suitably prepared and designated as an area in which an aeroplane can be safely brought to a stop in the event of an abandoned take-off.

Take-off Distance Available (TODA): Either the distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aeroplane can commence its take-off run to the nearest obstacle in the direction of take-off projecting above the surface of the aerodrome and capable of affecting the safety of the aeroplane, or one and one half times the take-off run available, whichever is the less.

Take-off Run Available (TORA): The distance from the point on the surface of the aerodrome at which the aeroplane can commence its take-off run to the nearest point in the direction of take-off at which the surface of the aerodrome is incapable of bearing the weight of the aeroplane under normal operating conditions.

Taxiway: A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of aircraft and intended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including:

Taxiway strip: An area of specified dimension enclosing a taxiway and intended to protect aircraft operating on the taxiway and to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft running off the taxiway.

Taxiway holding position: A designated position at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles may be required to hold in order to provide adequate clearance from a runway or another taxiway.

Taxiway intersection: A junction of two or more taxiways.

Threshold: The beginning of that portion of the runway available for landing.

2.3.AbbreviationsAAIB Air Accident Investigation BranchACN Aircraft Classification NumberADM Airside Duty ManagerAFS Airport Fire ServiceAGL Aeronautical Ground LightingAIS Aeronautical Information ServiceALARP As Low As Reasonably PracticableALoS Acceptable Level of SafetyAltMC Alternative Means of ComplianceAMC Acceptable Means of ComplianceAOA Airport Operators AssociationAOP Airside Operations Procedure (Airport)AOR Airside Occurrence ReportASB Airside Safety BulletinASD Aerodrome Standards Division (CAA)ASDA Accelerate Stop Distance AvailableATC Air Traffic ControlATCO Air Traffic Control OfficerATS Air Traffic Service

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ATZ Aerodrome Traffic ZoneATSA Air Traffic Services AssistantAWI Airside Works InstructionCAA Civil Aviation AuthorityCAP Civil Aviation PublicationCIA Cambridge International AirportCP Critical PartCS Conical SurfaceDME Distance Measuring EquipmentDRDF Digital Read out Direction FinderEASA European Aviation Safety AgencyEPM Emergency Planning ManagerERB Engine Running BayFOD Foreign Object Debris / Foreign Object DamageGA General AviationHAZOP Hazard and Operations analysisH24 24 hours a day, every day.ICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationIFR Instrument Flight RulesHIS Inner Horizontal SurfaceILS Instrument Landing SystemIRVR Instrumented Runway Visual RangeKSPI Key Safety Performance IndicatorLDA Landing Distance AvailableLPA Local Planning AuthorityLSA Localiser Sensitive AreaLVP Low Visibility ProceduresMATS Manager Air Traffic ServicesMATS Manual of Air Traffic ServicesMOR Mandatory Occurrence ReportMT Motor TransportNOTAM Notice to AirmenOFZ Obstacle Free ZoneOHS Outer Horizontal SurfaceOLS Obstacle Limitation Surface(s)PAPI Precision Approach Path IndicatorPCN Pavement Classification NumberPCV Passenger Carrying VehiclePPE Personal Protective EquipmentPPR Prior Permission RequiredPSZ Public Safety ZoneRESA Runway End Safety AreaRFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting ServicesRIV Rapid Intervention VehicleRPE Respiratory Protective EquipmentRTF Radio Telephony

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RVP Rendezvous pointSAI Standing Airside Instruction (Airport)SI Supplementary Instruction (ATC)SIP Safety Improvement PlanSMS Safety Management SystemSNOWTAM Snow State Message to AirmenSRG Safety Regulation Group (CAA)SSC Safety Severity CategorisationSSR Secondary Surveillance RadarTAI Temporary Airside Instruction (Airport)TAP Taxiway Access PointTDZ Touch Down ZoneTOCS Take-Off Climb SurfaceTODA Take Off Distance AvailableTOI Temporary Operating Instruction (ATC)TORA Take Off Run AvailableTS Transitional SurfaceUK AIP UK Aeronautical Information PublicationULD Unit Load DeviceVCR Visual Control RoomVFR Visual Flight RulesVOR VHF Omni Directional Radio RangeWIP Work-In-Progress (Airside works areas or activities)

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3. Manual Amendment and Revision

3.1.Record of AmendmentsManual Edition

Effective Date Amendment Summary Affected Page Numbers

14 V0.2 1st of August 2016 Change to Manual to EASA format All14 V0.3

31st of January 2017

Removal of reference to CAA Aerodrome Licence

A20

ANO 257 Article Change B79

3.2.Document AmendmentsThis is a controlled document; as such any amendments or revisions may only be incorporated by the following

Airside Assurance Manager Airside Operations Manager

The manual will be reviewed annually and will be deemed current for one year from publication date. To ensure out of date documentation is not retained, the month and year of publication will be included at the foot of each page. Once amended, the final sign off for issue of the Aerodrome Manual will be by the Airport General Manager.

Handwritten amendments of this manual are strictly prohibited.

Any amendments incorporated in a revised edition of the manual will be highlighted by a vertical bar in the page border opposite the changed text.

Airside Operational Procedures (AOP)Detailed permanent operational procedures, held as individual Airside Operational Procedures (AOP), which form part of this manual and are listed in Part E - Operating Policies and Procedures.

Airside Supplementary Instructions (ASI)Any safety critical or procedural amendments to this manual outside the annual review period will be made by way of an Airside Supplementary Instruction (ASI). The contents of an ASI will supersede that of the Aerodrome Manual. ASIs will be incorporated into the main body of the manual at the annual review.

Temporary Airside Instructions (TAI)Temporary changes or additions to the Aerodrome Manual will be made by way of a Temporary Airside Instruction (TAI). The contents of a TAI will supersede that of the Aerodrome Manual for the

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period that the TAI is in force.

Emergency PlanDue to the sensitive nature of the Emergency Plan this part of this document will only be obtainable through the Cambridge Airport Emergency Planning Officer. The Emergency Planning Officer will ensure all relevant parties have a pdf copy of the Cambridge Airport Emergency Plan distributed to them.

3.3.Manual DistributionTo ensure the manual is available for all airside staff, stakeholders and airport users it will be viewable on the Cambridge Airport website at www.cambridgeairport.com where it may be downloaded as a pdf file.

Notification of a Airport Operating Procedures, Airside Supplementary Instructions and Temporary Airside Instructions will be through email to airport staff, stakeholders and airport users via the Cambridge Airport Intranet and Website and via email distribution. A full distribution list for the Aerodrome Manual and its amendments and revisions is detailed in the relevant Airport Operating Procedure (AOP).

4. General Information

4.1.Purpose and Scope of the ManualThe Aerodrome Manual details the policies, procedures, instructions and characteristics that ensure safe operations at Cambridge International Airport in accordance with this Aerodrome Certificate.

4.2.Legal RequirementsThe Aerodrome Certificate, issued by UK CAA under EU Regulation 139/2014, provides for Public Transport use of the Aerodrome.

The Airport General Manager is responsible for ensuring that Cambridge Airport complies with the conditions of the Aerodrome Certificate.

As the certificate holder Cambridge International Airport is responsible for the safe operation of the airside areas and local airspace. The CAA devolves upon the certificate holder a share of the responsibility for monitoring the safety of operations. This is achieved through the establishment of a management system by Cambridge International Airport; this is contained in the Aerodrome Manual Part B - Aerodrome Management System.

Mandatory Notification of Changes to the Aerodrome CertificateIn order to maintain the Aerodrome certification the CAA must be informed of any proposed changes listed under ADR.OR.B040.

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CAA AccessA CAA Inspector2 will assess the aerodrome’s compliance with the applicable requirements, including the effectiveness of its management system, through a series of audits.

All airport personnel and airside users are requested to afford the CAA Inspectors any assistance they require in order to conduct their legal duties.

Non-compliance Corrective Action PlanA corrective action plan will be established through the audit actions tracking Q-Pulse system to address the outcomes of any non-compliance issues identified as a result of an audit.

Competent Authority (CAA) Safety DirectivesAny Safety Directives issued by the CAA will be impact assessed by the department managers and an action plan raised to ensure a timely implementation of the change.

Where necessary an immediate containment mitigation action may be required to ensure a safe operation is maintained while a longer term action plan is put in place.

Any actions taken will be recorded at the Airport Safety Committee Meeting.

4.3. Aerodrome Conditions of UseThe Aerodrome conditions of use are as set out in the Cambridge International Airport Terms and Conditions available at www.cambridgeairport.com.

2 A CAA inspector is considered to be any person to whom the CAA has formally assigned tasks related to the safety oversight of Aerodromes and Air Traffic Services.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management System

PART B: AERODROME MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

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1. Aerodrome Management System

1.1. IntroductionSafety is an integral part of how Cambridge Airport conducts business. The Safety Management System (SMS) ensures that this is carried out in a formalised and structured way.

ICAO Annex 19 defines safety management as:

A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.

Integration of Risk AreasIn order to ensure a robust and safe operation at Cambridge Airport the Airport requires the integration of different management systems. Whilst these operate to different regulatory requirements they all contribute to the complete operational structure. These management systems are:

Operational Safety (Aircraft) - SMS

Occupational Health and Safety (People) -

OHSMS

Quality - QMS

Environmental - EMS

Security - SecMS

Financial (Business Risk) - BMS

The risk interaction within these systems is a crucial part of the daily operation, any single failure in one or all of these systems could have a direct result upon the business risk at the airport. However this document and the SMS contained within it focuses only on Operational Safety within the Airport.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemSMS ApplicabilityPart B of the Aerodrome Manual describes the policies and processes employed to ensure a robust system to manage the safety of aircraft operations at Cambridge Airport. These processes will be applied by all employees at the airport.

The operational departments that fall under the airport SMS are: Air Traffic Services

o Air Traffic Controlo Air Traffic Engineering

Airport Fire Serviceo RFFSo Ramp Serviceso Wildlife Hazard Management

Airport Operationso Aircraft Fuel Services

Scope of the SMSThe Aerodrome Manual and the SMS contained within forms the top tier of the management of safety at the airport. It demonstrates the principles for the management of safety that are fully supported from the Accountable Manager down through all levels throughout the airport. The SMS doctrine that it identifies ensures that all procedures and actions are robust and maintain a safe environment for staff and visitors alike.

The Cambridge Airport document hierarchy is as demonstrated below:

Aerodrome Procedures and InstructionsTo ensure all airside users are fully aware of the regulations relating to the safe operations at the airport the procedures and instructions relating the airside areas will be contained in the following:

Airside Operational Procedure (AOP): Detailed permanent operational procedures, held as individual Airside Operational Procedures (AOP), which form part of this manual and are listed in

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AFS Local Operating

Instructions

MATS Part 2 & Local

Operating Instructions

Aircraft Fuel Operating

Procedures

Airside Operations Operating

Instructions

Wildlife Hazard Management

Aerodrome Manual &

Emergency Plan

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemPart E - Operating Policies and Procedures.

Airside Supplementary Instruction (ASI): Any safety critical or procedural amendments to this manual outside the annual review period will be made by way of an Airside Supplementary Instruction (ASI). The contents of an ASI will supersede that of the Aerodrome Manual. ASIs will be incorporated into the main body of the manual at the annual review.

Temporary Airside Instruction (TAI): Temporary changes or additions to the Aerodrome Manual will be made by way of a Temporary Airside Instruction (TAI). The contents of a TAI will supersede that of the Aerodrome Manual for the period that the TAI is in force.

Airside Information Notice (AIN): Any issues requiring an additional focus will be notified via an Airside Information Notice (AIN).

Airside Works Instruction (AWI): Airside works will be notified to all relevant stakeholders via an Airside Works Instruction. These will also serve as an Airside Works Permit.

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2. Safety Policy and Organisation

2.1. Management Commitment and Responsibility

2.1.1. Safety Policy

Safety is a prime consideration at all times within Cambridge Airport; it is afforded the highest priority over all other areas.

The Airport General Manager and all members of senior management are committed to developing, implementing, maintaining and constantly improving strategies and processes to ensure that all our aviation activities take place under an appropriate allocation of resources and training to manage safety effectively.

Our commitment is to: • Encourage all our staff and stakeholders to report safety events or potential hazards

however insignificant they may consider them at the time• Ensure that safety events are investigated, causal and contributory factors are identified,

mitigation action is taken and lessons learned are appropriately disseminated• Ensure that aerodrome safety is correctly prioritised when considered with commercial,

operational and environmental concerns • Ensure the management of safety is a primary responsibility of all managers and employees• Operate an effective safety management system and ensure continuous improvement• Clearly define for all staff their accountabilities and responsibilities for the delivery of airfield

safety performance• Operate a hazard identification and risk management processes to ensure the safety risks

are reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) • Promote a ‘Just Culture’ that ensures that no action will be taken against any employee who

discloses a safety concern, through the hazard reporting system, unless such disclosure indicates gross negligence or a deliberate or wilful disregard of regulations or procedures

• Comply with and, wherever possible, exceed, legislative and regulatory requirements and standards

• Ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement our safety policies and activities• Ensure that all our staff are provided with adequate and appropriate training, are competent

in safety matters, and are allocated only tasks commensurate with their skills• Ensure appropriate safety information is provided to all airside users and employees• Establish and measure our safety performance against realistic safety performance

indicators and safety performance targets • Ensure externally supplied systems and services to support our operations are delivered

meeting appropriate safety standards

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemNathan Deverell - Airport General Manager / Accountable Manager

2.2. Safety Accountabilities

2.2.1. Management Structure

2.2.1.1. Key Post HoldersAirport General Manager (Accountable Manager) Nathan Deverell

Airside Assurance Manager David Cran

Airport Operations Manager Michael Oakes

Manager Air Traffic Services Karen Fulton

Senior Airport Fire Officer David Thomas

Aviation Security and Compliance Manager Nathan Deverell then Simon Deverell asfrom 19.12.16

2.2.1.2. Deputising for AbsenceAll key staff members have specific safety responsibilities. To ensure continuity when they are absent from work a competent person must assume their safety responsibilities. To ensure this is carried out in a structured way the following will apply:

Post Position Authorised to Deputise During AbsenceAirport General Manager Airside Assurance ManagerAirside Assurance Manager Airport General ManagerAirport Operations Manager Airport Duty ManagerManager Air Traffic Services Air Traffic Control Officer i.c.Senior Airport Fire officer Duty Watch CommanderAviation Security and Compliance Manager MADG Head of Security

To assume the responsibilities of another person the person assuming the responsibilities must be deemed competent through technical / operational knowledge of the task. If a senior manager, out of necessity, is required to assume the role of another lacks the relevant competency they must act in accordance of the advice from a suitably qualified subordinate.

2.2.1.3. Deputising Outside of Normal Working HoursOutside of normal working hours (Monday to Friday, 09:00 to 17:00 local) it may be necessary for a subordinate to fulfil the safety responsibilities of their manager. The following will apply:

Airport General Manager: The Airport Duty Manager (ADM) is deemed competent and is authorised to take any action required to ensure the immediate safety of aircraft operations at any time on airside areas

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Manager Air Traffic Services: The Duty Air traffic Control Officer is deemed competent and is authorised to take any action required to ensure the immediate safety of aircraft operations at any time commensurate with the requirements of their license

2.2.1.4. Unforeseen CircumstancesIf, due to unforeseen circumstances, an immediate decision is required, the most senior person available (deemed by use of the organisation charts in this document) is authorised to make a decision that resolves a temporary situation. At the earliest opportunity, any temporary decisions will be reviewed through the standard formal processes described in this manual and any further action or changes taken as appropriate.

2.2.1.5. Staff Long-term AbsenceShould a staff member with safety responsibilities remain absent for an extended period of more than four weeks arrangements should be made to introduce an interim post holder. The position that is temporarily covered would be preceded by the word “Acting” e.g. Acting Manager Air Traffic Services. This temporary post would then assume the full safety responsibilities of the post being covered. These temporary arrangements will require consultation with HR and, where applicable, the CAA.

2.2.1.6. Exceptional CircumstancesIn exceptional circumstances there may be a requirement to carry out operations against set procedures for a temporary period, e.g. development works. These temporary procedures will be carefully assessed and special measures may be put in place to ensure that safety is not compromised. These exceptional circumstances will require approval from the Airport General Manager.

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2.2.2. Organisation Chart

Figure 1: Cambridge International Airport

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Airport General Manager (Accountable Manager)

Nathan Deverell

Senior Airport Fire Officer

David Thomas

Business Development Manager Jon Harper

Airside Operations Manager

Michael Oakes

RFFS & Wildlife Hazard

Management

Fuel & Ramp

Services

Airport Duty Managers

Day Working ADM

Air Traffic

Control

Air Traffic Engineering

Manager Air Traffic Services

Karen Fulton

Airport Administration

AssistantAirport

Operations Officer

Infrastructure & Compliance Director

Neal Jennion

Marshall Aerospace & Defence Group CEO

Steve Fitz-Gerald

MADG Head of Facilities

Andy Bainbridge

Facilities Manager Airfield and AGL

Maintenance Steve Eley MADG Head of

Security Paul Oughton

Aviation Security and Compliance

Manager Simon Deverell

Airside Assurance ManagerDavid Cran

MADG Head of Quality Assurance

MADG Safety Cell

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2.2.3. Safety Accountabilities and Responsibilities

2.2.3.1. Airport General ManagerPost Holder

Nathan Deverell

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Airport General Manager is the nominated Accountable Manager and therefore accountable for all safety related issues, he is accountable to the Infrastructure and Compliance Director.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

As the Accountable Manager the Airport General Manager is responsible for the safe operation of the Airport by meeting the conditions of the Aerodrome Certificate. This responsibility encompasses the development and implementation of the strategies and policies required to manage the airport operation. The Airport General Manager is also responsible for ensuring all airside development is planned and executed in a safe manner and one which has minimum impact on the operation. The Airport General Manager achieves this by:

Ensuring that all necessary resources are available to operate the aerodrome in accordance with the applicable requirements and the Aerodrome Manual.

Ensuring that if there is a reduction in the level of resources or abnormal circumstances which may affect safety the required reduction in the level of operations at the aerodrome is implemented.

Establishing, implementing and promoting the Safety Policy.

Ensuring compliance with relevant applicable requirements, certification basis, and the airports safety management system, as well as its quality management system.

Defining and leading on all aspects of operational support against the Airport Business plan, ensuring the timely recruitment, training, procurement, development of process and procedures to ensure adherence to Regulatory body regulations.

Satisfying the legal requirements of the regulatory authorities for the Aerodrome Certificate, including the CAA, EASA, MAA, UKBA, DfT and Special Branch.

Ensuring that a robust system is in place for dealing with emergencies through liaison with Special Branch, UKBA, DfT, CAA, Cambridge Fire and Rescue and supporting agencies and organisations

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2.2.3.2. Airside Assurance ManagerPost Holder

David Cran

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Airside Assurance Manager is accountable to the Airport General Manager.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The Airside Assurance Manager is responsible for the administration and management of the Safety Management System and Regulatory Compliance Management at Cambridge Airport.The Airside Assurance Manager achieves this by:

Developing a safety management system for the control of airside safety risks.

Establishing systems for the carrying out of safety auditing and operational inspections.

Monitoring airside planning and development for compliance with the aerodrome safety policy.

Ensuring that developments both on and off the aerodrome meet appropriate aerodrome licensing, planning and other legislation, in particular where the safety of operations may be affected and do not infringe safeguarded areas.

Establishing an aerodrome process for the reporting and follow-up of accidents and incidents on the aerodrome and in its local airspace, including closure action.

Establishing and implementing a process for carrying out risk assessments as part of the safety management system including a method of identifying hazards and evaluating risks.

Reviewing assessments of hazard and the effectiveness of risk control methods.

Establishing an aerodrome process for the reporting and follow-up of accidents, incidents and emergencies on the aerodrome.

Ensuring that the aerodrome physical characteristics comply with licensing requirements and are maintained in a satisfactory condition.

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2.2.3.3. Airside Operations ManagerPost Holder

Michael Oakes

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Airside Operations Manager is accountable to the Airport General Manager.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The Airside Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring the day to day safe operation of the airfield. Control is exercised through the Airport Duty Manager (ADM) and the Ramp Services Supervisor. The Airside Operations Manager achieves this by:

Ensuring that information relating to the safety operation of the airfield is disseminated to all airport stakeholders and users.

Ensuring the aerodrome is safe and compliant for day to day operational use.

Ensuring instructions concerned with the safe operation of aircraft are current and in accordance with statutory and aerodrome management requirements.

Ensuring that aircraft ground handling and fuel operations are conducted safely and compliantly manner.

Establishing a snow warning and clearance plan.

Ensuring that Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL) and other essential equipment for night operations and Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) is provided and located in relation to the aerodrome layout and in accordance with regulations.

Ensuring that aerodrome procedures for LVPs are developed.

Developing a safety management system for the control of airside works.

Developing a safety management system for the control of airside driving.

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2.2.3.4. Manager Air Traffic ServicesPost Holder

Karen Fulton

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Manager Air Traffic Services is accountable to the Airport General Manager.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The Manager Air Traffic Services (MATS) is responsible for the safe operation of the Air Traffic Services within the scope of Cambridge Airport and local airspace. The MATS achieves this by:

Ensuring that appropriate and approved equipment is available to ensure the safe and expeditious flow of Air Traffic.

Overseeing the training and development of staff involved with air traffic control.

Overseeing staff involved with air traffic control are competent and maintain competency for the appropriate control function.

Making available appropriate and up-to-date information on facilities, equipment status, procedures, obstacles and other information that is considered relevant to flight safety.

Ensuring that an appropriate Air Traffic Control or other radio communication service is provided and maintained.

Ensuring that procedures are in force to provide adequate protection for the safe arrival, departure and transit of aircraft and promulgating information about those procedures.

Ensuring that a flight information service and alerting service is provided and maintained.

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2.2.3.5. Senior Airport Fire OfficerPost Holder

David Thomas

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Senior Airport Fire Officer is accountable to the Airport General Manager.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The SAFO is responsible for provision of the Rescue and Fire Fighting Services in accordance with CAA licensing requirements and the strategic development of the policies and procedures required to manage the RFFS operation ensuring they are compliant and operationally effective at all times. The SAFO is also the Emergency Planning Officer. The SAFO is responsible for the management of the Cambridge Airport ground handling, wildlife management and fuel management teams. The Senior Airport Fire Officer achieves this by:

Ensuring that emergency plans are in place, adequate and tested to meet legislative requirements.

Ensuring that essential equipment for snow and ice clearance, measuring, recording and reporting of runway surface conditions is available.

Ensuring emergency fire and rescue facilities are compatible with sizes, types and frequency of aircraft in accordance with company and legislative requirements.

Ensuring that rescue and fire fighting policies, procedures and training fulfil the aims of the aerodrome and meet legislative requirements.

Reviewing policy and procedures as appropriate taking into account legislative changes, accident/incident data and changes to aerodrome layout, buildings and facilities.

Planning and implementing the co-ordination between internal staff and external personnel involved in fire fighting and emergency operations.

Assessing the feasibility of continuing aerodrome operations in an emergency situation

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2.2.3.6. Aviation Security and Compliance ManagerPost Holder

Simon Deverell

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Aviation Security and Compliance Manager is accountable to the MADG Head of Security.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The Aviation Security and Compliance Manager is responsible for complying with the regulatory requirements for Aviation Security at Cambridge International Airport. The Aviation Security and Compliance Manager achieves this by:

Establishing, monitoring and reviewing security procedures to maintain the safety of passengers, staff, aircraft and aerodrome facilities.

Establishing procedures and actions in response to a security alert, and ensuring the integrity of the restricted areas and access points is maintained at all times.

Planning and instigating the training and development of internal and external staff in relation to security

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2.2.3.7. Airport Duty Managers

Aerodrome Safety Accountabilities

The Airport Duty Managers (ADMs) are accountable to the Airside Operations Manager.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

The ADMs will maintain operational liaison with ATC, control authorities, emergency services, airline management, and other Cambridge International Airport operational managers to ensure the most effective use of facilities at all times.

The Airport Duty Manager achieves this by: Ensure that all airside users comply with all airside safety requirements and recommended

practices in accordance with the terms of the aerodrome license, this aerodrome manual and any local operating procedures or instructions.

Managing the interaction of aircraft servicing operations and other activities.

Managing and authorising all airfield Work In progress on a daily basis through the Airside Works Instruction system and providing airside safety briefings for external contractors.

Monitoring immediate airport environs for safeguarding purposes, including temporary obstacles.

Taking account of aircraft performance requirements with regard to runway declared distances and reduced declared distances, other runway physical characteristics, obstacle criteria and the effects of crosswind, weather and contaminated runways.

Monitoring Airside Vehicle Operations for the issue of Airside Driving Permits and Airside Vehicle Permits, auditing driver training and vehicle maintenance programmes are to established standards, recording airside vehicle accidents and incidents.

Activation and control of the Snow and Ice plan.

Monitoring current and forecast weather especially snow and ice.

Promulgating information on the surface state of the manoeuvring area, aprons, and runways, clearance operations and runway, taxiway and apron availability.

Dealing with fuel spillage incidents and reports to the Environment Agency if appropriate.

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2.2.3.8. All Cambridge Airport Personnel

Aerodrome Safety Accountability

Cambridge Airport Personnel are accountable to their Department Manager for providing services suitable for the continuance of airport activities for their operational role.

Aerodrome Safety Responsibilities

All Cambridge Airport personnel have the following safety responsibilities: Carry out their duties in compliance with company operating procedures and/or CAA

regulations Comply with relevant safety requirements and procedures outlined in:

o Cambridge International Airport Aerodrome Manualo Other authorized corporate manuals, instructions, and notices

Apply system safety measures as required by safety management procedures and instructions

Advise the safety manager of any safety occurrence or system failure, and identify/report any situation of potential risk or concern affecting system safety via one of the following means:

o Report directly to your immediate supervisor/manager or a safety managero Via team meetingso Submitting the required incident/accident reporto Supporting safety audits as and when they occuro Supporting safety investigations as and when they occur

By reading this Aerodrome Manual it is deemed that Cambridge Airport personnel confirm their acceptance of the above aerodrome safely responsibilities

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2.3. Safety Governance

2.3.1. Purpose

The management of safety at Cambridge Airport is of paramount importance; it is embedded in everything we do and involves not only our own staff but all users of the airport including visitors, passenger, based operators, contractors and other members of MADG.

The systems used to ensure all risks are managed to an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) are included in our governance structure; this will ensure effective implementation of the CIA policies.

2.3.2. Scope

The safety committees at Cambridge Airport that achieve this are: Airport Safety Committee Emergency Planning Group Manoeuvring Area Safety Team

o Local Runway Safety Team Employee Safety Forum

o Department Safety ForumsThis system delivers a two way system that ensures any risks are managed at an appropriate level within CIA. How we manage risks has an impact upon not only the day-to-day operational tasks but also the long term planning strategy, financial planning and reputational areas; all these ensure long term stability within the business with a safe environment for all who use and work at the airport.

Figure 2: Airport Safety Governance Structure

2.3.3. ResponsibilitiesThe Chairperson of the Committee, Forum, Group or Team is responsible for ensuring they meet at least as often as outlined in the relevant Terms of Reference. They are responsible for ensuring an accurate written record of the meeting is maintained and distributed to all members and any other interested parties as appropriate to the contents of the meeting. These should be distributed to all members in draft for comment before the final minutes are published.

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Airport Safety Committee

Emergency Planning Group Manoeuvring Area Safety Team (MAST)

(The Local Runway Safety Team forms part on this group)

Employee Safety Forum

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemMembers are responsible for submitting items for inclusion in the relevant agenda to the nominated Chair at least seven days prior to the meeting. It is mandatory for post holders with aerodrome

safety responsibilities to attend and contribute to formal safety related committees as detailed below. If post holders cannot attend a nominated deputy will attend in their absence.

2.3.4. Terms of ReferenceThe terms of reference are detailed in the Annexes below.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management System2.3.4.1. Airport Safety Committee (ASC)

Purpose:

The Airport Safety Committee (ASC) is a high level committee that considers matters of strategic safety in support of the Accountable Manager’s safety accountability. It sets Airport wide safety targets and policy. It oversees and coordinates safety across the entire site at Cambridge Airport and oversees compliance with regulatory safety requirements, including the Aerodrome Licence and Cambridge Airports internal safety objectives, and to endorse policy on matters relating to airfield safety management.

Objectives:

1. The Committee aims to ensure that there is a culture of continuous, positive improvement to safety across all the Airport operational areas.

2. The Committee aims to ensure that all incidents/accidents are closed out in a timely manner and that risks are ALaRP (As Low as is Reasonably Practicable).

Accountability and Reporting Arrangements:

3. The Committee will refer matters as appropriate to the MADG Board.

Membership:

4. The Committee will be chaired by the Airport General Manager.

5. Membership of the ASC comprises a member from each of the Airport departments with operational oversight of the aerodrome these are:

Airport General Manager (Chair) Airside Assurance Manager (Deputy Chair) Airside Operations Manager Manager Air Traffic Services Senior Airport Fire Officer Airport Security Manager

6. Other internal or external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

7. Members are required to appoint appropriate deputies to attend on their behalf if they cannot attend.

Frequency of meetings

8. The Committee will meet at regular intervals, at least 6 times a year. Additional meetings may be held on agreement with the Chair of the Committee.

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9. It shall report to the MADG Board through the Airport General Manager and Infrastructure and Compliance Director.

Key Tasks 10. The Committee shall be responsible for ensuring that appropriate strategies,

frameworks and structures are in place across the airport and for ensuring continual improvement in the safety experience. The Committee will (this is not an exhaustive list):

Determine safety performance against the safety policy and objectives Ensure appropriate resources are allocated to achieve the established safety

performance Ensure any safety action is taken in a timely manner Agree any top level safety actions and initiatives relating to CIA that ensures the

effectiveness of the SMS Receive feedback from operational areas to ensure that their annual safety

targets are met and any safety issues are addressed accordingly Ensure the business needs and safety needs combine for an efficient and safe

operation Monitor progress on all airport projects Developing policies for safe airside operations Provide regular progress reports to the MADG Board Ensure safety performance against the safety policy and objectives

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2.3.4.2. Employee Safety Forum (ESF)Purpose:

The Employee Safety Forum (ESF) will be the primary forum to review, discuss and examine solutions for safety matters and incidents, and determine recommendations to be taken to the Airport Safety Committee in order to improve levels of airside and aerodrome safety at Cambridge Airport.

Objectives:

1. The Forum aims to ensure that there is a culture of continuous, positive improvement to safety across all the Airport operational areas as directed by the Airport Safety Committee

2. The Forum aims to ensure that this is a priority for all staff of Cambridge International Airport

Accountability and Reporting Arrangements:

3. The Forum is established as a permanent sub-committee of the Airport Safety Committee (ASC) and is therefore accountable to this Committee.

4. The Forum will refer matters as appropriate to the ASC

Membership:

5. The Forum will be chaired by the Airside Assurance Manager.

6. Membership of the ESF comprises a member from each of the Airport departments, Human Resources and MADG Health, Safety and Environment with direct involvement in the aerodrome these are: Airside Assurance Manager (Chair) Airside Operations Manger (Deputy Chair) Air Traffic Control Air Traffic Engineering Ramp Services Department Airport Fire Service Airside Duty Manager MADG H&S representative MADG Environment representative HR Business Partner

7. Other internal or external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

8. Members are required to appoint appropriate deputies to attend on their behalf if they cannot attend.

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9. The ESF will meet at least twice a year. Additional meetings may be held on agreement with the Chair of the ESF.

Authority

10. The ESF shall report to the ASC through the Airside Assurance Manager.

Key performance indicators:

Compliance with Regulatory standards Annual CAA/EASA and other regulatory audits Airport and Regulatory Safety Reports Staff Feedback

Key Tasks 11. The Forum shall be responsible for ensuring that the strategies, frameworks and

structures agreed by the Airport Safety Committee are delivered across the airport and for ensuring continual improvement in the safety experience. The Forum will (this is not an exhaustive list):

Acting as the focus for shared ownership of and responsibilities for airside safety issues Considering actions to resolve airside safety problems Promoting airside safety discipline Reviewing Health and Safety incidents in order to share analysis and lessons learned Reviewing Environmental incidents in order to share analysis and lessons learned Reviewing airside incidents in order to share analysis and lessons learned, these may

include: o Apron congestion issues o Airside cleanliness issueso Review reports and statistics on accidents, incidents and emergencies, airside

discipline issues and discuss trends and solutionso Identification and reduction of shared riskso Apron equipment issueso Airside traffic issueso Standard operating procedures for airside activitieso New and updated airside safety instructionso Personal protective clothing/equipment issueso Environmental safety matters such as noise, blast and fumeso Methods to develop and promote apron safety awareness initiatives, such as poster

campaigns and safety presentations/exhibitionso Receive reports on significant outages and breakdowns concerning airside fixed

facilities; o Receive engineers’ briefings and reports on ongoing or imminent airside works and

projects and provide safety adviceo Proposed changes/developments to the airside environment, aircraft ground

handling operations and/or standard operating procedures

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o Results of aircraft turnaround audits

2.3.4.3. Emergency Planning Group (EPG)Purpose:

The EPG will be the primary forum to review, discuss and agree policies and plans for emergency and contingency responses including measures to improve general resilience.

Objectives:

1. The EPG aims to ensure that the airport emergency response plan is fit for purpose and maintains business continuity across the airport and operations as directed by the Airport Safety Committee.

2. The EPG aims to ensure that this is a priority for all staff of Cambridge Airport and that training of staff is carried out in accordance with all regulatory requirements.

Accountability and Reporting Arrangements:

3. The EPG is established as a permanent sub-committee of the Airport Safety Committee and is therefore accountable to this Committee.

4. The EPG will refer matters by exception and as appropriate to the Airport Safety Committee.

Membership:

5. The EPG will be chaired by the Senior Airport Fire officer (SAFO).

6. All members will be expected to engage fully with the agenda and make full and positive contributions as appropriate. Other external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

7. Membership of the EPG comprises a member from each of the Airport departments and external stakeholders and agencies with direct involvement in the aerodrome these are:

Airport: Senior Airport Fire officer (Chair) Airport General Manager (Deputy Chair) Airside Assurance Manager Airside Operations Manager Air Traffic Control Air Traffic Engineering Airport Fire Service Airside Operations Fuel Department

Third Party Service Providers, Tenants and Users (Invited representatives):The following are eligible to be represented:

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MADG Facilities MADG Security MADG Production MADG Flight Test and Operations ExecuJet EAAA Local Authorities Specialist representatives may be co-opted from time to time at the discretion of the

chairman

8. Other internal or external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

9. Members are required to appoint appropriate deputies to attend on their behalf if they cannot attend.

Frequency of meetings

10. The EPG will meet at least twice a year. Additional meetings may be held on agreement with the Chair of the EPG.

Authority

11. The EPG shall report to the Airport Safety Committee through the SAFO.

Key performance indicators:

Compliance with Regulatory standards Annual CAA and other regulatory audits Airport and Regulatory Safety Reports Emergency Training and Actual events

Key Tasks 12. The EPG shall be responsible for ensuring that appropriate strategies, frameworks and

structures are in place across the airport and for ensuring continual improvement in the emergency response plan. The Committee will (this is not an exhaustive list):

Owning the Emergency Response Plan and coordinating the compilation of the plan to ensure a fully integrated response

Continuous improvement of the systems and procedures contained within the aerodrome emergency response plan by: o Conducting a review of the relevant parts of the emergency response plan after a

full or partial exercise o Debriefing and analysing the emergency response operations after an emergency

situationo Developing new emergency procedures or systems as part of the emergency

response plan when new hazards are identified by the safety management system To ensure the coordination with the emergency response plans of other interfacing

organisations

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2.3.4.4. Manoeuvring Area Safety Team (MAST)Purpose:

The MAST will provide the essential partnership between Cambridge Airport and those stakeholders operating at Cambridge Airport in order to ensure an effective system is in place for communicating, considering and managing all aspects of flight safety, runway incursion risks, apron safety and FOD issues at Cambridge Airport and resolve matters related to airside and ramp safety operations.

Also to act as information exchange on safety matters, current issues and infrastructure developments with the aim of promoting safe and efficient operations.

Objectives:

1. The Team aims to ensure that there is a culture of continuous, positive improvement to safety across all the Airport operational areas as directed by the Airport Safety Committee

2. The Team aims to ensure that this is a priority for all staff of Cambridge International Airport and airside users

Accountability and Reporting Arrangements:

3. The Team is established as a permanent sub-committee of the Airport Safety Committee and is therefore accountable to this Committee.

4. The Team will refer matters as appropriate to the Airport Safety Committee.

Membership:

5. The Team will be chaired by the Airside Assurance Manager.

6. The MAST comprises a member from all areas that have an active interest in airside activities. The members of the MAST are:

Airport: Airside Assurance Manager (Chair) Airside Assurance Manager (Deputy Chair) Manager Air traffic Services Airside Operations Airport Fire Service Fuel Supervisor

Third Party Service Providers, Tenants and Users (Invited safety representatives):The following are eligible to be represented:

ExecuJet

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Hangar representatives MADG Flight Test and Operations Aircraft Operators GA Operators Cambridge Airport based HEMS Specialist representatives may be co-opted from time to time at the discretion of the

chairman

7. Other internal or external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

8. Members are required to appoint appropriate deputies to attend on their behalf if they cannot attend.

Frequency of meetings

9. The Team will meet at least twice a year. Additional meetings may be held on agreement with the Chair of the Team.

Authority

10. The MAST shall report to the Airport Safety Committee through the Airside Assurance Manager.

Key performance indicators:

Compliance with Regulatory standards Annual CAA and other regulatory audits Airport and Regulatory Safety Reports External Safety reports

Key Tasks 11. The Team shall be responsible for ensuring that the strategies, frameworks and

structures agreed by the Airport Safety Committee are delivered across the airport and for ensuring continual improvement in the safety experience. The Team will (this is not an exhaustive list):

Acting as the focus for shared ownership of and responsibilities for airside safety issues Communicate any areas of airside operations that may have an effect upon the

operation of other airside users, these may include:o AIRPROX o Level bustso Navigation equipment issueso Runway Safety (Local Runway Safety Team) See belowo Foreign Object Debris (FOD) preventiono Apron congestion issues o Airside cleanliness issueso Review reports and statistics on accidents, incidents and emergencies, airside

discipline issues and discuss trends and solutions

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o Identification and reduction of shared riskso Apron equipment issueso Airside traffic issueso Standard operating procedures for airside activitieso New and updated airside safety instructionso Environmental safety matters such as noise, blast and fumeso Snow and ice clearance issueso Receive reports on significant outages and breakdowns concerning airside fixed

facilitieso Reports on ongoing or imminent airside works and projects and provide safety

adviceo Proposed changes/developments to the airside environment, aircraft ground

handling operations and/or standard operating procedures Considering actions to resolve airside safety problems Promoting airside safety discipline

Local Runway Safety Team Purpose:

The Local Runway Safety Team (LRST) meets as part of the Manoeuvring Area Safety Team (MAST). The LRST promote runway safety and advise the Accountable Manager, through the MAST, on potential runway safety issues and recommend mitigating measures.

Objectives:

As part of its runway safety programme Cambridge Airport has established a Local Runway Safety Team to act on local runway safety issues, including runway incursion3 (as well as runway confusion) and excursion4 prevention.

11. The Team aims to ensure that there is a culture of continuous, positive improvement to runway safety across all the Airport and airside users operational areas

12. The Team aims to ensure that this is a priority for all staff and airside users at Cambridge Airport

Accountability and Reporting Arrangements:

13. The Team is established as the major committee for Runway safety at Cambridge International Airport

3 A runway incursion is ‘Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft

The ‘protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft’ is to be interpreted as the physical surface of a runway, from the centreline to the holding point appropriate to the type of runway. Where operations are being conducted during low visibility operations this should be the holding point appropriate to the procedures in force. The ‘protected surface’ includes the ILS glide-path and localiser critical areas at all times, and the ILS sensitive areas during low visibility procedures 4 A runway excursion occurs when ‘An aircraft veers off or overruns the runway surface during either take-off or landing’.

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14. The Team will refer matters by exception and as appropriate to the MAST

Membership:

15. The Team will be chaired by the Airside Assurance Manager.

16. All members will be expected to engage fully with the agenda and make full and positive contributions as appropriate. Other external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

17. Membership of the LRST comprises of representatives from the three main groups associated with manoeuvring area operations, namely the Aerodrome Operator (including Air Traffic Services), Ground Handling Associations and pilots from Aircraft Operators that operate at the aerodrome. These are:

Airside Assurance Manager (Chair) Airport Operations Air Traffic Services Airport Fire Service MADG Production FT&O Aircraft Operators

18. Other internal or external stakeholder representatives may be asked to attend the Committee as appropriate to specific agenda items.

19. Members are required to appoint appropriate deputies to attend on their behalf if they cannot attend.

Frequency of meetings

20. The Team will meet at least twice a year as part of the MAST meeting. Additional meetings may be held on agreement with the Chair of the Committee.

Authority

21. The Team is authorised to conduct any activity within its terms of reference. It is authorised to seek and may secure the information it requires from any employee and all employees are directed to co-operate with any request made by the Team as determined by the Airport Assurance Manager.

Key Tasks 22. The Team shall be responsible for ensuring that appropriate runway safety awareness is

in place across the airport and for ensuring continual improvement in runway safety. The Team will:

Identify potential runway safety issues, including the need for establishment of hot spots or other problem areas at the aerodrome and the review of the relevant entries of the AIP for accuracy.

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Develop and run local awareness campaigns, at suitable periods, including at the start of a busy season or before an unusual event, that focus on local issues.

Monitor the number, type and, the severity of runway incursions; disseminating safety recommendations delivered from accident and incident investigation findings as well as other relevant lessons learned.

Assist in verifying that communications between air traffic controllers, or other Air Traffic Services personnel, pilots, and vehicle drivers are satisfactory, or if any improvements could be suggested.

Make observations on a regular basis in different weather and light conditions to assess whether all runway entrances and visual aids are adequate, correctly located and understandable by all parties concerned, with no possible ambiguity of their meaning, or identify potential aerodrome design issues.

Understand the operating difficulties of personnel working in other areas, and recommending areas for improvement.

Provide advice prior to the implementation of changes to the aerodrome, practices and procedures to identify potential for runway incursion or excursion.

Assess the effectiveness of implemented operational solutions periodically.

2.4. Emergency Response Planning The Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) at Cambridge Airport serves to mitigate risk during times of an emergency and recover from an emergency situation. It is a structured plan that empowers key stakeholders to make decisions during emergencies in order to meet the goals of the plan: namely, to mitigate further/collateral harm or damage, to facilitate the safe continuation of operations during a crisis situation, and to provide for recovery of operations after the emergency.

Coordination of the AEP is the responsibility of the Emergency Planning Officer; at Cambridge Airport the Senior Airport Fire Officer carries out this duty. The AEP describes all aspects of the transition from normal to emergency operations and return to normal operations. The purpose of the Airport Emergency Plan is to ensure that there is:

Orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations Delegation of emergency authority Assignment of emergency responsibilities Authorisation by key personnel for actions contained in the plan Coordination of efforts to cope with the emergency Safe continuation of operations, or return to normal operations, as soon as possible

The Airport Emergency Plan is distributed by the Emergency Planning Officer and is available on the Airport Documents site of SharePoint and the MADG Business Management System.

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2.5. Document Control

2.5.1. Purpose

The document control procedure forms part of the Cambridge Airport safety management system.

The purpose of the documentation control procedure is to enable the action and audit the following document processes:

Approve Review Impact assess Update Identify changes Identify revision status Distribute Provide access

The document control procedure must clearly define the scope, purpose, method and responsibilities required to implement these parameters.In order to comply with document control it is essential that all personnel understand:

What documents should be controlled How this control should be exercised

2.5.2. Scope

This procedure is designed to outline the process for Cambridge Airport Document Control and Record Management in accordance with EASA/CAA and other related legislative system requirements. This procedure describes:

• The methodology for ensuring that the airport system documentation is current and suitable for use by staff, tenants, stakeholders and contractors. This includes the process to be followed for: o Document creation; o Document review process that ensures the relevant competent personnel or parties are

consulted and given an opportunity to provide input;o Impact assessment;o Modification and update of documents where necessary; o Identification of documents to ensure the most current versions are identifiable, legible

and available at points of use; o The prevention of unintended use of obsolete documents; o Document approval prior to issue;o Dissemination and communication of approved new or modified documents to relevant

personnel.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemCambridge Airport records shall be maintained, archived and disposed of in accordance with legislative requirements.

2.5.3. Responsibilities

Cambridge Airport Senior Management are responsible for and have authority to raise and implement Policies, Terms of Reference, Regulations and Procedures.

Cambridge Airport Department Managers are responsible for control of their operational areas Documentation and have authority to raise and implement operational documents. Department Managers are responsible for promoting good document and record management practices in their area whilst supporting overall compliance to the document control procedure. Department Managers may delegate responsibility for document control to a member of staff; however they still remain accountable for the document control procedures in their department.

Individuals and their line managers are responsible for the documents and records that they create, as well as being responsible for their retention and disposal in line with legislative requirements and organisational procedures and practices.

2.5.4. Applicability

This document control procedure operates within all operational areas of Cambridge airport.

The procedure applies to safety and operational documentation. The control of documents that do not have an operational or safety implication are the responsibility of Departmental internal procedures or Company procedures, i.e. HR documentation control for staff holiday management.

2.5.5. Document Structure

To ensure a structured flow of document hierarchy they are categorised as below: Level 1: Policy and Manuals Level 2: Procedures Level 3: Instructions Level 4: Forms and Records

2.5.6. Process

Each department will have its own instructions for document control however to ensure an Airport process that is uniform this procedure will set out the generic requirements for all to ensure their process is robust and the creation, storage and management of documentation is carried out in a manner that provides a system that is easily understood.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemDocument Creation or ChangePrior to the creation of a new document or change to an existing document the document originator or owner must ensure they have followed the following steps:

1. Identify the requirement;2. Raise a document change request (see example below);3. Create new or draft amendment to the existing document;4. Review draft changes with other operational areas that will or may be impacted by the

change;5. If regulatory approval is required by the originator or any impacted department at least 30

days, from submission to the CAA is required for regulatory approval;6. Notify all on distribution list of new or amended document and planned publication date;7. Relevant managerial level signs and approves document for publication;8. Publish the document in line with any other departmental documents that are required to

be changed and inform all on distribution list of publication and location of the document;9. Document the change;10. Post publication review; this may result in a document change if any feedback results in an

unsafe operation – if so return to start and carry out the process again.

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2.5.7. Document creation and Approval

Document creation and approval is only authorised by the following or their nominated deputy:

Document Type Function Document Creator Document ApproverPolicy Key system objectives Airside Operations Manager

Airside Assurance Manager Manager Air Traffic Services

Accountable Manager

Manual Approach and responsibility

Airside Operations ManagerAirside Assurance Manager Manager Air Traffic Services

Accountable ManagerAirside Operations ManagerAirport Assurance Manager Manager Air Traffic Services

Procedure Describes the process. Applicable to work areas. These are more specific

Any delegated employee Heads of Department

Instruction How to perform the process, attached to the procedure to help clarify the procedure

Any delegated employee Heads of Department

Record Places to record the results of tests, audits, etc

Any delegated employee Heads of Department

On approval, organisational documents are controlled electronically and issued via the intranet. Any printed copies are deemed uncontrolled and must be part of the departments document control procedure to maintain current copies.

2.5.8. FormatDocuments are written to an agreed format, templates are available for consistency.

2.5.9. Controlling InformationAll documents are ‘draft’ until the relevant manager has approved the document for general publication.

Revision details are noted on the issue number and date, revised copies issued and filed. If printed all superseded copies are removed from circulation and destroyed.

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2.5.10. ReviewOrganisational Procedures and associated forms are reviewed annually by the senior management team. Operational Procedures and associated forms are reviewed annually by the department that originated them.

2.5.11. StorageDocuments are to be stored on the MADG intranet site at M: Drive/AS/(Department).

2.5.12. Document Control RegisterDepartment managers are to ensure all operational documents are controlled by the approved system and registered on the department document control register.

2.5.13. Numbering and Version ControlAll documentation numbering will follow the format below; each element will be separated by a (.) (dot):

1. Airside Operations Documents will be preceded by ‘EGSC’ to indicate the document is originated by Cambridge Airport or include the Cambridge Airport Logo in the header or footer.

2. Type of document:a. AOP = Airport Operations Procedureb. ASI = Airside Supplementary Instruction c. TAI = Temporary Airside Instructiond. AIN = Airside Information Noticee. AWI = Airside Works Instruction

3. Unique three digit number4. The last two digits of the year

An example number format is: EGSC.TAI.001.16

Where:EGSC Relates to Cambridge Airport TAI Temporary Airside Instruction001 Is a unique three numerical identifier

.16 Is the year of issue.

An issue or version number and date of publication will be included along with a review date or period. I.e.

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Doc No:Issue:Date:Pages:Review Period:

EGSC.TAI.001.16209 Aug 20131 of 2012 Months

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2.5.14. Obsolete DocumentsObsolete documents are to be stored in the ‘Archive’ folder to ensure a fully auditable trail. Any hard copies of obsolete documents are to be destroyed. It is recommended that obsolete documents are either shredded torn in half to prevent out of date information and procedures accidentally being used.

2.5.15. CommunicationsAll those on a document’s distribution list should be informed of any changes or updates.

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3. Safety Risk Management

Safety Risk Management is the foundation of the Cambridge airport Safety Management System.

Safety risk management at Cambridge Airport involves two fundamental safety related activities:1. Hazard Identification2. Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation (reducing the potential of those risks to cause harm

to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

A hazard is:

Any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. It is a prerequisite to an accident or incident

Everyone is responsible for identifying and managing the risks within their operational areas. Additionally it is everyone’s responsibility to highlight risks in areas outside their control where a significant risk to property, equipment or people may be identified.

Understanding whether a hazard is pertinent to aviation safety or Occupational Health, Safety and Environment (OSHE) depends on its potential or foreseeable consequence or risk. Any hazard that can have an impact (whether directly or indirectly) on the operational safety of aircraft or aviation safety-related equipment, products and services should be assessed through this procedure. A hazard having purely OSHE consequences (i.e. without any impact on aviation safety) is addressed separately by the MADG OSHE system; these OSHE hazards and consequences with no impact on aviation safety are not pertinent to this document.

3.1. Hazard IdentificationThe three methodologies for identifying hazards are:

Reactive. This methodology involves analysis of past outcomes or events. Hazards are identified through investigation of safety occurrences. Incidents and accidents are clear indicators of system deficiencies and therefore can be used to determine the hazards that either contributed to the event or are latent.

Proactive. This methodology involves analysis of existing or real-time situations, which is the primary job of the safety assurance function with its audits, evaluations, employee reporting, and associated analysis and assessment processes. This involves actively seeking hazards in the existing processes.

Predictive. This methodology involves data gathering in order to identify possible negative future outcomes or events, analysing system processes and the environment to identify potential future hazards and initiating mitigating actions.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemThe identification of hazards that will or may have an impact upon the safe operation of aircraft at Cambridge Airport is the responsibility of all airport staff.

These hazards can be determined by the type of risk based on the impact to the operational area. These risks are:

System Risks: any risks that have an effect upon the normal operation of the aerodrome Development Risks: any risks associated with major airside construction or maintenance Temporary Risks: any risks that are related to one-off operational events or changes

3.2. Hazard Reporting

The reporting of any accident, incident, hazard or near miss is the responsibility of everyone who works on or uses the facilities of the airside areas at Cambridge Airport.

Within MADG and Cambridge Airport the following definitions apply:

A hazard is a situation with the potential to develop into a threat that may compromise any or all of the following: health, safety, flight, product, property or environment. A hazard should be viewed as something that may happen; a near miss would constitute this

An occurrence is an event that has taken place which has compromised one or all of the following: health, safety, flight, product, property or environment

An accident or safety occurrence can indicate that there is a failure within the safety management system. It is therefore important that all accidents and safety occurrences are reported and investigated.

To ensure all safety related concerns or occurrences are fully captured the following processes, where appropriate, are to be followed for all accident, incident, hazard identification and near miss reporting.

3.2.1. Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) – EASA Regulatory Requirement

The objective of the MOR Scheme is to contribute to the improvement of flight safety by ensuring that relevant information on safety is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated. The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability.

A reportable occurrence in relation to an aircraft means:

Any incident which endangers or which, if not corrected, would endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.

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At Cambridge Airport the following personnel are mandated to report through the MOR scheme:

Air Traffic Controllers Air Traffic Engineers Operational Managers Aircraft Ground Handlers responsible for:

o Fuellingo Servicingo Load sheet preparationo Loadingo De-icingo Towing

It should be understood that while the legislation defines those who are mandated to report, anyone may report, should they consider it necessary

The EASA legislation stipulates that MOR reports be filed within 72 hours of the occurrence. All reports are to be made using the EASA web page WWW.AVIATIONREPORTING.EU. The

CAA will automatically be informed with the report is submitted. Full details of how to complete the form are also given on the EASA website page.

The person completing the form is responsible for ensuring that it is despatched to the European Co-ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting System (ECCAIRS) via either of the websites detailed above.

To ensure any occurrences at Cambridge Airport are investigated quickly and any identified remedial actions carried out as soon as possible any submitted MOR’s are to be duplicated on the MADG ‘Report It’ system by the person reporting the occurrence as outlined below.

Example of the EASA reporting form.

There is no legal requirement to notify department managers that an MOR has been filed even when the occurrence may involve Cambridge Airport equipment, procedures or personnel. However, due to the time lapse between reports and investigations and to

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ensure that any safety concerns are managed as quickly as possible it is requested that any report is copied to the reporter’s manager or the Airside Assurance Manager.

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3.2.2. Internal Safety Reporting – MADG ‘Safety Report’ system

The immediate action upon identifying any safety related issue is:

Resolve or stop the situation if possible Then ‘Report It’

Internal reporting is carried out through the MADG ‘Safety Report’ system. This is available on the intranet, i@n home page.

Figure 3: MADG Intranet 'Safely Report It'

All reports submitted via the ‘Safety Report’ system will be received by the MADG Safety Cell who collate and upload the details on the Q-Pulse action tracker system and assign an action owner. In addition the system will automatically send a copy to the Airport Senior Managers so immediate containment action can be taken if required.

Confidential reports are only visible by the Head of Quality Assurance and cannot be traced back to the originator.

The reporting chain is the same for either an MOR or an internal Safety Report, the reporting form is the only difference as demonstrated in the flow chart below:

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‘Safety Report’ link on the main

MADG i@n intranet page

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Figure 4: Occurrence Report Flow Chart

3.3. Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

3.3.1. Circumstances for Risk AssessmentAlthough it is not possible to list every circumstance when a risk assessment is required the following are some typical examples where such an assessment may be required:

Implementation of new, or changes to communications, navigation, or other safety significant systems and equipment including those providing new functionalities and / or capabilities.

Physical and temporary changes to runways or taxiways Physical and temporary changes to apron/perimeter road system Introduction of new aircraft type or class to the airport Development of/or changes to Aerodrome/ATC procedures that could have an effect on

safety

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Changes to/establishment of operational or technical staff

For conciseness the term ‘system’ and ‘project’ should be considered to include the following: Any safety significant equipment Any safety significant procedure (e.g. operational procedures used with the provision of an

Air Traffic Control service or any maintenance procedures for the related equipment) The Human Interface involved

3.3.2. Risk Assessment Process

Step 1: Identify Safety HazardsHazard identification will ideally be conducted by a group of people. They will list the types of safety hazards they think may threaten the safety of persons on and around the proposed operation. The group should also consider those hazards which could damage equipment, or harm the environment or the reputation of the company.

Step 2: Rank and Assess the Severity of Safety HazardsThe severity and the likelihood of each hazard should then be assessed.

Step 3: Identify the Controls/Defences in Place to Manage the HazardsIdentified hazards are listed and ranked in their order of risk. Then possible defences (hazard controls) are identified and listed against them. This step should provide a list of current controls/defences against each hazard: some controls will defend against multiple hazards.

Step 4: Assess the Effectiveness of the Current Controls/DefencesAssess how effective is each hazard control/defence would be at preventing the occurrence i.e. does it remove the hazard or just minimise the likelihood or the consequence.

Step 5: Identify Further Controls/Defences RequiredEach hazard and its control(s) will be examined to determine whether the risk is adequately managed or controlled. If it is, the operation can continue, if not, further controls will need to be put in place to reduce the severity or likelihood or both. Risks that remain unacceptable should be stopped. Wherever possible risks should be reduced to as low as reasonably practical.

Step 6: Record the information in the Risk RegisterEach Risk Assessment along with the results will be recorded on the department Risk Register which in turn feeds in to the Airport Risk Register.

Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS)Not all risks can be eliminated however the risks will be managed based on either ALoS (Acceptable Level of Safety) or ALaRP (As Low as is Reasonably Practicable). The ALoS principle identifies three categories of risk:

1. Unacceptable - An unacceptable risk must be eliminated or reduced so that it falls into one of the other two categories below. If this cannot be achieved then the activity must not take place.

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2. Review - Tolerable risks must be properly assessed and controlled to keep the residual risk ALoS, and will be reviewed periodically to ensure they remain that way.

3. Acceptable - Risks are considered sufficiently low and well controlled. Further risk reduction is required only if reasonably practicable measures are available.

To determine whether a risk is tolerable (in the ALoS approach) the following criteria should be considered:

Legal requirements: Aviation organisations must comply with applicable CAA and relevant other state-based safety legislation. A control based on a legal requirement must always be considered ‘reasonably practicable’.

Expert judgement: A proposed control should be considered reasonably practicable if an appropriate group of experts has established it has a clear safety benefit, and the costs associated with its introduction are considered reasonable.

Cost-benefit analysis: Where expert judgement or contemporary good practice does not provide clear evidence that a specific control or group of controls are reasonably practicable, a cost-benefit analysis may be necessary. This establishes whether the cost of implementing a specific control is grossly disproportionate to its safety benefit.

Industry good practice: If the proposed control represents current, relevant, established good practice, that is sufficient evidence to conclude that it is reasonably practicable. For example, it:

o Complies with aviation industry standards, rules or procedureso Is a practice of other operators that are similar in scale and operation to your owno Is established and widely implemented in another industry sectoro Matches other countries’ legislated enforcement of the practiceo Is proven to have demonstrably improved safety, or can be implemented without

significant modification or cost.

3.4. Level of Safety Risk

3.4.1. Safety Risk Probability

Safety risk probability is defined as the likelihood or frequency that a safety consequence or outcome might occur. The determination of likelihood can be aided by questions such as:

Is there a history of occurrences similar to the one under consideration, or is this an isolated occurrence

What other equipment or components of the same type might have similar defects How many personnel are following, or are subject to, the procedures in question What percentage of the time is the suspect equipment or the questionable procedure in use To what extent are there organizational, managerial or regulatory implications that might

reflect larger threats to public safetyAny factors underlying these questions will help in assessing the likelihood that a hazard may exist, taking into consideration all potentially valid scenarios. The determination of likelihood can then be used to assist in determining safety risk probability.

Risk Probability (Likelihood)Value Likelihood Permanent Operations Temporary Operations Probability

1 Extremely About once in 50 years or more. Highly unlikely to occur 1 in 1,000,000

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ImprobableAlmost impossible, should virtually never occur. May be known rarely worldwide

during the programme or activity (<10-9 per hour)

2 Improbable

About once in 10 years. May rarely have occurred at CIA. Know to be reported in the industry but infrequently

Very unlikely to occur during the programme or activity

1 in 1,000 (<10-7 to 10-9 per hour)

3 RemoteAbout once a year. May occur at CIA once in a few years on average. Reported in the industry occasionally

Possible but most unlikely to occur during the programme or activity

1 in 100 (10-5 to 10-7 per hour)

4 OccasionalAbout once a month. Known to occur at CIA about 10 times per year on average

Can be expected to occur at least once during the programme or activity

1 in 10 (10-3 to 10-5 per hour)

5 FrequentAbout once a week. Known to occur at CIA about 50 times per year on average

Almost certain to occur several times during the programme or activity

1 in 2 (1 to 10-3 per hour)

Figure 5: Risk Probability Matrix

3.4.2. Safety Risk Severity

Safety risk severity is defined as the extent of harm that might reasonably occur as a consequence or outcome of the identified hazard. The severity assessment can be based upon:

Fatalities/injury. How many lives may be lost (employees, passengers, bystanders and the general public)?

Damage. What is the likely extent of aircraft, property or equipment damage? The severity assessment should consider all possible consequences related to an unsafe condition or object, taking into account the worst foreseeable situation.

Risk Severity

Leve

l

Seve

rity Qualitative Severity Description

Health and Safety Operational Safety Security Environment Financial Reputation

and Legal

1

Neg

ligib

le

Minor first aid treatment (e.g. Minor cut/abrasions) causing minimal work interruption

Nuisance or distraction. Procedure violated with no adverse effect. Slightly reduced margin of safety but controlled within existing procedures.

Minor breach of regulations

No Effect Less than £100K

No Implication

2

Min

or

Injury requiring first aid treatment causing inability to continue with current work activity for 7 days or less

Light damage to an aircraft (visible but no adverse effect). Light or moderate damage to vehicles (unfit for use). Short term disruption to operations or some facilities (up to an hour).

Reportable breach of regulations

Minor Effect

Between £100K and £1 million

Limited Localised Implication

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3

Maj

or

Medical treatment required. RIDDOR over 7 day lost time injuries

Moderate to serious damage to an aircraft, unserviceable for repairs. Vehicle, equipment or property damage. Out of service with costly repairs Significant operating limitations and significant disruption, several hours. Demanding workload to key personnel, potential for loss of attention.

Prosecution

Contained Effect

Between £1 million and £3 million

Regional Implication

4

Haza

rdou

s Permanent or life changing injuries. RIDDOR major injuries

Aircraft damaged requiring prolonged major repairs. Vehicle damaged beyond repair. Loss or relocation of facility damaged beyond use (several days or weeks). Very high workload to key personnel, with likely impairment of performance or accuracy.

Short airport closure

Major effect

Between £3 million and £6 million

National Implication

5

Cata

stro

phic

Single or Multiple Deaths

Aircraft destroyed. Vehicle or equipment destroyed. Major fire or explosion with substantial loss of facilities.

Long airport closure

Massive Effect

Greater than £6 million

International Implication

Figure 6: Risk Severity Matrix

3.4.3. Safety Risk Tolerability

A 5x5 risk matrix is used to assess the results of the risk probability and severity assessment.

Risk Index Matrix (Severity x Likelihood)

LikelihoodSeverity

5 - Catastrophic 4 - Hazardous 3 - Major 2 - Minor 1 - Negligible

5 – Frequent Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Review Review

4 – Occasional Unacceptable Unacceptable Review Review Acceptable

3 – Remote Unacceptable Review Review Review Acceptable2 – Improbable Review Review Review Acceptable Acceptable

1 - Extremely Improbable Review Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable AcceptableFigure 7: Risk Index Matrix

The evaluation of risks at Cambridge Airport can have an impact on different areas of the business. To ensure the risk is fully recognised risk assessors must take into account the impact on the safe operation of Cambridge Airport. The table below relates to the risk acceptability and managerial requirements for continued operations with the assessed risk.

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Risk Acceptance Tolerability TableRisk

Index Tolerability Action Required Acceptance of Responsibility

13 - 25 UnacceptableThe risk is unacceptable and major mitigation measures are required to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonably

practicable.

Not Acceptable for sign off at this

level of risk

5 - 12 Review

The level of risk is of concern and mitigation measures are required to reduce the level of risk to as low as reasonably practicable. Where further risk reduction/mitigation is not practical or viable, the risk may be accepted, provided that

the risk is understood and has the endorsement of the Accountable Manager.

Accountable Manager /

Airside Assurance Manager

1 - 4 Acceptable Risk is considered acceptable but should be reviewed if it reoccurs or changes that affect the risk are made.

Department Manager

Figure 8: Risk Acceptance Tolerability

3.4.4. EscalationIf the risk cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level for operations to safely continue the Manager, whose area the risk impacts upon, must escalate the risk to the Accountable Manager through normal reporting lines.

3.4.5. Unforeseen Circumstances - Dynamic Risk AssessmentSometimes short-term situations arise where a full risk assessment is not practical due to time limitations or the size of the project. These short term projects may be handled at Airport Duty Management level but must be recorded at least through the email system to either the Airside Assurance or the Airside Operations Manager.

3.4.6. Safety Risk ReviewAll safety risks must include a review date. Subject to the nature of the hazard a review should take place annually or as a result of an accident/incident or if a proposed change has an effect upon the risk assessment it must be reviewed as part of the change management process.

3.4.7. Risk Assessment CompetenceAll risk assessors should have attended a recognised risk assessors course. Training can be arranged through the MADG OSHE and Compliance department.

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Figure 9: Risk Assessment Flow Chart

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3.5. Human FactorsHuman factors are a key part of any risk assessment, the interface between equipment, procedures or processes and the human element will be included in every risk assessment and incident investigation.

Human Factors Behavioural Classification DefinitionsError The plan of action may be entirely appropriate but the action itself does not go according to plan.

Skill-based errors are associated with three related aspects of human information processing: recognition, memory (an error of omission or lapse) and attention (an error of commission or slip). For example: misinterpreting information on a display or gauge; pulling an incorrect circuit breaker; forgetting to complete a step of a task because of interruption or distraction

Mistake An action that goes according to plan but where the plan is inadequate to achieve the desired goal. Known as ‘cognitive errors’, mistakes can be split into two categories: rule based mistakes or knowledge based mistakes. Mistakes often arise when dealing with a problem for the first time or during an unexpected or novel scenario. Rule based mistakes can be divided into two categories: misapplying a good rule (assumptions) or applying a bad rule (habits). Misapplying good rules can happen in circumstances that share common features for which the rule was intended but where significant differences are overlooked. For example: using known good information based on knowledge of one aircraft type but on a new aircraft type where it is no longer applicable

Situational violation

Where deliberately not following the rules was the only way to complete the task, individuals may assert that, given the circumstances in which they found themselves, the only way to get the task done was to break the rules. For example: under time pressure, an individual uses incorrect equipment to achieve the task as the correct equipment was unserviceable at the time, a pilot continuing with an unstable approach due to fast following traffic

Routine violation Where deliberately not following the rules when completing a particular task was ‘normal’ behaviour (accepted by peers and immediate supervisors) within the organisation in the circumstances

Violation for organisational gain

Deliberately not following rules with the aim of benefitting the organisation. An individual may believe that their actions are for the good of the organisation in terms of a reduction of time, cost or resource; or to achieve organisational goals such as meeting schedules or targets. For example: missing out steps in a task that are judged to be superfluous or that are unachievable within the time available to meet a deadline or schedule

Violation for personal gain

Deliberately not following rules with the aim of benefitting the individual. Motivation based actions can be ‘corner cutting’ to complete a task more quickly or circumvent seemingly laborious procedures. They can also be ‘thrill seeking’ as a means of alleviating boredom or as a demonstration of ability or skill. For example: not completing a task to get away from work on time; not using the correct equipment because it requires effort to obtain or taxiing at excessive speeds to meet a personal deadline

Recklessness A conscious and substantial and unjustifiable disregard of visible and significant risk. Whilst there is no intent to do harm to others recklessness implies that an individual knowingly ignored the potential consequences of their actions. For example: coming into work under the influence of alcohol or knowingly operating a sector in an excessively fatigued state having not taken the required rest period

Sabotage Malicious or wanton damage or destruction. To determine whether an individual’s actions constitute sabotage there needs to be intent for both the actions and the consequence to cause damage or disrupt operations

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Figure 10: Fair System - Behaviours Analysis Flowchart

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3.6. Safety Culture

All Cambridge Airport employees, irrespective of the area in which they work, contribute to safety, and each is personally responsible for ensuring a positive safety culture.

Cambridge Airport operates to the principle of a ‘Just Culture’. The CAA definition of a Just Culture states:

‘Individuals are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training but which result in a reportable event; but Gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated’

Compliance with StandardsAll personnel have the duty to comply with approved standards including organisation policy and procedures, regulatory and government regulations.

Intentional Non-Compliance with StandardsOrganisation management makes a clear distinction between honest mistakes and intentional non-compliance with standards. Honest mistakes occur, and they are addressed through counselling and training.

3.7. Internal Safety InvestigationIt is Cambridge Airport’s primary concern in the interest of safety, to encourage the full and uninhibited reporting of any incident which might affect flight safety however minor.

The purpose of any investigation of an accident, incident or near miss is to establish the facts and identify the causal factors, and where necessary, take measures to prevent any further occurrences. It is not the intention to apportion blame or liability during the investigation.

Occurrence investigation will be the responsibility of department managers in their operational areas.

This process provides guidance for the investigation and record keeping for all reported Accident, Incident, Safety Occurrence or Near Misses at Cambridge Airport.

This process is a summary of the actions to be carried out by Department Managers; it does not replace Departmental Instructions for the requirements of regulatory and local incident investigation.

MADG Safety CellAll reports submitted via the ‘Safety Report’ system will be received by the MADG Safety Cell who collate and upload the details on the Q-Pulse action tracker system and assign an action owner. In

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The Q-Pulse system will then require the follow stages to be actioned: Assess the current risk of the safety report using the 5x5 risk matrix. Conduct an internal investigation to identify any causal factors relating to the incident. Establish and implement any mitigating actions to address the issue. Reassess the residual risk using the 5x5 risk matrix. Feedback the actions taken to the reporter.

The MADG Safety Cell will only close out the report once they are satisfied the appropriate mitigations have been put in place.

Depending on the serious nature of the Safety Report the Safety Cell can assign an Internal Investigation Team to conduct an investigation into the incident.

The results of these investigations are then fed back to the Event Review Group (ERG) who ensures all the causal factors have been identified and the correct mitigation actions are implemented.

All airport related Safety Reports are also reviewed on a weekly basis by the Senior Airport Management team.

4. Safety Assurance

4.1. Safety Performance Monitoring

4.1.1. Key Safety Performance Indicators

Key Safety Performance Indicators (KSPI’s) are the metrics used to measure operational safetyperformance levels at Cambridge Airport. KSPI’s monitor the level of safety performance in the following areas:

ANSP Aircraft Occurrence RWY Incursion Aircraft EmergencyRWY Excursion Aircraft Accident TCAS RA Event Aircraft Incident SRATCOH Breach Un-cleared OperationAirspace Infringement Unsafe ConditionControlled Flight Into Terrain FODNavigation Aids (contributing to an incident or accident) Runway

Drone (unauthorised) Taxiway

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Loss of Separation / AIRPROX ApronLevel Bust GrassInfrastructure Airside DrivingAerodrome Lighting Obstruction to Aircraft Buildings / Facilities SpeedingGround Equipment Un-cleared OperationNavigation Aids Unsafe ManoeuvreVehicles Vehicle AccidentWinter Ground Equipment RTF ProceduresWildlife Hazard Management Vehicle Non-CompliantConfirmed Wildlife Strike Airside PedestriansUnconfirmed Wildlife Strike MADG StaffWildlife Event PassengersGround Handling TenantsAircraft Towing Error Flight CrewCargo / Load Incident VisitorsEquipment Parking Obstruction Airside WorksHazardous Materials Occurrence Within SiteJet Blast / Rotor Wash Occurrence Outside of SiteAircraft Parking Error Health and SafetyMarshalling Occurrence BuildingsAdmin Error EquipmentFuel PeopleContaminated Airside SecuritySpillage Airside SecurityMiss-fuelling Document ControlAdmin Error Document Control Errors

This is included on a table that highlights the top five reports as demonstrated in the example below; this provides a visible method of highlighting the high risk areas.

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4.2. Management of ChangeChanges to processes, people, equipment or infrastructure can create hazards which in turn can affect the safety of the operation. Therefore these impacts of safety need to be identified and implemented safely.

The need for organisational change

The need for organisational change can result from many different triggers. These include: The appointment of new senior managers or a new management team Changes in customer requirements or expectations Changes in the work environment Changes in domestic or global trading conditions An inadequate skills and knowledge base, leading to new training programs Innovations in operational practice Poor performance New technology New ideas about how to do things better New contracts Recognition of operational problems, leading to a reallocation of responsibilities Regulatory or procedural changes Relocation or expansion Staff changeover Change in contractors, or bringing on new contractors

Accountabilities & ResponsibilitiesIt is the responsibility of the department manager to ensure that a competent person or persons is/are appointed to review and assess a change/new procedure.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemProcessAll changes in operational procedures/new procedures shall be documented & assessed for their safety significance prior to a permanent change or introduction of a new procedure.

The process of assessing the safety significance of a permanent change in operational procedure /new procedure is broken down into six parts:

1. Identification of the Permanent Procedure Change/New Procedure required in accordance with departmental instructions

2. Draft Changed/New Procedure3. Safety Assess Changed/New Procedure4. Dissemination and Implementation of the Change/New Procedure5. Review of Changed/New Procedure 6. Document Control of all completed documentation

Part 1 – Identification of Operational Procedure Change/New Procedure RequiredWhere a change in operational procedure/new procedure is identified as necessary. This shall include:

Date and instruction number Background to the change/new procedure Proposed change/new procedure Is the proposed change compliant with regulatory procedures Name of assessor/s

Part 2 – Safety Assess Draft Changed/New ProcedureThis shall include:

Utilisation of a Safety Risk Classification Form Risks Identified Mitigation to any risks identified Any Training Requirements Any associated H&S risks

The department manager will review all changes to Operational Procedures/ New Procedures and identify any staff training required. If staff training is required, the department manager will define and implement a training programme and the records of training will be held in the staff member’s personal folder.

Part 3 – Draft Changed/New ProcedureAn instruction is to be drafted as detailed and an impact assessment carried out.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management SystemWhen the department manager has approved the proposed change/new procedure, the instruction is to be finalised as required by department instructions. A Change operating procedure form and Safety Risk assessment are to be retained on file and sent to the CAA only if requested.

Part 4 - Review of ProcedureA review of relevant documents will be conducted annually or additionally where deemed appropriate by the document owner.

Part 5 - Completion of DocumentationOnly the department manager is authorised to sign the final section of the permanent change of operational procedure/New Procedure form to authorise the change/new procedure to be implemented.

Part 6 – Documentation and Record ManagementAll documentation associated with the Permanent Change in Operational Procedure/New Procedure is to be forwarded to the department manager for retention.

Figure 11: Management of Change Flowchart

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4.3. Audits

Safety audits are used to assess the level of compliance with the applicable regulatory framework and the organisational SMS processes and procedures; to verify the effectiveness of such processes and procedures and to identify corrective measures if needed. Planning of the audits will take into account the safety significance of the processes to be audited and the results of previous audits. Audits are designated as either internal or external audits. An internal audit is carried out by Airport staff; an external audit is carried out by a qualified person who is not employed by Cambridge Airport.

Airside Safety audits are carried out by:

Audit Area Summary Auditor Minimum Frequency

Airport Internal Departments

Ensure compliance with SMS and other regulatory documentation

MADG QA Department

Annually

Fuel Management

Compliance with CAP748 for those companies who store aviation fuel or who have responsibilities for “into plane fuelling”

External Annually

Tenants To assess Tenants compliance with the airport’s requirements for airside operations and the Aerodrome Manual

Airside Assurance Manager

Annually

Aircraft Turnaround

Ensure safe operation and compliance with CAP642

Airside Operations

Twice Weekly

Driver Training Ensure compliance with CAP790 Airside Operations

Annually

4.4. Alcohol and Other DrugsAnyone airside at Cambridge Airport under the influence of, or consuming Alcohol or other drugs will be the subject of The MADG Drugs and Alcohol Policy and will be escorted off the airside areas.

4.5. Contracted ActivitiesCambridge Airport will remain responsible for the activities and safety standards any external service providers.

As an aviation service provider we will often employ contractors in areas such as catering, ground handling, infrastructure, aircraft maintenance and fuel services. These contractors will be referred to as ‘third party interfaces’. Although we have probably always had contractual arrangements with providers the SMS provides both an opportunity (and an obligation) to extend these contractual arrangements to include safety performance.

ResponsibilitiesThe Manager responsible for the contracted third party is to ensure that all external suppliers provide safety assurance of their services and products and comply fully with legal and statutory requirements.

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Aerodrome ManualPart B: Aerodrome Management System5. Safety Promotion

5.1. Safety CommunicationsSafety communication is essential to maintaining a robust safety system, ensuring staff are fully informed about the SMS and their feedback is captured and acted upon where appropriate. Safety communication should:

Ensure all staff are fully aware of the SMS Convey safety-critical information Explain why particular actions are taken Explain why safety procedures are introduced or changed

At Cambridge Airport safety communication is carried out through a number of methods, these are: Aerodrome Manual Airside Information Notices Safety notices Works Briefs Briefings or toolbox talks Safety Committees Staff Face to Face Meeting Refresher training

5.2. Training and Education

IntroductionTo ensure the safe operation of Cambridge Airport all Department Managers are to ensure their staff are fully trained to complete any safety critical duties in accordance with either CAA requirements or a local training plan.

Each department will identify their own training and competency requirements for their staff and ensure training is recorded and records maintained.

Competencies and QualificationsThe training of staff is just the beginning of the process for safety requirements. Once trained personnel must be assessed for competency and currency.

Training – All staff that carry out a safety task are to have received adequate training through either an approved external training provider or in-house training when approved by the regulatory authority.

Competency - Competency means possession of the required level of knowledge, skills, experience and where required, proficiency in English, to permit the safe and efficient provision of aviation services.

Currency - To maintain your currency you will need to work on each qualification for which you hold a license or approval for a particular number of hours or times during a notified period. Department Managers are responsible for publishing the currency requirements in

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training documentation, but it is the individual’s responsibility to ensure they satisfy the requirements.

Safety Training Safety is everyone’s responsibility; therefore it is essential that all personnel are given an appropriate level of training to fulfil their safety responsibilities. Managers are responsible for ensuring all members of staff attend safety training to further their understanding of their responsibilities and the fundamental principles of a safety management system.

Safety Management System Training SyllabusAll members of staff involved in safety significant posts must be adequately trained to fill the post. This training will involve professional training relating to the post held and further training relating to either all airside operatives or supplementary duties carried out. This training must be carried out to ensure all members of staff are able to operate safely within a live airport environment.

It is the head of department’s responsibility to ensure all personnel under their command have attended and, if required, passed any courses relevant to their area of expertise including maintenance of competence scheme. A record of all courses attended and the outcome of that course, i.e. a copy of the certificate of attendance or pass, is to be available on the individuals’ personal file. In addition Department Managers are to ensure an adequate, documented, training plan for all members of staff is available.

Safety Management System training and airside awareness training will be carried out by all Airport staff prior to working on the airside areas.

6. Facilities and Equipment Requirements

Cambridge Airport will ensure that adequate facilities and equipment are provided to enable safety tasks and processes to be completed.

7. Record Keeping

Cambridge Airport will ensure that records of aircraft movements are made as per AMC2 ADR.OR.D.035.Each airport department will store and maintain adequate records for a designated time period in order to aid any safety related investigations.

8. Air Navigation Order Article 257The CAA’s power to prevent aircraft flying in accordance with Air Navigation Order 2016 Article 257 extends to any person authorised by the CAA at Cambridge Airport.

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At Cambridge Airport the CAA has authorised the following: Airport General Manager - Nathan Deverell Airside Assurance Manager - David Cran

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Aerodrome ManualPart C: Aerodrome Site Description

PART C: AERODROME SITE DESCRIPTION

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Aerodrome ManualPart C: Aerodrome Site Description

This Data is for Information Only. Do Not Use for Flight Planning Purposes.For Up To Date Information Please Refer to the UKAIP EGSC or Current NOTAMs

1. Introduction

Cambridge Airport lies immediately to the east of the city of Cambridge. The village of Teversham lies to the east of the airport site.

The main runway, bearing 05/23, is aligned southwest-northeast and is 1964m long. All terminals, aprons, cargo buildings and airside facilities are situated on land to the northwest of the main runway. There are also two grass runways; one runs parallel to the main runway and is situated southeast of it, the other is a short cross runway bearing 10/28. There are four taxiways serving the main runway from the northwest.

The Airport operates a mixture of traffic including private charter passenger flights, business aviation, general aviation, Air Ambulance helicopter and maintenance positioning flights. Along with aircraft arrival and departures the airport has flying training and engine ground running which all combine to add to the Airports diverse aviation environment.

2. Aerodrome Local Area Plan

Figure 12: Local Area Map

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Aerodrome ManualPart C: Aerodrome Site Description3. Aerodrome Boundary Maps

Figure 13: Airport Boundary

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Figure 14: Boundary of the Area set aside for the Movement of Aircraft Requiring the Use of a licensed aerodrome

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4. Aerodrome Chart

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Aerodrome ManualPart C: Aerodrome Site DescriptionFigure 15: Aerodrome Chart (Not for Planning Purposes) – The latest Aerodrome Chart is contained in the UK AIP EGSC entry.

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5. Airfield Map

The latest edition of the airfield map is held on the internal intranet Airport SharePoint Site.

6. Aerodrome Physical Characteristics

8.1. Aerodrome Location, Elevation and Reference TemperatureAerodrome Reference point Lat. 521218.09N (Mid point Runway 05/23) Long. 0001030.10E

Aerodrome elevation 47ft AMSLApron 16 elevation 49ft AMSLAerodrome Reference Temperature 19˚ C

8.2. Aerodrome Pavement Classification Strength Details of the Aerodrome Pavement Classification Strength are contained in Part D of this manual.

8.3. INS CheckpointsINS checkpoints have been surveyed in compliance with the WGS84 specification; these are contained in the UK AIP.

8.4. Visual & Non-Visual Aids

8.4.1. Visual Aids

8.4.1.1. General All visual aids comply with the requirements of ICAO Annex 14, and EASA CS-ADR-DSN unless

otherwise stated. All visual aids are subject to inspection for damage, deterioration and serviceability as

described in this manual. All visual aids are maintained, repaired and replaced in accordance with regulatory

requirements.

8.4.1.2. Signals There are two illuminated wind sleeves, visible from all runway thresholds. Marshalling signals provided comply with Rule 62 of the Rules of the Air Regulations.

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8.4.1.3. Surface Markings Painted surface markings are provided on the hard runway in accordance with EASA CS-ADR-

DSN. Taxiway and Apron markings are in accordance with EASA CS-ADR-DSN unless otherwise

stated. Temporary marking of closed aircraft movement areas is achieved by the use of mobile ‘Bad

Ground’ markers in accordance with EASA CS-ADR-DSN. These areas are lit with red portable lights at night and in periods of Low Visibility Conditions.

Any Work in Progress will be marked in order to ensure it complies with EASA CS-ADR-DSN. These areas will be lit with red portable lights at night and in periods of Low Visibility Conditions.

8.4.1.4. Signs Illuminated Runway Mandatory Holding Position signs are located at each runway access at

the hard standing taxiways. Non-Illuminated Runway Mandatory Holding Position signs are located at each runway

access on grass taxiways. Hard standing parking areas are marked with yellow numbered parking spots. Grass parking areas are numbered by rows.

8.4.1.5. Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL)Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL) is provided for the continued safe operation of aircraft at night and in periods of Low Visibility Conditions.

8.4.1.6. Approach, Runway, Taxiway and Apron LightingLighting at Cambridge Airport is in accordance with EASA CS-ADR-DSN requirements. Full details are contained in Part D of this Manual.

8.4.1.7. Obstruction LightingMADG Facilities maintains a comprehensive record of obstacle lighting locations. They are responsible for the provision of Obstacle Lighting on the airfield.

Obstacles off the Aerodrome Site that require red obstacle lighting are the responsibility of the owner of the obstacle.

8.4.1.8. Non Standard Taxiway / Apron Local MarkingsView Marking Meaning

Single White line Indicates the limit of the Code B taxiway cleared strip width.

Single Dashed White Line Indicates the limit of the Code A taxiway cleared strip width.

Single White Line with a Parallel Dashed White Line

Indicates ‘Give Way’ at the boundary between active Maintenance Areas and Taxiway Areas.

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8.4.1.9. Uncontrolled Pedestrian Taxiway Crossing PointsUncontrolled pedestrian crossing points have been established at Cambridge Airport to regulate the areas that pedestrians may cross Taxiway Alpha without prior approval from Air Traffic Control.

These are marked with a Triangle with an Aircraft inside. Pedestrians are to give way to aircraft and vehicles.

These are located at: The Airport Fire Service Station Hangar 1 Tenants GA Compound

8.4.2. Non-Visual Aids

Details of all non visual aids to navigation are contained in the UK AIP for EGSC. The following instrument approach procedures are available at Cambridge Airport:

ILS RNAV (GNSS) NDB SRA

8.5. ObstaclesCambridge Airport has a check survey carried out every year in accordance with regulatory requirements. Any obstructions that will affect the safeguarded areas at Cambridge Airport are published in the UK AIP.

7. Rescue Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) Level of Protection

The Airport RFFS Category is five (5) during operational hours. Higher Categories up to Category nine (9) may be available with 24 hours notice after suitable staff and resource analysis has been completed.

Prevention of FireSmoking is not permitted airside. The Airport Fire Service will be notified of any Hot Works Permits issued for airside works.

8. Aerodrome Operations

The types of aerodrome operations that Cambridge Airport is authorised for are as stated in the Aerodrome Certificate, reproduced in Part A of this manual.

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Aerodrome ManualPart D: Aerodrome Information Reported to the AIS

PART D: AERODROME INFORMATION REPORTED TO THE AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICE

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Aerodrome ManualPart D: Aerodrome Information Reported to the AIS

This Data is for Information Only. Do Not Use for Flight Planning Purposes.For Up To Date Information Please Refer to the UKAIP EGSC or Current NOTAMs

1. Name and Address1.1. Aerodrome Name and Address

Cambridge International Airport is the trading name of Cambridge Airport.Airport Address

Cambridge International AirportNewmarket RoadCambridgeCB5 8RX

Licensee AddressMarshall of Cambridge Aerospace LtdAirport HouseThe AirportCambridgeCB5 8RY

Telephone01223 373535 Airside Operations01223 373737 Switchboard (24 Hours)

2. Aerodrome LocationCambridge Airport is located 1.5 nm east of Cambridge City. Geographical CoordinatesThe Aerodrome Reference Point (ARP), at the centre of Runway 05/23, based on the World Geodetic System – 1984 (WGS-84) is:

Lat: 521218N Long: 0001030E

3. Aerodrome ElevationAerodrome Elevation: 47ftAerodrome Reference Temperature: 19 degrees CelsiusGeoid Undulation: 151ft

Runway Threshold Elevation Geoid Undulation

05 (Main) 36 ft 151 ft23 (Main 47 ft 151 ft05 (Grass) 36 ft 151 ft23 (Grass) 36 ft 151 ft10 35 ft 151 ft28 35 ft 151 ft

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4. Aerodrome BeaconLocation 521220.67N 0001057.67E. 500 m east north east of the ARP.Colour Flashing GreenCode 'CI'.

5. Aerodrome Dimensions5.1. Runways

RunwayDesignation

05 (main) 23 (main) 05 (grass) 23 (grass) 10 28

ICAO Code 4E 4E 2B 2B 1B 1BHeading ° (True)

049.87 229.89 049.91 229.92 099.89 279.89

Type Non Precision

Instrument

CAT I Precision Instrument with obstacle free zone

Visual Visual Visual Visual

Length (m) 1964 1964 899 899 439 439Width (m) 46 46 35 35 35 35Surface Grooved Marshall Asphalt Grass GrassSlope overall

0.14% up 0.83% down first 400m

- - - -

PCN 50/F/C/X/T - - - -Stopway - - - - - -Threshold Location

521202.44N 0000959.86E

521235.55N 0001103.83E

521211.12N 0001032.14E

521229.87N 0001108.40E

521210.28N 0001020.71E

521207.84N 0001043.49E

Threshold Elevation (ft)

36 47 36 36 35 35

Displaced Threshold (m)

Displaced by 230

Displaced by 145

- - - -

TORA (m) 1843 1886 899 899 439 439TODA (m) 1952 2019 899 899 439 439ASDA (m) 1843 1886 899 899 439 439LDA (m) 1628 1742 899 899 439 439Clearway (m)

183 x 210 161 x 210 - - - -

Runway 05/23 Hard Intersection Departure Declared Distances TORA (m)Departure Runway Hold Alpha Hold Bravo Hold Charlie Hold Delta

05 - - 580 125823 1623 1519 1202 -

5.2. Length, Width and Surface Type of StripRunway 05/23 MainAn asphalt/grass strip that is provided:

150m laterally on each side of the centreline of the runway and its extended centreline throughout the length of the strip

60m prior to the 90m RESA at each end of the runway.

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Aerodrome ManualPart D: Aerodrome Information Reported to the AISRunway 05/23 GrassA grass strip that is provided:

40m laterally on each side of the centreline of the runway and its extended centreline throughout the length of the strip

30m before the threshold and beyond the end of the runwayRunway 10/28A grass strip that is provided:

30m laterally on each side of the centreline of the runway and its extended centreline throughout the length of the strip

30m before the threshold and beyond the end of the runway

5.3. Runway End Safety AreaRunway 05 Main

Undershoot 230m Overrun 90m

Runway 23 Main Undershoot 144m Overrun 90m

5.4. StopwaysNo stopways are provided.

5.5. TaxiwaysDesignator ICAO

CodeTaxiway

or Taxilane

Hold Location

Width (m)

PCN Centreline to Nearest

Object (m)

Surface

Alpha (from RWY to B)

D Taxiway 521235.64N0001056.39E

20 42/R/C/X/T 37 Concrete / Asphalt

Alpha (from B to Customs Apron)

B Taxiway 15 14/R/C/X/T 20 Asphalt

Alpha (from Customs Apron

to Apron 2)

A Taxiway 15 14/R/C/X/T 15.5 Asphalt

Bravo D Taxiway 521233.70N0001051.89E

20 15/R/C/X/T 37 Asphalt

Charlie (From RWY to A)

C Taxiway 521226.75N0001038.06E

15 24/F/C/X/U 26 Asphalt

Charlie (from Compass Base

to Tower)

B Taxiway 15 11/R/C/W/T 20 Concrete / Asphalt

Charlie (from Tower to Apron

2

B Taxilane 15 22/R/C/W/T 22.5 Concrete

Delta E Taxiway 521214.90N0001015.42E

23 50/R/C/W/T 43.5 Concrete

Juliet A Taxiway - 7.5 - - GrassLima A Taxiway - 7.5 - - GrassMike A Taxiway - 7.5 - - Grass

Uniform A Taxiway - 7.5 - - GrassVictor A Taxiway - 7.5 - - Grass

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5.6. ApronsApron Designation

Surface PCN Remarks

1 Asphalt 14/F/C/X/T Only aircraft accessing Hangar 1 are permitted in this area unless previously authorised by Airport Operations.

2 Concrete 22/R/C/W/T -12 Concrete 8/R/C/W/T Aircraft Wash Facility only, use of this area is by strict permission

from MADG Production.16 Concrete 23/R/C/W/T Aircraft Maintenance Area only, use of this area is by strict

permission from MADG Production.17 Concrete 50/R/C/W/T Aircraft Maintenance Area only, use of this area is by strict

permission from MADG Production.22 Concrete 22/R/C/W/T -Customs Apron (North)

Concrete 17/R/C/W/T -

Customs Apron (South)

Concrete 23/R/C/X/T -

Fingers Asphalt - Due to the location of this area aircraft parking only accessible with use of an aircraft tug. No aircraft under power to access this area.

GA Parking Area Grass - All aircraft are subject to self parking in this area.Engine Testing Bay

Concrete 42/R/C/X/T Use of this facility is by arrangement only through Airport Operations

Compass Base Asphalt 24/F/C/X/U Due to the location, on Taxiway Charlie, use of this facility is by arrangement only through Airport Operations

6. Approach Procedures Visual Aids6.1. Approach and Runway Lighting

RWY 05 23High Intensity Approach 420 m one cross bar 900 m five cross barThreshold Elevated High Intensity green

wingbars at displaced thresholdFlush green threshold bar and Elevated High Intensity wingbars at displaced threshold

PAPI / MEHT LHS 3° 46 ft. Dist from Threshold: 296m

LHS 3° 39 ft. Dist from Threshold: 303 m

Runway Centre Line NoneRunway edge Elevated HI bidirectional with Omni-directional component WhiteRunway end Flush High Intensity bidirectional Red

6.2. Marking and Lighting of TaxiwaysTaxiway Designation

Edge Lights Centre -line lights

Holding Boards Wig Wags / Guard Lights

Stop Bars

A Blue reflective markings

- IFR illuminated Yes Nil

B Blue reflective markings

- IFR illuminated Yes Nil

C Elevated Blue Nil IFR illuminated Yes YesD Elevated Blue Nil IFR illuminated Yes YesJ Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilK Nil VFR not illuminated Nil Nil

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Aerodrome ManualPart D: Aerodrome Information Reported to the AISL Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilM Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilU1 Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilU2 Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilV1 Nil VFR not illuminated Nil NilV2 Nil VFR not illuminated Nil Nil

6.3. Marking and Lighting of ApronsApron Designation Light Stanchion Adjacent Hangar Lighting Marking1 Yes Yes -2 - Yes Aircraft Spot12 - Yes -16 - Yes -17 - Yes -22 - Yes -Customs Apron (North) - - Aircraft SpotCustoms Apron (South) Yes - Aircraft SpotFingers - Yes -GA Parking Area - - -Engine Testing Bay - - -

6.4. Lighting Standby Power AvailabilityThe National Grid supplies electrical power for airfield lighting, navigation aids and other essential equipment. Airfield lighting is powered from the south works No.1 sub-station. A separate sub-station on the airfield boundary supplies power to the AR15 radar.

In the event of a mains power failure standby generators cut in automatically to provide continuous power to all airfield essential services.

6.5. VOR CheckpointsNot applicable.

6.6. Standard Taxi RoutesTaxiway / Taxilane Restriction

Alpha (from RWY to B) When the Engine Running Bay is in use by any aircraft the taxiway is only available for Code B aircraft movements.When the Engine Testing Bay is in use by large aircraft that infringe Taxiway Alpha this portion of Taxiway Alpha is closed to aircraft movements.

Alpha (from B to Customs Apron

When aircraft are parked on the area adjacent to the FBO that portion of Taxiway Alpha is closed to any other aircraft movements.

Bravo When the Engine Testing Bay is in use by large aircraft that infringe Taxiway Alpha Taxiway Bravo is closed to aircraft movements.

Charlie (From RWY to A) When Compass Swings are in progress on the Compass Base that area is closed to all movements until the Compass Base has been vacated.

Charlie (from Compass Base to Tower)

None

Charlie (from Tower to Apron 2

None

Delta None

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6.7. Obstacles (Current list published via UK AIP and NOTAM)In Approach / Take-Off Areas

Obstacle Type Obstacle Position Elevation Obstruction Lighting Type/Colour

Where Promulgated

Building 521156.96N 0000938.05E 78 ft No UKAIPLamp Posts 521155.36N 0000946.30E 64 ft No UKAIPVehicles on road 521154.26N 0000951.10E 66 ft No UKAIPLamp Posts 521153.79N 0000951.71E 77 ft No UKAIPLamp Posts 521153.57N 0000953.52E 78 ft No UKAIPCrane C033.15 521153.79N 0000823.32E 341 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C063.15 521118.98N 0000757.42E 341 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C064.15 521118.81N 0000754.40E 174 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C065.15 521116.86N 0000754.79E 227 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C066.15 521114.58N 0000755.38E 364 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C017.15 521041.88N 0000720.20E 295 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C050.15 521021.59N 0000719.50E 211 ft Yes/Red UK AIPVehicles on road 521240.93N 0001106.18E 63 ft No UKAIPLamp Posts 521240.33N 0001100.96E 77 ft No UKAIPMound 521238.80N 0001055.51E 79 ft No UKAIP

In Circling Area at AerodromeObstacle Type Obstacle Position Elevation Obstruction Lighting

Type/Colour Where Promulgated

Crane C073.15 521239.28N 0000615.34E 263 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C021.15 521231.64N 0000716.21E 244 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C016.15 521231.16N 0000823.86E 302 ft Yes/Red UK AIPILS/DME Aerials 521226.26N 0001054.56E 61 ft Yes UKAIPWindsleeve 521225.90N 0001053.76E 61 ft Yes UKAIPChimney 521225.56N 0001005.88E 178 ft No UKAIPCrane C067.15 521207.43N 0000732.71E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPWindsleeve 521203.81N 0001010.92E 62 ft Yes UKAIPAR 15 Radar 521203.07N 0001039.42E 81 ft Yes UKAIPCrane C070.15 521158.74N 0000725.86E 216 ft Yes/Red UK AIPChurch 521156.25N 0000738.70E 253 ft No UKAIPCrane C055.15 521141.76N 0000808.14E 163 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C032.15 521141.63N 0000812.32E 223 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C056.15 521140.48N 0000807.65E 160 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C035.15 521140.20N 0000811.73E 274 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C071.15 521035.20N 0000810.78E 211 ft Yes/Red UK AIPChimney 521033.24N 0000825.90E 258 ft Yes UKAIPCrane C044.15 521030.80N 0000808.00E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C037.15 521030.10N 0000808.00E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C038.15 521029.10N 0000804.00E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C043.15 521028.60N 0000808.60E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C030.15 521028.53N 0000817.29E 303 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C039.15 521027.80N 0000806.50E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C042.15 521027.60N 0000801.80E 340 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C019.15 521024.52N 0000810.14E 215 ft Yes/Red UK AIPCrane C020.15 521023.92N 0000807.25E 194 ft Yes/Red UK AIPMast 521011.45N 0001128.57E 366 ft No UKAIP

6.8. Altimeter Pre-Flight Check LocationsApron 16 – 49 ft AMSL

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6.9. Disabled Aircraft RemovalThe person responsible for coordinating the removal of a disabled aircraft at Cambridge Airport is the Airport Duty Manager (ADM). The ADM can be contacted on 01223 373535 or [email protected] during aerodrome operating hours. The removal of disabled aircraft is the responsibility of the aircraft owner as detailed in the procedure contained in Part E of this Manual.

6.10. Rescue and Fire FightingCivil Category Requirements and Equipment Available in accordance with ICAO Doc 9137, Part 1, Rescue and Fire Fighting. This complies with the media requirements in CAP 168.

APPLIANCE WATER FOAM DISCHARGE RATE SECONDARY MEDIACobra 1 12,500lts 1,600lts 5,300lts 200kg Monnex 100kg BCFCobra 2 10,500lts 1,500lts 5,000lts 100kg MonnexCobra 3 10,000lts 1,280lts 5,000lts 100kg BCF

Aerodrome Fire CategoryThe aerodrome RFFS Category is Cat 5.Higher category (up to Category 8) may be available with 24 hours prior notice.

6.11. Aerodrome DerogationsCAA

Number Variation Non-Compliance

1 Engine running bay and adjacent security fence by road on NE edge of aerodrome infringe strip by approx 35m and 55m respectively

CAP 168, Chapter 4

6 Addenbrookes Hospital infringes IHS by 25m CAP 168, Chapter 47 Designation signage and markings for parallel runways 05/23 grass and

05/23 concrete (main) are not supplemented by the letters L and RCAP 168, Chapter 7

8 1. Longitudinal slopes on runway 05/23 exceed the 1:80 maximum2. Longitudinal slopes (first and last quarters) on runway 05/23 exceed

the 1:125 required3. Longitudinal slope changes on Runway 05/23 exceed the 1.5%

maximum4. Longitudinal slope of three transitional curves on runway 05/23 fall

below the minimum curve of 30,000m as required5. Distance between slope changes is not compliant6. The transverse slope on one side of runway 05/23 does not meet the

minimum crossfall of less than 1% as required

CAP 168, Chapter 3, Para 3.3.2CAP 168, Chapter 3, Para 3.3.3CAP 168, Chapter 3, Para 3.3.5CAP 168, Chapter 3, Para 3.3.6(a)CAP 168, Chapter 3, Para 3.3.2

9 Runway markings are non-compliant with CAP 168, but are compliant with EASA certification specifications

CAP 168, Chapter 7

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational Procedures

PART E: AERODROME OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresIntroductionAirside Operational Procedures (AOP)The Airside Operational Procedures detail the procedures, instructions and guidance to be followed in order to ensure the safe, compliant and efficient operation of the aerodrome.

Each AOP starts with a Policy statement indicating the intent under which the AOP is written. Wherever possible procedures covering a similar area or subject are group together under one AOP and listed in the Procedural Content.

AOP 01. Airside Security

Content

Coordination with security agencies Prevention of unauthorised entry into the movement area

Policy

Access to operational areas is strictly controlled by legislation and additionally by local procedure in order to maintain the security and safety of airport operations.

As well as complying with statutory requirements, Cambridge Airport will operate procedures to ensure that access to the aircraft movement area and various sub-areas within it are denied to all but those parties specifically requiring to do so in the course of their duties, and to ensure that such parties are adequately trained, briefed, and equipped to enter those areas safely.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 01 Airside Security

AOP 02. Control of Vehicles Airside

Content

Airside Driving Regulations Airside Vehicle Regulations The Lighting and Marking of Vehicles and other Mobile Objects

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Policy

Airside Driving RegulationsThe Driving in airside areas presents many specific challenges requiring different knowledge and skills to those required for public roads. Furthermore, poor discipline and lack of competence by airside drivers has one of the greatest potentials for hazard to aircraft operations. Holding a UK driving licence does not in itself make a person competent to be in charge of a vehicle in an airside area.

For these reasons Cambridge Airport will require airside drivers to undergo specific training by a competent provider and to regularly refresh these skills. A permit system, code of conduct, and a disciplinary process will underpin the objective of ensuring safe airside driving. This will apply both to driving generally, and to the specifics of operating individual types of vehicles. As well as meeting statutory requirements, procedures for obtaining a permit and operating a vehicle airside will follow the requirements to CAP790. Airside Vehicle RegulationsAll vehicles and trailed equipment operating airside at Cambridge Airport must be maintained and inspected in accordance with CAA CAP 642 Airside Safety Management and DVSA Regulations. A maintenance system whilst important will not on its own ensure quality maintenance is obtained. Effective management of the operator’s fleet by persons competent to do so will provide the best method of quality control.

A robust maintenance and safety inspection regime must be in place to ensure that vehicles/equipment do not endanger drivers, aircraft, persons or property and are fit for their intended purpose.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 02 Control of Vehicles Airside

AOP 03. Control of Airside Works

Content

Control of Airside Works Management of Contractors Changes to the Aerodrome Infrastructure

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Policy

The control of airside works will be managed in such a way as to minimise the operational impact while providing a safe environment for continued operation of the airport by customers and stakeholders. This is achieved through a partnership approach with the contractor, through gooddesign, risk assessment, a permit system, and active monitoring of safety performance.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 03 Control of Airside Works

AOP 04. Aerodrome Maintenance

Content

Aerodrome Sweeping Plan AGL Maintenance Airfield Habitat Management

Policy

Cambridge Airport conducts an aerodrome maintenance programme which applies assessment, monitoring and preventive maintenance where appropriate in order to maintain aerodrome facilities in a condition which does not impair the safety of aeronautical operations.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 04 Aerodrome Maintenance

AOP 05. Aerodrome Inspection and Reporting

Content

Three Tier Inspection Process AGL Inspections Runway Friction Assessment Process Control of Foreign Object Debris (FOD)

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Policy

In order to ensure that the aerodrome, associated aids and infrastructure remain suitable and compliant for the safe operation of aircraft there is a requirement to conduct regular inspections.

The Three-Tier Inspection Process is designed to inspect each area of the aerodrome at increasing levels of detail from regular daily inspections through to detailed monthly walking inspections of the runway.

The inspection regime will aim to ensure that runways and associated infrastructure are safe for use by all types of aircraft using Cambridge Airport. Inspections often form the final ‘link in the safety chain,’ they provide the opportunity to identify the conditions under which pilots and operators will be operating. The importance of inspections must not be underestimated.

Runway Friction Assessment ProcessRunway surface friction assessments are essential to ensure the safe operation of aircraft.

To ensure that the runway surface friction level does not fall below an acceptable level, Cambridge Airport will carry out friction assessments in accordance with the minimum standards set down in CAP 683 (The Assessment of Runway Friction for Maintenance Purposes).

The runway friction is measured every 11 months based on the current annual aircraft movement rates.

Foreign Object Debris (FOD)Foreign Object Debris (FOD) is any object, material or liquid that could cause damage to an aircraft. It represents one of the most serious but avoidable hazards to aircraft on the ground. Airport activity generates a great deal of waste material and debris. Examples of commonly found FOD include:

Packaging and wrappings Wood, wire, screws and nails Vehicle and equipment mechanical components Baggage components, such as strapping, wheels, padlocks, handles etc Newspapers, baggage labels, boarding cards Debris from aircraft cabin ‘gash bags’ Catering waste Construction materials Equipment and materials left by aircraft engineers Natural materials (plant fragments and wildlife) Runway and taxiway debris (concrete / asphalt, joint sealant)

If not properly controlled, this debris can end up on the movement area where it can present a significant risk to aircraft and airside workers. Hence, the importance of preventing the occurrence of FOD and removing any that does find its way onto the movement area should never be underestimated.

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresProcedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 05 Aerodrome Inspection Process

AOP 06. Apron Management

Content

Transfer of Aircraft from ATC to Ground Handling Aircraft Parking Allocation Marshalling and ‘Follow Me’ service Aircraft Chocking and Marking Aircraft Towing Aircraft Ground Running and use of GPU/APU Engine Start and Push Back Protection from Jet Blast Dangerous Goods Aircraft Washes Excess Traffic Contingency Plan

Policy

Aircraft Parking AllocationCambridge Airport retains full authority and control over the allocation of parking provided to aircraft.

Whilst a particular operator flights may be assigned to a specific Apron there are no parking areas dedicated to the operation of individual services except where security or border control requirements dictate otherwise.

A system of parking allocation according to flight type will be agreed between the Airport Manager and MADG Production and amended from time to time. This agreement covers service levels and customer expectations and may be overridden if required for reasons of aircraft safety.

Aircraft TowingIt is the responsibility of Companies which undertake aircraft towing to provide sufficient training to all operatives thereby ensuring that they are competent to operate in the relevant airfield areas. A copy of the latest pushback procedures must be located in the tug cab.

It is the responsibility of the tug drivers to ensure that:

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The tow vehicle, tow bar and associated equipment are serviceable for use and that towing is in accordance with the relevant Agreed Company procedures

Whilst towing in confined areas or around aircraft or other obstacles, the tug driver is responsible for wing tip clearance, in accordance with Rule 42 of the Air Navigation Order.

When aircraft are to be moved during periods of bad visibility or at night, the aircraft must be adequately illuminated at each extremity, i.e. navigation lights ‘on’ and the tractor must display headlights and an anti-collision beacon

ATC permission must be obtained before all aircraft tows. NB - ATC clearance does not imply wing tip clearance

Aircraft WashesCambridge Airport recognises that the washing of airframes is necessary both to ensure the safe condition of the aircraft but also to maintain its appearance. Washing of airframes will be permitted on the airport site, however because of the need to protect the environment from pollutants used in this activity, the locations and the times when washing may take place will be restricted.

Excess Traffic Contingency PlanCambridge Airport is a diversion alternate for many airline operators. Cambridge Airport welcomes this role and will seek, along with its service partners, to provide efficient operational support to flights diverting into Cambridge, wherever possible. At peak times however, the airport may be experiencing capacity shortfalls and priority must in these circumstances be given to Scheduled flights. Flights requesting to divert into Cambridge for a genuine emergency reason where the safety of the aircraft and those on board may be at risk will be given all due assistance.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 06 Apron Management

AOP 07. Aviation Fuel Management

Content

Enforcement of safety precautions during refuelling/defueling operations Fuel Spill Procedures

Policy

Aviation Fuel ManagementThe majority of aviation fuel provision at Cambridge Airport is provided by the Cambridge Airport Fuel Department and therefore the responsibility for the management of this facility remains with Cambridge Airport.

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Some operators have been given permission to control their own fuel provision therefore responsibility for the management of the aviation fuel at Cambridge Airport including (but not limited to) aviation fuel storage, distribution (both to the installation and from the installation to aircraft), quality and fitness of fuel for use in aircraft and the activity of fuelling to aircraft rests with the respective operator. As aerodrome licensee, Cambridge Airport will continue to monitor and audit the management, quality control and delivery procedures of the fuelling activities.

Fuelling activities at Cambridge Airport are undertaken by the fuel suppliers in accordance with CAP 748 (Aircraft Fuelling and Fuel Installation Management), in conjunction with Explosive Atmospheres (ATEX) and Dangerous Substances Explosive Atmosphere Regulations (DSEAR). Guidance material published by the fuel industry Joint Inspection Group (JIG) is also applied.

Fuel Spill ProceduresSpillage of fluids and substances on the airport is an ever-present risk and has the potential to be hazardous. Substances regularly handled at the airport are variously flammable, corrosive, explosive, radioactive, or otherwise harmful to health and to the environment. The handling and storage of these substances must be carefully controlled and robust procedures will be in place to handle spillages. The handling of spillages will address the principal concerns of maintain the safety of aircraft operations, health and safety or staff and passengers, and protection of the environment. Any fuel spillages and subsequent actions are the responsibility of the aircraft operator, owner or maintenance team.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 07 Aviation Fuel Management

AOP 08. Engine Ground Runs and Compass Calibrations

Content

Engine Ground Runs Compass Calibrations

Policy

Engine Ground Runs Cambridge Airport recognises that the ground running of aircraft engines for maintenance purposes is a necessary activity in the operation of the airport. However, this activity creates noise and jet blast, both of which are potentially hazardous and disruptive to the surrounding community if not carefully controlled. The Airport will operate procedures to allow aircraft ground running to take place under the supervision of competent persons, at times and at locations which take due regard of the need to protect persons working at the airport from noise and jet blast hazard, and the local community from unreasonable and avoidable disturbance.

Compass Calibrations

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresCambridge Airport recognises the need for on-site maintenance activities in support of commercial operations and will provide such engineering support infrastructure as can be reasonably accommodated within the airport site. Presently, this policy extends to provision of a Compass Swing Base for the calibration of aircraft compasses to Class 1 standard. The siting of the facility is within one of the principal taxiways and its use is therefore restricted to certain times.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 08 Engine Ground Runs and Compass Calibrations

AOP 09. Night Operations

Policy

Operations during the hours of darkness can impact the safe operation of aircraft if not controlled appropriately. Cambridge Airport is committed to providing facilities and procedures to enable the airport to remain safe to operations during periods of darkness. This procedure demonstrates the alternative procedures for night operations that mitigate the operational aspects that ensure continued safe operations at night.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 09 Night Operations

AOP 10. Operations of Aircraft with a Higher Code

Policy

Very Large Aircraft can be expected to operate at Cambridge Airport on an increasingly frequent basis as the airport’s business expands. These large types place correspondingly larger demands upon the airfield infrastructure. Cambridge Airport will provide infrastructure and procedures to enable such aircraft to use the airport. However, for commercial and logistical reasons it will be necessary to limit the extent of such operations to certain parts of the airport site only.

Procedure

Audit Process Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 10 Operations of Aircraft with and Higher Code

AOP 11. Integration of Unusual Aviation Activities

Policy

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresCambridge International Airport does not allow the operation of non powered gliders, parachuting or banner towing activities. No procedures therefore exist to accommodate such activities.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 11 Integration of Unusual Aviation Activities

AOP 12. Low Visibility Operations

Policy

Reductions in visibility can severely impact the safe operation of aircraft if not controlled appropriately. Cambridge Airport is committed to providing facilities and procedures to enable the airport to remain open to operations during low visibility conditions. It must be accepted that such conditions will reduce air traffic capacity to well below that achievable in normal operations, however it is the intention, over time, to increase the low visibility capacity pro-rata with increases in normal operating capacity.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 12 Low Visibility Operations

AOP 13. Adverse Weather Operations

Content

Strong Wind and Gale Warnings Thunderstorm Warnings

Policy

Adverse weather such as strong winds, gales, and thunderstorms can be expected at reasonably frequent intervals. They have the potential to disrupt airport operations and present risks to the safety of aircraft and people working airside. Cambridge Airport will ensure that a system is in place for the timely receipt of weather warnings, and the subsequent dissemination of these by competent persons who have a procedure to follow, and actions to take. The potential effects of such weather conditions will also be taken into consideration when risks are assessed for developments on the airfield.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 13 Adverse Weather Operations

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresAOP 14. Winter Operations and Snow Plan

Content

Winter Operations Aircraft De-icing Airport Snow and Ice Plan

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 14 Winter Operation and Snow Plan

Policy

The arrangements for dealing with adverse winter weather (snow and ice as opposed to strong winds and thunderstorms) will be published annually in the form of a stand-alone document ‘Winter Operations Plan’. This plan will be published in the autumn of each year and will cover the forthcoming winter period, typically between November and April, although the plan remains valid throughout the year. The purpose of the Winter Operations Plan is to establish a thorough response for maintaining safe aircraft operations during winter conditions of snow and ice. The Plan contains procedures, methods and responsibilities for all parties involved in the response at Cambridge Airport.

The Winter Operations Plan is available to view and download from the Cambridge Airport website.

Aircraft De-icingDuring the winter months it may become necessary for aircraft to undergo de-icing treatment before departure. This activity is safety-critical and will be conducted with strict adherence to procedures. Cambridge Airport possesses the equipment, materials and expertise to carry out this function. There is no dedicated aircraft de-icing pad on the aerodrome however certain areas have been designated suitable for aircraft de-icing to take place.

De-icing materials can be harmful to the environment and hence are managed carefully. Cambridge Airport operates procedures which ensure that de-icing materials are controlled and contained both in storage and in use, so as to prevent pollution of watercourses.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 14 Winter Operation and Snow Plan

AOP 15. Airside Safety Management

Content

Airside Competency and Training

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Airport Audits Third Party Audits Airside PPE Requirements Pedestrian Safety Airside Drug and Alcohol Policy

Policy

Airside Competency and TrainingAprons and airside areas are hazardous workplaces and, in order to ensure safe working practices, Cambridge Airport requires that all employers who employ workers airside ensure that their employees receive basic competence training that will provide the knowledge, skills and awareness to identify the hazards and to apply the relevant safety measures that are in place.

Airport AuditsAs part of the terms of the Aerodrome Certificate the airport departments will be audited by the Competent Authority (CAA). In addition, the Marshall ADG internal Quality Assurance Team also conducts audits on airport departments. Any actions generated by these audits will be recorded and tracked and on the Q-Pulse Audit system to ensure they are closed out in a timely and satisfactory manner.

Third Party AuditsThe Cambridge Airport manages the various activities on the aprons in order to ensure the safety of the airside users and the parking and turnaround servicing of aircraft. This is enhanced through aircraft turnaround audits.

The auditing of both internal departments and airfield tenants also forms one of the key components of Cambridge Airports Safety Management System (SMS).

Cambridge Airport Safety and Compliance is responsible for undertaking internal departments and airfield tenants, however, where specific expertise or independent verification is required then the services of relevant industry experts to assist in conducting audits will be utilised.

All audits will be carried out in confidence, the results of Service Partner or Internal Department audits will remain confidential to those companies or departments having been audited, the results of the audit including any non-compliance with agreed actions and time scales will be discussed at the audit out brief.

All reported non-compliances should be dealt with using the best endeavours of the company having been audited; any delay on agreed actions and time scales could however result in the audit being referred to the Airport General Manager.

All non-compliances resulting from Audit Reports will be included in the monthly Safety Performance Report and subsequently discussed at the Airport Safety Committee (ASC).

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresPersistent non-compliances by individual Service Partners will be monitored by the Airport Safety and Compliance Manager and brought to the attention of the Airport General Manager.

Drug and Alcohol PolicyCambridge Airport as part of Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group has a random drugs and alcohol testing regime operating within the company which all staff must adhere too. Tests are carried out by a 3rd party company but staff members will be randomly selected by clock number. Staff may also be selected without prejudice should it be reasonably suspected they are under the influence of alcohol, psychoactive substances or medicines

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 15 Airside Safety Management

AOP 16. Safety Incident Reporting and Investigation

Content

Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Airside Safety Reporting Safety Investigations

Policy

The open reporting of Mandatory Occurrences and safety incidents is a vital part of the Cambridge Airport Safety Management System. Reports are risk assessed, recorded and investigated to find any causal and contributing factors which can be mitigated in order to prevent a further reoccurrence.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 16 Safety Incident Reporting and Investigation

AOP 17. Aeronautical Information Notification Process and Aerodrome Survey

Content

Aeronautical Data Notification and Change Reporting Process CAP 232 Survey Aircraft Compass Base Calibration

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Policy

Aeronautical Data Notification and Change Reporting Process The provision of aeronautical data is critical to the safe operation of Cambridge Airport.

This information must be accurate and provided in a timely manner. The Airport will review the accuracy of this information through regular review, at least annually, to ensure it is up to date and accurate.

The UK AIP is the primary source of aeronautical data for Cambridge Airport.

Aerodrome SurveyAerodrome surveys are required to fulfil a number of statutory requirements.

CAP 232 sets out the required specification for Aerodrome Licensing topographical and obstacle limitations surveys.

Cambridge Airport will procure these services under a contract with a CAA approved provider to conduct the Aerodrome Survey. In addition to meeting the basic requirements of CAP 232, Cambridge Airport will use obstacle survey data, in combination with other information, to actively manage and control the obstacle risks and limitations to aircraft operations.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 17 Aeronautical Information Notification Process and Aerodrome Survey

AOP 18. Aerodrome Safeguarding

Content

Aerodrome Safeguarding Process Protection of Navigation Aids

Policy

The potential impacts of developments on, close to, or under the airspace of Cambridge Airport could have significant impacts on operational safety and capability. Cambridge Airport is responsible for its own safeguarding process and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the aerodrome and its airspace are safe at all times for use by aircraft. The priority in responding to safeguarding consultations will be to protect the safety and operating interests of Cambridge Airport. Consideration will always be given to allowing appropriate developments to take place within our

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational Proceduresregion. Cambridge Airport will work with local planning authorities and developers to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 18 Aerodrome Safeguarding

AOP 19. Wildlife Hazard Management

Policy

Aerodromes attract birds and wildlife for a variety of reasons. The large open spaces of grassland and hard standing are ideal for many species as a source of food, and also afford clear views of potential predators. It is therefore essential that the landscape is managed in such a way that a wildlife-attractive habitat is discouraged. Furthermore, the environment in the surrounding locality has an influence on the type and level of wildlife activity in the vicinity of the aerodrome. The requirements to manage the bird hazard are set out in EASA AMC/GM and CAP 772. In complying with these requirements, Cambridge Airport will ensure active control of the bird hazard on the airfield.

Effective Wildlife Control measures are an important aspect of Airfield Operations. Bird ingestion into aircraft engines and through cockpit glass has caused numerous major aircraft accidents involving loss of life, damage to property, disruption of airport activities and claims for damages. The identification of the local Bird Hazard, development of control procedures and detailed record keeping form the basis of an effective Wildlife Hazard Management Plan developed, reviewed and implemented by SAFO.

The Wildlife Hazard Management Plan is published as a separate document and is available from the SAFO.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 19 Wildlife Hazard Management

AOP 20. Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS)

Content

Level of Service Equipment Provision Prevention of Fire

Policy

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresIn order to uphold the continual safety and security of its passengers, customers and staff, Cambridge Airport is committed to ensuring that effective emergency and contingency plans are in place. The Cambridge Airport Emergency Orders, which are published to a selected distribution list, describe the emergency plans in place at Cambridge Airport with definitions of the emergency categories plus an indication of the roles and responsibilities of key organisations involved in an emergency response.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 20 Rescue and Fire Fighting Services

AOP 21. Calculating Reduced Runway Declared Distances

Policy

Operating with reduced runway distances can affect operational safety margins. Re-declaration and continued use of a blocked runway will not normally be considered unless the anticipated time to clear the runway or strip is unduly lengthy. Flight operations will not be permitted to continue in a manner requiring aircraft landing and taking-off to overfly active works on a closed section of runway. When runway distances are reduced, all departing aircraft are to use the maximum RTORA.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 21 Calculating Reduced Runway Declared Distances

AOP 22. Removal of Disabled Aircraft

Policy

It is the policy of Cambridge International Airport that the aircraft operator, its agreed custodian, or it’s designated agreed recovery agent will be responsible for the recovery of their aircraft.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 22 Removal of Disabled Aircraft

AOP 23. Aircraft Noise Abatement

Policy

Cambridge Airport will endeavour to limit, and reduce where possible, the number of people affected by noise as a result of the Airport’s operation and development.

Procedure

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Aerodrome ManualPart E: Aerodrome Operational ProceduresDetailed procedures are contained in AOP 23 Aircraft Noise Abatement

AOP 24. Detention of Aircraft

Policy

Where Airport Charges have not been paid to Cambridge International Airport (CIA), CIA may detain the aircraft in respect of which the charges are due, or any other aircraft operated by the person/company in default, by virtue of Section 88 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. This power may be exercised whether on the occasion when the charges have been incurred or at any time when the aircraft is on the aerodrome. However, CIA shall not detain or continue to detain an aircraft for unpaid charges if the operator of the aircraft or any other person claiming an interest in the aircraft:

I. Disputes that the charges, or any of them, are due or that the charges in question were incurred in respect of that; and

II. Gives to CIA, pending determination of the dispute, sufficient security for payment of the charges that are alleged to be due.

Procedure

Detailed procedures are contained in AOP 24 Detention of Aircraft

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