The United States and its allies have been at war in Afghanistan for almost ten years. The campaign has been led formally by NATO since !""-, when it took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan. It seems fair to ask now whether ISAF has made any progress at all. Indeed, some analysts might be excused for arguing that it is time for the United States to cut its losses and give up on this war.#
Critics of the war see little real progress. They point to rising civilian casual-ties, intensification of the war in the south since !""%, and a growing insurgent presence in previously quiet areas of the country (especially in the north) as signs that things are getting worse, not better.! Our research, drawing on extensive fieldwork, shows the opposite. We find that ISAF has made significant progress at the operational level. As we show in the first section of this article below, this is evident in the adoption of a more e'ective approach to counterinsurgency (COIN), in the development of Afghan national security forces (ANSF) and subnational governance, and in the military campaign against the Taleban, especially in the key southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.
So much progress having been made, one might expect NATO to be well on the road to ‘victory’. A handful of optimists do indeed think there are reasonable prospects for campaign success—which is to say, the development of a democratic government able to survive and provide for the country’s own internal security when NATO withdraws its combat forces in !"#*.- We argue otherwise. In the
* Drafts of this article were presented to the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen in November !"#", and to the Carr Center at the University of Harvard in February !"##. We are grateful to the seminar participants for their feedback. We also thank the following for their written comments on earlier drafts: Stephen Biddle, Robert Cassidy, James de Waal, Antonio Giustozzi, Anatol Lieven, Mike Martin, Je' Michaels, Mikkel Rasmussen, Michael Semple, Joshua White, the anonymous reviewer, and especially Lawrence Lewis. Theo Farrell wishes gratefully to acknowledge the financial support provided by an ESRC/AHRC Research Fellowship (RES-"$#–"!$–""&%) funded under the Research Councils UK ‘Global uncertainties’ programme.
# Robert D. Blackwill, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan’, Foreign A!airs %": #, !"##, pp. *!–.".! Ahmed Rashid, ‘Before the endgame: America’s fatal flaws in Afghanistan’, Der Spiegel, !& May !"#"; Gilles
Dorronso, ‘Afghanistan at the breaking point’, Carnegie Report, Nov. !"#", pp. $–%.- Paul D. Miller, ‘Finish the job’, Foreign A!airs %": #, !"##, pp. .#–&.; Max Boot, ‘Afghanistan: the case for
optimism’ (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, ! Sept. !"#"), http://www.cfr.org/publication/!!/$//afghanistan.html, accessed % Feb. !"##; Michael O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, !"#"); Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘New reasons for hope in Afghanistan’ (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, !/ Sept. !"#"), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/!"#"/"%!/_
second section of the article, we identify three strategic obstacles to campaign success. The first is the degree of corruption in Afghan government, which under-mines the legitimacy and e'ectiveness of this infant democracy. The second is falling public and political support for the war in NATO capitals, which under-mines ISAF credibility in the political endgame to the war. In sum, those who might be influenced by the military might of NATO—especially the main insur-gent groups, Afghan fence-sitters and regional players—all know that essentially the alliance is on its way out of Afghanistan. The third is the existence of home bases in Pakistan from where the main insurgent groups—0uetta Shura Taleban (1ST), the Haqqani Network (H1N) and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)—are able to direct and regenerate forces. This inherently limits the e'ect of the ISAF military campaign in Afghanistan. No matter how successful it is, it cannot elimi-nate the main insurgent groups.
Looking at prospects for the campaign in the third section of the article, we conclude that progress at the operational level cannot address these strategic obstacles. Prerequisites for this are political changes in Kabul, NATO capitals and Pakistan that are beyond the abilities of the ISAF campaign to bring about. In this sense, there is an operational–strategic disconnect at the heart of the NATO war e'ort.
Progress on the ground
By mid-!""%, the NATO campaign in Afghanistan had stalled. The initial assess-ment of ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, delivered to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in August, was that ‘the overall situation is deteriorating’; that ISAF faced ‘a resilient and growing insurgency’ and ‘a crisis of confidence among Afghans’.* Some #/ months on, ISAF has recovered momentum on the ground. In this section, we explore how it did so. First, we outline how McChrystal sought to change the conduct of the campaign. Then we assess the success of two key elements of the new McChrystal approach in Afghanistan: namely, protecting the population, and developing the ANSF through closer partnering with ISAF units. Finally, we discuss recent progress in the ISAF campaign, in promoting subnational governance, and in taking the fight to the Taleban.
The McChrystal approach
Faced with a flagging campaign, McChrystal set out to ‘redefine the fight’. Under its previous US commander, General David McKiernan, ISAF had focused on defeating the insurgency, and this resulted in a fairly conventional military
afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx, accessed % Feb. !"##; Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, ‘A winnable war’, Weekly Standard #.: *", .–#! July !"#", http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/winnable-war, accessed !# Feb. !"##. Some optimists argue that success in the war would be possible if a more decentralized form of democratic government were adopted: see Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia and J. Alexander Thier, ‘Defining success in Afghanistan’, Foreign A!airs /%: *, !"#", pp. */–&".
* General Stanley McChrystal, Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force and US Forces, Afghanistan (COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A), ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, -" Aug. !""% (unclassified), p. #.
campaign. McChrystal redefined the campaign using classic COIN principles. Recognizing that the conflict was essentially a political struggle rather than a military one, his campaign plan—the first for Afghanistan despite eight years of operations—addressed the reality that the greatest threat to stability in Afghani-stan was not from insurgent violence but from insurgent shadow government, as well as local power struggles. Thus the key to eventual success in the campaign was to demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government could protect and provide for them. McChrystal declared that ‘ISAF’s centre of gravity is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population “by, with and through” the Afghan government.’.
McChrystal’s new approach to operations in Afghanistan was dubbed ‘population-centric COIN’. It aimed to address the campaign centre of gravity through two operational priorities. First and foremost was to ‘protect the popula-tion’ from violence, intimidation and corruption. This required ISAF to ‘connect with the people’, in order to build relationships with Afghan partners and the local population.& The second imperative was to accelerate the development and owner-ship of Afghan security by Afghan national security forces through ‘embedded partnership’ of ISAF with ANSF. Tactically this required ISAF forces to assume more risk by getting out of forward operating bases and armoured vehicles.$
Protecting civilians from violence included a focus on reducing civilian casual-ties in operations involving ISAF forces. Karzai had been complaining in private to US commanders about civilian casualties since !""., and had received reassurances that this issue would be dealt with./ By !""$ he was fed up and became openly critical of ISAF’s failure to reduce the number of civilians killed and injured in military operations.% Even so, the numbers increased further in !""/, with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimating that /!/ civilian casualties were caused by ISAF and ANSF forces. This was an increase over !""$, when ISAF and ANSF together caused an estimated .-% civilian casualties.#"
In this context, McChrystal recognized that it was imperative to reduce civilian casualties. In his nomination hearing before the US Senate, McChrystal noted that how ISAF conducts its operations ‘may be the critical point’ in winning the support of the Afghan people and thereby campaign success. McChrystal told senators that ISAF would have ‘to operate in ways that minimize [civilian] casualties or
. McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–*.& McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–#!.$ The McChrystal approach was in fact based on that developed under General Petraeus in Iraq, which emphasized
securing the population and close partnership with Iraqi security forces. See Lt-Gen. Raymond Odierno, Commander Multinational Forces – Iraq, ‘Counterinsurgency guidance’, #. June !""$. Ironically, towards the end of his command McKiernan did produce a COIN guidance paper that recognized the imperative of protecting the population and supporting the ANSF. But this came too late to e'ect the necessary change in campaign approach. See Walter Pincus, ‘General’s paper sheds light on counterinsurgency’, Washington Post, $ April !""%.
/ Sarah Sewall, ‘The civilian in American warfare: normative pathways and institutional imperatives’, D.Phil. thesis, St Antony’s College, Oxford, !"#", p. !/#.
% Barry Bearak, ‘Karzai calls coalition “careless”’, New York Times, !* June !""$.#" Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘Afghanistan index: tracking variables of reconstruction and security
in post-%/## Afghanistan’ (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, !* June !""%), p. *, http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx, accessed % Feb. !"##
damage—even when doing so makes our task more di2cult’.## Hence, upon assuming command, McChrystal issued a tactical directive that set restraints on the use by ISAF of lethal force, especially air power and artillery.#!
McChrystal also saw that it was imperative to accelerate the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), both in size and in capability. In May !""% ANA strength stood at around /&,""", with planned expansion to #-*,""" by the end of !"##. McChrystal brought forward this target to October !"#". It was already clear that there were serious shortcomings both in ISAF training facilities and in ANA leadership and equipment.#- Accelerating ANA growth risked sacrificing ANA quality, as it would invariably lead to a lower standard of recruits and the condensing of ANA training. Moreover, ANA quality was far worse than was o2cially acknowledged at the time.#* In !""/, NATO had assessed &! per cent of ANA units to be incapable of conducting battalion-level operations with some ISAF support.#. In reality, ANA units were plagued by corruption, drug abuse, ethnic rivalry and poor leadership at all levels. Not surprisingly, ANA units su'ered high rates of desertion, especially in the south and east. Given all these problems, few ANA kandaks (battalions) had the men, let alone the command and equipment capabilities, to conduct battalion-level operations in !""%.#& Thus McChrystal had not only to make the ANA bigger, he also had to make it far better. Compounding this challenge was a roughly ." per cent shortfall in military trainers.#$
McChrystal decided to adopt a ‘fundamentally new approach that extends beyond just working together outside a [forward operating base]’. ‘Embedded partnering’ involved ISAF troops merging with ANSF to form a single combined force. McChrystal directed that ‘ISAF will partner with ANSF at all levels—from Government ministries down to platoon level’, in order to ‘live, train, plan, control and execute operations together’. It was hoped that embedded partnering would enable the Afghan army to move more quickly towards eventual transition to lead responsibility for security.#/
McChrystal also had to sort out ISAF unity of e'ort and command. He found ISAF waging not one war but several. In broad terms, ISAF was engaged in two di'erent campaigns: a peace operations campaign in the west and north of the country, and a COIN campaign involving much combat in the east and
## Tim Reid, ‘NATO commander Stanley McChrystal: “we must gain support of Afghans”’, The Times, - June !""%.
#! General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, ‘Tactical directive’, & July !""% (unclassified version).
#- Inspector General of the US Department of Defense, Report on the assessment of US and coalition plans to train, equip and field the Afghan national security forces, SPO-!""#–""$ (Washington DC: Department of Defense, -" Sept. !""%), pp. ii–iii.
#* Thom Shaker and John H. Cushman, Jr, ‘Reviews raise doubts on training of Afghan forces’, New York Times, & Nov. !""%.
#. ISAF HQ, Metrics brief !""$–!""/, p. /.#& Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Afghan national army: unwarranted hope?’, RUSI Journal #.*: &, !""%, pp. -&–*!.#$ Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan index: tracking variables of
reconstruction and security in post-%/## Afghanistan’, !! Dec. !""%, p. #..#/ General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, ‘Partnering directive’, !% Aug. !""% (unclassified).
Again, while this approach was ‘fundamentally new’ to Afghanistan, it had been adopted two years before in Iraq under General Petraeus.
the south. ISAF was also divided into five regional commands—West, North, Capital, East and South—with little coordination between them. Each regional command contained a number of military task forces, often from di'erent troop-contributing countries. Here too unity of e'ort and command was weak, with the national task forces taking little direction from their supposedly superior regional commands. Further complicating matters was a lack of unity between ISAF e'orts and those of partners outside the ISAF chain of command—both the civilian development programmes of partner nations and also the counterter-rorism mission of US forces still waging Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
McChrystal declared that ‘ISAF’s subordinate headquarters must stop fighting separate campaigns’. To this end, he established an intermediate operational headquarters—ISAF Joint Command—to ‘synchronize operational activities and local civil–military coordination and ensure a shared understanding of the mission throughout the force’. With ISAF Joint Command taking care of the ‘down and in’ aspect of command, ISAF Headquarters would be able to focus on the ‘up and out’ aspect: that is, overall campaign strategy, coordination with the Afghan government and international partners, and liaison with NATO capitals and other countries in the region.#% McChrystal also took command of all American forces in theatre, and thus was able to improve unity of e'ort between the ISAF and OEF missions. Improving unity of e'ort on the civilian side has proved more challenging. Even the appointment in January !"#" of a high-profile and highly capable NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Mark Sedwill (former UK ambas-sador to Afghanistan), to grapple with this problem appears to have made little di'erence on the ground. However, on protecting the population and partnership with ANSF, the picture looks more encouraging.
Protecting the population
Since population-centric COIN is focused on protecting the population, civilian casualties (CIVCAS) provide a useful metric for assessing its e'ectiveness. Producing reliable and independent data on CIVCAS is problematic, however, given the limited UN and humanitarian presence on the ground. ISAF has civilian casualty tracking cells in each regional command, which has improved the quality of the data, but there are still inherent limitations in relying on self-reporting by units on the ground.
UNAMA reported in August !"#" that there had been an #/ per cent decrease in CIVCAS caused by ISAF and ANSF over the first nine months of !"#" in compar-ison with the same period in !""%.!" This picture is consistent with a CIVCAS study commissioned by Petraeus and undertaken by an independent team from November !""% to November !"#". Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, the study found that some progress had been made in reducing CIVCAS. It assessed
#% McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–#*.!" United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘Civilian casualties rise -# per cent in first six months of
that CIVCAS numbers had reduced by about !" per cent over the period from mid !""% through to October !"#". Moreover, this period saw a huge increase in the scale and number of operations undertaken by ISAF, as a consequence of the surge of American forces into Afghanistan. When the number of civilian casual-ties is adjusted against this baseline, the study identifies ‘an overall ." per cent decrease both in civilian casualties and the number of CIVCAS incidents’ over the #/-month period.!#
As noted already, a major priority for McChrystal was to reduce civilian casual-ties caused by ISAF air attacks, and this was reflected in his tactical directive to ISAF units. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that ‘civilian casualties from air-to-ground engagements had decreased’ since !""%. However, the number of civil-ians shot by ISAF forces, especially in situations involving escalation of force (for example, at checkpoints), had increased over the same period.!!
Clearly, there is more work to be done, both in improving the accuracy with which civilian casualties are tracked and, more importantly, in reducing civilian casualties caused by ISAF troops escalating to lethal force. But overall the trend is going in the right direction. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that McChrystal’s ‘consistent emphasis on reducing civilian harm’ did have a positive e'ect. Indeed, the study concluded that this command philosophy was more important than the formal restrictions in the tactical directive on containing civilian casualties during a period when ISAF went on the o'ensive in the south.!-
Developing Afghan security forces
There has been a huge numerical expansion in the ANSF. Indeed, growth has exceeded targets. The ANA target was #-*,""" by October !"#"; actual numbers had reached #-%,""" by !* September !"#". Likewise, the Afghan National Police (ANP) target was #"%,""" by October, and numbers had already reached #!!,""" by !* September !"#".!*
So the ANA has got far bigger. But has it got better? In truth, we don’t entirely know. There is no accurate overall picture of ANA operational proficiency. The main assessment process, called the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, was managed by the same institutions responsible for training the ANA, namely the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). This created a motivated bias in the assessment process, as CSTC-A and NTM-A had an obvious institutional incen-tive to demonstrate the e'ectiveness of their training programmes. In late !""%, ISAF Joint Command assumed responsibility for managing the CM rating system, and in early !"#" it abandoned the system following a damning report by the US !# ISAF CIVCAS study briefing (classified), Nov. !"#", slide $.!! ISAF CIVCAS study, -# August !"#", p. %. The Afghanistan NGO Safety O2ce (ANSO) also reported a sharp
rise in civilians killed in escalations of force incidents in the first quarter of !"#": ‘ANSO quarterly data report (Q# !"#")’, # Jan.–-# Mar., !"#", p. #-.
!- This is evidenced in part by the fact that General McChrystal’s tactical directive was similar to directives put in place by the two previous ISAF commanders: ISAF CIVCAS study, -# August !"#", p. ##.
!* COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A General David Petraeus, unclassified briefing, ISAF HQ, Kabul, % Oct. !"#".
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).!. The system adopted in its place, called the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), relies more on qualitative assessment and tracks a broader range of metrics. According to ISAF Joint Command, SIGAR had given CUAT a clean bill of health by the end of !"#".!&
What is clear is that the rapid growth of the ANA has put a very great strain on the limited abilities of the Afghan Ministry of Defence to manage such a large army. Moreover, ANA infrastructure and logistics are struggling to support the expanding force. Predictably, ANA training was also shortened; the Basic Warrior Training course was reduced from ten to eight weeks. These structural and sustain-ability challenges are compounded by ethnic and political rivalries within the ANA, especially between Tajik and Pashtun factions.!$ Moreover, the army still su'ers from high levels of illiteracy ($"–%" per cent) and drug addiction (!"–!. per cent).!/ Absence without leave and desertion rates remain a serious problem, at -.–*. per cent nationally and as high as .. per cent in some units in the south.!%
Anecdotal evidence from Helmand suggests that ANA troops generally fight well, and that they are better at spotting IEDs than ISAF personnel.-" To be sure, Afghan troops exercise poor fire discipline, creating hazards for friendly forces and civilians.-# But they also are better able to ascertain hostile intent than ISAF troops, and thereby to avoid unwarranted escalation of force incidents involving civilians. The CIVCAS study for ISAF concluded that ‘the general consensus by forces in the field was that partnering probably provides some reduction in CIVCAS’.-! By one key measure, Afghan public opinion, the ANA is doing well. Accordingly to one major survey, most Afghans recognize that the ANA is poorly trained (.! per cent) and cannot operate without ISAF support (&% per cent). Yet when asked if the ANA ‘helps improve security’, there is a very positive response (/% per cent).--
Partnering with the ANA became a priority for ISAF forces across theatre in late !""% following McChrystal’s directive. All regional commands recognize the essential importance of partnering to the ISAF strategy of eventual transition to
!. United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), ‘Actions needed to improve the reliability of Afghan security force assessments’, SIGAR Audit-#"-## Security/ANSF Capability Ratings, !% June !"#".
!& Farrell email correspondence with Colonel Robert Cassidy, ISAF Joint Command, * Dec. !"#".!$ International Crisis Group, A force in fragments: reconstituting the Afghan National Army, Asia Report #%",
(Brussels: ICG, #! May !"#"), pp. %–##, #$, #%–!#; US SIGAR, "uarterly report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, -" April !"#"), p. &; Obaid Younossi et al., The long march: building an Afghan national army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, !""%), pp. !#–!.
!/ ICG, A force in fragments, p. #".!% US SIGAR, "uarterly report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, -" Oct. !"#"), p. &., fig. -.#%; Farrell
interview with ISAF mentor, TFH HQ, Lashkar Gah, !/ May !"#".-" Farrell interview with ISAF mentors, !". Corps HQ, Camp Hero, Kandahar, !& May !"#"; Major Ed Hill,
‘All together now: observations on embedded partnering with ANA on Op Moshtarak’, Bravo Company, # Royal Welsh BG (CF-#), n.d.; Afghan National Army Training Center (ANATC)/Doctrine Directorate, ‘Observations from Marjeh’, pp. /, #-.
-# Wesley Morgan, ‘Afghanistan: the problems with partnering’, New York Times, / Nov. !"#".-! ISAF CIVCAS study, p. &&.-- Random survey of &,*&$ adults across all -* provinces of Afghanistan: Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in #$%$: a
survey of the Afghan people (!"#"), p. *!, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/$%$, accessed % Feb. !"##.
ANSF security lead.-* The main obstacle to partnering is not the commitment of ISAF units, but ANA willingness to deploy in the field. Often ANA units will not deploy without clear instruction to do so.-. This situation is worsened by the highly centralized Afghan Ministry of Defence, which retards initiative by subordinate commanders.-& ISAF is trying to get around this, with some success, by issuing combined force orders down the ISAF and ANSF chains of command, and enabling ISAF field commanders to walk these orders across to their Afghan partners.
In sum, the ANA is quickly getting bigger and slowly getting better. The next big challenge is the ANP. In fact, the police are in many respects more important than the army, since it is the police who must provide long-term security within an area cleared of insurgents. The ANA dislikes hanging around for the ‘hold’ phase because they consider this to be a police role. The problem is that the ANP is far more corrupt, poorly trained, drug-ridden and ill-disciplined than the ANA. Often, the police are little more than a militia of the local powerholder; they commonly prey on the population, and through their extortion and violent abuse of civilians can turn local people towards insurgency.-$
A number of institutional reforms within the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan police since !""/ have begun to address the problems. A very top-heavy police force has been flattened: the number of commissioned o2cers (#/,""") was halved, and the number of police generals and colonels (-,""") was reduced by /. per cent. Police pay for all ranks has been greatly increased (to reduce the need and inclination to extort from the local population).-/ CTSC-A also operates the Focused District Delivery (FDD) Program, designed to improve the ANP rapidly in key districts. FDD takes whole police units away from their localities for eight weeks, weeds out the drug addicts and retrains the unit as a whole. CTSC-A’s own assessment indicates that FDD has produced promising results. In !""% it judged that #% per cent of retrained ANP were able to operate independently, and .& per cent could operate to various degrees with ISAF support. However, the impact of FDD is hindered by a shortage of training teams.-% Moreover, the situation in Helmand suggests that FDD has had more mixed results. When the ANP from Gereshk were taken to the regional training centre in Kandahar in May !""/, ##% of the #-" policemen tested positive for drugs. The entire eight-week training course was spent detoxifying the police. The ANP did show improve-ment on return to Gereshk, but one year on few FDD-retrained police were still
-* Farrell interviews with command sta' at RC-North (Mazar-e-Sharif ), RC-East (BAF), RC-South (KAF), RC-Southwest (Camp Bastion) and RC-West (Herat), Afghanistan, Oct. !"#".
-. Farrell interview with ISAF mentor team, Camp Hero, Kandahar, !/ May !"#".-& ICG, A force in fragments, p. #".-$ Royal United Services Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute, ‘Reforming the Afghan national
police’, Joint Report, Nov. !""%, pp. /–#*; Brian Brady, ‘Drugs and defection: how the UK really rates the Afghan police’, Independent, !/ March !"#"; Thomas Hardy, ‘Afghan police corruption is fuelling insurgency’, Daily Telegraph, - June !"#".
-/ US General Accounting O2ce, Afghan security: US programs to further reform Ministry of Interior and national police challenged by lack of military personnel and Afghan cooperation, GAO-"%–!/" (Washington DC: USGAO, March !""%).
serving.*" The ANP in Nad-e-Ali showed little improvement following FDD in early !""%.*# In response, the British task force created a Helmand Police Training Academy in late !""%, in order to produce newly minted ANP for a major opera-tion to clear and hold southern and northern Nad-e-Ali. Local leaders in Nad-e-Ali confirm that these new police are somewhat better, but there is still a need to root out the old corrupt checkpoint commanders in the district.*!
Recognizing the challenge, ISAF Joint Command made ANP partnering a key priority for regional commands in mid-!"#". It was pushing at an open door. Where previously regional commands and task forces were focused on partnering with the ANA, by !"#" everybody had woken up to the imperative to improve the ANP. An assessment of regional commands (RC) in October !"#" for ISAF Joint Command found that ‘All RC are pursuing ANP embedded partnering as priority within available resources.’*- Indeed, according to ISAF Joint Command, /$ per cent of ANP operating in key terrain districts were partnered with ISAF units by late !"#".** Overall, ISAF has taken a grasp of ANP development. But this is a tougher challenge than with the ANA, and it remains to be seen if the police can be made better fast enough.
Developing local governance
While ANSF development took centre stage under McChrystal, ISAF atten-tion also turned to developing local governance. Indeed, the first campaign-wide plan, produced by McChrystal, dealt head-on with the problem of ISAF resource constraints. Across Afghanistan, ISAF e'ort was focused on some /" ‘key terrain districts’, defined by population concentrations, economic hubs and major trans-port routes.*. Many of these were in the south, which, as noted above, was where ISAF’s ‘main e'ort’ was focused. However, even with this concentration of e'ort, ISAF analysis showed that progress would not be fast enough to demonstrate results within a politically acceptable timescale.*&
It was this realization that led McChrystal to look for a ‘campaign acceler-ator’—something dramatic that would restore momentum to the ISAF campaign. He settled on Operation Moshtarak. It was hoped that ISAF would be able to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on the Taleban in Helmand, and visibly demonstrate to local and home audiences that ISAF had turned the campaign around.*$ This was the context for playing up expectations of Moshtarak, and for McChrystal’s ill-advised claim that ‘we’ve got government in a box, ready to roll in’. Moshtarak failed to deliver
*" Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘Striking the right balance: how to rebuild the Afghan national police’, International Peacekeeping #$: #, !"#", p. /$.
*# Farrell interview with ISAF police trainers, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, Sept. !""%.*! Farrell interview with local o2cial, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, !% May !"#".*- ISAF Joint Command (IJC) study (classified), Oct. !"#".** Farrell email correspondence with Colonel Robert Cassidy, ISAF Joint Command, * Dec. !"#". *. There are currently *"# districts in Afghanistan.*& Command sta' briefing at ISAF Joint Command, IJC HQ, Kabul, Jan. !"#".*$ Farrell interviews with ISAF command sta', ISAF HQ, Kabul, Jan. !"#".
dramatic success in Marjah, and so did not produce a campaign-wide boost.*/ However, the Taleban did su'er defeat in Nad-e-Ali. Indeed, by mid-!"#" it was clear that the tide had turned in Helmand. In most districts the trends looked encouraging in terms of improved governance, services and security.*%
This concentration of e'ort continues under the revised ISAF–ANSF opera-tional plan, promulgated in October !"#". The number of key terrain districts has increased to just over %", and there is increased emphasis on freedom of movement on the major transport routes. Crucially, the revised plan focuses on combating corruption and developing subnational governance.." This e'ort is aided by the international community’s support of a number of Afghan programmes to promote subnational governance. A key example is the District Delivery Programme (DDP) run by the Independent Directorate of Local Gover-nance (IDLG). Launched in January !"#" the plan was for DDP to rapidly improve governance and services in /" key terrain districts by the end of !"##, primarily by providing funds and personnel for the district governors and improving links with national government line ministries..# DDP was trialled, with some success, in Nad-e-Ali during Moshtarak. But the programme is lagging considerably behind schedule. By September !"#" it had been rolled out only to six pilot districts, with packages being worked up for a further #* districts..!
More successful has been the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), launched by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) in !""- to promote democracy at village level in areas under government control. By mid-!"#" NSP had supported the creation of !!,."" community development councils in -#& districts across Afghanistan, and had financed some .",""" development projects. Field research shows the crucial importance of driving development assistance through local governance structures, in order to increase the local legitimacy and hence e'ectiveness of aid projects..- Assessment of NSP, based on an iterative large-scale survey, indicates that the programme has improved local democracy (especially in empowering women) and transparency, and has significantly raised local perceptions of access to governance and services..*
*/ Noah Shachtman, ‘Marjah’s “government in a box” flops as McChrystal fumes’, Wired, !. May !"#", http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/!"#"/"./marjahs-government-in-a-box-flops-as-mcchryst, accessed % Feb. !"##.
*% Farrell interviews with stabilization o2cers and government o2cials in Lashkar Gah and Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, May !"#".
.# Farrell attendance at final coordination meeting for roll-out of DDP trial, IDLG, Kabul, / Jan. !"#".
.! Farrell telephone interview with DDP mentor, - Sept. !"#".
.- Stuart Gordon, Helmand and stabilisation, #$$&–#$$' (Boston, MA: Feinstein Center, Tufts University, forthcoming !"##).
.* Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Rubin Enikolopov and Shahim Ahmad Kabuli, Randomized impact evaluation of Phase II of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme: estimates of interim project impact from first follow-up survey, / July !"#", http://www.nsp-ie.org/reportsimpacts.html, accessed % Feb. !"##.
The modest progress achieved on protecting the population, developing ANSF and improving subnational governance belies a more dramatic development on the ground. In short, ISAF regained military momentum in !"#". The surge of -",""" additional US troops into Afghanistan authorized by President Obama shifted the campaign on the ground in favour of the ISAF–ANSF combined force. These additional resources had been concentrated in the south (see table #), which was designated campaign ‘main e'ort’. Under the new combined force opera-tional plan, forces in the south would first secure central Helmand (Operation Moshtarak) and then go on to create the security conditions to expand governance in Kandahar (Operation Hamkari)...
Moshtarak was the first major test of McChrystal’s population-centric COIN. This massive operation involved simultaneously clearing insurgent strongholds in Marjah (by the US Marines) and north-east Nad-e-Ali (by British forces). Partner-ship with ANSF was far better than in previous o'ensives, and further improved as the operation progressed..& ISAF went to extraordinary lengths to gain local support for the clearing of central Helmand and to minimize civilian casualties. There were no civilian casualties in the British sector; the Taleban put up more of a fight in Marjah, and between #& and !/ civilians were killed here..$
The American press took a dim view of Moshtarak../ ISAF set expectations unrealistically high for the pace of progress in Marjah. When the Marines pushed into Taleban territory, they found the area far more run-down and people more cowed than they had anticipated. This has made it di2cult for ISAF to build
.. ISAF operational plan, Oct. !""% (classified).
.& Major B. Parker, ‘OP MOSHTARAK Phase ! observations and lessons identified’, !". ‘ATAL’ Corps, ANA, Camp hero, KAF, April !"#"; ANATC/Doctrine Directorate, ANA Lessons Learned Center, ‘Helmand province: observations from Marjeh’, April !"#".
.$ Theo Farrell, Appraising Moshtarak: the campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand, Royal United Services Institute report (London: RUSI, June !"#"); Je'rey Dressler, Operation Moshtarak: taking and holding Marjah, Institute for the Study of War report (Washington DC, March !"#"), pp. $–/.
./ Michael M. Philips, ‘Progress in Marjeh, but civilian trust remains elusive’, Wall Street Journal, !! Feb. !"#"; Richard A. Oppel, ‘Violence helps Taleban undo Afghan gains’, New York Times, - April !"#".
Table #: ISAF force levels by regional command
Regional command March #$$( February #$%$RC-North .,"/" $,.""RC-West !,%*" .,.""RC-Capital .,$*" .,"""RC-East !.,/$" !&,.""RC-South !!,--" .*,.""
Source: Data from ISAF webpage, http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-archives.html.
government and services, and easy for the Taleban to re-infiltrate and intimidate the local populace..% American reporters failed to spot the far more encouraging progress in north-east Nad-e-Ali. Following Moshtarak, district governance was strengthened, freedom of movement for locals greatly improved, and a more representative district community council elected.&" The atmospherics on the ground and key indicators—such as the number of shops in the bazaar and the number of children attending school—all pointed to improvements in security.&# In a survey of public opinion in Nad-e-Ali, %. per cent of respondents felt that life was ‘better or very much better’ in the district since Moshtarak.&!
Following Moshtarak, ISAF turned its attention under Petraeus to Hamkari, a massive operation to improve security and governance in and around Kandahar city. This operation is now ISAF’s main e'ort, with some #!,""" ISAF troops massed for it. The summer of !"#" was spent in a tough fight to clear the districts of Dand, Arghandab, Zharay and Panjwai and, with the ANP, establish a security force encircling Kandahar city. Dand was quickly cleared. Arghandab was eventu-ally cleared of insurgents with the help of the Afghan border police in October. By early November !"#", Taleban were leaving Zharay and Panjwai, albeit towards the end of the fighting season when fighters typically decamp to Pakistan for the winter months. The view within ISAF, and reported by the American press, was that the Taleban had been routed in southern Afghanistan.&-
What is clear is that Petraeus has ratcheted up the ISAF military campaign in order to ‘relentlessly pursue’ the insurgents. As one o2cial put it: ‘We’ve taken the gloves o'.’ Under McChrystal, ISAF operated under the most restrictive rules of engagement in order to minimize civilian casualties. Petraeus has sought to rebalance things in order to give commanders increased latitude to use force, and this has resulted in greater use of air strikes and artillery.&* Even more signifi-cant is the increased tempo of special operations forces (SOF) raids, especially targeted against Taleban leaders. From July to September !"#" some -"" insur-gent leaders were killed or captured in SOF operations; a further /." lower-level insurgents were killed and !,#"" captured.&. The more robust military campaign carries greater risk of civilian casualties, and potentially is in tension with the ‘protect the population’ mission.&& Certainly, the clearance of districts around Kandahar has necessitated extensive destruction of civilian buildings (rigged with
.% Farrell interview with ISAF intelligence o2cers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, !. May !"#".&" Farrell interviews with civilian adviser and battlegroup commander, FOB Shawqat, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, !$
May !"#".&# Farrell visits to Nad-e-Ali district centre in late Sept. !""% and late May !"#".&! This survey was conducted between $ and #* May. Of ."- callers to Radio Nad-e-Ali, %$ per cent freely
agreed to participate in the survey. Capt. Nick Carter, Influence O2cer, CF Nad-e-Ali, ‘Public perceptions of security in Nad-e-Ali, Helmand’, powerpoint slides, $ June !"#".
&- Carlotta Gall, ‘Coalition routs Taleban in southern Afghanistan’, New York Times, !" Oct. !"#". This view was confirmed in Farrell interviews with ISAF o2cers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, !.–!& May !"#".
&* Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘US deploying heavily armoured battle tanks for first time in Afghanistan’, Washington Post, #% Nov. !"#".
&. Unclassified briefing by COMISAF, General David Petraeus, ISAF HQ, Kabul, % Oct. !"#".&& The International Committee of the Red Cross reported steep rises in CIVCAS in Kandahar in late !"#":
Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Conditions hit new low for Red Cross’, New York Times, #. Dec. !"#".
IEDs), albeit with the promise of reconstruction funded by ISAF.&$ The SOF raids, in particular, have attracted criticism from Karzai.&/ ISAF’s own assessment is that those forces pursuing the kill-and-capture mission have developed ways of operating that respond to the emphasis of senior leaders on reducing civilian casualties.&% Press reporting of Taleban sources indicates that the SOF campaign has thrown the insurgents into disarray in the south, in particular, and that relent-less targeting of enemy leadership has reduced insurgents’ ability to conduct deliberate operations.$"
It was with good reason, therefore, that the new British Chief of the Defence Sta', General Sir David Richards, told the Commons Defence Committee in November !"#" that ‘we are hammering [the Taleban] at the moment.’ Less clear, however, is the strategic e'ect of these military gains; hence, at another point in his evidence to the committee, General Richards adopted a more guarded tone, telling MPs that ‘we can be cautiously optimistic, that there’s been a bit of an upturn’.$# Perhaps learning the lessons of Marjah, ISAF leaders are being careful not to oversell success. To be sure, it is too early to tell whether the gains in the south are sustainable. The Taleban may yet regenerate and return in force to central Helmand and the area around Kandahar. One very senior ISAF commander, while acknowledging the military gains ISAF has made, suggested that ‘we must judge progress on a seasonal basis’.$!
One problem is that ISAF’s success in the south may displace insurgents to elsewhere in Afghanistan. In other words, the Taleban may simply change focus to where ISAF is weaker. Press reporting suggests that this has been happening since summer !"#". In fact, Taleban infiltration of the north has been under way since !""$, with major Taleban gains in !""% in Kunduz, Faryab and Baghlan—provinces with large Pashtun pockets. That said, Taleban e'orts in the north do appear to have increased in !"#", with the support of Taleban cadres sent from the south. It is not all plain sailing for the Taleban, however. While local resistance to the Taleban in the north was not as fierce or widespread as commonly believed, the Taleban must still compete in a region with numerous other insurgent groups.$-
&$ For an eyewitness account, see http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/!"##/"#/#-/travels_with_paula_i_a_time_to_build, accessed % Feb. !"##.
&/ Thom Shanker, Elizabeth Bumiller and Rob Noland, ‘Despite gains, Afghan night raids split US and Karzai’, New York Times, #. Dec. !"#".
&% Farrell email correspondence with Dr Lawrence Lewis, US Joint Forces Command, $ Jan. !"##.$" Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Taleban extend reach to North, where armed groups reign’, New York Times, #. Dec. !"#";
Jon Boone, ‘Afghan Taleban leadership splintered by intense US military campaign’, Guardian, !! Dec. !"#".$# House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on ‘The appointment of the new Chief of the Defence Sta' ’,
uncorrected transcript of oral evidence, General Sir David Richards, #$ Nov. !"#", response to 1Q ./, Q&!, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm!"#"##/cmselect/cmdfence/uc&""-i/uc&"""#.htm, accessed % Feb. !"##.
$! Comments at RUSI–Land Warfare Centre conference, ‘Frontline COIN: linking strategy to tactics’, London, /–% Dec. !"#".
$- Rubin, ‘Taleban extend reach to North’; Antonio Giustozzi and Christopher Reuter, ‘The northern front: the Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns’, briefing paper - (Berlin: Afghan Analysts Network, !"#").
So far, ISAF has been unable to convert operational progress into strategic momentum. This failure is attributable to three strategic problems besetting the campaign: first, the lack of transparency and rampant corruption within Afghan government; second, the decline in political and public support for the war in NATO capitals; and third, the existence of insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.$* We explore each issue in turn below.
The Karzai administration: an unreliable partnerA key objective in McChrystal’s e'orts to ‘redefine the fight’ was to increase transparency within the Afghan government. Widespread corruption and rapidly declining government legitimacy were identified as strategic issues that ‘created fertile ground for the insurgency’.$. The idea was to ‘connect with the people’, shielding them not only from insurgent violence but also, and just as importantly, from corruption and coercion.$&
Working with Sedwill, McChrystal focused on addressing endemic corruption and the culture of impunity.$$ A key initiative in this respect was the formation of the Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) to coordinate international mentoring of Afghan e'orts to combat corruption and organized crime. While MCTF-A is led by the Afghan government, it was created by international law enforcement agencies, which maintains a close watch on the task force. This has served to irritate the already tense relationship between the international commu-nity and Karzai.
One prominent incident illustrates the problem. In July !"#" Mohammad Zia Saleh, a top o2cial in the o2ce of the Afghan National Security Adviser, was arrested on bribery charges. The investigation was prompted by the MCTF-A. Saleh’s internment exposed the deeply entrenched strains between Karzai and the ISAF anti-corruption drive.$/ Almost immediately, Karzai launched a campaign to rein in the MCTF-A and subordinate it to Afghan government structures,$% e'ectively robbing it of its independent status. Significantly, Saleh was later released on the orders of the Afghan attorney general’s o2ce./"
Hence, notwithstanding Karzai’s pledge ‘to clean the government of corrup -tion’,/# he has come to be viewed on the contrary as the chief stumbling block $* The problems of Afghan corruption and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan have been noted in successive White
House reviews of the campaign. See General James Jones, ‘President Obama’s Afghanistan–Pakistan (AfPak) strategy’, Foreign Press Center briefing, Washington DC, !$ March !""%; ‘Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy review’, #& Dec. !"#".
$. McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–*.$& McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. #–!.$$ ISAF document * (classified), July !"#", p. -.$/ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Karzai rift prompts US to re-evaluate anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan’,
Washington Post, #- Sept. !"#".$% Joshua Partlow and Greg Miller, ‘Karzai calls for probe of US-backed anti-corruption task force’, Washington
Post, . Aug. !"#"./" Rod Nordland and Dexter Felkins, ‘Anti-graft units, backed by US, draw Karzai’s ire’, New York Times, & Aug.
!"#"./# 0uoted in Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Karzai vows corruption fight, but avoids details’, New York Times, - Nov. !""%.
to meaningful reform./! Indeed, as western law enforcement agencies worked to investigate corruption, they were rebuked by Karzai’s o2cials for misunder-standing the nature of patronage networks that served to support the government. That such networks have a role to play is an established mantra in the Regional Commands. Senior o2cers accept that ‘functional corruption’ is a ‘norm in Afghanistan’./- The question is, how much corruption is acceptable and necessary to lubricate government? The fact remains that an uncontrollable level of corrup-tion undermines strategic progress.
According to surveys collated in !"#" by Transparency International, in terms of local Afghan perception, Afghanistan is the third most corrupt state in the world./* Importantly, &" per cent of those polled in !"#" stated that corruption had increased in the previous three years./. Data collected for a !"#" United Nations O2ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report are even more staggering. Nearly two-thirds—.% per cent—of those polled a2rm that public dishonesty is a greater concern than insecurity (.* per cent) and unemployment (.! per cent)./& Among those surveyed, the average amount of baksheesh paid in cash between January !""% and January !"#" was $#&"—in a country where, on average, GDP per capita is $*!. per annum. UNODC estimates the total sum of bribes paid over the same period amounted to $!.. billion, or nearly a quarter of Afghanistan’s GDP./$
Given this state of a'airs, Petraeus has identified combating corruption as a key objective. Shortly after assuming command, he appointed Brigadier-General H. R. McMaster (much lauded for conducting a brilliant counterinsurgency campaign in Tal Afar in Iraq) to head a newly created anti-corruption unit.// The mission of the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) Shafafiyat (Transparency) is to understand the nature of patronage networks and implement achievable anti-graft strategies./% Rather than seek to eliminate corruption per se, the transparency task force is seeking to restore legitimacy by focusing on local networks in the provinces and districts, as well as on high-level corruption in Kabul.%" Importantly, the CJIATF incorporates the work on combating corrup-tion already under way in ISAF contracting practices.%#
/! This has become evident in recently leaked diplomatic documents: see Polly Curtis, ‘Wikileaks cables on UK’s Afghan role embarrassing, says Cameron’, Guardian, $ Dec. !"#".
policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/!"#"/results, accessed % Feb. !"##./& United Nations O2ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Corruption in Afghanistan: bribery as reported by
the victims’ (New York: UNODC, Jan. !"#"), p. -. Similar results were yielded by a poll conducted jointly by the BBC, ABC News and Germany’s ARD News Show: %. per cent of those surveyed said that ‘corruption was a problem’, $& per cent said it was a ‘big problem’. See BBC News, ‘Afghans more optimistic for future’, ## Jan. !"#", http://news.bbc.co.uk/!/hi//**/%-".stm, accessed % Feb. !"##.
/$ UNODC, ‘Corruption’, p. *.// Dexter Filkins, ‘Petraeus opposes rapid pull-out in Afghanistan’, New York Times, #. Aug. !"#"./% US Department of Defense, Progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress (Washington
DC: Department of Defense, Nov. !"#"), p. &!.%" Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, ‘US shifts Afghan graft plan’, Wall Street Journal, !" Sept.
!"#".%# COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, General David Petraeus, ‘COMISAF’s counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting
These contentious issues—Karzai, ISAF contracting and corruption—all came together in Kandahar which, as noted, was the focus of ISAF’s main e'ort from summer !"#". The key power broker in the area is the President’s half-brother and Chief of the Kandahar Provincial Council, Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK). Western o2cials and journalists alike have long maintained that AWK is heavily involved in the illicit drugs trade.%! Exerting a dominant influence over regional politics through patronage networks, AWK was identified by ISAF as a major obstacle to progress in the south—but one that it was unable to remove. AWK is untouchable, given his close links to the President, who depends on his half-brother to maintain his support base in the south.%- Accordingly, ISAF has sought to win over and work with AWK. International contracts worth millions of dollars were dispensed to various companies and agencies run by his network. This ‘engagement strategy’ has produced a short-term pay-o': AWK assisted in stabilizing parts of Kandahar province, and has stayed clear of ISAF’s execution of operations inside the city.%* But this has been achieved at a longer-term cost to ISAF’s campaign to combat corruption and improve Afghan government legitimacy.
The extent of corruption was most dramatically revealed in the fiasco of the !""% presidential elections, which were marred by massive electoral fraud.%. Over a million votes cast were found to be ‘suspicious’, of which %.",""" in favour of Karzai were fraudulent.%& In the wake of this unedifying spectacle, international observers argued that ISAF could not defeat the Taleban because it did not have a ‘credible local partner’.%$ Yet polls indicate that the elections themselves have not eroded Karzai’s popularity among Afghans. One major survey put the President’s approval rating at $! per cent.%/ Another surmised that $* per cent of Afghans believe that elections have ‘improved the country’.%% Clearly, vote-rigging has not put people o' the electoral process.
However, this is not to say that ordinary Afghans have been fooled. Most people, especially in the east and south of the country, do not think that the presidential and parliamentary elections were ‘free and fair’.#"" In sum, the persistence of support for Karzai exists alongside waning public faith in the state and its organs. Indeed,
%! James Risen, ‘Reports link Karzai’s brother to Afghanistan heroin trade’, New York Times, * Oct. !""/. AWK’s malign activities have been confirmed in recently leaked diplomatic cables: see Embassy in Kabul to State Department, ‘Ahmed Wali Karzai: seeking to define himself as US partner’, !. Feb. !"#", http://!#-.!.#.#*..%&/cable/!"#"/"!/#"KABUL&%-.html, accessed % Feb. !"##.
%- Abdul Waheed Wafa, ‘Brother of Karzai denies links to heroin’, New York Times, & Oct. !""/.%* Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American o2cials, Kandahar RC-South, Aug. !"#";
Chaudhuri interview with former senior adviser to the Afghan government, London, Oct. !"#"; Chaudhuri interview with senior o2cial, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Aug. !"#"; Farrell interviews with command sta', RC-South, #" Oct. !"#".
%. Haseeb Humayoon, ‘The re-election of Hamid Karzai’, report * (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, Jan. !"#"); Peter. W. Galbraith, ‘How the Afghan election was rigged’, Time Magazine, #% Oct. !""%.
%& Humayoon, ‘The re-election of Hamid Karzai’, pp. !%–-#. %$ Galbraith, ‘How the Afghan election was rigged’; Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American
o2cials, Kandahar, Aug. !"#"; Chaudhuri observations in three round tables with senior ISAF o2cials, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Aug. !"#".
%/ BBC News, ‘Afghans more optimistic for future’.%% Asia Foundation, ‘Key findings – Afghanistan in !"#": a survey of the Afghan people’, pp. &–$, http://
asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/KeyFindingsAGSurvey!"#".pdf, accessed % Feb. !"##. #"" Asia Foundation, ‘Key findings’, pp. .–&.
the high approval rating for the President may reflect an inclination to support political authority and thus not provide an accurate picture of Karzai’s personal popularity.#"# Independent studies suggest that the lack of legitimacy has pushed the population ‘to look elsewhere for a more moral form of governance’.#"! Some have taken to Taleban courts, often reputed to deliver harsh but swift justice.#"- Others have chosen to support insurgent groups, not necessarily out of positive choice, but because of the lack of political alternatives.#"*
Petraeus has thrown his best and brightest at this problem. But progress on corruption is hindered by multiple tensions. Afghan politicians depend on the well-entrenched patronage system for survival and capacity to govern. Hence, tackling corruption targets the bedrock of the Afghan government. Moreover, as the case of AWK illustrates, ISAF often finds it expedient to work with corrupt power brokers.
NATO politics and withdrawal
The question of when international forces would withdraw from the country dominated policy debate on Afghanistan in !"#", both in Washington DC and in other key NATO capitals. It generated considerable strategic uncertainty, clouding progress on the ground. The debate kicked o' with President Obama’s speech at West Point on # December !""%. Speaking to international and domestic audiences alike, the President argued that the American military surge was to ‘create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans’, following which US forces would begin to withdraw in July !"##.#". In other words, ‘transition’ to ANSF lead would open the door for NATO to leave. As Obama put it in private, ‘this [the surge] needs to be a plan about how we’re going to hand it o' [sic] and get out of Afghanistan’.#"& In public, the Obama administration has emphasized that the July deadline is not set in stone, and is dependent upon conditions on the ground.#"$ Nonetheless, it has buttressed the downturn in strategic momentum.
The international conferences in London ( January !"#") and Kabul ( July !"#") emphasized transition as a strategic goal. The communiqué following the Kabul conference stressed that transition ‘should’ be completed by !"#*.#"/ This position was endorsed by NATO members at the Lisbon summit in November !"#". Indeed, #"# Chaudhuri telephone interview with senior Afghan specialist involved in polling, !" Jan. !"##. #"! Sarah Ladbury, ‘Testing hypotheses on radicalisation in Afghanistan’, independent Report for the Department
of International Development (London: DfID, #* Aug. !""%), p. #/; Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, ‘No shortcut to stability: justice, politics, and insurgency in Afghanistan’ (London: Chatham House, Dec. !"#"), pp. !–##.
#"- For details, see Frank Ledwidge, ‘Justice and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: a missing link’, RUSI Journal #.*: %, !""%, p. &–%.
#"* For surveys that validate this point, see Ladbury, ‘Testing hypotheses’, pp. #$–#%.#". Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in address to the nation’, speech at United States Military Academy
at West Point, # Dec. !""%, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-o2ce/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan, accessed % Feb. !"##.
#"& 0uoted in Bob Woodward, Obama’s war (London: Simon & Schuster, !"#"), p. -"#.#"$ Jon Boone, ‘General Petraeus insists he will not be bound by Obama’s Afghan exit date’, Guardian, #. Aug. !"#".#"/ Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, !" July !"#", p. $.
the summit discussions made clear that the vast majority of the #-/,""" inter-national troops deployed in Afghanistan would leave by !"#*.#"% Notwithstanding NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s assurance that NATO ‘is in this for the long term’,##" political elites a2rmed the deadline was real. Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron argued forcefully that transitioning by !"#* ‘will pave the way for British combat troops to be out of Afghanistan by !"#.’, a ‘firm deadline’ that the UK is set to meet.### The withdrawal of Dutch troops in August !"#", the planned withdrawal of Canadian forces in the middle of !"## and that of Polish soldiers in !"#! further suggest that NATO has begun the process of leaving Afghanistan.
The situation in Germany, the third largest troop-contributing nation, is hardly more encouraging. The current government is divided on the issue, with Defence Minister Guttenberg seeking an extended role for the Bundeswehr, and Foreign Minister Westerwelle pushing for withdrawal sooner rather than later.##! While the Bundestag is expected to extend the force mandate in March !"##, further exten-sions are likely to invite strong political opposition, making it all the more di2cult to secure broad social consensus for what is e'ectively a parliamentary army.##- Indeed, Westerwelle has confirmed that German troops will begin withdrawing as early as !"#!, suggesting the direction policy is likely to take on this question.##*
Even in Australia and France, where the governments have actually advocated extending the mission beyond !"#*, public pressure has reined in executive branch enthusiasm. In October, the federal parliament in Canberra debated the Afghan war for the first time since Australian Defence Forces deployed to Afghanistan in !""#.##. While both Prime Minister Julia Gillard and opposition leader Tony Abbott supported the war,##& polls indicate dipping public confidence.##$ Similarly, in France, President Sarkozy’s backing of the Afghan war has done nothing to rally popular support. Indeed, as table ! shows, public support for the war among all four top troop-contributing states declined in !"#".
There are three reasons for this decline in public support: NATO’s inability to craft a convincing strategic narrative that has a degree of salience with ‘home’
#"% Ian Traynor, ‘NATO maps out Afghanistan withdrawal by !"#* at Lisbon Summit’, Guardian, !" Nov. !"#". ##" 0uoted in ‘NATO and Afghanistan launch transition and embark on a long term partnership’, NATO News,
##! Ralf Beste, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Ralf Neukirch and Gregor-Peter Schmitz, ‘Germany debates Afghanistan’, Der Spiegel, !$ Dec. !"#".
##- Ulrike Demmer, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit and Ralf Neukirch, ‘Fear of rising death toll’, Der Spiegel, !. Dec. !"#".
##* Judy Dempsey and Mathew Saltmarsh, ‘German troops to begin Afghan exit next year’, New York Times, #& Dec. !"#".
##. Gerard Henderson, ‘Party leaders closer on Afghanistan war than you may think’, Sydney Morning Herald, #! Oct. !"#".
##& Editorial, ‘Speeches mask the reality of Afghanistan’s war’, Sydney Morning Herald, !# Oct. !"#"; Hamish McDonald, ‘A shaky premise for our Afghan exit’, Sydney Morning Herald, # Jan. !"##.
##$ Mathew Franklin and Mark Todd, ‘Afghan flak hits Tony Abbott in the polls’, Australian, #! Oct. !"#"; ‘More Australians call for Afghanistan withdrawal’, Angus Reid Public Opinion, -" June !"#", http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/-%#$&/more_australians_call_for_afghanistan_withdrawal/, accessed % Feb. !"##.
Table $. Comparative public support for Afghanistan campaign, $%%& and $%#%
Country Public support in #$$( (%) Public support in #$%$ (%)
United States ..a *"b
United Kingdom *!c -$d
Germany -$e -"f
France -!g -"h
a Mean percentage figure for the period between !""& and !""%, based on multiple polls computed by Sarah Kreps, ‘Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion’, Foreign Policy Analysis &: -, July !"#", p. #%..
b Figure computed by the authors based on the mean average of polls conducted between Aug. and Dec. !"#". See Je'rey M. Jones, ‘Americans less pessimistic about US progress in Afghanistan’, Gallup, !% Nov. !"#", http://www.gallup.com/poll/#**%**/Americans-Less-Pessimistic-Progress-Afghanistan.aspx; Je'rey M. Jones, ‘Obama finds majority approval elusive’, Gallup, ## Aug. !"#", http://www.gallup.com/poll/#*#/-&/Issues-Obama-Finds-Majority-Approval-Elusive.aspx; Je'rey M. Jones, ‘In the US, new high of *-% call Afghanistan war a mistake’, Gallup, - Aug. !"#", http://www.gallup.com/poll/#*#$#&/New-High-Call-Afghanistan-War-Mistake.aspx; Julie Phelon and Gary Langer, ‘Poll: assessment of Afghanistan war sours’, ABC/Washington Post poll, #& Dec. !"#"; ‘What the numbers say about Afghanistan progress in Afghanistan’, CNN, #. Oct. !"#", http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/!"#"/#"/#./what-the-numbers-say-about-progress-in-afghanistan/.
c Based on the average of polls conducted in !""%: see Richard Norton Taylor, Julian Glover and Nicholas Watt, ‘Public support of war in Afghanistan is firm’, Guardian, #- July !""%; ‘Majority of Britons oppose Afghan war’, Reuters, $ Oct. !""%, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-*!%$/-!""%#""$.
d This percentage argued that British troops should begin to be removed from Afghanistan in !"#": ‘News-night poll: most think Afghan war “unwinnable”’, BBC Newsnight, !- Feb. !"#", http://news.bbc.co.uk/!/hi/programmes/newsnight//.-"$&#.stm; Nigel Morris, ‘Afghan war is unwinnable and we should not be there, says voters’, Independent, !# April !"#".
e Based on the average of polls conducted in !""%: see ‘Transatlantic trends’, German Marshall Fund, !"#", pp. -/–%, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/!"#"_English_Top.pdf; ‘Germans would remove troops from Afghanistan’, Angus Reid Public Opinion, !/ March !""", http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/-..$$/germans_would_remove_troops_from_afghanistan/. These figures are consistent with alternative research: Kreps, ‘Elite consensus’, p. #%..
f ‘Germans consider ending Afghan mission now’, Angus Reid Public Opinion, ! April !"#", http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/-/!**/germans_consider_ending_afghan_mission_now/. The authors calculated the average of those advocating immediate withdrawal (-!%), withdrawal by !"## (!*%) and withdrawal by !"#. (#*%).
g Based on the average percentage of polling data from questions concerning attitudes towards the war and respondents’ support for withdrawal: see ‘Transatlantic trends’, pp. -/–%.
h Gene Zbikowski, ‘War in Afghanistan unpopular in France’, L’Humanité, #. July !"#", http://www. humaniteinenglish.com/spip.php?article#.&$.
populations; a sharp rise in western casualties;##/ and the questionable objective of supporting a government marred by charges of corruption and electoral fraud. The fact that both NATO and western political leaders have failed to commu-nicate the purpose of the mission to home audiences is an accepted fact among military commanders at ISAF HQ.##% In Britain, for instance, the war has been justified as necessary in order to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a ‘base for terrorism’. However, the government has failed to convince the parliament, let alone the public, of this case for war.#!" As one senior British commander
##/ Coalition fatalities were the highest in !""% and !"#": ‘Military casualty data’, Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, !"#", http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/military.html, accessed % Feb. !"##.
##% Chaudhuri interviews and observations during four round tables with senior British, American, French and Canadian o2cers and civilians at ISAF HQ and RC-South, Aug. !"#".
#!" House of Commons Foreign A'airs Committee, Global security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, eighth report of
recounts, ‘the %/##-Al 0aeda story lacks credibility when the scope of our mission is as expansive as it is, and complicated by an elusive end state’.#!#
With support for the war declining in NATO capitals, the political mood has turned against it. This is the all-important context of the !"#* deadline. No matter what o2cials say about transition being based on conditions on the ground, the political reality is that, come !"#*, NATO combat troops will almost certainly withdraw.#!!
Pakistan: an unwilling allyPakistan’s unwillingness to target insurgent groups hostile to coalition forces and housed in sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the porous Durand Line serves as yet another strategic impediment to progress in Afghanistan.#!- These groups include the 1ST and the H1N, which operate out of 0uetta (the capital city of Baluchistan), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and, increasingly, the densely populated city of Karachi.
Under the Bush administration, little attention was given to the dynamic of a shared insurgency spanning the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.#!* Conversely, Obama’s advisers were quick to recognize that both the ISAF mission and the future of Afghanistan were directly dependent upon Pakistani cooperation.#!. In March !""% the much publicized Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) strategy document made a case for a ‘regional approach’, treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries ‘with one challenge in one region’.#!& At ISAF HQ, McChrystal reached a similar conclusion: ‘stability in Pakistan’ was ‘essential’ to ‘enable progress in Afghanistan’.#!$ Insurgent groups were ‘reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)’.#!/ While the veracity of the latter claim is questionable,#!% that the Pakistani military are ‘living a lie’ is a matter of both conventional wisdom and dilemma.#-"
session !""/–!""%, HC -"! (London: TSO, Aug. !""%), pp. %&–%; David J. Betz, ‘Communication breakdown: strategic communication and defeat in Afghanistan’, internal paper for PRISM, RC-South, Sept. !"#".
#!# Chaudhuri interview with very senior British commander, ISAF HQ, Kabul, ## Aug. !"#".#!! This is not to suggest that NATO will abandon Afghanistan. There is evidence to suggest that a smaller
training/support mission and special forces will remain beyond the !"#* deadline. #!- ‘Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy review’; Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Intelligence reports o'er
dim views of Afghan war’, New York Times, #* Dec. !"#".#!* Ahmed Rashid, Descent into chaos (New York: Viking, !""/), pp. xxxvii–lviii; Gary C. Schroen, First in: an
insider’s account of how the CIA spearheaded the war on terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, !"".), pp. -./–&-.
#!. Chaudhuri interview with Bruce Riedel, Washington DC, !/ Aug. !""/; Bruce Riedel, ‘Al 0aeda strikes back’, Foreign A!airs /&: -, May–June !""$, pp. -.–/; Richard C. Holbrooke, ‘The next President: mastering a daunting agenda’, Foreign A!airs /$: ., Sept.–Oct. !""/, pp. #/–!".
#!& Jones, ‘President Obama’s Afghanistan–Pakistan (AfPak) strategy’. #!$ McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–#".#!/ McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–#".#!% The ISI’s linkage with the 1ST is a matter of much debate. While recent studies show that ISI o2cers are
represented on the 1ST’s leadership council, specialists claim that the ISI and the military merely provide shelter, not necessarily direct support, to the 1ST. See Matt Waldman, ‘The sun in the sky: the relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan insurgents’, Crisis State Research Centre working paper (London: London School of Economics, June !"#"), p. .; Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: a hard country (London: Penguin, forthcoming !"##), ch. &.
#-" 0uoted by Mike McConnell, the former US Director of National Intelligence, in Woodward, Obama’s war, p. #; Michael Semple, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: interdependent, distrustful neighbours’, Guardian, !$ July !"#".
Three interrelated reasons explain this state of a'airs. First, Pakistani elites are convinced that ISAF forces will soon withdraw from Afghanistan,#-# leaving them to contend with a raging civil war. Western intelligence accepts that the July !"## deadline for the beginning of US force withdrawal reinforced Pakistani support for the 1ST and the H1N, viewed by Pakistan as its proxies in the Afghan endgame.#-! Second, a core objective is to craft a hedging strategy against increasing ‘Indian influence in Kabul’.#-- That is, as far as the military are concerned, it simply does not make sense to target Pashtun–Afghan Taleban actors who may well return to power in at least some part of Afghanistan, particularly when the contending party—the existing Tajik-dominated government in Kabul—is considered to comprise India’s ‘Afghan protégés’.#-* The insecurity complex is further compounded by the fact that Pakistan has historically shared an uneasy relationship with Afghan princi-ples.#-. Third, recent research highlights a key domestic rationale for sheltering Afghan insurgent groups. Anatol Lieven argues that on the ‘street’ there is an ‘overwhelming level of sympathy for the Afghan Taleban’, making it all the harder for state authorities to turn against them.#-& In short, Pakistan’s frame of reference is shaped by regional dynamics that have been accentuated by both the repeated talk of withdrawal and important domestic compulsions.
With a view to reversing Pakistan’s strategic calculation, the Obama administra-tion set about increasing US economic assistance. Accordingly, the US Congress pledged $#.. billion annually for five years.#-$ The idea, initially, was to strengthen the government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari. However, US e'orts to buttress civilian authority irritated the military leadership.#-/ By the end of !""%, military elites felt sidelined. In an attempt to restore confidence, both countries initiated a strategic dialogue at the ministerial level. Importantly, the US increased assistance to the Pakistani military by $! billion.#-% The extended fiscal support was once again intended to prompt the military to take action against insurgent groups. Yet to date, for the reasons highlighted above, this approach has proved unsuccessful.
This is not to say that the Pakistani military has shied away from the ‘war on terror’. To the contrary: the military and intelligence agencies have taken decisive action against extremists who threaten stability within Pakistan. Indeed, the #-# Ahmed Rashid, ‘Trotsky in Baluchistan’, National Interest, Nov.–Dec. !""%. For alternative findings on
Pakistani military views on the US exit, see Christine C. Fair, ‘The militant challenge in Pakistan’, Policy Analysis ##, Jan. !"##, p. ##$.
#-! Chaudhuri interview with a senior western intelligence o2cer, Kabul, ## Aug. !"#". This is not to suggest that the military controls either the 1ST or the H1N; rather, that these groups serve as favourites in Afghanistan’s political landscape. See Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, eds, Abdul Salaam Zaeef: my life with the Taleban (London: Hurst, !"#") pp. #"$–!#.
#-- Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan on the brink’, New York Review of Books .&: #", ## June !""%.#-* Rashid, ‘Trotsky in Baluchistan’.#-. For an overview, see Farzana Shaikh, Making sense of Pakistan (London: Hurst, !""%) pp. !""–!"/.#-& Lieven, Pakistan, chs &, ##. The authors thank Anatol Lieven for sharing chapters of his manuscript and
research in advance of publication.#-$ ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act !""%’, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s###–
%&!&tab=summary, accessed % Feb. !"##. #-/ David Ignatius, ‘How to aggravate Pakistan’, Washington Post, ## Oct. !""%; ‘Kerry–Lugar aid bill sparks debate
in parliament’, Dawn, $ Oct. !""%.#-% Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, ‘US o'ers Pakistan army ! billion aid package’, New York Times, !! Oct. !"#".
Pakistani security forces have lost more lives fighting the militancy than all NATO countries in Afghanistan.#*" Since at least !""* the military has helped target key Al-0aeda leaders.#*# In April !""% it launched clearing operations in the Swat Valley. Operation Rah-e-Raast (The Right Path) pushed extremists out, elimi-nating their ability to ‘regain control of the area’.#*! In October !""% the military took the fight (Operation Rah-e-Nijat or Path to Salvation) to the Tehrik-e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistan Taleban. In !"#", while Pakistan’s COIN strategy and timetable were set back by the devastating floods that a'ected over #"" million people,#*- a number of operations were soon reinitiated in key Taleban strongholds.#** Clearly, resolve is hardly an issue with the Pakistani military, as long as the mission complements its strategic calculations.
Alongside the extended programme of assistance to Pakistan, the Obama admin-istration devoted attention to India. It was believed that meaningful dialogue and traction on the Kashmir dispute would encourage Pakistani elites to focus their attention on the 1ST and associated groups, rather than on India in the east.#*. Holbrooke’s uno2cial brief as US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan was to convince the Indians to engage in dialogue with Pakistan.#*& However, the prospect of improving relations was sidelined by the growing opposition to rapprochement in India following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November !""/.#*$ Frustrated by Pakistan’s refusal to arrest those responsible, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh argued that talks could resume once Pakistan put a stop to the ‘terror machine’.#*/ In early !"## Indian and Pakistani leaders stressed the need to engage in dialogue, but rapprochement will require Pakistan to take meaningful action against those accused in the Mumbai attacks.#*% This is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Neither economic nor regional incentives have altered Pakistan’s strategic perceptions. In fact, Pakistani anxieties have deepened because of India’s expanding footprint in Afghanistan. This point was emphasized by McChrystal, who argued that ‘while Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people’, they exacerbate regional tensions and ‘encourage[s] Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or
#*" Hilary Synnott, ‘Look both ways before attacking Pakistan’, Financial Times, * Aug. !"#"; Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report #$$( (Islamabad, Jan. !"#"), pp. #–..
#*# Anatol Lieven, ‘How the Afghan counterinsurgency threatens Pakistan’, The Nation, - Jan. !"##.#*! Hasan Abbas, Militancy in Pakistan’s borderlands (New York: Century Foundation, !"#"), p. !%. This was
confirmed by independent observers having visited Swat: Chaudhuri interview with senior Pakistani journalist embedded with the army, London, !! March !"#"; discussions with Anatol Lieven following his visit to Swat in Sept. !""%.
#*- Hilary Synnott, ‘After the flood’, Survival .!: ., Sept. !"#", p. !*%.#** S. Akbar Zaidi, Pakistan after the floods (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), !%
Sept. !"#"; Carlotta Gall, ‘Floods stunt Pakistani fight against insurgents’, New York Times, #- Sept. !"#".#*. Rashid, ‘Trotsky in Baluchistan’; C. Raja Mohan, ‘Barack Obama’s Kashmir thesis’, Indian Express, - Nov.
!""/.#*& Laura Roxen, ‘India’s stealth lobbying against Holbrooke brief ’, The Cable, Foreign Policy, !* Jan. !""%;
Woodward, Obama’s war, p. /&; Chaudhuri interview with former senior US State Department o2cial, London, #/ Sept. !""%.
#*$ See Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘The proxy calculus’, RUSI Journal #..: &, Dec. !"#", pp. .!–&".#*/ ‘Obama says talk to Pakistan’, Times of India, / Nov. !"#".#*% Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Krishna expects productive meeting with 0ureshi’, The Hindu, / Jan. !"##.
India’.#." McChrystal was referring to India’s $#.- billion aid package to Kabul, which angered the Pakistani military. This impending crisis in confidence is fuelled by claims made by Pakistani elites that India actively supports and arms Baluch groups in their struggle against the government in Islamabad. Baluch leaders are said to be sheltered in Indian consulates in southern and eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan.#.# While the facts underlying these claims are hazy at best, they serve to intensify further the prevailing culture of mistrust.#.!
Far from encouraging support for ISAF objectives, the layered and complex regional situation reinforces the belief among Pakistani elites that the central nodes of the insurgency represent the most promising option in the quest to secure Pakistani interests in the long term. This is the primary reason why, rather than turning on the Taleban, military leaders have positioned themselves as the key brokers in any attempt at reconciliation between the 1ST and the Karzai administration.#.-
The prospects for 2011
How, then, does the western campaign in Afghanistan look for !"##? It is pretty promising at the operational level. The trend on CIVCAS is positive. ANSF growth is healthy. There is more work yet to be done on ANA quality, but at least ISAF is now also focused on ANP partnering. Militarily, the ISAF campaign has regained momentum, and the Taleban appear to have been worn down in Helmand and Kandahar. ISAF is focused on the key challenge of supporting the development of subnational governance. The problem is that continued progress at the operational level cannot address the three strategic obstacles to campaign success: a corrupt and unreliable national government, declining domestic political support for the war in NATO countries, and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.#.*
For all the assistance that NATO provides to Afghanistan, there is only so much the US and its allies can do about Afghan government corruption. For a start, Afghanistan is a sovereign state and, ultimately, ISAF operates at the request of the Afghan government. Besides, Karzai probably realizes that the US needs him
#." McChrystal, ‘Commander’s initial assessment’, pp. !–#". For detailed analysis of India’s role in Afghanistan, see Shashank Joshi, ‘India’s AfPak strategy’, RUSI Journal #..: #, Feb.–March !"#", pp. !"–!%; Matthieu Aikins, ‘India in Afghanistan’, The Caravan Journal, Oct. !"#".
#.# For details on Pakistani views on the ‘Indian hand’, see Imtiaz Gul, The most dangerous place: Pakistan’s lawless frontier (London: Penguin, !""%), pp. !"#–!"..
#.! To date, Indians argue that such evidence has not been made available, and western o2cials in Kandahar are not clear about the validity of these claims. Importantly, and unsurprisingly, Afghan o2cials reject Pakistan’s claims. See ‘Pak claims India backing Baluch rebels’, Indian Express, !! Apr. !""%; Chaudhuri interviews with British, American and Canadian o2cials, RC-South, /–% Aug. !"#".
#.- Antonio Giustiozzi, ‘Negotiating with the Taleban’, (New York: Century Foundation, !"#"), pp. #.–#&.#.* Space constraints have prevented our discussing every issue pertaining to campaign progress in this article.
Opium production declined between !""$ and !"#", but from a very high baseline, while the licit economy grew spectacularly, albeit from a very low baseline: Afghan GDP grew on average by #! per cent per annum from !""- to !""/. See Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan index: tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-%/## Afghanistan’, #% Oct. !"#", pp. !., !%. The important point is that economic growth is a crucial factor in enabling states to escape the ‘conflict trap’: see Paul Collier, The bottom billion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, !""$).
almost as much as he needs the US.#.. McMaster’s newly formed anti-corruption unit, the CJIATF-Shafafiyat, promises to introduce better-informed anti-graft strategies in consultation with Afghan principals, a key failing of the MCTF-A. Yet rooting out high-level corruption, with the attendant costs for the existing patronage system, is likely to attract strong opposition from within the Afghan government. Indeed, in most cases the patronage network in Kabul can be traced back to key power brokers at the regional level. As we have noted, the paradox of having to work with such ‘ambiguous and problematic’ figures, while knowing that they corrode the government’s already waning legitimacy, is unfortunately a reality.#.& It is possible that, in time, the growth of subnational governance and a more professional ANSF will increase public confidence in the institutions of government. But such a ‘legitimacy uplift’ is unlikely in the next four years.
Could progress in the military campaign not stem the decline in public support for the war? Well, possibly; but no amount of operational progress is likely to significantly increase public support, because there is still the question of purpose: why is NATO fighting the war? Academic analysis of American public opinion and the use of force clearly show that public support for war is directly related to its purpose.#.$ As we have noted, NATO lacks a credible strategic narrative to explain the purpose to home audiences. It may be argued that a NATO-wide coherent narrative is not possible or even desirable, given di'erent national sensi-tivities and roles in Afghanistan. But in its absence, some NATO members—such as Britain, Canada and Germany—have struggled to construct national narratives that resonate with their own publics. An endless stream of scandals, involving political and financial corruption at the highest levels of Afghan government, has not helped on this score.
Finally, there is the problem of Pakistan. Notwithstanding a slew of high-ranking US visitors to Islamabad towards the end of !"#" and at the beginning of !"##, there is nothing to suggest that the security forces will turn their guns on anti-coalition insurgents.#./ Indeed, rather than adopting a conciliatory stance towards American pleas to ‘dry the swamp’ in north Waziristan, suspected home to the Haqqanis, General Kayani has taken on an increasingly defiant attitude. Indeed, the media-shy general has made clear that the US and Pakistan have di'erent ‘frames of reference’ with regard to regional security.#.% A leaked US National Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan stressed that Kayani ‘is unlikely to change his mind anytime soon’.#&" Convinced that western presence in Afghanistan will all but disappear in the next four to five years, Pakistan depends for its leverage and reach within Afghanistan upon its ability to shape a reconciliation dialogue
#.. Andrew Exum, Leverage: designing a political campaign for Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for a New American Security, May !"#"), p. %.
#.& Anthony King, ‘The power of politics’, RUSI Journal #..: &, Dec. !"#", p. $#.#.$ Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force, #%/#–
!"".’, International Security -": #, !""., pp. #*"–$$.#./ Karin Brulliard and Karen De Young, ‘US courts Pakistan’s top general, with little result’, Washington Post, #
Jan. !"##.#.% Brulliard and Young, ‘US courts Pakistan’s top general’.#&" ‘Gen. Kayani resisting US pressures to launch ground attack’, The Nation (Pakistan), # Jan. !"#".
between the 1ST and the Afghan government,#&# or so senior Pakistani o2cials believe.#&! Additionally, the stalemate in India–Pakistan relations following the Mumbai attacks persists, further aggravating Pakistani anxieties.#&- In sum, Pakistan is preparing for the endgame, in which there is little strategic space to consider US appeals that are wholly inimical to Pakistani interests.
In turn, and with a view to ending the war, if ISAF were to change tack and support a high-level reconciliation dialogue with the 1ST and the H1N, Pakistan would no doubt serve as a key interlocutor. Whether this is likely to happen depends on how Washington reads the conflict nearer to the US presi-dential elections in !"#!. Either way, reconciliation can at best be interpreted as a central component of an exit strategy, itself shaped by the inability to convert operational progress into strategic momentum.
Nobody can predict with any certainty how things will pan out in Afghan-istan in !"##. Our reading of the situation leads us to conclude that the most likely scenario is that operational progress will fail to produce the desired strategic outcomes. Indeed, it is entirely possible that things will get worse on the strategic side of things. Growing war-weariness among NATO publics, a strong and largely immovable patronage system led by corrupt power brokers in Afghanistan, and the strategic logic underlying Pakistani non-action may collectively tip the campaign into a downward strategic spiral. In these circumstances, the best that the US and its allies can hope for is to exert influence on key terrain districts and garrisoned cities like Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. With transition as the central goal for !"## and beyond, the focus is likely to remain on ANSF development. In many ways, the key will lie in converting the ANA and ANP into corporate institutions capable of thinking and fighting for national strategic interests.
As mentioned above, reconciliation is the wild card. There may yet be a negoti-ated end to the conflict that ensures a reasonably stable, legitimate and secure national government following NATO withdrawal. This coming year is likely to see leniency on the part of Washington to widen the channel of dialogue with at least the less ideologically driven parts of the insurgency. Negotiations in some form have been going on for some time.#&* The process, if it succeeds at all, will be a slow one. Violent resistance to the Afghan government is driven by a combina-tion of local rivalries and grievances, and ideological and military direction from the 1ST, H1N or HIG.#&. Accordingly, reconciliation requires engaging with a myriad of insurgent groups and addressing the mix of motivations specific to each group.#&& There is a growing realization in Washington that a negotiated end
#&# For details on Pakistan and reconciliation, see Matt Waldman, ‘Tough talking’, RUSI Journal #..: &, Dec. !"#", pp. &*–..
#&! Chaudhuri observations in track-two meetings convened by the authors with senior Pakistani and Indian representatives, London, !-–!* March !"#".
#&- Chaudhuri, ‘The proxy calculus’, pp. .&–$.#&* Ahmed Rashid, ‘The way out of Afghanistan’, New York Review of Books, #& Dec. !"#"; Ewan MacAskill and
Simon Tisdall, ‘White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taleban’, Guardian, #% July !"#". #&. Antonio Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the new Taleban (London: Hurst, !""%).#&& Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, !""%).
to the conflict is a better scenario than a strategy of hope in which key strategic impediments are implausibly expected to fall in line with ISAF campaign objec-tives.
