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    Philosophical Review

    Review: [untitled]Author(s): John V. CanfieldSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 101-103Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2693561

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    BOOK REVIEWS

    of their greatest philosophical foes, namely Bradley. Linsky's paper defendsRussell against the criticism of the axiom of reducibility leveled by Ramsey,G6del, and Quine. He argues that the axiom is neither ad hoc nor inconflict with other aspects of Russell's logical system. Finally, Hylton ex-amines Wittgenstein's puzzling remarks on the distinction between func-tions and operations in the 5.2s of the Tractatusand discusses the bearingof these remarks on Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke 4.0312) that the logicalconstants do not name anything.

    Overall, EarlyAnalytic Philosophynicely shows how studies in the historyof philosophy can provide valuable insights into the ongoing contemporarydiscussion.

    0YSTEIN LINNEBOHarvard University

    BOOK REVIEWS

    of their greatest philosophical foes, namely Bradley. Linsky's paper defendsRussell against the criticism of the axiom of reducibility leveled by Ramsey,G6del, and Quine. He argues that the axiom is neither ad hoc nor inconflict with other aspects of Russell's logical system. Finally, Hylton ex-amines Wittgenstein's puzzling remarks on the distinction between func-tions and operations in the 5.2s of the Tractatusand discusses the bearingof these remarks on Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke 4.0312) that the logicalconstants do not name anything.

    Overall, EarlyAnalytic Philosophynicely shows how studies in the historyof philosophy can provide valuable insights into the ongoing contemporarydiscussion.

    0YSTEIN LINNEBOHarvard University

    The PhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No. 1 Uanuary 2000)

    WIYTJGENSTEINN MiNDV AD LANGUAGE.By DAVID G. STERN. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. ix, 226.This book deals with some large tracts of Wittgenstein's writings concern-ing representation and the mental. Its defining characteristic, and one ofits main strengths, is an extensive use of material in the background ofWittgenstein's Tractatusand Investigations.Stern quotes from and discussesremarks from unpublished manuscripts, including the Big Typescript,ittle-studied published writings such as the Tractatusnotebooks, "Some Re-marks on Logical Form," PhilosophicalRemarks,PhilosophicalGrammar,aswell as lecture notes by Moore, King and Lee, and others. How much ofthese writings the book reproduces is suggested by the fact that its appen-dix, giving the original German of the previously unpublished matter trans-lated in the main text, is eleven small-print pages long; and there are farmore quotations from the published part of the corpus. The result is awork in which, for a run of pages, the ratio of quoted material to commentcan be as high as one to one (84, 85, 106-9, for example); and in whichmost pages contain a significant amount of indented quotation. The mainjustification offered for the wholesale inclusion of this material is that itprovides a context that can help determine what problem Wittgenstein wasaddressing in a given passage from his two main works (6). Stern's masteryof that material is impressive, as shown for example in his pellucid outlineof Wittgenstein's philosophical development after 1920 (91-98).

    Since Stern traces a rather wide range of issues through the whole ofWittgenstein's philosophical career (with special emphasis on the transi-tional writings) there is not much space left for considering particular

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    The PhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No. 1 Uanuary 2000)

    WIYTJGENSTEINN MiNDV AD LANGUAGE.By DAVID G. STERN. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. ix, 226.This book deals with some large tracts of Wittgenstein's writings concern-ing representation and the mental. Its defining characteristic, and one ofits main strengths, is an extensive use of material in the background ofWittgenstein's Tractatusand Investigations.Stern quotes from and discussesremarks from unpublished manuscripts, including the Big Typescript,ittle-studied published writings such as the Tractatusnotebooks, "Some Re-marks on Logical Form," PhilosophicalRemarks,PhilosophicalGrammar,aswell as lecture notes by Moore, King and Lee, and others. How much ofthese writings the book reproduces is suggested by the fact that its appen-dix, giving the original German of the previously unpublished matter trans-lated in the main text, is eleven small-print pages long; and there are farmore quotations from the published part of the corpus. The result is awork in which, for a run of pages, the ratio of quoted material to commentcan be as high as one to one (84, 85, 106-9, for example); and in whichmost pages contain a significant amount of indented quotation. The mainjustification offered for the wholesale inclusion of this material is that itprovides a context that can help determine what problem Wittgenstein wasaddressing in a given passage from his two main works (6). Stern's masteryof that material is impressive, as shown for example in his pellucid outlineof Wittgenstein's philosophical development after 1920 (91-98).

    Since Stern traces a rather wide range of issues through the whole ofWittgenstein's philosophical career (with special emphasis on the transi-tional writings) there is not much space left for considering particular

    101

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    BOOK REVIEWS

    exegetical issues in depth. Some points touched upon necessarily get shortshrift; and inevitably the reader will at times be left with the feeling that itdoesn't help in understanding Wittgenstein's puzzling ideas to be present-ed with equally opaque claims from the Nachlass. The Investigationspassagein which Wittgenstein speaks of "the importance of finding and inventingintermediate ases" (122) provides an example of how Stern can seem tounderstand things too quickly. The italicized phrase is highly puzzling.What did Wittgenstein have in mind? Stern passes the issue by, merelyquoting an early version of Wittgenstein's remark from the Big Typescriptand commenting briefly on it (28). The book often stays too close to Witt-genstein's own vocabulary and remarks to be able to offer satisfactory ex-egesis. On the other hand the author should not be seen as venturinganalysis in depth of a series of linked exegetical problems. Rather, in hismany relevant citations from the Nachlass, and his elucidatory commentson them, he provides a useful tour of the book's subject themes. A passagealong the extended surface he provides, an expanse often both novel andfascinating, has its own distinct value.The first half of the book deals with issues from the early philosophy.Stern accepts the traditional interpretation of the picture theory: an ele-mentary proposition portrays reality by having its simple names related inthe same way as the simple objects in the referred to atomic fact (39).Adopting Anscombe's example, by placing one name above another wecould claim that the corresponding objects stand in the same relationship.The trouble with that interpretation, as Carl Ginet has pointed out, is thatimmediately the elementary propositions cease to be logically indepen-dent.1 A fuller presentation than Stern gives would have to address thatproblem. I found Stern's account of the famous proof of objects (Tractatus2.0211, 2.0212) unconvincing (56-60). In explaining why, according toWittgenstein, some proposition would have to be true, if there were nosimple objects, and thus why, unacceptably, sense would be dependent ontruth, he argues that without simple objects an endless chain of furtherpropositions would have to supply the sense of the original proposition;but that result does not yet make sense dependent on truth. Stern's dis-cussion of the metaphysical self and related issues in section 3.4 is rich andinformative. In addition, he is certainly right in claiming that Wittgensteineschewed the task of saying what simple objects are, and right as well inemphasizing Wittgenstein's concern at that period, and in his transitionalstage as well, with the notion of immediate experience.The second half of the book deals with the post-TractatusWittgenstein.Chapter 4 considers a number of differences between the early and later

    1Carl Ginet, "An Incoherence in the Tractatus,"CanadianJournal of Philosophy3(1973): 143-51.

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    BOOKREVIEWS

    thought, and chapter 5 attempts to say how those changes came about.Chapter 6 contains, among other things, two brief discussions of privatelanguage, and an interesting consideration of the theme "All is in flux."The transitional Wittgenstein postulated a primary language dealingwith immediate experience, and a secondary language-our ordinaryone-for speaking of things in space and time. The second language mustbe cashed out in terms of the first. In the Tractatus his distinction is per-haps implicit in the idea that sentences in ordinary language are under-stood by projecting them onto their fully analyzed forms, and thus in effectonto a phenomenal language. Stern makes clear how significant the ideaof a phenomenal language was for Wittgenstein. In particular he establish-es the importance of Wittgenstein's investigation of the possibility of acompletely nonhypothetical phenomenological language. Stern's eluci-dates two puzzling points in Wittgenstein's writings, one concerning theanalogy of film strip and projected picture, the other a strange crank-turned machine Wittgenstein imagined, capable of representing the con-tent of a stretch of immediate experience, or the remembrance of such.These deliberations show Stern at his quite striking best. On the otherhand I remained puzzled about several issues, such as why Wittgensteinwanted a nonhypothetical primary language, what this "nonhypothetical"means, and how these ideas play out in the Investigations.If here and else-where the book fails to explain Wittgenstein fully, this is compensated forby its success in forging connections across the whole of the Nachlass, andespecially by its insightful comment on rewarding material from the un-published writings or under-studied works like the PhilosophicalRemarks.

    JOHN V. CANFIELDUniversityof Toronto

    BOOKREVIEWS

    thought, and chapter 5 attempts to say how those changes came about.Chapter 6 contains, among other things, two brief discussions of privatelanguage, and an interesting consideration of the theme "All is in flux."The transitional Wittgenstein postulated a primary language dealingwith immediate experience, and a secondary language-our ordinaryone-for speaking of things in space and time. The second language mustbe cashed out in terms of the first. In the Tractatus his distinction is per-haps implicit in the idea that sentences in ordinary language are under-stood by projecting them onto their fully analyzed forms, and thus in effectonto a phenomenal language. Stern makes clear how significant the ideaof a phenomenal language was for Wittgenstein. In particular he establish-es the importance of Wittgenstein's investigation of the possibility of acompletely nonhypothetical phenomenological language. Stern's eluci-dates two puzzling points in Wittgenstein's writings, one concerning theanalogy of film strip and projected picture, the other a strange crank-turned machine Wittgenstein imagined, capable of representing the con-tent of a stretch of immediate experience, or the remembrance of such.These deliberations show Stern at his quite striking best. On the otherhand I remained puzzled about several issues, such as why Wittgensteinwanted a nonhypothetical primary language, what this "nonhypothetical"means, and how these ideas play out in the Investigations.If here and else-where the book fails to explain Wittgenstein fully, this is compensated forby its success in forging connections across the whole of the Nachlass, andespecially by its insightful comment on rewarding material from the un-published writings or under-studied works like the PhilosophicalRemarks.

    JOHN V. CANFIELDUniversityof Toronto

    ThePhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000)IN DEFENSEOFPURE REASON.By LAURENCE BONJOUR. Cambridge: Cam-

    bridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 232.This book is an important contribution to the contemporary epistemolog-ical literature. It is the only available book-length treatment of epistemo-logical issues associated with the a priori. Moreover, it provides the mostcomprehensive articulation and defense of traditional rationalism. Thebook is tightly organized, crisply argued, and sets the standard againstwhich competing accounts must be measured.

    Bonjour opens by arguing that a priori justification must be taken seri-ously. All beliefs directly justified solely by experience are particular n theircontent. The justification of beliefs whose content goes beyond direct ex-

    103

    ThePhilosophicalReview,Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000)IN DEFENSEOFPURE REASON.By LAURENCE BONJOUR. Cambridge: Cam-

    bridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 232.This book is an important contribution to the contemporary epistemolog-ical literature. It is the only available book-length treatment of epistemo-logical issues associated with the a priori. Moreover, it provides the mostcomprehensive articulation and defense of traditional rationalism. Thebook is tightly organized, crisply argued, and sets the standard againstwhich competing accounts must be measured.

    Bonjour opens by arguing that a priori justification must be taken seri-ously. All beliefs directly justified solely by experience are particular n theircontent. The justification of beliefs whose content goes beyond direct ex-

    103


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