Case Digest VII Legal Ethics

8/18/2019 Case Digest VII Legal Ethics

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VII LAWYER’S DUTIES TO COURTS [Year]

A: Lawyer owes Candor and Fairness to the Courts

COBB-PEREZ vs LANTIN

GR No. L-22320Jul. 29, 1968

24 SCRA 219 – Legal Ethics – Counsel’s Assertiveness

FACTS:

A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’sfailure to pay a debt ofPhp 17,000.00. Hermoso won and a writ of execution wasissued in his favor. The sheriff was to conducta public sale of a property owned byPerez worth Php 300,000.00. This was opposed by Perez as heclaimed the amountof said property was more than the amount of the debt. Respondent JudgeLantin,issuing judge, found merit on this, hence he amended his earlier decision andissued a second writ thistime directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale of Perez’

210 shares of stock approximately worth Php17,000.00

Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying toenjoin the public sale.The case eventually reached the Supreme Court wherethe SC ruled that the petition of the Perezspouses are without merit; that theirnumerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. I n saiddecision, theSupreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should bepaid bytheir counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The counsels now appeal saiddecision by the SupremeCourt as they claimed that such decision reflected adverselyagainst their professionalism; that “If therewas delay, it was because petitioners’counsel happened to be more assertive… a quality of the lawyers(which) is not to becondemned.”

ISSUE: WON the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused

HELD

No. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty hisclient’s cause must beencouraged and is to be commended; what is not toleratedis a lawyer’s insistence despite the patentfutility of his client’s position, as in the caseat bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarilya layman to theintricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he findsthathis client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to

acquiesce and submit,rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resistthe whims and caprices of his client, andtemper his client’s propensity to litigate. A

lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to hisduty to his client; itsprimacy is indisputable.Atty. Baizas and

Atty. Bolinao jointly and severally liable for the treble costs.




In Re: Vicente Almacen

1 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts

FACTS: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case.They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notifiedthe opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place ofhearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but theCourt of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to themotion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari beforethe Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions asunconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender hislawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing hisprofession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commitculpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to theminute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why

and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” Healso stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the SupremeCourt is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Courtwanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did notsurrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why nodisciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” Hesaid he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant,prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed becausethe Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petitionthey reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out itsconstitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only thosecases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importancebeyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that apetition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but ofsound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial.For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the C ourt of Appeals’opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded saidcriticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful

and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channelsthe acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of thecourts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as ofthe judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal

condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over thewalls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation ofthe duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he shouldhave known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing partyof the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained bythe court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.




Teodoro Chavez vs Atty. Escolastico Viola

196 SCRA 10 – Legal Ethics – A lawyer shall do no falsehood

FACTS

In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition againstTeodoro Chavez where he sought to have the Alvendias be declared as bona fidelessees in a land controversy. Said petition was dismissed because ofnonappearance by the Alvendias.

In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of titleover the same land in controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted thathis clients were the true owners of said land because they acquired it by sale fromTeresita Vistan way back in 1929.

Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez said that because ofthe conflicting claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aidedin and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawfulapplication for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the

Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.

HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lesseesof the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clientswere owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; itmatters not which one. Worse, he offered no explanation as regards the discrepancy.

A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid thatcandidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditiousadministration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor andhonesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola wassuspended for 5 months.

Santa Pangan vs Atty. Dionisio Ramos

93 SCRA 87 – Legal Ethics – Lack of Candor by a Lawyer – Proper name to be usedby a lawyer

FACTS

In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. DionisioRamos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court inManila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramosappeared in), it was found that he used the name “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In hisdefense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birthcertificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. “D.D.” stands for DionisioDayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, hisname listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the off icial record containing the namesand signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized

to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice oflaw. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do nofalsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragableobligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the courtas “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”, r espondent has violated hissolemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severelyreprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspensionor disbarment.




G.R. No. 78252 April 12, 1989

PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner,vs.ANGELO KING, KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE

SARINO and DOMINGO K. LI,respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Simeon C. Sato for respondent Domingo K Li.

Syquia Law Offices for respondents King, Ken Suy Wat, Calderon and Ferrer, Jr.

GANCAYCO, J .:

The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases,the service of summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy thereof to thedefendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. 1 Suchservice of summons may be made at the defendant's dwelling house or residence orat his office or regular place of business. The essence of personal service is thehanding or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself.

However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time,substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at thedefendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age anddiscretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office orregular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 2

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable timethat substituted service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service shouldbe shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the factthat such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This isnecessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method ofservice. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the commonlaw; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only asprescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under thecontrolling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must befollowed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than thatauthorized by the statute is considered ineffective. 3

The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review bycertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386 entitled

"Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al."dated January 27, 1987, and its resolution dated April 22, 1987. 4

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, andprivate respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money

market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly andsolidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5 which provides asfollows:

Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors ortrustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patentlyunlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of grossnegligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporationshall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resultingtherefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or membersand other persons.

Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and privaterespondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, MetroManila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who acknowledged receipt thereof forand in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited in thecertification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983.

On May 24, 1983, the law f irm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed amotion for extension of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss.The said motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for thedefendants. The motion was granted in an order dated May 26, 1983 giving thedefendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the reglementaryperiod within which to file the responsive pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of theaction for a period of sixty (60) days on the ground that there was an on-goingnegotiation for an amicable settlement of the case between the parties. The motionwas denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declaredefendants in default for failure to file an answer. This motion was granted in an orderdated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel,submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It reads as follows:

1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, thenaccount with the plaintiff as of June 15, 1983, in the sum ofP707,500.01 with 20% interest per annum as follows:

P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983

100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983




100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983

100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984.

2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claimagainst the defendants.

3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by thedefendants provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly andseverally, two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiffis entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for thecollection of the unpaid account of the defendants. 6

On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the saidCompromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the terms andconditions embodied therein. Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitionerfiled a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial courtgranted the motion on December 16, 1983.

On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification"thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that heerroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in

fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January 17, 1984, said counsel filed a"Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy of theresolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of July 6,1983 showing that he was theattorney-in-fact of MFC only, and praying for the correction of the judgment,accordingly. The motion for clarification was denied on January 20,1984.

On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motionto set aside the decision dated July 18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writof execution dated December 21, 1983 on the ground that there was no service ofsummons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was nottheir address as they were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had noauthority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were

not served copies of the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only

when it was being executed; and that they did not participate as directors or officersof MFC in the subject transaction.

On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from judgment with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging

therein that there was no service of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones wasnot authorized to represent him or to enter into the Compromise Agreement. After anopposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower court denied the samein its order dated April 6, 1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by theprivate respondents were also denied on May 4,1984.

Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiteratingthat there was no service of summons upon each of them as service of summons wasmade at the address of the firm with which they had severed connections; that thecounsel of record of MFC has no authority to represent them in the case and in theCompromise Agreement; that they have not ratified the same by a partial payment ofthe compromise judgment; and that they were no longer connected with MFC at thetime they were sued. In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on

January 27, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellantsneed not be resolved: Wherefore:

(1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromiseagreement rendered by the lower court as well as the writ ofexecution issued pursuant thereto as against appellants AngeloKing, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., andDomingo Li are hereby SET ASIDE; and

(2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby

ordered to direct proper service of summons on the aforesaidindividual appellants at their respective correct addresses andthereafter to proceed in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED. 7

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by theappellate court on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition predicated on thefollowing grounds:

(A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEALFROM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT DATED APRIL 6,1984,DENYING (i) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S

'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25,1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION,




COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION FILEDJANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELOKING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON and JOSEFERRER, JR. and (b) DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROMTRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING

THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS LONG BECOMEFINAL AND EXECUTORY.

(B) THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELYIGNORED THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATERESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROMJUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION TOSET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ANDQUASH EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATERESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTINCALDERON AND JOSE FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OFTIME.

(C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED ASDIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF MFC WERE PROPERLYSERVED WITH SUMMONS.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers ofMFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject ofthe litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personalservice of summons must be observed in that summons must be served personallyon private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them.

The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal serviceof summons was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in thecomplaint does not appear to be the office address of private respondents as theywere no longer connected with the corporation then. Personal service of summonsshould have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of theSecurities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriffeffected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the AssistantManager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as abovestated private respondents were no longer connected. Such substituted service is notvalid. There was no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be aprevious personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted servicecould be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly served withsummons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.

It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC andprivate respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a responsivepleading, and a suspension of the proceedings pending a possible settlement of thecase; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise Agreement in behalf of MFC andprivate respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a

compromise judgment was rendered; that said judgment was partially complied withbut upon default in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought fromand granted by the trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informedthe court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreementin behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf of the defendants, hisvoluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings andthe Compromise Agreement would constitute a waiver of the defect in the service ofsummons. However, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when heproduced the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that theauthority of said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of theprivate respondents.

Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of theprivate respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in so far as theyare concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment is also null and void asto private respondents. The ruling of the lower court that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed beyond the reglementaryperiod is untenable. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does notprescribe. 8

One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in theperformance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He representedhimself to be the counsel for the defendants including the private respondents notonly in the motions he filed but also in the Compromise Agreement he submitted. Itwas only after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced

that he perked up by saying that he committed an oversight and that he was notauthorized by the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in theCompromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of thepracticing lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression ofthis imperative. Counsel should be made to account before his peers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, reportand recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floorof the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. Thisdecision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.




A.C. No. 716 January 30, 1969

EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant Vs. PEDRO B. CARRANZA,respondent

Confusion and Prolongation of the Cadastral Suit

FACTS:

A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, fordeceptionpracticed on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of thefalsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his clientto the effect that her own mother left nolegitimate ascendants or descendants or anyother heirs except herself, when, as a matter of fact, thedeceased was survived byfour other daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he introducedthe samein evidence. Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, havingcausedconfusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence

containing a false statementinconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason ofthe family litigations between his client andcomplainant, which are rooted insuccession rights and that respondent's failure to discharge his dutiesas a lawyerconsistent with his oath of office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Carranza violated his oath for prolongation of the cadastral suit.

HELD:

Pedro B. Carranza, respondent, is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an

offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with.Every member ofthe bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the wayheconducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice.Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that theyare officers of the court,and that while they owe their clients the duty of completefidelity and the utmost diligence, they arelikewise held to strict accountability insofaras candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.Even if there be no intent todeceive, a lawyer whose conduct betrays inattention orcarelessness should not beallowed to free himself from a charge instituted against him by the mere pleathat hisconduct was not willful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.




G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972

MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant,vs.UY KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG

and RELIABLE REALTY CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.

Petitioner in his own behalf.

J. Natividad & Associates for respondent.

MAKASIAR, J. : p

Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for reviewby certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co,Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court ofFirst Instance, alleging that he filed on May 5, 1969 a complaint dated April 30, 1969for the annulment of a deed of sale, reivindicacion and damages against respondentsdocketed as Civil Case No. 76412 and assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court ofFirst Instance presided over by Honorable Jose L. Moya, wherein he averred:

(1) that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pendingsettlement in Special Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch VI ofthe Manila Court of First Instance and also a beneficiary of theestate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson pending settlement in SpecialProceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court ofFirst Instance. In Special Proceedings No. 63866, he appealedfrom the order dated December 27, 1967 appointing Ricardo VitoCruz as ancillary administrator to the Supreme Court, which appealwas docketed as G.R. No. L-29235;

(2) that he has been named as special administrator of the estate ofRosina in Special Proceedings No. 67302 originally assigned toBranch VI but later transferred to Branch VIII and consolidated withSpecial Proceedings No. 63866 but the Presiding Judge of BranchVIII dismissed said Special Proceedings No. 67302 in an orderdated February 20, 1967, which he also appealed to the SupremeCourt and docketed as G.R. No. L-28054;

(3) that to protect his interest as such beneficiary in the estates of

Rosina and Julian, he caused a notice of lis pendens to beannotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49877/ T-158,

49878/T-158, 49879/T-158, 49880/T-158, 49881/T-158 all issued inthe name of Rosina covering five adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila;

(4) that in an order dated April 16, 1969 (p. 73, rec. of L-30935),Judge Manuel P. Barcelona presiding in Special Proceedings No.

63866, authorized respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillaryadministrator of Rosina's estate, upon the latter's motion, to sell thereal properties of the estate for the payment of the estate andinheritance taxes, realty taxes of the estate and expenses ofadministration;

(5) that respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz negotiated for the sale of theaforesaid lots with the Reliable Realty Corporation, which waswilling to buy the properties for P400,000.00 provided the noticeof lis pendens annotated on the titles covering said lots iscancelled;

(6) that upon motion of respondent Vito Cruz, Judge ManuelBarcelona in Special Proceedings No. 63866 ordered thecancellation of the said notice of lis pendens in an order dated April15, 1969 (Schedule "C" of petition, p. 43, rec.);

(7) that respondent Vito Cruz executed a deed of sale over theaforesaid properties in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation,organized by respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nicasio Co,Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong, and respondent JudgeManuel P. Barcelona issued an order dated April 24, 1969approving the said deed of sale (Annex "A" and Schedule "B" ofpetition, pp. 38-47, rec.);

(8) that thereafter T.C.T. Nos. 49877, 49878, 49880, and 49881were cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. Nos. 96471/T-757,96472/T-757, 96473/T-757 and 96474/T-757 were issued by theRegister of Deeds in favor of respondent Reliable RealtyCorporation;

(9) that the aforesaid orders of April 16, 1969 and April 24, 1969were issued without due notice to petitioner and without or inexcess of the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge in SpecialProceedings No. 63866 for the reason that he had been divested of jurisdiction of said proceedings by reason of his appeal therein inG. R. No. L-29235, (p. 32, rec.);




(10) that on April 30, 1969, he caused the filing of a notice ofadverse claim on the properties covered by T.C.T. Nos. 96471,96472, 96473 and 96474 (p. 34, rec.); and

(11) that he spent at least P10,000.00 in his efforts to protect and

defend his hereditary interests in the estate of Rosina;

and prays for judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots asnull and void, (b) directing the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles issued inthe name of Reliable Realty Corporation, (c) declaring that the aforesaid five lots ashis distributive share in the estate of Rosina as well as directing the register of deedsof Manila to issue in his name new transfer certificates of title, and (d) sentencingprivate respondents jointly and severally to pay him P10,000.00 as actual damages,P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, andP50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus legal interests on all said values.

Private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co,Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss (Appendix "B", pp. 44-50,rec.) appellant Macias' complaint in Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance onthe grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of thesuit; that the complaint states no cause of action; that there is another action of thesame nature pending in court; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to prosecute thepresent suit; and alleging specifically that:

(1) Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case since the subject matter involved properlybelongs exclusively to and is within the competence of Branch VIIIand Branch IV before which courts Special Proceedings Nos.63866 and 57405 are pending and petitioner's alleged claim ofbeneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends on arecognition thereof by the probate court in said Special

Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405;

(2) that upon the face of the complaint, the same does not contain acause of action; because Branch X, which is coordinate withBranch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, under the existing jurisprudence has no authority to annul the questioned ordersissued by Branch VIII, aside from the fact that he appealed to theSupreme Court from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIIIdismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302 which was then pendingbefore Branch IV and subsequently transferred to Branch VIII (L-28054), from the order denying Macias' claim of beneficiary interestin Rosina's estate and appointing respondent Vito Cruz as ancillaryadministrator of the estate of Rosina in the same Special

Proceedings No. 63866 (L-29235; Annex "A", pp. 51-60, rec.) aswell as from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch IV also

denying Macias' petition for relief from the order approving thepartial distribution of the estate of Julian and denying his motion forthe removal of Vito Cruz as administrator and appointment ofherein appellant in his place (L-28947; Annex "B", pp. 61-65, rec.);

(3) that petitioner Manuel Macias is not a real party in interest;because he is not the beneficiary, nor legatee nor creditor, muchless an heir, of Rosina. He bases his alleged interest in the estateof Julian who died intestate on June 15, 1964 solely on the latter'smemorandum to his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sisterRosina will, after his estate is settled, give at her convenience topetitioner Manuel Macias the sum of P500.00; to Faustino A. Reisand Severino Baron the amount of P10 000.00 each; and toDominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto P1,000.00 each. Thesaid memorandum is not a will. Unfortunately, Rosina died onSeptember 14, 1965 without being able to comply with thememorandum of her brother Julian. Since petitioner has not beendeclared an heir or legatee of Julian in Special Proceedings No.

57405 nor of Rosina in Special Proceedings No. 63866, he has nolegal standing to file the present action. The aforesaid motion todismiss was followed by supplement alleging that since the buyer,the Reliable Corporation, has a distinct personality from those of itsincorporators, there is no cause of action against privaterespondent Uy Kim, Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co andManuel Sosantong, its incorporators.

Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for intervention in said Case No. 76412dated June 4, 1969, reiterating the ground of the motion to dismiss advanced by theother private respondents as aforestated and emphasizing that this petition for relieffrom judgment seeks the nullified classification by the Presiding Judge of Branch X ofthe order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866

dated April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admmitted by petitioner's motion in praying thatthis Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to Branch IV or Branch VIII as hispetition seeks to nullify the orders of Presiding Judge Manuel Barcelona of BranchVIII in said Special Proceedings No. 63866 (Annex "B", pp. 96-97, rec.).

Petitioner-appellant filed his opposition dated June 14, 1969 to the motion to dismissof respondents Reliable Realty Corporation and its incorporators as well as to themotion for intervention filed by respondent Vito Cruz.

In an order dated June 30, 1969, Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of Branch Xsustained the motion to dismiss and forthwith dismissed plaintiff's complaint herein inCivil Case No. 76412 but denied the prayer of the motion to dismiss for cancellationof the notice of adverse claim, which petitioner-appellant caused to be annotated on

the titles issued in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, from which order petitioner-




appellant Macias interposed his appeal, and accordingly filed this petition for reviewon certiorari .

Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co,Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed on December 12, 1969 their motion to

dismiss the instant petition on the ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of FirstInstance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, for the said Branch X is withoutauthority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a coordinate branch of the ManilaCourt of First Instance; that petitioner-appellant is not a beneficiary, heir or creditor ofthe estate of Julian or Rosina; and that petitioner-appellant had already appealed theorder of Judge Barcelona of Branch VIII authorizing and approving the sale of the lotsin favor of respondent Reliable Realty Corporation respectively dated April 16 and April 24, 1969 (Annex "A" pp. 94-95, rec.), which appeal is now pending before thisCourt in L-30935 (pp. 87-97, rec.; pp. 4, 15, appellant's brief; emphasis supplied).

In a manifestation dated and filed on December 19, 1969, respondent Vito Cruzadopted in toto as his own motion to dismiss and/or answer, the motion to dismissdated December 12, 1969 filed by the principal respondents (p. 102, rec.).

Petitioner-appellant filed on December 19, 1969 an opposition dated December 18,1969 to the motion to dismiss (pp. 104-108, rec.).

In Our resolution dated January 23, 1970, the motion to dismiss petition for reviewand certiorari was denied (p. 123, rec.).

In a manifestation dated February 13, 1970, private respondents Reliable RealtyCorporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantongadopted as their answer their motion to dismiss filed on December 12, 1969 (p. 133,rec.).

The appealed order of respondent Judge Jose L. Moya, dated June 30, 1969, reads:

It appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending inBranch VIII of this Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for thesettlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina MargueriteWolfson; that the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditarytitle of her estate; that the sale of the lands forming part thereofwhich the plaintiff desires to annul was approved by this Court inSpecial Proceeding No. 63866; that aside from praying for theannulment of the sale, the plaintiff also seeks a declaration that thelands sold constitutes his distributive share of Rosina MargueriteWolfson's inheritance; and that the plaintiff has appealed to theSupreme Court from the order approving the sale, and it being

settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment or order of a branchof the Court of First Instance is vested exclusively in the branch

which rendered the judgment or issued the order and that any otherbranch, even if it be in the same judicial district, which attempts todo so, exceeds its jurisdiction (Tuason v. Judge Torres, 21S.C.R.A. 1169, L-24717, December 4, 1967), and it beingunquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a

deceased person and determine the persons entitled theretobelongs exclusively to the court or branch thereof takingcognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in thiscase; and finally the Supreme Court having already acquired jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiff's appeal, no subordinate courtshould attempt to pass upon the same question submitted to it, themotion to dismiss filed by the defendant is granted and thecomplaint is dismissed.

The prayer in the motion to dismiss for the cancellation of the noticeof adverse claim which the plaintiff caused to be annotated on thetitles to the lands on account of the present action is denied as theonly question raised by a motion to dismiss is the sufficiency of the

complaint filed in the action. (Appendix "F", p. 78, rec.).

The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without merit and the foregoing orderappealed from should be sustained.

Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusionof all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning thesettlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filedbefore Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by formerJudge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where SpecialProceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceasedRosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:

... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. Thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutesbut one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estateit is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, onecourt, which should have exclusive control of every part of suchadministration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each independentof the other, would result in confusion and delay.

xxx xxx xxx




The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdictionof the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, was notinserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in thepublic interest for the better administration of justice. For thatreason the parties have no control over it. 1

On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it shouldbe stated herein that any challenge to the validity of a will, anyobjection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claimwhich any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestatesuccession may make, must be acted upon and decided within thesame special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shalltake cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the daycomes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudicationof the property to the interested parties, ... . 2

This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo, 3 thus:

... The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate theestates of deceased persons either summarily or through theprocess of administration. (See articles 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules ofCourt.) In order to settle the estate of a deceased person it is one ofthe functions of the probate court to determine who the heirs arethat will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount orproportion of their respective shares. ...

It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by hereinpetitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents which was assignedto Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L.Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court.

Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of firstinstance that first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other branches of the same court of first instance or judicial districtand all other coordinate courts. Thus, in the 1970 case of De Leon vs. Salvador , 4 Mr.Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled:

The various branches of a Court of First Instance of a province orcity, having as they have the same or equal authority andexercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, shouldnot, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with the respectivecases, much less with their orders or judgments, by means ofinjunction. 5

In the words of Mr. Justice Fernando, also in behalf of the Court, "any other viewwould be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the mainpurpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and toavoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction arepermitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. ... This is to preclude an

undesirable situation from arising one, which if permitted, as above pointed out, wouldbe fraught with undesirable consequences, as already indicated, for the bench, noless than for the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction. 6

Appellant claims that his action in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X of the ManilaCourt of First Instance, is not for the annulment of any judgment or order of BranchVIII of said Court and that nowhere, either in the prayer or in the body of hiscomplaint, does he seek for the annulment of any order of Branch VIII (p. 8,appellant's brief). This pretension of appellant is belied by paragraph 8 of hiscomplaint in Civil Case No. 76412 alleging that the order dated April 15, 1969directing the register of deeds of Manila to cancel the notice of lis pendens caused tobe annotated by the appellant on the titles covering the five (5) lots and the orderdated April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale were both issued by the Presiding

Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866, without due notice to andhearing of appellant; and further belied by paragraph 9 of the same complaint allegingthat the acts of the buyers of the aforesaid five (5) lots in causing the cancellation ofappellant's notice of lis pendens in obtaining the registration of the deed of sale, inprocuring the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles over the five (5) lots inthe name of Rosina, and in securing new transfer certificates of title in the name ofdefendant Reliable Realty Corporation, are all null and void ab initio, because (1) ofthe pendency of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235 for said appeal divested thePresiding Judge of Branch VIII of any jurisdiction in Special Proceedings No. 63866 tosell the properties in question notwithstanding the order of April 24, 1969 approvingthe deed of sale, (2) the orders dated April 15, 1969 and April 24, 1969 directing thecancellation of appellant's notice of lis pendensand approving the deed of sale maynot be registered as they have not become final and will not become final by reasonof his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235, and (3) he was not notified of the petition to sell

any portion of Rosina's estate (pars. 8 & 9, Appendix "A", pp. 30-34, rec.). It is patentthat by the aforesaid paragraphs 8 and 9 of his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412before Branch X, appellant impugns the validity of the aforementioned orders of thePresiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866.

Furthermore, in his motion to the Honorable Executive Judge of May 5, 1969,appellant averred that he filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 to nullify and setaside certain orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona of Branch VIII in SpecialProceedings No. 63866 over the testate estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson andprayed that said Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to either Branch VIII orBranch IV (Annex "A", pp. 21-22, appellant's brief). Said motion could not refer toorders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona other than the aforecited orders of April 15, 16,and 24, 1969 in Special Proceedings No. 63866.




This appellant impliedly admits on pp. 3-4 of his reply brief which is furtheremphasized by his statement that the only purpose of his motion dated May 5, 1969was "to keep the action away from possible prejudgment by the abovementionedbranches of the court below (referring to Branch IV and Branch VIII of the ManilaCourt of First Instance)."

But even without considering paragraphs 8 and 9 of appellant's complaint and hismotion dated May 5, 1969 in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X, his prayer in thesame complaint for the nullification or rescission of the deed of sale covering the f ivelots in question cannot be decreed without passing upon the validity of the orders ofthe Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 cancelling hisnotice of lis pendensauthorizing the sale and approving the sale. And, as heretoforestated, under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the Presiding Judge of Branch Xof the Manila Court of First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon thevalidity of said orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, which court, as theprobate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including thevalidity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for thepayment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof.

Appellant's insistence that in Civil Case No. 76412, he seeks to recover hisdistributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina, all the more removes the saidcase from the jurisdiction of Branch X; for as heretofore stated, the distribution of theestate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. He must therefore seekhis remedy in the same probate court — Branch VIII — which is hearing SpecialProceedings No. 63866, instead of filing a separate civil case in Branch X.

Moreover, his petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus in G.R. No. L-30935,entitled Macias vs. University of Michigan, et al., wherein he questions the validity ofthe aforesaid orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No.63866, amply covers the same subject matter and seeks substantially the same reliefas his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 and the present petition (see pars. 26, 28,

30-40, and the prayer in this petition, pp. 13-34, rec. of L-30935). .

Appellant himself states that the decision in the three cases he filed with this Courtnamely, G.R. Nos. L-29235, L-28947 and L-30935 will answer the question whetherhe has legal interest in the estates of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and Julian A.Wolfson (pp. 21-22, appellant's brief).

The cases he cited, as correctly contended by appellees (Lajom vs. Viola, et al., 73Phil. 563; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; andQuion vs. Claridad, L-48541, January 30, 1943, 2 O.G., No. 6, June, 1943, p. 572, 74Phil. 100), are not applicable to and therefore do not govern the instant case,because the actions therein were filed by the preterited heir or legatee or co-ownerlong after the intestate or testate or partition proceedings had been closed or

terminated. In the case at bar, Special Proceedings No. 63866 is still pending in theprobate court — Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance — where appellant

should present, as he has in fact presented, his alleged claim of legal interest in theestate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, which claim, if valid, will certainly entitle him toall notices of all petitions, motions, orders, resolutions, decisions and processesissued and/or promulgated by said probate court. There is no order by the saidprobate court terminating or closing Special Proceedings No. 63866.

However, in the recent case of Guilas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance ofPampanga, et al., 7 WE reiterated the rule:

... The better practice, however, for the heir who has not receivedhis share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in thesame probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening ofthe probate or administrative proceedings if it had already beenclosed, and not th rough an independent action, which would betried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decisionor order of the probate or intestate court already final and executedand re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra;

Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; RomanCatholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455,460-61).

Even in the case of Quion, etc. vs. Claridad, et al., supra, invoked by appellant, WEruled that the intestate proceedings, although closed and terminated, can still bereopened within the prescriptive period upon petition therefor by a preterited heir.

The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to f ile severalactions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief,which is unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure ofhimself in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with someunderstanding. But considering appellant's ability and long experience at the bar, his

filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the appealed order is herebyaffirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. Let this be entered in his personalrecord.




Garcia vs Francisco

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, CPR

FACTS:Garcia, et. al leased a parcel of land to Lee for a period of 25 years

beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Leerefused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee was represented byAtty. Francisco. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed acomplaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance

and reconveyance with damages (docketed as Q-89-2188) but wasdismissed by the trial court.

On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint forunlawful detainer against Lee but Lee answered alleging as special andaffirmative defense the pendency of case Q-89-2188. This allegation was

rejected by Judge Bautista. On October 24, 1989, Atty. Francisco filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against

Judge Bautista and Garcia, et. al (such is violative of the Rule on SummaryProcedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus orprohibition against any interlocutory order). On November 13, 1989, JudgeVera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with thetrial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant,

however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 wasdismissed. Lee did not appeal.

On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals

against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Petitionwas denied. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal.

Instead, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzonand the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in theunlawful detainer case and damages with prayer for issuance ofpreliminary injunction.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia’s group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil

Case. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining JudgeSingzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked thisorder in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary

injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the

Court of Appeals. Garcia then filed a motion for execution in the unlawfuldetainer case.

Then, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for

certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orderagainst the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessorsbut was denied.

Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari withpreliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors

in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare thewrits of execution in the unlawful detainer case. Such dismissed but againLee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According toFrancisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.

ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Francisco transgressed with the Code of Professional

Conduct

HELD:Yes. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Francisco’s cause was without

merit. Atty. Francisco abused his right of recourse to the courts for thepurpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he wasdisdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions orproceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as hebelieves to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not

to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an

honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed inhim by law as an officer of the Court. Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took hisoath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience inthe practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with itand to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and themisuse of judicial processes.

SUSPENDED for 1 year

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B: Observing and Maintaining Respect Due to the Courts and Judicial Officers

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language – Duty of a Lawyer

FACTS:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan forviolations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the thenTanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the SupremeCourt a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of theTanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The SupremeCourt, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalezdirecting him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations againstZaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informationsagainst Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claimsthat he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of theTRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actionsfrom the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petitionto be given due course”.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court thenordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in thenewspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he isentitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court mayhave lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on

Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitutecontempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed theiroath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for theSupreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the SupremeCourt and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in thecountry.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalezseems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional

freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to beadjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public

interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of theintegrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomybetween free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a SpecialProsecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the

Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in thegovernment of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity andauthority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must bebona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he allegedthat members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to theZaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.




Paragas vs. Cruz

Facts: In asking for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his petition forcertiorari in the present case, counsel for the petitioner, Atty. Jeremias Sebastian,used derogatory expressions against the dignity of the Court in the language of his

motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is administratively liable for hisactions/language.

Held: The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration penned by thecounsel of the petitioner are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful and he is herebyguilty of direct contempt of court.

As remarked in People vs. Carillo: “Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer ofthe court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarilythat high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the properadministration of justice.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of hisclient, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation orproceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.”




FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA

MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAOSALMA, pet i t ioners , vs . LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT,WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J .:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside theDecision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 ofDumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and

damages.

The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, theyare entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, whichoriginally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon theother hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No.1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order forpartition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to thethen Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered inthe Register of Deeds.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Korte

Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damagesalleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originallypart of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issuedin the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, RobertoMaglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.[1] On 19 April1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639.[2]Consequently, on 13 May 1952,then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order [3] directing the parties to subdivide saidlot into six portions as follows: Rtcspped

a) Hermogenes Olis - lot 1639-A

b) Pascual Olis - lot 1639-B

c) Bartolome Maglucot - lot 1639-C

d) Roberto (Alberto) - lot 1639-D

Maglucot

e) Anselmo Lara - lot 1639-E

f) Tomas Maglucot - lot 1639-F.[4]

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subjectlot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions ofsubject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Saidrespondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rentalamount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs ofRoberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.

Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Sdaadsc

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC foundthe existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis(purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively)[5] as indubitableproof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that TomasMaglucot, respondents predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as itwas he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition.[6] The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission orrepresentation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot bedenied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision oflaw, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 waspartitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his

successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition against theother co-owners who claim that there was one.[7] Said court, likewise, ruled that thetax declarations[8] over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the sameare constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission bythem of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter .[9]

The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows: Missdaa

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgmentis hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendantsordering the latter:

1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premisesthereof and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs; Slxmis

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2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 forattorneys fees;

3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993for actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to

the time they actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw

4. To pay the costs.[10]

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled thatthe sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusiveevidence of partition.[11] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure underRule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was nopartition of Lot No. 1639. Slxsc

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed thefollowing reversible errors:

I

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTIONPLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;

II

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OFPAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THEDEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D,HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;

III

IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION,CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IFPROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOMEOF THE CASE;

IV

IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLYSHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT

PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOTPROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCHTHAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENEDDURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OFPROCEDURE;[12]

Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physicallysubdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actualexecution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated sharesin 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.[13] Petitioners opinethat in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formalsubdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olisand the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition.[14] Petitioners furthercontend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respectivehouses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot."[15]Simply put,petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicialconfirmation in 1952, and respondents acquiescence because they themselvesexclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to thepresent.[16]

For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, theyemphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised ornotified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFIsubsequently confirmed the same.[17] Second, they point to the fact that petitionerswere unable to show any court approval of any partition.[18] Third, they maintain thatLot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is s till an existing andperfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partitionwhatsoever .[19]

After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on

record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in thiscase is whether there was a valid partition in 1952. Scslx

Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases broughtbefore it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited toreviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in thefollowing instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact areconflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond theissues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellantand the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)

when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which theyare based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main











































and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of factare premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidenceon record."[20] This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings offacts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions withoutcitation of specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of

evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shallconsider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition. Slx

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: f irst, an order forpartition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whetherpartition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivisionsubmitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the casemay be.[21] The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with thedetermination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, ( i.e., not otherwiselegally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the partiesinterested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is notentitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partitionis legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting ofrents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition amongthemselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm thepartition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partitionand/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by anyparty aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it appears that "theparties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event,partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more thanthree (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition ofthe accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have beenaccorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the partyor parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate inquestion. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.[22]

The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or orderdecreeing partition is that it is final and appealable.[23] The order of partition is a finaldetermination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the proprietyof the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not havingbeen appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become finaland executory and cannot now be disturbed. Mesm

The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory orfinal is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the meritsof the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what isinterlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of thecase.[24] An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable

because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted.[25]

However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the rulingin Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,[26] which held that the order of partition is interlocutory,was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having beenconfirmed by the trial court are not binding.[27] In this case, both the order of partitionand the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties

do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they haveassented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,[28]especially, where, byreason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution ofthe commission.[29] Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots inaccordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to theorder for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.

This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs.Cinco.[30] In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, theorder appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketchplan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties. Calrky

Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without beingconfirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties.[31] However, this rule doesnot apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedlyunconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effectto the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court orderfor partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 andcontinue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of thecourt approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean thatconfirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the partiesherein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of thesupposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan. Kycalr

The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreementto tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.[32] By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.[33] It was only in 1952 when thepetition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namelyHermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided andhave separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the partiesin this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupiedspecific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possessionremained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.

From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentativesubdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that saidcourt was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in

accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, sa id courtordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative



























































sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the partiestherein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with thesketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision planwhich would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showingthat respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any

objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued theirpossession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivisionplan. Kyle

It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partitionaccepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, willnot be subsequently permitted to avoid partition.[34] It follows that a party to a partitionis also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of thesubdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownershiprights over their share for a long time.

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who tookpossession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion

allotted to another party.[35]

A person cannot claim both under and against the sameinstrument.[36] In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by itsprovisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. Theymust accept all or none.[37] Parties who had received the property assigned to themare precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it.[38] Here,respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, alreadyoccupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continueduntil this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession andownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D alsoin accordance with the sketch plan. Exsm

In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as tomislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action

and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold thatwhat is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of theadversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of benefits, whicharises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and isfree to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, choosesto adopt such defective proceeding as his own.[39] Ratification means that one underno disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act ordefective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It isthis voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what wastheretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making theratification.[40]

The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot

No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire LotNo. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point

by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that theamount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were forthe payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable thatthe parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactionsfor so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax

declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the recordsare tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable thatrespondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they couldhave easily verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than fourdecades.

The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such,the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in theconcept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in anothera superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right orwrong.[41] Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors ofpetitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-Din the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action wascommenced. Msesm

Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support thepresumption.[42] Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may bepresumed.[43] It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation ofland, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either bydeed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were notrecorded.[44] And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots,and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenantsin common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy incommon, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot wasset off to him whose name it bears.[45]

Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of t itleshowing any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceledclearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unlesspartition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition orthat the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition. Esmso

Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect theinterests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but thenon-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the partiesthereto of their obligations thereunder .[46] As originally conceived, registration ismerely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary inorder to give it legal effect as between the parties.[47] Requirements for the recording

of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the publicto act with the presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine.[48]
































































It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oralagreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to theconfirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties tookpossession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was institutedbecause some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of theoriginal title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There isno evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. Theonly significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is thatrespondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude,therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were thebases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences ofthe order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oralpartition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actualpossession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partitionand the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate thepermanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition isalready well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya,[49] we declared that an oral partition is valid.In Hernandez vs. Andal ,[50] reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,[51] this Court has ruled, thus:

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute offrauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition when it has beencompletely or partly performed. Esmmis

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition isvalid and enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where theparol partition has actually been consummated by the taking ofpossession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by theparties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize andenforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving anoral partition under which the parties went into possession,exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed thepartition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in aproper case decree title in accordance with the possession inseveralty.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitionmay be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assertthe rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parolpartition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts ofindividual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity willrecognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual forthe purpose of concluding the right of the part ies as between eachother to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that theparties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition bytaking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership withrespect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of thepartition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of partperformance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary,to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds.It has been held that where there was a partition in fact betweentenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity wouldhave regard to enforce such partition agreed to by theparties. Esmsc

Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First,respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the shareof Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the housesof respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot. Esm

On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that afterrespondents were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-Dbelonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of RobertoMaglucot.[52] Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because theyalso intend to use the lot for a residential purpose.[53] This testimony of Aida Maglucotis unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact.Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted evidence of thepetitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a co -owner ofthe said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and thatthey are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D. Chief

On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names ofConstancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot,[54] Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in thenames of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot,[55] Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in thenames of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida[56] showing that the houses of theabove-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of RobertoMaglucot[57] constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons ofthe ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are publicdocuments. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein arepresumed to be true and accurate.[58] The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot thatRoberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respectivedeclarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated andnot supported by any other evidence. Jksm

No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portionof Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas











































Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketchplan of said lot showing the partition into six portions.[59]

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners intheir petition for review on certiorari . Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners

made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny ofthe records and lack of study of the law "by the researcher."[60] Second, he cited theresearcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to therecord"[61] that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of anypartition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "thiswill only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher."[62]

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and asan institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by thecourts and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of theiroffice. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate theresearcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementaryrules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper

language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to theresearcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.[63]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. h Y

SO ORDERED.
























Villaflor vs. Sarita (308 SCRA 129)

Facts: Complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline. The Commissioner assigned to investigate the case

issued an order directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint.The period of time alloted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondentsubmitting his comment. An order was issued requiring the parties to attend thehearing of the case but the respondentfailed to appear. A notice of hearing was sentto respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving therespondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter didnot avail, the case was submitted for resolution.

Issue: Whether or not failure to obey notices from the IBP investigators constitutesan unethical act.

Held: Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignityand authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has

taken. It is his foremostresponsibility to observe and maintain the respect due tothe courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial

authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court ordersand processes.

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/villaflor-vs-sarita-308-scra-129.html

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/villaflor-vs-sarita-308-scra-129.html







C: ASSISTING THE COURT IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 80390 March 27, 1998

CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and ANGELICA M. BAUTISTA, petitioners,vs. ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, & NESTORFORTUNADO, respondents.

MARTINEZ J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated January 24,

1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 262,which reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July 31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filedby respondents.

The facts are not disputed:

Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are the registeredowners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 7-3041 andT-1929, both registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Said propertieswere mortgaged by Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders CommercialBank (now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the amount ofP370,000.00.

On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank,among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said complaint, Traders Royal Bankinterposed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mortgage.

On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision3, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:

1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual topay to the plaintiffs the amount of P24,550.00plus legal interest from the filing of the complaintuntil fully paid and attorney's fees in the amountof P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.

2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgagewhich is attached as Annex "B" of the complaintto be declared null and void and, ordering theRegister of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel the said

mortgage at the back of TCT No. T-1929, Book I,Page 8 and TCT No. T-3040, Book I, Page 96 ofsaid Register of Deeds.

II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaintof Defendant Traders Commercial Bank:

1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. andOfelia Lopez to pay the Traders Commercial Bank jointly and severally the amount of P578,025.23,inclusive of interest and other bank charges as of April 30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all interestand bank charges until full payment is made and,to pay to the bank the amount of P20,000.00 asattorney's fees and the costs.

The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs

is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in this manner:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified byeliminating paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the decision ofthe lower court declaring the real estate mortgage in favor of theTraders Commercial Bank null and void. The decision is affirmed inall other respects.4

On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the mortgage topetitioner Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March 19,

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1984 wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties beforeclosed for non-payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure,respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, acomplaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction against petitioner, whichwas docketed as Civil Case No. 262.

After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary judgment whichwas granted by the court. Consequently, on July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. In its decision, the trial court delved on the issueof prescription of a mortgage action.

Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the principal loan hasalready been paid, the mortgage, which is an accessory contract, should likewise beextinguished.

On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, o f thesummary judgment of July 31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered andmodified to read:

Premises considered, the Court finds that theplaintiffs have made out a preponderating caseagainst the defendants.

And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining orderof the Court in the case on April 23, 1984 is hereby converted intoa preliminary injunction and by these presents made permanent.The City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L. Bautista and Mrs.

Angelica M. Bautista are hereby permanently restrained fromconducting a public auction sale of the property covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register ofDeeds of Iligan City is hereby further ordered to cancel Entry No.451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.) on file with hisoffice. No pronouncement as to damages or attorney's fees.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Resolution6 on August

28,1987, forwarding the case to this Court for resolution reading thus:

Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty.Ramon Gonzales' motion to the sound discretion of this Court andconsidering the unrefuted allegation of the said motion that therewere no documentary or testimonial evidence which were the basisof the questioned decision but mere admissions of the parties, the

questions raised on appeal become mere questions of law, overwhich the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction.

On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review contendingthat the trial court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in declaring that he has no

right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in declaring the temporary restrainingorder into a permanent preliminary injunction and in ordering the Register of Deedsof Iligan City to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.

We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submittheir respective Memoranda on August 31, 1988.

On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed averified Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage hasalready been released by the Traders Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown inthe certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage,7 and that thepetitioner was killed in a robbery in his house.8 Respondents therefore pray for thedismissal of the petition.

On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogenato comment on the said Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of theCourt addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices,9 withthe postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court consideredthe resolution as served. 10

Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss the petition forhaving been rendered moot and academic.

The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has the right toextra-judicially foreclose the mortgage is no longer necessary in view of the releaseof the mortgage as shown in the certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose wouldbe served by passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case could

hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-settled rulethat courts will not determine a moot question or abstract proposition nor express anopinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. 11






























G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970

VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO, plaintiffs-appellees,vs.

SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (deceased), PRIMO AGUINALDO and RUFINA

AGUINALDO, defendants, CECILIO AGUINALDO, ANASTACIA AGUINALDO,SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO, DOMINGO AGUINALDO, and FELICITASBAGAWISAN, defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to

the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any courtfor that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the move taken by the defendants in his

case amounted to. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its approval. Stillundeterred, they would appeal. They ought to have known better. There is no reasonto refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court complained of, appointingappellants as legal representatives of the deceased defendant and substituted in hisplace pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the execution that ought that havetaken place long since could at long last be effected.

There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, the Court of FirstInstance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution recitingthat as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, 1 nowappellees, requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconveyone-fourth (¼)pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees, and to pay thelatter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There was an

appeal. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It wasfurther set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution wasgranted. Hence the writ of execution. On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio

Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ ofexecution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo diedon August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such appeal. There was an opposition tosuch motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rulesof Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case, it isthe duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor,

administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that there was afailure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above provision. The prayer wasfor the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel

for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of theheirs or the legal representatives of the deceased in order that they could be

substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision, final and executoryin character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by the Hon. RicardoC. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit thename and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other legalrepresentative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The aforesaid counsel in turn

merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31,1956, and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaidorder. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in theirfavor be not rendered nugatory by the above technicality, had no choice but to askthe court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing thesurname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, agranddaughter, substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, thistime presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid motion andsubstituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.

Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by resolution of February 17,1969 certified the matter to this Court, the question involved being one of law. As

noted at the outset, we find for appellees.

1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely forembodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus:"Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, itshall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,

administrator, guardian or other legal representative." 2Had the defendant, thereafterdeceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his death therecould be compliance with the above provision. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such

neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital toremember that the judgment had become final and the s tage of execution reached.

Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now to apply the aboverule. That would be to set at naught the principle consistently adhered to by thisCourt.

It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo 3in these words: "And with more compellingreason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order itsstay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court, forit cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other orfurther relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgmentof the higher court." 4What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez 5 is worth

recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it isessential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgmenthas become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of

the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated




to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v.Reyes 7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater awareness on the part oflitigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable tobe wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the

operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in thiscase, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quiteobvious and indisputable." 8

2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection

bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure atechnicality. From Alonso v. Villamor , 9 a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as toour disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to theparties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such aworthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for whichthey are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again.

WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.

This decision is immediately executory. Treble costs against defendants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar,. Castro, Teekankee, Barredo andVillamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.




G.R. No. L-43757-58 July 30, 1976

REGINO GABRIEL and JAIME TAPEL, petitioners,vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents. In re: Contempt citation against Atty. Cornelio M.Orteza, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In the Court's Resolution of June 11, 1976, the petition (filed on May 31, 1976) in thecases at bar for review of the Court of Appeals decision of November 28, 1975 which

affirmed in toto the Manila court of first instance's judgment of September 27, 1968

convicting, after joint trial, the two petitioners accused of the crime of theft, wasdenied for lack of merit. The Court further noted therein that a first petition for thesame purpose filed through another lawyer on March 6, 1976 had been previouslydenied and final judgment entered on May 10, 1976, and cited Atty. Cornelio M.Orteza who filed the second petition at bar for contempt and/or for disciplinaryaction, as follows:

... Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced inthe petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit,a previous petition for review of the same decision docketed asG.R. Nos. L- 43113-14 having filed by petitioners on March 6, 1976

thru Atty. Rodolfo D. Mapile and denied as per resolution of March15, 1976 and entry of final judgment having been made on May 10,1976. Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza is hereby required to SHOW CAUSEwhy he should not be held in contempt and/or disciplinary dealtwith for filing a second petition on behalf of the same petitionersfor review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals which wasalready previously denied with finality within ten (10) days fromnotice hereof.

Respondent Atty. Orteza still filed without leave of court on July 6, 1976 a mot ion forreconsideration of the Court's above-quoted resolution denying his petition for reviewand after having secured for the purpose an extension (on the ground of pressure ofwork) filed on July 12, 1976 his explanation.

The burden of both pleadings is that the first petition to set aside the Court of Appeals affirmance of petitioners conviction was a special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65, while the second petition was one for review under Rule 45. 1

The explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. However zealous may be counsel's

concern and belief in the alleged innocence of the petitioners, it is elementary thatcounsel may not split their appeal into one to set aside the appellate court's denial ofpetitioners appellants' motion for reconsideration of its decision affirming the trialcourt's judgment of conviction and/or for new trial (the first petition) and into anotherto set aside the appellate court'sdecision itself, which affirmed the trial court's

conviction of the petitioners-appellants (the second pet ition).

Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes andimproper conduct that tends to impede obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. 2 Needless to add, the lawyer whofiled such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of afinal and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence(for not knowing any better or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to actwith all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to himto be just and are consistent with truth and honor. 3

Thus in several instances in the past, the Court has admonished that (L)itigants andtheir counsels are warned under pain of contempt and disciplinary action that a partywho has already failed to have a decision of the Court of Appeals set aside through apetition for review by certiorari with the denial of his petition (by the First Division towhich such petitions for review are assigned under the Court's standing resolution of

November 15, 1973) should not under the guise of a special civil action file a secondpetition for the same purpose of setting aside the same Court of Appeals' decision tobe acted upon by the Second Division (to which special civil actions are assignedunder the Court's resolution of November 15, 1973). and vice-versa, for such conduct

would tend to trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and impede theadministration of justice". 4

Respondent Atty. Orteza is therefore adjudged guilty of contempt of court and isordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos with ten (10) days from noticehereof failing which, he shall be imprisoned for a period of (50) days. While furtheradministrative action against him is herewith forborne, he is hereby warned that afuture repetition or the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severely.

Petitioners' purported motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of June 11,1976 denying their second petition is ordered expunged from the records as a shammotion, (as is the second petition itself), since the decision sought, to be reviewed

has long become final and executory with the entry on May 10, 1976 of final




judgment of denial of the first petition. Let copies hereof be furnished the IntegratedBar of the Philippines and attached to his Personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

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Case Digest VII Legal Ethics

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