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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Joseph Raymond Molina
Petitioner [s],
VS.
The People Of Puerto RicoRespondent[s],
))))))))))/
Case No.:
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BYA PERSON UNDERSTATE CUSTODY
COMES NOW Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
and files the instant petition to overturn and vacate a sentence in the state court that
is contrary to the United States Constitution.
PRELIMINARTY STATEMENT
1. The name of the Court that entered the judgment is the Superior court
of Puerto Rico in San Juan, Puerto Rico, under criminal case No. K 1C
2008G0028. Imposing a sentence of five years and six months of
incarceration, with a suspended incarceration sentence. This case is filed
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pursuant to Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973)1 and Carafas
v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)2.
2. The date of Judgment was February 13, 2009 Writ of certiorari was denied
January 27, 2012, by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, a motion for
reconsideration was denied on March 30, 2012.
3. The time of judgment of conviction was Five years and Six months
(suspended)3. The sentencing Judge was Hon. Abelardo Bermudez (now and
appellate Judge).
4. The nature of the offence convicted Art. 122 (third degree) was violation of
Criminal Code. Article 122 requires aggression against a person the renders
permanent damage, but not requires medical attention, or specialized
professional treatment ambulatory would be guilty of a crime in the fourth
degree. Aggravated to third degree. This is to say that the Government must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina was
the aggressor. The evidence at trial and admitted clearly showed the victim
was the aggressor.
5. The sentence was for on count of Article 122 in the Third Degree
1 Restraints imposed on petitioner who was released on his own recognizance constitute "custody" within themeaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Pp. 411 U. S. 348-353.2 Though the federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant be "in custody" when the habeas corpusapplication is filed, the relief that may be granted is not limited to discharging the applicant from physical custody,the statute providing that "the court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243.Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574 (1960), overruled. Pp. 391 U. S. 238-240.33
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6. There are no future sentences to be serve after completion of the five years
and six months.
FACTS UPON WHY THE SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED
7. The appearing petitioner submits that the facts as specified here support the
following:
The evidence in admitted (video tape) when looked in light most
favorable to the People of Puerto Rico is insufficient to show that
Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina Young was the aggressor as
required by the Art. 122 of the Puerto Rico penal Code.
The waiver of jury trial was done involuntary because of the
presiding judge apparent conflicts of interest with the alleged victim
Mr. Carlos Romero Barceló. These facts were learned after the trial
and conviction.
The prosecutor’s statements were unconstitutional and not relevant to
the issues at trial and prejudiced the decision, even after the court
attempted to distance itself, it nonetheless followed the pleading of
the prosecutor.
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THE FACTS
8. On Super Tuesday March 8th 2008 (national primary elections) petitioner
entered the café known as Pelayo to have dinner at Pelayo. There, alleged
victim form Governor, Commissioner Resident and mayor of San Juan
Puerto Rico, Mr. Carlos Romero Barceló, was having drinks with
approximately seven to eight political followers. See Petitioner entering the
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restaurant. (Photo admitted into evidence stipulated by the parties. There his
followers invited Petitioner to sit and chat over the political scenario of
March 8, 2008. After cordial introduction, a conversation ensues regarding
the Super Tuesday Democratic Primaries. There, allege victim Carlos
Romero Barceló instigated conversations regarding Republican participant
and former president George W. Bush.
9. The issue of the bias of the presiding Trial Judge, The
Honorable Abelardo Bermudez, as well as this judge’s meeting
exparte with the alleged victim of the case, former Governor
Carlos Romero Barceló, was presented to the Apellate Court
refused to consider the motion or remand to the Court of First
Instance.
10. Furthermore, the prosecutor of the case, Mr. Cesar Mercado
Santaella, employed polarizing xenophobic and irrelevant political
arguments in order to plead for a guilty charge in his closing
arguments. His statements constituted a violation of the
Petitioner’s due process and unduly influenced the judge to make
a decision based on political considerations as opposed to the facts
of the case.
11. Objections to the Prosecutor’s behavior were made by Trial
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Counsel during the closing arguments and sentencing of the case
at the First District Court of Puerto Rico. While Judge Bermudez
attempted to distance de Court from the inappropriate statements
made by the Prosecutor, he nevertheless ruled in favor of the
prosecution, finding Petitioner guilty.
12. The waiver of jury trial was discovered to have been made
unknowingly by the Petitioner, and submitted to the Appellate
Court on April 27, 2011 with the motion to Appellate Court and
was not heard by the Appellate Court.
13. The issue of the vagueness of the federal constitutionality
statue was not raised previously and is being presented to the
Court for the first time.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
14. This case raises exceptionally important questions
concerning the administration of justice by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico through politically appointed justices. The
proceedings related to the case of the People of Puerto Rico versus
Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina were corrupted by the alleged
victim’s political manipulation of the presiding trial judge. For
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this case, Superior Court Judge Abelardo Bermudez was
specifically appointed by the Court to hear the case of the People
of Puerto Rico versus Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina. The
Petitioner was President of a mortgage banking firm (Golden
Mortgage Bankers) and the alleged victim was Carlos Romero
Barceló, a former Governor, Resident Commissioner, and Mayor of
the Capital City, San Juan. The Trial commenced on the first
week of October, 2008. The alleged victim Carlos Romero Barceló
testified on October 9, 2008 before then Superior Judge Abelardo
Bermudez.
15. On April 25, 2011 the internationally acclaimed golfer, Mr.
Juan A Rodriguez (“Chi Chi” Rodriguez), witnessed the alleged
victim Carlos Romero Barceló entering the residence of his
neighbor, Mr. Pedro Rivera Casiano. Mr. Rodriguez also witnessed
Judge Abelardo Bermudez entering the residence of Mr. Pedro
Rivera Casiano, where he met with alleged victim Carlos Romero
Barceló. See sworn declaration of Juan A. Rodriguez. On the date
of the meeting between the alleged victim and Judge Abelardo
Bermudez -April 25, 2011- the trial of People of Puerto Rico versus
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Petitioner Joseph Raymond Molina was still proceeding under the
jurisdiction of Judge Bermudez.
16. Petitioner was charge with violation of Art. 122 33 L.P.R.A. §
4750 aggravated battery in the third degree. The First District
Court of San Juan sentenced Petitioner to a five year term of
incarceration with a suspended sentence.
17. Following the conclusion of the trial, the lead prosecutor in
the case, Mr. Cesar Mercado Santaella, was promoted to Superior
Court Judge. Additionally, Superior Court judge Abelardo
Bermudez was appointed as an appellate justice while the appeal
of the case was pending at the Appellate Court of Puerto Rico.
18. An affidavit with the sworn testimony of Mr. Juan (“Chi
Chi”) Rodriguez was submitted to the Appellate Court for
consideration before rendering its ruling. The Appellate Court
refused to consider the affidavit or to send the case back to the
Superior Court. See declaration of Ms. Rosa Ward, Appellate
Counsel.
19. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico refused to address the
Constitutional violations submitted on appeal and certiorari.
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20. Superior Court Judge Abelardo Bermudez’ s fraternization
with the alleged victim while the trial was proceeding under his
jurisdiction represents a flagrant violation of the legal protections
guaranteed to the Petitioner by the U.S. Constitution, whose case
was clearly not conducted with any semblance of due process.
21. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s closing statements in the trial
are tantamount to prosecutorial misconduct rendering the trial
unfair on the basis of both the prosecution and trial judge’s
conduct during of the case.
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
22. Significant issues are at stake in this case relating to the
preservation of a citizen’s right to have a fair trial in the State
Court of Puerto Rico, The appearance of impropriety projected by
the meeting of a trail judge with the alleged victim of a case which
he is serving as the presiding judge undermines the respect,
confidence and trust that the American judicial system merits and
instead disgraces this very system.
23. The prosecutors closing statement were not in any way
related to the actual facts surrounding the confrontation in
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question but instead employed manipulative political rhetoric that
had no place in a courtroom. The Prosecutor declared that former
“President Bush is an abuser and a coward” and that “now comes
this Miracle [Petitioner] from another place to pretend to tell us
what we have to think and pretend to tell us what we have to say”.
Now Petitioner “comes from another place [United States] to us,
and pretends to tell us what I have to think in my country [Puerto
Rico] and pretend to tell us Puerto Rican what we have to say, for
what reason?s With what rights? Is this individual to come and
tell me what I have to say in my country [Puerto Rico]? no that
same liberty that he has to express his opinion I have them too?
“If he want to come to Puerto Rico to hit an ex-governor and brag
about it, why doesn’t he go to CUBA and punch FIDEL to see
what is going to happen”.
ISUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
24. The probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
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BASIC PRINCIPLE
25. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
(applicable to the federal government) and the Fourteenth
Amendment (applicable to the states) provide that the government
shall not take a person’s life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Due process contemplates fair process/procedure,
which requires at least an opportunity to present objections to the
proposed action to a fair, neutral decision maker (not necessarily a
judge).
FAIR, NEUTRAL DECISION MAKER- JUDGE BIAS-
26. The Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself
when he has actual bias (e.g. he has a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in a case) or when there is merely
a serious risk of actual bias. A serious risk of actual bias exists
when “under realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness,” the judge’s interest poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudice that it must be forbidden. Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
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27. In respect to this case the undisputed fact is that Superior
Court Judge Adalberto Bermudez was looking to be promoted to
Appellate Justice and the appellate appointment took place on the
Saturday afternoon in a closed section of the Puerto Rican Senate,
after the trial and while pending appellate review.
28. Even when a judge does not have any direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in case, of kind requiring his or her
disqualification at common law, there are circumstances in which
probability of actual bias on part of judge is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (U.S.W.Va.,2009). In deciding
whether probability of actual bias on the part of judge is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable, the court's inquiry is objective one,
that asks not whether judge is actually, subjectively biased, but
whether average judge in judge's position is likely to be neutral, or
whether there is unconstitutional potential for bias. In lieu of
exclusive reliance on personal inquiry by judge, or on appellate
review of judge's determination respecting actual bias, the Due
Process Clause is implemented, in area of judicial recusal, by
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objective standards which do not require proof of actual bias; in
defining these standards, court asks whether, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the
interest in question poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that practice must be forbidden if guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
29. There is serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and
reasonable perceptions, when person with personal stake in
particular case had significant and disproportionate influence in
the appointment of the judge to a case by raising funds or by
directing the judge's election campaign when the case is pending
or imminent. This is the case at bar. Former Mayor of San Juan,
Governor and Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló
maintains his seat as Vice-President of the powerful New
Progressive Party of Puerto Rico and has numerous lobbying
contracts that leverage his significant political influence.
30. Due process may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh scales of
justice equally between contending parties. U.S.C.A.
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Const.Amend. 14. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct.
2252 (2009).
31. This Honorable Court has held that“[e]very procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process
of law.” 273 U. S ., at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437. In Ward v. Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267. This is the case at bar.
In the case at hand, Mr. Juan “Chi Chi” Rodriguez witnessed
former governor and alleged victim Carlos Romero Barceló
meeting with the trial judge at the time the trial was occurring on
or about October 9, 2008.
32. Similarly, the Court has also reasoned that no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome,”
id., at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, this Court noted that the circumstances
of the case and the prior relationship required recusal. The judge's
prior relationship with the defendant, as well as the information
acquired from the prior proceeding, was critical. In reiterating
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that the rule that “a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings
should be [tried] before a judge other than the one reviled by the
contemnor,” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466, 91
S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532, rests on the relationship between the
judge and the defendant, id., at 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, the Court noted
that the objective inquiry is not whether the judge is actually
biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to
be neutral or there is an unconstitutional “ ‘potential for bias,’ ”
id., at 466, 91 S.Ct.
33. The objective standards implementing the Due Process
Clause do not require proof of actual bias, this Court does not
question Justice the trial judge subjective findings of impartiality
or propriety. The Court need not determine whether there was
actual bias. Rather, the question is whether, “under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the
interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.” Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.
499. Pp. 2261 – 2262.
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IITHE PROSECUTOR’S XENOPHOBIC CLOSING
ARGUMENT WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
34. The Prosecutors failed to argue the evidence and the
elements of the crime charged and moved on to politically charged,
xenophobic arguments that were unconstitutional and
discriminatory.
35. The Prosecutors argument that Petitioner came from
another place, [the United States] cuts the fundamental principle
of equal protection under the law and substantive due process
guaranteed by the U.S Constitution Fifth, Six and Fourteenth
Amendments. Prosecutor Mercardo argued that the Petitioner
“comes from another place [United States] to us, and pretends to
tell us what I have to think in my country [Puerto Rico] and
pretend to tell us Puerto Ricans what we have to say, for what
reason? With what rights? And “If he want to come to Puerto Rico
to hit an ex-governor and brag about it, why does he go to CUBA
and punch FIDEL to see what is going to happen”.
36. Here, the prosecutors abandoned the due process of arguing
the evidence [and admitted security video tape] and the elements
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of the crime charged and instead became an advocate for the
alleged victim and his political views. The prosecutors' closing
arguments vouched for the government's case and improperly
blurred the distinction between witness and advocate U.S. v.
Hermanek 289 F.3d 1076, 1084 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2002). United States
v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding prosecutor’s
reference to African-Americans as “bad people” and calling
attention to fact that defendants were not locals was improper).
37. Ordinarily, legitimate arguments based on competent
evidence in the case are not rendered improper by the fact that
they incidentally stir the sympathies and prejudices of the jury.
Thus, such comments do not constitute error where they are
within the permissible bounds of fair comment and are not in fact
inflammatory to the extent of constituting misconduct by the
prosecuting attorney. On the other hand, comments calculated to
unduly create, arouse, or inflame the jurors' sympathies,
prejudices, fears, or passions to the arguments which diminish the
presumption of innocence are forbidden detriments of the accused
are improper. Stein Closing Arguments § 1:17 (2011-2012 ed.)
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prosecutor Mercado’s’ statements were made in closing arguments
because of his personal knowledge that Petitioner is a Cuban
American, born in the State of Georgia, who was part of the U.S.-
supported Bay of Pigs invasion into Cuba in 1961, as part of the
2506 Brigade, and who spent time in Communist Cuban jails as a
war prisoner. None of these facts were ever made part of the
evidence at trial, because Petitioner did not testify at trial and
instead elected to have the restaurant security videotape,
admitted into evidence, to serve as the primary evidence at trial.
38. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: “inappropriate
statements by a prosecuting attorney–particularly during closing
argument–may warrant reversal. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637 (1974), the Court held that in federal habeas actions,
“improper jury argument by the state does not present a claim of
constitutional magnitude unless it is so prejudicial that the
petitioner’s trial was fundamentally unfair within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”. Northern
Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s future
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dangerousness improper prosecutorial conduct at guilt phase
where evidence against defendant not strong).
39. The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations has
been made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth
Amendment (see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.s. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019; Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1; Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; and In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682), provides
specified standards for ‘all criminal prosecutions.’ Theses
standards were ignored and dismissed in all respect by the
prosecutor, who today sits on the bench of the Superior Court of
Puerto Rico.
40. The prosecutor is a state official his action in closing
argument is within the aspect of a fair trial, which is implicit in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which
the States are bound. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93
S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
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86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,
85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81
S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.
IIITHE WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL WAS MADE
UNKNOWINGLY AND INVOLUNTARY DUE TOPRESIDING JUDGE INVOLVEMENT WITH ALLEGED
VICTIM
41. The defendant waived the right to a jury trial without
knowing that Mr. Juan “Chichi” Rodriguez has sworn to have seen
the presiding judge meeting with the alleged victim while the case
was proceeding before him as finder of fact.
42. For the waiver of a constitutional right to be valid it must be
made knowingly and intelligently. Here, neither the defendant nor
trial counsel was aware of the exparte socialization of the trial
judge and juror with the alleged victim a former governor,
Senator, And Resident Commissioner.
43. A defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial must be made
knowingly and voluntarily, joined in by the prosecutor and
accepted by the court. Here, little can be argued about the
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knowledge of the defendant and his counsel as to the gathering
that individual Juan “ChiChi” Rodriguez swears to have
witnessed at his golf community in Guayama, Puerto Rico. The
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. In this case, the trier
of fact, the trial judge, was meeting exparte with the ex-governor
while the trial was proceeding under his jurisdiction.
44. Furthermore, the primary evidence of the trial was the
videotape from the security camera of the restaurant, which
clearly shows that the alleged victim is the aggressor. The alleged
victim is the first to rise from his chair and reach across the table
to where Petitioner was sitting, and he is the first to make a
physical contact with the Petitioner. In light of this evidence it is
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impossible to see how the trial judge was impartial in this ruling.
The evidence speaks for its self, it is the alleged victim who
instigates, initiates and makes the first assault and battery.
IVPETITIONER WAS CHARGED WITH A SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENT BUT NEVER CHARGED OR CONVICTEDOF THE CRIME OF BATTERY IT SELF
45. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico statute is overbroad
because it sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is
subject to government control, but also includes within its
prohibition the practice of a protected constitutional right, that
the statement “any means” ignores defendant’s the right to defend
and protect himself from an attack, or through the exercise of non-
criminal conduct such as negligence. The statute ignores the
means rea or intent to commit the battery.
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46. Puerto Rico criminal code 33 L.P.R.A. § 4749 defines Simple
Battery as: “Any person who “illegally through any means or form
inflicts injury to the bodily integrity of another” shall incur a
misdemeanor”. The Petitioners submits that the words “illegally
and any means or form” is overly vague and excessively broad
because includes within its prohibition the practice of a protected
constitutional right and included conduct that is not prohibited by
statute, ordinance or code.
47. Pursuant to the charge of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750, if the battery
described in § 4749 of this title defines aggravated causes as an
“injury that does not leave permanent harm, but requires medical
attention, specialized professional outpatient treatment”, shall
incur a fourth degree felony.
48. A statute is impermissibly vague if it either (1) “fails to
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand what conduct it prohibits” or (2) “authorizes or even
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597
(2000).
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49. The constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely
related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of
mens rea. In contrast to previously disapproved statutes that
merely set out the subjective effects of conduct and imposed
penalties for causing that injury, see, e.g., Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214
(1971) (finding ordinance prohibiting conduct “annoying to
persons passing by” unconstitutionally vague), this statute
required the government to prove that Shrader both intended to
cause his victims serious harm and did in fact do so. See Bowker,
372 F.3d at 381–82 (relying on the connection between the
“requirement that a perpetrator intend to harass a victim” and the
“concrete harm requirement” to conclude that § 2261A was not
vague). .” U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973).
50. Under Puerto Rico’s civil code 33 .L.P.R.A. § 3022(17), an
“illegal act” is defined as “any act in contravention with any
statute, regulation or code”. Thus, the term “illegal act” does not
define the means rea but submits an act against any statue, code
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or regulation as the substitute for means rea. In the instant case,
Petitioner was not charge with violating any another statute, code
or regulation. He was simply charged and convicted with violation
of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750 an aggravation of battery which does not
define what is the intentional conduct is to be or the act that is
punished but the result of the act which could be in form of
negligence or self-defense. The charged and convicted statute
merely penalizes the act [a sentencing statute] with the intent to
be harm as an aggravating factor to a sentence. The illegal act as
defined by code 33 L.P.R.A § 3022 (17) “Illegal Act” was never
charged against the Petitioner by the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico nor was a judgment of guilt ever entered by the Superior
Court of Puerto Rico for any “Illegal Act” to mean a violation of
statute, ordinance or code.
51. Hence, the Conviction should be overturned as violative of
Petitioners substantive due process and procedural due process,
because the alleged underlying crime -the “Illegal Act”- was not
charged or a sentence of guilt entered as against any “Illegal Act”
in violation of statute, code, or ordinance.
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52. The vagueness doctrine, which is one aspect of the due
process requirement of notice, holds that a law is facially invalid if
persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its
meaning and differ as to its application." Petitioner was never
placed on notice [or charged] with which “Illegal Act” was
committed and which statute, ordinance or code was violated.
Procedural due process is the right of the Petitioner to be given
notice of the “illegal act” [statute, ordinance or code] violated and
an opportunity to be heard and submit proof of the contrary that
negates the charge of violation of statute, ordinance or code.
Absence of a conviction for an illegal act (not charged by the State)
the conviction for violation of 33 L.P.R.A. § 4750 cannot be
sustained within the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution
applicable to Puerto Rico through the Fourteenth Amendment.
WHEREFORE the appearing Petitioner respectfully prays for this
Honorable Court to grant the Petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Page27
Respectfully Submitted,
July 11, 2012Ricardo Izurieta Ortega
Ricardo Izurieta Ortega, Esq.USDC-PR # 124205
Attorneys & Counselors at Law421 Muñoz Rivera Ave
Midtown Bldg. Ste. PH 1005San Juan, P.R.00918
Tel (787)531-9419Fax (787)767-4926
Email: [email protected]