Carol S. Lilly Power and Persuasion Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953 2000

7/22/2019 Carol S. Lilly Power and Persuasion Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953 2000

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owerand ersuasion


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ower and ersuasionIdeologyand Rhetoric

inCommunistYugoslavia944 953

Memberof thePerseus ooks GroupWestviewR S

Carol S Lilly


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All rights reserved. Printedin theUnited StatesofAmerica.No partofthis publicationmaybe reproduced or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronicormechanical, in-cluding photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, withoutpermission in writingfrom thepublisher.Copyright 2001by Westview Press,A Memberof thePerseus Books GroupPublished in 2001in theUnited Statesof Americaby WestviewPress,5500 Central Avenue,Boulder Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12Hid sCopse Road, Cumnor Hill,Ox fordO X2 9JJFindus on the WorldWideW eb at www.westviewpress.comLibraryofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication DataLilly CarolS, 1959-Powerandpersuasion :ideologyandrhetoricincommunist Yugoslavia 1944-1953/by CarolS.Lilly.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-8133-3825-51. YugoslaviaPoliticsand government1945-1980. 2.YugoslaviaCulturalpolicy.3.RhetoricPoliticalaspectsYugoslavia. 4. ComminicationPoliticalaspectsYugoslavia. I. TitleDR1302.L55 2000949.702dc21 00-048470CIPThe paper used inthis publication meets the requirementsof theAmerican National Stan-dard forPermanenceof Paper forPrinted LibraryMaterials Z39.48-1984. RS USPN DEMAND 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2


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Contents ronyms vii knowledgements xi

Introduction 1Note About Sources, 9Notes, 11

Part ne1 SettingtheStage 17

HistoricalReview, 7ExternalandInternal Constraints,25Notes, 31

2 Toolsof theTrade:TheApparatusforCultural Change 35TheCommunist Party,35TheState,42MassOrganizations,48Notes,54

3 Problems of Persuasion 61Internal Disunity, 61KadroviRe avaj uSve Cadres Determine Everything,66Notes,71

PartTwo4 Taking Power: Cultural ManipulationandRevolutionaryChange 77

CompromiseandModeration,77PartisanstvoinPostwar Rhetoric,86PragmatismandPartisanstvo,92Conclusion,105

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Notes,1075 Constructing theFramework; MobilizationandControl 115

ShockworkandCompetition,118Youth Volunteer Labor Brigades,12Economic TasksandEducation,124Cultureand the Media,128Notes,132

6 The Cultural Transformation Begins 137NewGoalsand New Expectations,138Cultureand Ideology,140Educating the Educators, 148Conclusion,153Notes,154

7 TheCultural Transformation Delayed 161The Soviet-Yugoslav Split, 162Two Steps Backward, 165ThreeSteps Forward,175Conclusion,189Notes, 191

8 TheCultural Transformation Transformed 1981950:ATurning Point,198Further Reforms,2 8The Sixth Party Congressand the FourthCongressof the People s Front, 210Playing by New Rules, 214Notes,222

9 The Cultural Transformation Abandoned 229YouthandCultureA fter theSoviet-Yugoslav Split,229Conclusion,24Notes,242Conclusion 245

ibliography 253n ex

vi ontents


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ronyms

The following abbreviations for archives, archival funds, individualworks,organizations, and institutions have been employed in the textand infootnotes. CKSKJ Arhiv Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije

(Archivesof theCentral Committeeof theLeague ofCommunists ofYugoslavia) F W F Anti fascist Front ofWomen/ Anti faistikifronten

J Arhiv Jugoslavije (ArchivesofYugoslavia) V N O J Anti faistiko vijee narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije(Anti fascistCouncilof thePeople sLiberation ofYugoslavia)

CC/CK Central Committee/Centralni komitetCKKPH Centralni komitet Komunistike partije Hrvatske (Central

Committeeof theCommunist PartyofCroatia)CKKPHAP Centralni komitet Komunistike partije Hrvatske,

Agitprop (Central Committeeof theCommunist PartyofCroatia, Department ofAgitation and Propaganda)

CKKPJ Centralni komitet Komunistike partije Jugoslavije(CentralCommittee of theCommunist PartyofYugoslavia)

CKSKOJ Centralni komitet Savez komunistike omladineJugoslavije (Central Committeeof theLeagueofCommunistYouth ofYugoslavia)

CO Centralni odbor (Central Council)CPSU Communist Partyof theSoviet UnionC P Y Communist PartyofYugoslaviaC R P P Croat Republican Peasant PartyCV Centralno vijee/ vee (Central Council)D F J Demokratska federativna JugoslavijeF N R J Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija (Federal

People sRepublicofYugoslavia)G K Gradski komitet (City Committee)


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ronymsH D A Hrvatski Dravni Arhiv (Croatian State Archives,

previously Archivesof the Insitute for the History of theWorkers MovementofCroatia)

JS RNJ Jedinstveni Sindikat Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije (UnitedTradeUnionof the WorkingPeople ofYugoslavia)K D A H Komitet za drutvenu aktivnost ena Hrvatske(Committee for theSocial Activity ofWomenofCroatia)KK Kotarski komitet (Regional Committee)KKU Komitet za kulturu i umetnost (Committee for CultureandArt)KP H Komunistika partija Hrvatske (Communist PartyofCroatia)KPJ Komunistika partija Jugoslavije (Communist PartyofYugoslavia)

KPO Kulturno prosvetno odeljenje (Cultural EducationalDepartment)K P S Komunistika partijaSrbije (Communist Partyo fSerbia)

K Komitetza kole i nauku (Committee for Schools andScience)

KU D Kulturno umetniko drutvo (Cultural Artistic Society)LC Y League ofCommunists ofYugoslaviaL F V V fond Veljka Vlahovia (Personal fund of VeljkoVlahovi)LTU League ofTrade UnionsM K Mesni komitet (Local Committee)M N K Ministarstvo za nauku i kulturuM P Ministarstvo prosvete (Ministry ofEducation)N F H Narodni frontHrvatske (People s Front ofCroatia)N F J Narodni front Jugoslavije (People sF ron tofYugoslavia)N O J Narodna omladina Jugoslavije (People sYouthofYugoslavia)

NOB Narodnooslobodilaka borba (People sLiberation Struggle)NOH Narodna omladina Hrvatske (People sYouthof Croatia)NSO Narodnastudentsk omladina (People sStudent YouthO K Okruni/Oblasni komitet (District/ Regional Committee)OO Okruni/Oblasni odbor (District/ Regional Council)PB PolitburoPC People sCouncilPF Y People sF ron t ofYugoslaviaPK Pokrajinski komitet (Regional Committee)PKSKOJH Pokrajinski komitet Savez komunistike omladine

Jugoslavije za Hrvatsku (Regional Committee of theLeagueo fCommunist YouthofYugoslavia forCroatia)


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ronyms

PWC Peasant Working CooperativeP YY People sYout hofYugoslaviaRKSSRNH Raionski komitet Socljalistikog saveza radnog naroda

Hrvatske (Regional Committeeof theSocialist Leagueofthe Working People of Croatia)S W P Y Socialist Alliance of theWorking People ofYugoslaviaSK J Savez komunista Jugoslavije (League ofCommunistsof

Yugoslavia)S K O J Savez komunistike omladine Jugoslavije (League of

CommunistYou th o fYugoslavia)SRZ Seljaka radna zadruga (Peasant Working Cooperative)SSJ Savez sindikata Jugoslavije (League ofTrade UnionsofYugoslavia)SSOJ Socijalistiki savez omladine Jugoslavije (Socialist Leagueof You th ofYugoslavia)SSRNJ Socijalistikisavez radnog naroda Jugoslavije (Socialist

Leagueof theWorking People ofYugoslavia)U K niverzitetski komitet (University Committee)U N R R United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation AdministrationU P Uprava zapropagandu i agitaciju (Administration forPropaganda and Agitation)USAOH U jedinjeni savez anti faitike omladine Hrvatske (United

LeagueofAnti FascistYou thofCroatia)USAOJ U jedinjeni savez anti faistike omladine Jugoslavije

(United LeagueofAnti FascistYou thofYugoslavia)VSSH Vijee Savez sindikata Hrvatske (Councilof the League of

Trade UnionsofCroatia)YP YugoslavPeople sArmyZ V Zemalsjko vijee (Land Council)


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Acknowledgements

AsI satdown towrite these acknowledgements, I found myself over-whelmedby themagnitudeof thetask. That enormity stemsinpart fromthe many years that this work has been inprogress;I chose the topic formydissertation thesis in1985,In thesubsequent fifteen years,agreatmanypeople,as well as many academic and funding institutions, facili-tated theresearchand writingofthisstudy,I am gratefulto all ofthemand fearthatI may forgetsome. ShouldI do so, Iapologizefor itnow.Tobegin with Imust thank thelibrary,staff and, ofcourse, faculty ofYaleUniversity wherethisproject began.Inparticular,mythanksgo toProfessor IvoBanac,mythesis advisor,whotaughtmemore thanI cansay and without whose exacting guidance this work, however flawednow, would undoubtedly include many more errors. Thanksalsoto rnyunofficialadvisorsatYale Paul BushkovitchandSusan Woodward,whooffered considerable additional advice and criticism, as well as moralsupport.Dr.Woodward,inparticular,provided invaluable assistancethanksto herincredible breadthofknowledgeandremarkable listeningandteaching skills.

Researchfor this monograph then continued at numerous libraries andarchives in the United States and theformerYugoslavia. The librarians atthelibraryandarchivesof theHoover Institution inStanford were espe-cially gracious and helpful. I thank them all, but especially LindaWheeler, In the former Yugoslavia,myworkwasgreatly facilitatedbythe professional and friendlystaffat the University Library and the Insti-tutefor theContemporary HistoryofCroatiainZagreb,and inBelgradeat the Institute forContemporary History,theArchivesof the CentralCommitteeof theLeagueofCommunists ofYugoslavia,the ArchivesofYugoslavia,and theNational LibraryofSerbia.Asimportant as theirhelp,of course, was thefundingwhich made that researchpossible.Overthe last 15 years, I have been fortunate to receive generous grants fromthe International Research and Exchanges Board, The American CouncilofLearned Societies, and the UniversityofNebraskaatKearney'sRe-search Services Council.I amextremelygratefulto all ofthem

On a more personalnote,I would like also to thank all those in the for-merY ugoslaviawhomademyresearch trips therenotjust productive


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but absolutely fun Twofamiliesinparticular have given moreto methanI caneverrepay and, perhaps most important, formed withinme areserveoffaithin andlovefor thepeopleofthat region strong enoughtosurvive the miseries and tragedies of the last decade. My deepest thanksthen go toLela Baaand herfamilyinZaprei, Croatia,andMomiloPavloviand his fami ly inSremicaandLebaneof theFederal RepublicofYugoslavia,

Asecond reasonfor thesizeof mydebtofgratitudeis my firm beliefinthevalues (atleastfor me) ofcollaboration. What that meansinpracticeisthat over thepast years Ihavebegged,bribed, orbullied numerousfriendsandcolleagues into readingandcritiquingmywork.At the top ofmy listofregular readers are,ofcourse, Melissa Bokovoyand JillIrvine,mytwo closest colleagues in the field as well as two of my best friends.Close behind them are Nick Miller and Tom Clark, followed by JamesGerman, Charles Hanson, and back in the earlieststagesof my research,JohnBuchanan and Carla Schmidt. Others who provided extremely valuable critiques wereG a ryCohen, Martin Johnson, Dennison Rusinow, andtheanonymous reviewers at Westview Press. Their comments have beenenormously helpful and have clearly contributed a great deal to whatevervirtues this bookmaypossess.Its flaws anderrors,ofcourse, remainm y own. Inaddition, of course, Ithank RobWilliams, Carol Jones,MichelleTrader,and therestof theprofessional staff atWestview Pressfo rtheir workinbringingmymanuscripttoprint.Final ly I thank all those whose daily friendship, support, and lovehelped me maintain a sense of perspective and carry out my work withcommitmentandeven,onoccasion, intensitybut notobsession. Theyfacilitatedandencouraged myresearchandwritingbutalsorefusedto letmeneglect those other aspectsof life that bringjoy and satisfaction.Forthese gifts,I amespecially g ra te fu l to myparents, Douglas andJudithLilly and to myhusbandandchildren, Rick, Daniela,and MaxGarvue.

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ntrodu tion

When theCommunist Party ofYugoslavia (CPY) took power after theSecondWorld War, it had a vision fora new and better societya societyin whichallhumans would live together inpeaceand prosperity and inwhichtheir mutual exploitation would be eliminated. Based on theideol-ogy ofKarlMarx andFriedrichEngels(asamendedbyVladimir Lenin),thatvision was the party s ultimate goal and main source of legitimacy.Consequently, many party policies sought to achieve the social and cul-tural transformation inherent inthat vision. Yet party leaders also facedinnumerable practicalandpolitical problems associated first with main-taining power and rebuilding theYugoslav economy, and later with re-taining independence and economic viability in the face of Soviet andEastern European hostility. Moreover, party leaders inYugoslaviawerenotactingin avacuumbut had totake into accountthepreexisting soci-eties and cultures.1Indeed, Yugoslav Communists faced aparticularlycomplex taskastheyconfrontednot one but awhole seriesofpreexistingcultures based around thecountry s numerous constituent nations andnational minorities. Hence, every attempt atchange faced anarrayofdeeply entrenched structures, institutions, values,and behavioral habits.In each case, Yugoslavia s Communistshad to decide whetherand howto undermine theextantcultures ort adopt and manipulate them fortheir ownpurposes. Postwar CPY policies thus reflectthe party s strug-gle tofind andhold abalance betweenitslong-term goaloftransformingsocietyand culture2and its immediate political andeconomicneeds, be-tween its revolutionary desire for change and its pragmatic need for se-curityandstability.In itsefforts toattain both political security and social change, the CPYemployed anumber of tools, including economic incentives, force andpersuasion. While party leaders often countedon the first two torealizepolitical goals, they also saw persuasion ascrucialfor securing public ac-ceptance of and participation in their political agenda. Persuasion waseven more important to the social andcultural transformation requiredbythe party s long-term vision for the future. After all, the party s ulti-mategoal required changes not only in the country s political and eco-


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nomic structure, but in itscitizensin their values, morals, goals, aes-thetics,andsocialbehavior.3Thesenewcitizens wouldbestrong,coura-geous,andhardworking,butalso intelligent, educated,andhighly cul-tured. Most of all, they would be people who recognized that the needsofsocietyas awhole were more important thantheneedsof any one in-dividualand whowere prepared togive theirall forthat greater good,understanding that in so doing they would also be serving their own bestinterests. While party leaders did not hesitate to useforceto achieve theirends, they believed that the final goal of communism could only be builtwiththevoluntary cooperation andparticipationof thevastmajorityofthe population. Consequently, persuasion was a vital component of theparty's activitiesandparty leaders desperately wantedit tosucceed.Thismonograph documents the CPY's use of persuasive rhetoric byoral, written, and visual meansforboth its long-term transformative andshort-term political goals in the years between theestablishmentof Com-munist power inYugoslavia withthe liberationofBelgradeinOctober1944and the end of theparty's first reformera at theJune 1953 SecondPlenum of theCentral Committee of the Leagueo fCommunists of Yu-goslavia LCY,form erlytheC PY).Itconsiders boththeintentionsand ac-complishments of theparty'spersuasive strategies and shows the evolu-tionoftheir contentand formduringthe firstnine yearsofCommunistrule.

Intheprocess,itmodifies existing historiographyonearly postwarYu-goslavia in several ways. Most historians of Yugoslavia designate the pe-riod from 1944to1949as the Stalinist era, during whichtime the Yu-goslav Communists were rigid and dogmatic ideologues whounreservedly drew nearlyalltheir policiesandinstitutions directly fromSoviet modelsand imposed themon ahelplessandpassive population.TheJune 1948 split between Tito and Stalin, they then explain, broughtaboutthe next reformist era ofYugoslavhistory,from late 1949to theSixthParty CongressofNovember 1952. Accordingtotraditional views,the split caused a political and economic crisis thatforcedCPY leaders torenounce their Soviet-based policies and initiate a series of innovativepolitical, social, and economic reforms. These reformswere designed tojustify thecontinued tenureof CPYleadersinpowerdespiteSoviet hos-tility,secure Western economic aid, and pacify an increasingly dissatis-fied population.4These scholars clearlydelineatedthe main events andissues relating to theSoviet-Yugoslavsplit and have offered many valu-able insights intothedevelopmentofcommunisminYugoslavia. Theirresearch established asolid foundationofknowledgeonwhichall futurestudiesof thetopic must rely.For avarietyofreasons, however (someclearly relatingto theavailabilityofsources), nearlyall oftheseearlierscholars concentrated on theSoviet-Yugoslavsplitand its accompanying

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political ndideological changes, neglecting in the process the years be-tween 1944and1948.5Myresearch intothe1944-1948era ledmetoquestion manyof the as-sumptions abouttheso-called Stalinist period. Firstofall,mystudyofrhetoricshowed that while partyleadersunquestionably drewon the So-viet experience, they were fully conscious wellbefore 1948 thatnot allfeaturesof theSoviet example were worthyofemulationorsuitedto Yu-goslavia's needs andconditions.Moreover, the evolvingformand con-tentof CPYrhetoric revealed party leaders who, even before the split,were not justideologues committed to a Marxist-Leninist vision of thefuturebut also very practical powerpoliticians,willing and able to mod-ifytheir policiesinresponsetounexpected eventsandreactionsfrombe-low.Likewise, the populace was more influentialand effectivethan pre-viously assumed. Albeit on an unequal basis and within certainboundaries, ordinary people engaged in aprocess o negotiation withparty leaders, resulting in clearly visible consequences for both theparty'srhetoricand itsmore general policies.

Thetraditional periodization and depictionofpostwar Yugoslavhis-torythusraisesanumberofquestions.Afterall,if CPYleadershadbeenblindly dogmatic ideologues, more Stalinist than Stalin himself,upuntil1948, their metamorphosis into flexible and innovative reformers by 1950would seem improbable.Thetransformationof thepassiveandimpotentpopulaceof the1940s into dangerous masses that party leaders triedtopacify isequally baffling. It is mycontention that whilethesplitwas adefining moment inpostwar Yugoslavhistory,itssignificanceand thecontentofsubsequent reformscan beproperly understood onlyin thecontextofthose years precedingthesplit.Onlybycombining evidencefromthe twoerascan wedeviseaportraitof the CPY and Yugoslavsoci-etythat resolves these dilemmas.Byplacing equal emphasis on the yearsbeforeand afterthe split, thismonograph reveals the line of continuity that joined them and thatmakes the post-1948 reforms intelligible. In the process, it modifies thesignificanceof1948, which then ceasestorepresentakindof iron cur-tain separating two apparently unconnected regimes. For while manyofthechanges that took placein CPYpoliciesafter1948 were stimulatedbyexternal events, the direction and form that those changes tookflowedfromtheparty's previous experiencesandinternaldevelopment.Thesplit created both a crisis and an opportunity that allowed and evenrequired policy changes;yet thenatureofthose changeswasrootedintheparty's previous successesandfailures. Withoutdenying the significance of theSoviet-Yugoslavsplit,my study allows us to see another cri-terionofequal importancefor theevolutionof the Yu goslavCommunistregimethetension betweentheparty's desireforrevolutionary social

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andcultural change and itsconcurrent need forpolitical securityandstability.

Justasimportant,mystudy revises our understandingo thecomplexand evolving dynamic between the party-state and Yugoslav society inthe postwarera. Cold war-era historiography ofCommunist regimeshastended to perceive them as monolithic behemoths that persistently im-posed their policieson helpless and passive subjects. More recent studies,especially those based onnewly available archival sources, have beguntomodify that perspective, revealing the kinds ofpressure from belowthat various socialforceshave been able to assert even in clearly dictator-ialregimes. My study belongs in that latter category, as it will describethe ways in which the party-state and Yugoslavia s inhabitants re-spondedto and influenced oneanother. While I do not pretend that therelationship was an equal one, neither was it entirelyone-sided. A fterall,preciselybecause CPYleaders were committedto their vision for the fu-ture, they wishedtoengage Yugoslavia s citizensin itsconstruction.Yetseekingto ensure their ownpolitical security, party leaders also insistedon a degree of social control that served tostifle popular initiative and ac-tivism. These simultaneous and contradictory goals competed inpartyrhetoric and directly influenced the nature of state-society relations.The party s long-term vision for the future which involved the trans-formationofsociety and culture, required that allYugoslav citizens learnandadopt Marxist-Leninist ideology as a way ofunderstanding theworld,a vision for the future and aprogram ofaction. Italso requiredthat they become active participants in the construction of socialism.Rhetoricalstrategies designed to attain that goal were both motivationalandpedagogical. They sought to inspire thepopulace with theparty s vi-sion for thefuture but also provide them with the knowledge and skillsnecessary to achieve that vision. The party s concurrent need for stabilityrequired quite adifferentkind of rhetoricone that stressed absolute ad-herence to the program established from above and indeed an absence ofalternatives to that program. Itoffered both positive and negative direc-tions,informing thepublicnotonly whatitmustdo butwhatitmust not.It was, most often supportedby the open threat of coercion.

Thetension between the opposing goalsinCPYrhetoric reflected theparty s graduated strategy for the construction of socialism in Yu-goslavia. Accordingtothat strategy, party leaders focusedfirstonsecur-ing political power, second on achieving economic stability, and onlythird on transforming society and culture in accordance with Communistvalues. Although thisphased program of action was referred to onlyrarely in print (and then only after 1948), it clearly dictated what partyleaders understood to be their immediate and long-term goals. Byrefer-ringto that strategy, then, we may better understand why certain policieswere implemented, continued, modified,orabolished at particular times.

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Referenceto that strategy alsohelpsexplain changes in theparty'sper-suasive activities. In thefirsttwophases,as party leaders sought to con-solidate power and reconstruct the economy on a socialistbasis,the glo-rious future and theimportanceofMarxist-Leninist ideology remainedsecondaryto thedemandsofdaily politicsinparty rhetoric.Eventhen,partyleaders couldnot afford completelytoneglect their long-termvi-sionfor the future. After all,itrepresented their main sourceoflegiti-macy.Nonetheless, it was only when the party embarked on the thirdphaseoftransforming societyandculture that Marxist-Leninist ideologybegan to play a stronger and more public role in CPY rhetoric. Hereagain, however, party leaders, while giving moreemphasisto their long-termgoals,could not afford to risk their immediate position in power.And so the balancing act continued.Y eteven while adhering totheirstrategy, CPYpolicies and rhetoricwerenecessarily limitedbyexistingconditions, institutions,andsocialrelationsinpostwarYugoslaviaaswellas by theinternational constella-tion ofpower. Such internal andexternal constraints, to use StephenLukes's terminology,often forcedparty leaderstomod ifytheir approachand adoptpoliciescontrary to their guidingideology.6The most impor-tantexternalforce theSoviet-Yugoslavsplit,interrupted and delayed theplanned transformationofsocietyandculture, whileitsimultaneouslyallowedCPYleaderstoexpand their notions abouthow toachieve thattransformation.Nonetheless,it did notchangethebasic strategy. More-over,thedirection takenbymanyreform sin the1950swasclearly deter-mined by the party's domesticexperiencesinparticular, its past suc-cessesandfailuresin thefieldofpersuasion.

Publicresponse to party rhetoricalsoinfluenced itsformand content.Whenurged to take up the party's vision and help make it happen, someYugoslavcitizens were inspired and acted with enthusiasm and vigor.Y ettheydid notalwaysdo so in anorderlyoracceptable manner.Veryoften when such citizens heeded the call to show greater initiative,they made mistakes. Moreover, the party's calls for engagement some-times resultedindisagreements over strategy andgoalsoreven opendissent. This kindofactivism clearly counteredtheparry's needforpolit-icalsecurityandstability.Yetwhen party rhetoric soughttoresolve theseproblemsby offering increasingly specific and restrictive instructionsabout how toparticipate,itonly dampened public interestand enthusi-asm; discussion ceasedand Yugoslavcitizens adoptedastrategyofpub-licaccommodation and private resistance. That is, they would do pre-ciselyasmuchastheyhad to and refrain from forbidden activities,butalso withdraw from activism into the privatesphereand avoidcontactwiththeparty-stateasmuchaspossible.Obviously, these responses toCPY rhetoric, even whileo fferinggreater political stability, sabotaged theparty's plans for social and cultural change.

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Theparty's need to maintain power and its desire to inspire public en-thusiasmforcommunism thus meant that party leadersoftenhad to ad-justboth their policiesandtheir rhetoricinresponsetosuch feedbackfrombelow. These modifications,aswellasnumerous internalreports,offerclues about popular opinion and revealtheexistenceofactiveorpassiveresistance.When a particular approach or policy worked well,partyleaders talked aboutandencouraged furtheruse of it.When,on thecontrary,it met with popular resistance, they talked about that too andsometimes either modifiedordiscontinued it. Ineither case,welearnmuchabout the party, the populace, and the complex relationship be-tween stateandsociety.We cangaugethesensitivityof CPYleadersto-wardpublic opinionandclarifytheEm itsoftheirflexibility,while simul-taneously discerning thelevelofpublic support ortoleranceforpartypolicies,themethodsbywhich people expressed their opinions,and thedegreetowhich they were abletoinfluenceparty policy.

Thisanalysis relies uponamodified viewofstate-society relationsinCommunist, fascist and other dictatorial revolutionary regimes.For ifeven withintheheavily restrictive culturaland ideological milieuofearly postwar Yugoslavia,thepopulationwasneither passivenorimpo-tentbut able to express its views and influence the party's long- andshort-termplans,itseemslikely that a similar process of negotiation(however unequal)mayalso have developed inother systems typicallytermed totalitarian. In thissense,my research contributes to the civilsociety literatureonEastern Europe that recognizes apolitical meansofsocialpressure.7Itdiffers however,inthat those authors tendtofocusontheactivitiesoforganized interest groupsof the1970s-~1980s,whileYu-goslav citizens of the 1940s-1950sexpressed their views inwaysthatwere less coherent and deliberate.It comes closer to supporting JamesScott's conclusion that subordinate classes resist the dominant culture insmall ways, in ridicule, in truculence, in irony in petty acts ofnoncom-pliance,in foot dragging,indissimulation, inresistant mutuality,in thedisbelief in elitehomilies,in the steady, grinding efforts to holdone'sown against overwhelmingodds, except thathe,like those theoristswho describe culture as an ideological battleground, assumes a class ba-sis totheseactsofresistance.8InYugoslavia,bycontrast, those resistingtheparty's ideological and cultural agenda were not always its classen-emies but were often among those most favored and coddledby theCPY including workers, intellectuals,andyouth.Thematerial thusde-scribes state-society relations as a complex and oftenunpredictable dy-namicbetween ruling elitesandtheir constituents.

Whilethis study focusesonpersuasion,itsrole withintheparty'spro-gram for change should not be overstated. Coercion was also crucial andit,too,reflected theparty's graduated strategyfor theconstructionofso

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cialism.Partyleaders expected to use coercion especially during the firstand second phases of their program in order to secure power and restruc-turetheeconomy accordingtosocialist principles. During those periodsin particular, party leaders relied heavily on their monopoly over thestate sorgans offorce.Theyarrested,imprisoned,or shot open, active, orpotentially dangerous opponents of the regime, sometimesin horrify-inglylarge numbers. Meanwhile, they severely restricted the civil liber-tiesof the rest of the population. Whatever the claimsof someCPYrhetoric, therewas norealfreedom ofassembly, speech,orpress.

Theparty suse ofcoercion clearly affected thenatureand impactof itspersuasive policies aswellas the character ofstate-society relations.Partyrhetoric obviously backedup by thethreatofforcehadvery differ-entconsequences than that which was purely persuasive. The coerciveelementof theparty s programforchange thus remindsus of thelimitstopopularresistanceindictatorial regimes. Yet,theparty s changingem-phasis on coercion also points to its boundaries. For while party leadersrelied on force during the first two phases of their program, they ex-pected toreduceitsusage over time. Coercion, they believed, couldhelprealize the party s political and economic policies but it could not effectthelong-term culturaltransformation ofsociety.In fact however,itappeared that neither could persuasion. Bytracingtheevolutionofparty rhetoric, this book presents alsoacase studyin thegoalsandachievementsofCommunist party persuasionand informs usaboutitsvalueas a meansofbringing about change. Itoffers aparticu-larly enlightening case, moreover, since persuasive methods in Yu-goslavia changed so radically and so quickly but with so little apparentsuccess. Further, the question ofpersuasion sutility is particularly in-triguing now that we have witnessed the demise (or transmogrification)ofmost Communist partiesbut seealso some evidenceoftheir lingeringpopularity. Finally,an evaluation ofpropaganda s persuasive effect isclearly germane given its recent and flagrant application by several newnationalist regimesinYugoslavia s successor states.

Among the persuasive means employed by party leaders in the1940s-1950swere newspaper andjournalarticles;public speeches; edu-cationalcurriculaandcourse content;posters;insignia; group activitieslikeparades, workplace competitions,andvolunteer labor brigades;andthe works,monuments,andproduction ofboth high andpopular cul-ture. Whiletheimportanceof thepublic mediaandeducationasmeth-ods ofindoctrination iswell known, thepersuasive valueofculturalmonuments and ritualshas stimul tedmuch debate among both thosewhowoulduse it and thosewho studyit. Abelief inculture s educa-tional and persuasive potential hasbeen adoptedby awidevarietyofreligious, political, and commercial organizations since the beginning of

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time.The Catholic Church sought to maintain its monopoly on most cul-ture in order to directpeople'sattention toward God; Jacobinidealistsstrovetoalter Frenchcitizens' fundamentalvaluesand associationsbycreating a newrevolutionary calendar; andAmerican advertisers haveusedthepowerofpopular musictopromote their products.Yet the ef-fecto sucheffortsremains uncertain.Cancultural manipulation changepeople'sminds?And if so, how and towhat extent? Most recently, thisquestionhasbeen addressed in the formof anongoing debate among20th-centuryU.S. historians aboutthenatureof the relationship be-tweentheproducersandconsumersofmassorpopular culture.Is theHollywood entertainment industry imposing its own warped valuesandcheap aesthetic tastes on the public, or is it only responding to pre-existing popular tastes and demands? Further, to what extent are theconsumersofculture abletomakeittheir own, adaptingit totheir inter-estsandimbuingitwiththeir values, regardlessof itsproducer'sorigi-nalintent?9

Thedebateisclearly relevantto adiscussion ofstate-society relationsinYugoslavia, where, as in all Communist-dominated countries, the stateheldamonopoly overtheproductionanddistributionofcultureand ma-nipulated itwiththeclear intentofdirectingand changingthevaluesandaesthetic tastesof itscitizenry.Myinvestigation intothesuccessesand(moreoften failuresof theparry's manipulationofcultureandothermoredirect persuasive methods supports the hypothesis of several pre-viousscholars that such suasiveeffortsareeffectiveonlyormainly whentheyseek to build upon already existing values and beliefs and are muchlesssowhen theytry tochangepeople'svaluesorcreatenewonesforthem.10Inotherwords,party rhetoric couldconfirmandsometimesma-nipulatethe existing culture, but was generally unable to transformit.11

Forexample, Yugoslavia's citizens proved remarkably adeptat findingwaysofappearingtocomply withthedemandsof theparty while simul-taneouslysatisfyingtheir own personalneedsand interests. Yugoslavia'syouthmight indeedjoinvolunteer labor brigadesin thedesired numbersbut did notalwaysusethat opportunitysomuchfortheir moralandide-ological developmentas for avoidingparental discipline. Similarly, musi-cians might conform to the party's insistence that they compose songsabouttheheroic wartimeeffortsof thePartisansor thecontributionsofworkers to theconstructionofsocialism,butwould thenset thepoliti-callycorrect lyrics to decadent jazzmusic. In otherwords,even as theCommunist rulersofYugoslaviasoughttomanipulatetheextant culture,Yugoslavia'scitizens manipulated with equal or greater success that cul-ture imposed upon themfromabove.

Ultimately,theparty's apparent inabilitytotransform societyandcul-ture alterednotonlythe formandcontentof itspersuasive rhetoric,but

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eventuallyits entire approach to the construction of socialism. Thus, theparty s relaxationofcultural controls beginningin1950wasmotivatednot somuch by theconsequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav split as by nega-tiveresponses to its previous policies and the rhetorical strategies de-signedto justify them.Thereformsof theearly 1950s were intended toreactivateYugoslavia s citizens andengage themin the cultural transfor-mation. Again, however, theparty s response to feedback from belowcould go either way. While such feedback inspired certain reforms, itended others.Bymid-1953, top CPY leaders began toback away frommany recently adopted political reforms, not so much due to externalevents like the death of Stalin but because domestic reactions to the newpersuasive approachhad convinced them that those reforms could en-danger the party s hold onpower. Those reactions also gradually con-vinced party leaders that they would never effect the transformation ofsociety bymeansofpersuasion.As aresult,theparty s political securitycame toacquire a position ofabsolute priority, while its long-term visionwasconsignedto anincreasingly distant future.

NoteAbout SourcesTheactivities and strategies described in this monograph were called bythe Communists agitation and propaganda or agitprop 12 These terms didnotcarrythe pejorative connotation among Communists that theydoamong Western observersbutwere seen to be a legitimate andnaturalpart of politics. Indeed, persuasion and rhetoric are inherent in politicalactivity.When applied by Communist regimes, however, the activitytakes on a more suspicious nature and isoften considered to be simplylyingor a means ofdistracting public attention from despotic govern-ment. Certainly, rhetoric can be andoften is used for suchpurposes (bothbyCommunist and non-Communist parties). Nonetheless, my compari-son of official published rhetoric with internal party documents andmeetings revealed that in mostcases CPY propaganda accurately re-flectedthe party s short-termand/or long-term goals andintentions. Al-though party rhetoricdid offer some outright lies, they tendedtofall intocertain categories (statistics on production orbroad generalizationsabout popularsupport for thepartyor itspolicies)andwere easily recog-nized. Otherwise, becauseit representedtheparty s most direct meansofcommunicatingwithnot only thebroader public but also its own mem-bership,CPY rhetoric had to and did describe party goals with reason-ableaccuracy.

Indeed, through such rhetoricone may clearly discern the party s en-tire political, economic, and cultural program.Its changing form and con-tentmirrored changes in CPY goals and priorities. Moreover,my re-

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search shows thattheparty s persuasive policiesnot onlyaccuratelyre-flected its goals,but in some casesevendetermined them. That is, publicresponse to some rhetorical strategies convinced CPY leaders to makefundamental changesin their overall approach and general policies. Insuch cases, rhetoric did not just mirror orjustifyparty policies/ but actu-ally inspired and influenced them.Anexaminationofsuch rhetoric thusclearlycontributes toa fuller and more sophisticated understanding ofthe regime.

Information forthis studywasdrawn largely from thearchival fundsin Belgrade and Zagreb of various party,state, and mass organizations aswell as from numerous public fo rms ofpersuasion, such as periodicalandnonperiodical publications, film, radio, speeches, educational pro-gramsand curricula, official celebrations, and high and popular cul-tureincludingliterature, art, sculpture, music, theater, and dance. I alsomadeuse of agrowing supplyofmemoir literature and Iconducted in-terviews withaselect number ofparticipants in theparty s persuasiveactivities. In terms of secondary sources, I relied not only on other histo-rians,but also on experts in the fieldsof political science, anthropology,literature,the arts, andeducation.

Atarchives in Zagreb and Belgrade, the more important funds werethose of the politburo and the departments of agitation and propagandafrom thecentral committeesof the CPY andCommunist PartyofCroatia;archivesof the People s Front and of women s, youth, and trade unionorganizations; and archivesof theministryofeducation and Committeefor Schools and Science. Access to these archiveswas available in Yu-goslavia alreadyby the late 1980s.

Amongthemore important newspapers consulted wereBorbu(the offi-cial organof the CPY}, PoHt i ka (an ostensibly independent but clearlyCommunist-dominated newspaper),20 ok tobar(the organof thePeople sFrontofBelgrade), Rod (the organof the united tradeunions organiza-tion),and Republ ika (the organof the non-Communist but cooperativeRepublican party). Particularly relevant journals included Komunis t(theparty stheoretical journal), N a . a knj izevnost NfN and Repub l ih i Serb-andCroat-based literary journals), Mlados t (ayouth literary journal), andSawemena Skola journalof theUnionofEducational Workers).

Mostof theinternal documentsandmanyof thepublic ones examinedwereof an ail-Yugoslavnatureand presented the conclusionsofcentralorgans,usually basedonnumerous reports received from throughoutthecountry. Exceptas otherwise stated, these conclusions and the policiesbased on them were meant tobe applied in the same way in all regions ofthe country. Thisdoes not mean, of course, that all policies were applieduniformly throughout the country. Onthe contrary, it is one of the basicconclusions of this work that policy implementation varied widely de-

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pending on anumber offactors, including theage,educational level,class, gender, religious background,andnational identityofthosein-volved.Anyattempttoprovideacomprehensive social historyof the erawouldhavetoaddress thesedifferences in asystematic manner.

Notes1.Culture inthis work refers both toworksand monumentsofartistic creation

and towhat Geertz calls massculture, definedas the half-formed, taken-for-granted,indifferently systematized notionsthat guidethe activitiesofnormalmen ineveryday life. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (NewYork:BasicBooks Inc., 1973),14,362.2.Given Yugoslavia's complex national makeup, it would undoubtedly bemore accuratetospeakofefforts torealizethetransformation ofcultures, notcul-ture.TheCommunists,however, madenosuch distinction and for thesakeofsimplicity,unlessthedistinction isabsolutely necessary, neither willI.3. Forthis paper, I use theterm citizens tomean only members of a state.While somemayreasonablydisputeitsimplicationofsovereignty,it is,evenso, alessproblematic term thanthemost obvious alternative, Yugoslavs4.PhyllisAuty, Yugoslavia (NewYork:W alkerand Company, 1965); GeorgeW.Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugos lav ia and the New Communism (NewYork:Twentieth Century Fund, 1962);DennisonRusinow, T he Yugoslav Experiment1948-1974(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1977). Yugoslav histori-anshave generally followedasimilar approach. Whilelesscriticalof CPYleadersbeforethe split, theynonethelessblame all flaws in the early yearso party ruleon its adherence to the Soviet model. Vladimir Dedijer,Tito (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1953); MilovanD jilas, ConversationswithStalin (NewYork:Har-court BraceJovanovich, 1 9 6 2 ; PeroMoraa and StanislavStojanovic, eds., Povi-jest Saveza ka munista fugoslavije (Belgrade:IzdavackicentarKomunist,1985).

5. Certain aspectsof theperiod have beenaddressedinlargerhistories,mem-oirs,and isolated monographs, but most oftenonly in a brief and clearlyintro-ductory manner.SeeDusan Bilandzic, Histori ja SodjalistiCke Federa t ivne EepublikeJugoslavi je: G l a v n ipro cesi 1918-1985(Zagreb:Skolskaknjiga,1985);BrankoPetranovic, Politiflte ipmvne prilike za vrerne p r i w e m e n e vlade D FJ(Belgrade: 1964);BrankoPetranovifi, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1978(Belgrade: 1980); Morafia andStojanovic;Vladimir Dedijer,Nov i priloziza b i o g r a f ij u o s i p a Broza Tita Vol.3(Bel-grade: Rad, 1984); Djilas,C onversations with Stalin;Milovan Djilas,Riseand FallNewYork:HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1983); Vladimir Dedijer,T h e B attle StalinLost Memoirs o f Yugoslavia 1948-1953(New York: VikingPress,1970);A.RossJohnson, T h e Transformation of Communist Ideology T h e Yugoslav Case 1945-1953(Cambridge, M A: The MITPress, 1972);IvoBanac, Wi th Stalin Ag ainst Tito Cam-informist Splits in Yugoslav ommunism(Ithaca, NY :Cornell UniversityPress,1988); AdamB.Ulam , Titoism and the Co minform (Cambridge, M A:Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1952). Only recently, stimulatedby a new availabilityo archivalmaterials,has more detailed studyof the1944-1948periodbeen initiatedby anum ber ofyoung Yugoslav scholars aswellas by a fewAmericans.SeeMelissa

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Bokovoy,Peasantsa ndCom munists:PoliticsandIdeology in theYugoslav Countryside,1941-1953(Pittsburgh: UniversityofPittsburgh Press,1998);KatherineM. Mc-Carthy, Peasant Revolutionaries and Partisan Power:RuralResistance to Com-munistAgrarianPolicies in Croatia,1941-1953, Ph.D. Dissertation, UniversityofPittsburgh, 1995; Vojislav KoStunica and Kosta tavoski, Party PluralismorMonism, Social Movements and the Political System in Yugoslavia., 1944-1949 Boul-der,CO;WestviewPress, 1985);LjubodragDimic,Ag itprop kultura Agitpropomkafaza kulturne politike u Srbiji, 1945-1952(Belgrade: Rad, 1988); RajkoDanilovic,Upotreba neprijatelja: Politicka sudjenja 1945-1991 u jugoshviji (Valjevo: Valjevac,1993);Sonja Bokun-Djinic, Na sudiliStu agitpropa: Etatizatn iknjiievno nasledje,1944-1952(Belgrade:FilipVisnjic,1997);Radmila Radio,Verom pretty vere:Drlavaiverskezajednice uSrbiji, 1945-1953(Belgrade:IMS,1995); MarkoLopusina,Crnaknjiga: Cenzura u Jugoslainji, 1945-91(Belgrade: Fokus, 1991);Momfilo Pavlovic,Srpsko selo1945-1952: Otkup(Belgrade:Institutzasavremenu istoriju, 1997).

6.Stephen Lukes,Essays in Social Theory (London:MacMillanInc., 1977), 3-13.7.See,forexample, VaclavHaveletal ThePowerofthePow erless(Boston,MA:

FaberandFaber,1987)andVladimirTisrnaneanu,ReinventingPolitics: EasternEu-rope fromStalintoHavel(NewYork:FreePress,1992).8.James C.Scott, Weapons of the Wea k: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversity Press, 1985), 350.Seealso AntonioGramsci, T heModern PrinceandOther W rit ings (NewYork:International Publishers, 1957); Stu-art Hall, NotesonDeconstructing'The Popular', inPeople's HistoryandSocialistTheory,ed,Raphael Samuel (London: RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 1981), 227-240.

9.For aclearandunapologetic expressionofboth viewssee theintroductorychaptersbyBernard Rosenberg and David Manning Whiteintheir edited vol-ume,MissCultureRevisited(NewYork:VanNostrandReinhold Co., 1971),3-21.Foramore recent discussion of theissue,see thearticlesbyLawrenceW.Levine,RobinD.G.Kelley,Natalie Zemon Davis,and T. J.JacksonLearsinAm ericanHis-torical Review,97(December 1992):1369-1430.10.See, forexample, JacquesE llul Propaganda, th eForma tionof Men's Attitudes(NewYork: AlfredA.Knopf,1965), 295; Oliver Thomson,MassPersuasioninH is-tory, An HistoricalAnalysis of th eDevelopment ofPropaganda Techniques(Edinburgh:PaulHarris Publishing, 1977);Ian Kershaw, How Effective WasNazi Propa-ganda? in azi Propaganda, th ePowerand theLimitations,ed. DavidWelch(UK:Croom Helm Ltd., 1983),180-205.

11. This conclusion may be seen as either encouraging or discouraging in thecurrentpost-Communist context.Anoptimist might conclude thattheobviouslyabsurd rhetorical claims recentlyset forthbyvariousnationalist groupsin Yu-goslavia's successor states are clearly doomed tofailure.Apessimist,on the otherhand, might worry more aboutwhattheapparent successes ofsuch nationalistpropaganda seem tosuggestabout the preexisting values and beliefs of the localpopulation.

12. The separate functionsof agitation and propaganda as terms relating tomethodsofCommunist indoctrination were firstelaborated by G. V.Plekhanovwho stated that the propagandist presentsmany ideas to one individual, ortoseveral individuals.Theagitatorpresentsoneidea only,or a fewideas,but hepresentsthem to a whole mass ofpersons. Lenin later explained that propa-

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ganda was primarily ideologicalexplaining thebasesof class society and theinevitabilityofclassstrugglewhileagitationwas to beboth economicandpolit-ical But ifPlekhanovand Lenin differentiated between the twotechniques,CPYleaders (at least up until1950) did not and generally referred to their persuasiveactivities using the lump term agitprop. C V Plekhanov cited in LeonardSchapiro, The Communist Party of th e Soviet Union 2d ed (NewYork:Random.House,1971),23; V. I.Lenin, Zadachi russkikhsotsial-demokratov, in Polnoeso -bmnie sochinenii2:6-7(Moscow:1958-1965),

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Part ne

Whilethis monograph offersa primarily chronological argument, itdoesnot provide a fullaccount of all events and policies in the years between1944 and1953. Therefore and inordertohelp readers place thechangingthemes and forms of party persuasivepolicies in context, Chapter 1 pro-videsabriefsummaryofevents leadingup to theestablishmento Com-munist rule and sketches the main political and economic developmentsin Yugoslavia from 1944 to 1954. Some of these later developments willbe described inconsiderably more detail insubsequent chapters. Thischapter also describes the domestic and international context withinwhichtheCPY seffortsto remake society tookplace.

Chapter 2specifies the individuals, institutions, and organizations in-volvedin party persuasiveactivitiesincludingthe Communist party,the state, and the massorganizationsanddescribes the methods bywhich they sought to realize the party s short-term and long-termagenda. Essentially, then,this chapter displays the nuts and bolts of partypersuasion, explainingwhocarriedit out and bywhat means.Finally Chapter 3 describes several common problems thatCPY leadersfaced in their ef for ts to t ransform society and culture by persuasivemeans, includinganoccasional lack of unity indecision making at the topand af armore pervasive lackof consistency inpolicy application below.


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Setting theStage

istoric l ReviewTheliberationofBelgradefromGerman occupationby thecombined ef-fortsofTito'sPartisans and the SovietRedArmyonOctober20,1944,represented thesymbolic beginningofCommunist rule overthesecond new Yugoslavia. Although there had been and would be dates of morelegalimportance,control overthecountry's political centernotonly sug-gested the solidity of the Communist organization, but provided it withthesecure basisandadministrative apparatus necessaryforgovernance,1Thefirst old Yugoslavia whichhad perished in theSecond WorldWar had been formedonDecember 1,1918, as an allianceofseveralSouth Slavicand othernations.Originally entitled The KingdomofSerbs,Croats, andSlovenes, the new state really combined members ofoveradozen ethnic groups, each withits ownculture, history,and insome cases, languageandreligion. Whiletheunificationofthese groupsmade a certain amount ofsensegiven the geographic, demographic, andpolitical makeup of the region, it was nonetheless atoddswith the exclu-sivistatmosphere typical of many 19th-century nationalist ideologies.Moreover, the newly formed entity rested on shaky foundations sinceeachof thepredominant member nations joiningitheld different con-cepts of state organization. While the Croats hoped the Yugoslavstatewould be a loose federation of equal and autonomous nations, the Serbsenvisioned andsuccessfully establishedit as ahighly centralized, uni-taristic entity dominatedbySerbian governing institutions.As aresult,many citizens of the new state never accepted its legitimacy and evenfewercameto seethemselves asmembersof a new Yugoslav nation.Theresultant clashes between these conflicting notions of the new state,combined with the concurrent growth of national intolerance and themonarchical government's increasingly oppressive andautocratic style,made for a turbulent interwar experience.2 Eventually,faced by thegrowing threatfrom Nazi Germany in the late 1930s, the prewar govern-

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meritrecognized thedangersof itsinternaldissensionandmade someconcessions aimedatreconciliationand unification Butthese measureswerebothtoolittleand toolateandwiththeonseto theSecond WorldW arthefestering national tensions exploded into violence.TheCommunist PartyofYugoslavia,first formedin 1919, had re-mained, throughoutthehistoryofinterwarYugoslavia,arelatively smallandinconsequential force.Outlawedby thegovernment after 1921andtornbyinternaldissension(mostly overthenational question),thepartycameclosetobeing dissolvedby theSoviet-dominated Communist Inter-national,orComintern,in1937.CPYfortunes begantoimprove onlyinthenextfewyears thanks bothto itsadoptionof theComintern'snew popularfront line,which helped end the party's previous self-imposedisolation,and to thenamingofJosipBrozTitoasgeneral secretaryof theparty.Tito's purgesand bolshevization of theparty madeit a firmer,moredisciplined, and more monolithic body than ever before, yet theCPYremained relatively smallandweak, countingon the eve of theSec-ondWorldWaronly 12,000members.3Inthecourseof thewar, however,thebalanceofforcesinYugoslaviaaltered radicallyand the CPYfound itselfin anadvantaged position toleadaPartisan movementfor liberation from foreign occupiers.Theparty's vast interwar experience in illegal activity, together with its con-solidation and bolshevization under Tito, made the CPY uniquely wellsuitedtodevelopan underground oppositionto theforeign occupiers.Evenmore important,the CPY was theonly prewar partyinYugoslavianotassociated withany onenational group.In thebloody fratricidal con-flictthatdevelopedconcurrently withforeignoccupation,theCPY'sap-parent abilitytostand above nationalismandcallfor the brotherhoodandunity of allY ugoslavnationsandnationalitieswasenormouslyef-fective.

Moreover,duringthewar,theparty'spopular front policyfinallybe-gan tobearfruit.AlthoughCPYefforts tocooperate with otheropposi-tion parties in prewar Yugoslavia had met with little success, under con-ditionsof foreign occupationandcivil war,theparty's callforunityinthestruggle against fascismregardlessofpolitical, national,or religiousaffiliation gained new impetus. Consequently, and particularly as theparty's military successes grew, increasing numbersofordinary citizens,including many with no ties to or interest in communism, joined the Par-tisan forces. This unionofpeasants,workers, andothersledby theCPY, but fighting for thecommon goalsofliberationfrom foreignoccu-pation, national equality,and abetter futureformed thebasisof theUnited People's Liberation Front, later renamedthePeople'sFrontof Yu-goslavia(PFY).By1947,the PFY hadgrown intoamass organizationof 7million membersand was theCPY's strongest pillarofsupport.

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Asthe war progressed, the Communist party gradually but insistentlycreatedand affirmed its owngoverning organizationsat alllevelsofsoci-ety.At thelowest level,the CPY firstestablished local governing bodies,known asPeople'sCouncils (PCs), in all liberated regions to stimulateandcoordinatethegatheringofsuppliesfor thePartisan army. Originallyconsidered temporary,inSeptember 1942theCentral Committeeof theCPYdeclared the PCspermanent and the germ from whichthe futuregovernment willdevelop. 4By the end of thewar,anentire systemofPCs, beginningat thebottom with localorvillage councilsandprogress-ing upward through townships, cities,districts,andregions,notonlyse-curedsuppliesfor thearmy,butalso actedasfullyfunctioning organsofgovernment.CPYconstructionof itshigher organsofpower beganonNovember26-27,1942,withthe firstmeetingof theAnti-fascistPeople'sLiberationCouncilofYugoslavia AVNOJAnti-faSistifiko vijecenarodnog oslo-bodjenja Jugoslavije). ActingonSoviet advice,AVNOJdid not immedi-atelyestablish itselfas anorganofpowerinopposition to theprewarYu-goslav government, now in exile in London, but only as a generalpolitical, national,andanti-fascist body.Oneyear later, however,at itssecond meetingonNovember29-30,1943,and in defianceofSovietin-structions, AVNOJ officiallydeclared itselfthehighest legislative, execu-tive,andjudicial organofpowerinY ugoslavia,

Theparty's next goalwas toobtain internationalrecognition of its newgovernment.In theearly partof thewar,theWestern allieshad offeredtheir support exclusively to the royalistYugoslav government-in-exileand to theCetniks,a Serbian organization loyal to King Petar and led byColonelDraiaMihailovi.Although originallyaresistance movement,Mihailovi^'sCetniksendedbycollaborating withtheGermans,and in1943 the British transferred their support to the Partisans as it had be-comeclear that they were more effective at fightingGermans.The CPYand theBritish government held prolonged negotiations throughout1944, eventually agreeing to a compromise government based onAVNOJ,butincluding also representatives fromthegovernment-in-exileand theprewar Yugoslav Parliament.TheJune 1944''Tito-Subasic'Agree-ment also obligedthe CPY topermit freeactivityofother political par-tiesand tohold freeelectionsfor aconstitutional assembly.

The RedArmy's approach through Romaniain the fallof1944 offeredthe CPY anopportunitytoenlist Sovietaid for theliberationofBelgrade.Inlate September,Titosecretlyflew toMoscowtonegotiatethejointac-tionand onemonth lateracombined forceofSovietandPartisan soldiersdrovetheGermansfromBelgrade.OnOctober20,1944,Tito'sSupremeStaff took control overYugoslavia'scapitalcity.Althoughthe war in Yu-goslaviacontinued torageforalmost seven more months untilthe final

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expulsionofGerman troops fromCroatiaand Sloveniain May1945,theliberationofBelgrade greatly enhancedtheCPY's positionas theleadingforce inYugoslavia.Theparty,nonetheless,restated itscommitmenttothecompromise reached with Britain,and the newgovernmentof Dem-ocraticFederated Yugoslavia, created March 7, 1945, included threemembers of the Yugoslavgovernment-in-exile. Likewise,AVNOJnowdesignated the new government's provisionalassembly eptedintoits ranks 118 non-compromised prewar politicians and people'sdeputies.Officially,the new government's main function was to maintain orderwhile presiding over the promised freeelections to a constitutional as-sembly. Held on November11,1945, the elections themselves were, ac-cording to most observers, relativelyfreeandclean.The preelection cam-paign, however, certainlywasnot.The CPY had designed theelectorallawtobenefitits owncandidates, exerted tightcontroloverthe media,carried out systematic terror against opposition elements, and issuedbarelyveiled threats againstany neutral or apolitical citizens. Underthese conditions, theoppositionchosetoboycotttheelections, turningthem intoaone-horse race.Yetdespite thefarcicalnatureof theelection,theparty's intense political activitypaidoffwhentheelections achievedboth high voter turnout and a 90 percent victory for the Communist-backedcandidates.5

OnNovember 29,1945on the second anniversaryof theSecondMeetingofAVN OJthenewly elected Constitutional Assembly declaredKingPetar formally deposed andYugoslaviaa FederalPeople'sRepub-lic. Twomonths later,onJanuary31,1946,it formally adopteda newconstitution, modeledonthatof theSoviet Union,TheConstitutionalAs-semblythen refashioned itselfas newYugoslavia'sfirstparliament.

Once it had secured victory through elections, the new regime relaxeditsconcernfor theWesternallies*democratic sensitivitiesandbecamefarless restrainedin itstreatmentofopposition elements.By thespringof1946,tetnikleaderDraiaMihailovic,hadbeen captured, tried,andexe-cuted, and in thefallof that year the party also arrested and imprisonedtheCroatian Catholic archbishopofZagreb,AlojzijeStepinac,ostensiblyforcollaborating withtheCroatfascistorganization knownas theUstaSa.Thefollowing summersaw thearrest, trial,and imprisonmentofprewarSerbpolitician DragoljubJovanovic ,who, althoughamemberof thePeo-ple'sFront, had proved to be unacceptably stubborn in hisrefusalto ac-cept all party policies without question.

Inthemeantime,thepartyhadlaunchedaseriesoflegislativeandeco-nomic policies designed to bring about the socialist transformation ofso-ciety.Already in August 1945, the Provisional Assembly had passed a

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lawonagrarian reformandcolonization that ultimately resulted in theredistribution ofsome800,000hectares of land among 316,000 peasantfamilies.6InDecember1946,Parliamentpassedits firstlaw onnational-ization, covering such enterprises of nationalimportance asbanking,transportation, andwholesale commerce, although, infact 80percentofYugoslav industry had already been confiscated either directly fromwartime occupiers or from their Yugoslav owners on often dubiousgrounds ofcollaboration.Asecond nationalization lawpassed inApril1948 finally completed theprocess, realizing state control over evenminuteenterprises.Meanwhile,inApril 1947,thegovernment had un-veiled its first Five YearPlanforeconomic development, which, againfollowingtheSoviet example, calledforextremely high levelsofinvest-ment, especially in theinfrastructureand inheavy industry.

Inthespringand summerof1948,CPYprogress toward socialist de-velopmentwassuddenly interruptedby itsdeveloping conflictwiththeSoviet Unionand People'sDemocracies ofEastern Europe,A fter atensemeeting between top CPY leaders and Stalin in February 1948,Tito's pictures were suddenly removed from allpublic placesinRoma-nia. Then on March 18, the Soviet Union abruptly recalled its high levelmilitaryand diplomaticpersonnel from Yugoslavia,claiming that theywere surrounded by anabsence ofcomradeship. 7In theweeksandmonths that followed, Soviet leaders carried on a heated correspondencewiththeCentral Committeeof theCPY.Intheir letters, StalinandMolotovaccused Yugoslavleaders of a varietyofsins, from anti-Soviet atti-tudestocoddlingthepeasantry. Someof theaccusations were clearlylu-dicrous while others bore more relationshiptoreality.Top CPYleaders,however, correctly surmised that the conflicthad nothing to do withthese specificaccusations but was intended to destroy the independenceoftheparty, makingitintoamore obedientandpredictable satellite.Intheirresponses,therefore,CPYleaders refused toadmit error, whilenonetheless insistingontheir loyaltyto theSoviet Unionand thecauseofsocialism.They declined, moreover,todiscuss their caseat aspecialmeetingof theCommunist InformationBureauor Cominform (anorga-nizationinwhich Yugoslavia's Communistshadpreviously heldaposi-tionofleadership)convened inBucharest, Romania,onJune28,1948.Theresolution passed at that meeting restated the Soviet accusationsand called on healthy elements in the party to remove their leadersandreturn Yugoslaviato thesocialist fold.Inresponse,CPYleaders firstpublished theresolution andtheir entire correspondence with Sovietleadersand then instituted a campaign to root outCominform support-ers, whileat thesame timestilldeclaring loyaltyto theSoviet Unionandsocialist bloc.

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Thesplit, formalizedby theCominform resolutionofJune28,1948,thusdid not endYugoslavia'sefforts atsocialization. tdid, however,change them, thoughnot all atonceand notalwaysin theexpected man-ner.Theimmediate impactof thesplitwas atighteningup ofparty con-trolsonYugoslavsociety, seen most clearlyin thearrestand imprison-ment ofsome 14,000 Communistsas Cominformistagents.Inaddition,the considerable economic hardships imposed by the Cominform block-ade ofYugoslavia, together withthecountry's heightened defenseneeds,led thepartytoaccelerateitsplan forsocialization of thecountrysidethroughtheoften forciblecreationofPeasant Working Cooperatives. Yet,itwas also during this period that party leaders began to express increas-inglysharp criticisms of the Soviet Union and its party leadership. Begin-ning in the spring of 1949, that leadership was consistently described asimperialistic, chauvinistic, and bureaucratic, while its policies were nowsaid to deviate substantially from the theories ofMarx, Engels, andLenin.Itwasalsoinmid-1949 that party leaders began rereadingtheclassicsofMarxandEngelsinordertoprovide ideological justificationfortheiracts ofindependence.Astheydid so,they developeda newapproachtothe political and economic construction of socialism, as well as a more so-phisticated and thoughtfulunderstanding of social and cultural change.Consequently,whiletheimmediate post-splitera didshow increased lev-els ofrepressionandhigher demandsfor themobilizationoflabor,italsoservedas anincubatorfor newideas abouthow toachievethe transfor-mationofsociety,

One of theembryos nurturedinthat incubator would emergebyJune1950 as the Law on Worker's Self-Management or,accordingto its officialtitle, TheBasicLaw on theManagementofState Economic Enterprisesand Higher Economic Associations by theWorkCollectives. Introducedand defended byTitoandpassedby the National Assembly on June271950, the new law was intended to begin the process of the witheringawayof the state and bringYugoslavsocialism closer to the modelenvi-sionedbyMarxand Engels.The law officiallyended state ownershipofthemeansofproduction, turningitoverto society in thecareofelectedworkers' councilsandmanagement boards.Inpractice, however,the en-terprise director, though officially anonvotingmemberof themanage-mentboard, maintained considerable authority. Most important,as anagent of thestate,he wasresponsible forensuringtheenterprise'scom-pliance with central economic planning.Yetevenif the Law onSelf-Managementdid notleadtotrue workers'managementof theeconomy,itprovided theideologicalbasisformoreinfluentialchangesin thestructureandmodus operandiofparty organi-zationsespecially at the district and local levels. Accordingly, there-

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formofparty organizationspassedonJune20,1950,soughttoestablishaclearer boundarybetweenpartyandstate apparati.In thepast,it ex-plained,district partyandgovernment positionshadbeen almost insepa-rable and thepartyhadexerciseditsleading roleinsociety throughdi-rect control over the most important branches of the state. Whileclaiming that this approach had been both necessary and correct in thefirstyearsofsocialist construction,theCentral Committee admitted thatithad now become a barrier to socialist democracy as it had preventedthedevelopmentofindependencebygovernment organizationsandsti-fled theinitiativeof themasses.8The reformalso reducedthesizeof theadministrative apparati in all party organizations, hoping to minimizebureaucratization. As a result, whereas in 1950 there had been 11,930 pro-fessionalpartyfunctionaries,by November 1952 that number had beenreduced to 4,599.9

Meanwhile,party leaders strengthened effortstostimulate ideologicaldebateat theFourth Plenumof theCentral Committeeof the CPYheldinJune1951. The plenum's Resolution on theoretical work in the CPYnowstated thattheopinionsof topparty leaders neednot beobligatorilystudied or adopted by lower party forumsunless so ordered by a Polit-buro directive. The Fourth Plenum also urged substantial progress in thedevelopmentof amoreindependentandprofessional legal systemafterastunning reportbyAleksandar ankoviadmitted tonumerous viola-tions oflegalityin theprevious yearsby theparty,thecourts,and espe-cially the secretpolice,otherwise known asUDBa.10Various speeches bytopparty leadersin theearly1950salsonow referredto thefuture with-ering away ofboththestateand theparty.Allagreed that suchan oc-currence wouldnotmean theireliminationbutonlyawithering awayoftheir functions.Nonetheless,thevery existenceofsuchdiscussionsre-flected arevised interpretationof theparty's guiding ideology.

Thehigh pointof theparty's reformpolicies cameat theSixthPartyCongress held November 2-7, 1952, and at the Fourth Congress of thePeople'sFrontinlate February 1953.TheSixth Party Congress repre-sentedaculminationand officialendorsementof thetrendsand reformscarriedout in theprevioustwoyears. First,itoffered asevere criticismofthe Stalinist system, unequivocally describing it as an aggressive imperi-alist force,state-capitalist,andbureaucratic. More importantly, however,partyleadersnowmoved beyond criticizing Stalinist revisionismto ar-ticulateopenlyand officially theirowninterpretationofMarxist theoryfor theYugoslavcase basedonworkers'self-management, theseparationofpartyandstate,and theguiding(butnotruling)roleof theCommu-nist party. To make tangible this new approach, the Central Committeechanged theparty's name from theCommunist PartyofYugoslaviatothe LeagueofCommunistsofYugoslavia LCY).Theparty,its leaders

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nowdeclared, would unquestionably maintain its leading role insociety,butwould realizeit bydifferent,less Stalinist,means.11TheFourthCongressof thePeople'sFront (now renamedtheSocialistAllianceof theWorking PeopleofYugoslaviaSAWPY heldinFebruary1953 markedafurther step forwardinexpandingtheparty's viewof itsrole.Allagreed thatSAWPYnowrepresented themain political organi-zationin thecountry.TheLCY, meanwhile, would represent only itsmost ideologically consistent section and would seek torealizeitsgoals through that organization.

Thecongress also preparedthegroundfor the officialabandonmentofthe collectivefarms,describing Stalin's collectivization drive as the cruelexploitationof themasses and the barbaric theftof thepeasantry, Ac-cordingto the DecreeonProperty RelationsandReorganizationofPeas-antWorkingCooperatives, on March 30, 1953, peasants couldchoosefreelytoleavethecooperative, taking with them whatever equipmentandlandtheyhadbrought intoit.Predictably, most did.Insome areas, two-thirdsof thepeasantsinPeasant Working Cooperatives leftthem withinthe firstnine months.By1957,theamountofarable landin thesocialistsectorhaddeclined from25percentin1952toonly9percent.12

Although collectivefarmswere never reestablished in Yugoslavia, theparty almost immediatelythereafterembarkedon an era ofretrenchmenttowardtighter party control.Thecrucial turning point awayfrom reformcame at theSecond Plenumof theCentral Committee held onTito'sis-landretreatofBrioniinJune 1953.Theplenum's purposewas toevaluateand reinterpret theconclusionsof theSixth Party Congress. Inmarkedcontrastto plenums and congresses earlier in the 1950s, which worriedabout excessive bureaucratization, the use of administrative methods,and thedangerofdeveloping state capitalism,thedirective letter thatfol-lowedthe Brioni Plenum expressed concern over the growing and dan-gerous influenceof thebourgeois West.TheBrioni Plenumof1953 thusmarkedthe end of thereformperiodof the1950s.Indeed, less thanayearlateratanother Brioni PlenuminJanuary 1954,MilovanDjilas,the fore-most proponentof thereforms, wouldbe firstexpelled from thepartyand later arrested. The party, it was now made clear, would not witheraway, nor would it turn over its leading role in the country to any otherorganization.

Nonetheless, throughoutthefollowing decades,Yugoslaviawouldbe-comeknownfor thegreater degreeoffreedomandeconomic prosperityit offered. Instark contrasttothosein theSoviet Unionand itsEasternEuropeanallies, Yugoslavia's citizensenjoyed therighttotravel abroadandhadconsiderable accesstoWestern materialandcultural imports.Thanks to Western loans,Yugoslavcitizens also enjoyed a much higherstandard ofliving thandid their counterpartsin theWarsawPact. Yet,

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thecountry also retained itssocialist systemandwhile other periodsofreformcame and went, none was as innovative or idealistic as that of theearly1950s,andnone ever causedanyfurtherwaveringin theparty'sde-terminationtomaintainitsmonopolyonpower.

ExternalandInternalConstraintsTheevents outlined above developed as the result of a complex mixtureof forces including ideology, international events,andYugoslavia'sdo-mestic circumstances. This monograph focuses mainly on the ideologicalelement, thatis, on CPYefforts torealizeitsvisionfor the future. Thoseefforts however, were necessarily conditioned by theparty'spositionwithin the matrix of domestic and international power relations, as wellas by Yugoslavia's postwar economic and social circumstances. While notthe sole determinants of CPYpolicy, theserelationsandcircumstancesdefined theboundaries within whichtheparty soughttorealizeitsideo-logical agenda. Party policies could not help but be affected by theemerging cold waratmosphere,theSoviet-Yugoslavsplit, Yugoslavia'schangingbutnearly alwaysdesperateeconomic situation,thehigh levelofnational tensionin the country, and a generally unstable political andsocial environment.

Withinthe emerging postwar division of power between the SovietUnionand theWest,anddespite awartime agreement between Stalinand Churchill evenly splitting future political influence in Yugoslavia,theCPY's risetopower firmly affixed Yugoslaviato theSoviet camp.New Yugoslavia'sloyaltyto theSoviet Union derived mainly from theCPY'sCommunist ideology and its adherence to the general line of theCommunist movement.Upuntilthe end of theSecond World War,theSoviet Union had been the only majorcountry in the world ruled byCommunists, providing it an essentially unchallenged position of au-thority among other aspiring Communist parties. Soviet predominanceinthe Comintern, first formalized at its Second Congress by the manda-tory adoption of Lenin's 21Conditions, grew even further underStalin,when defenseof theSoviet Union becamethe first dutyand re-quirementof allComintern members.

TheCPY had joined the Comintern already in 1919 and its adherenceto theComintern linewasnever seriously questioned. Indeed,Sovietleaders commonly and directly interfered in the CPY's internal organiza-tionandpolicy determination throughouttheinterwar period. Even dur-ing the war,afterSoviet leaders had dissolved the Comintern, they con-tinued to send regular advice and directives to the CPY throughcommuniques, couriers,and radiotransmissions. Afterthe warended,

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the CPYremained closely attunedto theSoviet Unionin thedetermina-tionandexecutionof itsdomesticand foreign policies,Itisalso true,however,that almostfromthevery outsetof thewar,theCPYshowed considerably more independence in its relations with theSoviet Union than did any of the other Communistpartiesin Eastern Eu-rope, Evenin theearly stagesof the war CPYleaders tookanumberofdecisions separate from or in opposition to the Soviet line, and as theparty's position of authority inYugoslaviaincreased, so too did itsinde-pendence. The CPY certainly did not consciously set itself up inopposi-tion to the Soviet Union. On the contrary,Yugoslavparty leaders clearlyconsidered themselves to beStalin'smost loyaland devoteddisciples.UpuntiltheSoviet-Yugoslavsplitandevenfor sixmonths after it, CPYleaders regularly hailedtheSoviet Unionas thefirstcountryofsocialismandpublicly recognizeditspositionofauthority. Treatmentof theSovietUnion by theYugoslavmedia was voluminous and unfailingly compli-mentary,g lorifying it as themost just, democratic, freedom-loving,andprogressive nation in the world. Nonetheless, in the years from 1944 to1948,severaldisputesarose betweenthe twogovernments concerningtheir mutual economicrelations,the behavior of Soviet military person-nel in Yugoslavia, and especially theCPY'sradical foreignpolicies. Al-thoughCPYloyaltyto theSoviet Union remained unshaken until afterthe 1948split,itsearlier adherenceto theSoviet line couldbeconsideredneither unquestioningnorunconditional13

Meanwhile,CPYrelations withtheWestgrew increasingly tense afterthe end of thewar.Inpart, Yugoslavia's relations withtheWest reflectedonlythe changing international scene in which the United States and theSoviet Union, with their vastlydiffering politicalideologies,emerged asthe predominant world powers. Already by late 1944 and early 1945, theentire wartime alliance system was disintegrating in disputes over theconstruction ofpeace and thepostwar organization ofEurope. Despitewhatis now seen asStalin'srelatively conservative foreign policy, theWesternallies'fearofproliferatingCommunist-dominated governmentsresultedbyearly 1946inChurchill's declarationof a crusade againstcommunism and by 1947in Truman's promise to help GreeceandTurkeywardofftheCommunist threat.TheCPY,inparticular, regularly provoked Western hostility throughitsradical domesticpolices,its intransigent stance with regard toTrieste,and itscontinued aid to Communist insurgents inGreece. AlthoughStalin often opposed theseCPYpolicies, Western allies clearly believedtheyhad originated in Moscow. Thus the Western allies tended to treatYugoslaviaas afullyobedient satelliteof theSoviet Unionand atestingground in the battle between Soviet and Westernideologies.

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As aresultofboth theCPY'sinflexiblepolicies and Western miscon-ceptions about theirsignificance,ill feelings between Yugoslavia's Com-munist regimeand theWestbegan to surface already in1943and in-creased steadily in the years following the war. Consequently,Yugoslavia'spostwar relations with theWestwere characterized by anextremedegreeofuncertainty,andYugoslav leaders apparently consid-ered new warpossiblein thenearfuture.In aPolitburo meetinginDecember1945,forexample, Tito warned that giventhe xtr m lytense sit-uation in Trieste, the party must be militarily prepared for anything, andinternal reports throughouttheearly postwareraworried thatthepresstoooftenpublished material that might beusefulto an unnamed enemyincaseofwar.14Evenso, itwouldbeinaccuratetosuggest thattheWesthad no influ-enceon CPYpoliciesbefore1948.Forevenifparty leaders steadfastlyre-jected Western political,economic,andcultural models, thesame couldnot besaidofYugoslavia's citizens. WhileCPYopponentswhopromotedWesternpoliticalandeconomic solutions mightbedealt with relativelyeasily,party leadershad amuch harder time counteringtheinfluenceofWesternhigh and popular culture on Yugoslavia's intellectuals and ordi-narycitizens,

15Inthe yearsfollowingtheSoviet-Yugoslavsplit,Yugoslavia'spositionin this international dichotomy necessarily changed. Expelled from the

Sovietblocand thetargetof analmost complete economic blockadebytheSoviet UnionandEastern European countries, Yugoslavia's leaderswereforced toreorient their foreignpolicies toward theWest.Whilere-tainingasocialist systemandclaiming continued loyaltyto the socialistcause,party leaders nonetheless reduced theleveloftheir anti-Westernrhetoric and ended their support of Greek insurgents. Simultaneously,they began cautious conversations with Western diplomats insearchofeconomic aid.BySeptember 1949, theyhadsecured theirfirstU.S.loanof 20million.In the following years, party leaders would accept largeamounts of additional Western economic and even military aid. While al-waysclaiming that thisaidcame with nostrings attached, the in-creased contact with the West unquestionably influenced the politicalandculturalrealm,whiletheloans themselves offerednew opportunitiesintheeconomicsphere.16

While clearly conditionedby theconflictbetweenEastandWestin theinternational sphere,CPYpolicieswere more directly affected by Yu-goslavia'sdomestic needsandcircumstances. Yugoslavia's impoverishedeconomic status,inparticular, placed almost overwhelmingdemandsonthe new regimein theyears immediately followingthewar. Largelyagrarianand seriouslyunderdeveloped,Yugoslavia's prewar per capita

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income hadbeen only between60 and 70U.S.dollars,compared with 521in theUnited Statesand 236inFrance.17This stateofpovertywasfur therexacerbatedby thewar,in which atotalof 1.7million people diedandanother3.5million were lefthomeless.Thecountry's infrastructuresuffered enormousdevastationasover50percentofrail lines werede-stroyed,along with35percentofprewar industry,50-70percentofpre-war livestock,and 80percentofploughsandharvesting equipment.Manyvillageshadbeen entirely destroyedand difficultliving conditionsprevailed evenin them ajorcities. Worse yet,twoyearsofdrought imme-diately followingthe war and anotherin1950 raised thethreatofmassstarvation.18

Thenewgovernment's firstandmost pressing responsibility, then,wastopreventafamineandbegin rebuildingthecountrybyreestablishinglinesofcommunicationanddistribution,aswellasagriculturalandindus-trialproduction.Inthese earlyefforts despite significant andcrucialaidfrom UNKRA the newgovernment stood almost entirely alone.For al-thoughCPYleadershadoriginally hopedformassive Soviet aid, they soonhad toaccept thattheSoviet Unionitselfhadbeen badly damagedby thewar and wasunable(orunwilling)toraiseYugoslaviaout of itspoverty.

Consequently, economic tasks occupiedamajorproportionof thenewgovernment's energy,andparty leaders regularly warned that failureintheeconomic sphere could threatentooverturnalltheir wartime moralandpolitical victories. ImmediatelyfollowingtheliberationofBelgrade,various party documents had begun tostressthe overwhelming impor-tanceofeconomic activities.YouthleaderMilijanNeoreclc', fo rexample,stated,Todayagoodmember of the party and SKOJ[the Communist youth organi-zation]is one who is agood merchant.Agood memberof thepartyis onewhoknowstobring foodproductstoBelgradeand tosell thematregulatedprices.Todaywemustbegood grocers,good engineers,andgoodmer-chants.Thesurvivalof thebroadpopularmasses dependsuponit.19Bylate 1947,thecountry's economic status, whilefar fromprosperous,seemed atleast relatively stable. FollowingtheSoviet-Yugoslavsplit,however,economicissueswere once againthesubjectofenormous con-

cern. Nowborderedbyunfriendly nationson allsides,Y ugoslavia facedgreatlyincreased defenseneeds,while at the same time the Soviet andEasternEuropean economic blockade inhibited the party's ability tocarryout itseconomic agendaasspecifiedby the FiveYearPlan. Theseconsiderations altered CPYpolicies in anumberofareas.Forexample,accordingtoSusan Woodward, economic requirements (though causedbyachangein thecountry's international status) were primaryinboth

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the party's disastrous decision to accelerate its campaign for the social-izationof thecountrysidein1949and itslater introduction ofworkers'self-management.20

Asecond circumstance that inevitably shaped the formandcontentofCPYdomestic policieswas thenational question. Fromthemomentof itsformal inception in December 1918, Yugoslavia'sfate wasinextricablyconnected with the relations between its constituent nations and nation-alities. Despite claimsto thecontrary, Yugoslavia's recent conflictshavenot resulted from ancient ethnichatreds. It is true that a degree of ten-sionhaslong existed between manyof thepeoplesofYugoslavia;yetthattension has only periodically produced violence. During much of theirlong history, Yugoslavia's ethnic groups have managed to coexist on theBalkan peninsula reasonably peacefully,if not harmoniously. Indeed,during the 19th and 20th centuries the growth of Serb, Croat, Slovene,and other national ideologies was accompanied by the development ofYugoslavism as a kind of South Slavic national identity. The precisecontent of theYugoslavnational idea varied considerably over timeandamong different national groups; nonetheless, its popularity amongmany in the region should not bedismissed.

Unfortunately muchofthat appealwas squandered duringtheinter-warperiodby theSerbian-dominated government's insensitiveandbul-lying approach to the country's other constituent peoples. Evenso, thestrongest expression ofhostility amongYugoslavia'snations came onlyduring the SecondWorldWar with thegenocidalpolicies of the Croatianfascist UstaSa and thesubsequent massacresofCroatsandMuslimsbySerbian Cetnik organizations. The legacy of hatred caused by thoseeventswasperhaps the greatest challenge that Yugoslavia's postwarCommunist party would face. Indeed the Communist regime deservessome credit for tempering those hostilities and maintaining peace amongtheYugoslavnationsfornearly50years. Yet,as is nowclear,theCommu-nistsmayalsobeblamedforfailingultimatelytofacethenational prob-lemhead on and finda lasting solution.

Thepositionof the CPYconcerningthenational questionhadvariedduring the interwarperiod fromcomplete indifference andunitarismtoadvocatingthemandatorydissolutionofYugoslaviaas an artificialcre-ationofVersailles.By thebeginningof thewar, however,thepartyhadfinally settled on a federal solution to the problem within a united Yu-goslavia. Fromthevery beginningofYugoslavia's occupation,thepartyspokeout fornational self-determinationand theequality, brotherhood,and unityof all Yugoslavnations within afederalstructure that ultim t lyincludedthe sixsovereign republicsofSerbia, Croatia, Slovenia,Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, the autonomousprovinceofVojvodina and the autonomous regionofKosovo-Metohia.

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Thefederalstructureof newYugoslaviadid notprovidetheindividualrepublics withanyreal independence since decision making withinthepartyandstate remained highly centralized.Yeteveniflargelya formal-ity theparty's federal solutiondidshow thatitvalued each constituentnation,and CPYadherenceto it was a keysourceof itspostwar legiti-macyYetCPYpolicies concerningthenational question wereoften inconsis-tentas the party sought a balance between its more popular support fordecentralized federalism and its ideologically based centralism. On theonehand,party leaders consistently stressed the equali

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Carol S. Lilly Power and Persuasion Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953 2000

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