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Caribbean Mass Migration:

Which observable factors predict the level of migrant flow once a mass migration event begins?

Giovanni Bruna

&

Anabelle Devarez

Florida International University

Authors Note

Giovanni Bruna, School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University

Anabelle Devarez, School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University

This research was completed for the ISS 6926 Capstone course in the Professional Master

of Arts in Global Governance program.

Inquiries concerning this article can be addressed to either of the two authors.

Contact: gbrun001@fiu.edu, adeva001@fiu.edu

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Figure 1. Map of Cuba

Source: (wwp.greenwichmeantime.com)

Figure 2. Map of Haiti

Source: (wwp.greenwichmeantime.com)

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Figure 3. Haitian Migrant Routes: Old and New

Source: The Wall Street Journal

Figure 4. Example of a Direct Cuban Migrant Smuggling Route to the U.S.

Source: http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs1403.html

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Figure 5. Example of Alternative Cuban Migrant Routes

(through Central America and Mexico; ultimate destination still being the U.S.)

Source: The Washington Post

Figure 6. Example of Haitian Migrant Route through the Bahamas

Source: The Miami Herald

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Table 1.

NUMBER OF HAITIAN AND CUBAN MIGRANTS INTERDICTED AT SEA, 2010 - 2013

JAN-JUN ‘10

JUL-DEC ‘10

JAN-JUN ‘11

JUL-DEC ‘11

JAN-JUN ‘12

JUL-DEC ‘12

JAN-JUN ‘13

JUL-DEC ‘13

JAN-MAR ‘14

# OF HAITIANS 595 1003 536 649 538 250 288 529 445 # OF CUBANS 171 268 431 767 677 478 574 961 488 Source: U.S. COAST GUARD

Table 2.

NUMBER OF LANDINGS OF HAITIAN AND CUBAN MIGRANTS ON U.S. SOIL (MAINLAND, PUERTO RICO, MONA ISLANDS) FROM FY2004-PRESENT

FY 2004

FY 2005

FY 2006

FY 2007

FY 2008

FY 2009

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2013

FY ’14 -

# OF HAITIANS 157 156 270 179 59 75 101 44 130 710 375 # OF CUBANS 1251 2739 3714 4098 3003 530 423 796 428 518 331 Source: U.S. COAST GUARD

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Abstract

Political instability, economic downfalls, and natural disasters are just some of the many events

that can trigger a mass migration episode in the Caribbean. What are less known are the factors

and variables that may facilitate predictions of the level of migrant flows once a mass migration

event has initiated. Therefore, this paper explores specific observable variables. These variables

are divided into acute and chronic. The acute variables include: U.S. migration policies towards

Cubans and Haitians, quality of maritime transport vessels, access to communication networks,

common migrant profiles, and weather conditions. The chronic variables include: main

debarkation points, distance to travel to the intended migrant destinations, new routes, smuggling,

and brain drain.

Keywords: mass migration, Cuba, Haiti, routes, flows, interdiction, smuggling

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Caribbean Mass Migration:

Which factors predict the level of migrant flow once a mass migration event begins?

Purpose/Focus

The ultimate goal of this capstone research paper is to provide U.S. Southern Command

an in-depth analysis tool with which to examine conditions in Cuba and Haiti during a potential

future mass migration. This paper aims to assist the aforementioned agency in adequately

anticipating and responding to such a scenario. By providing noteworthy observations from the

extensive research conducted, U.S. Southern Command can then further delve into some of the

findings brought forth in order to prepare the appropriate rescue operations at sea and refugee

camp set-ups on land, were another mass migration event to occur in the Caribbean.

Methodology

In attempting to answer the research question at hand, different methods were employed.

Naturally, existing literature on Caribbean migration was heavily researched. Sources included

academic journals, scholarly articles, social science databases, and a wide selection of news

reports. In addition, a wide-range of information from individuals with much expertise on the

subject matter was obtained. Not only was a diverse set of Florida International University

migration-expert faculty members contacted and interviewed, but even high-profile individuals,

such as the director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, were

interviewed face-to-face. Equally helpful was e-mail communication and phone interviews with

current and former officials from the United States Coast Guard. Furthermore, responses and

insight from local NGOs and the Haitian Consulate in Miami were aimed to be incorporated.

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Limitations

In general, the major difficulty encountered was contacting several NGOs in South

Florida. Although they were reached out to numerous times, no responses were ever obtained.

Also, a major impediment to carrying out further research was the obvious restrictions placed on

obtaining classified information. This made acquiring more in-depth and quantitative data

collection for this capstone project much more challenging.

Definition

According to the International Organization for Migration’s Glossary on Migration, mass

or collective migration is defined as “the sudden movement of large numbers of persons” (2004,

International Organization for Migration (IOM)).

Introduction

“The mass migration of peoples, particularly that of the movement of political refugees

and persons fleeing war and starvation in the developing world, has been largely a twentieth

century phenomenon, encompassing new and increasingly complex issues for the world

community” (Chamberlain, 1983, p.93). As will later be discussed, the final decade of the

twentieth century saw three significant mass migration events in the Caribbean. While

environmental degradation, the violation of basic civil rights and liberties, chronic

unemployment, governance issues, and underdeveloped economies can all trigger a mass

migration episode, the primary reason such large-scale migration movements occur is political

instability.

Political instability can be characterized by institutional weakness, endemic corruption,

the threat of military coups, and a lack of democratic freedoms. These constitute the decisive

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political factors behind recent mass migrations in the Caribbean. However, the focus of this

paper is to identify the observable factors that can help predict the level of migrant flows once a

mass migration is already underway.

Regional Focus

When studying and analyzing mass migration episodes, it is highly useful to focus on the

Caribbean as a critical point of reference. Its waterways represent major passages through which

thousands of migrants try to illegally enter the United States each year. As noted by Robert

Watts in the Homeland Security Affairs journal, “Maritime migration in the Caribbean basin has

always been a fairly consistent phenomenon…As economic and political conditions worsen in

the region, it is likely that Caribbean maritime migration will increase, and thus is a growing

concern within the U.S. government. The threat is tremendously variable and diverse…Unlike

migration on land, the sea presents unique challenges to both migrants and law enforcement

activity. For migrants, transport on the water is slow and incredibly hazardous, making death or

injury a very real possibility (if not likely)” (Watts, 2008).

Given that the three major islands that comprise the Greater Antilles – Cuba, Hispaniola

(comprised of Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and Jamaica have a total population of around

35 million, it is only logical that the U.S. government is concerned with monitoring this region of

the world and including it under its radar of national security issues. Whereas Mexican migration,

the prime example of undocumented migration into the U.S., has come to a halt since that

group’s net migration levels are now at zero, Caribbean migration has not subsided (Passel, Cohn,

Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). The Caribbean region and its mobile population have proven that miles

of perilous waters do not deter. Not only is the Caribbean basin losing thousands of its

inhabitants per year, it is also an increasingly popular corridor for migrants from Latin America,

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Asia, and Africa whose ultimate destination is the United States as well. Finally, in discussing

the issue of Caribbean mass migration, threat vectors such as migrant country of origin, the

distance to travel from the home country (i.e. Haiti) to get to the host country (i.e. U.S.), and

whether migration is propelled by the individual (a.k.a. individual and/or humanitarian) or by

profit (smuggling-based) must all be taken into account.

Country: Cuba

Popularly referred to as the Pearl of the Antilles, Cuba’s geo-strategic location represents

a singular situation. For starters, it has had icy relations with Washington for over 50 years due

to Cold War ideological differences. The Missile Crisis, an economic embargo, and virtually no

diplomatic relations all characterize the dynamics between the two neighboring countries.

Relevant to migration, the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act was replaced by the “wet foot/dry foot”

policy which was instituted by the U.S. government in 1995, immediately after the mass

migration situation the previous year. It stipulates that Cuban migrants who are able to physically

reach U.S. shores will be granted asylum and allowed to remain in the country. Upon having

stayed for one year and one day, they are then able to apply for permanent residency. Thereafter,

they can obtain citizenship if they wish to do so.

While this policy significantly reduced the number of Cuban migrants attempting to reach

the U.S., it produced the emergence of smuggling networks as will later be discussed. These

networks are an important alternative means of illegal migration from the Communist island-

nation. Regardless if migration is humanitarian or smuggling-based, Cubans travel through

various routes such as the Florida Straits, the Bahamas, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,

Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Puerto Rico in order to ultimately make their way into

the U.S. Even though Cuba has a high UN human development ranking, Cubans consistently

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seek expanded economic and civil liberties abroad. Given the decades-long established Cuban

communities in Little Havana and Hialeah in Miami, it is common that a constant flow of

newcomers is assisted in adjusting to life in American society.

Country: Haiti

Haiti, being the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, provides a steady source of

maritime migrants. These migrants risk their lives on poorly-built sail boats and freighters that

frequently end up overloaded and maneuvered by inexperienced helmsman. Once they are

interdicted at sea, Haitian migrants are usually sent back to Haiti because they are not viewed as

political refugees under U.S. immigration policy. Rather, they are considered economic migrants,

seeking a life of better opportunities abroad. In trying to get to the U.S., Haitians either travel

through the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Turks and Caicos, or traverse the Mona Passage

into Puerto Rico before continuing to Florida in most cases. Moreover, while most Haitian

migrants comprise humanitarian (self-motivated/individual) migration, smuggling is also

becoming a larger issue.

Haitian migration to the U.S., as many other migration flows coming from the developing

world, is identified by a chain migration pattern. Chain migration involves a couple of

individuals acquiring legal status in the U.S., settling in a household, and subsequently recruiting

relatives and friends. This migration pattern prompted the development of such iconic Miami

neighborhoods as Little Havana and Little Haiti. Similarly, as will later be discussed, chain

migration is critical to encouraging high numbers of tertiary-educated migrants to illegally enter

the U.S. Given “the continuation of a devastating political, environmental, social, and economic

situation (including a 40 percent unemployment rate) in Haiti guarantees an unbroken chain

migration, particularly to the United States…” (Wah, 2013, p.60). In other words, what has

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historically developed among Cuban and Haitian migrants is a herd mentality. Once one migrant

has effectively established himself/herself in the U.S., friends and family in the homeland are

informed on how best to go about carrying out a similar maritime voyage to the developed world.

Once in the host country, migrants search for the benefits and opportunities that their compatriots

were able to acquire. These typically include housing, education, and healthcare.

Historical Background

In the last three decades, the U.S. has experienced three mass migrations. They all

emanated from two countries in the Caribbean: Cuba and Haiti.

Mariel Boatlift

From April 1st until September 28th, 1980, the U.S. confronted its first mass migration

emergency. Given permission by Cuba’s then President Fidel Castro to depart from Mariel Port,

an estimated 124,776 undocumented Cubans traveled by a fleet of mostly U.S. vessels in clear

violation of U.S. laws. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, the makeup of this group was: 60%

men, 22% women, and 18% minors. In all, the number of vessels assisted by the U.S. Coast

Guard totaled 1,387 and the maximum number of Cubans interdicted in one day was 3,784

(www.uscg.mil). It is clear that a political decision by Cuba’s top leader resulted in the mass

exodus of Cubans to Florida.

ABLE MANNER

Starting on January 15th 1993 and ending on November 26th 1994, this operation oversaw

a total of 25,177 Haitian migrants interdicted in the body of water located between Haiti and

Cuba called the Windward Passage. On one day alone, precisely the 4th of July of 1994, a

maximum of 3,247 Haitians were interdicted. In all, over 6,000 cutter days and 14,000 flight

hours were spent throughout this operation, involving 17 cutters, 9 aircraft, and 5 U.S. Navy

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ships (www.uscg.mil). As in Cuba, politics was the trigger in Haiti. The period between the 1991

coup d'état until the reestablishment of a new government in 1994 saw the dramatic increase in

departures of Haitian migrants traveling north to Florida.

ABLE VIGIL

While interdicting and assisting Haitian maritime migrants during Operation Able

Manner, the U.S. Coast Guard was simultaneously involved in Able Vigil from August 1994

until September 1994. A total of 30,224 Cuban migrants were interdicted at sea during this

period. In one day alone, the maximum number of interdicted Cuban migrants was 3,253.

(www.uscg.mil).

Most Recent: Op Able Sentry

Mass migration is an ongoing challenge for U.S. national security. U.S. Coast Guard

Lieutenant Justin Fellers informed of a more recent incident called Operation Able Sentry.

Taking place from February to March 2004, it “consisted of 905 Haitians migrants recovered;

and consumed 269 cutter days, over 830 flight hours (23 total cutters and 9 aircraft)” (J. Fellers,

personal communication, February 13, 2014).

Analysis of U.S. Coast Guard Statistics

Contributing greatly to the overall work of this paper was the incorporation of invaluable

information from two U.S. Coast Guard primary sources. One is a current lieutenant and the

other a former official. Lieutenant Justin Fellers was able to assist in acquiring necessary

statistics, imagery, and historical background information regarding mass migration in general

and migrant interdiction in particular. Meanwhile, former USCG official Jose Lantigua discussed

certain aspects of the migrants’ maritime journey including routes, motives, financing methods,

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and expectations. Modes of communication with these two individuals consisted of emails and

phone interviews.

Thus, when looking at Table 1 on page 5 of this paper, it becomes clear that there was a

spike in the number of Haitian migrants from January to December 2010, when compared to the

following two years. This reflects the almost obvious departure of injured and displaced Haitians

following the massive 7.0 Richter scale earthquake at the start of that year. While certainly

nowhere near the amount needed to be classified as a mass migration scenario, the 1,598

Haitians that were interdicted at sea in 2010 was a considerably higher figure than those for 2012

and 2013, when this group’s number did not reach 1,000. By contrast, there was a sizeable

increase in Cuban migrants interdicted at sea in 2011, 2012, and 2013 when compared to 2010.

For example, in 2011 and 2012 around 1,200 were interdicted; that was an increase of over 750

migrants from the previous year. Additionally, in Table 1, one can observe that from July to

December of 2013, there was a notable increase in Cuban migrants interdicted at sea. “Fueling

the spike was a brew of factors: hikes in U.S. visas issued to Cubans; rumors that U.S. benefits

for Cuban migrants might be cut; …Cuba’s easing of its migration rules on Jan. 14… (Chardy

and Tamayo, miamiherald.com).

Then, Table 2 shows the number of landings of Cuban and Haitian migrants on U.S. soil

(mainland, Mona Island, and Puerto Rico) between 2004 and the first three months of 2014. Here,

it is clear that there was a major increase in Cuban migrants traveling and successfully landing at

their intended destination. Specifically, as is evidenced by the information in the tables, there

was a notable spike in Cuban migration during 2006 and 2007. At this time, there was much

political uncertainty due to Fidel Castro’s illness. Much of the island’s population was unaware

of what to expect regarding the country’s leadership. Upon Castro’s resignation as head of the

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Cuban Communist Party in 2006, migrant smugglers living in Florida began using high-speed

boats to pick up Cubans.

According to former USCG Lantigua, the smugglers commonly make a stopover at Cay

Sal Bank, a series of Bahamian islands 50 miles northeast of Cuba, before continuing to drop off

the migrants at the less patrolled areas of Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach (Jose Lantigua,

personal communication, March 27, 2014). In many instances, these migrants are unscrupulously

left stranded just feet away from the shoreline and the Coast Guard then rescues them. The

former Coast Guard official also mentioned that those Cuban migrants that were interviewed

upon being interdicted or processed to stay in the U.S. once they had reached land, were aware of

the civil benefits that they could obtain. He further explained that many Cubans enter the

Dominican Republic through the border city of Dajabon, remain in the northern cities of

Santiago and Moca for a few days, and are then transported to La Romana before making the

voyage to Puerto Rico. Lantigua noted that the whole trajectory is financed by family and

organized by Cuban and Dominican smugglers.

As far as the Haitian migrants are concerned, they are also receiving

monetary assistance to carry out their trips. For this migrant group, Lantigua commented that

most Haitians discuss political instability and encouragement by family members in the U.S.

(family reunification motives) as main drivers for engaging in maritime migration. For example,

Radio Haiti was responsible for spreading news of the extension of Temporary Protective Status

for undocumented Haitians residing in the United States, immediately after the 2010 earthquake

occurred. Also, he noted that since the Dominican Republic temporarily opened its border to a

flow of injured and displaced Haitians from the same earthquake, there wasn’t a mass migration

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of Haitians traveling to the United States, as may have been anticipated by national security

analysts and border enforcement agencies.

Observable Variables

The following variables can assist the U.S. government in anticipating the approximate number

of migrants that may be interdicted at sea or taken care of in refugee camps once they land on

U.S. shores, most likely in the Florida Keys or even in core urban areas such as Miami, during a

potential mass Caribbean migrant influx in the future.

Acute Variables

Acute variables are temporary yet intense. They are not necessarily constant, meaning

they can change and evolve. These variables are serious contributors to increasing maritime

migration flows. They include:U.S. migration policies towards each group, the quality of

maritime vessels, access to communication networks, common migrant profiles, and weather.

U.S. immigration policy and its implications for Haiti. Haiti’s proximity to the U.S.

mainland allows its population to consider escaping the unfortunate political and social

conditions on the island. However, theses travels aren’t always the safest, given that travelling by

sea with poorly constructed boats represents a grave danger. As a result, it is evident that migrant

interdiction and mandatory detention centers are key components of U.S. immigration policies

towards Haitian migrants (Wasem, 2010, CRS Report for Congress).

There has always been a debate within the United States government whereby certain

members of Congress have criticized the mandatory detention of Haitians who attempt to enter

the United States without proper documentation. This group bases its argument on humanitarian

grounds, given the dire socio-economic conditions of the Haitian people. Conversely, there’s an

opposing group that argues that providing a more lenient treatment towards Haitians would

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increase the likelihood of a mass migration episode occurring (Wasem, 2010, CRS Report for

Congress).

In 1981, the Reagan administration reacted to the mass migration of asylum seekers by

establishing a program to interdict suspicious boats across the Straits of Florida. This agreement

was made in conjunction with Haiti’s dictator Jean Claude Duvalier. It authorized the U.S. Coast

Guard to search private Haitian vessels that were navigating the high seas and interrogate their

passengers. Since then, Haitians have been considered economic migrants. Nevertheless, this

definition of Haitian migrants was challenged by the coup d’état against former President Jean-

Bertrand Aristide in 1991 (Wasem, 2010, CRS Report for Congress).

While the United States took the aforementioned stance, other countries in the

international community such as Honduras, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela,

classified Haitian migrants as political refugees. Soon after the coup d’état against

democratically-elected Aristide, the United States temporarily began to treat them as asylum-

seekers as well. This immediately contributed to an increase of Haitians fleeing the island-nation.

As a result, the 1992 George H. W. Bush administration, citing the sizeable surge of incoming

Haitians, reverted to previous legislation by ordering the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept any

Haitian boat and return their occupants without any interrogation process (Wasem, 2010, CRS

Report for Congress).

In 2002, the former United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)

concluded that illegal mass migration by means of maritime transportation threatened the United

States’ national security, by diverting the Coast Guard and other agencies’ critical resources from

their domestic duties. The United States government firmly believes that providing Haitian

migrants with an easy pathway to citizenship could cause an immediate increase in migration

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flows once again, and could eventually become a mass migration scenario. Despite these fears,

the U.S. government decided to halt deportations against Haitians in January 2010, due to the

deadly earthquake previously mentioned. During the following eighteen months, Haitian

nationals qualified for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), in order to legally work and send

remittances that would help reconstruction efforts (Wasem, 2010, CRS Report for Congress).

It is evident that the relationship between governments influences the occurrence of

illegal migration movements in the Caribbean basin. When discussing Haiti, one can hypothesize

that the perceived United States immigration policy is a crucial factor that contributes to whether

or not a person will risk his or her life by attempting to enter the United States. Equally,

evidence has shown that political unrest, such as the 1991 coup, causes a spike in migration

flows. This factor combined with a return to more lenient migration policies from the United

States, as was briefly the case during the coup d’état, is seen as a determinant of a mass

migration episode. Maritime mass migration would either accelerate or diminish depending on

the migration policy towards Haiti. Ultimately, this paper seeks to argue that some possible

thresholds that may trigger mass migrations are the chronic variables mentioned below.

An interesting case for further examination and in support of the previous statement is the

2010 earthquake. Despite the crisis, the natural disaster didn’t cause a mass migration. As

already mentioned, the Dominican Republic’s national government offered humanitarian

assistance by briefly opening up its borders and allowing injured and displaced Haitians to

receive assistance during the immediate aftermath of the disaster. This serves as evidence that

politics play a bigger role in the causes of a mass migration. In addition, the constant vigilance of

the United States Coast Guard along the Florida Straits has forced Haitians to seek alternative

routes to escape their country. Ultimately though, reaching the United States is the primary goal

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even when deportation policies are harshest or when pathways for TPS are unclear or nonexistent.

U.S. immigration policy and its implications for Cuba. Cubans who enter the United

States benefit from an amnesty that allows them to stay in the country and grants them the status

of political refugees (2006, FAIR). United States immigration policy towards Cuba has its roots

in the Cold War’s ideological confrontations. Although the policy considers these migrants as

political refugees, a survey of Cuban male head of households living in Miami showed that only

half of Cuban migrants suffered either imprisonment, fear of imprisonment, prosecution, and loss

of jobs. Most of them were merely opposed to either the Cuban government or towards

communist ideology itself (Mitchell, 2001, Western Hemisphere Migration).

In 1995, the United States enforced the “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy. The policy

established that any illegal Cuban migrant that successfully reaches a U.S. shore (mainland or

territory) is immediately granted refugee status while any that is intercepted at sea would be sent

back. In effect, this policy is an amendment to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (Morley, 2007,

washingtonpost.com). Ultimately, the United States views this policy as a way of controlling or

avoiding a mass migration event from the island by instituting an established arrangement for

migration between the two countries. The policy was implemented through an agreement

between the governments of both countries. Under the law, the Cuban government agreed not to

take action against those individuals who were interdicted at sea subsequently sent back to the

island (Morley, 2007, washingtonpost.com). The consequences for those who are deported to

Cuba are less known. Some advocacy groups opposed to the Cuban government claim that

employment, housing, and food rationings are all subject to adverse effects. However, the Cuban

government does not completely approve of the “wet foot, dry foot” policy since it views it as a

major incentive for Cubans to risk their lives by attempting to reach U.S. soil.

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Thus, in March 2014, the United States and Cuba started a new set of talks regarding the

long-standing immigration policy. The Cuban government believes that the “wet-foot, dry foot”

policy doesn’t promote an orderly and safe migration because it encourages illegal departures

and irregular arrivals of Cuban citizens in the United States (Frank, 2014, Reuters). However, the

most challenging situation that could cause a future mass migration from Cuba would be a

political transition. If unexpected internal Communist Party altercations arise, the “wet-foot, dry-

foot” policy might become a facilitator of a mass migration episode. A regime collapse, such as a

military coup or mass public protests that turn violent, coupled with U.S. asylum guaranteed by

the existing policy, could very well push Cubans to leave en masse. Although the Cuban

government counts on tools to restrain these protests, a counter-revolutionary process can indeed

occur. Either way, once the Castros pass, tensions are likely to arise between different groups

vying for power (Maybarduk, 2011, Changing Cuba). As history has shown, only when the

Cuban government changes its policies towards migration or chooses to encourage and even

promote illegal migration, will a spike in flows in occur. In the event that social conflicts arise on

the Communist island, its physical proximity to the U.S. mainland will likely continue to be a

determining factor of potential mass migrations. Although the United States immigration policy

towards Cuba is completely different than the policies towards the rest of the hemisphere, the

truth is that it has served its purposes. Two decades have passed and the policy has avoided

another mass migration. In effect, the policy that controls the flows of illegal Cubans to the

United States, by deporting anyone interdicted at sea, has prevented a scenario reminiscent of

1980 and the early 90’s. This proves that official mandates and propaganda in Cuba are factors

that lead to spikes in migration.

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Quality of Vessels. Unfortunately, Haitians tend to migrate on poorly-crafted and rickety boats.

In recent years, there have been numerous incidents where overloaded vessels have capsized or

simply broken apart near the Bahamas or South Florida’s coastline. As noted in a local South

Florida newspaper, “one of the more dramatic human smuggling cases … was off the Palm

Beach county cast. In May 2009, a boat carrying about 30 Haitian immigrants capsized off

Boynton Beach, killing 10 people, including a pregnant woman (Campbell, 2010, sun-

sentinel.com).

As is evident from the U.S. Coast Guard website’s image collection concerning this issue,

a typical Haitian fishing boat or sailing vessel is made out of wood. Wood is naturally the

cheapest material available on most Caribbean islands used to construct the vessels. While the

majority of Haiti’s land cover has been deforested for charcoal, it is still not uncommon for

groups of Haitian men to construct wooden ships by sawing and hacking with machetes and

picks along western coast villages such as Leogane. These 30-foot long vessels are subsequently

purchased by smugglers for up to $12,000 dollars and taken to northern Haiti to search for

potential passengers (Cotto and Daniel, 2013, huffingtonpost.com).

Other types of transportation used by Haitians include freighters. While a freighter might

be somewhat of an improvement when compared to the sailing vessels, they are still equally as

dangerously overloaded with migrants; sometimes carrying capacity swells with as many as

hundreds of migrants travelling side by side. Furthermore, it is important to mention that most

Haitian vessels traveling to the United States are not properly equipped with life vests, nor do

they have a qualified helmsman on board to successfully steer and operate the vessel.

Likewise, information from the U.S. Coast Guard website shows Cubans embarking on

all kinds of transportation including rafts, small boats, vessels, pleasure crafts, “go fast”

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smuggling vessels, and even cars and trucks crafted usage at sea. Although there is a wider range

in the forms and quality of vessels that Cubans use to try to reach the U.S., this migrant group

has equally suffered from capsized vessels and missing or dead migrants at sea. In addition, from

data acquired from the U.S. Coast Guard, it appears that Cubans are willing to travel on their

vessels more frequently throughout the year. Cuban migrant flows are steady, while Haitians

appear to engage in less-frequent voyages. However, the latter migrant group departs on the

voyages with larger numbers of passengers onboard.

Telephone, mobile cellular, and Internet users. As of 2012, Cuba had 1.2 million

landline telephones, 1.68 million cell phones, and 1.6 million Internet users. Although mobile

cellular services are expanding, only 10 per 100 inhabitants have a cell phone (CIA World

Factbook). By contrast, in Haiti, there are 50,000 landline telephones, 6 million cell phones, and

1 million Internet users. Given the introduction of low-cost GSM phones into Haitian society,

cell phone density there reaches 40 per 100 persons (CIA World Factbook). As these figures

suggest, while a greater number of Cubans have access to the World Wide Web, more than three

times as many Haitians own a cell phone.

Similarly, the World Bank’s statistics on internet users shows that in 2012 only 25.6 out

of 100 persons had internet access in Cuba. This is clearly an increase from the 14.3 persons in

2009. By contrast, only 10.9 out of 100 people had internet access in Haiti by 2012. This figure

was only 8.1 in 2009. The data clearly shows that despite Cuba being ruled by a dictatorship, the

internet is more accessible to Cuba’s population than it is to Haitians in Haiti (World Bank,

data.worldbank.org)

As a result, the use of these technologies is critical for each migrant population group, as

it enables them to communicate with established communities in the host nation, such as Little

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Haiti or Little Havana in Miami, view ways of life and possible opportunities in the host nation,

and ultimately have the chance to arrange the payment of a risky voyage with a local or regional

smuggler. Due to the importance and expansive reach of telecommunications, in December 2013,

“…the U.S. Coast Guard …released a public-service television ad, in English and Creole, aimed

at discouraging Haitians from venturing out to boat. Featuring Haitian community leaders in

South Florida and footage of migrants leaping off a capsized vessel, the spot concludes (by

stating), ‘Thousands try, hundred die. Do not take to the sea’” (Campos-Flores, 2014,

online.wsj.com). Nevertheless, this strategic initiative may not work as effectively in Cuba and

Haiti as it has in the Dominican Republic. In Cuba, the telecommunications sector is controlled

entirely by the state, while in Haiti this infrastructure is, at best, dilapidated.

Migrant Profile. Dr. Duany, Director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida

International University, provided insight into some of the prominent characteristics of the

Cuban migrant since the early 1990s. He stated that the most consistent profile over this time

period is characterized by white males, aged 18-44, having anywhere from an

agricultural/services professional background to a formal university degree. Furthermore, as

already mentioned, these Cubans typically leave the island from the Western provinces, mainly

around Havana and Matanzas (J. Duany, personal communication, February 26, 2014).

Regarding Haitians, most come from the northern areas of the country. Samuel Constant,

Director of the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami, estimates that 70% of the Haitians in South

Florida originated from: La Gonave, Port-de-Paix, Anse Rouge, Le Borge, Jean Rabel, and

Gonaives (Boswell, 1982, p.19). Moreover, political sociologist Dr. Hintzen mentions that the

“working class and underclass” are the largest constituents of Haitian migration, while “mostly

anybody” in Cuba makes up the groups of illegal migrants (personal communication, March 29,

24

2014). In addition, he says that Haiti is a country much more open to smuggling networks than is

Cuba, where greater state vigilance and harsher emigration laws pervade. Ultimately, Dr.

Hintzen suggests that family reunifications and by extension the welcoming assistance offered by

the groups’ established migrant communities coupled with the attractiveness of the United States

in terms of economic opportunities, would likely result in a spike in migration from both Haiti

and Cuba.

Furthermore, during an interview for the Associated Press, Etienne Brutus, a 26-year-old

unemployed father of three, said “I don’t have work, I don’t have a room, I’m hungry” (Coto and

Daniel, huffingtonpost.com). He said this referring to his life in Haiti and in response to why he

had been seeking to travel to Puerto Rico. However, he was caught leaving the Dominican

Republic’s southeast coast along with tens of other fellow Haitians in April 2013. He concluded

by saying “If I can get to Puerto Rico, amen. If I can get a room, a job and papers, I’m leaving”

(Coto and Daniel, huffingtonpost.com). Mr. Brutus is a prime representation of the thousands of

young, unemployed Haitian males who decide to leave their country through illegal maritime

voyages.

Weather. In regards to weather, migrants do have knowledge of when to embark on their

maritime journeys. In fact, U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Justin Fellers mentioned that “there is a

relationship between weather conditions and migrations. In general, the summer months (March-

October) see greater migrant activity than the winter months. During this period, the weather is

periodically more favorable to taking to the sea, although migrants are aware of local weather

trends and specific storms or hurricanes can certainly reduce migrant activity. However, the

hurricane season is actually busier than during the winter” (J. Fellers, personal communication,

February 13, 2014). Given that many years can pass without any major storm passing through

25

the Caribbean basin, it is easy to see that “hurricane season” will not prevent migrants from

traveling.

Precisely, hurricane season, which spans the months of June to November, does not

minimize illegal maritime movement in the Caribbean. Even though there are occasions in which

Caribbean nations must frequently face the severe impacts of precarious wind and rainfall as a

result of hurricanes, it will ultimately be determined by migrants, on an individual (personal)

basis, whether to stay behind and engage in reconstruction efforts in the home country or take the

risk of emigrating illegally under such precarious weather conditions.

Chronic Variables

Chronic variables are more constant, long-term, and recur frequently. They are more

stable and have the capacity to have greater adverse effects. These variables are the ones most

likely to increase the levels of migrant flows once a mass migration has initiated. They include:

new migrant routes, the main embarkation points and distances to intended destination, the brain

drain factor due to the socio-economic attractiveness of the United States, and the issue of

smuggling.

New Routes. Halfway through last year, hundreds of Haitians had made their way

through the Dominican Republic and into Puerto Rico. Fewer numbers of Cubans also followed

the same path. The logic behind the new route is to safely and successfully make it to the U.S.

island territory in order to then fly onward to Miami or New York. While migrants must show

some form of identification at the airport in Puerto Rico, no passport is required to travel to the

U.S. mainland. A smuggler can transport a Puerto Rico-bound Haitian for $1,000 to 1,500

dollars. Once in Puerto Rico, Haitians can easily get their hands on fake driver’s licenses and

stolen Social Security numbers from the island’s vibrant black market economy.

26

Since the U.S. Coast Guard has increased patrols by means of Hamilton class cutters,

Miami is no longer as easy to reach directly from Haiti as it used to be. Thus, Haitians have been

attempting to reach Puerto Rico through the perilous Mona Passage. By contrast, Cubans have

“…only to reach Mona Island, a tiny speck in the middle of the Mona Passage, to qualify for

asylum under the U.S. government’s ‘Dry Foot’ policy (Quintanilla, 2005, latimes.com). As of

2005, most of the yolas, vessels departing the Dominican Republic towards Puerto Rico, carried

about 100 migrants. Noting that there had been an increase in women and children traveling

during the 2003-2005 years, “officials estimate only 1 in 4 yolas arrives safely in Puerto Rico;

the others are either intercepted or lost at sea, their passengers presumed drowned (Quintanilla,

2005, latimes.com).

In fact, a total of 352 Haitian migrants were captured by U.S. officials between

November 2012 and April 2013. They were either en-route, on the island, or near the island

(Coto and Daniel, 2013, huffingtonpost.com). Depending on how effectively U.S. and Dominican

Republic law enforcement agencies contain the advancement of Puerto Rico-bound Haitians and

Cubans in the coming months will determine whether this new route will consolidate itself as the

new major maritime highway into the continental United States. So far, it appears that smugglers

of Haitians and Cubans have no limits when it comes to finding any path possible into the U.S.

Due to the heavier patrolling by the U.S. Coast Guard, information that gets to Haiti and Cuba

comes from those migrants who have successfully entered the U.S. and also from those that have

been interdicted at sea and were subsequently deported. This information combined with the

smugglers’ profit motives result in new routes springing up throughout the Caribbean and

Central and South America.

Main embarkation points, distance to travel to these points, and distance to travel to

27

intended destination. In Cuba, some of the major ports of migrant departure include Havana,

Mariel, and Matanzas. It is from these western cities and provinces that most migrants decide to

embark on the journey directly toward the Florida Straits or to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. A

total of 103 miles separate Havana, Cuba’s capital, from the Florida Keys; about 360 miles

separate Matanzas from Cancun. In fact, migrants departing from Varadero are even closer to

Key West and Marathon than Havana is to those two Florida Keys. It is from this point that Cuba

is a mere 90 miles away from Key West.

Once Cuban migrants reach the Florida Keys, they are either picked up by family

members living in Miami or they board a 3-hour bus ride northward towards family reunification.

By contrast, when Cubans are dropped off near Cancun, Mexico, they must then typically make

their way northward through land and cross the border into Texas or Arizona and continue

onward to Miami. Although a much longer trajectory, it may be the case that Cubans prefer land

migration because of the perceived fewer dangers when compared to maritime migration.

In Haiti, the main ports of departure include the capital Port-au-Prince, Leogane to the

west of the capital, Cap-Haitien to the north, and Tortue Island and Port-de-Paix to the northwest

(Fielding et al., 2006). The distance from Leogane, and by extent Port-Au-Prince, to Tortue

Island is 107 miles. Meanwhile, the distance from Cap-Haitien to Ragged Island, Bahamas is 283

miles; 223 miles separate Port-Au-Prince from Providenciales, Turks and Caicos; and around

231 separate both Cap-Haitien and Port-de-Paix from Crooked Island, Bahamas. These distances

show that Haitians are much further away than Cubans when attempting to reach the Florida

Keys.

Then, the Haitian and Cuban migrants who are crossing into the Dominican Republic in

order to continue onward to Puerto Rico find the less than 80 miles separating the eastern coast

28

of Dominican Republic from Puerto Rico to be a simpler alternative in attempting to reach the

U.S. The closest territorial points to Puerto Rico are La Altagracia, La Romana, Miches, and San

Pedro de Macoris, all of which are located in the southeast. When crossing this passage, called

the Mona Passage, Cubans either get off on Mona Island or join other migrant groups in an

attempt to reach Aguadilla, Puerto – the most common point of landing. The distance is so short

that only 51.5 miles separate La Altagracia, Dominican Republic from Mona Island, while 74.6

miles separate La Romana from Mona Island. From La Altagracia to Aguadilla, Puerto Rico

there is 96.6 miles to navigate, while La Romana and Miches are 114 miles and 130 miles,

respectively, from Aguadilla. In reality, the Mona Passage is highly treacherous and dozens are

periodically perishing in their attempts to cross it. In response, the Dominican Republic’s naval

authorities have focused their patrolling efforts on the north-eastern portions of the island,

specifically around Samana.

Brain Drain: Tertiary Educated Migrants. According to the World Bank, tertiary

education “broadly refers to all post-secondary education, including but not limited to

universities” (www.worldbank.org). This network of institutions is represented by community

colleges, technical schools, institutes, laboratories, and distance learning centers. A continuing

issue for the Caribbean is that most people emigrating are highly-skilled and educated. Given

that these types of migrants are in high demand in developed, OECD countries such as the U.S.

and Canada, the Caribbean has for decades suffered a brain drain of professionals, entrepreneurs,

and university graduates. These individuals are also the most mobile group of migrants because

they can afford to embark on journeys northward.

Many researchers and analysts claim that the brain drain situation in the Caribbean is the

largest in the world. For example, Haiti was among the top emigration countries of tertiary-

29

educated in 2000; it was in fourth place with almost 84,000 migrants (www.worldbank.org).

Whether they’re Cuban doctors and other health professionals or Haitian agro and service-sector

professionals, the prospects of expanded economic opportunities in the U.S. will likely accelerate

the desires of more of these kinds of migrants, especially once they become aware that many

compatriots, (friends and relatives) can provide a lending hand. Since both Cuba and Haiti

continuously lose tertiary-educated migrants, it may be wise to conduct further research into the

possibility of large flows of educated migrants propelling a mass migration incident forward

once it starts.

Smuggling. As opposed to trafficking, which entails elements of coercion, exploitation,

or violations of human rights, smuggling involves a migrant’s willingness to offer the smuggler a

financial or material benefit in return for facilitating his or her illegal entry into a given country.

For example, “…Haitian (mostly) children are smuggled to the DR and Haitian adults to the US,

and other Caribbean or North American countries. Smuggling usually occurs via the TCI-

Bahamas route, due to USCG patrols which have moved traditional smuggling routes to the east.

Smuggled migrants on their way to the US who find themselves stranded in the TCI and

Bahamas are often exploited as laborers in these countries” (2013, IOM-HAITI Strategic Plan).

Haitian migrants, whom are commonly called boat people, either save up to a year’s worth of

salary or rely on their South Floridian families to pay their passage across the Caribbean.

Smugglers’ fares vary from one thousand to four thousand dollars for both Cuban and Haitian

migrants. In addition, International Relations Professor Eduardo Gamarra from Florida

International University says that Haitians are being enticed by Dominican smugglers, who are

now targeting Haitians, since an educational campaign to dissuade Dominicans from crossing the

Mona Passage has taken effect (Campo-Flores, 2014, online.wsj.com). Since demand by

30

Dominicans wishing to be smuggled into Puerto Rico or the mainland U.S. has decreased,

smugglers have turned their attention to a country that has what seems to be an infinite supply of

eager migrants: Haiti. On a similar note, regarding the shift in illegal Cuban migration to the U.S.,

“one single policy (Wet Foot, Dry Foot) caused the significant increase in the smuggling market

whereby trips on speed boats were paid by family members in South Florida” (R. Guerette,

personal communication, March 29, 2014). This refers to the shift from flotilla vessels to the

high-speed boats after the 1994 mass migration episode. Additionally, Dr. Guerette suggested

that an abundance of smugglers available to carry out the transport operations coupled with a

return to flotilla transportation, would likely lead to noteworthy spikes during a mass migration

from Cuba.

Furthermore, since the 2010 earthquake did not set off a mass migration, Consul General

of Haiti in Miami Francois Guillaume believes traffickers are to blame for the recent increase in

Haitian migration to the United States. Yet another opinion by Marleine Bastien, founder of the

Haitian Women of Miami NGO, believes that migrants are merely responding to failed promises

of assistance by the international community, their own politicians, and the Obama

administration. While the reasons for the recent surge in smuggling from Haiti continues to elude

American and Bahamian law enforcement agencies, officials note that this type of migration is

increasingly being linked and carried out with narcotics trafficking (Robles and McCartney,

2013, nytimes.com). However, it is alarming and noteworthy to mention that even as far back as

in a 1982 article in the Caribbean Review, Thomas Boswell says that “…smugglers are capable

of transporting as many as 4,000 Haitians to Miami per month if the demand were sufficient”

(Boswell, 1982, p. 20).

Looking Ahead

31

In Cuba

The U.S. government should closely monitor the upcoming political developments

concerning the 2018 culmination of President Raul Castro’s second term. This official date

represents a historic moment in which the country’s future political leadership will be

transformed. Current Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel, an electrical engineer and former

Minister of Higher Education, is believed to be the front-runner to replace the soon-to-be 60-

year-old Castro era (Cave, nytimes.com). Whether or not the historic revolutionary leadership

ultimately allows 52 year old Canel to rule Cuba is still uncertain.

However, many analysts speculate that it will indeed be a younger technocrat, with a civil

rather than a military background such as Canel, who will best be able to steer Cuba’s current

economic reforms into the future. Depending on pressure from growing numbers of civil society

groups, internal Communist party power struggles, growing economic disparities, and potential

riots and protests, 2018 has the ability to prompt, albeit slowly, a regime change in Cuba. As in

the past, the U.S. should heed a potential mass exodus of Cubans if the political structure of the

island nation starts to fracture or completely disintegrate.

In Haiti

Haiti’s troubles are vast and varied. Abject poverty, the 2010 earthquake, ensuing cholera

cases, and political turmoil are just some of the most obvious issues. While international aid

continues to flow into the country, albeit at a slow pace, the U.S. government should focus on the

major protests that have rocked the capital and other urban areas during the final two months of

2013. The discontent over President Michel Martelly’s administration, which resulted in a

massive violent demonstration on November 18th of last year, centers on the delays for elections

in the country’s Senate and local municipalities, the high cost of living, and food insecurity.

32

Most important to note is that the anti-government protestors were calling for the President’s

resignation for failing to alleviate poverty and unemployment (2013, economist.com). Anti-

government manifestations can become ever more frequent and further destabilize what is

already widely considered a top failed state by The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index Report.

Likewise, if another repressive dictatorial regime such as “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s were to

be instituted in Haiti, it would likely spark a significant emigration scenario once again. Whether

because of potential property confiscation or political persecution and assassinations, thousands

of additional Haitians would seek refuge in the United States and other developed countries. As

Tatiana Wah notes, “since 1990, Haiti has had over nineteen governments – with prime ministers

averaging only about sixteen months in office” (Wah, 2013, 59). Time and again, the persistent

flow of Haitian migrants into the United States is due to political instability.

33

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