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DOI: 10.1177/0309816893050001031993 17: 25Capital & Class

Werner BonefeldCrisis of Theory: Bob Jessop's Theory of Capitalist Reproduction

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Bonefeld assessesand criticises Jessopsdialectic between

structure andstrategy. He arguesthat Jessop equatesclass struggle withcapitalist strategies,thus destroying theMarxian notion of acontradictoryconstitution of social

relations.

Werner Bonefeld

Crisis of Theory: BobJessops Theory ofCapitalist Reproduction

During the 1980s a new wordThatcherismenteredthe political lexicon. For many on the left Thatcherism cameto signify a broad-ranging programme of post-fordist trans-

formation. One of the major contributors to a post-fordistinterpretation of Thatcherism has been Bob Jessop. Hiscontribution has focused on the reformulation of statetheory. This reformulation aims at a conceptualisation of anintermediate concept of state: the fordist or post-fordiststates as distinctively different modes of capitalist regulation.The reformulation of state theory has been criticised byvarious authors,1 particularly for its disarticulation of structureand struggle. In this paper, it will be argued that Jessopsreformulation destroys the Marxian notion of social relationsin favour of a combination of system theory and conflicttheory.

In his analysis of Thatcherism, Jessop has made animportant and original contribution to the perennial theme ofMarxist controversy, namely that of the relation betweenstructure and struggle. This contribution is his dialecticbetween structure and strategy which he elaborated in his

theoretical work.2

Jessop explores his dialectic in terms ofstrategic selectivity of structures and the structurallytransforming role of strategies. In the simplest terms, Jessops


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26 Capital & Class50

approach is concerned with the mutual articulation ofstructure and strategy which for him transcends the polaritybetween approaches which privilege either structure orstrategy. The outcome of this articulation is historically

contingent.This article assesses and criticises Jessops dialectic betweenstructure and strategy. I shall argue that Jessop equates classstruggle with capital strategies and, thereby, destroys theMarxian notion of a contradictory constitution of socialrelations. The outcome, rather than supplying a clear andcoherent conceptualisation, is a theoretical maze. The casualtyin this is not only the critical dimension of Marxism but also

Jessops own approach which, as will be argued, is tautological.

Jessops approach reifies structures by dismissing classstruggle. It might appear that all that is at issue is thedefinition of concepts with little practical importance. Thatis not so. The issue is an understanding of the driving forceof capitalist development. Is the replacement of Fordism byPost-Fordism driven forward by the objective tendencies ofcapitalist development, or by a process of constant, hard-fought struggle? If the former, we are confronted with aclosed structural-functionalist world which we are powerless

to change. If the latter, we are faced with the reality of aconstant struggle (see Holloway, 1988; 1991). The theoreticalsuppression of class struggle leads to a deterministic under-standing of social development in which obeisance may bepaid to class struggle, but what really counts is the dynamictrajectory established by the inescapable lines of capitalsprojects. The thrust of the assertion that capitalist develop-ment follows some inescapable lines of development is thatan understanding of the struggle-to-exploit is not of primaryimportance. Instead, it becomes more important to under-stand the institutional logic of capital because capitalistdomination is realised through an emergent, impersonal andquasi-natural network of social connections. (Jessop, 1991p.173). The result is that the focus of analysis shifts from aconceptualisation of class struggle to a conceptualisation ofthe structural framework of struggle.

This paper is in three parts. The first part introduces

Jessops notion of an accumulation strategy. I shall then turnto his dialectic between structure and strategy and finally tothe theoretical implications of Jessops approach.


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Crisis of Theory 27

The Notion of Accumulation Strategy

Jessops approach is premised on the notion that social realityis constituted by the confluence of multiple chains of causality

generating from different social sub-systems such as theeconomic and the political. The link between differentsubsystems is established theoretically by the method ofarticulation. According to this method, any single event isdetermined by a distinctive conjuncture of different causalprocesses. As Jessop (et al, 1988 p.53) puts it, historicalphenomena are best analysed as a complex resultant ofmultiple determinations. Social events cannot be understoodby privileging one determination at the expense of others.

Jessop seeks thus to overcome the structuralist emphasis onthe economic as determining in the last instance. For example,the political and the economic are thus understood to be bothdetermining and the causal processes stemming from thepolitical and the economic engage with each other in acontingent way. This is the basis for Jessops notion ofdeterminism without reductionism, that is, without theeconomic reductionism of structuralist Marxism. In order tograsp the dynamic of social change, one has, according to

Jessop, to follow the strategic line of capital in the face ofvarious dilemmas, risks, uncertainties and complexities,emergent strategies, trial and error techniques etc. (ibid., p.8).He claims that the interplay of the laws of capitalist develop-ment with the hegemonic struggle of different capital logicsmelts different social systems together, so permitting acorresponding social cohesion of ideological, political andeconomic patterns.

Jessop advocates the Poulantzarian distinction between atheory of the capitalist mode of production and the theory ofthe capitalist state region. Such an approach to the capitaliststate denies an internal relation between the political and theeconomic on the basis of the labour theory of value (as in

Jessop, 1982). In the face of criticism, Jessop sought to makethis good by supplying a link between the economic and thepolitical.3 The link is the concept of accumulation strategy(Jessop, 1983). Jessop supplies a l ist of different

accumulation strategies which range from Hitlers Gro-raumwirtschaft to Japans rich country and strong army andto Germanys Modell Deutschland (ibid., p.94). The list is


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arbitrary because of his failure to integrate it into atheoretical concept. His attempt to incorporate the labourtheory of value into his argument is conspicuous for itseclecticism. As argued by Psychopedis (1991 p.189), an

accumulation strategy is understood as a subject which, inJessops [1983] own words, must take account of the circuitof capital, international conjunctures, the balance of powerand which must consider the relation between the classes,etc. (In other words, we have here a reappearance of theHegelian idealistic subject so disliked by the structuralists.).

A successful accumulation strategy stands above classrelations because it takes into account different modes ofcalculation and gives a particular coherence and political

direction to the multiplicity or forces operating in the realworld of competing subjects. An accumulation strategy givesrise to a mode of regulation in which the multiple determin-ations of the real world combine. He calls a mode ofregulation a contingent necessity.

The term accumulation strategy is used as a means ofarticulating the contingent unity between the economic andthe political. Since there is no substantive unity to the circuitof capital nor any predetermined pattern of accumulation

(Jessop, 1983 p.91), sustained accumulation requires an extrapower in order to impose regulative mechanisms. This poweris the state. The pattern of accumulation is determined by theaccumulation regime adopted by the state. However, nounique accumulation strategy is available to the state, butrather a range of alternative strategies, expressing differentclasses and fractional interests and alliances. Any viableaccumulation strategy has to reconcile the pursuit of sectionalinterests with the sustained accumulation of capital. Thedetermination as to which accumulation strategy will beadopted by the state requires an analysis of political conflictsthrough which strategic issues are resolved (Jessop, 1983).

Jessop sets himself the task of showing the way in which theformal character of the state unfolds in specific historicalconjunctures. This task is bound up with an understanding ofthe structural selectivity of the political terrain. For example,if it is the case that the political has its own logical causal

processes and distinctiveness, it becomes important, as arguedby Ling (1991), to show how the political can remain opento changes in its environment whilst at the same time


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Crisis of Theory 29

retaining its closed-ness from that environment. However, ifthe political shapes the social environment how can it retainits distance to causal mechanism stemming from, forexample, the economic? Jessop supplies three overlapping

answers. Firstly, the state stands above a plurality ofcompetitive conflicts and class struggles and so provides thefunctional integration of a regime of accumulation. Thestate operates, secondly, on the basis of a strategic selectivity.This means that the state favours some demands andmarginalises others. As a result, the state is both open to, andclosed from, its environment. This is the basis for Jessopscharacterisation of his work as a strategic relationalapproach. Lastly, Jessop offers his dialectic of structure and

strategy as a means of integrating social relations into theanalysis.

The Dialectic between Structure and Strategy

For Jessop, Marxist theorising is not predicated on the realmovement of class antagonism and the constituting

movement of class struggle but, rather, on the contention thatthe real world is a world of contingently realised naturalnecessities (Jessop, 1988 p.8). The notion of contingencyallows Jessop to define a structurally complex world ofsystems and institutions within which social actors pursuetheir interests. Capitalist development is said to be dependentupon the actions of competing social subjects who occupy aparticular position vis--vis structure and whose actionscomprise distinct modes of calculation, patterns of strategicconduct and forms of struggle. Jessop uses the phrase thedual perspective of structural determination and classposition to thematise this. The restructuring of a mode ofarticulation is determined by class and non-class strugglesand these struggles are in turn determined by the strategicselectivity which is incorporated in structures. The limitsimposed upon the field of struggle by the facilitating andconstraining operation of structures entail that the dynamic

of capitalism is a complex outcome of two intersectingmechanisms. The causal mechanisms of the capitalist systemgenerate a potentiality for change which constrain and


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facilitate the strategies of different social groups. Secondly, thetransformation of a mode of articulation depends onsubjective mechanisms like hegemonic projects which pushthe system from, for example, Fordism to Post-Fordism. The

success of any competing strategy depends on itscomplementarily to all other relevant strategies within theoverall structural ensemble (Jessop, 1988 pp.42 and 44).Thus, structures dominate. Their inherent strategicselectivity decides which strategy is allowed to reproduce thesystem. Structures connote a system of causal mechanisms

which provide social spaces for human activities. While theseactivities are vital for the reproduction of structures, thestructural framework is not limited to human activities.

The world of structures is said to be complex because of itsdivision into different regions, each having its own causalpowers and liabilities. Further, these regions are said to involvehierarchies, with some regions emergent from others butreacting back on them. Each region is itself stratified,comprising not only a level of real causal mechanisms andliabilities but also the levels on which such powers areactualised and/or can be empirically examined (ibid.). Jessoptakes for granted the separation of social relations into

distinctive structural systems and proliferates these structuresby dividing basic structures into stratified subsystems.

Jessop does not deny that there is an internal relationbetween different social systems. However, and in contra-distinction to approaches predicated on the notion of anantagonistic constitution of social relations, Jessop thematisesthis unity in terms of a positivist social theory. The unitybetween different systems is founded on the notion ofnatural necessities. As Jessop (1988 p.8) puts it, the real

world is a world of contingently realised necessities. Jessopavoids giving an answer to the question as to the constitutionof these necessities. The necessities are assumed to benatural necessities. The determination of natural remainsunexplained. And yet, the notion of natural necessities is ofcrucial importance for what Jessop describes as his realistontological approach (see Jessop, 1988).4 This approach ispremised on the idea that the real world of capitalism is

subject to change through the sui generisoperation of differentregions whose articulation is dependent on, but not limitedto, the action of social subjects. Reality is thus made up of


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Crisis of Theory 31

deep structures which condition and make possible theevents we observe in everyday experience (Lovering, 1990p.39). Social actions are thus deeply structured. Jessopincorporates Critical Realism into his approach in an attempt

to contextualise the non-necessary correspondence (Jessop,1986) between different social systems. His approach focuseson the constraints imposed on human agency by definitestructural contexts. He sees social strategies and processes asconstrained by the strategic selectivity embodied in structures(Jessop, 1988).5

As will be argued below, Jessops real is t ontology ispredicated on the notion that the real defies analysis. Beforeexplaining this further, however, Jessops dialectic between

structure and strategy needs to be clarified. Jessop has toaccount for the fact that the capitalist system moves. Thisleads him to introduce, on an empirical level, the notion ofmany subjects (Jessop, 1988/1991). We are thus confronted

with the notions of, on the one hand, a sui generisoperation ofdifferent regions (Jessop, 1986), and, on the other, of aplurality of empirically observable subjects. The notion ofmany subjects is obscure because it is premised on theconcept of natural necessities. These necessities exist

independently from human relations (Jessop, 1988). Thepositivist concept of natural necessities connotes a structure

which determines social relations. The concept naturalnecessities seems to be conceived of in terms of systemproperties which are contingently reproduced: The sui generisoperation of the system produces social effects which definetheempirically observableactions of different social actors.The relative success or failure of a strategy is seen as dependingon unrecognised structural conditions of action.6

Jessops pluralist reformulation of the Marxist notion ofclass is not uncommon in the Marxist tradition. In the daysof the DIAMAT-style Marxism of the Stalin years, socialdevelopment was seen as being determined by technologicaldevelopment. The irony of Jessops approach is that hisupdating of Marxism reintroduces an understanding ofhistory in terms of an adaptation of social relations to thefunctional requirements of the productive forces.7 While

Jessop proclaims against such an interpretation of his views,his dualism between natural necessity and many subjects iscomplicit in the reintroduction of old-style orthodoxy.


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Closure andPositivism

Je ssops approach dwells on the idea of intermediateconcepts.

8These are seen as being necessary if the gap

between the generic level of abstract laws and the analysis ofspecific historical conjunctures is to be bridged. What is

taken for granted here, is a separation of the generic from thespecific, since, otherwise, there would be no gap to bridge.However, the net result of this reformulation is notsufficient. This is because the conjunctural approach has toidentify key variables, such as technological developmentfrom mass assembly lines to new technology or shiftingarticulations of the economy and politics, which makeeverything clear. The identification of key variables borderson determinism and by doing so marginalises class. For

example, the state-system can adopt specifically fascist orauthoritarian or bourgeois-liberal or fordist or post-fordistforms. The idea of form as a species of something moregeneric has underpinned both DIAMAT-style conceptions ofgeneral laws which have to be applied to specific socialinstances and the conjunctional approach which focuses onintermediate concepts to bridge the gap between the abstractlevel of general laws and their concrete application. In

Jessops approach the concrete is not seen as a mode of

existence of social relations but, rather, as a specificarticulation of more general laws of natural necessity. Theconsequence of this understanding is that the approach canidentify static structures only because human relations appearmerely as a social effect of structural laws. Further, theidentification of key variables not only reinforces the idea ofstructural laws but provides, also, a sociology ofinterconnected features without being able to specify thetheoretical relationships between the various elements of thesupposed concrete articulation of structures in, for example,the form of Post-Fordism. Theory becomes non-binding andarbitrary. This is because the dualist separations of afetishised worldthe separations of struggle from structureand of one region of society from anotherare not calledinto question but taken for granted, as the principle of socialthought. The separation between structure and struggleentails a deterministic conceptualisation of capital in that

capital becomes a structure of inescapable lines ofdevelopment which stand above social relations. Jessopsapproach is characterised by the attempt to derive social


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of empirical factors which make capitalist developmentcontingent and relative. This, however, means that, contraryto Jessops intention to sensitise concrete analysis to the realstructures which constrain agency and strategy, the real world

of social conflict is beyond theorys grasp. In Jessop, realityconstitutes itself as an arbitrary, empiricist combination ofabstract laws (Psychopedis, 1992 p.2). It seems that thecontingent character of abstract laws defies an analysis of theempirical conditions of the capitalist exploitation of labour.

According to Jessop one can, nevertheless, reveal tendentialcausal mechanisms whose outcome depends on specific initialconditions as well as on the contingent interaction amongtendencies and countertendencies (Jessop, 1988 p.9). For

example, in his analysis of Thatcherism, Jessop (et al., 1988p.9) asserts that there are many Thatcherisms. This view iscorrect with regards to Jessops approach. The notion of manycauses and an infinite number of factors goes hand-in-hand

with the idea that reality is open to different interpretations(see Ling, 1991). However, Jessop destroys the interestingnotion or many Thatcherisms by declaring that Thatcherismhas adopted a strategic line. If there are many Thatcherisms,how can one depict Thatcherisms strategic line? A strategic

line evolves from the strategic vision of Thatcherism (Jessop etal., 1988 p.11). This vision has given direction and coherenceto the development of the British state during the 1980s. Thenotion of a multiplicity of diverse factors is furtherundermined by Jessops economic determinism. He argues thatThatcherisms vision is determined economically. This isbecause one needs to have an understanding of the decisiveeconomic nucleus of hegemony in order to see the structuralsource of power (ibid., p.16). Jessop contradicts himself. Onthe one hand he declares that there are many determinationsand that one cannot privilege one at the expense of others and,on the other hand, he insists that the economic nucleus ofpower is decisive.

However, the results of capitalist reproduction do notfollow the unfolding of economic laws because these laws needto be activated by human agency (Jessop, 1988). Thus, whilethere are causal mechanisms, the actual results of these

mechanisms depend on empirical conditions which, as wasreported above, defy conceptualisation. Jessop denies thatthere is a single objective logic of capitalist development


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Crisis of Theory 35

Pluralism,Determinism andSociologism

which transcends all particularities (Jessop, 1988/1991). Hededuces from this denial the separation of abstract theoryfrom real results, that is, from empirical data. He insists thatthe development of capitalism is always mediated through

historically specific institutional forms, regulatory institutionsand norms of conduct, such as the wage relations, forms ofcompetition, monetary emission, the state, the internationalcommercial and financial system and the norms of conductand modes of calculation which correspond to theseinstitutional forms, etc. (ibid., p.151). He fails to show howthis list can be integrated conceptually and how it can beapplied to concrete analysis.

Jessop understands the Marxian notion of capitalist socialrelations as a means of articulating different laws of motion.The distinction between different laws is, as argued byPsychopedis (1991), already problematic since it destroys thenotion of the inner relationship between different phenomena.The laws of capitalist accumulation are conceived of as astructural framework which determines the empiricallyobservable class conflict in the real world. Jessop argues that

capitalist domination is realised through an emergent andimpersonal and quasi-natural network of social connections.This network is reproduced by human agents and, accordingto Jessop, could never be understood without referring to theiractions. He insists, however, that it would be wrong toconceive of class struggle as the starting point because classstruggle is one mechanism amongst others in and through

which capital accumulation is analysed. The understanding ofclass struggle as a mechanism of capitalist reproduction callsfor objective sociological criteria with which to establish theclass relevance of social antagonism (Jessop, 1991). The classcharacter of social subjects is defined in terms of their relationto the value form. For Jessop, the key to deciphering thestructural framework of class antagonism is the concept ofsurplus value (ibid., p.148). It is the dominance of the valueform in a system of generalised commodity production whichis seen as determining the conceptual identity of classes, the

nature of class relations, the forms of class struggle and thetotalising dynamic of class struggle and competition withinthe capitalist mode of production (ibid.).


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For Jessop, the value form is better understood as a meta-form (ibid.). This notion is founded on his genus-speciesdistinction. The value meta-form describes the structuralframework within which different forms of value, such as

productive, financial, commercial capital, compete with eachother. Their competition unfolds within the circuit of capitalwhose structure is abstractly defined by the value meta-form.Within the circuit of capital we find, according to Jessop,different logics of capital. These logics connote differentaccumulation strategies of competing capital fractions. Thevalue meta-form does not fully determine the course ofaccumulation but only the institutional logic and directionaldynamic of capitalism, in itself indeterminate. It needs thus to

be overdetermined by an economic class struggle in which thebalance of class forces is moulded by many factors beyond thevalue form itself (Jessop, 1983 p.90). The value form isunderstood not as a process in and through which socialrelations appear in the form of relations between things, but asa thing-like structure which determines social relations. Thisinversion underlies the empiricism of Jessops approach,according to which it is contingent institutional forms andpolitical conflicts which determine the development of value

relations and the course of accumulation. (Clarke, 1991 p.49fn.24). The value-meta form defines the coherence of thecapitalist mode of production, a coherence which is achieved,in practice, through the contingent forces of social conflict inthe real world. The value meta-form is seen merely asconstraining, externally, the room for manoeuvre of differentcapital logics. The conception of the value form as a valuemeta-form is tautological. This is because the determination ofthe value meta-form in the real world of contesting socialforces presupposes the practical existence of the value meta-form, and vice versa. In Jessops approach, the value meta-formis seen as external to its own determination.

Jessop destroys an understanding of the capital-labourrelation as an exploitative relation because he construes classantagonism as external to the trajectory dynamic ofcapitalism. Both capital and labour are conceived as humanbearers of structural laws which stand above the social

conflict. By putting his argument in this way, Jessop treatscapital and labour as both victims of structural laws and ascreative powers. However, this is not to say that the notion of


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Crisis of Theory 37

the real power (Jessop, 1988) of competitive struggle andclass conflict is conceived of in terms of an equilibriumbetween the social contestants. The combination ofstructural laws and sites of contest reintroduces capital as a

transhistorical subject whose dynamic logic is theoreticallypresupposed and whose realisation is empirically observable.Within the relation of capital and labour, the class struggle issubordinated to the basic forms and dynamics of capital asthe dominant force (bergreifendes Subjekt) (Jessop, 1991p.165). What this, however, means is that the social conflictis understood merely in terms of a theory of capitalregulation. As Jessop puts it, the multiplication ofinstitutional forms and regulative mechanisms actually

create significant barriers to a general attack on the capitalrelation by fragmenting and disorganising opposition andresistance and/or channelling it along particular paths whereit threatens less harm to the core institutions of capitalism.(Jessop, 1988 p.43). Class conflict does not as such createthe totality nor does it give rise to [capitalisms] dynamictrajectory (Jessop, 1991 p.154). This is because theconceptual identity of classes is given by the capital relationitself rather than being constrained by classes which shape the

capital relation (ibid.). The capital relation stands aboveclass relations. For Jessop, it would be more accurate toconclude that class antagonism arises because of the inherentquality of the capital-labour relation than that this relation isantagonistic because of the contingent occurrence of classstruggle and/or competition (ibid., pp.1501). He thusinsists that capital is not an antagonistic social relation andthat the antagonism of classes arises only in the real world ofmultiple determinations. As a consequence, the concept ofclass dissolves into the pluralist notion of interest-groups,each of which relates to emergent structural ensembles in itsown way. The Marxist notion of class antagonism is thusdestroyed in favour of a sociological conception ofempirically observable modalities of a multitude of socialconflicts. What sense can be made of Jessops conceptcapital-labour-relation? The capital relation defines thenatural necessity of capitalism in terms of capital as an ideal

subject. Jessop thus treats the structural selectivity ofstructures and capitals projects as equal. The understandingof capital as an bergreifendes Subjektmeans, fundamentally,


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that the articulation of causal mechanisms in the real world ofmultiple determinations is achieved by the subjectivity ofcapital. While the world is conceived of as a world ofcontingently realised natural necessities (Jessop, 1988), the

notion of contingency relates only to the ability of capital toachieve sustained reproduction on the basis of a successfulaccumulation strategy.

According to Jessop (1985; 1998/1991), the dynamic ofthe real world of capitalism is achieved through a process

without a subject. For Jessop, this does not mean that thereare no active subjects. On the contrary, any natural necessityof capitalism must be reproduced through social practices

which are always (and inevitably) def inite social practices,

articulated more or less closely as moments in specific modesof regulation (Jessop, 1988 p.34). Jessop seeks to resolve thecontradiction between the notion of a process without asubject and the subjectivity of capital (capital is the subject:

Jessop, 1991 p.150) by differentiating capital, as mentionedabove, into a series of logics. Each of these logics is incompetition with the others, permitting a pluralist strugglebetween different capital interests. There is no logic ofcapital but a series of logics with a family resemblance,

corresponding to different modes of regulation andaccumulation regimes (ibid.). The family resemblancementioned by Jessop connotes the notion of capital as thesubject. The different logics of capital entail a contest betweenalternative accumulation strategies seeking to establish aspecific regime of accumulation within the limits of thevalue meta-form. The dual perspective of structuraldetermination and class position (Jessop, 1985 p.344)connotes the power of social subjects to modify the abstracttendencies of capitalism in and through a stable articulationbetween the invariant elements of capitalism and the variantelements emergent in different specific forms such as Fordismand/or Post-Fordism (see Jessop, 1988 p.34). The value meta-form plays the role of an external economic structure whichpassively defines the limits within which social subjects andhistorical contingency can determine the course ofaccumulation. Jessops approach fails to explain how social

conflict and structures interrelate. His equation of classstruggle with capitalist strategies is an unsatisfactory responseto this problem.


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Crisis of Theory 39

Conflict Theoryand Empiricism

According to Jessop, a mode of regulation is a contingentnecessity. Jessops theoretical project is to show in concreteanalysis how structures constrain social conflict. Structures areseen as explicit reference points for strategic calculations and as

comprising partly recognised and partially unacknowledgedsets of structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities(Jessop, 1988/1991). In order to gain purchase on the systemicconditions of action, Jessop distinguishes four structural levels.These levels are, first, the empirically observable regularities insocial relations; second, the basic forms of social relations

which together comprise a social formation; third, the networkof institutions and organisations comprising a social order; and,lastly, the structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities

provided by structural development for social actors (Jessop,1988 p.38). According to Jessop, the first level, i.e. theempirically observable regularities in social relations, does notoffer much purchase on the systemic conditions of action. Thisis because it does not provide direct evidence concerning thebasic structures as they result from changing combinations ofreal mechanisms and contingent circumstances. The secondlevel, i.e. the basic forms of social relations, is too abstract togive much purchase on strategic conduct. The third level, i.e.

the network of institutions, gives purchase on strategic conductbut needs to be specified further so as to bring out its strategicrelevance. It is the fourth level which is crucial. Structures needto be examined relationally, that is, in terms of their structuralconstraints and conjunctural opportunities which emerge fromthe strategic orientation of social forces (ibid.).

The strategic selectivity of structures impinges on socialforces through a set of conjunctural moments. Thesemoments involve elements which can and elements whichcannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents). Accordingto Jessop (1988 p.38), the same structural element can operateas a structural constraint for some agent(s) at the same time as itpresents itself to other agent(s) as a conjunctural opportunity .In order to assess the strategic relevance of social agents orgroups of agents, one has to concentrate, according to Jessop, onthe need of capital. The need of capital has to be assessedstrategically in relation to complex conjunctures rather than

formally in terms of an abstract, purely economic, circuit ofcapital (Jessop, 1988/1991 p.155). How can one define theneed of capital in conjunctural terms?


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Theory: An endin itself

Since the concrete cannot be theorised (see above), theneed of capital can only be assessed in terms of a preformedconception of the natural necessities of the capitalist system.In order to understand the realisation of capital reproduction

in the real world, Jessop seeks to assess the need of capital, aneed which is already presupposed abstractly. As aconsequence, Jessops notion of the action of social subjects isnot only predicated on a sort of individualistic reformulationof the Marxian notion of class struggle but also, and as amatter of entirely distinct theorising, on a sort of idealistreformulation of capital as a transhistorical subject. All socialsubjects are seen as mere participants in the global capitalistsubject. Social conflicts are thus seen as facilitating forces

which reproduce the capitalist system. The social conflict isconstrained by, and forced to reproduce, capital as thetranshistorical subject. Social conflict is thus construed as acreative force which articulates structural opportunities inpractical terms and so realises the dynamic direction andinstitutional logic of capital in the real world. Jessopsdialectic between structure and strategy is construed in termsof system theorys conflict theory. The social conflict isconstrued in terms of its functionality, that is, as a means of

reinforcing the status quo. Conflict is understood as a creativemeans of balancing and hence maintaining a society. It helpsto create and modify norms, and assures the continuance ofthe system.

However, even if one were to accept Jessops approach, itremains unclear how the social body of pluralist struggles canbe transformed into a definite strategy. The dictum that wemust examine the structural selectivity inscribed in structures(Jessop, 1988/1991 p.159) remains incomprehensible. Howcan one understand structural selectivity? Jessop tackles thisproblem by stressing that it would be wrong to reduce astructural category to, and/or derive it from, a strategiccategory, and to derive a single strategy from a given structure(Jessop, 1988 p.41). This is because structural categoriesbelong to the realm of the system which is disconnected from

the concrete realm of social practices and because there arealways competing strategies (ibid.). Further, the relationshipbetween different structural elements have only a relative unity


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Crisis of Theory 41

(ibid.). Lastly, the outcome of the dialectic between structureand strategy is always contingent (ibid). What, then, for

Jessop, constitutes selectivity? It seems that there is no answerto this question. This, however, means that theory loses its

truth criteria. Jessop insists that structural constraints andconjunctural opportunities emerge from the strategicorientation of social forces (Jessop, 1988 p.38). In turn,however, this means that structural selectivity is defined byand remains at the mercy ofthe contingently emergingtransformation of social reality. This further implies that thenotion of structural selectivity defies conceptualisation andthat it can be observed only empirically. As in Critical Realism(see Gunn), Jessops argument comprises a vicious circularity

of presuppositions. He presupposes structural selectivity asconditioning the action of social subjects and then hepresupposes that structural constraints emerge from thestrategic conduct of social subjects. Each is supposed to makesense of the other. In other words, the real world lies outsidetheorys grasp. Jessops realist ontology turns against itselfinasmuch as it offers no concept of the real.

Jessop supplies a theoretical maze. On the one hand, thereis no single cause, whilst, on the other, the economic is

determining. On the one hand, Jessop isolates differentphenomena from the social whole, and, on the other, he seeksto reconnect phenomena in an external way. On the one hand,

Jessop proposes the separation of social existence into differentstructural regions, and, on the other, he seeks to articulate thespecific interconnections of these regions. On the one hand,

Jessop claims that there are underlying laws of motion, and,on the other, he introduces subjective mechanisms for theselaws actualisation. Jessop urges that the real is indeterminablesince it is mediated by an infinite number of factors. At thesame time, he insists that capital is the subject. Jessopsunderstanding of capitalist social relations is not only basedupon a theoretical maze but also on a tautological descriptionof social reality. First of all the outward appearance of reality istaken for granted (multiple causes), and then it is in the lightof this outward appearance of reality that social developmentis assessed. By attempting to grasp the development of

capitalism in this way, his analysis proliferates structures whichare not only static and fetishised but whose theoretical statusremains unclear.


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If one were to follow Jessop, all theory would be able toachieve is to say that the real world is changing within aframework of structurally defined parameters whose concreteimplications defy conceptualisation. According to Jessop we

know that there are different subjects whose activities are moreor less coordinated, whose activities meet more or lessresistance from other forces, and whose strategies are pursued

within a structural context which is both constraining andfacilitating (Jessop, 1988 p.43). We know also that there aresignificant barriers to a general attack on the capital relation(ibid.), that there is a real scope for class struggle and that thesuccess of the nth strategy depends on its complementarity toall other relevant strategies within the overall structural

ensemble (ibid., pp.42, 43). This body of knowledge, however,is insubstantial because of the complex web of contingencies.

Any conceptualisation of the real is doomed to fa ilurebecause the real world is a world of discovery and ofcontingently arising chance discoveries and of an infinitenumber of factors. Regulation is consequently defined as astudy of the complex process of mutual adjustment andaccommodation within and among different institutions(Jessop, 1988/1991 p.152). Jessops research project degenerates

into an empirical study of institutional intersections; and aresearch project lacking a conceptual framework is acontradiction in terms.

Conclusion

Approaches such as Jessops, which are predicated on thedisarticulation of structure and struggle, involve no internalconnection between the political and the economic on thebasis of the labour theory of value. The central methodologicalfault of such approaches is the separation of the social wholeinto different regions each of which is seen as having its formalstructure, its own laws and logic. Such approaches cannot takeaccount of fundamental historical developments in andthrough the category of labour, because labour plays no role inthe internal logic of the different regions. Labour is separated

from capital and is reduced to an empirical factor of anhistorical development which is both contingent and relative.Jessops approach is a common response to the methodological


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Crisis of Theory 43

misunderstanding of structuralism. He aims at giving greaterweight to historical analysis by combining abstract theory witha theory of historical developments. The combination of theconcrete with an abstract theoretical structure involves the

modelling of social phenomena on to pre-formed conceptswhich for their part are placed at the mercy of the historicalcontingency they seek to render intelligible. In other wordsthe concepts stand above historical developments. An analysis

which takes the fragmented character of bourgeois society forgranted and which seeks to trace the causal interconnectionsof such fragments cannot grasp their historical developmentbecause it refuses to risk the methodic assertion of the real inand through abstraction.

An approach such as Jessops, turning as it does uponstructural integration, is an approach which runs the risk ofconceptual collapse. This is because such an approach cannot

justify its concepts. For example, the assumption that the realworld is divided into different regions raises the question ofthe interdependence, that is, the structural adequacy ofdifferent regions such as the political. Firstly, to what is thepolitical adequate; secondly, what determines the adequacy ofthe political; thirdly, what is the criterion with which to define

adequacy? Only three solutions are possible. Firstly, theadequacy of the political is measured in terms of its outputconcerning the requirements of the economic. Such a solutionopens the way for an economistic Marxism, concentrating onthe economic as the determining structure, thus making thepolitical merely attendant upon the inescapable lines ofeconomic development. The second solution is to introduce anew set of concepts with which to justify the first level ofconcepts. However, the new set of concepts needs to be

justif ied itself, leading to the introduction of new conceptsand so on. This solution reproduces the problem it claims toresolve through an infinite regress of metatheories (see Gunn,1989).

The third solution is to abnegate a conceptual under-standing in favour of a descriptive sociology of correspondingfeatures among different subsystems. Such a solution sees theeconomic and the political as autonomous systems which

generate causal interrelations through a sui generisoperation oftheir internal laws. As a consequence, theory must identifyreciprocal elements which exist in different subsystems


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(e.g. mass production and demand management and theideology of social consensus). No explanation can be given ofhow a reciprocal matrix of mutually supporting elementsdevelops. The only possible explanation is to declare such a

matrix to be a contingent articulation among differentautonomous systems. This solution interprets historicaldevelopment in terms of its more or less close approximationto a model whose elements are not conceptualised butpresupposed. The problem of justifying concepts is therebyavoided only because the historical development is understoodto be contingent, thus allowing the concepts to be contingentand arbitrary themselves. Further the concepts can be readily

justif ied on the basis of the real: it is what it is. Since, for

example, we can observe the hegemonic project ofThatcherism, the articulation between the political and theeconomic can be seen as a contingent articulation because it isreal in practice. In the event, the real is explained by whatexists, hence tautology. First a model or norm (e.g.Thatcherism) is abstracted from disparate historicaltendencies, and then it is in the light of this model that thesignificance of these same tendencies is assessed. The realityof alleged historical tendenciese.g. Post-Fordismfinishes

up by being evaluated according to the model which wassupposed to be derived from them. Jessop in other wordspresupposes what he intended to show. The fundamental

weakness of theories which aim at understanding the structuraladequacy of social forms is that they see contradictions only interms of functional inadequacy. Such an approach destroys theMarxian understanding according to which structure andstruggle, and concept and history, stand or fall together. Theclass struggle does not simply take place within the forms; theforms are themselves a moment of the class struggle and are atissue in class struggle, as capital and the working class confrontthem as issues at stake in social reproduction. The develop-ment of forms can be understood only on the basis of aninternal relation between structure and struggle.10 It seemsclear that Jessops approach entails a systematic attempt todestroy the conceptual links which permit an analysis of themode of existence of class antagonism.

The political charge against Jessops work is that it fetishisessocial relations as relations of things. The conceptual chargeagainst him is that he does so through a distinction between


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Crisis of Theory 45

Acknowledgement

Notes

structure and struggleeach of which, however, is supposedto render the other term coherent. Structure is seen asescaping determinism because it is qualified by agency andagency is seen as escaping voluntarism because it is qualified

by structural constraint. However the intelligibility ofstructure is seen as deriving from agency and vice versa.Jessops dualism is thus sustained only through a tautologicalmovement of thought. Adding together, eclectically, twofallacious positions hardly amounts to a theorisation whereineither one of them can be redeemed.

_________________________

I would like to thank R. Gunn, K. Psychopedis and L. Hills for theircomments. The usual disclaimers apply.

_________________________

1. See the collection of articles edited by W. Bonefeld andJ. Holloway 1991.

2. See Jessop, 1983; 1985; 1986; 1988; 1988/1991; 1991. I shallnot refer to Jessops recent (1990) contribution to state theory.This work is a collection of his earlier work. For an assessment of

Jessop (1990) see Ling (1991).3. The following part relies on Clarke (1991) and Psychopedis

(1991).4. The notion realist ontology is taken from Bhaskar. For a seminal

critique on Bhaskar see Gunn (1989; 1991 a,b; 1992).5. The notion of strategic selectivity derives from Offe (1972).6. As in Rational Choice Marxism (see Elster, 1987 esp. ch.1),

subjects operate and calculate rationally and individually within aframework of unrecognised rules which they seek to transformthrough strategic conduct so as to maximise their fortunes.

7. On the connection between technological determinism and thepost-fordist debate see Pelez and Holloway 1990, and Clarke1990.

8. The following section is taken from the introduction to Bonefeld,Gunn and Psychopedis [eds.] 1992a.

9. Voluntarism and determinism are theoretically complementary,both are expressions of the separation between class struggle andcapital. (Holloway, 1991 pp.170/1; see also Bonefeld1987/1991; 1992; Clarke 1983; 1991).

10. See the contributions to the collection of articles edited byBonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis 1992a; 1992b._________________________


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Crisis of Theory 47

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__________ (1992) On Contingency and Indeterminacy. Paperpresented at conference on Class Struggle and Subjectivity Today:The Constitution of Marxian Categories. University of Paris VIII,January.

_________________________

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