Case Digests - Persons and Family Relations (3)

8/20/2019 Case Digests - Persons and Family Relations (3)

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1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES

FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur withBatangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit totransfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three

certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos wereconfiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town‗s police statio ncommander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation wasbased on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation ofcarabaos and carabeef from one province to another.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for theconfiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transportedfrom one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceablebefore publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.

RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against the Pesigans on

April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen daysthereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised

Administrative Code. The wor d ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars &regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprisethe public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penaltiesbinding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having generalapplicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that,every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall bedeemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to aviolation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation &

forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results thatthey have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. Thesummary confiscation wasn‗t in order. The recipients of the carabaosshould return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport thecarabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the saidexecutive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda andZenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal ofthe carabaos.

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of theregulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affectedhereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of

that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.

2. PEOPLE VS. VERIDIANO

FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violationof BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion toQuash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge anoffense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of theoffense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of

the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed themotion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of thecheck, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense.Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, thispetition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review therespondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.

HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of inMay 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act ofmaking or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only thefact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the

special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute inquestion was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penalprovisions, the law must be published and the people officially informedof its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.

The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in

such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., tomake known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended tomake the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then itcould have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.


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3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters ofpublic concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid andenforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed forwrit of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/orcause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,

general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters ofimplementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for thedismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legalpersonality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is requiredbefore any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement ofpublication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the

date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give thegeneral public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulatetheir actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice andpublication, there would be no basis for the application of the maximignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice topunish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law whichhe had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall bepublished in the Official Gazette. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes uponrespondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if theconstitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public

concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of generalapplicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that beforea person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specificallyinformed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuancesof general application which have not been published have no force andeffect.

4. MRCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had notyet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be givenretroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,

that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein(plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive thegovernment of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester casewhere enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of thecomplaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, tomislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

HELD: Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for theeffectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure,for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court maybe changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it doesnot affect or change vested rights."


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5. YAOKASIN VS. COMMISSIONER

FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/VTacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau ofCustoms. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered therelease of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin.

On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to releasethe seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner ofCustoms since it is adverse to the government citing the CustomsMemorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of theIntegrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, datedSeptember 24, 1972. This Section 12 states that a decision of a Collectorof Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government issubject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary ofFinance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by eithercommissioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shallbecome final and executory.

The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of thereorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they hadnot been published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the IntegratedReorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when theselaws have not been published in the Official Gazette.

RULING: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan isenforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not applyto CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the

Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customscollectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerateswhat shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrativeorders and proclamations shall be published except when these have nogeneral applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs tocomply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which isaddressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence nogeneral applicability therefore need not be published in the OfficialGazette.

6. KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of thedeceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover fromthe petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements grantedby way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.

The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements onthe land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of theindebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In Clause V, the parties stipulatedthat Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 years, the debt w/ interestthereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; inClause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and itsimprovements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid bythe owner of the land; in Clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 daysfrom the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion inthe CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and thatin lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; inclause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to

redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she wouldexecute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee,the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest;and in Clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presentedunder Clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contractof sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage wouldsubsist in all its force.

One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass thatEmiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well asthe tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and thepetitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to

the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would notcollect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the landtax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduceimprovements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits ofthe land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien and assuch is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the landbecause he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited

by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.


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xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows thatthere is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it isinvalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed apossessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in themanner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is

the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we canneither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in histitle or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibitioncontained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within goodfaith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis ofgood faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is basedupon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversantwith the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage ofthe improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he wasnot violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking

possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did notknow, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment ofthe fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, hisignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be thebasis of good faith.

The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to havethe improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter thevalue thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have theland where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them itsmarket value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

7. PUZON VS. ABELLERA

FACTS: The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon herdeath by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel ofland situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of thepublic domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another caseRepublic v. Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued

under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only toplaces covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguiowhich was covered by a town site reservation.

This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates oftitle covering lands within the Baguio Town Site Reservation pursuant toRA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 consideredas valid certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable undercertain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question wasreverted to the public domain.

The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment oftaxes. Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A yearafter, a certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitionerfiled a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile,Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition tothe petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled thatsaid auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegallymade. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petitionwith petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and thatPD 1271 has a curative effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively

RULING: Yes. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactiveapplication of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allowssome exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. Theintent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the timethey were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognizethe effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by personswith Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated,honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And suchwould be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, thevalidity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the

conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.


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8. ACOSTA VS. PLAN

FACTS: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana in the Court of FirstInstance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino Magday.

After the answer, the complaint was amended to implead the Departmentof Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands asadditional defendants. Magday filed an amended answer. The Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filedseparate answers to the amended complaint.

After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, uponplaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary

judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, rendered judgmentdismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffsfiled a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied by therespondent Judge. They filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupersand filed a notice of appeal. The trial court granted their motion to appealas paupers.

Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record onappeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of thecase to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of theRules of Court. Respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to filea record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal orderwas filed by the appellants. They mailed their record on appeal to theCourt. The lower court denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence,this petition for certiorari by the appellants raising the lone legal questionof whether for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant, the timelysubmission of a record on appeal is required.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law can be given retroactive effect.

RULING: The reorganization having been declared to have beencompleted, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. Arecord on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The sameproviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issuedby this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, thoseprovisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, asappellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will beconstrued as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time oftheir passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to thatextent.'

9. MRCA VS. CA

FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had notyet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be givenretroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,

that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein(plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive thegovernment of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester casewhere enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of thecomplaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, tomislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

HELD: It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutesregulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable toactions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.


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10. BPI VS. IAC

FACTS: The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack andthe Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines [hereafterreferred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the PhilippineIslands(hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through acorporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case.

HELD: Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without sellingthem to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt, is atransaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must beconsidered as one which falls under the general class of prohibitedtransactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void,having been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitorylaw. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of actionagainst the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of thecause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense,both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of actionagainst each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is

one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

11. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

FACTS: This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners questionthe constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service isauthorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions ofRepublic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as

Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled"Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the BudgetaryInnovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An ActStrengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic ofthe Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent andGuaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. Thepetitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks torestrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budgetpursuant to said decrees.

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the

aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio whenhe was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative powerwas restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitutionwas ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation byCongress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to thepresent, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billionautomatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act thatrests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitionerscontend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 andP.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, afterthe adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative

under Section 3, Article XVIII.

HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of theConstitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances notinconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended,repealed or revoked."

This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adoptedby its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the thenPresident Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in forceand effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are

otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.


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The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No.81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawfulauthorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwiseamended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying withthe duty to implement the same.

12. MARTINEZ VS. VAN BUSKIRK

FACTS: Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908,Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila.When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for thetransportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, wascoming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff

was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagonpass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into thecarromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it,causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff‘s head and injuring thecarromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who wasdriving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually agood servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He alsoclaims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at CalleHerran, and for that purpose the defendant‘s employee tied the drivinglines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purposeof unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed bythe driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to

run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown uponthe ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle andtractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable forthe negligence of such driver.

RULING: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligentin leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in thiscase. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, havenot been destructive and which are approved by the society, areconsidered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as

unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permittedby the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One couldnot easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to aninjury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cocheronegligent because of such circumstances.

Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injuriousand which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long atime has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to beunreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driverwas not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting inunloading his wagon.


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13. ARMIGOS VS. CA

FACTS: The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint againstthe herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, forthe collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment wasrendered in favor of the private respondent and against the hereinpetitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8

June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice ofappeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completedthe other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the f ilingof an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee.However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration ofthe appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filedbeyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.Petitioner‘s contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copyof the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when heperfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that thedecision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing hisappeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is

erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that thecomputation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour hereceived copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day periodcomprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.

HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall bethe 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it wassubmitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last dayincluded" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil

Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, thetime within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computedby excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sundayor a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of theRules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules ofCourt, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day ofthe act, event or default after which the designated period of time beginsto run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is tobe included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event thetime shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or alegal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day assynonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a

different view.

14. NAMARCO VS. TECSON

FACTS: On October 14, 1955, the CFI-Manila rendered judgment in acivil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of thisdecision was, on October 21, 1955 served upon defendants in said case.On December 21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties,assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as plaintiff in that case and

judgment creditor therein, f iled with the same court, a complaint againstdefendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. DefendantTecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescriptionof action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence,the appeal to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the SupremeCourt, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one oflaw, namely, pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgementmust be brought within 10 years from the time the judgment sought to berevived has become final. This in turn, took place on December 21, 1955or 30 days from notice of the judgment -- which was received bydefendants on October 21, 1955 -- no appeal having been takentherefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which the 10 years

from December 21, 1955 expired. Plaintiff alleges that it was 12/21/65,but appellee maintains otherwise, because when the law speaks of yearsxxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 years of 365 days each, or anaggregate of 3650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December19, 1955. Plaintiff.-appellant further insists that there is no question thatwhen it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is oneyear. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it isthe 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belongto the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute oneyear.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment isbarred by the statute of limitations.

HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that itstheory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting theconnotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days.[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21,1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" interms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19,1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to thecomputation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.]


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16. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO

FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage beforeCatholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed,they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work whileEscano stayed in Cebu then Misamis. While in Misamis, Escano askedfor petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her

non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US withoutinforming Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extremecruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then marriedagain to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation anddamages against wife and parents in law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal.

RULING: No, the divorce and the second marriage are not recognized asvalid. As stated in Art. 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos inPhilippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid.

The Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part ofthe code, instead of divorce; legal separation is used, wherein marriageis still recognized. To recognize a decree of divorce of foreign courtswould be violation on public policy and Article 17 of Civil Code.Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and thosewhich have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shallnot be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or bydeterminations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It wouldalso discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorcedelsewhere. It would not make any difference if Tenchavez was also in thecourt of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗tconfer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds

to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone otherthan her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis ofadultery. As result, the petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation,and may recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.

17. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. Theyestablished their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. Theywere divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this timewith Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,

1983, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita Manila, the GalleonShop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice beordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared asthe administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner andprivate respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines wherepetitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control overconjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the

court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may berecognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to theirnational law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations torespondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not bediscriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to beserved.


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18. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with privaterespondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before theRegistrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, FederalRepublic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in

private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding againstpetitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support andseparation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on theground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the childwas granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adulterybefore the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,latter ―had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man

named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983‖.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on theground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife asdecree of divorce was already issued.

RULING: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adulteryand concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint shouldbe the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, itappeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latterobtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the

Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the sameconsideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husbandof petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery caseunder the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filedsuit.

19. PEOPLE VS. RITTER

FACTS: Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by appellant who inserted aforeign object into her vagina causing her death. A criminal case and acivil case was filed against the defendant

HELD: Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victim ‗s heirs

despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also freefrom civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Thedoctrine in Urbano v IAC, wherein a person while not criminally liable,may still be civilly liable, is applicable.


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20. ROE VS. WADE

FACTS: Roe (petitioner), a pregnant single woman, brought a classaction suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws.These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except onmedical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in thelawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for

violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with nochildren, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws onthe grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was countyDistrict Attorney Wade (defendant).

A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held thatRoe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciablecontroversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court alsoruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does‘complaint was not justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial.The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void asvague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because thedistrict court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the lawswas not warranted.

The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United Statesand Wade cross-appealed the district court‘s judgment in favor of Roeand Hallford.

ISSUES:1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those

required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violatethe Constitution of the United States?

2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment tothe United States Constitution protect the right to privacy,including the right to obtain an abortion?

3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact lawsprohibiting abortion?

4. Did the fact that Roe‘s pregnancy had already terminatednaturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Courtrender her lawsuit moot?

5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?

RULING:1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only

life-saving procedures on the mother‘s behalf, and that do nottake into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other

interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due ProcessClause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy,including a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy, against state action.

3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the rightto terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in

protecting both the pregnant woman‘s health and the potentialityof human life at various stages of pregnancy.

4. No. The natural termination of Roe‘s pregnancy did not renderher suit moot.

5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.

The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, thedecision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant woman‘s doctor. Inregard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote theirinterests in the mother‘s health by regulating abortion procedures relatedto the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, statesmay promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating

or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the lifeor health of the mother.

The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is―capable of repetition, yet evading review,‖ is an exception to the generalrule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review,and not merely when the action is initiated.

The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. § 1253 does not authorize a partyseeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal fromspecific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of

both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.

The Does‘ complaint seeking injunctive relief was based oncontingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore toospeculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessaryfor the Court to decide Hallford‘s case for injunctive relief because oncethe Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities wereprohibited from enforcing them.

3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child‗sPERSONALITY

In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines


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21. GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) forthe first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 shebecame pregnant by her present husband before they were legallymarried. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and actingon the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.

After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As shewas then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancyproved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by thedefendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again becamepregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacionand the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant'sclinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three metthe defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month oldfoetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning forhis election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave hisconsent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing thisaction and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluzwe granted certiorari .

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff have the right for damages in behalfof his unborn child.

RULING: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personalinjury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see thatif no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unbornchild on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could

derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause ofaction did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same wasextinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone cantake place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacityas distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke theprovisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur )under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expresslylimits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the childshould be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with thecondition specified in the following article". In the present case, there isno dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother'swomb.

22. QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO

FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio andJacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request foramendment of complaint. Quimiguing averred that the then alreadymarried Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through

force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite effortsand drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimedfor monthly support, damages and attorney‘s fees. The defendant -appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing‘s failure toallege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lowercourt dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment tothe complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of theoriginal complaint to state a cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support anddamages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth incomplaint.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to supportof the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action fordamages.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisionalpersonality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from itsprogenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa mere.‖ Article 742 of thesame Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receivedonations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also furtherstrengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield tohis lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim thatentitles her to claim compensation for damage caused‖ per Article 21 ofthe Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which providesmoral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or otherlascivious acts.


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23. DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA

FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was acashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant‘s brother in law VicenteMendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and anunmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to havehis haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and

had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnantand a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of

Antonia‘s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February1931, he even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the childis his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he wasout of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding herto eat on time for her and ―junior‘s‖ sake. The defendant ask his friendDr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St.Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House inCamarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.

When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenlydeparted and he was married with another woman at this time. It shouldbe noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who wasin charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name IsmaelLoanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES: Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with theother letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy provesacknowledgement of paternity.

RULING: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves asadmission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the

admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is thatthe writing shall be indubitable. ―The law fixes no period during which achild must be in the continuous possession of the status of a naturalchild; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father'sr esolution to admit the status‖. Supreme Court held that they agree withthe trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco forsupposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has nostanding in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a

judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize thesecond baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modifythe judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loancoin the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it

is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to theamount of pension.

24. LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE

FACTS: Fragante filed an application for a CPC to install, maintain andoperate an ice plant in San Juan. Pending application with the PublicService Commission (PSC), Fragante died and he was substituted by thelegal representative of his estate. The PSC granted the application.Petitioner contends that the PSC erred when it allowed the substitution of

the legal representative of the estate of Fragante as the party applicantin the case pending before the commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante can be considered as a―person‖.

RULING: There would be a failure of justice unless the estate isconsidered a ―person‖. Within the framework and principles of theconstitution itself, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civilrights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to naturalpersons, the term ―person‖ used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemedto include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to

include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in theseconstitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among theseartificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,the Court held that within the framework of the constitution, the estate ofFragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for thepurposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which includethe exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights andthe fulfilment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.


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25. DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTICS

FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28,1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag andDarang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legalrate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final orelse Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.

Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land,which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has anarea of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by thesheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given assecurity under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or longbefore June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria‘s death.The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledgedand signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta,

Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs inOria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1,1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution

against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity asadministrator of Oria‘s testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment against Oria and execution againsthis land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

RULING: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 justlearned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. TheDumalaos‘ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics wasunaware of Oria‘s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oriaas a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria,thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court‘s judgment

against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as faras Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridicalcapacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lostthrough death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in orderto annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitledto claim attorney‘s fees against the corporation.

26. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ

FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas‘ brothers and sisters unaware of the former‘sdeath on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus onSeptember 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging thatshe was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and wasconfined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial

residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ ofhabeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana‘s body tothe sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeascorpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failuredue to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio‘s residence. The court orderedthat the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy butEugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

RULING: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitalianawas correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to

Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that―Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarriedman or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shalldevolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.‖ Albeit, petitioner claimshe is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where ―a manand a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years ashusband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husbandand wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the communitywhere they live may be considered legally mauled in common law

jurisdictions‖. In addition, it requires that the man and woman livingtogether must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.

Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marryingVitaliana.


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27. JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

FACTS: On Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro,Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion,and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife AdelaConde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Thebuilding was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three

daughters who fell. Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn‘twant to leave so he left with his son, his son‘s wife and neighborFrancisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground therest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. The German Club collapsedtrapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adelaand Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid forthree days. On Feb. 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy,they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed.

The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin,survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed thereverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of

succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN,Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of theRules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to thecase at bar.

RULING: No, neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions,as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and soare not to be available when there are facts.

Upon the issue of who between the mother and son died first, in light of

the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can bearrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. Thepresumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based onspeculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance ofevidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantialor (4) inferential.

Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are calledto succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, inthe absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, andthere shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules

of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

28. SMITH, BELL & CO. VS. NATIVIDAD

FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing underthe laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British.It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato, brought to Cebu forthe purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.‘s merchandise betweenports in the islands. An application for registration was made at Cebu at

the Collector of Customs, but was denied. This is because they were notcitizens of the US or the Philippines. Based on Act 2671, Sec. 1172 ofthe Certificate of Philippine Register; upon registration of a vessel ofdomestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate ofPhilippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domesticownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate ofPhilippine register shall be optional with the owner. Domestic ownership,as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens ornative inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the US residingin the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composedwholly of citizen of Philippines, or US, or both. Plaintiff‘s contends that

Act No. 2671 deprives the corporation of its property without due process

of law because by the passage of the law, the company wasautomatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of theBato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use.

ISSUE: Whether or not Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due processof law by the Philippine Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761.

RULING: No. (judgment is affirmed, and plaintiff can‘t be grantedregistry.) Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippine Coastwide trade,falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview ofthe police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the

arteries of the commerce in the Philippines. If one be severed, thelifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of thecountry and general welfare is sustained.


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29. BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS: The defendant Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiffparish priest, took possession of the church on July 5, 1901. Headministered if as such under the orders of his superiors until November14, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made ademand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and

cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and otherprop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refusedto make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunctionw/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ thePope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join theFilipino Church, the head of w/c is at Manila.

In January 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant.,alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church wasthe owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books,money, and other properties, belonging thereto, and asking that it berestored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of

the properties which he had received and which was retained by him,and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of theplaintiff.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Churchhas no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, madewith reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand yearsany other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecianeloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were stillworshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require seriousconsideration.

30. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS

FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one otherpersons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with twoothers as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severallyStandard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of thedebt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife

of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) thather husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 by Manila‘s Court ofFirst Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, withauthority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given byher husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanentlyinsane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane andunable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason askedthe court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence forVillanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond.The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacityto act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva, appellant, was incapable of enteringinto contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.

RULING: No, he wasn‘t. ―Capacity to act‖ must be supposed to attach toa person who has not previously been declared incapable, and suchcapacity is presumed to continue so long contrary is not proved, that is,at the time of his acting he was incapable, crazy or out of his mind;which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case.‖There was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving ofthe bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of actingbecause of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that theyobserved insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,

but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legallydeprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well thathe was insane.


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31. MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU

FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two ofthe four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale,these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at thetime they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before thenotary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their

two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their motherthe sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, andfraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sumof P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand theannulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of thething benefited by the defendant.

According to the Defendant, the plaintiff‘s mother had sold a portion ofthe original land to the defendant for a sum. The plaintiff‘s fathersubsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for asum to cover his children‘s welfare after his wife‘s death. The plaintiffshad alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and

perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400. Cross-complaintfiled for damages due to the malicious and unfounded complaint by theplaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minorspresented themselves that they were of legal age.

RULING: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still validsince it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of pubertyand adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minorspretended that they had already reached their majority.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity toact, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations,as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such aseasements.

Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselvesfrom compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek theirannulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law onestoppels.

32. YOUNG VS. TECSON

HELD: Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not estophim from denying that he was of age or from asserting that he was underage, at the time he entered into the contract, for the breach of w/c anaction is brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the liab. resulting frommisrepresentation has its juridical source in the capacity of the person

making the misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making themisrepresentation cannot bind himself by contract, he cannot also bebound by any misrepresentation he may have made in connectiontherewith. A person entering into a contract must see to it that the otherparty has sufficient capacity to bind himself.

The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, theminor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affectthe case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because hisprevious misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowingthe contract.


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33. BAMBALAN VS. MARAMBA

FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land. Hewas forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell the land to GenovenaMuerong, since she was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to theloan Genoveva gave Paula. To have the document of the saleacknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the

petitioner. Isidro didn‗t try to conceal his age; in fact the respondent waswell aware that Isidro was a minor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the piece of land in question void orvalid.

RULING: The sale of the land is void because Isidro is incapacitated toenter into such contracts, and because the land wasn‗t even registeredand hence, cannot be sold. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannotbe used since the petitioner didn‗t try to hide his age

Art. 38 NCC provides that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of

being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictionson capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exemptthe incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latterarise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

The land in question wasn‗t even registered in the Register of Deeds; thesale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided insection 50 of Act. 496.

34. SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS: Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent Ramon)executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five parcels ofland to petitioner Sia Suan. A few days later (within the month after thesale of the parcels of land), Ramon‘s counsel wrote to Suan‘s husband,Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the ground that Ramon was a

minor when the signing took place. After Gaw Chiao responded to theletter, Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiao‘s counsel to ratify the sale.

After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw Chiao, aspayment for the sold parcels of land/ Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold theparcels of land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio inherited it.

Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance ofLaguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground ofhis minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; actionwas denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramon‘s father and brother,Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved. Ramon brought case to theCourt of Appeals which reversed the CFI Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Alcantara‘s execution of the deed of saleis valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution.

RULING: Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due tohis act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect. The deedof sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it. Ramon is not allowedto annul such deed, because he already ratified it. Mercado doctrine isapplicable in this case. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith;he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and itsratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because heexecuted it while still a minor. ―…pr evious misinterpretation has already

estopped him from disavowing the contract‖. The Court of Appeals saidthat Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the SupremeCourt holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in thedeed of sale, due to his minority. The Supreme Court is of the opinionthat Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring anycosts on their part. Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu,herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legalage, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as longas the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstancethat about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appelleeinformed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, becauseappellee‗s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from

disavowing the contract.


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35. BRAGANZA VS. VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa AbrilleP70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised inwriting to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of thePhilippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have nopaid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first

instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to thecontract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of theCA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000+ 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganzasons when they signed the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, areto be bound by the contract of loan they have signed.

RULING: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share inthe contract because they minority of her sons does not release her fromliability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.

However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA whichfound them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority.The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – ―in order to holdthe infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It hasbeen held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his agedoes not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action ofdeceit.‖

The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are stillliable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art.1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of

their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they mayhave profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, whichis P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalentto P1,166.67.

36. US VS. VAQUILAR

FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and hisdaughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnessestestified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to thecommission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant wascomplaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The

witnesses‘ evidence for insanity include: • ―appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetratingat the time he was killing his wife.‖

• ―he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, hewouldn‘t have killed his family‖

• at the moment of cutting those people, ―he looked like amadman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random‖

• sister said, ―…then he pursued me….he must have been crazybecause he cut me‖

ISSUE: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declarethe accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.

RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. Theappellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal,not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed thecrimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he isinsane. The popular meaning of ―crazy‖ is not synonymous with the legalterms ―insane‖. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jailis not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word inthe cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse afterthe commission of the crime.

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity

which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a pervertedcondition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, doesnot exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof thatthe defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a fewmoments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumedthat he was in a normal state of mind.


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37. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS

FACTS: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including theappellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI ofManila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffsSOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, ElisaVillanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was

declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she wasauthorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legalproceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husbandwhile in a state of insanity.

ISSUE: Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarilywarrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act.

RULING: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanuevapossessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence towarrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering frommonomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and

incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of hiswife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished,that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management,as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum ofmoney.

38. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN

FACTS: Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old and was hired as ahousekeeper by the mother of the accused. Accused Policarpio Rafananand his family lives with his mother. On March 16 1976 in the evening,after dinner, Estelita was sent to help the accused in the store. At 11pm,the accused called Estelita to help him close the door of the store and he

suddenly pulled her inside and said ― come, let us have sexualintercourse‖ in which Estelita said she don‘t like. Despite the struggle ofEstelita, Policarpio was able to rape her and told her not to tell anyone orelse he would kill her. But somehow, the family of the accused was ableto find out which made Estelita leave the house. Estelita was crying onher home and told her mother about what happened. During trial, theaccused pleaded not guilty but in the end he was convicted. He thenappeal to the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commissionof the crime.

RULING: Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. If there wasimpairment of the mental faculties, such impairments was not socomplete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousnessof his acts. The testimonies negate complete destruction of intelligenceat the time of the commission of the crime. The fact that the appellantthreatened Estelita with death reveals to the court that the accused wasaware of his act. The law presumes every man to be sane. A personaccused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation ofinsanity and the accused was not able to prove it. Although it is not aexempting circumstance under art 12 of Revised Penal Code, it is amitigating circumstance under the art 13 of RPC.


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39. ABELLA VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed tointervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitionerLarrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that shemisrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga,Leyte.It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her

husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commissiongranted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor,hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the secondhighest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor ofKananga, Leyte.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneouswhen it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that thepetitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for theposition of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law,

the matter of determination of the ―residence‖ is more on the principle of―intention‖, the animus revertendi rather than anything else.‖ In thisregard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residenceto Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed herKananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendievidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in thecourse of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."

HELD: In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that thepetitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 topursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that sheestablished her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers

herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not toabandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. Thefact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years doesnot signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is commonamong us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly residedspecially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intentsand purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.

40. CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO

FACTS: In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte,Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias

Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting fromdefendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage betweenSocorro and Geronimo.

The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised suchmarriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants'house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of thebride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made theimprovement and spent P700; and (c ) that without cause defendantsrefused to honor their pledged word.

HELD: The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and thedefendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One,the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants inconsideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the

agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". Forbreach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro fordamages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise isadmissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, becauseit is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as toFelipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintainedon the theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded asaction by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."


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41. DOMALAGAN VS. BOLIFER

FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant entered into acontract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant acertain amount upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of thedefendant; that he has completed his obligation under said contract bypaying the stipulated amount; that notwithstanding said agreement, the

daughter was joined to a lawful wedlock with another man not his son;that immediately upon learning of the marriage, he demanded the returnof the payment he has made. The trail court rendered a judgment infavor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiffand the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of aprospective marriage is valid and effective.

RULING: Plaintiff invokes paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code ofProcedure in Civil Action and, appellant argues that the verbal contract,not having been reduced to writing, plaintiff cannot recover. The section

relied upon by the does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties toan action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to theadmissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in questionand permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, itwill be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced towriting.

42. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten(10) years younger than she, used to go around together and wereregarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriageprior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advisedpetitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to

marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendantmarried one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,for breach of promise to marry.

RULING: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequentlydelivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach,nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical andhospitalization expenses as well as attorney‘s fees. Because ofdefendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmedby her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age

and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that saiddefendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moraldamages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.


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43. WASSMER VS. VELEZ

FACTS: Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutualpromise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 asthe big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that theyhave to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And onthe next day he sent her the following telegram ―Nothing changed rest

assured retur

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Case Digests - Persons and Family Relations (3)

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