Case Digests 16

NAME: JABE TECSON GICA [ THE JUDICIARY: Case Digest 7 ]

TITLE: ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

CITATION: 93 PHIL 696 EN BANC G.R. NO. L-6355-56 DATE: AUGUST 31, 1953

FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A

case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial

officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of

salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.

Due to this, the judgment given by Court of First Instance has declared the section 13 of Republic Act

590 “No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be

considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of

his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law” unconstitutional. Case was appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional?

THE COURT’S RULING:

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary

of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or

ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in

office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This

act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-

defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that

the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its

passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a

statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping

a judicial function in defining a term.

** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal

Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High

Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The

independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing

their salaries.

The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax

on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The

interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and

jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide

therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby

tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the

interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already

given in a case by the highest court of the land.

TITLE: NITAFAN VS. CIR

CITATION: 152 SCRA 284 DATE: JULY 23, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified

Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.

Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the

Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers

constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes?


The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as

approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by

the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or

employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has

authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of

the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby

makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.

The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or

employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6,

Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their

continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the

framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers.

Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision.

The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be

deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.)

after “decreased” was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the

period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore.

Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in

government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other

employees.

Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law.

The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional

construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be

given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the

realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may

also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the

explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the

Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and

Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if

lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained

construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the

Constitutional Commission.

TITLE: DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA

CITATION: 112 SCRA 284 DATE: MARCH 12, 1982

FACTS:

In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefor and for Other

Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the

judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would

contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He

averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP

129)?


The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior

courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the

competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such

power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In

case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that

sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does

not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.

As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.

Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the

implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles

of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be

consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that

there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory

opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say

prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of

deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be

appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the

Executive to whom it properly belongs.

There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought

to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the

exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present

incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free

from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it

with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the

choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the

former is to be preferred.”

TITLE: SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG VS. ESTRELLA

CITATION: A.M. NO. 01-1608-RTJ DATE: JANUARY 16, 2001

Facts:

On October 20, 1997, ten members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig, Metro Manila file a complaint

charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital

Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct relative to Election Protest No. 144,

entitled “Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia”.

The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D.

Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8,

1995 elections. In his protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality. This

was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of respondent wherein

it was docketed as Election Protest No. 144. Both parties offered their respective exhibits, which were all

admitted by respondent judge.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to

examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion

of the order provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was

better to have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all the

questions and objections relative to the ballots. On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a Manifestation and

Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that an order be issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to be

furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow him to copy or review or at least to read said reports.

Respondent judge denied the motion on the same day, proclaiming that the examination of contested

ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the court, and not by the parties, hence, only the

court was given copies of the NBI Reports.

On the same day that Garcia’s motion was denied, respondent also set the date of promulgation of

judgment for July 31, 1997. This prompted Garcia to file a “Manifestation and Most Urgent Motion to

Defer and/or Cancel Scheduled Promulgation of Judgment” premised on respondent’s refusal to furnish

him a copy of the NBI Reports, and Garcia’s physical impossibility of examining the contested ballots

because (a) the report was submitted on June 26, 1997, and (b) the contested ballots and other election

paraphernalia had been transferred to the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig in RTC, Branch 157. Respondent

judge denied Garcia’s motion on July 28, 1997, explaining that: To allow parties at this stage to secure

copies of the NBI report and to comment on the same before promulgating the decision would be

opening the floodgates for undue delay.

Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for restraining order and

preliminary injunction with the COMELEC on July 29, 1997. The very next day or on July 30, 1997, the

COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from proceeding with

the scheduled promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.

The judgment was promulgated, disposing that the Court resolves to sustain the Protest lodged by

Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and accordingly renders judgment DECLARING the aforenamed Protestant the duly

elected mayor of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro

B. Garcia was dismissed. Complainants further claim that it was only after the promulgation of judgment

that Garcia was able to secure copies of the NBI Reports.

In his Comment dated December 10, 1997, respondent vehemently denied the allegations in the

complaint by addressing complainant’s two main issues: (1) whether it was proper for respondent to

have designated the NBI to conduct the necessary handwriting examination and to submit reports on

the results thereof to the court and not to the parties considering that said reports were the sole basis

of the decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether it was proper for respondent to have granted the

“Motion for Execution Pending Appeal” filed by the declared winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him to

take his oath notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal filed with the Commission on Elections

concerning the decision rendered by respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act?

The Court’s Ruling:

The respondent violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

“Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following

shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e)

Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any

unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial

functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”

He was found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay

a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with the stern warning that any similar

misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In the previous report and recommendation dated February 29, 2000 submitted by Court Administrator

Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently observed that respondent gravely abused his discretion in

deciding the case and in issuing the questioned order since grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

of jurisdiction occurs when a board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercises its judgment

in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, or fails to consider the evidence adduced by the

parties. The Office of the Court Administrator echoed the COMELEC’s finding that respondent’s action

showed utter disregard of the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the

disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.

No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of

competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). Indeed, in every case, a judge shall

endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public

opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has

continually reminded members of the bench that “The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense

of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice.

He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus,

exerting the same devotion as a priest “in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious

liturgy”, the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence

reposed in him”. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998])

In the recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M. Agcaoili (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12,

2000), a judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid

such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or

friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just,

correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to

his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will

nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed

to be less than impartial and honest.

To conduct this kind of examination, involving enormous number of ballots, is almost impossible to

accomplish. One would have to spread the 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a

floor or table space bigger than the size of a basketball court, and by going over those thousands of

ballots, pick at random groups of ballots – six groups in all – and, by examining them, reach a conclusion

that the ballots in each of these groups were written by one person. Common sense dictates that this is

simply an impossible procedure. And we are not convinced that through this method, the NBI could

correctly and with scientific precision invalidate 12,724 ballots of the protestee.

Indubitably, the foregoing have raised the suspicion of partiality on the part of respondent. Verily, a

judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent

standards are intended to assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable

of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs. Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1 [1999])

TITLE: SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA


FACTS:

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a graduating student at Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. Prior to the

end of the school year, the said school constituted a Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor

composed of teachers of the said school for the purpose of selecting the honor students of its

graduating class. The above-named committee deliberated and adjudged Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as the

third honor, the first and second place being obtained by his two other classmates, Socoro Medina and

Patricia Liñgat. Three days before the date of graduation, the third place Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,

represented by his mother and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the ranking of

honor students by instituting an action for certiorari, injunction and damages in the Court of First

Instance of Cotabato against the above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor

and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

The complaint alleges grave abuse of discretions and irregularities in the selection of honor students in

the said school such as the following: (a)the placing of Patricia Liñgat in the second place instead of him

when in fact he had been a consistent honor student and the former had never been his close rival

before except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; (b)the tutorial given by their teacher in English to

the first honor during summer vacation; (c)the illegal constitution of the said committee as the same

was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the

Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be

composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; (d)the changing of the final ratings on their grading sheets;

(e) that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and

to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances, and

as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under

the circumstances. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds (1) that the action

for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question

brought before the court had already become academic.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration of

citizenship?


The Supreme Court ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the proceeding initiated and originally

prayed for is a declaratory relief to have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be no

action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist

for the settlement of justifiable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and

enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for

said breach of right. As an accident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,

the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.

Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding

may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a

legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief

available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status,

such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of

a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

TITLE: DAZA VS. SINGSON

CITATION: 180 SCRA 496 DATE: DECEMBER 21, 1989

FACTS:

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political

realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally

resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly

reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original

members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional

member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on

Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the

petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election

thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and

so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the

real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the

Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the

Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional

representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s removal is unconstitutional?

Whether or not the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional?


WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is

LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission

on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the

Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the

political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in

the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with

authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by

members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill

said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista

Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber

in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4

from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over

the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied

Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber.

It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had

not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were

still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was

invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House

of Representatives as required by the Constitution.

The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on

Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of

Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF

THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see

to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate

measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.

Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its

representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may

transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be

permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of

political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to

another. The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the

House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as

our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be

resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we

are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely

discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not

evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

TITLE: GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

CITATION: 191 SCRA 288 DATE: NOVEMBER 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a

group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products “naphta

cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production

in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas.

Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private

respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their

plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the

investors without considering the national interest?


The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered

the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock

maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual

controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the

reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion.

He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue

which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he

remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run

like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.

Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the

1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of

the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI

does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President

of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the

Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

TITLE: PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

CITATION: 97 PHIL. 806 DATE: OCTOBER 31, 1955

FACTS:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise

known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for

the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180

be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and

colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will

also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and

3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe

rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general

standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish

adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,

and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,

inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given

in the same,”

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening

a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the

petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a

school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could

exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted

a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting

unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels

to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for

prohibition was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be

declared void and unconstitutional?


The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to

obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court.

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a

direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the

validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all

members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises

only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual

interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the

authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incident alto the decisions of such cases where conflicting

claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it

is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy

between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive

relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest

therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the

petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument

to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not

per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there

has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars

and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official

documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore,

the court denied the petition for prohibition.

TITLE: TAN VS. MACAPAGAL

CITATION: 43 SCRA 678 DATE: FEBRUARY 29, 1972

FACTS:

A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V.

Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but

purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-

Leido Resolution, 1 dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would

have this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and

Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present

Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the

present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the

present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." 2 Such a plea of the utmost

seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is understandable, therefore, why

the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit.

Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day

of that month a printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that petitioners took

some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American

Jurisprudence. 3 The show of diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is something else. A

perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are oblivious of the authoritative precedents in

this jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by its conformity with the law as it stands. In this

sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be eroding considering, however, the compulsion of the ancient

faiths.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi?

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?


Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement. "Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by

one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on

laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for

the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which

may be enjoined at the request of a

At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the

1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has

actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.

Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and

the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so

that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness.

TITLE: DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

CITATION: 95 SCRA 392 DATE: JANUARY 22, 1980

FACTS:

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory

and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that

any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits

and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be

elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which

states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting

to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices

covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of

conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the

commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall

be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus and

will be declared null and void?


In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg. 52 remains constitutional and

valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.

One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are

classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for

new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null

and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

“Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel

(Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not

synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of

innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges

have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In

ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of

acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be

ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges

have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a

crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right

to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be

rebutted, yet there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time

constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome

the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather

than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between

two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.

Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted

for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable

portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg.

52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the

second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the

constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

TITLE: OPLE VS. TORRES


FACTS:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to

privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued

by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National

Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, (1)it is a usurpation of

the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of

privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January

24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of

the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the

implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308?


As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner

and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and

that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic

ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to

bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the

misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the

Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner

Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.

His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents

themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,

respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National

Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS

and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show

their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its

constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insisted that weights the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its

result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

TITLE: NORTH COTABATO VS. REPUBLIC

CITATION: G.R. NO. 183591 DATE : OCTOBER 14, 2008

FACTS:

The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral

Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia. The GRP-MILF agreement is the result of a formal peace talks between the parties

in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The pertinent provisions in the MOA-AD provides for the establishment of an

associative relationship between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the Central Government.

It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the Philippine government as “associative,” thus

implying an international relationship and therefore suggesting an autonomous state. Furthermore,

under the MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel guarantees that necessary amendments to the Constitution

and the laws will eventually be put in place.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said MOA-AD constitutional?


The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its

specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative

relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes

that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it

said. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the

Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President

herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a

usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the

people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the

outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding

on the Philippines under international law, respondents’ act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,

already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD “contains provisions which are repugnant to the

Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of part of the Philippines’ territorial

sovereignty.” She further said that had the MOA-AD been signed by parties, “would have bound the

government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil

institutions, and armed forces. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would have

been compromised.”

In this case, The Court explained that the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave

abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO

No. 3, RA 7160, and RA 8371.

EO No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for

a principal forum for consensus-building.

R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national offices to conduct consultations

before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may

call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The

MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory

to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or

displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) provides for clear-cut procedure for the

recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of

the free and prior informed consent (FPIC) of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.

TITLE: KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA JR.

CITATION: 232 SCRA 110 ATE: MAY 5, 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which

grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar

activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its

revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the

PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational

company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer its

services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual

nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the

Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through

which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered

to PCSO.”

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an

on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21

October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-

signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract

would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval by the Chief

Executive.”

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing

the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.

Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant

Executive Secretary Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the

imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-

petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors,

priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto

Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of

Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and

Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and

concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners

have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine

Charity Sweepstakes Office.

http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/04/07/kilosbayan-vs-guingona/

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?

Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,

which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint

venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and

valid?


We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such

issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the

remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the

envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The

legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,

this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage

of.

The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with

another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease

such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an

independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but

by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus

hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any

arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and

management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the

franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are

provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint

venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.

We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph

B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to

law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the

petitioners.

TITLE: KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

CITATION: G.R. NO. 118910 DATE: NOVEMBER 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased

online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at

least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8

years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of

lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare

ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the

Contract of Lease.

It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2)

of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the

law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding

required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO.

PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a

legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?


STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure

from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually

involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by

theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the

law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not.

RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine

in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties

involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when

substantially unrelated claims are involved.

When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form

separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to

make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the

previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept

in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate

issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

TITLE: JOYA VS. PCGG

CITATION: G.R. NO. 96541 DATE: AUGUST 24, 1993

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christie’s

of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the

Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his

relatives and cronies.

Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to

the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were

turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie’s of New

York for the sale of the artworks?


The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law

or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal

requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there

must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the

determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the

jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of

Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-

in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief

demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case

is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.

"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained

or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term

"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished

from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the

party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of

some third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal

standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for

the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the

validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation

and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents

Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations

as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A.

4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation

and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the

premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the

people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of

PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without

due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege

that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the

Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations

established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R.

Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings

legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been

given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as

gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an

occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary

government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan

Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by

the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these

paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and

statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired

by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent

disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to

recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.

Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have

become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their

alleged unauthorized disposition.

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the

criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that

a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the

concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,

petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987

Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed.

Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the

artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify

to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the

governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the

expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an

unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of

a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the

disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that

the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one

which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial

resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar

considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its

purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition

is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date

— 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and

academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a

suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public

interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant

the relaxation of the rule.

TITLE: CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

CITATION: G.R. NO. 133250 DATE: JULY 9, 2002

FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation

projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or

about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the

Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid?


To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will

sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of

alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the

public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of

77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of

the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of

the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of

290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other

than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all

forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural

resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources

shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under

the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may

enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or

corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such

agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-

five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for

irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,

beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive

economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as

cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays,

and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or

financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and

other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real

contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State

shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,

within thirty days from its execution.

TITLE: GONZALES VS. NARVASA

CITATION: G.R. NO. 140835 DATE: AUGUST 14, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the

creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of

presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed

amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case?


In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury

as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury

attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

assistants.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that

he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. In his capacity as a

taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established

that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.

Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or

spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of

its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by

EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress.

The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in

the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the

Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the

petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a

taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue.

TITLE: UMALI VS. GUINGONA

CITATION: G.R. NO. 131124 DATE: MARCH 21, 1999

FACTS:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by

Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati,

March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential

memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and

regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance,

misfeasance and nonfeasance.

Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an

Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against

the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.

Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer,

copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet.

Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office.

On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the

PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of

the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the

PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the

service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

ISSUES:

Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure?

Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law?

Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can

raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision?

Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis

for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152?


Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and

under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for

removal.

Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of

tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of

Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due

process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with

respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended

the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-

observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.

Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.

According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled

to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It

was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce

sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of

the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial

Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings.

As to last issue, it is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action

against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in

Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and

not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman.

In sum, the petition is dismiss on the ground that the issue posted by the petitioner don’t constitute a

valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.

However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the

exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner

before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position

taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective

and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

TITLE: LAUREL VS. GARCIA

CITATION: G.R. NO. 92013 DATE: JULY 25, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in

Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by

the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As

such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the

property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated?

Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar?


Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown

that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public

dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A

conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an

immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the

essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be

determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a

domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property

belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of

property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is

governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule

is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through

reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable

of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine

who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public

domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

TITLE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

CITATION: G.R. NO. 171101 DATE: NOVEMBER 22, 2011

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition

filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock

Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are

operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court

declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to

the right of the original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want

to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to

them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs

will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing

their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is available in this case?

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

Whether or not the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the

full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development

Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?

Whether or not the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to

HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed

on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme

on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in

Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be

given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?


The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary

to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but

also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and

effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and

consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be

applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution

approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the

Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed

to retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also

given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA

6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not

the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no

longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011

decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless

that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the

issue of constitutionality.

Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only

involves 4,915.75 of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as

regards the 4,915.75 of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its

mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other

agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were

supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –

considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered

commonly-owned by farm workers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size

that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway

in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs

decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per

qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and

enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall

determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda

Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal

Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the

separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of

the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of

the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be

distributed to the FWBs.

For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date

when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and

possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the

agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that

is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under

compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of

coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just

compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to

justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the

instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only

preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file

an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The

court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a

judicial function.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from

the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award

(CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant

case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the

issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.

Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the

subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the

day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.

The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain

as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control over the subject

lands]given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs

in the HLI capital stock is just 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to

remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.

http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1027845194005507795

Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting

shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the

majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI

share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the

295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

TITLE: DANTE LIBAN VS. GORDON

CITATION: G.R. NO. 175352 DATE: JANUARY 18, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross

Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as

Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the

Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent

Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which

provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations

or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case

of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a

GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the

Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC

Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is

not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a

GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and

because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector

individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as

PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is

void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935

Constitution states that “the Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,

organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by

the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to

incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it

wants to be a private corporation. The fall of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a

government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the

prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a),

5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.

95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a

private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The

PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically

questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the

PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

ISSUES:

Whether or not it is correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the

constitutionality of the PNRC charter?

Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?


The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting

the second sentence thereof.

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the

very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private

corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues

defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated

the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,

Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-

established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be

unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the

record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will

be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be

unavoidable.

This Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court

should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground

upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely

affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was

being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the

Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August

16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No.

1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate

existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private

corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation

contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it, not just in terms of

structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and

the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in

recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective

from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity

of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not

been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

This Court must recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique

status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and

effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and

harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the

former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private

corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international

humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations

under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can

neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as

well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international

humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or

a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his

position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso

facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the

Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. The sui generis character of PNRC

requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the

humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of

a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC

Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all

national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s

blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to

the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those

who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of

the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared

void must therefore stay.

Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive

portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a

government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the

prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

TITLE: SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB

CITATION: 38 SCRA 42 DATE: APRIL 29, 1971

FACTS:

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. Fifhteen

years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. He filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by

prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.

PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the

time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt

moratorium and RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium.

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here,

RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers.

However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the

law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual

obligations clause in the constitution).

PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the

bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action is prescribe?


The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of

legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former

shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force

and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its

invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to

be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be

reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the

governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may

have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity.

It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what

had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of

a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the

prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

TITLE: SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO

CITATION: 183 SCRA 145 DATE: March 14, 1990

FACTS:

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal

recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to

appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner

had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso

issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the

documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal

recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the

Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2)

Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article

38 of the same code.

A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and

Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a

Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter

requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.

The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the

properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can

validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?


Under the new Constitution, “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of

seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The

Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue

search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,

we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. The

power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the

power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the

Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the

nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify

specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a

result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

TITLE: PEOPLE VS. RAMOS

CITATION: 296 SCRA 589 DATE: AUGUST 10, 1999

FACTS:

October 16, 1995 – Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape against Feliciano M. Ramos. It

was alleged that the appellant was able to perpetrate the felony against the minor through the use of

force and intimidation in its execution

Elizabeth Ramos, a minor of 14 years old, was raped by her father while her brothers and sisters were

sleeping nearby. She was warned not to report the matter to anyone or else he would kill her. The rape

was discovered only when she suffered an abortion of the fetus that she was carrying in her womb.

Upon filing of the charges in the RTC Feliciano changed his residence to Tuai, Cagayan and an alias

warrant of arrest was issued. March 26, 1996 Feliciano was arrested in Tuao, Cagayan while he was

feeding the ducks.

After the prosecution has presented their evidence Feliciano wanted to change his plea to guilty and he

was allowed by the court to do so. Feliciano Ramos was sentenced to death by the RTC of Pangasinan.

ISSUES:

Whether or not he can claim the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Whether or not his plea of guilty can be taken as a mitigating circumstance?

Whether or not the 7 new attendant circumstances instituted by RA 7659 can be considered as

aggravating circumstance?

Whether or not the accused can be convicted for qualified rape?


NO. There was no voluntary surrender because he arrested by police Aban. According to Aban Feliciano

“went with him” when he showed the warrant of arrest. The execution of warrant of arrest against

Feliciano entailed expenses of about P2,500

Surrender is voluntary when it is done by an accused spontaneously and made in such a manner that it

shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he

acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his

search and capture.

Feliciano tried to evade arrest by changing his residence. The appellant was arrested and he was

actually taken and held in custody under the authority of the law.

NO. His plea of guilty was made after the evidence against him was presented. It was made out of fear

of conviction & not based on his conscience. A plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity,

indicating repentance on the part of the accused.

A plea of guilty made after the arraignment and after the trial had begun does not entitle the accused

to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance

NO. RA 7659 in A335 in the RPC provided for the 7 new attendant circumstances. People vs. Garcia –

attendant circumstance partake the nature of qualifying circumstances and not merely aggravating

circumstance, since they increase the penalties by the degrees. Aggravating circumstance affect only

the period of the penalty and does not increase it to a higher degree.

People vs. Bayot – qualifying circumstance or an inherent aggravating circumstance should not be

mistaken for a generic aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery. Generic aggravating

circumstance, not offset by mitigating circumstance, increases the penalty which should be imposed

upon the accused to the maximum period, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. A

qualifying circumstance – gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also imposes on the author

thereof no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law for said crimes.

Rape with the concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship with the aggressor gives a

different character of rape which raised the imposable penalty from reclusion perpertua to the higher

and supreme penalty of death. Result: minority of the offended party and relationship to the offender

special qualifying circumstance.

NO. Cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he wasn’t properly informed that he is being accused

of qualified rape.

Every element which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. Person

cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that which he is charged in the complaint or information

on which he is tried.

In Garcia it was held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges

against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be

convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the

offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was

arraigned. The general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances, even if not

alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial over objection of the defense and may be

appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual

commission of the offense and its consideration by the courts do not violate the constitutional right of

the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

TITLE: PEOPLE VS. MATEO

CITATAION: G.R. NO. 147678-87 DATE: JULY 7, 2004

FACTS:

Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be

accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior

determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility

of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the

circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to

the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against appellant

Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of

reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and

recommends an acquittal of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express

provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life

imprisonment or death?


The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals

for appropriate action and disposition.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in

which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving

offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the

more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is

imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution – Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme

Court shall have the following powers:

“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court

may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”

The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of

Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court.

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does

not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate

appeal or review in favor of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence

of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the

evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal

from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,

the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – CRIMINAL LAW

determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face

with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct

mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the

penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it prescribed

an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion

perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in

these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where

life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded

an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by

the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of

judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life

imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances

so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme

Court for its final disposition.

Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty

law in 1993 until June 2004, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated

consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on

automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907)

appellants saved from lethal injection.

Under the Constitution Article VIII, Section 5, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally

vested in the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-

making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here

announce additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate

court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural

matter. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and

Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124, Section 3 of rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they

provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the

penalty imposes is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the

Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in “Internal Rules of the Supreme Court” incases

similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.

TITLE: VILLAVERT VS. DESIERTO

CITATION: G.R. NO. 133715 DATE: FEBRUARY 23, 2000

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA

6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the annulment of the Memorandum] of the Deputy

Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17 July 1997, in Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by the

Ombudsman, which recommended the dismissal of petitioner from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes

Office (PCSO), Cebu, as well as the order dated 30 January 1998 denying petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.

Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch responsible for

the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn by him, which are already considered sold.

As Villavert is not expected to sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign

tickets to ticket outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers and

hawkers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sec. 30 Art. VI violates the Constitution?


In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of

the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the prescription in Sec.

30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court

without its advice and consent.

In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from

quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals

from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of

Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.

Any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman

in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the

Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith

DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.

As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for final disposition to the Court of

Appeals is still in order.

The case was REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure to be disposed of in accordance with law.

TITLE: YAO VS. CA

CITATION: G.R. NO. 132428 DATE : OCTOBER 24, 2000

FACTS:

In 1973, Constancio Maglana, president of Prime White Cement Corporation, sent an offer letter to Yao

Ka Sin Trading. The offer states that Prime White is willing to sell 45,000 bags of cement at P24.30 per

bag. The offer letter was received by Yao Ka Sin’s manager, Henry Yao. Yao accepted the letter and

pursuant to the letter, he sent a check in the amount of P243,000.00 equivalent to the value of 10,000

bags of cement. However, the Board of Directors of Prime White rejected the offer letter sent by

Maglana but it considered Yao’s acceptance letter as a new contract offer hence the Board sent a letter

to Yao telling him that Prime White is instead willing to sell only 10,000 bags to Yao Ka Sin and that he

has ten days to reply; that if no reply is made by Yao then they will consider it as an acceptance and that

thereafter Prime White shall deposit the P243k check in its account and then deliver the cements to Yao

Ka Sin. Henry Yao never replied.

Later, Yao Ka Sin sued Prime White to compel the latter to comply with what Yao Ka Sin considered as

the true contract, i.e., 45,000 bags at P24.30 per bag. Prime White in its defense averred that although

Maglana is empowered to sign contracts in behalf of Prime White, such contracts are still subject to

approval by Prime White’s Board, and then it still requires further approval by the National Investment

and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government owned and controlled corporation because Prime

White is a subsidiary of NIDC.

Henry Yao asserts that the letter from Maglana is a binding contract because it was made under the

apparent authority of Maglana. The trial court ruled in favor of Yao Ka Sin. The Court of Appeals

reversed the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the president of a corporation is clothed with apparent authority to enter into

binding contracts with third persons without the authority of the Board.


The Board may enter into contracts through the president. The president may only enter into contracts

upon authority of the Board. Hence, any agreement signed by the president is subject to approval by the

Board. Unlike a general manager (like the case of Francisco vs GSIS), the president has no apparent

authority to enter into binding contracts with third persons. Further, if indeed the by-laws of Prime

White did provide Maglana with apparent authority, this was not proven by Yao Ka Sin.

As a rule, apparent authority may result from (1) the general manner, by which the corporation holds

out an officer or agent as having power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority with which it

clothes him to act in general or (2) acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or

constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or without the scope of his ordinary powers. These are

not present in this case.

Also, the subsequent letter by Prime White to Yao Ka Sin is binding because Yao Ka Sin’s failure to

respond constitutes an acceptance, per stated in the letter itself – which was not contested by Henry

Yao during trial.

TITLE: FR. MARTINEZ VS. CA

CITATION: G.R. NO. 123547 DATE: MAY 21, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz,

married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then

Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in

Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The lot is located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal

Hall of Cabanatuan City. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la

Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it to private respondent

Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-Veneracion).

Private respondent Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on October 22, 1981 and was

issued TCT No. T-40496 (Exh. 9). When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents

De la Paz were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Pazes as a family and

not individually. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that

petitioner would give a down payment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and that the

balance would be payable by installment. After giving the P3,000.00 down payment, petitioner started

the construction of a house on the lot after securing a building permit from the City Engineer’s Office on

April 23, 1981, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la Paz (Exh. B/Exh, 1).

Petitioner likewise began paying the real estate taxes on said property (Exh. D, D-1, D-2). Construction

on the house was completed on October 6, 1981 (Exh. V). Since then, petitioner and his family have

maintained their residence there.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot in dispute as to

make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double

sale of immovable property?

Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal is not necessary for

the perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has been filed within such period?

Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion for

reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based?


It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that petitioner is assailing the findings of

fact and the appreciation of the evidence made by the trial courts and later affirmed by the respondent

court. While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions, namely: (a)

when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when

the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of

discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact

are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issue of the case

and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the

Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions

without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition

as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) when the

finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is

contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked

certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a

different conclusion.

In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents Veneracion are the owners of

the disputed lot on their reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Paz’s assurance that he would

take care of the matter concerning petitioner’s occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting good faith.

This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that

where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the

person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof,

to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who

presents the oldest title. The requirement of the law, where title to the property is recorded in the

Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be entitled to

priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good

faith, i.e., without knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be

ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land.

a. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private respondent Reynaldo

Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days before the execution of the first Deed of Sale

with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it vacant. However, this is belied by the

testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then building inspector of the Department of Public Works and

Highways, that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in the

performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the progress of the construction of the

building subject of the building permit issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found

it 100 % completed (Exh. V). In the absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have regularly

performed his official duty. Thus, as early as October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion already

knew that there was construction being made on the property they purchased.

b. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of sale between the private

respondents by considering their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. More specifically, it

overlooked the fact that the first contract of sale between the private respondents shows that it is in

fact an equitable mortgage.

The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an equitable mortgage are

(1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and (2) that their intention

was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. A contract of sale with right to repurchase gives rise

to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: (1) when the price of a

sale with a right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as

lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another

instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the

purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the

taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the

parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other

obligation. In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be

construed as an equitable mortgage.

In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents intended the transaction

to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took

actual possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in possession of the

Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where they resided; (3) During the period between the

first sale and the second sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to take

possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption had expired and private

respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to

another person for P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase the two

lots forP180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the same

amount. Thus, it is clear from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended the

first sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of P150,000.00.

With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the parties, it should be

noted that this Court in several cases, has ruled that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should put

a reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in good faith.

Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial conference in the MTC in Civil Case

No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time

the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore,

knew that there were already occupants on the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are

persons, other than the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private

respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioner’s right over the property. But he never talked to

petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He merely relied on the assurance of private respondent

Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even the owner of the lot in question, that he would take care of the

matter. This does not meet the standard of good faith.

c. The appellate court’s reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to determine private

respondents Veneracion’s lack of knowledge of petitioner’s ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.

Art. 1357 and Art. 1358, in relation to Art. 1403(2) of the Civil Code, requires that the sale of real

property must be in writing for it to be enforceable. It need not be notarized. If the sale has not been

put in writing, either of the contracting parties can compel the other to observe such requirement. This

is what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his

favor by private respondents De la Paz. There is nothing in the above provisions which require that a

contract of sale of realty must be executed in a public document. In any event, it has been shown that

private respondents Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put them on inquiry as to the

nature of petitioner’s occupancy of the disputed lot.

2.Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) erred in denying petitioner’s

Motion for Execution of the Judgment, which the latter filed on June 6, 1989, two years after private

respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on March 3, 1987 without paying the

appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial court’s denial of his motion is contrary to this Court’s ruling

in the cases of Republic v. Director of Lands, and Aranas v. Endona in which it was held that where the

appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the MTC becomes

final and not appealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional

requirement.

Petitioner’s contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of Lands deals with the

requirement for appeals from the Courts of First Instance, the Social Security Commission, and the Court

of Agrarian Relations to the Court of Appeals. The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the other hand, was

decided under the 1964 Rules of Court and prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) and the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this Court on January 11,

1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter at issue.

On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was held that although an appeal fee is required to

be paid in case of an appeal taken from the municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a

prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under §20 and §23[44] of the Interim Rules and Guidelines

issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P.

Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit:

(a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day

to appeal by any party. Even in the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts, nothing is

mentioned about the payment of appellate docket fees.

Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not

automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the

appellate court. Thus, private respondents Veneracions’ failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not

fatal to their appeal.

3.Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion for reconsideration

was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof.

This contention is likewise without merit.

Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that “No petition for review or motion for reconsideration

of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.” This

requirement was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its

decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not

raised anything new. Thus, its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration states:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the petitioners.

Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been

considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to

disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.

TITLE: MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ


FACTS:

Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against

petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has

falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted

for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989,

when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and

10 criminal cases that have beensubmitted for decision.

Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s

constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts?


A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct

and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised

Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates

of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of

administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of

powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts

and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance

with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation

thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the

doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative

duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for

determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative

duties.

TITLE: NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE


FACTS:

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same

compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan

covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title.

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas

answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended

and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he

may be investigated only by the Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this case claiming the

lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view

of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?


If the law had really intended to include the general grant of “rank and privileges equivalent to Judges”,

the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant

of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers

because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over

executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such

officials.

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative

functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the

exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its

members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume

any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not

intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or

removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

The suspension of Noblejas by the Executive Secretary valid.

Also, the resolution of the consult a by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an

administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties

themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in

character. Still, the resolution of the consult are a minimal portion of the administrative or executive

functions.

TITLE: MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PASAY TRANS.

CITATION: 57 PHIL 600 DATE: 1932

FACTS:

The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting

the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain

transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and

the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates

to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court,

sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled.

"An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway,

and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City

of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Opposition was entered

to the petition by a number of public utility operators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446 is valid?


The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to

arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction

of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and

1821 of the Civil Code.

We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and

agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting

others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in

extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally

enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without

recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.

We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of

arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall

within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the

right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the

courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would

then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the

Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. taThe present petition

also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to

determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at

all.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our

government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as

the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any

other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the

powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its

members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume

any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise

jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by

law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it

could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could

hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members

of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and

possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the

Supreme Court.lawph aw Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court

holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a

democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the

members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom

shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the

Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

TITLE: DE LLANA VS. ALBA


FACTS:

In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefore and for

Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one

of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would

contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He

averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129)?


The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior

courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the

competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such

power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In

case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that

sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does

not arise.

Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its

effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of

significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed

legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction

that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be

accorded the fullest consideration.

No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this

Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly

this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it

could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.

Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the

reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no

departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be

achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of

the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present

incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free

from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it

with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the

choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the

former is to be preferred.”

TITLE: YNOT VS. IAC


FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,

when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of

Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that “the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this

Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be

distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat

Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through

dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos”.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon

his filing of a supersedes bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court

sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the

confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order,

as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,3 which upheld the trial court,

and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power,

violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power?


The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both

restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in

the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that

is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in

Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To

justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the

interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such

interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the

purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning

the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years

old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit

for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive

order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there

be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A

imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that

"no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be

transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable

connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned

measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their

indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one

province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their

slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.

As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could

be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. However, if the movement of the live animals for

the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason

either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have

to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is

outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive

authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty

prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the

accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being

transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to

the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution.

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This

was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron

rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility

must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make

it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and

circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest

they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need

to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are

notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a

safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the

jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of

law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly

dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It

is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural

due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however if there is a

justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem

sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's

peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant

destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not

have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded

to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order

No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only

but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty,

and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because

the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law

and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated

is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The

conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender

is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who

are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,

we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

TITLE: MARCELINO VS. CRUZ


FACTS:

On 04 Aug 1975, Marcelino was convicted for rape. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in

the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. On the date set

for promulgation of the decision in its finality, Marcelino’s counsel moved for postponement. The court

ignored his motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period?


The date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same

necessarily comes at a later date. Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the

effectivity of this constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or

resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the

inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to

this provision. It had various stands depending upon proper application and for valid or meritorious

reasons which are provided for by judges of the lower courts in which extension may be given to resolve

such cases.

ART. VIII, Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be

decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,

unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months

for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last

pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief

Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the

case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has

not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such

responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or

matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

ART. XVIII, Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution,

adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the

Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be

adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable

period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts,

shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.

Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall

apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period

lapses after such ratification.

TITLE: DE ROMA VS. CA


FACTS:

Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate. When

administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of

the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by their mother to

Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is

not disputed.

The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she

said in the Deed of Donation “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC

interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not

impaired.

On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express prohibition

to collate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not these lands are subject to collation?


The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass

of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of

the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the

determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)

Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly

provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as

inofficious. (1036)

The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as irrevocable.

The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from

collation as required under the provisions of the NCC.

Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express

prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the

rule not the exemption should be applied.

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