Casal and Williams Equality Ch 7.pdf

8/12/2019 Casal and Williams Equality Ch 7.pdf

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7 Equality1

PAULA CASAL AND ANDREW WILLIAMS

Chapter Contents

Introduction

Justice as fairness

Equality of resources

Equality, priority, and sufficiency

Equality and interpersonal comparison

Equality, opportunity,

and responsibility

Conclusion

Readers Guide

This chapter begins by outlining the place of equality in the two leading contemporary

theories of economic justice: John Rawls conception of justice as fairness and Ronald

Dworkins account of equality of resources. It then examines three debates that theseauthors have helped to shape. The first debate arises between egalitarians and various

influential critics, who appeal to the importance of achieving efficiency and avoiding

certain forms of absolute deprivation. The other two debates take place among egalitarians

and relate to the respects in which individuals lives should be equal, and the degree to

which choice and personal responsibility must figure in any plausible account of equality.

The case study draws on the latter two debates to consider how to allocate responsibility

for the decision to become a parent.


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151 Equality....................................................................................................

Turning to the exercise of political authority, a second consensus exists that ruling

rightly requires attaching equal importance to each citizens life. Such a requirement of

impartiality among citizens rejects certain considerations as grounds for political action.

For example, it denies that a citizens race or gender is itself a good reason to attach less

importance to benefiting him or her rather than someone else, and so opposes extreme

forms of racism or sexism. So construed, however, an insistence on impartiality still

leaves unanswered many questions about how political authority should be exercised. For

example, it is silent about whether governments are required to protect individuals from

suffering worse prospects in life because of their race or gender, or because of some other

unavoidable characteristic. We now turn to these more controversial questions about the

demands of equality, and their implications for the exercise of political authority and the

design of economic institutions. Our starting point is the outstanding work of twentieth

century political theory, John RawlsA Theory of Justice(1971).

Justice as fairnessThe aim of Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971; 1999) is to identify a set of plausible

principles of social justice (pp. 310). As Rawls explains the terms, principles of

justice provide uncompromising, or especially weighty, moral standards for resolving

individuals competing claims. Principles ofsocial justice resolve claims on the design

of the basic structure that is, a set of major social institutions that distribute rights

and dutiesand exert profound influence on individuals life prospects. Because the

basic structure encompasses, among other things, legislation and government policies,

the principles are guides to the exercise of political authority.

According to utilitarianism, whether the exercise of authority is justifiable depends

ultimately on what maximizes thesumof benefits and burdens. In contrast, Rawls rejectspurely aggregative principles. He argues that, even if utilitarians are right that those

principles may guide distributive decisions across different stages in one life, extending

them across different lives is a mistake, because it fails to take seriously the distinction

between persons (1971; 1999, p. 24).

In Rawls account, because society is comprised of separate persons, distribution is of

fundamental importance. For example, it is deeply unfair that some individuals should

have far worse career prospects than those of others merely because of their class origins

or family background, rather than their different ambitions and natural talents. To

correct such inequalities, Rawls advocates a principle of fair equality of opportunity,

which requires that similarly motivated and naturally talented individuals enjoy the same

prospects in the competition for jobs (1971; 1999, Pt 12).

Rawls also recognizes that individuals can have less income and wealth than others

due to their class origins or their being endowed by nature with fewer marketable talents.

He argues that it would be arbitrary to be concerned only with inequalities arising from

the social lottery and not the natural lottery, and then proposes a novel solution to the

problem of how to distribute income and wealth.

The solution assumes that it would be implausibly wasteful to oppose all economic

inequalities. Doing so would, for example, impede firms using unequal wage rates


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Paula Casal and Andrew Williams 152....................................................................................................

as incentives for especially talented individuals to pursue more productive occupa-

tions that benefit everyone. Thus, Rawls rejects a strict egalitarian principle, which

opposes economic inequality regardless of its harming anyone, instead proposing the

difference principle, which permits inequalitiesthat is, differencesin income and

wealth, but requires that they be arranged to benefit the least advantaged to the

greatest extent possible. Although not as strict as some alternatives, the difference prin-

ciple remains genuinely egalitarian, because it treats equality as a baseline and then

permits expansions in inequality only if they are not harmful to those who benefit

least. Because the difference principle does not require such expansions, it also dif-

fers from a maximizing principle that favours continually increasing the income and

wealth of the least advantaged, regardless of its environmental impact (Rawls, 2001, pp.

634).

Rawls also recognizes that economic inequalities that enhance the income and wealth

of the least advantaged, and are licensed by the difference principle, might be harmful

in other respects. For example, they might still be large enough to jeopardize fairness

in the labour market and democratic process, or equality before the law. These harmful

inequalities are governed by additional principles that deepen even further egalitariancharacter of justice as fairness.

Asmentioned,theprincipleoffairequalityofopportunityalreadyrequiresgovernments

to address labour market inequalities arising from discrimination and other differences

in social luck. Note, too, that Rawls defends another principle of social justice: the basic

liberty principle, which restricts inequality still further by insisting on upholding the fair

value of rights to participate in the political system and not merely more familiar civil

liberties. Thus, justice as fairness condemns inequality when it corrupts the democratic

process by allowing the rich to buy political power.

For a fuller understanding of how justice as fairness regulates inequality, then, we need

to bear in mind how Rawls orders his various principles:

FIRST PRINCIPLE

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic

liberties compatible with a similar liberty for all.

SECOND PRINCIPLE

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . . and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of

opportunity.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 266)

Rawlsfirst principlegrants individuals basic civil liberties, such as equality before the

law and freedom of speech, as well as rights to participate in the democratic process on a

fair basis. The second principle, known as democratic equality, comprises:

the difference principle; and

the principle of fair equality of opportunity.


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In sufficiently developed societies, Rawls treats these principles as in lexical order. Thus,

the first principle may not be compromised to any degree to better realize democratic

equality and equality of opportunity enjoys similar priority over the difference principle.

Because Rawls principles function as a set of filters on unjust inequalities, even if

an inequality survives the difference principle, it may still be ruled out by other more

weighty principles. One might, however, oppose large economic inequalities, because

of deleterious consequences that Rawls principles leave unmentioned. For example,

expansions in economic inequality arguably diminish health and longevity, regardless

of their effects on absolute income levels. This may explain why wealthy, but unequal,

countriessuch as the USAperform so poorly in terms of health and why less

wealthy, but more equal, countriessuch as Cubaperform so well (Daniels, 2001).

Economic inequality also correlates positively with crime and violence, both within

and across countries, and even after controlling for other determinants (Fajnzylber

et al., 2002).

Justice as fairness leaves questions concerning illness, mortality, death, crime, and

violence largely unanswered. As Rawls notes, justice as fairness is an incomplete theory,

which deals with only a limited number of issues. It is also an ideal theory, proposed forsituations offull compliancerather than partial compliance. Thus, it states what justice

requires if individuals generally conform to its demands and so says little about how to

respond when individuals act unjustly. We should not assume, then, that Rawls claims

that his principles exhaust the reasons to restrict economic inequality or that his theory

cannot be developed to provide additional considerations. For example, Rawls concern

with maintaining the social basis for self-respect might also justify limits on stigmatizing

differences in living standards (Scanlon, 2000, Pt II).

Having been the subject of such intense scrutiny, it is unsurprising that democratic

equality has provoked objections, and there are three important examples that bear on

our later remarks. The first objection comes from the right of the political spectrum and

claims that, like other egalitarians, Rawls gives too little scope for individuals to exercisecertain economic liberties (Nozick, 1974, ch. 7). Those who press this objection assume

that individuals have rights to use and transfer their holdings as they see fit, even if doing

so, for example, creates the type of class-based inequalities that jeopardize fair equality of

opportunity.

The second objection comes from the opposite end of the spectrum and claims that

Rawls exaggerates the degree to which justice permits inequality. There are two distinct

versions of this charge. The first claims that Rawls fails to recognize that fairness and

efficiency can be conflicting values, and that inequalities are unfair even when eliminating

them would make nobody any better off (Temkin, 2000). The second does not assume

the fairness and efficiency conflict, but instead claims that Rawls fails to recognize that his

difference principle should apply not only to public policies, but also to individual wage

negotiation and career choices. As a result, he mistakenly regards as just many inequality-

generating incentives that are necessary to motivate individuals simply because they fail

to comply with the demands of justice (Cohen, 1991; 1997).

The third objection arises naturally from a utilitarian perspective and claims that

rejecting all economic inequalities that are harmful to the least advantaged is too

extremefor example, because it rules out distributions that impose very small losses

on the least advantaged, but yield enormous gains to everybody else.


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KEY TEXTS 7.1

Rawls,Justice as Fairness: A Restatement(2001)

After publishing his masterpiece, A Theory of Justice, in 1971, Rawls continued to refine

his conception of justice as fairness and to develop a more general conception of political

liberalism. He also regularly taught at Harvard and the extensive lecture notes he provided

for his students eventually developed into the Restatement. This later volume explains

the intuitive ideas that animate justice as fairness and clarifies the content of, and main

arguments for, Rawls principles of justice. As well as discussing how those principles might

be institutionalized by a property-owning democracy and become stable, the volume also

contains replies to criticisms of various aspects of justice as fairness, including its treatment

of the family and of variations in capability.

KEY POINTS

Rawls opposes utilitarian principles, because they overlook the moral importance of how

benefits and burdens are distributed.

Rawls conception of democratic equality applies to a societys major institutions or basic

structure.

Different critics have objected that democratic equality affords too small a role to economic

liberties, exaggerates the degree to which justice permits inequality, and sometimes makes

excessive demands on the more fortunate.

Equality of resourcesDworkins theory ofequality of resources finds its fullest expression in his book, Sovereign

Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. (1981b; 2000). The theory begins with the

assumption that displaying equal concern for all of those obliged to obey their commands

is the price that those possessing political authority must pay for their right to rule.

As Dworkin emphasizes, the requirement of equal concern need not extend to all of

humanity or apply to decisions that do not involve the exercise of authority. Dworkin

then argues that the best interpretation of equal concern demands that the economy is

arranged to produce results that might have emerged from an imaginary procedure in

which markets play a defining role.

To illustrate the procedure, Dworkin imagines shipwreck survivors, who must divide

a desert islands resources equally among themselves. Any division, he suggests, should

satisfy an appropriate version of what economists term theenvy testand so will ensure

that nobody prefers anyone elses initial share of resources. Dworkin then argues that

the most appealing way to eliminate envy is through an auction, in which everyone has


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KEY TEXTS 7.2

Dworkin,Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000)

After Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971), this is the most influential contemporary statement

of liberal egalitarianism. Rejecting equality of welfare, Dworkin defends his own conception

of equality of resources and explains the role that it affords to civil liberties, democracy, and

community. Dworkin also applies his theory to various debates about public policy regarding

health care, campaign finance legislation, affirmative action, and genetic intervention. Others

have developed Dworkins ideas in more radical ways most notably Philippe Van Parijs, who

employs resource egalitarian arguments to defend the provision of a universal basic income

inReal Freedom for All (1996).

the same bidding power, and in which the auctioneer continuously divides lots until the

market clears and no bidder wishes to repeat the process.The procedure then becomes more complex, because Dworkin assumes that individuals

should be free to make different choices about production, investment, and trade. Where

individuals vary only in their preferences, he argues that those who succeed in more

productive endeavours are entitled to a higher income. Dworkin recognizes, however,

that the outcome of the social and natural lottery will also exert a profound influence

on individuals relative prospects. Like Rawls, he assumes that economic institutions

should enable individuals to share fairly in each others fortunes. Nevertheless, Dworkin

rejects democratic equality as insufficiently sensitive to individuals ambitions. Instead,

he favours a form of luck sharing, in which individuals personal values play a much

larger role in determining how much protection against misfortune equality requires.

Dworkin defends his alternative proposal by distinguishing luck in the choices individu-als make that is, theiroption luckand luck in the conditions that they face regardless

of their choicesthat is, their brute luck. He argues that inequalities arising from

variations in option luck against a fair background should be treated very differently from

inequalities arising from variations in brute luck. For example, suppose some islanders

choose to gamble with their justly held initial holdings, have bad option luck, and lose.

If this is the case, there need be no reason to object to their having fewer resources than

those who declined to gamble, or who chose the same gamble, but had better option luck.

If some islanders are born blind while others are sighted, however, or if some have higher

incomes because they are more naturally gifted rather than more industrious, then there is

a weighty reasonto redress such misfortunes but how much redress does justice require?

Relying on his assumption that individuals should be free to expose themselves to

different degrees of luck, Dworkins answer appeals to the idea of a fair insurance market.

To describe such a hypothetical market, he assumes that decisions will reflect individuals

actual preferences and attitudes to risk. Unlike in actual insurance markets, however,

individuals are situated equally. Thus, they can afford the same insurance packages, and

are aware only of the overall distribution of misfortune and not their own place in the

distribution. Given limited information about the level of protection and premium that

each individual would prefer, Dworkin argues that individuals should receive the average


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KEY THINKERS 7.1

Ronald Dworkin (1931)

One of the worlds leading legal, moral, and political philosophers, as a legal philosopher,

Dworkin is best known for Taking Rights Seriously (1977) and Laws Empire (1986), which

provide an alternative to legal positivism. As a moral philosopher, he is known for his

discussion of abortion and euthanasia in Lifes Dominion(1993) and as political philosopher

for his defence of liberal egalitarianism in Sovereign Virtue(2000). He has also made many

influential contributions to public debates about US Supreme Court decisions, often via The

New York Review of Books.

level of protection that would be purchased in such a market. He recommends funding

such protection by a system of general taxation, which includes a progressive income tax.

To summarize, then, from Dworkins perspective, an actual distribution of income and

wealth is equal only if the individuals involved might have produced such a distributionthrough a specific market process. The process involves those individuals exercising

certain rights to produce and trade, using resources that they have acquired in an equal

auction, and pooling risks through a fair insurance market. If information is available

about each individuals behaviour in such a market, then each should be compensated

for misfortune to a degree that depends on the level of insurance that they would have

purchased. In the absence of such individualized information and to minimize the risk of

overcompensation or under-compensating, the level of compensation should depend on

that which the average insurer would have purchased.

There are important theoretical differences between equality of resources and demo-

cratic equality. In defining an equal distribution, Dworkin attaches more importance thanRawls to market freedoms and, in particular, to the freedom to choose which level of pro-

tection against misfortune to assume. Thus, although both theorists appeal to hypothetical

agreement from behind a veil of ignorance that is, in a situation of limited informa-

tionDworkin employs a thinner veil, which allows decision makers to be guided by

personal preferences. As a result, Dworkin recommends a more ambition-sensitive form

of luck sharing in which what qualifies as relative misfortune, as well the appropriate form

and level of redress, varies depending on the preferences of the individuals concerned.

KEY POINTS

Dworkin claims that those in authority should display equal concern for the lives of all of

their subjects by meeting the demands of equality of resources.

Equality of resources evaluates different distributions by appealing to a hypothetical market

procedure, which includes a fair insurance market.

Democratic equality and equality of resources both require individuals to share in each

others fortunes, but Dworkins view does so in a manner that is more sensitive to

individuals values and attitudes to risk.


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Equality, priority, and sufficiencyWe now turn to draw some distinctions that cast light on the variety of egalitarian

principles available, as well as two influential objections to egalitarianism.

One distinction depends on whether a principle attaches any importance to an

individuals level of advantage relative to others when determining the reasons to benefit

that individual. Comparative egalitarian principles imply relative position does matter. As

an example, consider the strict egalitarian principle mentioned earlier, according to which

it is bad, or unfair, if some individuals are worse off than others. This principle faces an

influential criticism, which Derek Parfits illuminating essay Equality or priority? (2000)

dubs the levelling down objection. The objection points out that the strict principle

implies that it would be better, in one way, if everyone were to be blind rather than if

some were to be blind and others sighted. It assumes that such a conclusion is highly

implausible and infers that we should reject strict egalitarian principles.

There are various ways in which to argue that the levelling down objection fails to

show that we should reject all egalitarian principles. The first replythat of pluralistegalitarianismreiterates that the strict principle implies only that levelling down is

better in some respectrather than all things considered. Pluralist egalitarians argue that

our reluctance to waste benefits therefore shows only that the pursuit of equality, like

many other values, must sometimes be tempered to respect other values; it does not, they

insist, show that equality lacks any value whatsoever. The second conditional egalitarian

reply (Temkin, 2000, p.157) suggests that we should apply comparative principles to

choose only among non-wasteful distributions. As suggested earlier, democratic equality

provides one example of this type of reply. Under certain conditions, as Rawls notes,

the difference principle recommends choosing the most egalitarian member of the set of

non-wasteful distributions (Rawls, 2000, p. 61).

The most radical reply abandons the concern with relative position that is characteristicof comparative principles. The reply appeals to what Parfit terms the priority view, or

prioritarianism(2000, p. 101). According to this non-comparative egalitarian principle,

the moral value of benefiting each individualdiminishesas the individuals absolute level

of advantageincreases(Raz, 1986, ch. 9). The priority view implies that it is, in one way,

better to provide some benefit to a less well-off individual than a better-off individual.

As a result, it tends to favour the less advantaged when their interests conflict with the

more advantaged and so qualifies as egalitarian in a broad sense of the term. To justify

favouring the less advantaged, however, the priority view appeals only to the absolute

condition of each individual. For this reason, prioritarians need not assume that reducing

the gap between the better and worse off has any non-instrumental value, or that we have

any reason to waste benefits when doing so diminishes inequality. Thus, prioritarians can

escape the levelling down objection more easily than can comparative egalitarians.2

The priority view has a second attraction, because it can take more moderate, as well

as more extreme, forms.Extreme prioritarianismgivesabsolutepriority to the interests

of the less advantaged over those of the more fortunate. This form of prioritarianism

resembles the difference principle in that both positions prohibit benefiting better-off

individuals if doing so deprives the least advantaged of any benefits; moreover, they do

so even when those benefits are very large and can be produced at very small cost to the


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less advantaged. As mentioned, some critics object to the difference principle, because it

displays such rigidity. Rawls has replied by insisting that hisprinciples should be assessed as

a package and suggesting that the type of situation just mentioned is very unlikely to occur,

especially when his prior principles are satisfied (2001, p. 67). A different reply is available

to prioritarians. They can adopt the moderate priority view, which requires attaching non-

absolute priority to the interests of the less advantaged. From this perspective, whether

there is decisive reason to benefit the less fortunate rather than more fortunate can depend

on, for example, the size of the benefits at stake and the number of individuals involved.

For illustration, suppose that a government must choose between funding a medical

programme that provides a modest benefit to a small group of very badly off individuals

or one that provides a bigger benefit to a larger group of less badly off individuals. The

policy implications ofmoderate prioritarianism, like those of the pluralist comparative

view, are indeterminate until weights are attached to the various factors that the two views

deem relevant. This suggests that prioritarians must pay a price for escaping the rigidity of

the extreme viewnamely, increased reliance on appeals to intuitive judgements likely

to resist systematic formulation (Williams, 2004).

We shall conclude this section by drawing a further distinction between the types ofegalitarian principle canvassed so far and sufficiency principles. These principles claim

that, when evaluating distributions, what ultimately matters is whether individuals have

enough to escape absolute deprivation or to live above some critical threshold. Thus, the

moral importance of individuals having enough is not explained by the further beneficial

consequences of them doing so. If reaching a particular thresholdfor example, being

well nourished or literatehad such consequences, then prioritarians would already

attach great importance to securing these crucial benefits, given their commitment to

taking the size of benefits into account.

Arguments based on sufficiency principles play a valuable role in public affairs by

stating that the eradication of poverty, at home and abroad, is an urgent responsibility

of government. Such principles also play a more negative role in a second influentialobjection to egalitarianism. The objection is pressed byanti-egalitarian sufficientarians

who argue that, once everyone has enough, there is no reason to reduce inequality

or to attach priority to the less advantaged (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003). There are

various forms that such a position might take, depending on whether it requires simply

minimizing the number of individuals who suffer absolute deprivation or attaches

importance to distribution below the threshold.

There are also various ways in which egalitarians can reply to the sufficientarian critique

(Casal, 2007). The most obvious reply claims that thresholds are usually points on a

continuous scale and that locating them at any particular point is likely to be arbitrary.

For example, even the idea of a subsistence income is more complex and contestable than

it at first appears, because it is defined by reference to some standard life expectancy.

Further distinct replies arise depending on where the threshold is located. Thus, lower

thresholds make it less plausible for the sufficientarian to claim that, when everyone has

enough, even large inequalities are unimportant; higher thresholds make it less plausible

to insist on maximizing the number of individuals who have enough, because, then, far

too many individuals may be sacrificed in order to ensure that a small number attain

some ambitious threshold. Triage may be plausible on the battlefield when survival is at

stake, but appears much less plausible as the relevant threshold is raised.


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KEY CONCEPTS 7.1

Principles of distributive justice: equality, priority, and sufficiency

Egalitarians believe that it is non-instrumentally bad, or unfair, if some individuals are worse

off than others. Prioritarians believe that the moral value of a benefit, or disvalue of a burden,

diminishes as its recipient becomes better off on an absolute, rather than relative, scale.

They need not believe that inequality, which is a comparative notion, is non-instrumentally

bad. Sufficientarians also reject egalitarian comparisons of the relative position of individuals

and focus instead on whether individuals have enough not to fall below some critical level of

advantage.

Perhaps the most effective reply to the sufficientarian critique points out that there are

more or less egalitarian ways of ensuring that everyone has enough. Suppose, for example,

that a government can fund its welfare state through two different tax systems: one system

secures adequate revenue through imposing the same flat tax rate on each citizen who hasenough; the other imposes a progressive tax rate that takes a larger proportion of citizens

resources as they become wealthier. The reply insists that the latter system is preferable,

even if both are equally likely to ensure that everyone has enough. Such a conviction

is powerful counter-evidence to the sufficientarian critique. In contrast, it fits well both

with the egalitarian impulse to reduce the gap between the more and the less wealthy, and

the priority views key assumption that reasons to benefit individuals diminish as they

become more advantaged. As this reply suggests, equality, priority, and sufficiency may

be friends rather than foes.

KEY POINTS

There are pluralist and conditional egalitarian replies to the objection that comparative

egalitarian principles favour levelling down.

Prioritarians claim that the moral value of benefiting an individual diminishes as individuals

enjoy more benefits.

Sufficientarian anti-egalitarians argue that, when everyone has enough, inequality is unob-

jectionable. Egalitarians can reply that more egalitarian ways of eliminating insufficiency

are preferable to less egalitarian ones.

Equality and interpersonalcomparisonAnyconception of equality requires somestandard of interpersonal comparisonto identify

an individuals level of advantage in different distributions. Much of the debate about

interpersonal comparison turns on what role judgements about an individuals resources


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KEY CONCEPTS 7.2

The currency of distributive justice

The currency of distributive justice is a phrase coined by G. A. Cohen to refer to the standard

of interpersonal comparison that is employed to identify each individuals level of advantage

and thereby decide on how individuals fare relative to one another in different outcomes, or

under different institutions. Contemporary egalitarians have debated whether interpersonal

comparisons should focus on welfare, primary goods, resources, or some combination

of these, or other, benefits. Although most favour focusing on individuals opportunities

to enjoy the relevant types of benefits, more disagreement exists about the extent to

which individuals can forfeit their entitlements through voluntary choices. One extremely

permissive view, associated with luck egalitarian currencies, assumes that individuals have

extensive choice-making powers and that avoidable inequalities are not unjust.

(Dworkin, 1981a; 2000, p. 65),welfare(Arneson, 1989), andcapabilities (Sen, 1992; Nuss-baum, 2000), or all three considerations (Cohen, 1989) should play in such comparisons.

To sample the debate, begin with the most simple resource-based standard, which

makes comparisons purely on the basis of each individuals level of income and wealth.

Consensus exists that this proposal is too crude and that there can be morally relevant

differences between individuals in other dimensions. For example, all else being equal,

one individual is worse off than another in a morally relevant sense if he or she suffers

from a severe disability, such as blindness or paraplegia. There are, however, various ways

in which to attempt to accommodate this conviction.

Some attempt to do so by arguing that comparisons should focus in addition, or even

exclusively, on personal welfare, or well-being, understood as what makes a personslife worth living for the individual concerned (Parfit, 1984, Appendix I). One influential

account of welfare is preference-based and assumes that how well an individuals life

goes depends upon the extent to which his or her self-regarding preferences are satisfied.

A preference-based welfare egalitarian might, then, attempt to justify redistribution to

the disabled by appealing to the assumption that disabled individuals are likely to be

less satisfied with their lives than are others. But those who oppose welfare standards

might question whether being disabled necessarily reduces the level of welfare available

to an individual or deny that an individuals claim not to be disadvantaged by disability

depends upon the truth of such an assumption. Surely Dickenss Tiny Tim, they might

See chapter 8

insist, is entitled to a wheelchair, even if his quality of life is higher than that of many of

the individuals who are required to fund its provision?Opponents of preference-based welfare standards can also press a more general

objection, designed to show that subjective satisfaction should play no role whatsoever in

interpersonal comparison. The objection takes the form of a dilemma, which Dworkin

illustrates with the following two scenarios (1981a, Pt VIII)

1. In this scenario, we suppose that satisfaction is initially distributed equally, wealth

is also distributed equally, and preferences are equally expensive to satisfy. An in-

dividual, called Louis, then deliberately acquires some new and relatively expensive


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preferences, and can attain the same level of satisfaction as others only if he receives

more wealth than them.

2. In this scenario, we suppose that satisfaction is initially distributed equally, al-

though an individual called Jude has less wealth than others, but correspondingly

inexpensive preferences. Jude then deliberately acquires preferences that are more

expensive than his previous ones, but no more expensive than others preferences.

As a result, Jude can attain the same level of satisfaction as others only if he receives

as much wealth as them.

The dilemma arises because welfare egalitarians must respond to the first scenario by

either accepting or denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others with

more modest ambitions. If welfare egalitarians take the former option, they then face

the first horn of the dilemma, because Dworkin then insistsand many egalitarians

agree that Louis is surely not entitled to more wealth than others. Welfare egalitarians

might take the latter option of denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others

and justify doing so by appealing to the fact that Louis might have avoided acquiring

more expensive preferences. If welfare egalitarians make this response, which invokes theprinciple of equality of opportunity for welfare, then they face the second horn of the

dilemma (Arneson, 1989), because Dworkin then points out that, in his second scenario,

Jude might also have avoided deliberately acquiring more expensive preferences than he

previously possessed and so, like Louis, enjoys the same opportunity for welfare as others.

Welfare egalitarians should, he suggests, treat the scenarios similarly. Thus, if equality of

opportunity for welfare justifies denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others,

then it also justifies denying Jude as much wealth as others.

Some egalitarians endorse such a denial. For example, in his paper On the currency of

distributive justice (1989), Cohen rejects equality of opportunity for welfare, but affirms

equality of access to advantage, and so affords some role in interpersonal comparison to

an individuals opportunity for welfare as well as his or her resources and capabilities.Cohens hybrid view implies that, if other things are equal, then Jude should receive

fewer resources, because of his alleged good fortune in having relatively inexpensive

tastes.

In sharp contrast, Dworkin insists that any such denial of Judes claim to equal

resources is implausible and remains unmoved by Cohens later arguments (Cohen,

2004; Dworkin, 2004, pp. 33949). In Dworkins account, then, pandering to people with

expensive tastes by giving them more resources than others and penalizing people with

inexpensive tastes are both objectionable. So, having refused either to side with Louis or

against Jude, Dworkin instead recommends refusing to allow interpersonal comparisons

of preference satisfaction any role in defining an equal distribution.

How might egalitarians avoid the implausibility of a crude resource-based standard

and the various problems associated with welfare-based standards? One response is to

embrace the capability approach to interpersonal comparison that is recommended by

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. According to this approach, an individuals level

of advantage depends on his or her capacity to function or to act in certain listed ways:

for example, to be well nourished, mobile, and literate. Assuming blindness or paraplegia

impact upon the morally relevant capabilities, the view can easily explain why individuals

with such disabilities are worse off than others, even if they possess the same income and


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KEY THINKERS 7.2

G. A. Cohen (1941)

A leading contributor to many important debates in political philosophy, Cohen first became

well known through Karl Marxs Theory of History: A Defence (1978), the founding text in

the development of analytical Marxism. He later made major interventions in debates on

libertarianismand the currency of justice. Most recently, through If Youre an Egalitarian,

How Come Youre So Rich? (2000) and his forthcomingRescuing Justice and Equality, Cohen

has focused on the role of individual conduct in achieving social justice and has provided the

leading leftist critique of liberal egalitarian political philosophy.

wealth. If the view excludes preference satisfaction from the list of capabilities, it can also

avoid pandering to, or penalizing, people on the basis of their tastes.

Considered as a framework for developing some standard of interpersonal comparison,

the capability approach fits well with familiar judgements of the relevance of individualsneeds to distributive decision making. The most obvious challenge facing itsadvocatesis to

develop a specific version of the approach that focuses on specific capabilities and explains

their relative importance in determining an individuals overall level of advantage. It is

debatable, however, whether such a challenge can be met without reliance on divisive per-

fectionist assumptions about different capabilities contribution to personal well-being. It

is also debatable whether the capability view is superior to a sophisticated resource-based

standard such as Dworkins, which justifies redressing inequalities in capability when

doing so mimics the operation of a fair insurance market (Dworkin, 2000, ch. 8).

KEY POINTS

Egalitarians disagree about the role of resources, welfare, and capabilities within interper-

sonal comparison.

Critics claim welfare standards pander to expensive tastes, penalize inexpensive tastes, or

rely on divisive perfectionist ideals.

The claim that capabilities are relevant within interpersonal comparison has considerable

appeal, but disagreement exists about how to identify the relevant capabilities.

Equality, opportunity,and responsibilityThe problem of egalitarian interpersonal comparison is multifaceted. When comparing

each individuals level of advantage, egalitarians have to ask more than whether they

should focus on resources, welfare, capability, or some other type of benefit. They also


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163 Equality....................................................................................................

have to ask what range of choices about the relevant benefits egalitarian institutions

should empower individuals to make and how to distribute responsibility for those

choices between the decision maker and other individuals.

Suppose that egalitarians accept Dworkins recommendation to focus on resources and,

when distributing goods among a group of similarly talented individuals who differ only

in their preferences, treat everyone as entitled to an equally valuable share of resources.

In addition, they need to decide whether those individuals are entitled to make different

decisions about the productive use of their resources and about their use in other types

of gamble. They also need to decide how the costs and benefits of any such decisions

should be distributed. For example, in a desert island scenario, egalitarians have to decide

whether individuals are entitled to work on their land more or less intensively, or to

assume higher or lower risks with their assets. They must, moreover, decide how much

more of their larger product industrious individuals who work more productively than

other similarly talented individuals are entitled to retain and how much, if any, should be

shared with others.

There is a spectrum of opinion about how egalitarians should answer these questions

about the relationship between liberty, liability, and equality. Some views of the rela-tionship place relatively few limits on how individuals are entitled to use their assets,

provided they do not threaten others fair shares. They also place few limits on the costs

that individuals may be left to bear as a result of making choices that are rightfully theirs.

According to these relatively permissive views, whether one individual is worse off than

another in a morally relevant respect depends, to a large degree, upon the history of the

different individuals actual holdings. Thus, even extreme inequalities in outcome might

be defensible if they were to arise from individuals exercising their rights differently,

but against a background of similar opportunities. Other more restrictive views place

narrower limits on how individuals are entitled to use their assets and what costs they are

liable to bear for their choices. Thus, they might deny individuals the right to squander all

of their assets or to engage in various high-stakes gambles. To limit the costs that decisionmakers incur, they might limit the options available to individuals or insist that everyone

shares the costs of others choices, rather than only those of their own misfortunes.

For illustration, consider how such views bear on public policy relating to funding for

smoking-related illnesses. Setting aside the complications that arise because of smokings

addictive character and assuming that every smoker faces the same probability of illness,

more permissive egalitarians are likely to recommend allowing individuals to smoke

without privately insuring against any additional medical costs they thereby incur. They

are also likely to favour requiring those individuals to finance their own medical care if

their smoking leads to illness and might even consider denying such care, rather than

forcing those who choose not to smoke to share in its financing. In contrast, more

restrictive egalitarians may instead compel smokers to take out additional insurance, by

taxing cigarettes to cover their additional medical expenses, or even force others to share

the costs of smokers choices, by financing those expenses out of general taxation.

Although Rawls has made some remarks about voluntary unemployment, it is Dwor-

kins work that has provided most of the impetus for recent discussion of the relationship

between equality, liberty, and liability (Rawls, 2001, p. 179). As mentioned earlier, equality

of resources permits inequalities in outcome that arise because of differences in indi-

viduals choices against a fair background and reflect variations in their attitudes to risk.


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Many welcome Dworkins lead and have devised rival ambition-sensitive conceptions of

equality (Arneson, 1989; Rakowski, 1993; Roemer, 1995; 1998; Van Parijs, 1996).

Cohen, for example, claims that Dworkin has performed for egalitarianism the con-

siderable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the

anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility (1989, p. 933). Cohens own

conception of equality of access to advantage treats inequalities in outcome very dif-

ferently, depending on whether they originate in variations in choice against an equal

background rather than luck, or are, in that sense, avoidable rather than unavoidable.

Thus, explaining how egalitarianism does not enjoin redress of our compensation for

disadvantage as such, Cohen writes that it:

attends, rather, to involuntary disadvantage, which is the sort that does not re-

flect the subjects choice. Peoples advantages are unjustly unequal . . . when the

inequality. . . reflects unequal access to advantage, as opposed to patterns of choice

against a background of equality of access.

(1989, p. 920)

On the other hand, Cohen adds that:[when] deciding whether or not justice (as opposed to charity) requires redistribution,

the egalitarian asks if someone with a disadvantage could have avoided it or could now

overcome it. If he could have avoided it, he has no claim to compensation, from an

egalitarian point of view.

(p. 920, cf. pp. 916, 931)

Unlike Cohen, however, others have resisted the implausible assumptions about choice

and responsibility that they claim to detect in some of the most influential recent versions

of egalitarianism.

Elizabeth Anderson (1999, p. 295) coins the label luck egalitarianism to refer to the

fundamentally flawed conception of justice that she alleges is present in the work ofArneson, Cohen, Dworkin, Rakowski, Roemer, and Van Parijs. According to Anderson,

luck egalitarianism is flawed, because it combines too critical an attitude to involuntary

disadvantages with too uncritical an attitude to voluntary disadvantages. Pursuing the

first type of objection, she argues that many attempts to mitigate inequalities in fortune

would be counterproductive, or would jeopardize individuals status and privacy. For

example, trying to redress the unequal effects of the natural lottery on individuals by

redistributing resources will stigmatize the recipients, or will require public officials to

pass judgement on the relative worth of individuals natural endowments and make

intrusive enquiries into the degree to which their circumstances are avoidable. Pursuing

the second type of objection, Anderson appeals to an associational ideal of democratic

citizenship, the maintenance of which requires that individuals enjoy access to adequate

levelsof certain capabilities. She objectsto luck egalitarianism by alleging that it mistakenly

places no limits on inequalities in such capabilities, provided they have the appropriate

voluntary origins. In Andersons view, however, law-abiding individuals are not entitled

to relinquish such capabilities, although they are entitled not to exercise them.

The success of Andersons critique remains the subject of considerable debate. It is

dubious, for example, whether Andersons objections apply to all of the theorists she

groups together as luck egalitarians or to all attempts to mitigate misfortune (Dworkin,


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165 Equality....................................................................................................

2002, Pt IV). It is also possible that luck egalitarians might accommodate her conviction

that some inequalities involving certain forms of absolute deprivation cannot be rendered

only by appeals to their voluntary origins. To do so, they might eschew the assumption

that any inequality can be rendered just if it might be avoided and instead limit the range

of choices that egalitarian institutions should empower individuals to make (Bou-Habib,

2006). Finally, they might also insist that Andersons positive proposal to maintain a

safety net through which even the imprudent are never forced to fall (1999, p. 325) is prey

to many of the objections to anti-egalitarian sufficiency principles canvassed earlier.

KEY POINTS

Any conception of equality needs to include an account of liberty and liability.

Most egalitarians reject equality of outcome as the best understanding of the egalitarian

aim. Some claim that inequalities in advantage are unjust if, and only if, they are

unavoidable or involuntary, or due to luck rather than choice.

Opponents of this luck egalitarian claim argue that it is too critical of certain unavoidable

inequalities and too uncritical of certain avoidable inequalities.

ConclusionThe last thirty years have seen substantial progress in understanding the options that

are available to those who believe that equality plays an important role in understanding

social justice. This chapter outlined a number of those options, although inevitably manyissues remained unexplored: in particular, questions about how to understand equalitys

role within the family, its relevance across states and generations, and its relevance to our

treatment of non-human animals. At the same time that theorists made progress, inequal-

ity has grown at alarming rates in, and across, many societies. Such growth is not a fact of

nature, but is, to some degree, under human control. Assessing inequality and attempting

to find a unified answer to the questions we have addressed remains a morally urgent task.

BOX 7.2

Global inequality

In 1960 the 20% of the worlds people who live in the richest countries had 30 times the

income of the poorest 20% by 1995 they had 82 times as much income.

(United Nations Development Programme, 1998, p. 29)

A child born in the industrial world adds more to pollution and consumption over his or her

lifetime that do 3050 children born in developing countries.

(United Nations Development Programme, 1998, p. 4)


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The richest 20% of the worlds people in the highest-income countries account for 86%

of total private consumption expendituresthe poorest 20% a minuscule 1.3%. More

specifically, the richest fifth consume 45% of all meat and fish, 65% of electricity, 58% of

total energy, 74% of all telephone lines, 84% of all paper, and 87% of the worlds vehicle

fleet. In each of these areas the share of the bottom fifth, in the lowest income countries, is

less than 10%.

(United Nations Development Programme, 1998, pp. 2, 50)

The time somebody needs to work to buy 1 kg of bread or rice or a hamburger in most cities

in the United States is about 20 minutes. In poorer countries it can take up to 18 times

more. It takes 2 hours for the bread, 3 for the burger, in Moscow; 3 for each in Shanghai, 1

and 4 respectively in Caracas and 2 and 6 hours, respectively in Nairobi.

(Sutcliffe, 2002, p. 9)

The income shortfall that separates the 2,801 million people who live below the World

Banks $2 poverty line equals only 1% of global income, or the US annual defense budget,

or half the market value of current annual crude oil production.

(Pogge, 2002, p. 205)

The additional cost of securing the universal provision of basic education is 6 billion U.S.

dollars; i.e. 2 billion dollars less that the amount spent annually on cosmetics in the U.S.

Providing water and sanitation for all costs 9 billion dollars, which is again 2 billion dollars

less than Europeans spend annually on ice-cream. Providing reproductive health for all

women costs 12 billion dollars which equals consumption of perfume in the US and Europe.

Providing healthcare and nutrition for all costs 13 billion dollars, which is 4 billion dollars

less than what is spent on pet food in the US and Europe. Satisfying all the abovementioned

global needs together will cost 40 billion dollars, which is less than what is spent on cigarettes

or alcohol in Europe (50 and 105 billion dollars, respectively) and, of course, weapons in the

world (780 billion dollars). 40 billion dollars is also just 4% of the combined wealth of the

225 riches people in the world1 trillion dollarswhich equals the annual income of the

poorest 47% of the worlds people (2.5 billion dollars).

(United Nations Development Programme, 1998, pp. 37, 30)

Women are half the worlds population, yet they do two thirds of the worlds work, earn

one-tenth of the worlds income, and own less than one-hundredth of the worlds property.

(United Nations, 1985)

CASE STUDY

Pricing parenthood

There is considerable consensus in Western democracies that only very exceptional circum-

stances can justify limiting individuals legal rights to choose whether or not to reproduce

and to determine the size of their families. Many even regard such legal rights as embodying

human rightsand endorse Art. 16(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

according to which Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality

or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.

See chapter 9


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167 Equality....................................................................................................

It would be mistaken, however, to assume that such rights are compelling because

reproductive decisions are inconsequential, or affect only parents and the children they

create. For many individuals, there will be few decisions with as momentous an effect on

their well-being, personal relationships, career prospects, and lifetime earnings as the decision

whether or not to start a family. Moreover, the cumulative impact of such decisions will

extend well beyond the family and, depending on circumstances, may do so in more orless welcome ways. For example, a low fertility rate may reduce pressure on scarce natural

resources and make it easier for a society to achieve sustainable solutions to long-term

environmental problems. On the other hand, it may also produce an aging population that is

beset by labour shortages, a shrinking tax base, and an increasing need for medical care.

It would also be mistaken to assume that political decisions have little impact on how

the costs and benefits of parents reproductive choices are spread between themselves and

others. Instead, their distribution depends very much on the background of institutions and

policies against which those choices are made. For example, the price of parenthood will vary

considerably depending on the extent to which the state supplements parental income with

a system of child benefits or tax allowances, provides in-kind benefits in the form of freely

available childcare, education, and medical assistance, and funds these measures through

general taxation on all workers or consumers. The career prospects of men and women will

also vary, depending on the extent to which workplace organization leaves at a competitive

disadvantage those parents with extensive domestic responsibilities.

Despite widespread opposition to legally enforced restrictions on reproductive choice,

there is less agreement about how to answer the questions of distributive justice that are

raised by reproduction. This section examines how some of the positions mentioned so far

bear on some of those questions.

As a preliminary, it is worth drawing some distinctions about the various interests at stake

and how they might complement or conflict with one another. The most obvious comparison

is between the interests of individuals considered as children and as adults. Both sets of

interests favour providing children with a fair start in life that enables them to contribute to

their society on a just basis. They are also likely to support public funding for the institutionsnecessary to develop individuals productive capacities and sense of justice. Conflicts are

more likely to arise between the interests of parents and non-parents, and of mothers and

fathers, and the former may well intensify in societies in which fewer people opt to become

parents. Assuming that institutions will have different distributive implications, how might

arguments from egalitarian political theory guide the choice between the interests of parents

and non-parents, or those with larger and smaller families?

One starting point is to consider the implications of equality of resources in a simple

case, within which the theorys other demands are satisfied and all reproductive decisions

are voluntary. Even in this simplified scenario, it seems plausible to suppose that those

implications will vary depending on whether society has reached the point at which the

production of additional members, on balance, has positive or negative effects on the per

capita stock of resources. So, when the effects are positive, egalitarians need to ask whether

parents have any special claim to reap the benefits generated by their reproductive choices. 3

Conversely, when the effects are negative, they need to ask whether parents are especially

liable to bear the costs.

Addressing the latter question, some argue that equality of resources implies that, ideally,

anyoverall costs generated by the choiceto reproduce should be borne by the decision makers,


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assuming that they already possess a fair share of resources (Casal and Williams, 2004). In a

trenchant endorsement of parental liability over shared liability, Rakowski writes that:

Babies are not brought by storks whose whims are beyond our control. Specific individuals

are responsible for their existence. It is therefore unjust to declare . . .that because two

people decide to have a child, or through carelessness find themselves with one, everyoneis

required to share their resources with the new arrival, and to the same extent as its parents.

(1993, p. 153)

Similarly, according to Peter Vallentyne, it seems clear thatagents have a duty to cover

the . . .costs of their procreative activities (2002, p. 207).

Anderson (1999, pp. 297, 3235), however, rejects Rakowskis resourcist conclusion and

treats it as further evidence of luck egalitarianisms implausibility. In part, her rejection is

animated by a concern to protect dependent caretakers, who are usually women, and children

from certain forms of absolute deprivation. Resource egalitarians can address this worry by

incorporating a principle of sufficiency within their view and limiting parental liability by

means of a guaranteed safety net. They can also emphasize that their position treats parents

choices as a matter of brute luck for their offspring and so opposes shifting liability from

parent to child. There are, however, other more fundamental criticisms that are less easy to

accommodate.

According to the capability view, institutions and policies should not be assessed by asking

whether they produce outcomes that could have emerged from the type of market process

favoured by equality of resources. Instead, assessment should focus on a list of specific capabil-

ities and ask how they are distributed between different individuals. The concrete implications

of the view will vary greatly, depending on how that list is specifiedbut if it includes pro-

creative and parental capabilities, then the capability view will favour adjusting the price that

individuals have to pay to become parents to ensure that the relevant capabilities are available

and fairly distributed. Thus, when resource egalitarians insist on parents responsibility to

bear any costs that arise from their choosing to reproduce, advocates of a family-friendly

capability view might reply that it is non-parents responsibility if they choose not to takeadvantage of the procreative capabilities that society rightly makes available to them.

Which view, if either, is more plausible? As mentioned, the capability view enables

egalitarians to express a concern for human needs that many find intuitively compelling.

Nevertheless, any view faces objections when it classifies certain activities as needs, while

classifying others as the objects of mere preference. For example, suppose that the claim

that parenthood is a need rests on the substantive assumption that many individuals would

lead far less worthwhile lives if incapable of becoming parents. One obvious response is

to question whether the substantive assumption is sound and to claim instead that those

individuals might have led no worse lives without becoming parents. Even if the assumption

is sound, however, critics could challenge the assumptions political relevance by claiming

that it is too divisive to form part of a liberal political conception of justice. They could

also point out that, even if living well does depend on the capability to become a parent,

it is far less plausible to claim that it depends on being able to have as many children as

one might desire. Thus, a perfectionist defence of the family-friendly capability view at most

justifies limiting parental liability perhaps by granting anexemptionin the case of the first

or second childrather than denying it altogether.

Welfare egalitarians seem just as unlikely as resource egalitarians to accept that parent-

hoods welfare-promoting effects justify spreading its costs across society. If the effects of


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169 Equality....................................................................................................

parenthood are so positive, financing transfers to parents at the expense of non-parents is

just as likely to increase inequalities in well-being as to diminish them. Suppose, then, that its

advocates attempt to defend the family-friendly capability view by relying on less substantive

judgements about individuals interests.

One such defence begins with the observation that people are often moved by moral or

religious convictions to become parents or to nurture their offspring, and then argues thatequality requires adjusting individuals entitlements to take into account either their moral

obligations or their beliefs about such obligations (Anderson, 1999, pp. 3245). Various

conceptions of freedom of religion and conscience imply that it is more difficult to justify

placing on burdens on religious and conscientious activity than placing comparable burdens

on other types of activities, and so might support such adjustments (Nussbaum, 2000, ch.

3). For example, some claim that religious observers are entitled to special exemptions from

generally applicable norms; the observant should be allowed greater flexibility in their working

hours or permitted to slaughter animals in ways that would normally contravene anti-cruelty

legislation (Shiffrin, 2004, pp. 2767; Casal, 2003). A family-friendly capability view might

extend this type of claim to working parents and conclude that they too should be treated

differently, with the costs borne by others who lack their responsibilities.

The appeal to conscience raises deep, but unresolved, issues in liberal egalitarianism.

For illustration of one of the challenges that it faces, reconsider the case of Louis, whose

preferences are more expensive to satisfy to than are those of others, but who resource

egalitarians refuse to grant a larger share of resources. If the appeal to conscience is sound,

whether such refusal is justified should depend on the grounds for Louis preferences. For

many, however, it makes no difference whether Louis wishes to undertake some lengthy

journey because he feels bound to go on a pilgrimage, rather than drawn by a sense of

personal adventure. If this reaction is defensible, then there is reason to doubt whether the

appeal to conscience justifies the family-friendly capability view.

To conclude this brief survey, consider how one might appeal to autonomy, rather

than to conscience, to reject the resource egalitarian requirement to internalize the costs

of reproductive choice. The argument assumes that social institutions should ensure thatparents provide continuous care for their offspring, but also notes that institutions can do

so in ways that are more or less restrictive of parents autonomy, or opportunities to pursue

a plurality of valuable goals (Alstott, 2004a; 2004b; Raz, 1986, ch. 14). Thus, in order to

satisfy their duties of care under some institutions, many parentsespecially motherswill

often need to forgo employment opportunities, consequently suffering serious long-term

disadvantage. Alternative institutions are feasible, however, that preserve a far wider array

of opportunities and so protect parents autonomy to a greater degree. As Alstott herself

proposes, such institutions might involve resource transfers to caretakers that enable them

to save for their old age and to purchase childcare or education, thereby protecting their

employment opportunities. The appeal to autonomy assumes that care for children should

be secured in ways that preserve, rather than jeopardize, parental autonomy and so favours

the second type of institution.

Even if it is more plausible to appeal to autonomy than conscience, the argument just

sketched is not immune to objections. Resource egalitarians might, for example, object that

it is very unclear when restrictions on parents opportunities become so serious that they

constitute a threat to their autonomy. They might also ask whether the alleged threats to

parental autonomy arise only because the demands of equality of resources are not satisfied,

particularly for women. Far more work needs to be done on these issues, as well as on


22/23


many of the other distributive questions generated by procreation that we have not had time

to survey. Most importantly, even if justice does require parents to bear the costs of their

decisions, it might still remain a serious injustice if, as remains the case in most societies,

the price of motherhood greatly exceeds the price of fatherhood.

QUESTIONS

1. Are class-based inequalities in career prospects and political power really unjust?

2. Are social and natural luck comparable as sources of unfairness?

3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls intuitive argument for democratic

equality?

4. What role, if any, should insurance markets play in a plausible conception of equality?

5. What is wrong with levelling down?

6. Is there any reason to care about inequality if everyone has enough?

7. To what extent, if at all, should egalitarian principles of justice aim to ensure equality in

preference satisfaction?

8. Is the capability approach preferable to equality of resources?

9. Are only unavoidable inequalities unjust?

10. To what extent does a concern with equality favour sharing the costs of parents repro-

ductive choices?

FURTHER READING

Barry, B. (2005)Why Social Justice Matters, Cambridge: Polity Press.One of the worlds leading

political theorists provides a trenchant critique of the recent growth of inequality and an important

discussion of how preserving equality of opportunity depends on limiting inequality in outcome.

Casal, P. (2007) Why sufficiency is not enough, Ethics, 117(2), pp. 296326. A systematic

critique of anti-egalitarian appeals to principles of sufficiency, combined with positive proposals

about the role that such principles can play in complementing principles of equality and priority.

Clayton, M. and Williams, A. (eds) (2000) The Ideal of Equality, London: Macmillan.A useful

collection of classic papers, including Parfits Lindley Lecture, Equality or priority?, as well as

contributions by Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Dworkin, Nagel, Rawls, Scanlon, and Temkin.

Cohen, G. A. (1997) Where the action is. on the site of distributive justice, Philosophy

and Public Affairs, 26(1), pp. 330.Summarizes Cohens widely discussed critique of using the

difference principle to defend incentives and argues for the application of principles of social

justice to individual conduct.

Cohen, G. A. (1989) On the currency of egalitarian justice, Ethics, 99(4), pp. 90644.An

article that greatly influenced later debates about justice and interpersonal comparison, and the

role of choice and responsibility, within egalitarian theories.


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171 Equality....................................................................................................

Dworkin, R. (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA;

Harvard University Press.Perhaps the second most important statement of liberal egalitarianism.

Okin, S. M. (1989) Justice, Gender and the Family, New York: Basic Books. An influential and

accessible critique of the role of the traditional family in maintaining gender-based inequality

and one of the best statements of feminist political theory.

Rawls, J. (1978) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. The most important

statement of liberal egalitarianism.

Temkin, L. (1993) Inequality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. The most detailed and systematic

treatment of various views of how one outcome can be worse than other in relation to inequality.

Van Parijs, P. (1996) Real Freedom for All, Oxford: Clarendon Press. A brilliant appeal to

resource egalitarian principles to defend radical social reform, via the provision of a universal

basic income that is unconditional on willingness to seek paid employment.

WEB LINKS

hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/ The Human Development Report 2006 compares figuresfrom 177 countries on various aspects of human development, such as literacy or life expectancy,

and compares various countries success in converting their wealth into human development.

mora.rente.nhh.no/projects/EqualityExchange A wide range of forthcoming paperson equal-

ity within various disciplines, as well as information on conferences and fellowships relevant to

the study of equality.

www.demos.org/inequality Inequality.org contains a wealth of recent information about

inequality, as well as statistics and quotations.

www.jrf.org.uk TheJoseph Rowntree Foundation provides links to a host of usefulinformation

about poverty and inequality in the UK.

www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/inequal/index.htm The World Bank Groups PovertyNet

contains information on inequality, its measurement, and its effects on poverty, crime, health,

and gender relations.

ENDNOTES

1 The authors are grateful to Catriona McKinnon for very helpful comments.

2 See Persson (2001) for a plausible argument that prioritarians can escape the levelling

down objection even if their view takes a comparative form that attaches importance to an

individuals relative, as well as absolute, levels of advantage.

3 Space precludes further discussion here, but see Casal (1999) and Casal and Williams (2004,

Pt IV).

Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book to access more learning

resources: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/mckinnon/

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