SocialMediaforSocialChange:ACaseStudyofSocialMediaUseinthe2011EgyptianRevolution

ByCarolineS.Sheedy

ACapstoneProject

PresentedtotheFacultyoftheSchoolofCommunication

InPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirements

FortheDegreeofMastersofArtsinPublicCommunication

Supervisor:ProfessorLaurenFeldman

April28,2011

ii

COPYRIGHT

CarolineS.Sheedy

2011

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IwouldliketothanktheCommunicationsandMarketingofficeofAmericanUniversityforgivingmetheopportunitytoworkmywaythroughgraduateschool.

IwouldalsoliketothanktheSchoolofCommunicationfaculty,especiallyprofessorLaurenFeldman.

Finally,thankstomyfriendsandfamilyfortheirconstantsupport.

iv

ABSTRACT

Thedebateoverwhetherornottheemergenceofsocialmediahaschangedtheway

peoplecommunicateforsocialchangehasreceivedheightenedattentionsince

MalcolmGladwelldeclared,“therevolutionwillnotbetweeted”inhis2010New

Yorkerarticle.Thiscapstoneprojectexaminestheuseofsocialmediainseveral

recentcasesthatreceivedworldwideattention(the2008attacksinMumbai,the

2009GreenRevolutioninIran,andthe2010earthquakeinHaiti),andpresentsa

casestudyoftheuseofsocialmediainthe2011Egyptianrevolution.Theuseof

socialmediabefore,during,andafterInternetaccesswasshutdowninEgyptis

examined.Severalkeyissuesrelatedtotheuseofsocialmediaforsocialchangeare

discussed:socialmediapolicy,culturaldifferencesinsocialmediause,theeffectsof

tiestrengthonmotivatingpoliticalaction,andthedigitaldivide.Thispaper

concludesthefollowingstatementsabouttheuseofsocialmediaforsocialchange:

1. Socialmediatoolsareoftenpersonified,butforsocialchangetooccurtheremustbepeoplebehindthetools.

2. Socialmediacanincreaseworldawarenessofanissue.3. Socialmediaallowspeopletohelpeachotherregardlessoflocation.4. Socialmediauseforsocialchangecanbedangerous.

v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1Limitations .................................................................................................................................................... 3Structure ........................................................................................................................................................ 4

Background..................................................................................................................5SocialMedia ................................................................................................................................................. 5Facebook........................................................................................................................................................ 5Twitter ............................................................................................................................................................ 6YouTube.......................................................................................................................................................... 7Flickr................................................................................................................................................................ 7

SocialMediaCommunicaiton:ThreeStudies................................................................82008AttacksinMumbai ....................................................................................................... 82009IranRevolution ...........................................................................................................102010HaitiEarthquake ........................................................................................................13

LiteratureReview.......................................................................................................17HowSocialMediaisusedforSocialChange .................................................................17OnlineCommunication ..........................................................................................................................17MotivatingPoliticalAction ..................................................................................................................19TheInfluenceoftheMedia...................................................................................................................20TheTheoryofTies....................................................................................................................................22

ExternalFactorsthatAffectSocialMediaUse..............................................................24CulturalDifferencesinSocialMediaUse .......................................................................................24LegitimacyofSocialMedia ..................................................................................................................25TheDigitalDivide ....................................................................................................................................26PolicyImplications ..................................................................................................................................27

CASEPROFILE.............................................................................................................322011EgyptianRevolution ..................................................................................................32SocialMediaMomentum.....................................................................................................33TunisianRoots...........................................................................................................................................33StateofAffairsinEgypt.........................................................................................................................35WeareAllKhaledSaid...........................................................................................................................36AasmaMahfouz ........................................................................................................................................38#Jan25...........................................................................................................................................................39

DuringProtests ......................................................................................................................39DuringBlackout .....................................................................................................................41

CASEANALYSIS ..........................................................................................................43GlobalTies ...................................................................................................................................................43CitizenJournalists ....................................................................................................................................44Dangers.........................................................................................................................................................44Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................45

vi

APPENDIXA ...............................................................................................................47

APPENDIXB ...............................................................................................................48

BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................49

1

INTRODUCTION

Lessthan24hoursafterInternetaccesswasshutdowninEgyptduringthe

massive2011protests,GoogleandTwitterlaunchedSpeak2Tweet,aservicethat

allowsEgyptianstousetheirmobilephonestorecordmessagesthatareinstantly

translatedintotweetswith#egypt.Inlessthan24hourstheSpeak2Tweetfeedhad

8,660followerswhoposted897tweets—roughlyonetweeteverytwominutes

(Kawamoto,2011).Clearly,communicationviaTwitterwasdeemedimportant

enoughforthesecompanies,bothwestern‐based,toswiftlyprovideanalternative,

anactionthatisjustoneofmanymarkingasignificantchangeincommunication

methodsandexpectationsworldwide.

Thewayssocialmediaarechangingcommunicationhavereceivedalotof

mediaattentioninthepastfewyears.Notably,the2008attacksinMumbai,the

2009Iranelectionprotests,andthe2010Haitiearthquakeweresituationsinwhich

socialmediaplayedasignificantroleincommunication.Socialmediatoolsaresaid

togivepeopletheabilitytoconnectanduniteinacrisis,raiseawarenessofanissue

worldwide,andusurpauthoritariangovernments.Thesetoolscanbeusedto

quicklygetinformation,suchasthelocationofahospital,topeopleindanger.The

increasedawarenessbroughtonbysocialmediacanhelpraiseasignificantamount

ofmoneyforacause.Forthefirsttime,everyonecanbeajournalist.

However,misinformationorrumorscanquicklyspreadonsocialmedia,and

theoft‐laudedtransparentnaturecanbedangerous.Forexample,itmayallow

criminalstokeeptrackofpoliceactivity.Additionally,thoughawarenessofanissue

2

maybeincreased,itishardtosaywhatrolesocialmediaplaysinactuallyputting

peopletoaction.

Otherissuesinvolvedintheuseofsocialmediaforsocialchangeincludethe

abilityandauthority,orlackthereof,ofsocialmediacompaniestohandlecrisis

situations.Forexample,Twitterearnedpraiseaftertheydelayedsitemaintenance

(afterarequestfromtheU.S.StateDepartment)toavoidinterrupting

communicationinIranduringthe2009election,butFacebookhascomeunderfire

becauseoftheirrealnamepolicy,whichputsactivistsindangerofhavingtheir

accountdeletediftheyarefoundtobeusingafakename(evenifitisfortheir

safety).

Manybelievethatthesenewwaysofcommunicatingcanhelptocreatesocial

change.Twitterco‐founderBizStonewentsofarastosaythatsocialmedialowers

thebarrierforactivism(Mainwaring,2011),Othersinsistthattheeffectsofsocial

mediaareminimal;socialchangecomesaboutthewayitalwayshas,frompeople

ontheground.Mostfamously,MalcolmGladwellclaimedinhis2010NewYorker

articlethatonlinesocialnetworkscreateonlyweakties,notthestrongtiesthatare

neededforactualaction.Hearguesthatthereisnothingspecialaboutusingsocial

mediatocommunicateforsocialchange,thatwearegivingtoomuchcredittothe

toolsbehindthecommunication:“Whereactivistswereoncedefinedbytheir

causes,theyarenowdefinedbytheirtools”(Gladwell,2010).Others,likeClay

Shirky,believethatthesea‐changeincommunicationhashadahugeeffectonthe

waypeoplecreatechange:“Groupactiongiveshumansocietyitsparticular

3

character,andanythingthatchangesthewaygroupsgetthingsdonewillaffect

societyasawhole”(Shirky,2009,p.23).Thereisnoquestionaboutwhetherpeople

areusingsocialmediatocommunicate,buthasthismadeadifferenceintheway

activistschangetheworld?

Thiscapstoneprojectwillexaminetheuseofsocialmediainthe2011

Egyptianrevolution.Itwilloutlinehowsocialmediawasusedtoplantheprotests,

howitwasusedduringtheprotests,andwhathappenedaftertheInternetwasshut

downinEgyptonJanuary27,2011.Itwillexaminehowtheuseofsocialmedia

duringtheprotestscomparestopastsocialmediauseandwhetherornottheuseof

socialmediainthiscaseinvokednotjustawareness,butaction.Finally,this

capstoneprojectwillexplorethefutureofsocialmediaasanagentforsocialchange.

Limitations

Asofthiswriting,theEgyptianrevolutionisongoing.Thiscapstoneproject

willcovertheeventsoftherevolutionfromafewdaysbeforetheproteststartedon

January25,2011throughFebruary11,2011,whenHosniMubaraksteppeddown

aspresident.

ThispaperwillfocusontheuseofFacebook,Twitter,Flickr,andYouTube.

Thereareothersocialnetworkingplatformsthatmayhaveplayedaroleinthe

Egyptrevolutionandothercrisissituationsmentioned,butthesefourseemtobe

themostprominentplayers.

4

BecausethispaperwaswrittenbyanEnglish‐speakingAmerican,itshould

benotedthatthispapermayhavealanguageandculturalbiasbecauseofthe

informationavailable.

Structure

Thispaperwillbeginbyprovidingsomebackgroundonsocialmedia.Itwill

examinethreecasesinwhichsocialmediauseaffectedcommunicationworldwide,

the2008attacksinMumbai,the2009Iranpresidentialelection,andthe2010

earthquakeinHaiti,andbrieflyexaminetheimplicationsofeachexample.Areview

ofliteraturewillfocusonthehowsocialmediacanbeusedforsocialchangeandthe

externalfactorsthataffectsocialmediause.AcaseprofileontherevolutionofEgypt

willbefollowedbyanalysisanddiscussionoftheuseofsocialmediaforsocial

change.

5

BACKGROUND

SocialMedia

“SocialMedia”are“agroupofInternet‐basedapplicationsthatbuildonthe

ideologicalandtechnologicalfoundationsofWeb2.0,whichallowsthecreationand

exchangeofuser‐generatedcontent”(Kaplan&Haenlein,2010,p.60).AsofJune

2010,22%oftimespentonline(oroneineveryfourandahalfminutes)isspent

usingsocialmediaandblogsitesworldwide(“SocialNetworks/BlogsNowAccount

forOneinEveryFourandaHalfMinutesOnline,”2010).Theglobalaveragetime

spentperpersononsocialmediasitesisnownearlyfiveandahalfhourspermonth

(JenniferVanGrove,2010).PopularsocialmediaincludeFacebook,Twitter,

LinkedIn,YouTube,Flickr,andTumblr.

Facebook

FacebookisasocialnetworkservicelaunchedinFebruary2004.Asof

January2011ithasmorethan600millionactiveusers(NicholasCarison,2011).

AccordingtoMashable.com:

Facebookisasocialutilitythathelpspeoplecommunicatemoreefficiently

withtheirfriends,familyandcoworkers.Thecompanydevelops

technologiesthatfacilitatethesharingofinformationthroughthesocial

graph,thedigitalmappingofpeople'sreal‐worldsocialconnections.Anyone

cansignupforFacebookandinteractwiththepeopletheyknowinatrusted

environment.Facebookisapartofmillionsofpeople’slivesandhalfofthe

usersreturndaily(retrieved2/26/2011).

6

Twitter

Twitterdescribesitselfas“areal‐timeinformationnetworkthatconnects

youtothelatestinformationaboutwhatyoufindinteresting.”Amicro‐blogging

site,Twitterallowsuserstosendoutmessagesinshortspurtsofupto140

charactersper“tweet.”Userscan“follow”otherusersorcommunicatebysearching

forhashtags(e.g.#egypt),user‐identifiedkeywordsthatcluereadersintowhat

othersthinkisimportant.TwitterisbasedinSanFrancisco,butit'susedbypeople

innearlyeverycountryintheworld,andisavailableinEnglish,French,German,

Italian,Japanese,andSpanish.AsofSeptember2010,thereare175million

registeredusersandanaverageof95milliontweetswritteneachday(retrieved

February25,2011).

Twitterisanextremelypersonalmethodofcommunication.Usersmust

chosewhomtheyfollow,andthuscreateauniqueexperiencethatisspecificto

them.

Likeemailorthetelephone,Twitterisanon‐prescriptivecommunication

platform.Eachuserexperiences"Twitter"differentlydependingonthetime

ofdayandfrequencyshechecksherfeed,theotherpeopleshefollows,and

theinterface(s)sheusestoaccessthenetwork.Becauseofthisflexibility,

normsemerge,mutate,collide,andfadeawayamongTwitteruserswitha

fluiditythatmaynotbeeasilyapprehendabletoanon‐user...(Driscoll,

2010).

7

OneofthestrengthsofTwitteristhatitcanbeaccessedusingcomputersor

mobilephones,makingitalightweightmethodofcommunicatingduringcrisis.

YouTube

AccordingtoMashable.com,YouTube,foundedinFebruary2005,isthe

leaderinonlinevideo,andthepremierdestinationtowatchandshareoriginal

videosworldwidethroughaWebexperience.YouTubeallowspeopletoeasily

uploadandsharevideoclipsonwww.YouTube.comandacrosstheInternetthrough

websites,mobiledevices,blogs,andemail(retrievedFebruary25,2011).YouTube

changedthewaypeoplesharevideosbecauseitcreatedasimplewaytoshare

otherwisecumbersomeandlargevideofiles.BeforeYouTube,itwasdifficultto

sharevideowithalargenumberofpeople.

Flickr

Flickrisaphoto‐sharingsitethatallowsuserstosharephotoson

www.flickr.comorthroughembeddedappsonotherwebsites.Flickrallowsusersto

tagphotoswithkeywords,whichcreatescommunitiesaroundcommoninterestsor

events.

8

SOCIALMEDIACOMMUNICAITON:THREESTUDIES

Therearemanyrecentexamplesofhowsocialmediaischanging

communication,butthreecasesstandout:the2008attacksinMumbai,the2009

Iranrevolution,andthe2010Haitiearthquake.Thissectionwillproviderealworld

examplesofhowsocialmediaarebeingusedforcommunication.

2008AttacksinMumbai

TheattacksinMumbai,IndiaoccurredonNovember26,2008.Pakistani

gunmantargetingAmericanandBritishcitizensforuseashostageskilledatleast

101peopleandwounded200inthetouristareasintheIndianfinancialcenterof

Mumbai(Magnier&Sharma,2008).Twohotels,thecity’slargesttrainstation,a

Jewishcenter,amovietheater,andahospitalwereattackedwithmachine‐gunsand

grenades(Sengupta,2008).

Immediatelyaftertheattacksbegan,firsthandaccountsbeganshowingupon

Twitter,Flickr,andothersocialmediasites.Peoplenearthesiteoftheattacks

sharedlocationswherebloodwasneededandgavereportsonthehealthoftheir

familyandfriendsandtheactivityofboththepoliceandtheterrorists(Leggio,

2008).

@mumbaiattack:Hospitalupdate.Shotsstillbeingfired.AlsoMetrocinemanextdoor

@aeropolowoman:BloodneededatJJhospital

Figure1Sampletweetsduring2008Mumbaiattack(Shachtman,2008).

9

SocialmediauseduringtheMumbaiattackspromptedadebateoverthe

ethicsof“citizenjournalists”onsocialmedia.Socialmediausersareobviouslynot

heldtothestandardsthattraditionaljournalistsare,andthetweetsandposts

comingfromtheMumbaiattackswereproblematic.Rumorsbegantocirculatethat

theIndiangovernmentwasaskingpeopleatthesiteoftheattacksandelsewhere

nottopostthelocation/activityofpoliceforfearthattheterroristswouldutilize

thisinformation(Leggio,2008).Additionally,somewarnedthatbecausecitizen

journalistsoftenpostunconfirmedinformationthatcanquicklyberetweetedor

repostedbyhundredsofpeople,socialmediacanconsequentlycreatechaos.In

crisissituations,thiscanhappeneasilyandisnotaphenomenonlimitedtonew

media.

OnebloggerlikenedtheMumbaisocialmediachaostothechaosthatensued

duringhurricaneKatrina,beforesocialmediawassoubiquitous.“Frenziedmedia

recycledandamplifiedmanyoftheunverifiedreports.”Nationalmediareportedon

rumors“thataninfant'sbodyhadbeenfoundinatrashcan,thatsharksfromLake

Pontchartrainwereswimmingthroughthebusinessdistrict,thathundredsof

bodieshadbeenstackedintheSuperdomebasement,”whichgainedcredencewith

eachretelling(Rosenblatt&Rainey,2005).InMumbai,thoughsomeofthe

informationsharedthroughsocialmediawasundoubtedlyhelpfulandlegitimate,

cynicspointedoutthatmuchofitwasrepetitiveorvalueless,orsimplyrepeatedthe

reportsfrommainstreammedia(Caulfield&Karmali,2008).

10

TheMumbaicaseshowsusthatwhilesocialmediauseinacrisissituation

maybehelpfultothoseonthegroundandthoseseekinginformationaboutthe

crisis,itisdangerousbecauseitcancauseorincreasethespreadofrumorsand

misinformation.

2009IranRevolution

The2009Iranianpresidentialelectionprotests,alsocalledthe“Green

Revolution”andthe“PersianAwakening,”beganonJune13,2009.Protesters

disputedthevictoryofMahmoudAhmadinejadinsupportofMir‐HosseinMousavi,

contendingthatAhmadinejadhadwontheelectionfraudulently(Bower,Amanpour,

Desta,&Bozorgmehr,2009).

Tocountertheprotesters,theregimecensorednewspapers,blocked

websites,andjammedsatellitetransmissions.Thetelephonesystemusedfor

textingwastakendown(“EDITORIAL:Iran’sTwitterrevolution,”2009)Atone

point,allInternetconnectionsweretakendownforaperiodof20hours

(Moscaritolo,2009).

Despitetheeffortsoftheregimetoquietprotesters,socialmediawasusedto

broadcasttheprotestsandviolencesurroundingthemtotheworld.Iran“byone

estimate”hasmorebloggerspercapitathananyothercountryintheworld.“Any

Iranianwithamobilephonecouldfilmtheprotestsandtheresponseofthesecurity

forces.Hourbyhour,theseclipsfoundtheirwayontoYouTubeandcountless

bloggingsites”(Blair,2009).Theprotestswerequicklynicknamed“TheTwitter

Revolution”becauseoftheactivists’relianceonthesocialnetworkfor

11

communication.Atitspeak,asearchfor"Iran"onTwittergeneratedover100,000

tweetsperdayandover8,000tweetsperhour(Boguta,2009).

ProtestersusedTwitterandothersocialmediatowarneachotherofdangers

andcommunicatebasicinformation.

[Iranians]used[Twitter]totelleachotherwhereNOTtogo.Theyuseditto

helpeachother.Thegovernmentdidwhatitcouldtobogdownthe

communicationnetworks(boththeInternetandSMS),butpeopleboth

insideandoutsideIranmadestridesincreatingwork‐aroundstotheblocks,

likesecureserverspaceoutsideofIranforuseinprotest‐organizingmessage

boards(Vafa,2010).

InIran,thereisonlyoneInternetprovider,thegovernment‐runcompany

DataCommunicationofIran(DCI).DCIcanprogramitsInternetrouterstoblock

accesstoparticularsites,likeYouTube.DCIcanalsothrottlebackthetotalamount

ofInternetdataenteringorleavingthecountry,oritcanshutofftheInternet

altogether(Bray,2009).However,Twittermessagescanbesentbymanywebsites,

makingitimpossibleforthegovernmenttofindandblockeachone.Thisiswhy

Twitterrosetothetopofcommunicationmethodsduringtheprimeoftheprotests.

Asthemessagesfromsocialmediabegantoreachtherestoftheworld,

peopleoutsideofIranturnedtheirhomecomputersintowhatisknownasa

“proxy,”avirtualhostthatsubstitutesforthehomeconnectionofusersinIran,

allowingthemtobypassthefiltersemployedbyIraniangovernmentcensors(Bray,

12

2009).Takingitastepfurther,politicalactivistsusedTwitterandothersocial

mediasitestorecruithackerstohelpwiththeprotests,callingforDDoS

(Distributeddenial‐of‐service)attacksagainstIraniangovernmentwebsites,making

themunusableortakingthemdowncompletely(Moscaritolo,2009).

Thiscrisisalsomarkedanincreasedunderstandingoftheproblemssocial

media’stransparency(orfalsesenseoftransparency)canbring.Therewerea

numberofreportsthatTwitteraccounts,emailaddresses,andFacebookaccounts

werehackedbywhatappearstobetheIraniangovernment.“[Itisbelieved]that

sincesomeofthose[hackedaccountswere]usedtospreadmisinformationabout

thelocationofrallies,itwasanorganizedorsemi‐organizedeffortbytheIranian

governmenttospreadmisinformation”(Moscaritolo,2009).

ThecrisisinIranhighlightedthevalueofTwitterbysharingthestrugglesof

theIranianprotesterswiththeworld,seeminglyattheverymomentwhenTwitter’s

valuewasbeingquestioned(Bray,2009).“WhentheSovietUnionsuppressedthe

revoltsinHungaryin1956andPraguein1968,itdidsobehindaconvenientveilof

secrecy.Today'stechnologyensuresthatIran'sregimewillnotbesofortunate”

(Blair,2009).Ahmadinejadremainsinpowerasofthiswriting,butthesuccessof

theGreenRevolutionmaynotdependsolelyondeposingAhmadinejad.Asone

bloggerwrote:

Iranisarguablyoneofthemostenigmaticandisolatedcountriesinthe

world.Yetforthepastyear,MILLIONSofnon‐Iranianshavebeenmade

awareofthedemocraticaspirationsoftheIranianpeople.Isthisworthless?

After30+yearsofmischaracterizationandOrientalistrhetoricbeingthrown

13

againstamonolithicIranianidentity,peoplefromallovertheearthlearned

thatIraniansareyoung,intelligent,powerful,tech‐savvy,andhatetheir

crookedgovernmentasmuchastherestoftheworlddoes(Vafa,2010).

Theuseofsocialmediaduringthe2009Iranrevolutionhighlightsboththe

benefitsanddangersofusingsocialmediaforcommunication.Socialmediacanbe

usedtoprovideinformationtopeopleontheground,butitcanalsobeusedto

spreadmisinformationorinformtheoppositionofprotesters’locationorpersonal

information.Perhapsmostimportantly,socialmediacanbeusedtospread

awarenessofanissueworldwide.

2010HaitiEarthquake

OnJanuary12,2010thePort‐au‐PrinceregionofHaitiwasstruckbya

magnitude7.0earthquake(“U.S.GeologicalSurveyHomepage,”nd).Haitiisoneof

thepoorestcountriesintheworld,andwasill‐equippedtohandletheaftermathof

thequakewhichaffected3millionpeople(“RedCross:3MHaitiansAffectedby

Quake,”2010).

CharityeffortsonFacebookandTwitter“grewbyleapsandbounds”the

weekoftheearthquake(Valentino‐DeVries,2010).Adigitalcampaignthatallowed

peopletotextanumbertodonatemoneytotheRedCross(thedonationwould

appearontheirnextphonebill)raisedover3milliondollarsinjust48hours.

CelebritiespromotedthecampaignonTwitter,whichhelpedtoquicklybreak

14

mobilegivingrecords.UserscouldchangetheirFacebookstatusestoreflecthow

muchmoneytheyhaddonated,anddonatetheydid.RedCrossspokesperson

JonathanAikendescribeditas"aphenomenalnumberthat'sneverbeenachieved

before"(Gross,2011).

TheRedCrosswasjustoneorganizationusingtheInternettoraisemoney

forthecause.Quicklyafterthequake,callsfordonationsonlinewereubiquitous

(Gross,2011).Evenvirtualworldshadcallsfordonations.Forexample,userscould

purchasevirtualgoodsinthepopularFacebookgameFarmvilletoraisefundsfor

theearthquakevictims(Mainwaring,2011).

Adesignblogger,JeanineHays,starteda“BloggersDayofAction,”anidea

thatstartedwithatweetandeventuallyunitedmanybloggersandraisedthousands

ofdollars.TheideawasthateachbloggerwouldcreateapostaboutHaitiandlinkto

asitewherereaderscoulddonatetothecause.Somebloggerstookthedayofaction

fartherbyauctioningartworktoraisemoneyforHaitiorvowingtodonatemoney

foreverycommentreceivedontheirblog.

15

TheDayofActionshowedjusthoweffectivesocialmediatoolscanbeinuniting

otherwiseunconnectedpeopleforacause.

Thismovementhighlightsthepowerofasingleaction‐aswellaspotential

directionsforthebloggingcommunitytoevolveintoleadersofchange,

echoingthesentimentsofanthropologistMargaretMead,‘Neverdoubtthata

smallgroupofthoughtful,committedcitizenscanchangetheworld.Indeed,

itistheonlythingthateverhas’(Rubenstein,2010).

TheflipsidetothegooddoneusingsocialmediaisthatFacebook,Twitter,

andsitespromotingdonationswereplaguedwithscamssoonafterthequake

(Valentino‐DeVries,2010).Thisbringstoattentionamajorproblemofsocial

media—justasitallowseveryonetobea“citizenjournalist”withnochecksor

balances,italsorequireseveryonetobeabletodiscernwhatisnews,whatis

nonsense,andwhatisascam.

Figure2.ImageusedtodesignatethatablogwasparticipatingintheBloggersDayofActionforHaiti.

16

SocialmediausefortheHaitiearthquakereliefillustratesthepowerofsocial

mediatoquicklyraisemoneyforacauseandconnectotherwiseunaffiliatedpeople,

butalsoexposesthedangerofscams.

17

LITERATUREREVIEW

HowSocialMediaisusedforSocialChange

OnlineCommunication

Tounderstandhowsocialmediacanbeusedforsocialchange,itisimportant

tounderstandthewaysthatonecancommunicateonline.Thissectionwilldiscuss

thewaysthatuserscancommunicateandinteractwithgroupsofpeople.Agroup

canbeaformallyorganizednumberofpeopleorsimplypeoplewhoidentifywith

similarvaluesorwhohaveacommoninterestorexperience.Forexample,Flickr

userswhotagtheirphotoswiththesameeventtagcouldbeconsideredagroup.

Userscan:

• Virtuallyjoinagroup• Getupdatesandmessagesaboutagroup• Read,post,orcommentonnewsandinformation• Receive/sendprivatemessageswithgroupleadersandmembers• Readandengageintransparentconversationsthatcanbeseenbyothers• “Lurk”inagroup—readinformationwithoutmakingoneselfknownasa

followerormemberofthegroup• Interactwithothersdespitesocialorlocationboundaries

Communicationonlineisdifferentfromtheone‐waycommunicationof

television,radio,andnewspapersbecauseonlineuserscanrespondtomessagesin

realtime,notjustreceivethem.However,muchlikelearningofanewsstoryfrom

television,receiversofthatinformationarenotnecessarilyproneforaction.Even

thosewhovirtually“join”agroupmaytakenofurtheraction.“Insteadofattending

meetings,workshopsandrallies,un‐committedindividualscanjoinaFacebook

18

grouporfollowaTwitterfeedathome,whichgivesthemsomemeasureof

anonymitybutdoesnotnecessarilymotivatethemtophysicallyhitthestreetsand

providefuelforarevolution”(Papic&Noonan,2011).

Therearesomeclearbenefitsofonlinecommunicationforsocialchange.

Onlinegroupsarelessexpensivefortraining,recruitment,andorganizationthan

traditionalmethods(Papic&Noonan,2011).Mostpeoplearealreadyusingthe

socialmediaplatformsthatactivistscanuseforcommunication,sothereisnoneed

toconvincerecruitstofindorjoinanothersite,orinthecaseoftraditionalmedia,

watchorsubscribetoanewprogramorpublication(Greeley,2011).Also,groupsof

peoplenaturallyformgroupsaroundsharedcausesorinterests,sofindingan

audienceiseasyonline(Mainwaring,2011).

Studieshaveshownthatpeoplewhoareactiveonlinearelikelytobeactivein

groupactivities.ThePewResearchCenterfoundthat80%ofInternetusers

participateingroups,comparedwith56%ofnon‐Internetusers.Socialmediausers

areevenmorelikelytobeactive:82%ofsocialnetworkusersand85%ofTwitter

usersaregroupparticipants(Rainie,Purcell,&Smith,2011,p.2).Additionally,if

usersfeelthattheycanactuallymakeadifference,theyaremorelikelytoengagein

agroup(Rainieetal.,2011,p.14).

Incrisissituations,liketheHaitiearthquakeorMumbaiattacks,therearemore

broadcast‐basedinformationsharingactivities,wheretheuserispushing

informationouttomanyusersandnotdirectingittowardonespecificuser(Hughes

&Palen,2009).Thisisdifferentfromthewaysocialmediaisnormallyused,but

19

thesekindsofcommunicationsindisastercontextscanserveimportanttactical,

communitybuilding,andemotionalfunctions(Palen&Liu,2007,p.728).Also,a

studybyHughesandPalen(2009)foundthatthosewhobeginusingsocialmedia

duringacrisisaremorelikelytobecomelong‐termusersofsocialmedia.

Activistswhousesocialmediaforsocialchangecanusethemtoplanin‐real‐life

andin‐virtual‐lifemeetings,keepfollowersinformedabouteventsandnews,and

gainfollowers.Socialmediausecanincreaseusers’self‐efficacytojoinacause

because,inpart,theirpeers’involvementandactionsaretransparent.Itcanalsobe

usefulbygivinganon‐the‐groundviewtopeoplenotculturallyorphysicallyclose

totheusers.

MotivatingPoliticalAction

Regardlessofthekindsoftoolsusedfororganizationandcommunication,

socialchangerequiresalotofwork.Revolutionstakeorganizing,funding,andmass

appeal(Papic&Noonan,2011).Evenawell‐organizedrevolutionmustgothrough

an“activistprocessofsocialtransformation—whichincludesinformation

acquisition,knowledgedevelopment,transferandsharing;ideationandthought

leadership;empathyandemotionalconnection;andthespreadofcredibleideas

thatinspirecognitivedissonance”(Leggio,2008).

Animportantaspectofmotivatingsocialchangeisconvincingpeoplethat

theirparticipationwillmakeadifference,especiallyiftheirparticipationwill

requirethemtoexperiencepersonaldiscomfortordanger.Thisisnosmalltask.

20

Inlargegroups,suchasthoseinvolvedinacollectivepoliticalprotest,the

contributiontotheactionofeachordinarymember(i.e.,onewhoisnota

leaderofthegroup)hasnodiscernibleimpactonthegroup’soverallsuccess;

therefore,therationalindividualwillnotabsorbthecostofparticipation

(suchastime,financialresources,orthethreatofphysicalinjury),sinceheor

shewillenjoythepublicgoodinanycaseifothersprovideit(Finkel,Muller,

&Opp,1989,p.886).

Gladwellpointsoutthattheworkbehindtosocialchangeisnowoften

associatedpurelywiththetoolspeopleusetocommunicate,insteadofthepeople

behindthework.Itshouldbenotedthatregardlessofthetoolsusedinplanningand

organizing,fromwordofmouthtoradiotoInternet,thesamebasicprinciplesof

motivationmustbeapplied.Socialmediamaymakethetaskofcommunicating

informationeasier,butthetaskofconvincingpeopletotakepersonalrisksisnot

lessened.

TheInfluenceoftheMedia

Socialmediatoolshavebeenpraisedfortheabilitytoreachmanypeople,but

thetransitionfromreachtoactionisdebated.Infact,theargumentoverwhetheror

notthemediainfluencessocialchangeisnotnew.Intheir1948study,Lazarfeldand

Mertonarguedthatthemassmediacancauseaudiencestobecomeknowledgeable

aboutasubject,buttakenoaction(Lazarfeld&Merton,1996,p.11).Thus,they

arguedthatmediacreatenosocialchange,butinsteadworkstoenforceexisting

socialvalues.Forexample,thoughtelevision,newspapers,andothermediareach

21

massiveamountsofpeople,itisimpossibletotellthe“socialandpsychological

impact”thatthiscauses(p.11).

Accordingtothestudy,inventionsthat“enlargetheradiusofmovementand

action”liketheautomobilehaveagreatereffectonsocietythaninventionsthat

“provideavenuesforideas–ideaswhichcanbeavoidedbywithdrawal,deflectedby

resistance,andtransformedbyassimilation”liketelevision,radio,orcomputers(p.

12).Thisisbecauseinventionsthatprovideavenuesforideascanlullpeopleintoa

falsesenseofcomplacency—theycanmistaketheirbeinginformedforbeing

engaged,andconsequentlydonothing.

Thisideamayeasilybeappliedtosocialmedia—onecanseehowtheover

abundanceofinformationstreamingonaTwitterfeed,forexample,couldbringa

personnottowardsaction,butover‐stimulationorafalsesenseofunderstanding.

Forexample,apersonmightlearnaboutthemassiveearthquakereliefeffortson

Twitter,butnotbecompelledtodonatebecauseofthefeelingthattheyarealready

involved.

Withsomuchinformationavailableinaninstant,itisdifficulttoknowwhat

topayattentiontointhefirstplace.KovasBoguta,aco‐founderofInfoharmoni,a

companythatanalyzesInternetdata,asks,“HowdoesanInternetjunkie,news

organization,orpoliticaloperativemonitorrapidlyevolvingreal‐timeevents,from

thecrucialdetailstothebiggerpicture?Moreimportantly,howcanadatastreambe

turnedintoreal‐timeaction,reachingthepeoplewhoneedit,whentheyneedit,and

inaformtheycaneasilydigest?”(Boguta,2009).Inthisway,socialmediais

differentfromtelevision,newspapers,orradiobecauseaneditordoesnotfilterthe

22

informationstreamedonsocialmedia.Thisgivesavoicetothosewhomaynot

otherwisehaveone,butthosevoicesmaybeconsideredunreliable.

TheTheoryofTies

Animportantpartofcommunicatingforsocialchangeinvolvesthetheoryof

ties.Insociology,weaktiesarelooseacquaintancesthatcanhelpafriendgenerate

creativeideas,findajob,andtransferknowledge,whilestrongtiesaretrusted

friendsandfamilywhocanaffectemotionalhealthandoftenjointogethertolead

organizationsthroughtimesofcrisis(Granovetter,1973,p.1365).Weaktiescan

helpjobseekers,whorelyonquantityofconnectionsforjobleadsandreferences.

Forexample,ajobseekerwhohasheldmanypreviousjobsmayhavemoreluck

findinganewpositionthanonewhoheldthesamejobformanyyears,becausethe

formerhasmanyconnections,howeverinformal,torelyon.

Gladwellsaysthatweaktiesdonothelppeoplecreatesocialchange.Hecites

StanfordsociologistDougMcAdamwhostudiedwhycertainpeopleparticipatedin

the1960civilrightslunchcountersitin.

Whatmatteredmorewasanapplicant’sdegreeofpersonalconnectiontothe

civil‐rightsmovement.Allthevolunteerswererequiredtoprovidealistof

personalcontacts—thepeopletheywantedkeptapprisedoftheir

activities—andparticipantswerefarmorelikelythandropoutstohaveclose

friends...High‐riskactivism...isa“strong‐tie”phenomenon(Gladwell,

2010).

Ifstrongtiesareessentialforsocialchange,andsocialmediadonotcreate

strongties,perhapsitisimportanttonotethatpeoplemayhavefewerstrongties

23

thantheydidwhenGranovettercoinedthetermin1973.AstudybyMcPhersonet.

alin2004foundthatthenumberofpeoplewhosaythereisnoonewithwhomthey

discussimportantmattershastripled.Thestudyrecreatedthe1985GeneralSocial

Survey,whichcollecteddateontheconfidantsofAmericans.Accordingtothe

study’sfindings,theubiquityofrecenttechnologysuchascomputersandmobile

phonesmayhaveaffectedpeople’srelationshipsandties:

“While[computer]technologiesallowanetworktospreadoutacross

geographicspaceandmightevenenhancecontactsoutsidethehome(e.g.,

arrangingameetingatarestaurantorbar),theyseem,however,tolowerthe

probabilityofhavingface‐to‐facevisitswithfamily,neighbors,orfriendsin

one’shome...Internetusagemayeveninterferewithcommunicationinthe

home,creatingapost­familialfamilywherefamilymembersspendtime

interactingwithmultiplecomputersinthehome,ratherthanwitheach

other.[Thissuggests]thatcomputertechnologymayfosterawider,less‐

localizedarrayofweakties,ratherthanthestrong,tightlyinterconnected

confidanttiesconfidantties(McPhersonetal.,2006,p.373).

Still,maybetheInternetallowsweaktiestobeutilizedinadifferentway.For

example,asdecribedintheHaitiearthquakecase,manypeoplewithlittleorno

strongconnectionwiththecountrydonatedmoney.Peopleweremotivatedtodo

goodwhentheysawtheblogposts,tweets,andstatusupdatesoftheirpeers.In

thatcase,awarenesswasraisedviaanetworkofweakties.

24

...byspreadingawarenessviaweakties,othersocialrolescanbedefined

andfilled,perhapsbysomeindividualslessstronglycommittedthecausebut

importantintermsoftheirpositionswithinthenetwork(hitthe'donate

here'button!)(Srinivansan,2010).

The$10onepersondonateddidn’tmakeabigdifferenceinthereliefeffort,butby

sharingthedonationonsocialmediahundredsmore(weaklyconnectedpeople)

werecalledtoactiontodonateandshareaswell.

ExternalFactorsthatAffectSocialMediaUse

CulturalDifferencesinSocialMediaUse

SocialmediasiteslikeFacebookareusedbymanydifferentcountriesand

cultures,butnotnecessarilyinthesameway.Studieshaveshownthatcultural

differencesprofoundlyimpactthewaypeopleusesocialmedia.

Onestudyidentifiedfiveareasinwhichculturaldifferencesaffected

communication:design,language,languagesubtleties,Internetperformance,and

facesandavatars(McGrath,2009).Thistellsusthatthoughpopularsiteslike

FacebookandTwittermaybeusedbymanydifferentcultures,theymaybeutilizing

orunderstandingthefeaturesindifferentways.

AnotherstudyusedtheGeertHofstedeframeworktoexaminesocialmedia

useacrossdifferentcultures.Thisframework“definesnationalculturesusingfive

dimensions—PowerDistance(PDI),Individualism(IDV),Masculinity(MAS),

25

UncertaintyAvoidance(UAI),andLongTermOrientation(LTO).”Differentcultures

havedifferentlevelsofthesedimensions.Forexample:

Individualism(IDV)versusCollectivismdescribesthedegreetowhichindividuals

areintegratedintogroups.Inindividualistculturesthetiesbetweenindividuals

areloose:everyoneisexpectedtolookafterhim/herselfandhis/herimmediate

family.Incollectivistcultures,peoplefrombirthonwardsareintegratedinto

strong,cohesivein‐groups,oftenextendedfamilieswhichcontinueprotecting

theminexchangeforunquestioningloyalty(Mishra,2008).

Becauseofdifferencesincultures,peoplemayusesocialmediatoolsdifferently.For

example,Facebooktreatsall“friends”asthesame,butsomeculturesmayhave

differentexpectationsfordifferentrelationships.Thismayalsofactorintoavarietyof

aspectsofsocialmedia,suchasthewaytiestrengthisperceived,andthusaltertheway

differentculturesareabletousesocialmediaforsocialchange.Thisshouldbe

consideredwhenanalyzingtheuseofsocialmediaforsocialchangeinothercultures.

LegitimacyofSocialMedia

Onereasonwhysocialmediacoverageofcrisisorrevolutionmaybesucha

popularsourceofinformationisthattheremaybelittleornootherwaytogetthe

informationthatisbroadcastusingsocialmedia.Forexample,AlJazeeraEnglish,

whichofferscoverageoftheMiddleEast,oftenwhennoothermediawillorcan,is

notcarriedbyanymajorAmericancableorsatellitecompanies,andcanonlybe

foundonafewsmallcablesystemsinWashington,D.C.,Ohio,andVermont(Rich,

2011).

26

Foralltheattentionsocialmediahasgottenfromthemedia,government

officialsmayhavebeenignoringit.AfterthecrisiseruptedinEgypttheCIAwas

accusedofnotgivingPresidentObamaenoughwarningtimetoprepareforthe

seriousnessofthecrisis.SeniorU.S.lawmakersusedaSenatehearingtoaccusethe

CIAofbeingslowtograspthe“opensource”revolution(GregMiller,2011).(Greg

Miller,2011).Thismarksanimportantpartofthedebateovertheusefulnessof

socialmediainacrisis.Socialmediaisatransparentformofcommunicationthatis

changingthewaypeoplereceiveandinteractwithnewsandinformation,butone

thatisonlynowbeingseenaslegitimate.

TheDigitalDivide

Oneofthebiggestconcernswhenanalyzingtheeffectofsocialmediauseon

socialchangeisthequestionofwhohasaccesstotheInternet.The“digitaldivide”

describesthe“potentialforadividebetweenthoseconnectedtotheInternetand

thosenotconnected,sometimeswordedasthedividebetweentheinformation

have'sandhave'snot”(J.Steyaert,2002).Anillustrationofthisproblemcanbeseen

ina2010mapoftheworldasshownbyFacebookusers(seeAppendixA).

Figure3showsInternetusersintheworlddistributedbyworldregions.We

canseethatAfricaaccountsforonly5.6%oftheworld’sInternetusersandthe

MiddleEastonly3.2%.

27

Figure3Internetusersworldwide.(“WorldInternetUsageStatisticsNewsandWorldPopulationStats,”2010)

IfthemajorityofapopulationdoesnothaveaccesstotheInternet,thesuccessof

socialmediauseforsocialchangeeffortswillclearlybelimited.

PolicyImplications

Socialmediausehasclearlysurpassedthe“earlyadopter”stage.Withsomany

users,itishardtosaywhohascontroloveralloftheinformationsharedusingsites

likeFacebook,Twitter,andYouTube.Muchhasbeenmadeof“citizenjournalists,”

buttheycannotbeheldtotheethicalstandardsoftraditionaljournalists.Privacy

concernshavebeenapartofsocialmediaforyears,butassocialmediabecomes

moreintegratedintothewaypeoplecommunicate,complexissueshavearisen.The

rangeofproblemsisdiverse,rangingfromdebateoveraniPhoneappthatallows

userstoavoidDUIcheckpoints(“CheckpointerforiPhone,iPodtouch,andiPadon

theiTunesAppStore,”n.d.)togovernmentshackingintoactivists’profiles

(Madrigal,2011).

28

InaJanuary2010address,HillaryClintonsaid,"Newtechnologiesdonot

takesidesinthestruggleforfreedomandprogressbuttheUnitedStatesdoes(York,

2010).ThisstatementreiteratestheproblemGladwellcomplainedof,thatwe

personifytoolsinsteadofactions,butalsoraisesanimportantquestion.Whomakes

therulesofsocialmedia:thegovernment,theplatform,ortheusers?“[Socialmedia

platforms]often[lack]eventhelanguageskillstomakemoralandpolitical

judgmentsinothercountries.Nor[dothey]offerbasicconstitutionalprotections

suchashabeascorpusortherighttofaceyouraccuser”(Greeley,2011).Ifactivists

inEgyptareusingsocialmediaplatformsdevelopedintheU.S.,whoserulesshould

theyfollow?

Anotherquestionthatpertainstothetopicofsocialmediaandsocialchange

isthequestionofwhohasarighttohaveasocialmediapresence.Certainlyone

wouldagreethatthosewhousesocialmediatobeabusiveorthreateningshould

notbeallowedtocontinue,butthenon‐transparentpoliciesthatsomeplatforms

haveontheissueofdeletingaccountsmakestheissuecomplicated.Forexample,

Facebook’spolicyondeletingprofilesisunclear(anissueinitself),butitseemsthat

itiseasyforuserstogetotherusers’accountsremoved.Anyusercan“report”

anotheruserformisconduct,andafteracertainnumberofreportstheoffending

accountistakendown.Thereisnocorrespondencewiththeremoveduser,justthe

optiontoemaildisabled@facebook.comtorequestthattheaccountbereinstated

(York,2010).OneexampleofabuseofFacebook’s“report”actioncanbeseenina

groupthatwascreatedonFacebook(inArabic)forthesolepurposeofreporting,

andthushavingremoved,FacebookprofilesofatheistArabs.Thegroup(nolonger

29

inexistence)wasentitled“Facebookpesticide”anditssolepurposewasto“identity

Atheists/Agnostic/anti‐religionintheArabworld.”Onceidentified,thegroup

memberswouldthenattempttoreportsuchusersuntiltheiraccountswere

deactivated(York,2010)

Itiseasytoseehowthiscanaffectactivistsusingsocialmediaforsocial

change.IfanactivistisusingFacebooktoorganizeeventsandrelaymessages,it

maybeeasyfortheopposingsidetohavehisorheraccountdeactivated,thereby

cuttingoffthesourceofinformationandforcingthegrouptofindanotherwayto

communicate.

Facebook’sreal‐namepolicyhasalsocausedastir.Recently,popularChinese

bloggerandactivistMichaelAnti’sFacebookaccountwasdisabledbecausehewas

notusinghislegalname,ZhaoJing.AntihadbeenusingthenameMichaelAntifor

morethanadecadeinhisactivistwork,andhasbeenpublishedsolelyunderthat

name.“Bylockinghimoutofhisaccount,Facebookhascuthimofffromanetwork

ofmorethan1,000academicandprofessionalcontactswhoknowhimasAnti”

(Tran,2011).

Therealnamepolicyposesaseriousthreattoactivistsorganizinga

revolutionbecausethetransparentnatureofsocialmediaallowsthegovernmentto

seetheiractionsandtakeactionagainstthemiftheydeemnecessary.

Furthermore,thereseemstobelittledocumentationonwhycertainprofiles

aredeletedforreal‐namepolicyviolationsandothersarenot.AquickFacebook

searchfortheuser“SantaClaus”willillustratethispoint.

30

TheoppositeofFacebook’sreal‐namepolicyisthelackofverificationfoundon

othersocialmediasites.Twitter,YouTube,andLinkedIndonothavestrictreal

namepolicies(LinkedInhasavaguerulethatonecannot“Createauserprofilefor

anyoneotherthananaturalperson”).Thiscreatesdifferentproblemsforactivists—

onecannotbesurethatpeoplearewhotheysaytheyare(asmentionedbrieflyin

rumorsofgovernmentimpersonatingactivistsinIranexampleabove).

Insomecases,socialmediaplatformsmaybeaskedbygovernmentsorlaw

enforcementtoturnoversomeuserinformationortohelpidentifycriminals.

AccordingtoFacebook'sChiefSecurityOfficerJoeSullivan:

Wegetrequestsallthetimeinafewdifferentcontextswherepeoplewould

liketoimpersonatesomeoneelse.Policewantingtogoundercoverorhuman

rightsactivists,say.Andwe,justbasedonourcoremissionandcore

product,don'twanttoallowthat.That'sjustnotwhatFacebookis.Facebook

isaplacewherepeopleconnectwithrealpeopleintheirlivesusingtheirreal

identities(Papic&Noonan,2011).

Twitterattemptstonotifyusersiftheyhavetoreleaseanyrecordsor

informationaboutthem.

Ourpositiononfreedomofexpressioncarrieswithitamandatetoprotect

ourusers'righttospeakfreelyandpreservetheirabilitytocontesthaving

theirprivateinformationrevealed.Whilewemayneedtorelease

informationasrequiredbylaw,wetrytonotifyTwitterusersbeforehanding

31

overtheirinformationwheneverwecansotheyhaveafairchancetofight

therequestiftheysochoose(Caulfield&Karmali,2008).

32

CASEPROFILE

TheuseofsocialmediaintheEgyptianrevolutionhasreceivedmuch

attention.Duringtheprotests,Twitter,Facebook,andYouTubewerekeyplayersin

communicationoftheactivists.WhentheInternetwasshutdownonJanuary27th,

theprotestsdidnotdwindle,whichbringsintoquestiontheextentofthevalueand

influencesocialmediaplayedintherevolution.Thiscaseprofilewilloutlineand

examinetheuseofsocialmediafromDecember2010untilFebruary11,2011,when

HosniMubaraksteppeddownaspresidentofEgypt.

2011EgyptianRevolution

The2011EgyptianRevolution,alsocalledtheEgyptianProtests,theLotus

Revolution,theDaysofRage,andthePapyrusRevolution,wasinspiredbyasimilar

revolutioninnearbyTunisia,whichsawtheoverthrowingofthelongtimeTunisian

president.ThousandstooktothestreetsinCairo,Alexandriaandothercitiesin

Egypttoprotestpoverty,unemployment,governmentcorruption,andtheautocratic

ruleof30‐yearpresidentHosniMubarak(CraigKanalley,2011).Theprimary

demandsfromprotestorganizersweretheendofHosniMubarak’sregime,theend

ofemergencylaw,andacallforfreedom,justice,aresponsivenon‐military

government,andmanagementofEgypt'sresources(AlexisMadrigal,2011).

Thefollowingdatesaresignificanttotherevolution:

January25,2011:ProtestsbeganJanuary27,2011:AllInternetaccessinEgyptissuspendedJanuary28,2011:PresidentHosniMubarakdeclaresanewgovernmentwillbeformed.January31,2011:AnewEgyptiangovernmentisswornin

33

February1,2011:Mubaraksaysthathewon’trunforreelectioninSeptemberFebruary2,2011:InternetservicereturnsinEgyptFebruary10,2011:Mubarakisexpectedtostepdown,butrefusesFebruary11,2011:MubarakresignsandleavesCairo

SocialMediaMomentum

TunisianRoots

TheprotestsinEgyptwereinspiredbythesuccessfulrevolutionin

neighboringTunisia,

whichsawtheoverthrow

ofdictatorZineElAbidine

BenAli.Theprotests

beganaftera26‐year‐old

fruitvendor,Mohamed

Bouazizi,sethimselfon

firetoprotestthe

injusticesoflifeunderBen

Ali.AFacebookpageinhishonormadehimanationalmartyrandledtomassive

protests(Yaffa,2011).Soon,Facebookplayedacontinuingmajorroleinthe

protests,asactivistsusedthesitetosharevideosandinformationwhenmanyother

siteswereblockedbytheTunisiangovernment.

Thevideos‐‐shotshakilywithcameraphones‐‐createdalinkbetweenwhat

washappeningonthestreetsinthepoorareasofthecountryandthe

broaderTunisianpopulation.Manyaregraphic.Inonevideo‐‐sincetaken

Figure4.AphotoshopedimageofFacebookfounderMarkZuckerbergholdingupasignthatreads"SayebSala7,ya3ammer,"thesloganofafreedomofexpressioncampaigninlate2010.

34

down,apparently‐‐ayoungmanislyingonagurneywithhisskullcracked

open.Brainoozesout.Criesareheardallaround.Thevideofocusesinonthe

man'sfaceandasthecamerapullsback,weseethattherearetwoother

peoplewithcameraphonesrecordingtheinjury.Videoaftervideoofthe

revolutionaryeventscapturesotherpeoplevideoingthesameevent.Those

videos,andtheactionstheyrecorded,becametherawmaterialforamuch

greateronlineapparatusthatcouldamplifyeachinjury,death,andprotest

(Madrigal,2011).

Thevideos,pictures,andinformationaboutprotestsspreadlikewildfire,and

TunisiahadseveralhundredthousandnewFacebookusersinafewdays,with

averagetimespentonthesitedoubling.However,thiswasnotwithoutthe

government’snotice,andonlineactivistsbegantohaverun‐inswithAmmar,the

nameTunisianshavegiventotheauthoritiesthatcensortheInternet.Thousandsof

passwordswerecapturedbythegovernmentusingthecountry’sInternetService

Providerstologinformationanddeleteprofiles(Madrigal,2011).

Inthiscase,Facebooktookaction.TheyroutedallTunisianrequestsfor

Facebooktoanhttpsserver,whichencryptsinformationsothatit’snotsusceptible

tothekeyloggingstrategytheTunisiangovernmentwasusing.Theyalsoemployed

asystemthatrequireduserstoidentifytheirfriendsinphotosinordertologback

intotheiraccount(Madrigal,2011).

NeighboringEgyptwatchedtheYouTubevideos,readthetweets,joinedthe

Facebookgroups,andwatchedinaweasBenAliwasoverthrown.“Theriveting

35

imagesbeamedintomillionsofEgyptianhomesoftheTunisianuprisingappearto

haveledtoashiftinthepublicconsciousness”(Murphy,2011).ButEgyptismuch

largerthanTunisia,andmanydoubtedthatcitizenswouldbeunitedinthewaythey

wereinTunisia.

StateofAffairsinEgypt

EgyptisthelargestArabcountry(morepeopleliveinCairothaninallof

Tunisia).TheU.S.hastoleratedtheregime’s“anti‐democraticexcessesinthe

interestofstability,”andEgypthasbeenalongtimeally(Murphy,2011).Itis

currentlythesecondhighestrecipientofU.S.foreignaid(afterIsrael)(Craig

Kanalley,2011).EgyptisoneofonlytwoArabstatestohaveapeaceagreement

withIsrael.ItstraddlesthevitalSuezCanalandisconsideredahugeinfluencerof

theArabworld.

“Withitsstrategicsituation,itsculturalinfluenceandapopulationdouble

thatofanyotherArabcountry,Egypthasforthreedecadesnowbeenthe

linchpinofaprecariousbutenduringregionalPaxAmericana.IfEgyptwere

tofallintochaos,notonlythenation,butalsotheregion,wouldbedeeply

affected”(“AspecialreportonEgypt:America’slieutenant,”2010).

HosniMubarakhadbeenpresidentofEgyptsince1981,afterhis

predecessor,AnwarSadatwasassassinated.Whenhetookofficeheextendedthe

country’s“EmergencyLaw,”whichgivesthegovernmenttherightto“imprison

individualsforanyperiodoftime,andforvirtuallynoreason,thuskeepingthemin

prisonswithouttrialsforanyperiod”(CraigKanalley,2011).

36

Theongoing2011revolutionisthelargestpopularrevolutionin30years.

Manybelievethattheuseofsocialmediaforcommunicationandplanninghasmade

therevolutionpossibleforthelongunhappypeople.Oneactivisttweeted,“Weuse

Facebooktoscheduletheprotests,Twittertocoordinate,andYouTubetotellthe

world”(Howard,2011).

WithanInternetpenetrationrateof15.4percent,Egyptisaheadofmostof

Africa,thoughitlagsbehindmanyMiddleEasterncountries.Forcontrast,Iranhas

anInternetpenetrationrateof31percent,theUnitedKingdomhasarateof83.6

percent,andAfghanistanhasarateof3.6percent(“InternetFilteringinEgypt,”

2009).

Centraltothemomentumoftheprotestsweretwoviralsocialmediaefforts,

aFacebookpagecalled“WeareAllKhaledSaid”andviralvideosbyayoungwoman,

AasmaMahfouz.

WeareAllKhaledSaid

KhaledSaidwasa28‐year‐oldmanfromAlexandriawhowasbeatentodeathby

policeafterallegedlypostingavideoshowingpolicesharingdrugsfromadrugbust.

AFacebookpage,“WeareallKhaledSaid,”servedasamemorialandhad473,000

users(asofFebruary6,2011).ThebiggestdissidentFacebookpageinEgypt,the

pageunitedEgyptiansinrageaboutSaid’sdeathwithpostsofcellphonephotosof

Said’sbatteredbodyinthemorgueandYouTubevideoscontrastingpicturesofa

healthySaidwiththemorgueimages(Preston,2011).

37

InDecember2010Facebookdisabledthegroupbecauseitsadministratorswere

usingpseudonyms.Thegroupwasreinstatedwhenanadministrator,WaelGhonim,

offeredhisrealname(Greeley,2011).“Thepagequicklybecameaforceful

campaignagainstpolicebrutalityinEgypt,withaconstantstreamofphotos,videos,

andnews.Ghonim’sinteractivestyle,combinedwiththepage’scarefullycalibrated

posts—emotional,apolitical,andbroadintheirappeal—quicklyturneditintoone

ofEgypt’slargestactivistsites”(Giglio,2011).

OnJan.14theTunisiandictatorfelland“WeareAllKhaledSaid”announceda

revolutionofEgypt’sown.“Eachofthepage’s350,000‐plusfanswascordially

invitedtoaprotestonJan.25.Theycouldclick“yes,”“no,”or“maybe”tosignal

whetherthey’dliketoattend”(Giglio,2011).

Asdiscussedabove,vowingtoattendaneventorjoiningagrouponlineisnot

necessarilyatrueindicatorofthenumberofpeoplewhowillattendorbecome

involved.Thesuccessoftheprotestwasyettobeseen,andGhonimandotherswere

unsureaboutthefollow‐throughoftheirsocialmediafollowers.

Ghonim,theheadofMarketingforGoogleMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,has

littletimetodebatethemeritsofsocialmediaforsocialchange:

Thebottomlineis:Ihavenoidea...Whilesomecommentatorshyped“that

theInternetismakingarevolution,”othersproclaimedthatthe“revolution

can’tbetweeted”...Idon’tknow,andIdon’tgiveas‐‐t.I’mdoingwhatit

takestomakemycountrybetter(Giglio,2011).

38

TwodaysaftertheJanuary25protestsGhonimwasarrestedandheldfor12

days,Uponhisrelease,hewashailedastheonlineheroofthemovement,atitlehe

refutedinatweet:“Revolution2.0:Noonewasaherobecauseeveryonewasa

hero”(Porter&Beinner,2011).

AasmaMahfouz

AasmaMahfouzisa26year‐oldEgyptianwomanwhowasoneofthefoundersof

the2008April6YouthMovement(aFacebookgroupstartedinSpring2008to

supporttheworkersinanEgyptianindustrialtownwhowereplanningtostrikeon

April6).OnJanuary18thsheuploadedavideotoFacebookthatcalledforEgyptians

tojoinherinprotestatTahrirSquareonJanuary25th.Thevideowasuploadedto

YouTubeandwentviral.Themessageofthegirlwhowasunafraidtoshowherface

spreadacrossEgypt:

I’mmakingthisvideotogiveyouonesimplemessage:wewanttogodownto

TahrirSquareonJanuary25th.Ifwestillhavehonorandwanttolivein

dignityonthisland,wehavetogodownonJanuary25th.We’llgodownand

demandourrights,ourfundamentalhumanrights(Goodman,2011).

PartofthesuccessofMahfouz’svideowasthatshedidnothidebehindacomputer

screentosharehermessage.“AsmaaMahfouzspeaksdirectlytothecameraand

identifiesherself.Theboldnessofthisact,speakingoutsoforcefullyasawoman,

inspiredmanyotherstostartpostingtheirimagesonline”(Goodman,2011).

39

#Jan25

January25thwasapublicholidayinEgypt,NationalPoliceDay.Thecallstoaction

sparkedby“WeareAllKhaledSaid”andAsmaaMahfouzwererepeatedinthe

hashtag#Jan25.Activistsusedthistomarkalltweetsrelatedtotheprotests.

Figure5.Exampleofcalltouse#Jan25onTwitter.

DuringProtests

Thereisoftenadisconnectbetweenwhathappensonlineandwhat

happenedattheprotests.ButthereisnodoubtthattheprotestsinTahrirSquare

wereveryreal.

Thiswasnomovie—nostudentsit‐ineither.Some500diedintheclashes.

Thereweremanycasualtieswhenunarmedyoungmenrashlystormedthe

MinistryofInteriorbuildingandweremoweddown.Countlessmorewere

injuredwhenMubaraksupporterstriedtotakethesquare.Thosehurt

refusedtogotothehospitalforfearofbeingarrested(Porter&Beinner,

2011).

A22‐year‐oldInternetactivistnamedAhmedAbdRaboarrangedforprotestersto

sleepundertankstopreventthemfrommoving.Shereportedterrifyingdetailsof

theprotestsalongwithupliftingmomentsofhope:

40

”Whensniperswereshootingthey[theprotesters]wouldchant,‘Keepon

going.Thereare80millionofus.’”Shesawtwopeopleshotdeadandwas

herselfsavedwhenastrangercoveredinblooddraggedheroutofthewayof

achargingvehicle.Andyetshesays,“ThiswasamomentofUtopia,whenit

didnotmatterwhatyourreligionwas,howyoudressed,orwhereyoucame

from”(Porter&Beinner,2011).

Thesegraphicnarratives,images,andvideosweresenttoEgyptandtheworldby

thosewhohadaccesstothesocialmedia,butasdiscussedabove,notallofEgyptor

evenmostofEgypthasaccesstotheInternet(Internetpenetrationrateof15.4%).

Theactivists’strategyforthe#Jan25protest,plannedthroughonline

communication,wasfor“multiplefast‐movingdemonstrationsintwentylocations

aroundthecity,designedtotrytomobilizethepeopleinpoorerareas(whocould

notaffordtheluxuryofcomputersandtheInternet)andavoidtheusualpolice

tacticofcordoningoffprotestersandpreventingthemfromrallying”(Nunns&Idle,

41

2011,p.31).

Figure6.Tweetsduringtheprotests(Nunns&Idle,2011).

ThosewithInternetaccessreportedtotheworldinrealtime.Tweetsfrom

theprotestsrangedfromrallyingcriestorequestsforhelptojournalisticnote

taking.

DuringBlackout

TheInternetwasblockedinEgyptforfivedays.Manyseethisasaclear

indicatorthatactivists’useofsocialmediatoolswasahugethreattothe

government.“ThefactthatHosniMubarak’sregimetookthestepofblockingthe

Internet,despitethemillionsofdollarslosttotheeconomy,isatestamenttothe

fearitprovokedamongtherulers”(Nunns&Idle,2011,p.21).

TheInternetblockwastoolate.BythetimetheylostInternetaccessthe

protestshadalreadybeenplannedandtheactivistswerealreadytogether.Social

mediahadgonefromtoolsusedtoplanandorganizetoreal‐timereportingtools,

42

andEgypthadalreadygottentheattentionoftheworldbythetimeaccesswascut.

LiketherevolutioninIran,therestoftheworldwastunedinandwillingtohelp

activistsgetonlineorspreadnews.

[Theactivists]wenttogreatlengthstogetonlineduringthefive‐dayInternet

blackout,whentheirtweetscouldnoteasilybereadbyotherEgyptians.By

telephoningfriendsabroadtouploadtheirtweets,poolingtheirresourcesto

getontotheoneremainingInternetserviceproviderinEgypt(theoneused

bythestockexchange),orofferinginterviewstonewsorganizationsin

returnforaccesstotheirsatelliteInternetconnections,activistsmanagedto

ensurethattheregimecouldnotcutthemofffromtheworld(Nunns&Idle,

2011,p.20).

Thishighlightsanimportantaspectofusingsocialmediaforsocialchange.

Communicationforplanningandinformationsharingbetweenrevolutionariesis

importantandcrucialtoapoint,butoneofthemostimportantaspectsistheraised

worldawarenesssocialmediacanbringtoacause.Theprotestswereplanned

online,butmanyofthepeoplewhoattendedthe#Jan25protestslearnedabout

themthroughwordofmouth.Therestoftheworldbecameinvolvedthroughthe

Internet.

CASEANALYSIS

GlobalTies

Fromthecasestudyabovewecanseesocialmediatoolsinaction,rather

thanintheabstract.Theideathatclicking“like”onaFacebookpageforacausewill

translateintoactionisabsurd,butwhenthatFacebookpageisatestamentto

problemspeoplefaceintheirdailylives,thereismuchhigherlikelihoodthatthey

willtakeaction.

Weaktieshavebeensaidtobehelpfulinsituationswhereitdoesn’tcost

someonemuchtimeorefforttohelp.Forexample,someonemightasktheirTwitter

followersiftheyknowanyonewhoishiringforparttimeworkandreceivemany

replies.Gladwellsaysthatthiskindofresponsewon’thappenifasocialmediauser

asksforsomethingbig,liketimeormoney.Thismaybetrue,butwhatGladwell

doesn’tconsideristhatinarevolutionlikethatinEgypt,peopleareaskingtheir

weaktiesforhelpforaproblemthatisuniversal.Thoughtheactivistsmaynot

knowthepeopletheyrecruittoprotest,thepeopletheyarerecruitingarevery

similartothemandtheproblemstheydescribeareuniversal.

KovasBogutacreatedaninfographicthatvisualizestheEgyptianInfluence

NetworkonTwitter(seeAppendixB).Themapshowsindividualsnearthosethey

influence(thosewhoarelikelytoreadandsharetheirtweets)aswellasthe

languagetheyusetotweet(ArabicandEnglish).Thesizeofthenoderepresenting

eachindividualrepresentshowmanyotherstheyinfluence.WaelGhonimcanbe

44

seenasaninfluencerforboththeArabandWesternworlds,forexample.Boguta

notesthatmanyoftheprominentnodesontheinfographicwereatonepoint

arrested,but“theirdeepconnectivityhelpensuretheywerenot

"disappeared"(Boguta,2011).

CitizenJournalists

TheEgyptrevolutionraisesquestionsaboutwhethercitizenjournalismis

activismandwhetherparticipantscanbejournalists.Asdiscussedearlier,thefact

thatsocialmediausersdonothavetobevettedorheldtoethicalstandardsisbotha

problemandablessing.Perhapsthe“rules”ofsocialmediawillbecomecleareras

theyareembracedbythenextgenerationofsocialmediausers,bothincrisis

situationsandmorepeacefultimes.Inthiscase,citizenjournalistsinEgypthave

shownusthattheyareaforcetobereckonedwith.Socialmediacreatesan

unprecedentedoutletforthevoiceofanoppressedpeopleagainstadictatorship.

Dangers

Themassiveorganizingandactionthathappenedthroughtheuseofsocial

mediaintheEgyptrevolutionmaymakeitseemasthoughusingtheInternetasa

toolforsocialchangeisnotdangerous.EvenpostMubarak,itstillisextremely

dangerousinEgypt.OnApril11,2011TheNewYorkTimesreportedthata25year

oldblogger,Maikel Nabi, was sentenced to three years in jail for speaking out

against the Egyptian army’s abuse of female detainees. The evidence against Nabi

was a compact disc of screen shots of his personal Facebook page and blog

(Bronner, 2011).

45

Itmaybeevenworseinothercountries.AccordingtoFacebook’sChiefof

SecurityJoeSullivan,"WhenyoustepbackandthinkabouthowInternettrafficis

routedaroundtheworld,anastonishingamountissusceptibletogovernment

access”(Madrigal,2011).

Conclusion

Fromthisbriefcasestudyafewconclusionsaboutthecurrentuseofsocial

mediaforsocialchangecanbemade.

• Therearepeoplebehindthesocialmediatoolsthatareusedforsocialchange.

Acommontrendhasbeentogivecredit,atleastinname,tothetoolsusedforsocial

changeandnotthepeoplebehindthem—Iran’s“TwitterRevolution,”forexample.

Socialmediacanbeusedasatooltoraiseawareness,raisemoney,andjoinpeople

together,buttopersonifythesetoolsistounderestimatethetime,resources,and

risksthatactivistsandcitizenssacrifice.

• Socialmediatoolscanraiseworldawarenessofanissue

InEgypt,wesawthatthoughnotallorevenmostofthecountryhadInternetaccess,

peoplewereunitedatthe#Jan25protest.Butperhapsthebiggesteffectthatthe

onlineaspectoftheprotestshadwastogivetherestoftheworldaviewfromthe

ground.ThiswasalsoapparentinthemoneyraisedfortheHaitiearthquakerelief

andintheworldawarenessofIran’srevolution.

• Socialmediatoolsallowuserstohelpeachother,regardlessoflocation

46

SocialmediauseduringtheMumbaiattackshelpedpeoplegethelptothoseinneed

andgetinformationtofamilymembers.InEgypt,protestersusedsocialmediato

shareinformationaboutdangersandhelpeachothergetsuppliesandmedical

attention.Buttheabilitytogethelpfromothersbyusingsocialmediaisnotlimited

bylocation.Notonlydidpeoplefrommanyothercountriestuneintotherevolution

inEgypt—manypeoplehelpedtheactivistsbysettingupproxies,hackinginto

governmentsites,andspreadingthewordaboutthecause.Additionally,the

increasedawarenessmayincitepoliticianstobemorevocalandopenwiththeir

reactiontotherevolutionorsituationtransmittedviasocialmedia.

• Socialmediauseforsocialchangeisdangerous.

Itisclearthatthepoliciesofmanysocialmediaplatformsmaynotbeinthebest

interestsofactivists,andthereisarealdangerofgovernmentsusingsocialmediato

spyon,misinform,orincriminateactivists.

Theauthorofthiscapstonehopesthatthispaperhasmadeitclearthatsocialmedia

isneitheraperfectmethodforsocialchangecommunicationnoratrendthatwill

quicklypass.

APPENDIXA

WorldmapvisualizedbyFacebookusers(Butler,2010).

Seehigh‐resolutionversionhere.

48

APPENDIXB

Mapindicatingthe“EgyptianInfluenceNetwork”showsTwitterusersinproximitytotheuserstheyinfluenceandthelanguagetheyuse(Boguta,2011).

(Seehigh‐resolutionversionhere.)

49

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AspecialreportonEgypt:America’slieutenant.(2010,July15).TheEconomist.RetrievedApril10,2011,fromhttp://www.economist.com/node/16564218

Blair,D.(2009,June15).Iranstrugglestocensornewsofprotests.Telegraph.co.uk.Retrievedfromhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5543145/Iran‐struggles‐to‐censor‐news‐of‐protests.html

Boguta,K.(2009,July25).EvolutionofaRevolution:VisualizingMillionsofIranTweets.ReadWriteWeb.RetrievedMarch20,2011,fromhttp://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/evolution_revolution_visualizing_millions_iran_tweets.php

Boguta,K.(2011,February11).VisualizingTheNewArabMind.ComputationalHistory.RetrievedApril9,2011,fromhttp://www.kovasboguta.com/1/post/2011/02/first‐post.html

Bower,E.,Amanpour,C.,Desta,S.,&Bozorgmehr,S.(2009,June13).Ahmadinejadhailselectionasprotestsgrow‐CNN.com.CNN.com.RetrievedMarch6,2011,fromhttp://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/13/iran.election/index.html

Bray,H.(2009,June19).FindingawayaroundIraniancensorship.TheBostonGlobe.Retrievedfromhttp://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/06/19/activists_utilizing_twitter_web_proxies_to_sidestep_iranian_censorship/

Butler,P.(2010,December13).VisualizingFriendships|Facebook.RetrievedApril28,2011,fromhttp://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook‐engineering/visualizing‐friendships/469716398919

Caulfield,B.,&Karmali,N.(2008,November28).Mumbai:Twitter’sMoment.Forbes.com.RetrievedFebruary27,2011,fromhttp://www.forbes.com/2008/11/28/mumbai‐twitter‐sms‐tech‐internet‐cx_bc_kn_1128mumbai.html

CheckpointerforiPhone,iPodtouch,andiPadontheiTunesAppStore.(n.d.)..RetrievedMarch23,2011,fromhttp://itunes.apple.com/us/app/checkpointer/id416970802?mt=8

CraigKanalley.(2011,February24).EgyptRevolution2011:ACompleteGuideToTheUnrest.RetrievedFebruary26,2011,fromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/egypt‐revolution‐2011_n_816026.html

Driscoll,K.(2010,October5).Perhapsarevolutionisnotwhatweneed.Civics,PopularMedia&ParticipatoryCulture.RetrievedMarch17,2011,fromhttp://civicpaths.net/groupblog/2010/10/05/perhaps‐a‐revolution‐is‐not‐what‐we‐need/

EDITORIAL:Iran’sTwitterrevolution.(2009,June16).WashingtonTimes.RetrievedMarch7,2011,from

50

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans‐twitter‐revolution/

Giglio,M.(2011,February13).HowWaelGhonimSparkedEgypt’sUprising‐Newsweek.Retrievedfromhttp://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/the‐facebook‐freedom‐fighter.html

Gladwell,M.(2010,October4).SmallChange:Whytherevolutionwillnotbetweeted.RetrievedJanuary21,2011,fromhttp://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell

Goodman,A.(2011,February8).AsmaaMahfouz&theYouTubeVideothatHelpedSparktheEgyptianUprising.DemocracyNow.RetrievedApril6,2011,fromhttp://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa_mahfouz_the_youtube_video_that

Granovetter,M.S.(1973).TheStrengthofWeakTies.TheAmericanJournalofSociology,78(6),1360‐1380.

Greeley,B.(2011,February2).TheFallacyofFacebookDiplomacy.BusinessWeek:OnlineMagazine.Retrievedfromhttp://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_07/b4215008414536.htm

GregMiller.(2011,February4).Senatorsquestionintelligenceagencies’anticipationofEgyptuprising.TheWashingtonPost.Retrievedfromhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2011/02/03/AR2011020305388.html?nav=emailpage

Gross,D.(2011,January15).DigitalfundraisingstillpushingHaitirelief.CNN.com.RetrievedMarch8,2011,fromhttp://articles.cnn.com/2010‐01‐15/tech/online.donations.haiti_1_earthquake‐haiti‐haiti‐relief‐twitter‐and‐facebook?_s=PM:TECH

Howard,P.N.(2011,February23).TheArabUprising’sCascadingEffects.Miller­McCune.RetrievedApril6,2011,fromhttp://www.miller‐mccune.com/politics/the‐cascading‐effects‐of‐the‐arab‐spring‐28575/

Hughes,A.L.,&Palen,L.(2009).Twitteradoptionanduseinmassconvergenceandemergencyevents.InternationalJournalofEmergencyManagement,6(3/4),248‐260.doi:10.1504/IJEM.2009.031564

InternetFilteringinEgypt.(2009).OpenNetIniative.RetrievedApril18,2011,fromhttp://opennet.net/research/profiles/egypt

J.Steyaert.(2002).Inequalityandthedigitaldivide:mythsandrealities.InS.HickandJ.McNutt(Eds.),Advocacy,activism,andtheinternet(pp.199‐211).Chicago:LyceumPress.

Kawamoto,D.(2011,February1).CanGoogleHelpProtestersBypasstheEgyptianInternetShutdown?DailyFinance.Retrievedfromhttp://www.dailyfinance.com/story/company‐news/google‐twitter‐saynow‐egypt‐protests/19824229/

Lazarfeld,P.F.,&Merton,R.K.(1996).MassCommunication,PopularTaste,andOrganizedSocialAction.Sources:NotableSelectionsinMassMedia(1sted.).Dushkin/McGraw‐Hill.

51

Leggio,J.(2008,November28).Mumbaiattackcoveragedemonstrates(goodandbad)maturationpointofsocialmedia|ZDNet.RetrievedFebruary27,2011,fromhttp://www.zdnet.com/blog/feeds/mumbai‐attack‐coverage‐demonstrates‐good‐and‐bad‐maturation‐point‐of‐social‐media/339

Madrigal,A.(2011,January24).TheInsideStoryofHowFacebookRespondedtoTunisianHacks.TheAtlantic.Retrievedfromhttp://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the‐inside‐story‐of‐how‐facebook‐responded‐to‐tunisian‐hacks/70044/

Magnier,M.,&Sharma,S.(2008,November27).IndiaTerroristAttacks‐TerrorattacksravageMumbai.LosAngelesTimes.RetrievedFebruary27,2011,fromhttp://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/27/world/fg‐mumbai27

Mainwaring,S.(2011,February4).Egypt:Socialmediaasalifeordeathproposition|USCCenteronPublicDiplomacy|Newswire–CPDBlog.Newswire­CenteronPublicDiplomacyBlog.RetrievedFebruary7,2011,fromhttp://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/egypt_social_media_as_a_life_or_death_proposition/

Moscaritolo,A.(2009,June15).IranelectionprotestersuseTwittertorecruithackers.SCMagazine.RetrievedMarch6,2011,fromhttp://www.webcitation.org/5ic0PcGvi

Murphy,D.(2011,January25).InspiredbyTunisia,Egypt’sprotestsappearunprecedented.ChristianScienceMonitor.RetrievedApril2,2011,fromhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0125/Inspired‐by‐Tunisia‐Egypt‐s‐protests‐appear‐unprecedented

Nunns,A.,&Idle,N.(Eds.).(2011).TweetsfromTahrir.NewYork:ORBooks.Palen,L.,&Liu,S.B.(2007).Citizencommunicationsincrisis:anticipatingafuture

ofICT‐supportedpublicparticipation.ProceedingsoftheSIGCHIconferenceonHumanfactorsincomputingsystems,CHI’07(p.727–736).NewYork,NY,USA:ACM.doi:10.1145/1240624.1240736

Papic,M.,&Noonan,S.(2011,February3).SocialMediaasaToolforProtest|STRATFOR.StratforGlobalIntelligence.RetrievedFebruary4,2011,fromhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202‐social‐media‐tool‐protest?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110203&utm_content=readmore&elq=22472856ccd34423b09bf9f41a196810

Porter,H.,&Beinner,R.(2011).WakingtheLion.VanityFair.Retrievedfromhttp://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/05/egypt‐revolutionaries‐201105#intro

Preston,J.(2011,February5).FacebookandYouTubeFueltheEgyptianProtests.TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html?_r=1&smid=tw‐nytimes

Rainie,L.,Purcell,K.,&Smith,A.(2011,January18).Thesocialsideoftheinternet.PewInternet&AmericanLife.

RedCross:3MHaitiansAffectedbyQuake.(2010,January13).cbsnews.com.RetrievedMarch8,2011,fromhttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/13/world/main6090601.shtml?tag=cbsnewsSectionContent.4

52

Rich,F.(2011,February5).WallflowersattheRevolution.TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/opinion/06rich.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

Rosenblatt,S.,&Rainey,J.(2005,September25).KatrinaTakesaTollonTruth,NewsAccuracy.LosAngelesTimes.RetrievedFebruary27,2011,fromhttp://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/27/nation/na‐rumors27

Rubenstein,C.(2010,January14).TheTweetforHaitiHeardAcrosstheBlogosphere.TheHuffingtonPost.Retrievedfromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/carolyn‐rubenstein/the‐tweet‐for‐haiti‐heard_b_424177.html

Shirky,C.(2009).HereComesEverybody:ThePowerofOrganizingWithoutOrganizations(Reprint.).Penguin(Non‐Classics).

Srinivansan,R.(2010,September28).sayyouwanttotweetarevolution?:RameshSrinivasan.RameshSrinivansan.RetrievedMarch17,2011,fromhttp://rameshsrinivasan.org/2010/09/28/say‐you‐want‐to‐tweet‐a‐revolution/

Tran,T.(2011,March8).ChinabloggerangeredoverlosingFacebookaccount‐WashingtonTimes.TheWashingtonTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/8/china‐blogger‐angered‐over‐losing‐facebook‐account/

U.S.GeologicalSurveyHomepage.(n.d.)..RetrievedMarch8,2011,fromhttp://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/

Vafa,A.(2010,September27).Gladwell’s(andMy)ThoughtsonRevolution«.TheOffense/DefenseBalance.RetrievedMarch17,2011,fromhttp://azv321.wordpress.com/2010/09/27/gladwells‐and‐my‐thoughts‐on‐revolution/

Valentino‐DeVries,J.(2010,January20).SocialNetworkingCarriesHaitiEarthquakeFundRaisingIntoAnotherWeek.WallStreetJournal.RetrievedMarch7,2011,fromhttp://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/01/20/social‐networking‐carries‐haiti‐earthquake‐fund‐raising‐into‐another‐week/

WorldInternetUsageStatisticsNewsandWorldPopulationStats.(2010,June30).InternetWorldStats.RetrievedApril17,2011,fromhttp://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm

Yaffa,J.(2011,February5).DownloadingtheUprising.wsj.com.Retrievedfromhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704150104576122751785029870.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

York,J.(2010,April8).OnFacebookDeactivations.JillianC.York.RetrievedFebruary6,2011,fromhttp://jilliancyork.com/2010/04/08/on‐facebook‐deactivations/