Can We Live with Monetary Discipline for Another Decade?

Canadian Public Policy

Can We Live with Monetary Discipline for Another Decade?Author(s): John GrantSource: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 181-188Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public PolicyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3550154 .Accessed: 16/06/2014 13:16

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Can We Live With Monetary Discipline for Another Decade?

JOHN GRANT/Wood Gundy Limited

Monetary discipline is expected to persist in the form of high real interest rates for many years. Information technology is making it impossible to enforce non-market 'controls' on credit. Policymakers have painfully learned that monetary stimulus is counterproductive. However, the continued usefulness of M 1 as a control variable is also in question. Central bankers may have to use new instruments to achieve further deceleration of nominal output growth during the 1980s.

Pendant de nombreuses ann6es encore, une discipline mon6taire devrait persister sous forme de taux d'interet reel 61ev6s. Car la technologie de l'information rend impossible toute application de 'contrbles' hors-march6 du credit. Les hommes politiques ont d6couvert a leurs de- pens que le stimulus monetaire est dommageable. L'utilit6 de M 1 comme variable instrumen- tale est egalement en cause. La banque centrale devra peut-4tre faire usage de nouveaux instruments, afin de provoquer, durant les ann6es 80, un ralentissement de la croissance du rendement nominal.

I'm very tempted to start this paper with Al Jolson's famous first words in the Jazz Singer: 'Folks, You Ain't Heard Nothin' Yet!' In my opinion we not only CAN live with monetary restraint, we WILL live with it, and not just for another decade. I believe that there are many reasons to anticipate that monetary discipline will persist. Whether monetary discipline will rid us quickly or slowly of price inflation is another question, although I am optimistic that we will have made major progress before the end of the decade. Although formal, partial controls on specific forms of credit cannot be ruled out, from time to time or in specific situations, I don't expect them to take the place of general monetary discipline, enforced by central banks through a broad umbrella of interest-rate relationships focused ultimately on the control of bank cash reserves.

MAJOR EFFICIENCY GAINS POSSIBLE THROUGH VIDEOTEX

TECHNOLOGIES

I will try to lay some foundations for these statements. But I would like to anticipate my conclusions first, and paint a picture briefly for you of the world I envision in the 1990s. I don't think most people have really yet focused on the huge implications of two-way videotex terminals such as Telidon, or on the dramatic changes that are in store for the institutions of our society and our economy as we move quickly toward an information-rich world. It is true that 'robotics' has already become a buzzword; many people now appreciate that microprocessors are sweeping all before them in almost every field of endeavour. The

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182 / John Grant

world has already become, for financial managers, a global village in an operational sense. But when videotex terminals are universal, they will bring, above all, a dramatic further lowering of transactions costs in all sorts of businesses. When an ordinary person can, at her Telidon terminal, switch her free cash balances instantly from one financial institution to another, seeking the highest rate of interest available, whether it be for a day, a week or a month, there won't be any banking float any longer, and there will certainly be few if any non-interest-bearing deposits. When everyone has a money card, that can be presented to a merchant and processed immediately to debit one's account on an overdraft basis, at minimal marginal cost per transaction, the old institutional relationships that depended on inertia, on the high cost of information and on the high cost of individual transactions for their rationale, will simply vanish.

I am excited about these things, most of all because I believe these trends will be deeply supportive of a flowering liberal democracy. Easy access to information of all kinds is the basis, the sine qua non of a robust political system. But the implications for the economy are also very positive. By 1990, every transaction of any importance may automatically be logged into computers. The potential gains in efficiency are quite staggering to consider. In effect, once every transaction is 'on line,' and the computers can collate, process, assess and integrate the transactions immediately, the potential savings in, for instance, inventory levels are very impressive. The potential savings in clerical effort are almost incredible. The potential savings in accounting and bookkeeping effort are also particularly impressive. The computers will keep the books, they will monitor deliveries and failures to deliver, they will make possible a fully integrated, extremely high-powered and detailed kind of forecasting for even the smallest business, and they will make a mockery out of any attempt to shut off or divert the flow of credit.

It seems to me that the real reason that interest-rate discipline will survive in 1990 is that it is the only sort of financial discipline that is consistent with a truly efficient capital market. When everyone has a money card, when every individual's financial affairs can be examined and calculated quickly and efficiently, when through videotex we can manipulate our assets and liabilities almost indefinitely, it will be almost impossible to make a formal regime of credit controls stick. Those with reasonably long memories will recall that the so-called 'avail- ability doctrine' was already fought over and discarded back in the 1960s. Even then, it was found that attempts to impede the use of credit through regulatory devices were inefficient, could not be more than temporary and were essentially ineffective. But in the world of the 1990s, when the consumer with his two-way terminal will truly be king, the only way that individuals will be effectively persuaded to voluntarily limit their purchases of goods and services will be to offer them real, positive, interest rates on financial assets, high enough to present an attractive alternative. (I assume, of course, that the individual will also respond to the normal constraints of income, wealth, and whatever worthiness standards lenders choose to impose.) The only way to limit credit-worthy borrowing decisions will be to charge positive real interest rates high enough to represent a real deterrent. We will not be able to count on inertia, or ignorance, or high information costs to impede the decision to borrow, to lend or to buy. This may be frightening to some, but I personally wait for the day with considerable impatience.

Let us consider the world of 1990. The world we are heading toward will be one which, because of microprocessors and optical fibres, and because of sophisticated computer programs, will be incredibly aware of itself. When every transaction is logged by computers, when every business is linked to its customers, its suppliers and its bankers, linked to its delivery companies and its advisors, by instant and virtually costless communications, the need for physical and



Monetary discipline for another decade? / 183

financial inventories will be considerably reduced from what it is today. Obviously, we will still need to hold buffers against disasters, accidents and shocks. But I do think that the ability of the world to absorb, assess, regroup and generally flow around those shocks will be vastly improved. My fellow economists will appreciate the implications of having the National Accounts produced a few days after the end of each calendar quarter, substantially in their final form. In fact, the micro-level detail available to corporate planners will be so voluminous that it will only be possible to deal with it effectively by using highly integrative computer programs. I predict a major renaissance for operations research and for econometricians, in fact for those with analytic skills of all kinds. The richness of data available for collation, aggregation and iotegration from the lowest micro-level upward will spur an incredible pro- fusion of insights into behaviour, and the gain in efficiency and flexibility in the economy will more than compensate for the further drop in inventory levels that we will see.

THE ROLE OF MONETARY DISCIPLINE

It is just as well that most businessmen will be able to get along with low levels of inventories by today's standards, and with low levels of working capital. It is just as well that the pace of technological change will permit these efficiencies to happen, because I expect that the general level of real interest rates will be higher, possibly considerably higher, in 1990, relative to inflation, than it has been in the past. As long as you assume, with me, that there is value to society in having a stable general price level, you will, I think, be forced to the view that the only way to achieve it in the highly sophisticated world of videotex will simply be to keep the cost of credit, and the attractiveness of holding financial assets, at a real positive level which is roughly comparable, for the marginal borrower or lender, with the attractiveness of pur- chasing physical goods and services, and which therefore is capable of disciplining the overall level of physical demand in the economy to a flow rate which is broadly consistent with a stable general price level over time.

One of the valid arguments against high real interest rates is the loss of flexibility they impose on the economy. Inventories and cash balances are held today because they provide necessary buffers. Since we cannot predict the future, we compensate for our uncertainty by holding buffer stocks of goods and financial assets. But in a monetarily disciplined world, the opportunity costs associated with holding such stocks will persistently and generally be relatively high, certainly in comparison with our experience in the last few decades. Because of the high opportunity cost involved, businessmen will have to economize to a very considerable degree on these buffers. One of the costs of discipline, then, is a loss of flexibility. In a world of low inventories, we should probably expect price changes to be relatively fre- quent and relatively large, as suppliers turn to price shifts as short-run rationing devices for demand. We are slowly getting used to long delivery lags, another alternative to high inventories and there is no question that these developments are disadvantageous to society. In general, the imposition of a higher real cost for an important factor of production such as borrowed money can be expected to have the same sort of negative impact on total factor productivity as would the imposition of a higher real cost for any other factor, like oil for instance.

I should interject that 'monetary discipline' is not synonymous with 'monetarism'. 'Monetarists' argue that the general price level is controllable, in fact only controllable, by rationing the supply of money relative to the economy's physical capacity to produce. They argue that, at least in the long run, changes in the money supply ONLY affect the price level, and in particular cannot change the real rate of interest or the level of economic activity. They argue that there is a natural 'real interest rate' at which the volume of money that



184 / John Grant

people will hold will be just consistent with maintaining a stable price level. However, in

moving the economy from a high-inflation mode to a stable-price mode, policy must force transactors to economize on the use of money, and to accomplish this transition the real rate of interest must for some time lie above the 'natural rate'. Although monetarists argue that monetary policy should not be 'about interest rates' but about the ratio of money to output, a policy which forces the stock of money to grow more slowly than nominal output (after allowing for increased efficiency in using money) must be 'disciplinary' in the sense either that controls are formally imposed on borrowers' access to credit or that the real interest rate is forced upward by tight control over bank reserves and other determinants of the stock of money available to would-be borrowers.

Of course, I and many others would claim that productivity loss associated with a transi- tional high real interest rate environment is likely to be considerably outweighed by the long- run continuing benefits to society that come with a stable general price level. But I would add, that the world we are moving into is precisely the sort of world which will minimize the adverse effects of high positive real interest rates. It is precisely the videotex world, the micro- processor world of instant and cheap communication, that will minimize the social costs of low inventories and cash balances. So, in my opinion, the costs of monetary discipline will be considerably easier to bear as we go along, and this is a major reason to expect its disci- plines to endure.

WILL VELOCITY BECOME UNSTABLE?

One of the challenges for monetarism, as the decades progress, and as we move toward the videotex world, is the possibility that monetary velocity will become more unstable than it now is. We are probably going to see the last of the non-interest-bearing deposits in a relatively short period of time. Instead, individuals will in all probability weave around themselves a web of financial short-term assets, all bearing interest. The monetary authorities, in their effort to control the total value of spending on goods and services, will have to have some monetary fulcrum the amount of which they can control precisely, and which also has a highly predictable association with the level of nominal GNP. I don't think that there will be any difficulty for the Bank of Canada in keeping control of the monetary aggregates as such. In this respect, the central bank has a multitude of weapons, and I think that it will always be able to exercise a very effective control over the banks' cash reserves and therefore their total assets. But in a world where there is very little Ml, the authorities will not be able to use Ml targets. M1 is a convenient target variable because it is fairly sensitive to interest rates; but M2 and other wider aggregates, for the most part interest-bearing, cannot be limited so easily by raising interest rates; in fact, a rise in the level of interest rates would likely generate an increase in M2 rather than the opposite.

This does not, in my opinion, mean any particular difficulty will arise in the carrying out of the aims of monetary policy. After all, the purpose of the exercise is to control the level of nominal outlays on goods and services. By raising interest rates, if the central bank leads individuals and institutions to increase their intended holdings of short-term interest-bearing deposits at the expense of outlays on goods and services, then it will achieve its purposes. Nonetheless, it may be a difficult world for the central bank, because the bank may not be able to predict with confidence the level of interest rates or the rate of growth of particular monetary aggregates that will be consistent with the volume of spending on goods and services that it wishes to encourage.

Let me expand on this a little. Today, individuals and institutions hold M1, despite its




obvious lack of interest return, because they find it convenient for making purchases of goods and services in the short run. As we become more and more efficient in economizing on Ml, the velocity of Ml circulation rises, but on the whole it has been possible to allow for this in setting M1 targets. As time passes, and we move to a world in which debit or credit card usage is almost a matter of course, the need for M1 will fall much further. We may then find that the volume of Ml bears no particularly close relationship to the level of transactions that people undertake. If, then, the central bank switches to an M2 target, it may find that, para- doxically, it wishes to increase the level of M2 in order to reduce spending outlays on goods and services, at least in the short run. By tightening in on the banks' cash reserves, it will force them to bid higher for funds, thus on the one hand making overdrafts and other forms of credit more expensive and on the other hand making the decision to hold interest-bearing deposits and other financial assets more attractive. In such ways, people would be persuaded to reduce the volume of their purchases of goods and services. The system would certainly work, but the strict monetarists might be hard put to identify any particular monetary aggre- gate, except possibly for the monetary base, that would closely correlate in volume with the amount of spending activity that would be carried out.

This leads me to a presumption that, ultimately, monetary policy is really about interest rates after all. It seems to me that we have got ourselves into a world of monetary targeting primarily because of a perceived need by central bankers and others for a much more disciplined, much tougher, monetary policy than we had permitted to evolve in the '60s and early 1970s. The magic is not in the monetary targets as such, but in the decision to enforce a deceleration in nominal outlays on goods and services, at whatever cost in interest rates may be required. This is the real message of monetarism in my opinion, and it is this message with which I think we will have to learn to live.

A 'PERMANENTLY INVERTED' YIELD CURVE?

I shall now discuss a very different perspective. In my opinion, macro-economic policy will remain committed to monetary discipline even if videotex and technical progress come along at a very slow pace. I do expect that the rate of interest, whether short-term or long-term, will average significantly higher, relative to inflation, than we have come to consider normal. I expect too that the short-term rate of interest will remain more volatile around its high average level for at least a few years yet, for as long as the US authorities consider it essential to achieve tight and narrow bands on the monetary aggregates on a quarter-to-quarter basis. Further, I expect that short-term interest rates will remain generally higher than long-term interest rates for many years, particularly so when authorities are working especially hard to reduce the growth of nominal demand. I don't see any particular reason to expect central bankers to stop trying to reduce nominal output growth until they have got to a rate which is likely to be consistent in the long run with zero inflation. This is likely to take many years, and we will probably have a hard time deciding when we have got there. On the whole, then, a generally inverted yield curve is likely to be a customary thing for most of the 1980s.

There are many such corollaries to persistent monetary deceleration. But in making these projections, I realize that I may be accused of simply projecting today's overheated situation into the indefinite future. But this is not what I have in mind. There are three major reasons why I see monetary discipline continuing into the indefinite future.

The first reason has to do with hubris - or rather the loss of it. Policymakers have learned many painful lessons in the last fifteen years and particularly in the last eight years. One of the painful lessons was that the trend of productivity is not, after all, as subject to influence



186 / John Grant

as we had come to think during the 1950s. The 1950s and early 1960s were, in retrospect, golden years for the world economy. For many reasons, output and productivity grew faster, for longer, than they were expected to do. When the money supply grew rapidly, it financed not inflation but real output growth. When governments expanded their spending, they found that revenues expanded rapidly to finance them, so much so that the federal government more often ran surpluses than deficits in the 1950s and early 1960s. Those years led to an unwarranted degree of self-congratulation and ambition. The growth of econometric tech- niques was a further incentive to policymakers to concentrate on so-called 'fine tuning,' in the serene belief that they had almost everything figured out.

We are sadder and wiser today. Most policymakers no longer feel confident that they can influence the growth of productivity. Although President Reagan's 'supply siders' argue ve- hemently that they can lift productivity, I think they are probably the exception that proves the rule: the overwhelming chorus of disapprobation that has greeted the 'supply-sider's' claims is evidence that today's consensus is very far from confidence in our ability to influence, or even indeed to forecast, productivity.

The first real crises of confidence came as the result of President Lyndon Johnson's over- ambitious escalation of the Vietnam war. Very much a product of the then-prevailing optimism, the Johnson Administration walked into a situation in which US physical capacities fell far short of the burden placed on them, and the result was an inflationary surge which surprised almost everyone. It is true that there had been voices urging caution many years before Vietnam escalated. In Canada, Governor James Coyne fought a lonely and ultimately unsuccessful battle to impose very tight monetary discipline at the end of the decade of the 1950s. But those were years in which, although the inflation rate had slowly begun to rise, the prevailing doctrine continued to focus on policy's successes and was slow to understand its limitations.

But the major crises of confidence came in the wake of OPEC I. By 1976, policymakers had woken up not only to their vulnerability to external shocks, but also to the appalling depth of their ignorance about the factors influencing the growth of productivity. The furious rethinking that was accomplished from 1973 to 1976 was a major revolution in policy circles. Now that OPEC II has added its further body blow, I think it is safe to say that policymakers have lost almost all of their earlier cockiness. Even the most profligate politician has wakened to the fact that our productive potential has very tight, and even worse, unknown, limits.

The productivity enigma is the most important and most frustrating shortcoming of present-day economic analysis. The post-Keynesian optimism that we could manage demand right up to the tightest possible margin of full employment, was fostered by experience of decades of productivity growth that, in retrospect, was almost unique. It was certainly not achieved by conscious design. We have now learned, if you will, how much we do not know. And in this more sober light, the widespread adoption of monetary discipline and the swing to more cautious fiscal strategies are conscious reactions to chastening experience.

In my opinion, the gradual move to lower rates of monetary expansion is only one facet of the larger direction of economic policy in Western nations generally, which is aimed, as gently as possible, at making our reach fit back within our grasp. The assumptions that grew out of the fabulous 1950s are no longer appropriate, but it has taken a long time to learn the lesson. I believe that the lesson is now being applied.

Of course, this retreat to cautious monetarism and less ambitious fiscal policy will not necessarily solve our problems. The future success or failure of these policies, in terms of curing inflation or keeping our debt load within prudent limits, will still be determined by whether our productivity grows or declines, and by the willingness and ability of our trading




partners to absorb our exports and supply our import needs. If the world suffers new major supply shocks, or gives in to widespread protectionism, then Canada will continue to suffer massive inflation and balance of payments deficits even under the restraining gradualist policies now in place. Policymakers have no unique foresight, and so our level of confidence in forecasting must continue to be low. But this is exactly my point: it is precisely because policymakers have themselves come to recognize their limited power to anticipate events or influence them that we are likely to continue to live with discipline.

A CONSENSUS FOR CAUTION

A second major reason for expecting discipline to continue is that it is not just policymakers who have come to take a more cautious view of the world. I think that the election of President Reagan confirmed the existence of a broad consensus among the US electorate, not really very different from the consensus that put Mrs. Thatcher in power in Great Britain. This popular consensus, truly bipartisan, views the two countries as flabby, self-indulgent, presum- ing far too much on their productive capacity in a manner no longer justified in reality. The consensus views Western dependence on OPEC as an invitation to blackmail and as a symbol of strategic vulnerability. It views the current structure of government transfer programs as unsupportably generous, and at the extreme fiscally and morally crippling. In this view, 'monetarism' is the expression of a deep desire to restore balance, discipline and finally a sense of direction to a society which has lost its way.

I recognize that President Reagan's program, just like Mrs. Thatcher's, is contradictory, inconsistent and in many respects likely to fall short of the goals it sets out to achieve. It appears that Reagan's actual deficits, like Mrs. Thatcher's, will sharply outrun the planned deficits, at least in the early years. But I believe that we should not be too quick to write off either government. Politicians are faced with almost impossible demands, from an electorate which demands a return to discipline and balance, but through individual interest groups campaigns vigorously to retain individual spending programs and tax shelters. Leaders who display weakness and indecision in the face of these impossible demands are ruthlessly elim- inated. Those who persist, with however halting steps and however apparently inconsistent tactics, in restoring a sense of sustainable direction, prosper. Monetary discipline is an important part of the sustainable package, possibly particularly so in the early stages of ration- alization because it is such a ponderous task to re-orient fiscal policies in all their immense detail. Ultimately, it will be the electorates in each country which judge whether discipline is appropriate. In my personal judgment, North America is now firmly embarked on a long, gradual deceleration of monetary rates of expansion.

One might well ask, faced with the sort of arguments I have put, may we not see an even more draconian application of monetary policy? Given that policymakers and electorates alike are deeply concerned about our overly-extended economies, why not apply the brakes even more firmly? The answer, to my way of thinking, lies again in the experience of the policymakers, and their perception of the failures of policy in the last few decades. Time and again, as inflation began to inch upward and accelerate, governments attempted quick fixes. 'Stop-go' became part of the language of economic policy. Kamikaze assaults on inflation were tried in many countries, incorporating credit crunches, tax hikes, wage freezes and so on. In every case, however, these policies were met with a violent and overwhelming political counter-reaction, which resulted in efforts to stimulate investment and productivity through monetary stimulus, which in turn quickly tended to eat up excess capacity and then gener- ated even faster inflation and fiscal imbalances. The fundamental mistake in these episodes



188 / John Grant

was the too-great optimism in the powers of policy. It was believed on the one hand that inflation would respond to a severe but short credit squeeze, and on the other hand that stimulus would generate strong productivity-enhancing investment outlays. Both suppositions proved excessively optimistic. It is precisely the final, sober recognition of our limited power to influence events which has put power in the hands of the gradualists. Our current sobriety admittedly owes much also to the concern that we may suffer at any moment further blows from capricious and arbitrary fate. But there is a deeper lesson that has been painfully learned, and I think that we will live with its implications for the foreseeable future.

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Article Contentsp. [181]p. 182p. 183p. 184p. 185p. 186p. 187p. 188

Issue Table of ContentsCanadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), pp. i-ii+143-280Front Matter [pp. i-256]The Goal Effectiveness of Alberta's Preventive Social Service Program [pp. 143-155]The Economic Enigma of the Tar Sands [pp. 156-164]Should Performers Have a Copyright? [pp. 165-180]Can We Live with Monetary Discipline for Another Decade? [pp. 181-188]Federal Indian Policy and Indian Self-Government in Canada: An Analysis of a Current Proposal [pp. 189-199]Extra-Billing and Physician Remuneration: A Paradox [pp. 200-206]Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton Annexation Case [pp. 207-221]The Newfoundland Groundfishery: Some Options for Renewal [pp. 222-238]Planning for Remote Communities: A Case Study of Housing Need Assessment [pp. 239-247]Views and Comments / CommentairesTax Expenditures and the MacEachen Budget [pp. 248-252]"Room for Manoeuvre": A Comment [pp. 253-255]

Reviews / Comptes rendusReview: untitled [p. 257]Review: untitled [pp. 257-258]Review: untitled [pp. 258-259]Review: untitled [pp. 259-260]Review: untitled [pp. 260-261]Review: untitled [pp. 261-262]Review: untitled [pp. 262-263]Review: untitled [pp. 263-264]Review: untitled [pp. 264-265]Review: untitled [pp. 265-266]Review: untitled [pp. 266-267]Review: untitled [pp. 267-268]Review: untitled [pp. 268-269]Review: untitled [pp. 269-270]Review: untitled [pp. 270-271]Review: untitled [pp. 271-272]Review: untitled [pp. 272-273]Review: untitled [pp. 273-274]Review: untitled [pp. 274-275]Review: untitled [pp. 275-276]Review: untitled [pp. 276-278]Review: untitled [p. 278]Review: untitled [pp. 278-279]Books Received / Livres Recus [pp. 279-280]

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Can We Live with Monetary Discipline for Another Decade?

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