Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,

vs.

HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Alien, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.

c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor only.

In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases — Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years.

The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997,5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is "adopting" the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent "are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence."

In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows:

Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is "imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years" and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, 11 to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. 12

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioner's Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration 13 he filed, with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act. No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Entitled An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."

2 Rollo, 13-15.

3 Erroneously cited as "Rep. Act. 6691."

4 Rollo, 16-17; 18-22.

5 Id., 24-28.

6 The penalty for the offense of failure to register or failure to vote is fine of P100.00 plus disqualification to run for public office in the next succeeding election following his conviction or to be appointed to a public office for a period of one year following his conviction. However, the provisions of the Omnibus Election penalizing failure to register and failure to vote [Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (1) and paragraph (z), subparagraph (1), respectively] were expressly repealed by Section 17 of Executive Order No. 134 promulgated on 27 February 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino.

7 G.R. No. 126623, 12 December 1997.

8 P.D. No. 49, as amended.

9 R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

10 Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics.

11 Canon 18, id.

12 Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

13 Rollo, 21-22.

14 Applicable to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks pursuant to Canon 6 thereof.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners, vs.MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).

 

CRUZ, J.:

It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.  2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights forthirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for review. 5

While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? 6

Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?

Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:

... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislatureand that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years.Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:

"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 8

There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this

Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

 

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 41-43; pp. 44-45.

2 Ibid., pp. 10-17.

3 Id., pp. 42-43.

4 Id., p. 15.

5 Id., p. 28.

6 Id., pp. 12-14.

7 48 Phil. 836.

8 Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Ko, et al., 82 SCRA 776; Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137.

9 Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 394.

10 Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 141.

11 Rollo, p. 11.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

A.C. No. 288-J June 19, 1974

GAUDENCIO S. URBINA and VEDASTO B. GESMUNDO complainants, vs.JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

After the Court's resolution of February 6, 1974 dismissing the complaint "for failure to make out a prima faciecase without prejudice to respondent's filing a separate administrative complaint for unwarranted harassment against complainant Atty. Vedasto B. Gesmundo as sought in respondent's comment," there were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the verified Joint motion for suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December 27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent * and (b) the 1st Indorsement dated December 5, 1973 and received on January 9, 1974 of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President referring for comment complainant Gesmundo's letter of October 31, 1973 submitting his "objection to re-appointment" of respondent judge, both of which were referred to respondent for comment as per the Court's resolution of February 19, 1974.

In respondent's comment of March 8, 1974, he submitted the ten-page dismissal dated March 5, 1974 by the acting provincial fiscal of Laguna of complainant Urbina's criminal complaint against respondent for "Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment" wherein the fiscal correctly ruled that "(The decision of the respondent that is claimed to be unjust is now pending appeal. The question therefore of whether or not it is unjust is sub-judice. It would not be proper for this Office at this time to determine whether or not the said decision is unjust," and that assuming that he as a mere fiscal and a non-judicial officer could pass in judgment upon the justness or unjustness of respondent's decision complained of as unjust by the losing party (who has appealed the same to a higher court), there was no basis for concluding that the respondent judge knew that his judgment was unjust. Not only does he believe that his judgment is just and correct; his view that a probate court cannot decide questions involving title or ownership of real properties is well supported by the long line of decisions of the Supreme Court cited in his comment." (at pages 9-10)

Respondent convincingly denies as pointless the alleged threat thru Atty. Esguerra against complainant Urbina's life to compel him to withdraw his charges in this administrative complaint since there would remain another complainant in the person of Atty. Gesmundo.

Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former client (Urbina) who alone filed the criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent bears no ill will against him and if he feels aggrieved by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary appeal to the higher courts as he has already done." Respondent categorically denied having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina, directly or through another, confident as he was (although harassed) that the criminal complaint would ultimately be, as in fact it was, dismissed by the fiscal for being without basis in law and in fact.

Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of Atty. Esguerra, stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest that the pending appeal rather than the criminal complaint for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was his proper recourse against respondent's adverse decision, and unqualifiedly stating that he never made any threats nor went to Urbina's house and that "The statements I allegedly made as stated in the affidavit of Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips."

While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part of complainant and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the factual background of the administrative complaint which it has already dismissed previously for not making out a prima facie case and from the baselessness of the criminal complaint for allegedly "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has also been correctly dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of threats cannot be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on complainant's bare assertion as against the respondent's categorical denial supported by Atty. Esguerra's affidavit. In the light of ordinary human conduct and experience, it is difficult to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have been extremely foolhardy and pointless for respondent to have asked Atty. Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The Court finds respondent's comment to be satisfactory and will not subject respondent to further needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due course to the complaint-motion, as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment.

It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative complaints against judges of inferior courts that they should do so after proper circumspection and without the use of disrespectful language and offensive personalities, so as not to unduly burden the Court in the discharge of its function of administrative supervision over inferior court judges and court personnel. The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges, including dismissal and suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a means of harassing judges whose decisions have not been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate disciplinary action as officers of the Court.

The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict complained of (and now pending review on appeal) is far from erroneous.

ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.

The clerk of court is directed to furnish Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the President with a copy of this resolution as well as of the previous resolution of February 6, 1974, by way of reply to his 1st indorsement dated December 5, 1973.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

 

Footnotes

* Complainant-movant Urbina submitted two affidavits executed at Manila on December 14, and December 16, 1973 relating that a person identifying himself as Atty. Esguerra made two telephone threats against him, saying "Mr. Urbina, mag-withdraw ka sa iyong habla laban kay Judge Maceren; kung hindi, ipaliligpit kayo namin," and followed up with a personal visit to his

residence saying that "ikaw naman ay hindi siyang talagang kalaban ni Judge, kundi si Atty. Gesmundo; kaya't kailangang-kailangan ni Judge Maceren na mag-withdraw ka sa iyong dalawang habla sa kanya: Pag-kinalaban ninyo ang Judge, nanganganib kayo;' but that on all occasions he flatly replied that it was his right to complain and he would not withdraw his complaints.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 74376 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALVEZ,respondents.

G.R. No. 76394 December 22,1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.

G.R. No. 78182 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY, and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.

G.R. No. 82281 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Sangco, Anastacio, Castaneda & Duran Law Office for petitioners & private intervenors- petitioners.

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for intervenor-petitioner Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. Renato L. Dela Fuente for respondent Ayala Corporation.

G.R. No. L-74376:

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.

Sergio L. Guadiz for private respondents.

G.R. No. L-76394:

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.

Gruba, Tanlimco Lamso and Apuhin Law Offices for respondents.

G.R. No. L-78182:

Funk & Associates for petitioners.

Tee Tomas & Associates for respondents.

G.R. No. L-82281:

Funk & Associates for petitioner.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Associates for private respondents.

 

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before the Court are five consolidated petitions, 1 docketed as G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 hereof, in the nature of appeals (by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) from five decisions of the Court of Appeals, denying specific performance and damages.

The proceedings were commenced at the first instance by Jose Sangalang, joined by his wife Lutgarda Sangalang, both residents of No. 110 Jupiter Street, Makati, Metro Manila (G.R. No. 71169) to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon property, specifically the Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages. Later, the Sangalangs were joined by Felix Gaston, a resident of No. 64 Jupiter Street of the same municipality, and by Mr. and Mrs. Jose and Alicia Briones, both of No. 66 Jupiter Street. Pending further proceedings, the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), an incorporated homeowners' association, entered its appearance as plaintiff-in-intervention.

BAVA itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific performance and damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' (See G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281.)

ANTECEDENTS FACTS

I. G.R. No. 71169

The facts are stated in the decision appealed from. We quote:

x x x x x x x x x

(1) Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west up to Zodiac Street in the east, When Bel-Air Village was planned, this block between Reposo and Zodiac Streets adjoining Buendia Avenue in front of the village was designated as a commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, p. 10, Feb. 12, 1982).

(2) Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with appellant Ayala Corporation.

(3) Appellees-spouses Sangalang reside at No. 11O Jupiter Street between Makati Avenue and Reposo Street; appellees-spouses Gaston reside at No. 64 Jupiter Street between Makati

Avenue and Zodiac Street; appellees-spouses Briones reside at No. 66 Jupiter Street also between Makati Avenue and Zodiac Street; while appellee Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BAVA) is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air Village which takes care of the sanitation, security, traffic regulations and general welfare of the village.

(4) The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. The pertinent provisions in said Deed Restrictions, which are common to all lot owners in Bel-Air Village, are as follows:

I-BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION

The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community.

The association will also provide for and collect assessments, which will constitute as a lien on the property junior only to liens of the government for taxes and to voluntary mortgages for sufficient consideration entered into in good faith.

II-USE OF LOTS

Subject to such amendments and additional restrictions, reservations, servitudes, etc., as the Bel- Air Association may from time to time adopt and prescribe, this lot is subject to the following restrictions:

a. This lot/s shall not be subdivided. However, three or more lots may be consolidated and subdivided into a lesser number of lots provided that none of the resulting lots be smaller in area than the smallest lot before the consolidation and that the consolidation and subdivision plan be duly approved by the governing body of the Bel-Air Association.

b. This lot/s shall only be used for residential purposes.

c. Only one single family house may be constructed on a single lot, although separate servants' quarters or garage may be built.

d. Commercial or advertising signs shall not be placed, constructed, or erected on this lot. Name plates and professional signs of homeowners are permitted so long as they do not exceed 80 x 40 centimeters in size.

e. No cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, ducks, geese, roosters or rabbits shall be maintained in the lot, except that pets may be maintained but must be controlled in accordance with the rulings of the Association. The term "pets' includes chickens not in commercial quantities.

f. The property is subject to an easement of two (2) meters within the lot and adjacent to the rear and sides thereof not fronting a street for the purpose of drainage, sewage, water and other public facilities as may be necessary and desirable; and the owner, lessee or his representative shall permit access thereto by authorized representatives of the Bel-Air Association or public utility entities for the purposes for which the easement is created.

g. This lot shall not be used for any immoral or illegal trade or activity.

h. The owner and/or lessee of this lot/s shall at all times keep the grass cut and trimmed to reduce the fire hazard of the property.

xxx xxx xxx

VI-TERM OF RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing restrictions shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15, 1957, unless sooner cancelled in its entirety by two thirds vote of members in good standing of the Bel-Air Association. However, the Association may, from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions or parts thereof by majority rule.

VII--ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing restrictions may be enjoined and/or enforced by court action by the Bel-Air Association, or by the Makati Development Corporation or its assigns, or by any registered owner of land within the boundaries of the Bel-Air Subdivision (Sub-division plan PSD-49226 and Lot 7-B, Psd-47848) or by any member in good standing of the Bel-Air association." (Exh. 1 -b; Exh. 22, Annex "B"). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4- 6)

(5) When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped. Access, therefore, to Bel-Air Village was opened to all kinds of people and even animals. So in 1966, although it was not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along Jupiter Street. In 1970, the fence or wall was partly destroyed by typhoon "Yoling." The destroyed portions were subsequently rebuilt by the appellant. (Copuyoc TSN, pp. 31-34, Feb. 12, 1982). When Jupiter Street was widened in 1972 by 3.5 meters, the fence or wall had to be destroyed. Upon request of BAVA, the wall was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, pp. 4447, Feb. 12,1982).

(6) When the appellant finally decided to subdivide and sell the lots in the commercial block between Buendia and Jupiter, BAVA wrote the appellant on May 9, 1972, requesting for confirmation on the use of the commercial lots. The appellant replied on May 16, 1972, informing BAVA of the restrictions intended to be imposed in the sale and use of the lots. Among these restrictions are: that the building shall have a set back of 19 meters; and that with respect to vehicular traffic along Buendia Avenue, entrance only will be allowed, and along Jupiter Street and side streets, both entrance and exit will be allowed.

(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall subdivide and sell the commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to Zodiac Street. Appellant also informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon the commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the development and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special membership in BAVA of the commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed. The proposed deed restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street, the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every seventy five (75) meters of office space in the building and the limitation of vehicular traffic along Buendia to entrance only, but allowing both vehicular entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and any side street.

In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant and informed the latter that the application for special membership of the commercial lot owners in BAVA would be submitted to BAVA's board of governors for decision.

(8) On September 25, 1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it was finally decided that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots shall be increased from 12.5 meters to 15 meters. Appellant further informed BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22, 1973, BAVA wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had assessed the appellant, as special member of the association, the amount of P40,795.00 (based on 81,590 square meters at P.50 per square meter) representing the membership dues to the commercial lot owners for the year 1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of governors had already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on January 31, 1973 informed BAVA that due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the area of the lots which were accepted by the Association as members was reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding dues at P.50 per square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was remitted by the appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting membership dues from the owners of the commercial lots as special members of the Association. As a matter of fact, the dues were increased several times. In 1980, the commercial lot owners were already being charged dues at the rate of P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At this rate, the total membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178. 00 annually based on the total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial lots.

(9) Meantime, on April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18-A).

Thus, Chapter III, Article 1, Section 3.03, par. F. of the Ordinance provides:

F. Bel-Air Village area, as bounded on the N by Polaris and Mercedes streets and on the NE by Estrella Street; on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue and on the SW by the center line of Jupiter Street. Then bounded on the N by the abandoned MRR Pasig Line; on the E by Makati Avenue; on the S by the center line of Jupiter Street and on the W by the center line of Reposo Street." (Exh. 18-A)

Similarly, the Buendia Avenue Extension area was classified as Administrative Office Zone with its boundary in the North-North East Extending also up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18b).

Thus, Chapter III, Article I, Section 3.05, par. C. of the Ordinance provides:

C. The Buendia Avenue Extension areas, as bounded on the N-NE by the center line of Jupiter Street, on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue; on the SW by Buendia Avenue and on the NW by the center line of Reposo Street, then on the NE by Malugay Street; on the SE by Buendia Avenue and on the W by Ayala Avenue Extension." (Exh. 18-B)

The Residential Zone and the Administrative Office Zone, therefore, have a common boundary along the center line of Jupiter Street.

The above zoning under Ordinance No. 81 of Makati was later followed under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance 81 -01 on March 14, 1981 (Exh. 19). However, under this ordinance, Bel-Air Village is simply bounded in the South-Southeast by Jupiter Street-not anymore up to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. B). Likewise, the blockdeep strip along the northwest side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo to EDSA was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone (Exh. 19-c).

Thus, the Zoning District Boundaries -Makati, in Annex B of the Ordinance provides:

R-I-Low Intensity Residential

x x x x x x x x x

4. Bel-Air 1, 3, 4

Bounded on the North -- J.P. Rizal and Amapola St.

South - Rockwell

Northwest - P. Burgos

Southeast - Jupiter

Southwest - Epifanio de los Santos Ave. (EDSA)

5. Bel-Air 2

Bounded on the Northwest - J.P. Rizal

Southwest - Makati Avenue

South --- Jupiter

Southeast -- Pasig Line

East - South Avenue" (Exh. 19-b)

x x x x x x x x x

C-3-High Intensity Commercial Zone

2. A block deep strip along the northwest side of Buendia Ave. Ext. from Reposo to EDSA." (Exh, 19-c)

Under the above zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.

(10) Meanwhile, in 1972, BAVA had installed gates at strategic locations across Jupiter Street which were manned and operated by its own security guards who were employed to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village. (Villavicencio, TSN, pp, 22-25, Oct. 30, 1980; BAVA Petition, par. 11, Exh. 17).

Then, on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA directing that, in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the following streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use:

Amapola Street - from Estrella Street to Mercedes Street

Amapola Street -junction of Palma Street gate going to J. Villena Street

Mercedes Street -- from EDSA to Imelda Avenue and Amapola junction

Zodiac Street - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue

Jupiter Street -- from Zodiac Street to Reposo Street connecting Metropolitan Avenue to Pasong Tamo and V. Cruz Extension intersection

Neptune Street - from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street Orbit Street - from F. Zobel-Candelaria intersection to Jupiter Street

Paseo de Roxas - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue (Exh. 17, Annex A, BAVA Petition)

On February 10, 1977, BAVA wrote the Mayor of Makati, expressing the concern of the residents about the opening of the streets to the general public, and requesting specifically the indefinite postponement of the plan to open Jupiter Street to public vehicles. (Exh. 17, Annex B, BAVA Petition).

However, BAVA voluntarily opened to the public Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Neptune and Paseo de Roxas streets. (Exh. 17-A, Answer of Makati par. 3-7).

Later, on June 17,1977, the Barangay Captain of Bel-Air Village was advised by the Office of the Mayor that, in accordance with the agreement entered into during the meeting on January 28, 1 977, the Municipal Engineer and the Station Commander of the Makati Police were ordered to open for public use Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Accordingly, he was requested to advise the village residents of the necessity of the opening of the street in the interest of public welfare. (Exh. 17, Annex E, BAVA Petition).

Then, on June 10, 1977, the Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, par. 14).

Finally, on August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, pars. 16 and 17).

(11) Before the gates were-removed, there was no parking problem or traffic problem in Jupiter Street, because Jupiter Street was not allowed to be used by the general public (Villavicencio, TSN, pp. 24-25, Oct. 30, 1980). However, with the opening of Zodiac Street from Estrella Street to Jupiter Street and also the opening to the public of the entire length of Jupiter Street, there was a tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing along Jupiter Street coming from EDSA to Estrella Street, then to Zodiac Street to Jupiter Street, and along the entire length of Jupiter Street to its other end at Reposo Street. (Villavicencio, TSN, pp. 30-32, Oct. 30, 1980).

In the meantime, the purchasers of the commercial lots between Jupiter Street and Buendia Avenue extension had started constructing their respective buildings in 1974-1975. They demolished the portions of the fence or wall standing within the boundary of their lots. Many of the owners constructed their own fences or walls in lieu of the wall and they employed their own security guards. (TSN, p. 83, Feb. 20,1981; TSN, pp. 53-54; 72-74, March 20,1981; TSN, pp. 54-55, July 23, 1981).

(12) Then, on January 27, 1978, appellant donated the entire Jupiter Street from Metropolitan Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA (Exh. 7)- However, even before 1978, the Makati Police and the security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the traffic along Jupiter Street after the gates were opened in 1977. Sancianco TSN, pp. 26-30, Oct. 2,1981).

In October, 1979, the fence at the corner of Orbit and Neptune Streets was opened and removed (BAVA Petition, par. 22, Exh. 17). The opening of the whole stretch of Orbit Street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later to Jupiter Street was agreed to at the conference attended by the President of BAVA in the office of the Station Commander of Makati, subject to certain conditions, to wit:

That, maintenance of Orbit St. up to Jupiter St. shall be shouldered by the Municipality of Makati.

That, street lights will be installed and maintenance of the same along Orbit St. from J.P. Rizal Ave. up to Jupiter St. shall be undertaken by the Municipality.

That for the security of the residents of San Miguel Village and Bel-Air Village, as a result of the opening of Orbit Street, police outposts shall be constructed by the Municipality of Makati to be headed by personnel of Station No. 4, in close coordination with the Security Guards of San Miguel Village and Bel-Air Village." (CF. Exh. 3 to Counter-Affidavit, of Station Commander, Ruperto Acle p. 253, records)" (Order, Civil Case No. 34948, Exh. 17-c).

(13) Thus, with the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic, the different residential lots located in the northern side of Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential purposes. They became, for all purposes, commercial in character.

(14) Subsequently, on October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict A supplemental complaint was later filed by said appellees seeking to augment the reliefs prayed for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of the case. Claiming to be similarly situated as the plaintiffs-appellees, the spouses Felix C. Gaston and Dolores R. Gaston, Jose V. Briones and Alicia R. Briones, and the homeowners' association (BAVA) intervened in the case.

(15) After trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Metro Manila, rendered a decision in favor of the appellees the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby accordingly rendered as follows:

ON PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs-spouses Sangalang the following damages:

1. The sum of P500,000.00 as actual and consequential damages;

2. The sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5. The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENORS FELIX and DOLORES GASTON'S COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Felix and Dolores Gaston, the following damages:

1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages:

4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5 The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENORS JOSE and ALICIA BRIONES' COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Jose and Alicia Briones, the following damages:

1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5 The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENOR BAVA'S COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay intervenor BAVA, the following damages:

1. The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

4. The costs of suit.

The above damages awarded to the plaintiffs and intervenors shall bear legal interest from the filing of the complaint.

Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, at its own expense, within SIX (6) MONTHS from finality of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 400-401) 2

x x x x x x x x x

On appeal, the Court of Appeals 3 rendered a reversal, and disposed as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the decision appealed from as not supported by the facts and the law on the matter, the same is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause of action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

II. G.R. No. 74376

This petition was similarly brought by BAVA to enforce the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation. The petitioner originally brought the complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, 5 principally for specific performance, plaintiff [now, petitioner] alleging that the defendant [now, private respondent] Tenorio allowed defendant [Tenorio's co-private respondent] Gonzalves to occupy and convert the house at 50 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila, into a restaurant, without its knowledge and consent, and in violation of the deed restrictions which provide that the lot and building thereon must be used only for residential purposes upon which the prayed for main relief was for 'the defendants to permanently refrain from using the premises as commercial and to comply with the terms of the Deed Restrictions." 6 The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural ground, i.e., pendency of an Identical action, Civil Case No. 32346, entitled "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. v. Jesus Tenorio." The Court of Appeals7 affirmed, and held, in addition, that Jupiter Street "is classified as High density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 for National Capital Region," 8 following its own ruling in AC-G.R. No. 66649, entitled "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. vs. Hy-Land Realty & Development Corporation, et al."

III. G.R. No. 76394

x x x x x x x x x

Defendants-spouses Eduardo V. Romualdez, Jr. and Buena Tioseco are the owners of a house and lot located at 108 Jupiter St., Makati, Metro Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 332394 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. The fact is undisputed that at the time the defendants acquired the subject house and lot, several restrictions were already annotated on the reverse side of their title; however, for purposes of this appeal we shall quote hereunder only the pertinent ones, to wit:

(b,) This lot/shall be used only for residential purposes.

x x x x x x x x x

IV. Term of Restriction

The foregoing restriction(s) shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15, 1957, unless sooner cancelled in its entirety by two-thirds vote of the members in good standing of the Bel-Air Association. However, the Association may from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions or parts thereof by majority rule.

During the early part of 1979, plaintiff noted that certain renovations and constructions were being made by the defendants on the subject premises, for which reason the defendants were advised to inform the plaintiff of the kind of construction that was going on. Because the defendants failed to comply with the request of the plaintiff, the latter's chief security officer visited the subject premises on March 23, 1979 and found out that the defendants were putting up a bake and coffee shop, which fact was confirmed by defendant Mrs. Romualdez herself. Thereafter, the plaintiff reminded defendants that they were violating the deed restriction. Despite said reminder, the defendants proceeded with the construction of the bake shop. Consequently, plaintiff sent defendants a letter dated April 30, 1979 warning them that if

they will not desist from using the premises in question for commercial purposes, they will be sued for violations of the deed restrictions.

Despite the warning, the defendants proceeded with the construction of their bake shop. 9

x x x x x x x x x

The trial court 10 adjudged in favor of BAVA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 11 reversed, on the strength of its holding in AC-G.R. No. 66649 earlier referred to.

BAVA then elevated the matter to the Court by a petition for review on certiorari. The Court 12 initially denied the petition "for lack of merit, it appearing that the conclusions of the respondent Court of Appeals that private respondents' bake and coffee shop lies within a commercial zone and that said private respondents are released from their obligations to maintain the lot known as 108 Jupiter Street for residential purposes by virtue of Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipality of Makati and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, are in accord with law and jurisprudence," 13 for which BAVA sought a reconsideration. Pending resolution, the case was referred to the Second Division of this Court, 14 and thereafter, to the Court En Banc en consulta. 15 Per our Resolution, dated April 29, 1988, we consolidated this case with G.R. Nos. 74376 and 82281. 16

IV. G.R. No. 78182.

x x x x x x x x x

The case stemmed from the leasing by defendant Dolores Filley of her building and lot situated at No. 205 Reposo Street, Bel-Air Village Makati, Metro Manila to her co-defendant, the advertising firm J. Romero and Associates, in alleged violation of deed restrictions which stipulated that Filley's lot could only be used for residential purposes. Plaintiff sought judgment from the lower court ordering the defendants to "permanently refrain" from using the premises in question "as commercial" and to comply with the terms of the deed restrictions.

After the proper proceedings, the court granted the plaintiff the sought for relief with the additional imposition of exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00. The trial court gave emphasis to the restrictive clauses contained in Filley's deed of sale from the plaintiff, which made the conversion of the building into a commercial one a violation.

Defendants now seek review and reversal on three (3) assignments of errors, namely:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IN MAKATI AND THE MINISTRY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT'S CHANGING THE CHARACTER OF THE AREAS IN QUESTION HAD RENDERED THE RESTRICTIVE EASEMENT ON THE TITLE OF THE APPELLANTS VACATED.

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT BECAUSE THE APPELLEE(S) HAD ALLOWED THE USE OF THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE VILLAGE FOR NON- RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES, IT IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE.

III.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE EXISTED A BILATERAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THAT SINCE APPELLEE HAD NOT PERFORMED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT THE APPELLANT IN TURN WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO ANNOTATE THE RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS ON THE BACK OF THE TITLE.

Appellants anchor their appeal on the proposition that the Bel-Air Village area, contrary to plaintiff- appellee's pretension of being a strictly residential zone, is in fact commercial and characterize the restrictions contained in appellant Filley's deed of sale from the appellee as completely outmoded, which have lost all relevance to the present-day realities in Makati, now the premier business hub of the nation, where there is a proliferation of numerous commercial enterprises established through the years, in fact even within the heart of so-called "residential" villages. Thus, it may be said that appellants base their position on the inexorable march of progress which has rendered at naught the continued efficacy of the restrictions. Appellant on the other hand, relies on a rigid interpretation of the contractual stipulations agreed upon with appellant Filley, in effect arguing that the restrictions are valid ad infinitum.

The lower court quite properly found that other commercial establishments exist in the same area (in fact, on the same street) but ignored it just the same and said-

The fact that defendants were able to prove the existence of several commercial establishments inside the village does not exempt them from liability for violating some of the restrictions evidently choosing to accord primacy to contractual stipulation. 17

x x x x x x x x x

The Court of Appeals 18 overturned the lower court, 19 likewise based on AC-G.R. No. 66649. The respondent Court observed also that J. Romero & Associates had been given authority to open a commercial office by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

V. G.R. No. 82281

The facts of this case have been based on stipulation. We quote:

COMES NOW, the Parties, assisted by their respective counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully enter into the following stipulations of facts, to wit:

1. The parties admit the personal circumstances of each other as well as their capacities to sue and be sued.

2. The parties admit that plaintiff BAVA for short) is the legally constituted homeowners' association in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila.

3. The parties admit that defendant Violets Moncal is the registered owner of a parcel of land with a residential house constructed thereon situated at No. 104 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila; that as such lot owner, she is a member of the plaintiff association.

4. The parties admit that defendant Majal Development Corporation (Majal for short) is the lessee of defendant Moncal's house and lot located at No. 104 Jupiter Street.

5. The parties admit that a deed restrictions is annotated on the title of defendant Moncal, which provides, among others, that the lot in question must be used only for residential purposes;' that at time Moncal purchased her aforesaid lot in 1959 said deed restrictions was already annotated in the said title.

6. The parties admit that when Moncal leased her subject property to Majal, she did not secure the consent of BAVA to lease the said house and lot to the present lessee.

7. The parties admit that along Jupiter Street and on the same side where Moncal's property is located, there are restaurants, clinics placement or employment agencies and other commercial or business establishments. These establishments, however, were sued by BAVA in the proper court.

8. The parties admit that at the time Moncal purchased the subject property from the Makati Development Corporation, there was a perimeter wall, running along Jupiter Street, which wall was constructed by the subdivision owner; that at that time the gates of the entrances to Jupiter Street were closed to public traffic. In short, the entire length of Jupiter which was inside the perimeter wall was not then open to public traffic

9. The parties admit that subsequent thereto, Ayala tore down the perimeter wall to give way to the commercial building fronting Buendia Avenue (now Gil J. Puyat Avenue).

10. The parties admit that on August 12, 1977, the Mayor of Makati forcibly opened and removed the street gates constructed on Jupiter Street and Reposo Street, thereby opening said streets to the public.

11. The parties admit plaintiffs letters of October 10, 23 and 31, 1984; as well as defendants' letters-reply dated October 17 and 29, 1984. 20

x x x x x x x x x

The trial court 21 dismissed the petitioner's complaint, a dismissal affirmed on appeal, 22 According to the appellate court, the opening of Jupiter Street to human and vehicular traffic, and the commercialization of the Municipality of Makati in general, were circumstances that had made compliance by Moncal with the aforesaid "deed restrictions" "extremely difficult and unreasonable," 23 a development that had excused compliance altogether under Article 1267 of the Civil Code.

VI. The cases before the Court; the Court's decision.

In brief, G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the "deed restrictions" in question against specific residents (private respondents in the petitions) of Jupiter Street and with respect to G.R. No. 78182, Reposo Street. The private respondents are alleged to have converted their residences into commercial establishments (a restaurant in G.R. No. 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in G.R. No. 76394, an advertising firm in G.R. No. 78182; and a construction company, apparently, in G.R. No. 82281) in violation of the said restrictions. 24

Their mother case, G. R. No. 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had therefore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored.

As We indicated, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling in AC-G.R. No. 66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation, et al.," in which the appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same 'deed restrictions" as a result of Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on Ordinance Nos. 81. and 8101 is now assailed in these petitions, particularly the Sangalang, et al. petition.

Aside from this fundamental issue, the petitioners likewise raise procedural questions. G.R. No. 71169, the mother case, begins with one.

1. G.R. No. 71169

In this petition, the following questions are specifically put to the Court:

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court reverse the decision of the trial court on issues which were neither raised by AYALA in its Answers either to the Complaint or Supplemental Complaint nor specifically assigned as one of the alleged errors on appeal? 25

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court arbitrarily ignore the decisive findings of fact of the trial court, even if uncontradicted and/or documented, and premised mainly on its own unsupported conclusions totally reverse the trial court's decision? 26

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court disregard the trial court's documented findings that respondent Ayala for its own self-interest and commercial purposes contrived in bad faith to do away with the Jupiter Street perimeter wall it put up three times which wall was really intended to separate the residential from the commercial areas and thereby insure the privacy and security of Bel Air Village pursuant to respondent Ayala's express continuing representation and/or covenant to do so?27

a.

The first question represents an attack on the appellate court's reliance on Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01, a matter not supposedly taken up at the trial or assigned as an error on appeal. As a rule, the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) may determine only such questions as have been properly raised to it, yet, this is not an inflexible rule of procedure. In Hernandez v. Andal, 28 it was stated that "an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." 29

In Baquiran v. Court of Appeals, 30 we referred to the " modern trend of procedure . . . according] the courts broad discretionary power" 31 and in which we allowed consideration of matters "having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignore[d]. 32 And in Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 33 we permitted the consideration of a 'patent error' of the trial court by the Court of Appeals under Section 7, of Rule 51, of the Rules of Court, 34 although such an error had not been raised in the brief. But what we note is the fact that the Ayala Corporation did raise the zoning measures as affirmative defenses, first in its answers 35 and second, in its brief, 36 and submitted at the trial as exhibits. 37 There is accordingly no cause for complaint on the part of the petitioners for Ayala's violation of the Rules. But while there was reason for the consideration, on appeal, of the said zoning ordinances in question, this Court nevertheless finds as inaccurate the Court of Appeals' holding that such measures, had "in effect, [made] Jupiter Street ... a street which could be used not only for residential purposes," 38 and that "[It lost its character as a street for the exclusive benefit of those residing in Bel-Air Village completely." 39

Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 8 1-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial section. And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects. Thus, the Bel-Air Village Association's articles of incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is 'bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de los Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE from

Extrella St., to Pedestrian Lane by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street

. . . . 40 Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents.

We come to the perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the public. The petitioners contend that the opening of the thoroughfare had opened, in turn, the floodgates to the commercialization of Bel-Air Village. The wall, so they allege, was designed precisely to protect the peace and privacy of Bel-Air Village residents from the din and uproar of mercantile pursuits, and that the Ayala Corporation had committed itself to maintain it. It was the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as we said, that Ayala's liability therefor, if one existed, had been overtaken by the passage of Ordinances Nos. 81 and 82-01, opening Jupiter Street to commerce.

It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from the general public.

When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of the security in the area, 41 and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill " 42 a view we find acceptable in the premises. For it cannot be denied that at that time, the commercial area was vacant, "open for [sic] animals and people to have access to Bel-Air Village." 43 There was hence a necessity for a wall.

In any case, we find the petitioners' theory, that maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. The records do not establish the existence of such a purported commitment. For one, the subdivision plans submitted did not mention anything about it. For another, there is nothing in the "deed restrictions" that would point to any covenant regarding the construction of a wall. There is no representation or promise whatsoever therein to that effect.

With the construction of the commercial buildings in 1974, the reason for which the wall was built- to secure Bel-Air Village from interlopers had naturally ceased to exist. The buildings themselves had provided formidable curtains of security for the residents. It should be noted that the commercial lot buyers themselves were forced to demolish parts of the wall to gain access to Jupiter Street, which they had after all equal right to use.

In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did not make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it. The records, on the contrary, will show that the Bel-Air Village Association had been informed, at the very outset, about the impending use of Jupiter Street by commercial lot buyers. We quote:

x x x x x x x x x

1. Exh. I of appellee, the memorandum of Mr. Carmelo Caluag, President of BAVA, dated May 10, 1972, informing the BAVA Board of Governors and Barrio Council members about the future use of Jupiter Street by the lot owners fronting Buendia Avenue. The use of Jupiter Street by the owners of the commercial lots would necessarily require the demolition of the wall along the commercial block adjoining Jupiter Street.

2. Exh. J of appellee, the minutes of the joint meeting of BAVA Board of Governors and the Bel-Air Barrio Council where the matter that "Buendia lot owners will have equal rights to use Jupiter Street," and that Ayala's "plans about the sale of lots and use of Jupiter Street" were precisely taken up. This confirms that from the start BAVA was informed that the commercial

lot owners will use Jupiter Street and that necessarily the wall along Jupiter Street would be demolished.

3. Exh. 10, the letter of Mr. Demetrio Copuyoc to the President of BAVA, dated May 16, 1972, expressly stating that vehicular entrance and exit to the commercial lots would be allowed along Jupiter and side streets.

4. Exhs. 27, 27-A, 27-B, the letter of Atty. Salvador J. Lorayes dated June 30, 1972, with enclosed copy of proposed restriction for the commercial lots to BAVA. He proposed restriction again expressly stated that "Vehicular entrances and exits are allowed thru Jupiter and any side streets."

5. Exh. L of appellee, the minutes of the meeting of the members of BAVA, dated August 26, 1972, where it is stated "Recently, Ayala Corporation informed the Board that the lots fronting Buendia Avenue will soon be offered for sale, and that future lot owners will be given equal rights to use Jupiter Street as well as members of the Association."

6. Exh. 25, the letter of Atty. Lorayes dated September 25, 1972, informing BAVA of the widening of Jupiter Street by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in said street to benefit both the residents of Bel-Air and the future owners of the commercial lots. 44

The petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Demetrio Copuyoc, Ayala's manager, to build a "[f]ence along Jupiter with gate for entrance and/or exit 45 as evidence of Ayala's alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. It should be observed that the fence referred to included a "gate for entrance and or exit" which would have defeated the purpose of a wall, in the sense the petitioners would put in one, that is to say, an impenetrable barrier. But as Ayala would point out subsequently, the proposed fence was not constructed because it had become unnecessary when the commercial lot owners commenced constructions thereon.

Be that as it may, the Court cannot visualize any purported obligation by Ayala Corporation to keep the wall on the strength of this supposed promise alone. If truly Ayala promised anything assuming that Capuyoc was authorized to bind the corporation with a promise it would have been with respect to the fence. It would not have established the pre-existing obligation alleged with respect to the wall.

Obligations arise, among other things, from contract. 46 If Ayala, then, were bound by an obligation, it would have been pursuant to a contract. A contract, however, is characterized by a "meeting of minds between two persons . 47 As a consensual relation, it must be shown to exist as a fact, clearly and convincingly. But it cannot be inferred from a mishmash of circumstances alone disclosing some kind of an "understanding," when especially, those disparate circumstances are not themselves incompatible with contentions that no accord had existed or had been reached. 48

The petitioners cannot simply assume that the wall was there for the purpose with which they now give it, by the bare coincidence that it had divided the residential block from the commercial section of Bel-Air. The burden of proof rests with them to show that it had indeed been built precisely for that objective, a proof that must satisfy the requirements of our rules of evidence. It cannot be made to stand on the strength of plain inferences.

b.

This likewise answers the petitioners' second query, whether or not the Court of Appeals had "arbitrarily ignore(d) the decisive findings of the trial court." 49 i.e., findings pointing to alleged acts performed by the Ayala Corporation proving its commitment to maintain the wall abovesaid. Specifically, the petitioners refer to, among other things: (1) Ayala's alleged announcement to Bel- Air Village Association members that "[the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street will not be demolished," 50 (2) Ayala's alleged commitment "during the pendency of the case in the trial court" to restore the wall; (3) alleged assurances by Copuyoc

that the wall will not be removed; (4) alleged contrivances by the corporation to make the association admit as members the commercial lot buyers which provided them equal access to Jupiter Street; and (5) Ayala's donation to the association of Jupiter Street for "private use" of Bel-Air residents. 51

682 (1903), where it was held that "whether the plaintiffs services were solicited or whether they were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of services." (At 686.) In that case, the defendant had enormously benefitted from the services that entitled the plaintiff to compensation on the theory that no one may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another (Solutio indebiti) The facts of this case differ.

As we stated, the Ayala Corporation's alleged conduct prior to or during the proceedings below are not necessarily at war with claims that no commitment had been in fact made.

With respect to Ayala's alleged announcement before the association, the Court does not agree that Ayala had categorically assumed as an obligation to maintain the wall "perpetually," i.e., until the year 2007 (the expiration date under the "deed restrictions.") There is nothing in its statement that would bare any commitment. In connection with the conference between the parties "during the pendency" of the trial, it is to be noted that the Ayala Corporation denies having warranted the restoration of the said wall therein. What, on the other hand, appears in the records is the fact that Ayala did make that promise, but provided that the Mayor allowed it. It turned out, however, that the Mayor balked at the Idea. 52 But assuming that Ayala did promise to rebuild the wall (in that conference), it does not seem to us that it did consequently promise to maintain it in perpetuity.

It is unfair to say, as the trial court did, that the Ayala had "contrived to make future commercial lot owners special members of BAVA and thereby acquire equal right with the regular members thereof to use Jupiter Street 53since, as we stated, the commercial lot buyers have the right, in any event, to make use of Jupiter Street, whether or not they are members of the association. It is not their memberships that give them the right to use it. They share that right with Bel-Air residents from the outset.

The objective of making the commercial lot owners special members of the Bel-Air Village Association was not to accord them equal access to Jupiter Street and inferentially, to give them the right to knock down the perimeter wall. It was, rather, to regulate the use of the street owing precisely to the "planned" nature of Ayala's development project, and real estate development in general, and this could best be done by placing the commercial lot owners under the association's jurisdiction.

Moreover, Ayala's overtures with the association concerning the membership of commercial lot buyers therein have been shown to be neither perfidious nor unethical nor devious (paraphrasing the lower court). We quote anew:

x x x x x x x x x

(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall subdivide and sell the commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to Zodiac Street. Appellant also informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon the commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the development and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special membership in BAVA of the commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed. The proposed deed restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street, the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every seventy five (75) meters of office space in the building and the limitation of vehicular traffic along Buendia to entrance only, but allowing both vehicular entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and any side street.

In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant and informed the latter that the application for special membership of the commercial lot owners in BAVA would be submitted to BAVA's board of governors for decision.

(8) On September 25,1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it was finally decided that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots shall be increased from 12.5 meters to 15 meters. Appellant further informed BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22, 1973, BAVA wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had assessed the appellant, as special member of the association, the amount of P40,795.00 (based on 81,590 square meters at P.50 per square meter) representing the membership dues of the commercial lot owners for the year 1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of governors had already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on January 31, 1973 informed BAVA that due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the area of the lots which were accepted by the Association as members was reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding due at P.50 per square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was remitted by the appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting membership dues from the owners of the commercial lots as special members of the Association. As a matter of fact, the dues were increased several times. In 1980, the commercial lot owners were already being charged dues at the rate of P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At this rate, the total membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178.00 annually based on the total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial lots. 54

x x x x x x x x x

The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leave Jupiter Street for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We quote:

x x x x x x x x x

IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE subject to the condition that the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their families, personnel, guests, domestic help and, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public, and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such, ownership thereof shall automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public. It is also understood that the DONOR shall continue the maintenance of the street at its expense for a period of three years from date hereof." (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7) 55

x x x x x x x x x

The donation, on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it.

The Court cannot then say, accepting the veracity of the petitioners' facts" enumerated above, that the Ayala Corporation may be held liable for specific performance of a demandable obligation, let alone damages.

The Court adds that Ayala can hardly be held responsible for the alleged deterioration of "living and environmental conditions" 56 of the Bel-Air area, as a consequence of "Ayala's authorized demolition of the Jupiter perimeter wall in 1974-1975. " 57 We agree with Ayala that until 1976, "there was peace and quiet" at Jupiter Street, as the petitioners' (Sangalang, Gaston, and Briones) complaints admit. Hence, the degeneration of peace and order in Bel-Air cannot be ascribed to the destruction of the wall in 1974 and 1975.

What Ayala submits as the real cause was the opening of Jupiter Street to vehicular traffic in 1977., 58 But this was upon orders of the Mayor, and for which the homeowners' association had precisely filed suit (Civil Case No. 34998) 59 to contest the act of the Mayor.

c.

This likewise disposes of the third question presented. The petitioners' reliance on Ayala's alleged conduct (proving its alleged commitment), so we have ruled, is not well-taken. Ayala's alleged acts do not, by themselves, reflect a commitment to maintain the wall in dispute. It cannot be therefore said that the Court of Appeals "arbitrarily ignore(d]" 60 the lower court's findings. Precisely, it is the duty of the appellate court to review the findings of the trial judge, be they of fact or law. 61 It is not bound by the conclusions of the judge, for which reason it makes its own findings and arrives at its own conclusions. Unless a grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to it, it may accept or reject the lower tribunal's determinations and rely solely on the records.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Court of Appeals' holding that the Ayala Corporation, in its dealings with the petitioners, the Bel-Air Village Association in particular, had "acted with justice, gave the appellees [petitioners] their due and observed honesty and good faith." 62 "Therefore, under both Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, the appellant [Ayala] cannot be held liable for damages." 63

2. G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, & 82281

Our decision also resolves, quite anticlimactically, these companion cases. But we do so for various other reasons. In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily owing to our finding that it is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements based on the "deed restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial (C-3) zone, 64 pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said "deed restrictions.

In view thereof, we find no need in resolving the questions raised as to procedure, since this disposition is sufficient to resolve these cases.

It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the contracting parties, 65 but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 66 Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 67 we are told:

x x x x x x x x x

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into

and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengson in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power 'is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.' We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."

Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 68

x x x x x x x x x

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., on leave.

Paras, J., Took no part;

Feliciano, J., Took no part;

Padilla, J., Took no part;

 

Footnotes

1 Consolidated pursuant to our Resolution dated July 18, 1988.

2 ollo, G.R. No. 71169, 102-113. The decision of the Court of Appeals makes mention of specified areas in Makati having been converted into a "High Intensity Commercial Zone" as well as "Low Intensity Residential" (see page 9 of this Decision). This should be either "high" or "low" density.

3 Jurado Desiderio, J.; Campos, Jr., Jose and Camilon, Serafin, JJ., Concurring. Pascual, Crisolito J., Dissenting. The decision set aside, dated October 1, 1982, was penned by Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch XXI.

4 Rollo, Id., 128.

5 Civil Case No. 49217, Hon. Rafael T. Mendoza, Presiding Judge; rollo, G.R. No. 74376, 82.

6 Rollo. Id.

7 Camilon, Serafin, J.; Pascual. Crisolito Campos Jr., Jose, and Jurado, Desiderio, JJ. Concurring.

8 Rollo, Id., 34; emphasis in original.

9 Rollo, G.R. No. 76394, 24-25.

10 Civil Case No. 33112; see Id., 8, 10.

11 Jurado, Desiderio, J.; Campos, J., Jose and Camilon, Serafin JJ. Concurring; Pascual, Crisolito J., Chairman, on leave.

12 First Division.

13 Rollo, Id., 81.

14 Per Resolution, dated February 22, 1988.

15 Per Resolution, dated April 4, 1988.

16 See fn. 1, supra.

17 Rollo, G.R, No. 78182, 36-38.

18 Camilon, Serafin, J.; Pronove, Ricardo and Cacdac, Bonifacio, JJ., Concurring.

19 Civil Case No. 27719, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 145.

20 Rollo, G.R. No. 82281, 33-35.

21 Civil Case No. 8936, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXL, Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes, presiding, see Id., 32.

22 Bengzon, Eduardo, J.; Kapunan, Santiago and Buena, Arturo, JJ., Concurring.

23 Rollo, Id., 38.

24 See supra, 103-108.

25 Id., 32.

26 Id., 38.

27 Id., 50-51.

28 78 Phil. 196 (1947).

29 Supra, 209; emphasis supplied.

30 No. L-14551, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 873.

31 Supra 877.

32 Supra.

33 No. L-60129, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 799.

34 The rule states: Questions that may be decided. No which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, as its option, may notice plain errors See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 168. The pertinent paragraph of the answer states:

10. That in 1975, the Municipal Government of Makati enacted a zoning ordinance and classified the blocks between Buendia Avenue Extension and Jupiter Street as an administrative office zone with the north-northeast boundary of the zone extending up to the center line of Jupiter street. Under the said ordinance, Bel-Air Village has likewise been called into a residential zone, with its boundary at the southwest being delimited only up to the center line of the Jupiter Street. Similarly, under Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission, Jupiter Street has been made a common boundary of the commercial blocks along the north side of the Buendia Avenue Extension and the Bel-Air Village Subdivision, so that the said street is subject to the common use of the owners of both the commercial blocks as well as the residential areas.

11. That the restoration reconstruction of the wall on the blocks along the southern side of Jupiter Street will come the entire southside portion of Jupiter Street and will illegally deprive the abutting lot owners on the commercial blocks of their rights to have the street kept open and to have access to the street, in violation of Act 496, as amended by Republic Act 440.

36 See Id., 169.

37 Exhibits Nos. "18" and "19"; see Id., 168.

38 Id., 116.

39 Id.

40 Id., 66.

41 Rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 124.

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Id., 124-126; emphasis in original.

45 Id., 52.

46 CIVIL CODE, art. 1157, par. (2).

47 Supra, art. 1305.

48 This case should be distinguished from Perez v. Pomar, 2 Phil.

49 Rollo, Id., 38.

50 Id., 40.

51 Id., 47.

52 Id., 183-185.

53 Id., 92.

54 Id., 105-106.

55 Id., 193; emphasis in original.

56 Id., 45.

57 Id.

58 Id., 108-110.

59 Id., 193.

60 Id., 38.

61 RULES OF COURT, Rule 46, sec. 18.

62 Rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 126.

63 Id.

64 See rollo, G.R. No. 71169, Id., 117.

65 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 1159.

66 Supra, art. 1306.

67 No. L-24670, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.

No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

 

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 TSN, July 14, 1987 p. 16.

2 Ibid., p. 17

3 In re Torres, 55 Phil. 799.

4 In Re Stolen, 216 N.W. 127.

5 Cooper vs. People, 13 Colo 373, cited in in Re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944.

6 In Re Stolen, supra.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs.ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

 

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.

Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.

In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:

Butuan City23 April 1974

Atty. Ireneo Bunye928 Rizal AvenueSanta Cruz, Manila

Dear Atty. Bunye:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.

xxx xxx xxx

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.

My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.

Very truly

yours,

(SGD.) CESAR

L LANTO

RIAMajor Inf PC (ret)

Executive

Director 5

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:

June 1, 1974

Dear Major Lantoria,

At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.

Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.

xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.

Brotherly yours,

(SGD.) IRINEO

L.

BUNYI6

Counsel

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:

928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, ManilaMarch 4, 1974

Dear Major Lantoria,

This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.

Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.

Truly yours,

(SGD.) L.

BUNYI 7

Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.

By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the

under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);

d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)

In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development —

Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove his charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)

In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.

Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.

On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set

until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.

On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.

We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.

With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:

3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case. 17

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 28.

2 Rollo, p. 97.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Rollo, p. 5.

6 Id., p. 6.

7 Ibid., p. 7.

8 Rollo, p. 36.

9 Ibid., p. 47.

10 Id., p. 58.

11 Rollo, p. 63.

12 Ibid., pp. 85 and 86.

13 Id., p. 89.

14 Rollo, pp. 99 and 100.

15 Respondent alleged that at the time complainant filed his complaint in the case at bar, Judge Galicia was already dead, and was followed by the death of Mrs. Mascarinas. (Rollo, p. 98).

16 Promulgated by the Supreme Court on 23 June 1988.

17 In the case of Artiaga, Jr. vs. Villanueva (163 SCRA 638, July 29, 1988), Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva was found guilty of three (3) unethical practices, namely: (1) causing his client to perjure himself; (2) lack of candor and respect toward his adversary and the courts; and (3) abuse of the right of recourse to the courts. He was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12871             July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.

Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to

conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.

Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.

In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, theprosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarezvs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally

determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs.JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. 1âwphi1.nêt

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.

What follows is the opinion of the majority. lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4

For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.

There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the

law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.

At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.

Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."6

No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.

Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes célèbres was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:

In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.

No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.

I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual

trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.

Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate need.7

Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my original view; nonetheless. I concur.

Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V. and radio coverage and concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I favor live TV coverage, I now concur in the result.

Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for reconsideration only. The conditions are inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.

Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.

Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J. Jose Vitug.

De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with finality of the MR.

Footnote

1 Nine (9) members of the Court, namely, JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, MENDOZA, PARDO, BUENA, GONZAGA-REYES, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

vote to deny reconsideration, while six (6), namely, CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, PANGANIBAN, and QUISUMBING, vote to grant a

reconsideration.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, MENDOZA, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, and GONZAGA-REYES.

3 JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, PARDO, BUENA, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.

4 R.A. No. 8492 provides in pertinent parts:

SEC. 7. Duties and Function. - The [National] Museum shall have the following duties and functions:

7.1. Acquire documents, collect, preserve, maintain, administer and exhibit to the public, cultural materials, objects of art, archaeological artifacts, ecofacts, relics and other materials embodying

the cultural and natural heritage of the Filipino national, as well as those of foreign origin. Materials relevant to the recent history of the country shall be likewise acquired, collected, preserved,

maintained, advertised and exhibited by the Museum. (Emphasis added)

DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 13-A, dated May, 9, 1985, of the Department of Education Culture and Sports provides:

Rule 7. Transfer of Records to Archives. -

7.5 Preservation of Archival Records.

7.5.1 Archival records shall be stored under one roof and authorize their accessibility to the public, subject to certain security and safety measures to preserve the integrity of the records.

7.5.2 It shall be the responsibility of the Archives Division to protect archival documents in its custody and undertake corrective measures to rehabilitate weakened or brittled documents in

accordance with modern techniques.

5 160 SCRA 861 (1988). Cf. Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979), involving the novelized film on the life of Mioses Padilla, a majoralty candidate of Magallon, Negros

Occidental, who was murdered for political reasons at the instance of then Governor Rafael Lacson.

6 Id. At 870.

7 Paul A. Freund, Contempt Power: Prevention, Not Retribution, TRIAL, January-February 1971 at 13.

Separate Opinion

VITUG, J.:

Due Process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right that secures and protects, under a rule of law, the life, and liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A cherished fixture in our

bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by advances in science and technology. I fail to perceive it to be otherwise.

Precisely, in its 29th June 2001 decision, the Court did not consider it propitous to allow live television and radio coverage of the trial in order to help ensure a just and fair trial. The Court felt it

judicious to insulate not only the Sandiganbayan but also the trial participants, the lawyers and witnesses, from being unduly influenced by possible adverse effects that such a coverage could

bring. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling and countered that, if one must be pitted against the other, the right to public information of grave national interest should

be held more paramount than the right of the accused to a "fair and public trial," the former being appurtenant to the sovereign and latter being merely a privilege bestowed to an individual.

I am not ready to accept such a notion. I see it as being an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an age-old struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the sovereign.1 The right of the public to

information, in any event, is not here really being sacrified. The right to know can very well be achieved via other media coverage; the windows of information through which the public might

observe and learn are not closed.

In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for documentary purposes

because, first, the hearings are of historic significance, second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government

works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civil training of the people; and fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of

the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.lawphil.net

2

The proposition has novel features, regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. No

empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses

and jurors.3 In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience.4 The demeanor of the

witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses.5 The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not

adequately address the dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables.

Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personability innate in ever human being, and there

can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast.

In the petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether the case of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered by live television and

radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to be addressed by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be considered at all, the rule must be of general application and

promulgated after a thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been said and done in this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to be

helpful and of value.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, I concur but only in the denial with finality of the motion for reconsideration.

Footnote

1 See Frankfurter, J. in Bridges v. California, 314 US 252.

2 Resolution, pp. 3-4.

3 Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media, Gerard uelmen, University of San Francisco law review, Summer 1996.

4 "The Continuing debate Over Cameras in the Courtroom," Federal Lawyers, July 1995.

5 Supra.