Canons 7-14 Cases

8/22/2019 Canons 7-14 Cases

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IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.FLORA QUINGWA complainant,vs.ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Courta verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a memberof the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In hisanswer, the respondent denied all the materialallegations of the complaint, and as a special defenseaverred that the allegations therein do not constitutegrounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25,

Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation.Hearings were held by the then Solicitor RomanCancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted byher counsel, presented evidence both oral anddocumentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel,cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. Therespondent likewise testified. He denied having sexualintercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel onJune 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A.Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disownedArmando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint,formally charging respondent with immorality. The

complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time whencomplainant Flora Quingwa and respondentArmando Puno were engaged to be married, thesaid respondent invited the complainant toattend a movie but on their way the respondenttold the complainant that they take refreshmentbefore going to the Lyric Theater; that theyproceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R.Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on

the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,respondent proposed to complainant that theygo to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that'anyway we are getting married; that withreluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered bylove of respondent and the respondent'spromise of marriage, complainant acquiesced,and before they entered the hotel roomrespondent registered and signed the registrybook as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that afterregistering at the hotel, respondent shovedcomplainant inside the room; that as soon asthey were inside the room, someone locked the

door from outside and respondent proceeded tothe bed and undressed himself; that complainanbegged respondent not to molest her butrespondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I havepromised to marry you'; and respondent, stillnoticing the reluctance of complainant to hisovertures of love, again assured complainantthat 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulledcomplainant to the bed, removed her panty, andthen placed himself on top of her and held herhands to keep her flat on the bed; that whenrespondent was already on top of complainantthe latter had no other recourse but to submit torespondent's demand and two (2) sexualintercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until7:00 o'clock that same evening when they leftthe hotel and proceeded to a birthday partytogether; that after the sexual act withcomplainant on June 1, 1958, respondentrepeatedly proposed to have some more butcomplainant refused telling that they had betterwait until they were married; that after their said

sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling thatshe was already on the family way, complainantrepeatedly implored respondent to comply withhis promise of marriage but respondent refusedto comply; that on February 20, 1959,

complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnalknowledge with the complainant through apromise of marriage which he did not fulfill andhas refused to fulfill up to the present constitutea conduct which shows that respondent isdevoid of the highest degree of morality and

integrity which at all times is expected of andmust be possessed by members of the

Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the

respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent onMay 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint onJune 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant tothe Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise ofmarriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercoursewith her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,

1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts untilNovember, 1955, when they broke off, following aquarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, topractice law. Without stating in his answer that he hadthe intention of introducing additional evidence,respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20,1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted thecase for decision without oral argument. There was noappearance for the respondents.


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Since the failure of respondent to make known in hisanswer his intention to present additional evidence in hisbehalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present suchevidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April27, 1963), the evidence produced before the SolicitorGeneral in his investigation, where respondent had anopportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examinethe witnesses, may now be considered by this Court,

pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that thefacts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been apublic school teacher for a number of years. Shetestified that respondent took her to the Silver MoonHotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr.and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexualintercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Thehotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 andExh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived atthat hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at

7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondenton July 5, 1958, when the latter went to ZamboangaCity. When she learned that respondent had left forZamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime inAugust of that year telling him that she was in trouble.Again she wrote him a letter in September and anotherone in October of the same year, telling him that shewas pregnant and she requested him to come.Receiving no replies from respondent, she went toZamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met therespondent and asked him to comply with his promise to

marry her.1wph1.t

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City inJuly, 1958, and that he and complainant met inZamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact thatcomplainant sent him a telegram and letters waslikewise admitted in respondent's letter to thecomplainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which

was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20,1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This issupported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate

issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, anda certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternityand Children's Hospital issued by the medical records

clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between therespondent and the complainant was, the latter testifiedthat she gave money to the respondent whenever heasked from her. This was corroborated by the testimonyof Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Evenrespondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E)shows that he used to ask for money from the

complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainantwas subjected by the respondent himself failed to

discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General,the respondent averred that he and complainant weresweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact thatthey reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 isestablished by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness

of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent'sletter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh.E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255,

t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexualintercourse because of respondent's promise ofmarriage and not because of a desire for sexualgratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630,

December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission

to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before theSupreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moralcharacter (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court,now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is acondition precedent to a license or privilege to enterupon the practice of law, it is essential during thecontinuance of the practice and the exercise of theprivilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When hisintegrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough thathe denies the charges against him; he must meet theissue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legaland Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofsthat he still maintains the highest degree of morality andintegrity, which at all times is expected of him.Respondent denied that he took complainant to theSilver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with heron June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence toshow where he was on that date. In the case ofUnitedStates vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speakingfor the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty tohimself if not to the State. If he does not performthat duty he may not always expect the State toperform it for him. If he fails to meet theobligation which he owes to himself, when tomeet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardlyindeed if he demand and expect that same fulland wide consideration which the Statevoluntarily gives to those who by reasonableeffort seek to help themselves. This isparticularly so when he not only declines to helphimself but actively conceals from the State the

very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by therespondent in his answer to the charges of thecomplainant that the allegations in the complaint do not


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fall under any of the grounds for disbarment orsuspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated insection 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it isalready a settled rule that the statutory enumeration ofthe grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to betaken as a limitation on the general power of courts tosuspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of thecourt over its officers can not be restricted. Timeswithout number, our Supreme Court held that anattorney will be removed not only for malpractice anddishonesty in his profession, but also for grossmisconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the officeand unworthy of the privileges which his license and thelaw confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing Inre Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm.Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortelvs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct"is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.

(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that therespondent has committed a grossly immoral act and

has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamentalethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important thatmembers of this ancient and learned profession of lawmust conform themselves in accordance with the higheststandards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of theCanons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the baragainst the admission to the profession ofcandidates unfit or unqualified because deficientin either moral character or education. He shouldstrive at all times to uphold the honor and tomaintain the dignity of the profession and to

improve not only the law but the administrationof justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is herebydisbarred and, as a consequence, his name is orderedstricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,

concur.

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDADALMAN, complainants,vs.ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint1

dated 25 September 1979, thespouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrezcharged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the PhilippineBar, with malpractice and breach of trust. Thecomplainant spouses alleged, among others, thatrespondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, takenadvantage of their precarious financial situation and hisknowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded indivesting them of their only residential lot in PagadianCity; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafacase against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromisedthat case without their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent deniedall the charges levelled against him and prayed for the

dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrativecomplaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor

General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the

City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, toconduct the necessary investigation, with instructions tosubmit thereafter this report and recommendationthereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on theadministrative case until 15 July 1982, when herequested the Solicitor General to release him from the

duty of investigating the case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General grantedFiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed theProvincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S.

Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, amotion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing thecase followed by an urgent motion for indefinitepostponement of the investigation. Both motions weredenied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General tocomplete the investigation of the administrative case andto render his report and recommendation thereon within

thirty (30) days from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted hisReport and Recommendation

2dated 21 June 1988. In

as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings

held in the present case, the Solicitor General presentedthe following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5,1975, they obtained from respondent aloan of P 4,000.00. This loan wassecured by a real estate mortgage(Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p.16, records).lwph1.tIn the said ReaEstate Mortgage document, however, it


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was made to appear that the amountborrowed by complainants wasP5,000.00. Confronted by thisdiscrepancy, respondent assuredcomplainants that said document was amere formality, and upon suchassurance, complainants signed thesame. The document was brought bycomplainant Narciso Melendres to aNotary Public for notarization. After thesame was notarized, he gave thedocument to respondent. Despite theassurance, respondent exacted fromcomplainants P500.00 a month aspayment for what is beyond disputeusurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.Complainants religiously paid theobviously usurious interest for threemonths: September, October andNovember, 1975. Then they stoppedpaying due to financial reverses. In viewof their failure to pay said amounts asinterest, respondent prepared a new

document on May 7, 1976, a RealEstate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint,p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estatemortgage dated August 5, 1975, but thistime the sum indicated in said newcontract of mortgage is P 10,000.00,purportedly with interest at 19% perannum. In this new Real EstateMortgage, a special power of attorney infavor of respondent was inserted,authorizing him to sell the mortgagedproperty at public auction in the event

complainants fail to pay their obligationon or before May 30, 1976. Withoutexplaining the provisions of the newcontract to complainants, respondentinsisted that complainants sign thesame, again upon the assurance thatthe document was a mere formality.Unsuspecting of the motive ofrespondent, complainants signed thedocument. Complainants NarcisoMelendres again brought the samedocument to a Notary Public fornotarization. After the document was

notarized, he brought the same torespondent without getting a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assuranceof the respondent that the second RealEstate Mortgage was but a formality,neither bothered to ask from respondentthe status of their lot nor tried to paytheir obligation. For their failure to paythe obligation, the respondent onOctober 12, 1976, applied for theextrajudicial foreclosure of the secondreal estate mortgage (Exhibit 16,

Respondent's Position Paper). All therequirements of Act No. 3135, asamended, re extrajudicial sale ofmortgage were ostensibly complied withby respondent. Hence, finally, title wastransferred to him, and on June 20,1979, respondent sold the involvedproperty to Trinidad Ylanan for

P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by oneSalud Australlado on the first week ofMarch 1979 (see Sworn Statement ofcomplainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6,Folder No. 2 of case), and not havingknown the legal implications of theprovisions of the second Real EstateMortgage which they had executed,complainants could not believe that titleto their lot had already been transferredto respondent and that respondent had

already sold the same to a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March,1979, complainants tried to raise theamount of P10,000.00 and went torespondent's house on May 30, 1979 topay their obligation, hoping that theycould redeem their property, althoughthree years had already lapsed from the

date of the mortgage.

Respondent did not accept the profferedP10,000.00, but instead gavecomplainants a sheet of paper (AnnexB, Complainants' Position Paper), whichindicated that the total indebtedness hadsoared to P20,400.00. The computationwas made in respondent's ownhandwriting. Complainants went homewith shattered hopes and with grief intheir hearts. Hence, the instantcompetent for disbarment againstrespondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegationsof complainants. He maintains that whatappears on the two documents allegedlyexecuted by complainants, i.e., that theyobtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claimsthat he in truth delivered the allegedamount of P5,000.00 to complainantsand not P4,000.00. With respect to thesecond loan, respondent claims that hedelivered to complainants P8,000.00,plus the P2,000.00 loan previouslyextended [to] complainants [by] oneRegino Villanueva, which loan had beenindorsed to respondent for collection,


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thus making a total of P10,000.00, asappearing on said document.Respondent denies that he exactedusurious interest of 10% a month orP500.00 from complainants. He assertsthat the fact that complainants were ableto secure a loan from the Insular Bank ofAsia and America (IBAA) only provesthe truth of his allegation that the title ofthe property, at the time complainantsobtained a loan from IBAA on April1976, was clear of any encumbrance,since complainants had already paid theoriginal loan of P5,000.00 obtained fromrespondent; that complainants knewfully well all the conditions of saidmortgage; and that his acquisition of theproperty in question was in accordancewith their contract and the law on thematter. Thus, he denies that he has

violated any right of the complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both

complainants and respondent, we findagainst respondent.

While complainants are correct in theirclaim that they actually obtained anactual cash of P4,000.00, they are onlypartly correct in the claim that out of theP10,000.00 appearing in the secondReal Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 wasapplied to interest considering that notall the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00was applied to interest, computed asfollows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was

supposedly due on August 31, 1975.Complainants paid 10% monthly interestor P500.00 on September 30, 1975,October 31, 1975 and November 30,1975. Consequently, beginningDecember 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976(the date of the execution of the secondReal Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6)months lapsed. Six (6) months atP500.00 equals P 3,000.00, whichamount plus the P2,000.00complainants' loan to one Engr.Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for

collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding thisamount to the previous P5,000.00indicated loan secured by the firstmortgage results in P10,000.00, theamount appearing in the second RealEstate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of

the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreementhave been reduced to writing, it is to beconsidered as complaining all such

terms, and, therefore, there can be, asbetween the parties and theirsuccessors in interest, no evidence ofthe terms of the agreement other thanthe contents of the writing, except in the

following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection ofthe writing, or its failure to express the

true intent and agreement of the parties,or the validity of the agreement is put inissue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguityin the writing. The term "agreement"

includes wills.

There is no dispute that the twodocuments denominated Real EstateMortgages covering the supposedoriginal loan of P5,000.00 and theinflated P10,000.00, respectively, were

voluntarily signed by the complainants.The general rule is that when the partieshave reduced their agreement to writing,it is presumed that they have made thewriting the only repository and memorialof the truth, and whatever is not found inthe writing must be understood to havebeen waived and abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as itadmits of some exceptions, asaforequoted. One of the exceptions, thatis, failure to express the true intent and

agreement of the parties, applies in thiscase. From the facts obtaining in thecase, it is clear that the complainantswere induced to sign the Real EstateMortgage documents by the false andfraudulent representations of respondenthat each of the successive documents

was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainantsare not at all illiterate, respondent, beinga lawyer, should have at least explainedto complainants the legal implications of

the provisions of the real estatemortgage, particularly the provisionappointing him as the complainants'attorney-in-fact in the event of default inpayments on the part of complainants.While it may be conceded that it ispresumed that in practice the notarypublic apprises complainants of the legaimplications of the contract, it is ofcommon knowledge that most notariespublic do not go through the desiredpractice. Respondent at least couldhave informed the complainants by


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sending a demand letter to them to paytheir obligation as otherwise he wouldproceed to sell the lot at public auctionas per their contract. This respondentfailed to do, despite the fact that heknew fully wen that complainants weretrying their best to raise money to beable to pay their obligation to him, asshown by the loan obtained bycomplainants from the IBAA on April 8,1976. In this connection, it may bestated that complainants, per advice ofrespondent himself, returned theproceeds of the IBAA loan to the bankimmediately on April 30, 1976,considering that the net proceeds of theloan from said bank was only P4,300.00and not enough to pay the indicatedloan from respondent of P5,000.00,which per computation of respondentwould already have earned interest ofP2,500.00 for five (5) months(December 1975 to April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainantshad paid him the original loan ofP5,000.00, and that this was the reasonwhy complainants were able tomortgage the lot to the bank free fromany encumbrance. This claim isincorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrancewas simply because of the fact that thefirst Real Estate Mortgage for theindicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actualamount was only P 4,000.00) had not

been annotated at the back of the title(see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).

Respondent also denies thatcomplainants offered to him the amountof Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan,alleging that if the offer were true, hecould have readily accepted the samesince he sold the lot for almost the sameamount, for only P12,000.00, adifference of a few thousand pesos.Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer,but respondent refused the same for thesimple reason that the offer was madeon May 30,1979, three (3) years afterthe execution of the mortgage on May31, 1976. With its lapse of time,respondent demanded obviously thepayment of the accumulated substantialinterest for three years, as shown by hisown computation in as own handwritingon a sheet of paper (Annex C,

Complainants' Position Paper, Folder

No. 2).lwph1.t

In view of all the foregoing, theobservation made by the Hearing Officeris worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of theundersigned the pivotal question with

respect to this particular charge iswhose version is to be believed. Is it theversion of the complainants or theversion of the respondent.

In resolving this issue the possiblemotive on the part of the complainants infiling the present complaint against therespondent must be carefully examinedand considered. At the beginning therewas a harmonious relationship betweenthe complainants and the respondent somuch so that respondent was even

engaged as counsel of the complainantsand it is but human nature that whenrespondent extended a loan to thecomplainants the latter would be gratefuto the former. However, in the case atbar, complainants filed a complaintagainst the respondent in spite of thegreat disparity between the status of thecomplainants and the respondent.Admittedly, respondent is in a betterposition financially, socially andintellectually. To the mind of theundersigned, complainants were onlycompelled to file the above entitledcomplaint against the respondentbecause they felt that they are soaggrieved of what the respondent hasdone to them. It is for this reasontherefore that the undersigned isinclined to believe the version of thecomplainants rather than of therespondent. In addition thereto, therespondent as a lawyer could really seeto it that the transaction between thecomplainants and himself on papersappear legal and in order. Besides,there is ample evidence in the records o

its case that respondent is actuallyengaged in lending money at least in alimited way and that the interest at therate of ten per cent a month is butcommon among money lenders duringthe time of the transactions in question'

Going now into the second charge,complainants alleged that respondent,who was their counsel (privateprosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734,for estafa, against accused Reynaldo


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Pineda, compromised the case with theaccused without their consent andreceived the amount of P500.00 asadvance payment for the amicablesettlement, without however, giving tothe complainants the Id amount norinforming them of said settlement and

payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegationand claims that the amicable settlementwas with the consent of complainant

wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of

the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were notinterested in putting the accusedReynaldo Pineda to jail but rather inmerely recovering their money ofP2,000.00. At this stage, relationship

between complainants and respondentwas not yet strained, and respondent, ascounsel of the complainants in this case,knew that complainants were merelyinterested in said recovery. Knowingthis, respondent on his own volitiontalked to accused and tried to settle thecase amicably for P2,000.00. Heaccepted the amount of P500.00 asadvance payment, being then the onlyamount carried by the accused Pineda.A receipt was signed by bothrespondent and accused Pineda (AnnexM, p. 34, record). However, respondentdid not inform complainants about thisadvance payment, perhaps because hewas still waiting for the completion of thepayment of P2,000.00 before turning

over the whole amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accusedPineda give the abovementionedP500.00 to respondent, but they wereashamed then to ask directly ofrespondent what the money was allabout.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month afterMay 30, 1979, when the complainantshad already lost their trust and respectand/or confidence in respondent uponknowing what happened to their lot and,more so, upon respondent's refusal toaccept the Pl0,000.00 offered bycomplainants to redeem the same,Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accusedPineda on his way home and confrontedhim on the P500.00 that had been givento respondent. Accused then showed

complainant Melendres the receipt(Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00was an advance payment for thesupposed settlement/dismissal of the

case filed by complainants against him.

Sensing or feeling that respondent wasfooling them, complainants then filed amotion before the court which was trying

the criminal case and relievedrespondent as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard thecase and saw the demeanor of the

witnesses in testifying, had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, thefact that respondent received P500.00from Reynaldo Pineda is dulyestablished. Both the complainants andthe respondent agreed that the saidamount was given to the respondent in

connection with a criminal case whereinthe complainants were the privateoffended parties: that Reynaldo Pinedais the accused and that the respondentis the private prosecutor of the saidcase. The pivotal issue in this particularcharge is whether the respondentreceived the amount of P500.00 fromReynaldo Pineda as an advancepayment of an amicable settlemententered into by the complainants andthe accused or the respondent receivedsaid amount from the accused withoutthe knowledge and consent of thecomplainants. If it is true as alleged bythe respondent that he only received itfor and in behalf of the complainants asadvance payment of an amicablesettlement why is it that the same wasquestioned by the complainants? Why isit that it was not the complainants whosigned the receipt for the said amount?How come that as soon as complainantsknew that the said amount was given tothe respondent, the former filed a motionin court to relieve respondent as theircounsel on the ground that they have

lost faith and confidence on him? If it isreally true that complainants haveknowledge and have consented to thisamicable settlement they should begrateful to the efforts of their privateprosecutor yet the fact is that theyresented the same and went to theextent of disqualifying the respondent astheir private prosecutor. ReynaldoPineda himself executed an affidavit

belying the claim of the respondent.'


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Clearly, the complained acts asdescribed and levelled againstrespondent Decena are contrary tojustice, honesty, modesty, or goodmorals for which he may be suspended.The moral turpitude for which anattorney may be disbarred may consistof misconduct in either his professionalor non- professional attitude (Royong v.Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complainedacts of respondent imply somethingimmoral in themselves, regardless of thefact whether they are punishable by law.The doing of the act itself, and not itsprohibition by statute, fixes the moralturpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court forDistrict of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F

[2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that

complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise beblamed for trusting the respondent toomuch. They did not bother to keep acopy of the documents they executedand considering that they admitted theydid not understand the contents of thedocuments, they did not bother to havethem explained by another lawyer or byany knowledgeable person in theirlocality. Likewise, for a period of threeyears, they did not bother to ask forrespondent the status of their lot and/ortheir obligation to him. Theircomplacency or apathy amountingalmost to negligence contributed to theexpedient loss of their property thru thelegal manuevers employed byrespondent. Hence, respondent's liabilitymerits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfullyrecommended that Atty. Reynerio I.

Decena be suspended from the practiceof law for a period of five (5) years.3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through FiscalsAlmonte and Jamero, held several hearings during theinvestigation of the present administrative case: CityFiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actualhearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings

4While only

five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings5

wereheld under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In thosehearings, the complainants presented a number ofwitnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant

Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordinglycross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred inthe investigation of the administrative case and havingbeen pressed by the Solicitor General immediately tocomplete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed achange of procedure, from trial type proceedings torequiring the parties to submit their respective positionpapers. The complainants immediately filed their positionpaper which consisted of their separate swornstatements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a questionand answer form), their documentary exhibits and anaffidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filedhis counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, withseveral annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28October 1987, which had been set for the crossexamination of the complainants and their witnesses byrespondent, the complainants refused to submitthemselves to cross-examination on the ground that theorder of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986declaring respondent's right of cross examination ashaving been waived, had become final and executory.Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of thecomplainants' position paper, not having passed through

any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses tocross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due

process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront thecomplainants and their witnesses against him has beenviolated, Respondent in fact cross-examinedcomplainant Narciso Melendrez and some of thewitnesses which complainants had presented earlier. Aspointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of theproceedings shows that respondent had all theopportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the

complainants (those whose affidavits were attached tocomplainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but hadforfeited such opportunity by asking for numerouscontinuances which indicated a clear attempt on his partto delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent hadin fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettingsduring the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8)under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under FiscalJamero. There were also instances where respondentasked for postponement and at the same time reset thehearing to a specific date of his choice on which neitherhe nor as counsel would appear. That attitude ofrespondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare

his (respondent's) right to cross-examine thecomplainants and their witnesses as having been waivedin his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can notnow claim that he had been deprived below of theopportunity to confront the complainants and their

witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of theproceedings as well as the evidence presented by bothparties, we agree with the findings and conclusions ofthe Solicitor General.


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The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August1975 real estate mortgage that theamount loaned to complainants wasP5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2. exacting grossly unreasonable and

usurious interest;

3. making it appear in the second realestate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that theloan extended to complainants had

escalated to P10,000.00;

4. failing to inform complainants of theimport of the real mortgage documentsand inducing them to sign thosedocuments with assurances that they

were merely for purposes of "formality";

5. failing to demand or refraining from

demanding payment from complainantsbefore effecting extrajudicial foreclosure

of the mortgaged property; and

6. failing to inform or refraining frominforming complainants that the realestate mortgage had already beenforeclosed and that complainants had aright to redeem the foreclosed property

within a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conductunbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with theSolicitor General that the acts of respondent "implysomething immoral in themselves regardless of whetherthey are punishable by law" and that these actsconstitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice,honesty, modesty or good morals." The standardrequired from members of the Bar is not, of course,satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision withour criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact,may be penalizable under at least one penal statute

the anti-usury law.

The second charge against respondent relates to actsdone in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time

when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminalcase for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. Thereare two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is thatrespondent Decena effected a compromise agreementconcerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pinedawithout the consent and approval of the complainants;the second is that, having received the amount ofP500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," hefailed to inform complainants of that advance paymentand moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to thecomplainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the

knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondentinformed complainants of the amicable "settlement" andof the P500.00 advance payment only after petitionerNarciso Melendrez had confronted him about thesematters. And respondent never did turn over tocomplainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed tobe aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without specialauthority, compromise their clients' litigation or receiveanything in discharge of a client's claim, but the fullamount in cash.

6Respondent's failure to turn over to

complainants the amount given by accused Pineda aspartial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores hislack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended ordisbarred for misconduct committed in his personal ornon-professional capacity. Where however, misconductoutside his professional dealings becomes so patent andso gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain inthe legal profession, the Court must suspend or strikeout the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys.

7Thenature of the office of an attorney at law requires that heshall be a person of good moral character. This

qualification is not only a condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continuedpossession is also essential for remaining in the practiceof law, in the exercise of privileges of members of theBar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, althoughnot related to the discharge of professional duties as amember of the Bar, which puts his moral character inserious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the

practice of law.8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercisedby respondent attorney upon the complainants in hisprivate transactions with them, and the exacting of

unconscionable rates of interest, considered togetherwith the acts of professional misconduct committed byrespondent attorney, compel this Court to the convictionthat he has lost that good moral character which is

indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena ishereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken fromthe Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution beFURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread onthe personal records of respondent attorney, and to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,Sarmiento, Cortes, Gr;no-Aquino, Medialdea andRegalado, JJ., concur.

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,vs.ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:


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In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged therespondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of thePhilippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on herperson in the manner described therein. Uponrequirement of this Court, the respondent filed hisanswer denying all the allegations in the complaint andpraying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959,this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General forinvestigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted hisreport on the case with the recommendation that therespondent "be permanently removed from his officelawyer and his name be stricken from the roll ofattorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads asfollows:

The complainant testified that after lunch onAugust 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her fostermother, left her alone in their house and wentdown to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about

1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironingclothes on the second floor of the house therespondent entered and read a newspaper ather back. Suddenly he covered her mouth withone hand and with the other hand dragged herto one of the bedrooms of the house and forcedher to lie down on the floor. She did not shout forhelp because he threatened her and her familywith death. He next undressed as she lay on thefloor, then had sexual intercourse with her afterhe removed her panties and gave her hardblows on the thigh with his fist to subdue herresistance. After the sexual intercourse, hewarned her not to report him to her foster

parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all themembers of her family. She resumed ironingclothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock thatafternoon when she joined her foster mother onthe first floor of the house. As a result of thesexual intercourse she became pregnant andgave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8,

21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help shewould have been heard by the neighbors thatshe did not report the outrage to anyonebecause of the threat made by the respondent;

that she still frequented the respondent's houseafter August 5, 1959, sometimes when he wasalone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee,and received his mail for him. Once, onNovember 14, 1958, when respondent was sickof influenza, she was left alone with him in hishouse while her aunt Briccia Angeles left forManila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied thathe raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of

March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch onAugust 5, 1958, he went to the Commission OfCivil Service to follow up his appointment astechnical assistant in the office of the mayor ofMakati, Rizal, and read the record of theadministrative case against Buenaventura Perez(pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,

1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he hadillicit relations with the complainant fromJanuary, 1957 to December, 1958, when theirclandestine affair was discovered by thecomplainant's foster parents, but to avoidcriminal liability for seduction, according to him,he limited himself to kissing and embracing herand sucking her tongue before she completedher eighteenth birthday. They had their firstsexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after shehad reached eighteen, and the second one weeklater, on May 18. The last intercourse took placebefore Christmas in December, 1958. In all, theyhad sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly

in her house and sometimes in his housewhenever they had the opportunity. He intendedto marry her when she could legally contractmarriage without her foster parents' intervention,'in case occasion will permit ... because wecannot ask permission to marry, for her fosterparents will object and even my common-lawwife, will object.' After the discovery of theirrelationship by the complainant's foster parents,he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining thathe wanted to have a child, something she(Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25,

t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

x x x x x x x x x

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent hadcarnal knowledge of the complainant. Thecomplainant claims she surrendered to himunder circumstances of violence andintimidation, but the undersigned are convincedthat the sexual intercourse was performed notonce but repeatedly and with her consent. Fromher behaviour before and after the alleged rape,she appears to have been more a sweetheartthan of the victim of an outrage involving herhonor ....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding,the undersigned cannot in consciencerecommend respondent's exoneration. Therespondent tempted Briccia Angeles to livemaritally with him not long after she and herhusband parted, and it is not improbable that thespouses never reconciled because of him. Hisown evidence shows that, tiring of her after more


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than fifteen years of adulterous relationship withher and on the convenient excuse that she,Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, heseduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years ofage, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of achild, on June 2, 1959. The seduction wasaccomplished with grave abuse of confidenceand by means of promises of marriage which heknew he could not fulfill without grievous injury tothe woman who forsook her husband so that he,respondent, could have all of her. He also tookadvantage of his moral influence over her. Fromchildhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as anuncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedlybecause he is the paramour of a sister of hermother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18years old then), it is not difficult to see why she

could not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22,1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition datedMay 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person ofgood moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that

the Supreme Court permit him "to take the barexaminations to be given on the first Saturday ofAugust, 1954, or at any time as the Court may

fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moralcharacter he represented himself to be. From1942 to the present, he has continuously livedan adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whosehusband is still alive, knowing that his concubineis a married woman and that her marriage stillsubsists. This fact permanently disqualified himfrom taking the bar examinations, and had it

been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, hewould not have been permitted to take the barexaminations that year or thereafter, or to takehis oath of office as a lawyer. As he was thenpermanently disqualified from admission to thePhilippine Bar by reason of his adulterousrelations with a married woman, it is submittedthat the same misconduct should be sufficientground for his permanent disbarment, unless werecognize a double standard of morality, one formembership to the Philippine Bar and anotherfor disbarment from the office of a lawyer.

x x x x x x x x x

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfullyrecommend that after due hearing, respondentAriston J. Oblena be permanently removed fromhis office as a lawyer and his name be strickenfrom the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of hisinvestigation, that even if respondent did not commit the

alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of othermisconduct, the Solicitor General formulated anothercomplaint which he appended to his report, charging therespondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in hisapplication for admission to the bar that he is a person ofgood moral character; of living adulterously with BricciaAngeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations withthe complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thusrendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfitand unsafe to manage the legal business of others, andpraying that this Court render judgment ordering "thepermanent removal of the respondent ... from his officeas a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the

roll of attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondentalleged the special defense that "the complaint does notmerit action", since the causes of action in the saidcomplaint are different and foreign from the originalcause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks thenecessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 ofthe Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after duenotice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint

be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the CourtInvestigators to receive the additional evidence.Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which theparties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum whichwas granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same wasfiled, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rapehas not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction wascommitted by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjuryor fraudulent concealment was committed by therespondent when he filed his petition for admission to

the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit tobe a member of the bar.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that theforegoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approvedby this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the partiesadducing other evidence to prove their case not coveredby this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondentpresented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, whotestified as follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband(t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent onDecember 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n.23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royongwere evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross(t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to TeodoroArines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arinesare from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them(t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores askedher about her status she told him she was'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia,


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were then told to stay at respondent's house,respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondentasked her if she was married and she told him'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). Shetold respondent she was married (to Arines)when she and respondent were already livingtogether as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n.26). Respondent asked her to marry him, whenthey were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27).Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after theirarrival thereat, but she did not go with herbecause she and respondent 'had already agood understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27].Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometownin Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondentwas already reluctant to live with her and he toldher it was better for her to go home to Iriga(t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met herlegitimate husband (Arines), who told her he hadalready a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n.28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943),with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n.29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live

with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presentlyliving with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court

Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submitan affidavit at a later date, which request was alsogranted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961,the respondent averring, among others, the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime ofseduction against the complainant, because thelatter was born on February 19, 1940, and hisfirst sexual intercourse with her took place on

May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18years of age; that he had been living with hiscommon-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20years, but from the time he began courting her,he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for herhusband, Arines, or to commit the crime ofadultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16,1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted byher; that on February 21, 1942, he found Bricciaalone in his house, who told him that her sister,Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the otherevacuees; that from said date (February 21), tothe present, he and Briccia had been living

together as common-law husband and wife; that2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia tomarry him, but she confessed she was alreadymarried, and maybe her husband (Arines) wasstill living in Iriga; that he could not then driveBriccia away, because she was a stranger in theplace, nor could he urge her to join her sisterCecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in1943 she told Briccia to separate from him andto return to Iriga, and urged her never to see himagain; that contrary to his expectations, Bricciareturned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; thatBriccia strongly insisted to live with him again,

telling him that she cannot separate from himanymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia'sfather told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)had agreed not to molest them as in fact he(Arines) was already living with another woman;that he had 'no choice but to live with her'(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition totake the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did nothave the slightest intention to hide' from thisCourt the fact of his 'open cohabitation with amarried woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he didnot state said fact in his petition, because he didnot see in the form of the petition being used in1954 that the fact must be stated; and that sincehis birth, he thought and believed he was a manof good moral character, and it was only fromthe Solicitor General that he first learned he wasnot so; and that he did not commit perjury orfraudulent concealment when he filed his petitionto take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of

the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with

the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge ofthe law to take advantage by having illicit relations withcomplainant, knowing as he did, that by committingimmoral acts on her, he was free from any criminalliability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immoralityby continuously cohabiting with a married woman evenafter he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3)That respondent falsified the truth as to his moralcharacter in his petition to take the 1954 barexaminations, being then immorally (adulterously) incohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,a married woman. The investigators also recommendedthat the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of oneyear.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which wasserved on respondent, through his counsel of record, thecase was set for hearing before the Court on April 30,1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandumin lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the

corresponding memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that therespondent had sexual relations with the complainantseveral times, and as a consequence she bore him a

child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuouslycohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner

from 1942 up to the present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations withthe complainant Josefina Royong the and the opencohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are

sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable fordisbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with thecomplainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia


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Angeles, a married woman, because he has not beenconvicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is truethat the respondent has not been convicted of rape,seduction, or adultery on this count, and that thegrounds upon which the disbarment proceedings isbased are not among those enumerated by Section 25,Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer maybe disbarred. But it has already been held that thisenumeration is not exclusive and that the power of thecourts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of theprofession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to theproper administration of justice; it may be exercisedwithout any special statutory authority, and in all propercases unless positively prohibited by statute; and thepower may be exercised in any manner that will give theparty be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to beheard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citingIn Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settledrule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtueof its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts orconduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrineis that statutes and rules merely regulate the power todisbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or

rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court overattorneys, who are its officers, and that they may beremoved for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734).In the United States, where from our system of legalethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fairprivate and professional character or a good moralcharacter is a requisite condition for the rightfulcontinuance in the practice of law for one who has beenadmitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarmenteven though the statutes do not specify that as a groundof disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorneymay be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either hisprofessional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur.

417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court hasbeen toward the conclusion that a member of the barmay be removed or suspended from office as a lawyerfor other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is sophrased as to be broad enough to cover practically anymisconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Inthe case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent ismost apparent. His pretension that before complainantcompleted her eighteenth birthday, he refrained fromhaving sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incurcriminal liability, as he himself declared and that helimited himself merely to kissing and embracing her andsucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which

together with his knowledge of the law, he tookadvantage of, for his lurid purpose.

Moreover, his act becomes more despicable consideringthat the complainant was the niece of his common-lawwife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over herwho looked up to him as her uncle. As the SolicitorGeneral observed: "He also took advantage of his moralinfluence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'(uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of asister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral

ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why shecould not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admissionof his illicit relations with the complainant reveals therespondent to be a person who would suffer no moralcompunction for his acts if the same could be donewithout fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts,proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity

expected of a member of the bar.

The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to hisoffice, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment.This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in InRe Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted withapproval the following portion of the decision of theSupreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appea

(12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation whichexists between attorney and client, as well asbetween court and attorney, and the statutoryrule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,uniformly require that an attorney be a person of

good moral character. If that qualification is acondition precedent to a license or privilege toenter upon the practice of the law, it would seemto be equally essential during the continuance ofthe practice and the exercise of the privilege. Soit is held that an attorney will be removed notonly for malpractice and dishonesty in hisprofession, but also for gross misconduct notconnected with his professional duties, whichshows him to be unfit for the office and unworthyof the privileges which his license and the law

confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office andin no way directly bearing on his profession, hasnevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of theprivileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to hisacts. For us to do so would be as the SolicitorGeneral puts it recognizing "a double standard ofmorality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, andanother for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." Ifwe concede that respondent's adulterous relations andhis simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece didnot and do not disqualify him from continuing with hisoffice of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiringmoral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admissionto the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to

the moral depravity and character degeneration of themembers of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifyinghis stand that even if he admittedly committedfornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are notcontrolling. Fornication, if committed under suchscandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven inthis case, as to shock common sense of decency,certainly may justify positive action by the Court inprotecting the prestige of the noble profession of the lawThe reasons advanced by the respondent why he


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continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles,in that she helped him in some way finish his lawstudies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christiancharity" did not allow him to abandon her after hisadmission to the bar after almost 13 years ofcohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moraldereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, inorder to extricate himself from the predicament he foundhimself in, by courting the complainant and maintainingsexual relations with her makes his conduct morerevolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoralact. The noblest means he could have employed was tohave married the complainant as he was then free to doso. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations witha married woman and simultaneously maintainingpromiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moralperversion that can not be condoned. Respondent'sconduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for theprivileges of the legal profession. As good character isan essential qualification for admission of an attorney topractice, he may be removed therefrom whenever heceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the SolicitorGeneral exceeded his authority in filing the presentcomplaint against him for seduction, adultery andperjury, as it charges an offense or offenses differentfrom those originally charged in the complaint of January14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Basedupon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if theSolicitor General finds no sufficient ground toproceed against the respondent, he shall submita report to the Supreme Court containing his

findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon therespondent shall be exonerated unless the court

orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General.Answer of the respondent. If the SolicitorGeneral finds sufficient ground to proceedagainst the respondent, he shall file thecorresponding complaint, accompanied with allthe evidence introduced in his investigation, withthe Supreme Court, and the respondent shall beserved by the clerk of the Supreme Court with acopy of the complaint with direction to answer

the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in thelanguage of the foregoing rules requires the SolicitorGeneral to charge in his complaint the same offensecharged in the complaint originally filed by thecomplainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law providesthat should the Solicitor General find sufficient groundsto proceed against the respondent, he shall file thecorresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidenceintroduced in his investigation. The Solicitor Generaltherefore is at liberty to file any case against the

respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced

during the investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify hispetition to take the bar examinations in 1954 sinceaccording to his own opinion and estimation of himself atthat time, he was a person of good moral character. Thiscontention is clearly erroneous. One's ownapproximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral

character. Moral character is not a subjective term, butone which corresponds to objective reality. Moralcharacter is what a person really is, and not what he orother people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moranobserved: An applicant for license to practice law isrequired to show good moral character, or what he reallyis, as distinguished from good reputation, or from theopinion generally entertained of him, the estimate inwhich he is held by the public in the place where he isknown. As has been said, ante the standard of personaland professional integrity which should be applied topersons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by suchconduct as merely enables them to escape the penaltiesof criminal law. Good moral character includes at least

common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules ofCourt, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d]744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In ReDel Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess agood moral character at the time he applied foradmission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life withBriccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew himseemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not renderhim a person of good moral character. It is of no momentthat his immoral state was discovered then or now as heis clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking thename of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the

roll of attorneys.

In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,

Juan Sumulong for respondent.Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez byJudge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of oneyear, the case has been elevated to this court asprovided by law, for full investigation of the facts

involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate order.

The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of thePhilippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20,1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor GraciaCabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession ofcertain property, including twenty shares of the E.


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Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the PhilippineEngineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian ofthe minor, he borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch ofthe Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, toguarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge orconsent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, depositedwith the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank theshares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. OnApril 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement infavor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank,pledging, without the authority of the Court of FirstInstance of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, toguarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.

These are the facts, taken principally from thememorandum filed in this court on behalf of therespondent, which caused the judge of First Instance tosuspend him from the legal profession. To quote counselfor the respondent, "the misconduct of which therespondent in this case is guilty consist of havingpledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee

the payment of his personal debt."

Two questions present themselves for the resolution.The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippinesauthorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causesother than those enumerated in the statute? The secondquestions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or

disbarred for non-professional misconduct?

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that amember of the bar may be removed or suspended fromthis office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of thecauses therein enumerated. It will be noticed that ourstatute merely provides that certain cause shall bedeemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of anattorney's license. It does not provide that these shallconstitute the only causes for disbarment, or that anattorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other

reasons.

It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of thegrounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitationof the general power of the court in this respect. Evenwhere the Legislature has specified the grounds fordisbarment, the inherent power of the court over its

officer is not restricted.

The prior tendency of the decisions of this court hasbeen toward the conclusion that a member of the barmay be removed or suspended from his office as lawyerfor other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is sophrased as to be broad enough to cover practically anymisconduct of a lawyer.

Passing now to the second point as a general rule, acourt will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of itsofficers for misconduct alleged to have been committedin his private capacity. But this is a general rule withmany exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the pointthat the attorney has shown, through misconduct outside

of his professional dealings, a want of such professionalhonesty as render him unworthy of public confidence,and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legalbusiness of others. The reason why such a distinctioncan be drawn is because it is the court which admits anattorney to the bar, and the court requires for suchadmission the possession of good moral character.

The principal authority for the respondent is the case of

People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here itwas held, by a divided court, that where property isconveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professionaladvice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose ofraising a sum of money which he claims is due him fromthe cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells theproperty and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to hisown use, the relation of client and attorney not beingcreated by such trust, his conduct, however censurableas an individual occupying the position of a trustee, isnot such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him onmotion to the court to strike his name from the roll ofattorneys, but the injured party must be left to his properremedy by suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that

although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law willnot be disbarred for misconduct not in his professionalcapacity, but as an individual, there are cases formingan exception where his misconduct in his privatecapacity may be of so gross a character as to require hisdisbarment.

The Attorney-General relies principally on the case ofInre Smith ([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by

Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was said:

It is next contended that some of the chargesagainst Smith do not fall within the cause fordisbarment named in the statute. As will beobserved, the statute does not provide that theonly cause for which the license of an attorneymay be revoked or suspended are thosespecified in it, nor does it undertake to limit thecommon-law power of the courts to protectthemselves and the public by excluding thosewho are unfit to assist in the administration ofthe law. It merely provides that certain causesshall be deemed sufficient for the revocation orsuspension of an attorney's license. (Gen. Stat.,1901, sec. 398.) In the early case ofPeyton'sAppeal(12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this

statute is not an enabling act, but that the powerof the court to exclude unfit and unworthymembers of the profession is inherent; that "it isa necessary incident to the proper administrationof justice; that it may be exercised without anyspecial statutory authority, and in all propercases, unless positively prohibited by statute;and that it may be exercised in any manner thatwill give the party to be disbarred a fair trial anda full opportunity to be heard.' If there isauthority in the Legislature to restrict thediscretion of the courts as to what shall


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constitute causes for disbarment, or to limit theinherent power which they have exercised fromtime immemorial, it should not be deemed tohave done so unless its purpose is clearlyexpressed. It is generally held that theenumeration of the grounds for disbarment in thestatute is not to be taken as a limitation on thegeneral power of the court, but that attorneysmay be removed for common-law causes whenthe exercise of the privileges and functions oftheir high office is inimical to the dueadministration of justice . . . .

The nature of the office, the trust relation whichexists between attorney and client, as well asbetween court and attorney, and the statutoryrule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,uniformly require that an attorney shall be aperson of good moral character. If thatqualification is a condition precedent to a licenseor privilege to enter upon the practice of the law,it would seem to be equally essential during thecontinuance of the practice and the exercise of

the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will beremoved not only for malpractice and dishonestyin his profession, but also for gross misconductnot connected with his professional duties, whichshows him to be unfit for the office and unworthyof the privileges which his license and the lawconfer upon him.

We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by

the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound.

The relation of guardian and ward requires of theguardian the continual maintenance of the utmost goodfaith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. Thebond and the oath of the guardian require him tomanage the estate of the ward according to law for thebest interests of the ward, and faithfully to discharge histrust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped ourattention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez, askingthe court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera,he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado quesubscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (Theundersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian,etc.) which indicates that petitioner might not have beennamed the guardian in this particular case had he not at

the same time been a lawyer.

Counsel argues that the misconduct for which therespondent has been suspended by the lower court issingle and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only blotupon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the trialcourt has been extremely considerate of the respondent,and that were we sitting in first instance, we would

probably incline to a more severe sentence.

Judgment affirmed. So ordered.

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,vs.

ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with theCourt an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens'Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainantclaimed that respondent had been seeing his(complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house andelsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June1981, his wife left his conjugal home and went to livewith respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros,Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has been

living with respondent at that address.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a"Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denyingthe allegations of complainant. Respondentacknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeinghim but that she bad done so in the course of seekingadvice from respondent (in view of the continuouscruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant[complainant] against her), much as complainant'smother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice ofrespondent and of his wife and mother as to what to doabout the" continuous quarrels between affiant and hiswife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimesless serious) that the latter sustained from the former."

(Rollo, p. 8).

Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 torespondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made anumber of further allegations, to wit:

(a) That complainant'swife was not the onlymistress that

respondent had taken;

(b) That respondent hadpaid for the hospital and

medical bills ofcomplainant's wife lastMay 1981, and visitedher at the hospitaleveryday;

(c) That he had severaltimes pressed his wifeto stop seeingrespondent but that shehad refused to do so;


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(d) That she hadacquired newhousehold and electricalappliances where shewas living although shehad no means oflivelihood; and

(e) That respondent

was paying for his wife'shouse rent.

Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denyingthe further allegations of complainant, and stating that he(respondent) had merely given complainant's wife theamount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance duringher confinement in the hospital.

By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referredthis case to the Solicitor General for investigation, reportand recommendation. The Solicitor General's office helda number of hearings which took place from 21 October

1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant andrespondent presented evidence both testimonial and

documentary.

The Solicitor General summed up what complainantsought to establish in the following terms:

1. That respondent hadbeen courting his wife,Priscilla (tsn, May 12,1982, p. 9).

2. That he actually saw

them together holdinghands in l980 in Cubaoand Sto. Domingo,Quezon City (tsn, pp.13-15, May 12, 1983).

3. That sometime inJune, 1982, his wife lefttheir conjugal house atNo. 1 Lopez JaenaStreet, Galas, QuezonCity, to live withrespondent at No. 45

Sisa Street, BarrioTenejeros, Malabon,Metro Manila (tsn, pp.16- 17, May 12, 1983).

4. That while Priscillawas staying there, sheacquired householdappliances which shecould not afford to buyas she has no source ofincome (tsn, pp. 10-11,

Sept. 10, 1985, Exh.

'M', N' and 'Q').

5. That when Priscillawas hospitalized inMay, 1982, at the FEUHospital, respondentpaid for her expensesand took care of her

(tsn, pp. 18-20, June15, 1983). In fact, anincident betweenrespondent andcomplainant took placein said hospital (tsn, pp.5-8, Sept. 20, 1983,Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').

6. That an incidentwhich was subject of acomplaint took placeinvolving respondent

and complainant at No.45 Sisa Street, BarrioTenejeros, Malabon,Metro Manila (tsn, pp.8- 10, July 29, 1983;Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').

7. That again in QuezonCity, incidents involvingrespondent andcomplainant werebrought to the attentionof the police (Exhibits 'F

and 'G').

8. That Complainantfiled an administrativecase for immoralityagainst respondent withthe CLAO and thatrespondent wassuspended for one year(Exhibits 'D' and 'E').

(Rollo, pp. 33-35).

Respondent's defenses were summarized by the

Solicitor General in the following manner:

a) That Priscilla used tosee respondent foradvice regarding herdifficult relationship withcomplainant; thatPriscilla left complainantbecause she sufferedmaltreatment, physicalinjuries and publichumiliation inflicted or

caused by complainant;


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b) That respondent wasnot courting Priscilla,nor lived with her at No.45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,Malabon, Metro Manila;that the owner of thehouse where Priscillalived in Malabon was afriend and former clientwhom respondentvisited now and then;

c) That respondent onlygave P35.00 to Priscillain the FEU Hospital, asassistance in hermedical expenses; thathe reprimandedcomplainant for lying onthe bed of Priscilla inthe hospital which led totheir being investigatedby the security guards

of the hospital;

d) That it is not true thathe was with Priscillaholding hands with herin Cubao or Sto.Domingo Church in

1980;

e) That Priscilla boughtall the appliances in herapartment at 45 SisaStreet, Tenejeros,Malabon, Metro Manila

from her earnings;

f) That it is not true thathe ran after complainantand tried to stab him atNo. 1 Galas St.,Quezon City; that saidincident was betweenPriscilla's brother and

complainant;

g) That it is also not truethat he is always in 45Sisa St., Tenejeros,Malabon, Metro Manilaand/or he had a quarrelwith complainant at 45Sisa St., Malabon; thatthe quarrel wasbetween Priscilla'sbrother, Edgardo Miclat,and complainant; thatrespondent went thereonly to intervene upon

request of complainant'swife (see tsn, June 21,1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-

37).

The Solicitor General then submitted the following

F I N D I N G S

1. That complainant andPriscilla are spousesresiding at No.1 LopezJaena St., Galas,

Quezon City.

2. That respondent'swife was their 'ninang'at their marriage, andthey (complainant andPriscilla) consideredrespondent also their

'ninong'.

3. That respondent andcomplainant areneighbors, theirresidences being onehouse away from each

other.

4. That respondentadmitted that Priscillaused to see him foradvice, because of herdifferences with

complainant.

5. That Priscilla, in fact,left their conjugal houseand lived at No. 45 SisaSt., Barrio Tenejeros,Malabon, Metro Manila;that the owner of thehouse where Priscillalived in Malabon is afriend and former clientof respondent.

6. That Priscilla indeedacquired applianceswhile she was staying in

Malabon.

7. That incidentsinvolving respondentand complainant had

indeed happened.

8. That Priscillareturned to her mother's


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house later in 1983 atNo. 1 Lopez Jaena St.,Galas, Quezon City; butcomplainant wasstaying two or threehouses away in hismother's house.

9. That complainant

filed an administrativecase for immoralityagainst respondent inCLAO, whererespondent was foundguilty and suspendedfor one year. (Rollo, pp.37-39).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant'scharges of immorality had not been sustained bysufficient evidence. At the same time, however, theSolicitor General found that the respondent had not been

able to explain satisfactorily the following:

1. Respondent's failureto avoid seeing Priscilla,in spite of complainant'ssuspicion and/orjealousy that he washaving an affair with hiswife.

2. Priscilla's being ableto rent an apartment inMalabon whose owner

is admittedly a friendand former client ofrespondent.

3. Respondent's failureto avoid going toMalabon to visit hisfriend, in spite of hisdifferences withcomplainant.

4. Respondent's failureto avoid getting involved

invarious incidentsinvolving complainantand Priscilla's brothers(Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G',['G-1'] and ['I'])

5. Respondent's interestin seeing Priscilla in theevening when she wasconfined in the FEUHospital, in spite againof his differences with

complainant. (Rollo, pp.

39-40).

Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondenthad failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding anypossible action or behavior which may be misinterpretedby complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in thecomplainant's family," which behavior was "unbecomingof a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40).

The Solicitor General recommended that respondentAtty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice oflaw for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the record doesnot contain sufficient evidence to show that respondenthad indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife orwas otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this veryreason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspensionfrom the practice of law may be properly imposed upon

respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent

should be reprimanded for failure to comply with therigorous standards of conduct appropriately requiredfrom the members of the Bar and officers of the court. Asofficers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be ofgood moral character but must also be seen to be ofgood moral character and leading lives in accordancewith the highest moral standards of the community. Morespecifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the courtis not only required to refrain from adulterousrelationships or the keeping of mistresses

1but must

also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing thepublic by creating the belief that he is flouting those

moral standards.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMANDrespondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a memberof the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN himthat continuation of the same or similar conduct will bedealt with more severely in the future.

ENRIQUE A. ZALD

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