Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA.C. No.
5161 April 14, 2004ISIDRA TING-DUMALI,complainant,vs.ATTY. ROLANDO
S. TORRES,respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:In a Complaint-Affidavit1filed on 22 October 1999
with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent
Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony;
participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the
forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for
the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his
oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.The
complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera;
Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein
respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died
intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:a) One half of
Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area
of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by
TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;b) Lot
1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT
No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;c) Lot 1605
of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT
No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.According to the
complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with
her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of
what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an
illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent
the following acts or omissions:1. The respondent participated in,
consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed
by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the
sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting,
knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the
title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The
lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment
was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.2. The
respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise
against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603
when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an
overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document
to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the
property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law
Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to
sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and
misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964
entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original
Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No.
1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by
complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995,
the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only
children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and
Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their
names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express
conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to
sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited
from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial
payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.4.
On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false
misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he
requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of
reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that
it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the
reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the
release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine
National Bank, of which he was an employee.In his Comment,2the
respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that
he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the
co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his
parents-in-law.Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent
affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire
to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March
1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of
the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting
sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If
ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was
done in good faith.The respondent admits that he was the counsel of
Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the
reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina
in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of
spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on
him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot
1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his
wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because
the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife.
Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order
of reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996,
suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of
Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution
are usually uncontested and granted by courts.Finally, the
respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in
bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative
case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles,
and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.In her reply, the complainant
denies the presence oftokaor verbal will allegedly made by her
mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in
view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden
death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard
of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was
still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were
still minors including respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February
2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter
of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a
toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a
passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the
properties of the Ting spouses.On 14 June 2000, this Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.3On 9 January
2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented
by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of
the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 ofCanon1 and
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law.4In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335of 21 June 2003,
the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner
San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for six years.We fully agree with the Investigating
Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of
culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he
is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as
a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It
is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus:LAWYER'S OATHI, , do solemnly swear that
I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.SO HELP ME GOD.This oath to which all lawyers have
subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the
pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.6This
oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.Rule 1.02 A
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.. . .CANON 7
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.. . .CANON 10 A lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court.Rule 10.01 A lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the
vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath as
a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably
failed.The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they
are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only
between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other
siblings.7There was concealment of the fact that there were other
compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the
respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to
complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he
declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the
Philippines.8Yet, the respondent presented that document to the
Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer
of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his
sister-in-law Miriam.It also bears noting that the respondent was
consulted9regarding the falsification of complainants signature in
the Extrajudicial Settlement10dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot
1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her
right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed
complainants name in that document.11Such act of counterfeiting the
complainants signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to
falsification of a public document.12Instead of advising Marcelina
to secure a written special power of attorney and against
committing falsification, he presented13such document to the
Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of
Marcelina and his wife.14He himself, therefore, may also be held
liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of
the complainant and her other co-heirs.15Notably, he also admitted
in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal
documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16Respondent did not advise
his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary
to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a
lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the
land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the
primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes.17For a lawyer is the servant
of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.18As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate.19He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20He makes himself unfit
to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or
conduct.21Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife
and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec.
No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a
mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following
circumstances:First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and
Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were
heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22Second, during the hearing of said
case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers
and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The
transcript of that hearing reads:ATTY. TORRES:Q Madame Witness, are
you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting,
Jr. and Julita Reynante?WITNESS:A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima
Torres and I.Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?A None,
sir.23The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving
false testimony24in court, and he never corrected the same despite
full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case.25Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false
testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false
testimony.26Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to
the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice."27This Rule was clearly and openly violated
by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify
that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered
such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title
involving Lot 1605.The respondent must have forgotten that as an
attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his
part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him.28It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the
reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which
was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing
of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement
in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false,
as she was never in possession of the title29and would not,
therefore, know that the same was lost.Moreover, in a letter dated
20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent
requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale
of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong
that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing
the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within
the month.30Respondents information was misleading because he
presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after
he sent the letter.31Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and
honesty on the part of the respondent.Respondents acts or omissions
reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he
may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:Sec. 27.Disbarment or suspension
of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.In the determination of the imposable disciplinary
sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary
purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32While the
assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed
to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary
or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice.
Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.33Thus,
the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34Verily,
given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case,
we find that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance
of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt
the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.IN VIEW
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in
the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-22320 July 29, 1968MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZand DAMASO P.
PEREZ,petitioners,vs.HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila,RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF
MANILA,respondents.Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for
petitioners.Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.CASTRO,J.:This is a
motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May
22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation
therein made:We feel compelled to observe that during the
protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series
of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by
their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a
simple money judgment which has long become final and executory.
Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn.
The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice.Corollarily, this Court assessed
treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N.
Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the
judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so
far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and
condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their
clients.At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing
into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the
above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay,
and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this
adventure is patent.After November 15, 1962 when the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with
respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings
interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously
quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.Had the petitioners
and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of
stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position
from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein
Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose,
however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing
the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More
than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed,
and the same has yet to be satisfied.In a determined effort to
prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their
counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to
restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407
from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance,
after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following
the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his
wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and
asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which
she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic
civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which
latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the
execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960),
which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain
acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4,
1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the
respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is
clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew
or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance
of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs.
Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ
improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said
writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an
urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15,
1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment
debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was
then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support
of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her
counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the
respondent judge to issue the following order:When the urgent
motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning
for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact
that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view
thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of
execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for
resolution.Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of
injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since
the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another
tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a
comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time
from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the
same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in
connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the
Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge
of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary
injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no
power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the
injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal
from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as
in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of
October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to
recall the controverted writ of execution.The foregoing motion, far
from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October
19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally
do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an
offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due
to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1As a
matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21,
1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said
cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never
fulfilled.2Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964,
denied the said motion for reconsideration.The above exposition of
the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly
negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various
incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of
petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the
enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the
chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that
the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on
a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of
a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to
adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they
interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second
time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of
this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.The
movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid
civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said
that.In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution,
the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy
made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not
the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the
Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale,in which action the
conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a
basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the
event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the
protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this
remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292,only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of
thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied)
.And because of this statement, they now counter that the said
cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay.The
reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted
statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitionersincidentallyhad already availed of the suggested remedy
only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
wereapparentlyinstituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stocks in question. We used the wordincidentallyadvisedly
to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the
controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper
remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil
cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts
did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ
of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without
power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4
or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of
the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292
did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal
action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to
continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact
is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she
instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of
execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same
grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil
case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963,upon her own
motion.Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted
the same when they instituted the herein petition forcertiorariwith
urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds
proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also
dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties
because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition
forcertiorari.The movants further contend that "If there was delay,
it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive
... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."A
counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we
do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the
patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.It
is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman
to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper
his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy
is indisputable.The movants finally state that the "Petitioners
have several counsel in this case but the participation of each
counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court
ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners,
which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that
when we said "counsel" we meant thecounsels on record of the
petitionerswho were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407,
after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision
of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such
counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief
in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to
the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims
that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he
filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the
Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge
Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to
recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil
case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby
Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as
counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent
motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough,
antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.ACCORDINGLY, the
motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May
22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D.
Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the
treble costs assessed against the petitioners.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.Concepcion
C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.Fernando,
J., took no part.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONA.C.
No. 5379 May 9, 2003WALTER T. YOUNG,complainant,vs.CEASAR G.
BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q.
SUSA,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:On December
29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified
Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating
the lawyer's oath.1Complainant is the private prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000,
respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the"accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is
now under detention."2Upon personal verification with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on
December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention
executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security
Management Division of the NBI.Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of
Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on
December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other
formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the
private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and
the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was
referred to in the Motion as Annex "1".Respondents filed their
respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client,
they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial
court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and
brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to
heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day;
hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was
neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as
their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the
NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that
complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.
Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies
of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing
of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2)
of the Rules of Court.3For his part, respondent Susa argues in his
comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents
filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea,
Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for
hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was
not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to
receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate
of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion
in the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful
performance of his ministerial duty.In a Resolution dated August
13, 2001,4the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision.On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner,
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation
as follows:WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty.
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of
their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six
(6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended
dismissed for lack of merit.5The foregoing Report and
Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:RESOLVED to
ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in
view of respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty.
Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6We agree with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents
Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.A lawyer
must be a disciple of truth.7He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his clients."8He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.9The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to
display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.11The Court may
disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus
proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.12Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and
responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar.
Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court
if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused
had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to
mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly
allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their
oath when they resorted to deception.Respondents contend that their
allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of an
ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the
hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their
client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held
on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that
the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on
December 13, 2000 was false.InComia vs. Antona,we held:It is of no
moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police
authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the
hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening
event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve
respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he
should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail
filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of
personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the
court.13In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to
the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.14In the case at bar, the prosecution was served
with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the
scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the
non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers,
they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.15Finally, we are in
accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of
court should not be made administratively liable for including the
Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was
authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his
administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or
judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound
administration of justice.16Thus, he should not hesitate to inform
the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of
lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of
procedure.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys.
Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty
of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they
areSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.Let a copy of this Resolution be attached
to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.SO
ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST
DIVISIONAdministrative Case No. 1571 September 23, 1999PARALUMAN B.
AFURONG,complainant,vs.ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO,respondent.R E S O L U
T I O NPARDO,J.:The case before the Court is a verified
letter-complaint for disbarment, filed on December 22, 1975, by
Paraluman B. Afurong against Atty. Angel G. Aquino, for filing
frivolous harassment cases to delay the execution of a final
decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office.1wphi1.ntThe antecedent facts show
that on April 2, 1974, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint for
ejectment with the City Court of Manila for non-payment of rentals
against Victorino Flores.1The court rendered judgment on May 27,
1974 in favor of petitioner Paraluman Afurong. The court then
issued a writ of execution on February 17, 1975, which was served
on Victorino Flores in March 1975.Facing eviction from the land he
was occupying, Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to Atty.
Angel G. Aquino, an employee of said office at the time.On April 3,
1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a
Petition for Relief from Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order.2On May 9, 1975, the petition, after due hearing,
was dismissed for having been filed out of time.Atty. Aquino
subsequently filed on May 29, 1975, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition.3The
court set the pre-trial conference on December 12,
1975.Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office on October 1, 1975, Atty. Angel G.
Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and
indicating the address of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office at
715 Gastambide, Sampaloc, Manila as his office address.In the
aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement, Atty. Aquino stated that
he would be unable to attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on
December 12, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., of Civil Case No. 97976 because he
needed to attend the hearing of aHabeas CorpusCase4before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that same day and
hour.However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court stated that a decision had
been rendered on the aforementioned special proceedings case, and
that there was no hearing in connection with the case on December
12, 1975, for there was nothing more to be done in the proceedings
and the same was declared closed and terminated.5Thus, on December
22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint6with this Court for
disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino.According to complainant,
appropriate punitive sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G.
Aquino for filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of Civil
Case Nos. 97265 and 97976, and for giving false allegations in his
Urgent Motion for Postponement.Complainant emphasized that when
Civil Case No. 97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12, 1975, at
9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the same date and
hour, he would attend the hearing also on said date and time of
Special Proceedings No. D-00326, entitled "In the Matter of the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofHabeas Corpusof Lordeliza V.
Sohnrey".Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G. Aquino
misrepresented himself as an attorney of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office, using the name and address of said Office to
postpone the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December
12, 1975, despite the fact that he had been separated from office
at the time.On February 13, 1976, respondent filed with this Court
his Answer7to the complaint denying the charges against him,
contending that such acts had been done without malice.He admitted,
however, that at the time of the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976
set on December 12, 1975, he was no longer connected with the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was "included as one of
the employees purged by the President in a list published in the
newspapers last October 1, 1975."8Yet, he reasoned, "Not wanting to
remove the case from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office by
appearing as private counsel for the petitioner and still unable to
wait for my reinstatement which I was informed was forthcoming, I
decided to file a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference of
the case."He also conceded that, "In order to give more "force" to
my motion for postponement, I indicated therein that I had to
attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court."9He further admitted that the filing of the motion
with the facts so stated "might have caused some delay", but
justifies such act by stating that "such filing was prompted by
some circumstances which we can consider as inevitable and
unavoidable at the moment." He adds, "If I shall be given another
chance to continue handling the case, I promise that this mistake
shall never berepeated."10In a Reply filed on April 6,
1976,11complainant asserted that Atty. Angel G. Aquino was declared
guilty of contempt of court and correspondingly fined by this Court
in a Decision12dated February 26, 1976, for making false
allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.On May 3, 1976,
this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The parties agreed,
however, to hold the case in abeyance until the termination of
Civil Case No. 97976.13Effective June 1, 1988, all cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General were
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in the
Revised Rules of Court.14On May 22, 1997, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted a Report,15finding that respondent Atty. Angel
G. Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as
provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force at the time
of the commission of the acts in question. Investigating
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended that respondent be
penalized with six (6) months suspension.On July 26, 1997, the
Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the
report and recommendation of the InvestigatingCommissioner.16We
agree.The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an
attorney to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law.17The decision in Civil Case
No. 231552 had reached finality and execution of such decision was
being effected. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a
petition forcertiorariconsidering that there was no apparent
purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid
judgment.Furthermore, respondent committed falsehood when he stated
in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he had to attend the
hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial
of Civil Case No. 97976. Respondent himself admitted that he only
included such statement "in order to give more 'force'" to the
Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such act violates the Canons of
Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the
concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not
to mislead the court in any manner.In this case, Atty. Aquino
stated false allegations in his motion for postponement which
delayed the execution of a valid decision. It is worthy to note
that the lower court correctly declared respondent in contempt of
court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of
Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.18Moreover,
Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was
still employed with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in
fact he had been purged from said office. That he was awaiting
reinstatement to the same position at the time does not remove the
fact that he was misrepresenting himself to the court. By doing so,
he has violated his duty to employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law.19He could have delegated the case to another lawyer in the
same office.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty.
Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of
notice hereof.Let this decision be spread in the personal record of
respondent in this Court and copies thereof furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall provide all its
chapters with copies thereof, and the Office of the Court
Administrator which shall forthwith provide with copies thereof all
other courts through the respective presiding Justices and
Executive Judges.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concu
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975EUGENIO
CUARESMA,petitioner,vs.MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO, NICANOR
GUEVARRA, Sheriff of Quezon City or his Deputy and JUDGE PACIFICO
P. DE CASTRO, respondents. ATTORNEY MACARIO O. DIRECTO,respondent.R
E S O L U T I O NFERNANDO,J.:+.wph!1The predicament in which
respondent Macario O. Directo, a member of the Philippine bar, now
finds himself is one of his own making. In a petition for
certiorari filed with this Court on behalf of one Eugenio Cuaresma,
he included the following categorical allegations: "4. That your
petitioner has no knowledge of the existence of said case (Civil
Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch) aforecited
between the respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC, and Cesar Navarro,
and wherein the respondent Judge, [gave] due course to the
complaint, and the subject matter in litigation; 5. That on May 26,
1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of demolition, ordering
the respondent Sheriff of Quezon City or his deputy to demolish the
house of your petitioner etc., and on the same day May 26, 1972,
the Sheriff of Quezon City through his deputy [gave] three (3) days
to your petitioner to remove his house or face demolition, ... ;6
... 7. That your petitioner was not given a day in court to present
his side of the case, in violation of law, and of the dictum of due
process of the constitution, ... "1Thereafter, after receipt of the
comments of respondents, it turned out, as set forth in a
resolution of this Court of August 4, 1972, "that petitioner was
fully aware of the existence of said civil case because on December
14, 1971 Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel of petitioner, addressed
to respondent Marcelo Daquis a letter which indicates that both
counsel and petitioner were aware of the existence of the case. It
also appears that, before respondents Marcelo Daquis and Cesar
Navarro filed a motion for a writ of Possession in Civil Case No.
Q-12176, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma, along with the other
occupants of the lot in question, was given thirty (30) days notice
to vacate the premises which period was even extended for another
thirty (30) days, but that, despite that notice, petitioner Eugenio
Cuaresma refused to vacate the lot involved in the case. It further
appears that on May 3, 1972, Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel for
petitioner, filed a motion for intervention in the aforementioned
Civil Case No. Q-12176; and on May 13, 1972, same counsel filed a
motion to quash or recall the writ of execution, and an opposition
to the issuance of a writ of demolition. On May 22, 1972,
respondent Judge Pacifico de Castro issued an order denying the
motion to intervene as well as the motion to quash or recall the
writ of execution."2It was then set forth in such resolution that
there was no truth to the allegation that on May 27, 1972, the date
of the filing of the petition for certiorari in the present case,
petitioner had no knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No.
12176.Respondent Macario O. Directo was then given ten days to show
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
deliberately making false allegations in such petition. Thereafter,
on August 16, 1972, came a pleading which he entitled Compliance.
This is his explanation: "What your petitioner honestly meant when
he alleged that he [has] no knowledge of the existence of said
Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, was from
the time the plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted the said case in
June 1968 up to and after the time the Court issued the decision in
the year 1970. The plaintiff Marcelo Daquis entered into a
conditional contract of sale of the lot involved in said Civil Case
No. 12176 with the PHHC. There were four (4) purchasers, the
plaintiff, two others, and your petitioner. Because of the
requirement of the PHHC that only one of them should enter into the
contract, Marcelo Daquis was chosen by the others to enter into the
same. Since this was a sale on installment basis, by agreement of
all the purchasers, duly acknowledged by the PHHC, the monthly dues
of the petitioner and the two others, were remitted to Marcelo
Daquis, who in turn remits the same to the PHHC. In June 1968
plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted Civil Case No. 12176 in the CFI
of Quezon City. From June 1968 up to the time and after the
decision was issued by the court, plaintiff Marcelo Daquis never
informed your petitioner of the said case."3He reiterated in a
later paragraph that all he wanted to convey was that his knowledge
of the aforesaid civil case came only after the decision was
issued. He closed his Compliance with the plea that if there were
any mistake committed, "it had been an honest one, and would say in
all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on
his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally
unaware of any false allegation in the petition."4The above
explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere
afterthought. It could very well be that after his attention was
called to the misstatements in his petition, he decided on such a
version as a way out. That is more than a bare possibility. There
is the assumption though of good faith. That is in his favor.
Moreover, judging from the awkwardly worded petition and even his
compliance quite indicative of either carelessness or lack of
proficiency in the handling of the English language, it is not
unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the mode of
expression contributed to the inaccuracy of his statements. While a
mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him, still, in
the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would
suffice. At least, it would serve to impress on respondent that in
the future he should be much more careful in the preparation of his
pleadings so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty
cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that
candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of
honorable membership in the profession.WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario
O. Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of this resolution be spread
on his record.Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-25291 March 10, 1977THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKER &
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,petitioners,vs.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO,C.J:The Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, and Jose M.
Olbes, through a motion for reconsideration filed on April 21,
1971, ask this Court to re-examine its decision dated January 30,
1971.In the main, the respondents question the review made by this
Court of the determination of facts reached by the Court of
Industrial Relations and the consequent revision of the said
findings of fact. The respondents allege that this Court "swept
into unmerited oblivion the voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence" they proffered which evidence consisted ofExhibits "1" to
"38", and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique Clemente,
Vicente Abella, Rodolfo R. Encarnacion, Nestor Cipriano, Mauro
Blardoni, Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa, Vicente R. Ayllon,
Antonio L. Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes,
Calixto S. Fernandez, Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the
Manila Police Department Sergeant Crisanto Lorenzo of the Manila
Police Department, and Feliciano Morada.1Concededly, the findings
of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations, if supported by
substantial evidence, bind this Court.2This, for the reason that
the rule of substantial evidence, rather than the rule of
preponderance of evidence applicable in ordinary civil cases,
governs the Court of Industrial Relations in its findings of
fact.3And substantial evidence refers to "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."4There too, the substantiality, of the evidence depends
on its quantitative as well as itsqualitativeaspects. For, to be
considered as substantial, Evidence should primarily be
credible.5However, findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations unsupported by substantial and credible evidence do not
bind this Court.6And, certainly, the failure of substantial and
credible proof to sustain the findings of fact of the Court of
industrial Relations justifies the review by this Court of the said
factual determination. Conmitantly, the need to revise, reverse or
modify the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations
arises to enable this court to draw the appropriate and correct
conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the
rights and obligations of the parties involved.Thus, before coming
to the numerous errors which respondents claim have been committed
by this Court in reviewing and reversing the factual determination
reached by the Court of Industrial Relations, we reiterate what we
stated in the decision of January 10, 1971: we deemed it necessary
to review the entire factual milieu of the case in controversy and
to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the Court of
Industrial Relations because we found the sa same unsupported by
Substantial evidence and much more, by credible proof.The errors
allegedly committed by this Court in its factual findings and its
conclusions derived therefrom, properly summed up and grouped, fall
into three categories (1) those pertaining to findings and
conclusions without basis on record or contrary to the evidence on
records (2) those referring to findings and conclusions contrary to
the factual determination made by and conclusions arrived at by the
Court of Industrial Relations, and (3) those relating to issues not
raises or errors not assigned by the parties.To the respondents'
first cauldron of steaming objections belong the following factual
findings and conclusions of this Court purportedly unsupported by
the records or contrary to what appears in the same: (1) that the
respondents instructed Ramon Garcia and Vicente Abella to create
the disturbance which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that Garcia
issued a circular to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the NATU; (3) that the
respondents did not make counter-proposals to the Unions' demands
and that the said respondents insisted on the Unions' dropping
their demands for union security, "promising money benefits if this
was done;" (4) that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued
the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various
criminal cases against striking members of the Unions;" (5) that
"more than 120 criminal charges" were filed against the members of
the Unions; (6) that the respondents hired Felipe Enage and Garcia,
"former legal counsels of the petitioner, as personnel manager and
assistant corporate secretary respectively, with attractive
compensations," and (7) that Jose M. Olbes "brought three
truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two
meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted
in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building."1. Anent the
first point raised by the respondents, this Court, in the decision
of January 30, 1971, stated:There is therefore a reasonable
suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to
create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal
charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying
for injunction from the court of first instance.7Earlier in the
decision (Page 4) and in the preceding statements, this Court
briefly recounted the circumstances attending the occurrence. To
claim that this Court, in the above-quoted portion of the decision,
found and categorically stated that Garcia and Abella participated
in some sort of a pre- planned scheme to "create the disturbance"
constitutes but a mistaken impression of the statement of this
Court. The statement simply express that in the circumstances
already mentioned which circumstances the records unraveled lurked
the distinct likelihood that Garcia and Abella purposely provided
the provocation for the incident.2. We find the second objection of
the respondents well-taken, for the records offer little to provide
sufficient clarity on whether or not Garcia, as acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association, "in a circular issued in his name and signed by him,
tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating
with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU)." The transcript of the proceedings before the Court of
Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia's apparent adeptness at
evasion and inability to recall, among other things, whether or not
he issued the circular aforementioned. Nonetheless, the foregoing
questioned statement of this Court in the narration of facts in the
decision bears no materiality to the conclusions finally arrived
at.3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that "the
Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted
that the Unions first drop their demand for union security,
promising money benefits if this was done" as "truly false" and "an
unwarranted deviation from the truth." Far from being so, we find
that the records precisely support the finding. The thrust of the
testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65, tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7 to
13, tsn, April 29, 1960) the chairman of the negotiating committee
for the respondents verily points out that the said respondents
omitted, without sufficient reasons, to present counter-proposals
to the Unions' demands. This, in addition to the testimonial
evidence offered by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn, September
8, 1958) chairman of the negotiating panel for the Unions, supports
the finding that, indeed, the respondents offered no
counter-proposals to the demands of the said Unions. At most, the
records reveal, the respondents, to placate the Unions, indulged in
the superficial discussion of the demands, requiring the said
Unions to explain and clarify the import of their demands. Then,
too, the totality of the testimonial evidence of Lacsina (pages 35
to 38, tsn, October 14, 1958) and the Unions' panel members
Villaruel (Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958) and Du Timbol
(Pages 25 to 26 and 30, tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly indicates
that the respondents more than persuaded the Unions to drop their
union security demands with the promise of monetary benefits.4. We
consider the objection of the respondents to the statement of this
Court that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the
restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various
criminal cases against striking members of the Unions" as
well-founded. The records show that the respondents predicated
their petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction (Exhibit "32-B") upon certain acts which the said
respondents claimed the picketing members of the striking Unions
committed through "force, threats, intimidation, coercion and
violence." The restraining order (Exhibit "33-C") issued by the
Court of First Instance of Manila on May 31, 1958 makes no express
mention of the pendency of the various criminal charges already
filed against the picketing members of the striking Unions.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that on the day the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued the restraining order, several criminal
charges (Exhibits "19," "20", "23" to "29," inclusive and "31") had
been filed already with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila
against many of the picketing members of the Unions.5. The
respondents also question the statement of this Court giving the
impression of the filing of "more than 120 criminal charges"
against the members of the striking Unions. The evidence at hand
(Exhibits "19", "20," "23", to "31," inclusive) show, as of June 2,
1958, four complaints for coercion and seven for grave coercion
already filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Each of
the preliminary investigation memoranda, however, except three
(Exhibits "26," "29" and "30") names several members of the
striking Unions collectively as accused. Counting the charges
individually prescinding from the fact that a number of the members
of the striking Unions then faced two or more charges, having been
named as accused in more than one memorandum the charges add up to
eighty-four. On this point, we sustain the objection of the
respondents.6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the
following statement of this Court:It must be recalled that previous
to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal
of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the
respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former
legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and
assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive
compensations.8The respondents claim the "falsity of the finding"
that Enage and Garcia worked as "legal counsels of the petitioners"
and alleged this Court as "unduly unkind" in giving the impression
that they enticed Enage and Garcia "from their positions as 'legal
counsels of the petitioners' with high salaries." The records,
however, evince that Garcia served as Secretary-Treasurer of the
Federation of Free Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August 4, 1961)
and that Garcia handled cases for the Federation of Free Workers
(Page 58, tsn, August 4, 1961) with which the Unions then formed an
affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961; page 62, tsn,
January 16, 1962). With respect to Enage, the records show that he
worked with the Federation of Free Workers (Page 25, tsn, April 29,
1960). Even the respondents, in their brief (Page 46), stated that
Garcia and Enage worked as counsels for the Federation of Free
Workers. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the respondents'
assertion that neither Garcia nor Enage served as counsel, directly
or indirectly through the Federation of Free Workers, for the
Unions, this passing mention of the disputed former connection of
Garcia and Enage to the said Unions bears no relevance to the
principal merits of the case at bar. As to the other observations
of the respondents, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the same for
only amisreadingof the aforequoted portion of the decision gives,
in the words of the respondents themselves, "the unkind impression
that respondents enticed them (Enage and Garcia) from their
position as 'legal counsels of the petitioners' with high
salaries."7. The respondents' allegation that no evidence supports
the statement of this Court that they, through their president and
manager Jose Olbes,brought three truckloads of non-strikers and
others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight
entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered
thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process,
crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the
Insular Life Building.9rounds up the objections of the said
respondents properly falling under the first group, The respondents
claim the absence of Evidence showing that: (1) Olbes held the
position of manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of
"non-strikers and others;" (3) armed men escorted the non-strikers
and others;" (4) eight entrances provided access to the three
buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the non-strikers and
others entered measured "less than two meters wide."Object number
one deals with an inconsequential detail whether or not Olbes held,
in any capacity, the position of manager which bears no materiality
to the main issues raised by the case at hand.As to number two, the
evidence of the respondents' own witnesses Ramon Zosa (Page 38,
tsn, December 5, 1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18, 19 and 26, tsn,
February 1, 1961) and Olbes (Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50,
tsn, October 2, 1962) more than sufficiently indicate the truth
that Olbes led three busloads of non-strikers and others to the
picketed buildings. To this effect too, testified some witnesses of
the Unions, particularly Ponciano Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn,
January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to 25, tsn, June 11,
1959).Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly
whether or not armed men escorted the three JD buses filled with
non-strikers and others to the respondents' picketed premises.On
number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this
objection ion reveal the following means of access of the office
premises of the respondents comprised of almost one block bounded
by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga, Muelle de la Industria and Juan
Luna: (1) the Plaza Cervantes entrance to the Insular Life Building
(Page 8, tsn, February 8, 1961); (2) the two Plaza Moraga entrances
to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, September 13, 1960); (3)
the basement entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn,
October 2, 1962); (4) the Juan Luna entrance to the Ayala Building
(Page 11, tsn, August 4, 1961); (5) the Muelle de la Industria
entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 27, tsn, August 4, 1961); (6)
the Plaza Moraga entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21, tsn,
August 18, 1959); and (7) the entrance to the National City Bank of
New York the premises of which have a connecting door to the lobby
of the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn, October 2, 1962).As to
objection number five, not one of the parties offers any specific
evidence showing the exact measurement of the gate through which
the non-strikers and others entered. The evidence on record
relevant to this point disclose that the gate measures about two to
three meters wide.The respondents further unleash their vigorous
exception to the following findings arrived at by this Court; (1)
that the respondents discriminated against the strikers in the
re-admission; (2) that the respondents dismissed thirty-four
strikers without lawful cause; (3) that the respondents omitted to
give the dismissed strikers the opportunity to defend themselves
against the supposed charges against them; and (4) that the
respondents' letter of May 21, 1959 (Exhibit "A") contained
"promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to
return to work" and that the said respondents' letter of May 31,
1958 (Exhibit "B") contained threats to obtain replacements for the
striking employees' in the event of their failure to report for
work on June 2, 1958. The respondents strongly protest against the
alteration and reversal made by this Court of the factual
determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations on these
salient points.Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by
the respondents on the statements of this Court relevant and
related to the aforementioned findings, the arguments of the said
respondents all but lead to their primary objection that this Court
erred in finding that they committed unfair labor practice. For,
admittedly, the foregoing findings provided this Court with the
unshakeable bases in arriving at the inescapable conclusion that
the respondents committed unfair labor practice.In the decision of
January 30, 1971, this Court, fully cognizant that the findings now
questioned by the respondents constituted the considerations of
importance to the issues involved in the case at bar, sufficiently
and clearly, albeit lengthily, discussed all of them. And a
consultation with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose
the evidence, substantial and credible, in support of the said
findings.The respondents labor under the impression that, in the
controversy at hand, the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations deserve much weight and consideration. The
said findings of fact, the respondents argue, should remain
conclusive. However, the want of substantial evidence, nay,
credible proof, to uphold the findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations on the matters now disputed by the respondents, brought
about by the mistaken appreciation of the facts, prompted this
Court to review the facts on record and to alter and reverse the
determination reached by the said Court of Industrial Relations.
These, consequently, resulted in a view rather different from that
of the Court of Industrial Relations.Not infrequently, the Court of
Industrial Relations misapprehends the facts and, eventually,
arrives at erroneous conclusions. For in the Court of Industrial
Relations, only one judge hears the case and usually, not even a
judge hears the same. Instead, a hearing examiner an employee of
the Court of Industrial Relations takes charge of the proceedings
and receives the evidence. After hearing, the hearing examiner
submits his report on the case to the judge. The judge then studies
the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the hearing
examiner who saw and heard the witnesses and submitted the report,
renders the decision. More often than not, the proceedings before
the Court of Industrial Relations drag through years before the
case finally becomes subject to study and decision by the judge.And
even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the
aggrieved party, no rehearing takes place before the Court of
Industrial Relationsen banc. The individual judges, if they have
the disposition and the time to do so, review the evidence on
record or merely read and rely upon the memoranda submitted by the
respective parties and the decision subject of reconsideration,
giving due consideration to the capability, competency and probity
of the judge who penned the said decision. And almost invariably,
the Court of Industrial Relationsen bancupholds the decision for
reconsideration.10The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from
the hands of one hearing examiner Arsenio Adriano to another
Guillermo Medina. This case also took more than seven years before
its determination by the Court of Industrial Relations. These
factors, we opine, contributed to the misapprehension of facts
committed by the Court of Industrial Relations warranting a review
of the factual determination in its totality.Thus, this Court finds
it neither important nor imperative to pursue any further
discussion and resolution of the matters claimed by the respondents
as contrary to the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations.
And for the satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the
entire evidence on record makes it more apparent that evidence of
quantity and quality sustain, the findings of this Court on the
aforementioned matters now disputed by them.To the third group of
the respondents' objections appertain those findings of this Court
on issues not raised or errors not assigned by the parties. The
respondents question the action taken by this Court in discussing
and resolving the following: (1) the question as to the nature of
the strike staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not
the respondents refused to bargain collectively in good faith; and
(3) the question as to the reclassification of eighty-seven
employees as supervisors.Concededly, the Rules of Court, in
proceedings before the appellate courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, require the party seeking the review
of a judgment to set out in his brief the errors upon which he
relies for reversal. Otherwise, the appellate courts would not
consider those errors not properly assigned or specified.11However,
the Supreme Court has ample authority to review and resolve matters
not assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in
the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the
same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just
decision in the case.12This Court, thus, has the authority to waive
the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors
closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the
unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the determination of
the questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend.13The
same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties.
The Supreme Court, likewise, has broad discretionary powers, in the
resolution of a controversy, to take into consideration matters on
record which the parties fail to submit to the Court as specific
questions for determination.14Where the issues already raised also
rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the
latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and
as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the
authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as
well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases wherein
questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as
necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and
obligations of the parties and such questions fall within the
issues already framed by the parties, the interests of justice
dictate that the Court consider and resolve them.In the case at
hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike staged by the
Unions, the refusal of the respondents to bargain collectively in
good faith, and the reclassification of eighty-seven employees as
supervisors relate closely to the determination of whether or not
the respondents committed unfair labor practice. Thus, this Court
found it necessary to resolve these issues, without confining
itself to those tendered by the parties.In the same vein, we are
also constrained to reassess the ruling in our decision of January
30, 1971 to the effect that the strikes must receive backwages from
the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of
their discharge or their offer to return to work up to the date of
their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever they have
earned pending readmission.Significant changes have since
supervened as to the method of awarding backwages. In a line of
cases, the court has established a policy of fixing the amount of
backwages to a just and reasonable levelwithoutqualification or
deduction.Blazing the trail isMercury Drug Co. vs. CIR,15L-23357,
April 30, 1974, which enunciated the policy. The doctrine is not
without justification, for, in the same case, it was stated that
the evident aim is "to avoid protracted delay in the execution of
the award of backwages due to extended hearings and unavoidable
delays and difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of
the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages
during the pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the same
from the gross backwages awarded."Feati University Club vs. Feati
University,L-35103, August 25, 1974, adopted a consensus policy of
pegging the amount of backwages to their total equivalent forthree
years(depending on the circumstances) without deduction or
qualification. Therationalefor the policy was stated in the
following words:As has been noted, this formula of awarding
reasonable net backwageswithout deduction or qualificationrelieves
the employees from proving or disproving their earnings during
their lay-off and the employers from submitting counterproofs, and
obviates the twin evils ofIdlenesson the part of the employee who
would "with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a
windfall would come to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs.
Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24 SCRA 873 (1968), cited in Diwa ng
Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA 217 (1972))
andattritionand protracted delay in satisfying such award on the
part of unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further
proceedings to determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully
dismissed or laid-off employees to hold unduly extended hearings
for each and every employee awarded backwages and thereby render
practically nugatory such award and compel the employees to agree
to unconscionable settlements of their backwages award in order to
satisfy their dire need. (See La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs.
CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa vs. La
Campana Food Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970)).The above judicial
policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court,
inLuzon Stevedoring Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs. CIR, et
al., L-34300, November 22, 1974, reiterated the same way of
computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not exceedingthree
yearswithout requiring the parties to submit proof of compensation
received from other sources from the time of the illegal dismissal
until actual reinstatement.16We must now respond to the
pronouncements in the above and related cases if we are to give our
law on the matter order, direction and light.Here, a total of
eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June 2, 1958, date of the
commencement of the backwages. Considering all the commencement of
the backwages. Considering all the circumstances at bar,viz., the
lengthy procedural and technical manipulations of the parties, the
delay in the resolution of the case by the court below, the
complexity of the issues raised by the parties which were resolved
only on January 30, 1971, etc., the Court considers the fixing and
limitation of the backwages award to their total equivalent ofthree
yearswithout qualification and deduction as applicable to and fully
justified in the case at bar.The Court finds no sufficient or
compelling reason to further depart from its judgment as embodied
in the decision of January 30, 1971.ACCORDINGLY, subject to the
above modification as to backwages, the motion for reconsideration
is hereby denied, and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its
decision of January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other respects.
This denial is immediately executor.Barredo., Makasiar, Antonio,
Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.Separate
OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring:With the observation that for him
the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage had been
acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of
legal ethics.Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.Separate
OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring:With the observation that for him
the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage had been
acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of
legal ethics.Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA.M. No.
RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998ATTY. ANTONIO T.
GUERRERO,complainant,vs.HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR,respondent.A.M. No.
RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998GEORGE CARLOS,complainant,vs.HON.
ADRIANO VILLAMOR,respondent.QUISUMBING,J.:In a sworn
letter-complaint1addressed to this Court through the Court
Administrator, dated March 8, 1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero charges
Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial Court at Naval,
Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, with serious misconduct,
ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for issuing an
Order2dated December 11, 1987 declaring the complainant and one
George Carlos guilty of direct contempt.In a separate verified
complaint, involving exactly the same incident, George Carlos also
charges Judge Adriano Villamor with substantially the same
offenses.3By resolution dated February 5, 1991, this Court referred
to Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia of the Court of Appeals the
complaint of Atty. Guerrero, docketed as Administrative Matter
(A.M.) RTJ 90-483, for
